Post on 19-Dec-2015
Europe and North Africa:Migration as a common challenge
Ferruccio Pastore(Deputy Director, Centre for International Policy Studies-CeSPI, Rome)
International workshop in the framework of the project “Managing migration in the neighbourhood of the EU and the US. Towards a Transatlantic forum for
comparative research and policy dialogue”
(Academy of Graduate Studies, Tripoli, 18-19 June 2008)
Structure of the presentation
• Europe in the global migration geography• European migration policies: convergences and
divergences • Overall trends: opening to the East, closing to the
South?• Cross-Mediterranean migration: mutual perceptions
(and misperceptions)• Cross-Mediterranean migration: dominant policy
responses• “Externalisation” and “transit migration”• Future outlooks and open questions
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
World 75.9 81.5 99.8 154.0 174.9 190.6
Africa 9.0 9.9 14.0 16.2 16.3 17.1
Asia 29.3 28.1 32.3 50.0 49.9 53.3
Europe 17.0 21.8 25.4 48.4 56.1 64.1
Lat. Am.+
Carib.
6.0 5.7 6.1 7.0 5.9 6.6
North Am. 12.5 13.0 18.1 27.6 40.8 44.5
The global context (migrant stocks, millions)
Source: UNDESA, Population Division.
The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in the global migration landscape (stocks; 000s).
2000 2005
Global migrant stock 174,781 190,634
Of which Europe (in absolute values and as % of global stock)
56,100
32.1%
64,116
33.6%
Of which EU (in absolute values and as % of global stock)
26,429 (EU-15)
15.1%
39,788 (EU-25)
20.9%
Migrants’ stock in Northern America (in absolute values and as % of global stock)
40,844
23.4%
44,493
23.3%
Of which in the USA (in absolute values and as % of global stock)
34,988
20.0%
38,355
20.1%
The relative weight of Europe and Northern America in the global migration landscape (in terms of net migration;
absolute values are expressed in thousands).
1995-2000 2000-2005
European net migration (average annual)
769 1,083
EU’s net migration 621 (EU-15) 1,178 (EU-25)
Northern America net migration
1,394 1,370
Of which USA net migration
1,250 1,160
Source: CeSPI, based on UN Population Division,International Migration, 2002 and 2006.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Spain: 378.5
Spain: 427.8
Spain: 649.9
Spain: 738.5
Spain: 610.1
Spain: 652.3
Spain: 636.0
UK: 168.5 Germany: 274.8
Italy: 349.3
Italy: 600.6
Italy: 558.2
Italy: 338.1 France: 160.5
Germany: 167.8
UK: 184.3
Ger.: 218.8
UK: 260.5
UK: 203.6
UK: 196.3 UK: 159.5
Netherlands: 57.0
Portugal: 64.9
UK: 126.4
Ger.: 142.2
France: 105.0
France: 102.9
Italy: 157.0
Italy: 55.2 France: 60.4
Port.: 70.1
Port.: 63.5
Ger.: 81.8 Germany: 98.5
Ireland: 80.0
The largest EU immigration countries (net migration, 000s)
Source: CeSPI based on Eurostat.
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries (inflows, 000s, 2002-4) (source: OECD)*
2002 2003** 2004
Germany: 658.3 Germany: 601.8 Spain: 645.8
Spain: 443.1 Spain: 429.5 Germany: 602.2
UK: 418.2 UK: 406.8 UK: 494.1
Italy: 388.1 France: 135.1 Italy: 319.3
France: 124.8 Austria: 97.2 France: 140.1
* Non harmonised statistics. ** Data for Italy not available.
Five main EU countries of immigration among OECD countries (inflows, 000s, 2003-4) (source: OECD)*
2003** 2004
Germany: 238.4 UK: 266.5
UK: 214.6 Germany: 202.3
France: 173.6 France: 175.2
Italy**: 121.8 Italy: 156.4
Netherlands: 60.8 Austria: 59.6
* Harmonised statistics (long-term only; Spain not included).
** 2002 regularisation not included.
Deep differences in national economic migration policies among EU member states
Heterogeneity of national approaches (out of historical, economic, cultural and demographic reasons)We can group national approaches in a few “families” or blocs:a) “Conservative” continental bloc (France, Germany, Benelux, Scandinavians): closure to low-skilled immigration; narrow and selective opening to high-skilled flows;b) “Liberal” bloc (UK, Ireland): innovative and technocratic admission policy; competitiveness as priority; opening to free mobility of EU8 in 2004 as key component;c) Mediterranean bloc (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain): common challenges (acute ageing, wide underground economy, weak administrations) and similar strategie: frequent regularisations; attempts to manage low-skilled inflows (quota systems/agreements with sending countries);d) Eastern European bloc: heterogeneous; still struggling with institution building and migration transition.
