Post on 19-May-2018
Case Histories
• A few introductory notes:All j liti ti h j t i l t d– All major litigation on each project is completed
– All information reported here is in the public domain• Dam Failures discussed todayy
– The “Classics” plus– Taum Sauk– Silver Lake
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– Saluda Dam– Swinging Bridge
– Will not talk about Tampa Bay, Lake Dehli, Levee Failures
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References
• Dr. A.J. “Skip” Hendron
• Brian Green
• Prof J David Rogers• Prof. J. David Rogers
• Euler Cruz & Rafael Cesário
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• Dr. David Petley
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Definition of Failure
• Failure at a dam is “an uncontrolled release of water” • Causes of Failure• Causes of Failure
– Overtopping – the most common cause– Piping thru Embankment – 2nd!!
i i h d i d!!– Piping thru Foundation – 3rd!!– Foundation Degradation
• Karst developmentLi f ti
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• Liquefaction• Loss of fines over time
– Earthquakes – ground motion and faultsFailure of gates stoplogs flashboard malfunction– Failure of gates, stoplogs, flashboard malfunction, penstocks, tunnels, and reservoir slopes
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Some “Classics”Some ClassicsWe learn from out mistakes!!
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We learn from out mistakes!!
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Classic Failures
• Had a major impact on dam or hydro engineering
• Had a major impact on dam safety legislation and dam safety regulations
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legislation and dam safety regulations
• Had a major impact on society
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Folsom Dam
• Increased profession’s awareness of pthe need for maintenance and inspection of auxiliary featuresinspection of auxiliary features associated with a dams
Click to edit Master title style• Changed FERC’s Inspection Guidesg p
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Shih Kang Dam – TaiwanImpact of building a dam over a faultImpact of building a dam over a fault
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Austin (Bayless) Dam( y )Austin, Pennsylvania
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September 30, 1911
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Austin Dam
• Destroyed the myth that “gravity dams can’t fail”
• Illustrates the need for detailed,Illustrates the need for detailed, comprehensive foundation investigations and foundation preparation
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and foundation preparation
• Illustrates the need for temperature expansion/contraction joints in gravityexpansion/contraction joints in gravity dams
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Village of Longarone “Before”Vaiont Dam FailureVaiont Dam Failure
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The Vaiont Dam Disaster
• Dam completed and filled
• Reservoir cycled up and down several times overthree years
• Left Reservoir Slope Failed catastrophically
• Within 30 – 40 seconds some 270 million m3 of
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• Within 30 40 seconds, some 270 million m ofrock crashed into the reservoir.
• Resulting wave overtopped dam by about 100 –Resulting wave overtopped dam by about 100150 m.
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June 5 – 12:00 noon(Crest lost – maximum flood)(Crest lost maximum flood)
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Lessons Learned
• Compaction is extremely important throughout the dam and especially at the abutments
• Grout Curtains are critical to prevent piping
• Keyway design is critical
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• Keyway design is critical
• Filters are a key feature to resist piping
(When in doubt, add a filter)
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Sayano‐Shushenskayah kKhakassia, RussiaAugust 17 2009
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August 17, 2009
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Accident at Russia’s LargestHydroelectric Power StationHydroelectric Power Station
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Before the Accident
Crane
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Power Units
Air‐Oil Tanks
42Sump Tank Governor
Pumps Generators floor42
After the Accident
Sump Tank
Air‐Oil Tanks
Sump Tank
Floor
Click to edit Master title styleColector Ring
Unit 2
Crosshead –Unit 2
Colector Ring
Unit 1
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Generator floor
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Before the Accident
Generator Rotor – Unit 5
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Generator Runner
The accident started here
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Lower Van Norman DamLos Angeles, California
bFebruary 9, 1971
Click to edit Master title styleA Classic that was not a failure!
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Lower Van Norman February 9 1971February 9, 1971
L V N D b ilt b th Cit f L t A l
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• Lower Van Norman Dam was built by the City of Lost Angelesas part of the Los Angeles Aqueduct in 1916 – 1918, using thehydraulic fill and puddled fill techniques. A rolled fill additionwas placed in 1924.
