Post on 22-Jun-2018
18/03/2015 1www.centrenational-rfid.com
Evaluation d’Impact sur la Vie Privée
des Applications RFID
Les journées thématiques du CNRFID Paris
18 Mars 2015
Introduction RFID and privacy RFID operator
Legal Environment Chart of fundamental rights of European Union Directive 95/46/EC and French “Loi Informatique et Libertés” Recommendation 2009/387/EC, Mandate M436 et EN 16571 Future European Regulation
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA/EIVP) PIA levels PIA process: the 9 steps
Risk Analysis Data, Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, Residual risk EN 16571 / ISO 27005 vs. EBIOS
EN 16571 Registration Authority CSL/CNRFID Software
Agenda
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Privacy is a fuzzy concept but can be summarized…
“the claim of individuals to determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”
Information: Personal Data Data Protection
collection, accuracy, protection and use of data collected by an organization Data Security
protection of collected data
Notion of personal consent Opt-In Opt-Out
Personal data and privacy classification Physical (body integrity) Personal Behaviour (political, religious, sexual,…) Personnal communications (phone, emails, social networks, …) Personal information (gender, age, …) Spatial privacy (locations, travels,…)
Introduction: Privacy concept
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Citizen use more and more RFID technologies Ticketing (transportation and events) Payment (small values w/o PIN code) Identity (passport, driver licence) NFC applications…
Citizen are surrounded by RFID tags Everyday life products (textile, library books,…) Luxury goods (authentication, certificates,…) First developed for logistics, inventory, article surveillance, …
Data can identify people directly… Name, address, etc. Generally secured HF protocols (first use cases)
Or indirectly Unique identifiers (TID, EPC, …) Combined with other data, could impact privacy
Introduction: RFID everywhere?
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Introduction: RFID operator
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Definition is given in the Recommendation 2009/387/EC
‘RFID application operator’ or ‘operator’ means the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency, or any other body, which, alone or jointly with others, determines
the purposes and means of operating an application, including controllers of personal
data using a RFID application
Organizations that read RFID tags… … Organizations that write (encode) a tag
The RFID operator is responsible in implementing a PIA
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Privacy: European Regulations
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Directive 95/46/CE protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data Transposed in National French Law: “Loi Informatique et Libertés”
Chart of fundamental rights of the UE (2000/C 364/01) Art. 8, right to the protection of personal data
Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.
In France, such authority is CNIL !!!!
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Privacy: European Regulations
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Recommendation 2009/387/EC
Due to potential massive RFID deployment, the European Commission issued a
Recommendation (May 2009)
« on the implementation of privacy and data protection principlesin applications supported by RFID »
Title Data protection: Not only personal data
Definition and scope All RFID technologies (NFC and contactless smart cards included) All kind of application, including… governmental applications, with exceptions
being rare For retail sector (direct link to the consumer) there are rules when deactivation of
the tag is required
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Focus on tag deactivation at the Point of Sale
Once the tag leaves the « controlled domain »
Logic deactivation:
Secured deactivation (Kill + passwords)
Unsecured deactivation (Kill with one password for the entire application)
Reduced read range????
Hardware:
Tag destruction (strong electromagnetic wave,…)
Tag removal
Privacy(European Recommendation)
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Recommendation does not oblige to deactivate the tags at PoS if RFID operator undertakes a
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA)
and proves that the risk is limited Systematic deactivation (OPT-IN) in case of high level of risk.
To provide a simple, immediate and free way to disable the tag at PoS (medium level of risk) (OPT-OUT)
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) Identify the impact of the implementation of the application with respect to
personal data and privacy
PIA has to be undertaken by the RFID operator !
Level of detail consistent with the level of risk
Privacy(Recommandation)
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Privacy, PIA Framework
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To help the RFID operators in the PIA process,
European Commission gathers stakeholders
to draft a Framework
This Framework has been accepted by Art. 29
WP and endorsed by European Commission in
January 2011
Privacy, PIA Framework
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Framework tries to standardize the PIA process but…
WTF PIA
level?
Privacy: one word on M/436
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December 2008: European Commission issued Mandate 436 Madate is issued to CEN, ETSI and CENELEC (only CEN and ETSI participate) Phase 1: propose a gap analysis of existing standards related to RFID, data
protection and privacy protection. A joint technical committee is chaired by CNRFID
May 2011: phase 1 report underlines that there is no existing standard related to PIA process and signage (public awareness)
January 2012: KoM of phase 2: the goal is to publish standards in a 2 year time frame (only CEN is involved)
July 2014: publication of 2 major standards
EN16570: Signage and public awareness EN16571: PIA process for RFID applications
July 2014: CNRFID became the Registration Authority for EN16571
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Future European Regulation
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Future Regulation on Data Protection Supersedes Directive 95/46/CE Regulation: no need to transpose it into national law Art.33 makes Privacy Impact Assessment Mandatory
Art. 32a: Respect to riskThe controller, or where applicable the processor, shall carry out a risk analysis of the potential impact of the intended data processing on the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, assessing whether its processing operations are likely to present specific risks
Art. 33: Data Protection Impact AssessmentThe controller shall carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the rights and freedoms of the data subjects, especially their right to protection of personal data
Art. 33: Describes the minimal requirements …
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Future European Regulation
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The DPIA shall contain …
a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing
an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes
an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects
a description of the measures envisaged to address the risks and minimize the volume of personal data which is processed
a list of safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data
a general indication of the time limits for erasure of the different categories of data
a list of the recipients or categories of recipients of the personal data
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Introduction RFID and privacy RFID operator
Legal Environment Chart of fundamental rights of European Union Directive 95/46/EC and French “Loi Informatique et Libertés” Recommendation 2009/387/EC, Mandate M436 et EN 16571 Future European Regulation
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA/EIVP) PIA levels PIA process: the 9 steps
Risk Analysis Data, Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, Residual risk EN 16571 / ISO 27005 vs. EBIOS
EN 16571 Registration Authority CSL/CNRFID Software
Agenda
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Privacy Assets and Data Types
Assets are classified in two categories Assets that can directly identify individuals
Passport, Medical bracelet, Loyalty card, Venue-based trackable bracelets, …
Assets that when held can identify the individualsAirline baggage tag, Tagged employee uniform, Public transport card, Retail product, Library book, …
Privacy Assets are closely related to Personal Data (wherever it is stored) EN 16571 assesses the “value” of the data on the tag and in the application
Associated Personal Data are classified into 6 categories
PI Personal Identifier (name, email, DNA, …)
PB Personal Behaviour (age, religion, political affiliation…)
TH Tag and Hardware (RFID chip ID, IPV4/6, …)
RV Residual Value (Residual value on loyalty card, travel card, …)
TL Time and Location (start location, route, …)
IT Identity of Things (Unique Item code)
PIA Levels
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Privacy in depth model
This model identifies all of the layers that need to be considered to assess the privacy risks associated with the RFID technology used in the application
The top four layers are directly concerned with RFID technology, whereas the bottom four layers are concerned with the host computer and application
PIA Levels
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Asses the PIA Level
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To assess the PIA level, you need to answer
3 basic questions
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What to consider regarding the PIA level?
Level 0: no PIA required
Level 1:
Risk assessment for data types other that PI and PB
Only consider threats on the RFID air-interface
Level 2:
For PI and PB, only consider threats on application layer
For other data types, consider all kind of threats
Level 3:
For PI and PB, consider all kind of threats
Whatever the level, don’t forget to consider the controlled and uncontrolled domains
PIA Levels
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Introduction RFID and privacy RFID operator
Legal Environment Chart of fundamental rights of European Union Directive 95/46/EC and French “Loi Informatique et Libertés” Recommendation 2009/387/EC, Mandate M436 et EN 16571 Future European Regulation
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA/EIVP) PIA levels PIA process: the 9 steps
Risk Analysis Data, Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, Residual risk EN 16571 / ISO 27005 vs. EBIOS
EN 16571 Registration Authority CSL/CNRFID Software
Agenda
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Asset identification and valuation
2 categories of asset
directly identifiable assets, where encoded data includes:
an individual's name
a unique chip ID
any identifier that has a one-to-one relationship with the individual
indirectly identifiable factors specific to the individual's physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity, as included in Directive 95/46/EC for the definition of person data
The value of the asset is based on the highest value of the associated data types
The value of asset is between 0 and 4 (based on ISO 27005)
EN16571 gives a list (quite exhaustive) of data types and proposes values
Risk Analysis: Asset
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Example of Asset valuation
Membership card with information encoded in the RFID chip and stored in the application
Risk Analysis: Asset
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RFID Threats are mainly based on two different attacks: Eavesdropping Tag activation