• The embankment failed during the February 9, 1971 M. 6.7 SanFernando Earthquake but no water was released
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Fernando Earthquake, but no water was released.
Lower Van NormanForerunner to Modern Liquefaction AnalysisForerunner to Modern Liquefaction Analysis
Susceptibility to Liquefaction
Click to edit Master title style•Careful forensic evaluations by the geotechnical engineering group at U.C.Berkeley unraveled the dam’s failure by liquefaction of a zone of low densitysandy hydraulic fill, shown in blue in the above sections.Th St t b tl l t d 30 th h d li fill d f t fitti
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•The State subsequently slated 30 other hydraulic fill dams for retrofittingbetween 1973 – 75.
Swinging Bridge Dam Cross SectionSwinging Bridge Dam Cross Section
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Swinging Bridge Dam
• Over time leaks developed
• Fines transported to penstock during dewatering
• Sinkholes developed on crest
• Reservoir drained
• Penstock & Unit abandoned
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• Dam repaired and refilled (3 yr shutdown)
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Silver Lake DamDead River Hydroelectric ProjectDead River Hydroelectric Project
M t i T St L k• Mountain Top Storage Lake– Main Concrete Dam with Spillway & Outlet Pipe/Gate Control– Auxiliary Dams and Dikes
Emergency Spillway with Erodible Fuse plug– Emergency Spillway with Erodible Fuse plug
• May, 2003 – snowmelt, Gate Control not Activated• Fuse Plug Eroded
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• Fuse Plug Eroded• Main Dam Overtopped – minimal damage• Dam No. 2 overtopped & eroded away entirely
• Failure drained approximately 25,000 acre feet of water from Silver Lake Reservoir
• $100 million damage – no fatalities
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• $100 million damage no fatalities
Saluda DamA Failure that was Prevented!A Failure that was Prevented!
WATEREERIVER
SALUDA RIVER
COLUMBIA
SANTEERIVER
COLUMBIA
LAKEMURRAY
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Aerial View of Saluda Dam
Intake TowersNORTH
Spillway
McMeekin Station
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Saluda Hydro
BushAsh Ponds & Landfill
Bush River Rd.
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Saluda Dam
HydroelectricPlant
Existing Dam
Plant
Lake Murray
Lake Area 78 square miles
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Lake Area 78 square milesLake Capacity 1,600,000 acre feet Dam Length 7,800 feetMax Dam Height 200 feetPowerhouse Capacity 260 MWOriginal Construction Hydraulic Fill
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Original Construction Hydraulic FillOriginal Completion 1930
Original Dam ConstructionOriginal Dam Construction
•Dam was constructed 1927 ‐ 1930
•11,000,000 cy‐‐semi‐hydraulic method
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7085
As‐Built Dam Configuration
• Semi‐Hydraulic Fill
• Most soils “Dumped”
• No compaction
Rolled CoreWashed Fill
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Rip RapUnwashed Fill
Washed Fill
Washed Fill
Sluiced Core Residual SoilUnwashed Fill
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Dynamic Stability Analysis
• Liquefaction Evaluation of Saluda Dam
– Earthquake record selection
Liquefaction methodology– Liquefaction methodology
• Post‐Seismic Stability Analysis
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Liquefaction Analysis
Factor of Safety against Liquefaction (FSL)
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-0.02 0.32 0.66 1.001.00 1.33 1.67 2.002.00 3.78 5.57 7.35
Extensive Liquefaction, Post‐Seismic FS < 1
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Section AA’ (typ.)