Eavesdropping Listening the communication between a tag and an interrogator Eavesdropping distances are greater than reading distances Information can be decoded if not cover-coded or encrypted
Tag Activation RFID tag are operational once energized (no ON/OFF switch) A fake reader can ask a real tag to backscatter information Activation distances are greater than reading distances because attacker does not
care Regulation limitations (eg. 2Werp in Europe) More and more commercial readers are available
At least 250 Million HF readers on smart phones Many small UHF readers that have USB connections or plug into smart phones
e.g. Arete Pop (1 off price 200€) with a read range of 1 metre
Actual threats are a mix of eavesdropping and tag activation
RFID Threats
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Physical data modification: unauthorized changing of encoded data on the tag by deleting, modifying or adding
data Example: changing a product code to gain some financial advantage
Tracking Continual sequence of unauthorized tag reading The threat can be deployed with mobile or fixed interrogators Example: tracking of employees in known zones, tracking of customers,…
Relay Attack Also known as “Man in the middle” attack Allow a real tag to communicate with a real reader at long distances Example: Access a building without authorization
Examples of RFID Threats
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Threats are classified using 2 vectors:
The layer that is attacked (data on the tag, RFID air-interface, RFID reader, application)
The security requirement (confidentiality, availability, integrity)
The value of the threat is either low, medium or high (ISO 27005)
The value is linked to the complexity and required skill required for implementing the threat
Threats associated with the data encoded on the RFID tag and the RFID tag
Side Channel attack (confidentiality)
Physical data modification (integrity)
Cloning (integrity)
Tag reprogramming (integrity)
Tag destruction (availability)
…
Risk Analysis: Threats
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Threats associated with the air interface or the device interface communication
Unauthorized Tag Reading (confidentiality)
Eavesdropping or traffic analysis (confidentiality)
Crypto attacks (confidentiality)
Relay, or man-in-the-middle attack (integrity)
Replay attack (integrity)
Noise (availability)
Jamming (availability)
Malicious Blocker Tags (availability)
…
Risk Analysis: Threats
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Threats associated with the interrogator
Side channel attack (confidentiality)
Exhaustion of protocol resources (availability)
De-synchronization attack (availability)
There is no identified interrogator’s threat on data integrity
Threats associated with the host application
Privacy and Data Protection Violations (confidentiality)
Injecting Malicious Code (integrity)
Partial/complete denial of service (availability)
Risk Analysis: Threats
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Vulnerability can be:
Low: it is unlikely or impossible to implement a threat
Medium: it is possible (identified in research documents) to implement a
threat
High: the threat has been exploited in real world
Taking into account the “exposure” time
Asset that is held on a transient basis (less than 50 consecutive days) are
considered as less vulnerable
Vulnerability can be reduced by one level
Example: detachable label on retail product.
Risk Analysis: Vulnerability
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Risk value (EN 16571 / ISO 27005)
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The initial risk value is easy to compute
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Risk value (EN 16571 / ISO 27005)
Example: library book Asset: Unique Identifier linked to book category
(data on the tag): 2 Threat: Tag activation: Medium
Vulnerability: UHF protocol, no encryption: High
Risk Value 5/8
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But exposure is lessthan 50 consecutivedays
Risk is reduced by one
Risk Value: 4/8
Countermeasures are applied in order to
mitigate the risk
Countermeasures are classified:
embedded in the tags and devices (crypto)
available in the technology but require an action by the RFID operator (kill)
independent of the hardware and can be implemented by the RFID operator
(systematic removal of the tag at point of sale)
RFID operator can advise the individual about protecting privacy (please
remove the tag yourself)
Risk Analysis: Countermeasures
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Once countermeasures have been implemented, the risk shall be reevaluated
The basic rule (described in EN 16571) is that:
Implementation of a countermeasure reduces the risk by 1
If RFID operator decides to remove, destroy, or render untraceable a tag
before it moves from the controlled to the uncontrolled domain, then the risk
level goes to zero.
CSL/CNRFID Software is more sophisticated
Countermeasures’ values can be more or less than 1
Implementation of multiple countermeasures on a threat reduces the risk
even more (cumulative effect with non linear equation)
Overall Risk reduction can be more or less than 1
Risk Analysis: Countermeasures
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The risk that has not been canceled (zeroed) is called the residual risk
This residual risk has to be compared to the benefits carried by the application
The residual risk has to be accepted by the stakeholders
The risk has to be reassessed in case of:
significant changes in the RFID application
changes in the type of information process
reports of breaches in similar RFID applications
And every year ….
Risk Analysis: residual risk
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EBIOS: Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité
A 5 steps methodology
Circumstantial study - determining the context
Security requirements
Risk study
Identification of security goals
Determination of security requirements
EBIOS is primarily intended for governmental and commercial organizations
working with the Defense Ministry that handle confidential or secret defense
classified information: Nothing to do with RFID and privacy
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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CNIL proposes a methodology for privacy risk management based on EBIOS
The 5 steps become:
Background study: What is the context?
Feared events study: What does one fear happening?
Threats study: How can it happen? (optional)
Risk study: What is the risk level? (optional)
Measures study: What can be done to treat risks?