Lower Bound
B t C
-0.03 0.31 0.66 1.001.00 1.33 1.67 2.002.00 3.51 5.02 6.53
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Best Case
-0.06 0.30 0.65 1.001.00 1.33 1.67 2.002.00 3.96 5.92 7.88
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Remediation Concept
Competent Rock
Click to edit Master title styleRockfill Damoc a• Length 5,100 feet
• Max. Height 200 feet
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g
Remediation Concept
Click to edit Master title styleRCC Dam• Length 2,200 feet
• Max. Height 210 feet
a
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g
Taum Sauk Upper ReservoirLesterville, MissouriDecember 15, 2005
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ecember 5, 005
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Taum Sauk on December 15, 2005Release of 1 4 Billion Gallons of WaterRelease of 1.4 Billion Gallons of Water
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Taum Sauk Forensic Investigation
• Field InvestigationsVi l Ob i– Visual Observations
– Geologic Mapping• Breach AreaBreach Area• Breach Channel
– Record Search
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– Test Borings & Sampling– Laboratory Testing– Instrumentation InvestigationInstrumentation Investigation– Interviews (operators & mgmt)
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Forensic Investigation
• Engineering AnalysesH d li A l i ( fl l it– Hydraulic Analysis (overflow zones, velocity, impingement zone)
– Rockfill Dike (seepage, piping & stability)– Concrete Facing (effect on µ)– Liner (effect on µ)– Parapet Wall (stability, structural)
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Parapet Wall (stability, structural)– Asphalt Liner (effect on µ)– Grout Curtain (effect on µ)Fil ( ff )– Filters (effect on µ)
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Rockfill Dike Stability ‐ Sliding
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Water PressureResisting
Weight of
Estimated P
Normal F
W
Sliding Weight of Water
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Pore Pressure at Overtopping
Force
Taum Sauk Re‐build Data
• Same Footprint
• No change in capacity or generation
• 110 to 140 ft high• 110 to 140 ft high
• ~ 6800 ft long ‐ 9 monoliths @ ~800 ft
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• RCC with processed “old rockfill” dam
• RCC – 2.8 million CY + 0.5 million CVC
• Symmetrical w Concrete Face
• Overflow Release Structure86
• Overflow Release Structure
• Highly redundant Instrumentation
Upstream View of the Fracture ZoneCleaning and Mapping in ProgressCleaning and Mapping in Progress
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Keys to a Forensic Investigation
• Investigation Work PlanPl f Liti ti f th b i i– Plan for Litigation from the beginning• Civil or Civil & Criminal• Expect Opposing Experts
Lit t S h– Literature Search– Interviews– Review of Existing Calculations & Design Basis
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– Field Investigations– Laboratory Testing– “New” AnalysisNew Analysis– Report Preparation
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Keys to a Forensic Investigation
• Have a well defined engagement letter• Avoid emails!!• Avoid derogatory remarks & comments• Keep consistent & accurate field logs• Keep confidentiality
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• Use NDA’s with Subcontractors• Treat drafts & preliminary documents consistent with standard corporate policy
• Implement a robust QA/QC Program
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• Be open minded!!
Keys to a Forensic Investigation
• Public Domain Literature Search – Professional Literature
– News Accounts & Photos/Videos/
• Private File Search– STID’s & PFMA’s
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– STID s & PFMA s
– Permit Applications
Inspection Reports– Inspection Reports
– Instrumentation Reports
C t ti R t & Ph t95
– Construction Reports & Photos
Keys to a Forensic Investigation
• Field Investigations (drilling, geophysics, etc)– Implement a Field Work Plan– Implement a HSEP immediatelyI l t QA/QC P– Implement a QA/QC Program
– Use Calibrated Equipment with traceable records• SPT Energy
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SPT Energy• Shelby Tube & Split Barrel Dimensions• Pressure gages, flow meters, DRM Systems
U S l M if P l– Use Sample Manifest Protocols– Watch the field records carefully!!!!– Use NDA’s with subcontractors
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– Use NDA s with subcontractors
Keys to a Forensic Investigation
• Laboratory Testing– Implement a Laboratory Testing Plan
– Implement a QA/QC Programp Q /Q g
– Use Calibrated Equipment with traceable records
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– Use defendable Standards (ASTM, C of E, etc)
– Use Sample Manifest Protocolsp
– Watch the lab records carefully!!!!
– Should Field Logs be adjusted based on lab
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Should Field Logs be adjusted based on lab tests?