STEP 1: equivalent to the description of the application
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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STEP 2: Feared events are:
unavailability of legal processes
change in processing (diversion of the purpose, excessive or unfair collection...)
illegitimate access to personal data
unwanted change in personal data
disappearance of personal data
Feared events are ranked using the addition of:
Level of identification (negligible, limited, significant, maximum)
Prejudicial effect (negligible, limited, significant, maximum)
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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STEP 3: Threats study: How can it happen?
A threat is a possible action by risk sources on supporting assets
Threats are ranked using the addition of:
vulnerabilities of the supporting assets (negligible, limited, significant, maximum)
capabilities of risk sources (negligible, limited, significant, maximum)
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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STEP 4: Level of risk
Severity vs. Likelihood
You can only have a map of the
risk not a score
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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STEP 5: Measures
The RFID operator describes how he will reduce the risk (severity and/or
likelihood)
It is up to the RFID operator to evaluate the risk reduction
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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EBIOS is more devoted to security issues and not suited to RFID and privacy
EBIOS concentrates on feared event not on privacy asset and data type
For one feared event, many data types can be involved so what data type do we have to choose?
EBIOS doesn’t take into account where the data is stored
A feared event can occur if the data is stored in the tag or in the hosted application (the threat will be different !)
When using EBIOS methodology, you will have to imagine scenario so you can forget risks
EBIOS doesn’t give an overall risk score so it is difficult to rank the risk and choose to mitigate the highest ones
EBIOS doesn’t explain how a measure reduces the risk score
EBIOS doesn’t take into account the uncontrolled domain
EBIOS doesn’t take into account the exposure time
Risk Analysis: EBIOS approach
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Introduction RFID and privacy RFID operator
Legal Environment Chart of fundamental rights of European Union Directive 95/46/EC and French “Loi Informatique et Libertés” Recommendation 2009/387/EC, Mandate M436 et EN 16571 Future European Regulation
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA/EIVP) PIA levels PIA process: the 9 steps
Risk Analysis Data, Threats, Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, Residual risk EN 16571 / ISO 27005 vs. EBIOS
EN 16571 Registration Authority CSL/CNRFID Software
Agenda
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European Registration Authority
Role defined in the standard EN 16571 – PIA process Privacy Capability Statement
A reference document Clear and standardized information on product features related to privacy
for: RFID chips, tags and readers Avoid misinterpretations of technical standards (many optional features)
and commercial manufacturers’ information (incomplete datasheets) Allow easy comparison of different products
The Registration Authority: Gathers information from the manufacturers Provides these information to RFID operators Is the unique entry point in Europe Impinj and NXP already declare their UHF products
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European Registration Authority
Impinj and NXP declare UHF products… More to come You can download Privacy Capability Statement from the WebSite
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European Registration Authority
Example of PCS Impinj M4QT
C:\Users\ctetelin\Desktop\UHF PCS - passive RFID chip - Impinj M4QT -20141217.pdf
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PIA made easy: a devoted software
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Choose the tags you are using in the application
In case the product is not referenced, an email is automatically sent to support
PIA made easy: a devoted software
Only threats that are relevant to the specific RFID protocol and the layer are presented. These are the threats for 15693 and Tag Data:
The operator can accept or change the EN 16571 suggested values
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The countermeasures are linked to threats and impact on risk values varies
Spreadsheet Threat/Countermeasures
PIA made easy: a devoted software
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The software displays the PIA summary, with details of Operator details Application description (overview) Data on the tag Countermeasures applied by the operator Countermeasures the individual should apply The risk score
Export in various formats e.g. PDF, HTML
More at: http://rfid-pia-en16571.eu
PIA made easy: a devoted software
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RFID operators have now all the reference texts to undertake a PIA
PIA is a good practice and is not mandatory European Recommendation Next step: European Regulation ? All ICT technologies will be covered
PIA is a good way to establish trust between operators and citizen
PIA approach could be spread to other communication and internet technologies
Governments could be a forerunner with ID applications…
Conclusion
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Based on ISO/IEC 29160 : RFID Emblem
One common Emblem (EN 16570)
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Additional Information to be provided by RFID operators
Signalisation (EN 16570)
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NFC tags may be read in this area for the purpose of easy NFC Smartphone based professional data exchanges. vCard
application is available on demand and can be embedded in your visitor badge.
vCard application is operated and controlled by French RFID National Center (CNRFID)
A Privacy Impact Assessment has been undertaken and validated by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL)
PIA summary can be downloaded at www.centrenational-rfid.com
For more information, please contact us by phone or email:+33 494 370 937, contact@centrenational-rfid.com Back to presentation
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