Mediterranean bloc
Liberalbloc
Conservativebloc
Eastern
bloc
“Families” of EU countries according tofundamental characters of admission system
In the long term: persisting differences, but also convergence(% over-65 and over-80 on total pop.; today and in 2050)
North Europe15,9 – 4,424,2 – 9,1
Eastern Europe14,1 – 2,726,6 – 6,9
Western Europe17,8 – 4,7
27,7 – 11,5
South Europe17,8 – 4,5
31,4 – 11,6
MEASURING POLICY DIFFERENCES (AND POLICY OUTCOMES)
(total regularised foreigners; collective schemes, not including individual reg.; 000s, 1973-2008)
Italy 1,431
Greece 1,166
Spain 1,130
France 302
Portugal 249
Belgium 65
TRENDS: IS THE EU OPENING TO THE EAST WHILE CLOSING TO THE SOUTH?
% African-born among total foreign-born pop. in selected EU countries (Source: OECD)
Belgium France Germany NL PRT Spain UK
% North-Africa born
12.7% 39.1% 0.5% 10.1% 0.2% 15.8% 0.5%
% Sub-Sahara-born
9.8% 9.6% 1.2% 7.2% 53.5% 3.6% 16.7%
African nationalities among top 10 nationalities in terms of yearly inflows (main EU receiving countries, 2005, French data NA) - Source: OECD 2007
Receiving country African nationalities among top 10 flows
Ranking Trend compared to average 1990-2004
BELGIUM Morocco 3rd community ↑
ITALY (2004) Morocco 3rd ↓
Tunisia 10th ↓
NETHERLANDS Morocco 7th ↓
PORTUGAL Capo Verde 2nd ↑
Angola 5th ↓
Guinea-Bissau 6th →
Sao Tomé and Principe
9th →
SPAIN Morocco 2nd →
SWEDEN Somalia 9th ↑
UK (2001) South Africa 6th ↑
RELATIVE CLOSURE OF LEGAL IMMIGRATION CHANNELS TO AFRICANS
% of Africans in stocks of legal immigrants(Italy and Spain, selected years)
1991 1996 2000 2003 2006
Spain n.a. 18.3% 29.2% 26.3% 23.5%
Italy 35.0% 28.7% 27.7% 24.0% 23.4%
Sources: Min. of Interior for Italy, Extranjería for Spain.
AFRICANS ARE LITTLE REPRESENTED ALSO IN AMNESTIES
% North-African nationals in subsequent Italian regularisation schemes
1986 1990 1995 1998 2002
Morocco 26.3% 22.4% 14% 11% 7.4%
Tunisia 8.4% 12.1% 4.2% 2.6% /
Egypt 3.8% 3.5% 3.3% 4.4% 2.4%
Algeria / / 3.1% 1.5% /
Source: G. Sciortino based on Italian Min. of Interior.
ASYMMETRIC LIMITS TO AFRICAN MOBILITY?Italian visas for Africans (000s, 1999-2006)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N. Afr. & Middle East
110,9 132,6 128,9 106,9 114,6 123,9 128,4 140,2
Sub-Saharan Africa
43,0 58,3 51,1 47,4 50,0 58,7 63,3 63,3
WorldTotal
834,7 1.009,0 947,1 853,5 874,9 983,5 1.076,7 1.198,2
Source: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
INCREASED AFRICAN SHARE IN CLANDESTINE FLOWS% of Africans among irregular migrants apprehended upon (or
before) landing (Italy and Spain-Canary Islands, different years)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
N. Africa 11.9% 17.2% 11.7% n.a. 69.6% 70.52%Sub-Saharan Africa
3.8% 25.0% 41.4% n.a. 24.6% 24.8%
1994-8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Morocco 100% 88.2% 36.%2 32.%5 39.8% 32.6% 9.1%Rest of Africa
0% 11.8% 63.2% 66.2% 58.1% 62.9% 86.8%
Sources: Plan Canario para la Inmigración 2004-2006 for Spain; Min. ofInterior for Italy
Italy
Spain
Irregular migration by sea: relatively small but dominates perceptions (apprehensions, 000s; de Haas)
‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06
Spainmainland
7.0 7.2 12.8 14.4 6.8 9.8 7.2 7.0 6.4
SpainCanary
0 0.9 2.4 4.1 9.9 9.4 8.4 4.7 31.0
ItalySicily
8.8 2.0 2.8 5.5 18.2 14.0 13.6 22.8 21.4
ItalyCalabria
0.9 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3
Malta 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.05 1.7 0.5 1.4 1.8 NA
TOT 16.9 11.8 23.0 30.2 38.7 33.9 30.7 36.5 59.2
Intra-African mobility much moreimportant than outbound mobility
Source: Hein de Haas,International MigrationInstitute (IMI), Oxford.
Arrows do not indicate migrationroutes but depict major country-to-country migration flows. Due to lack of reliable data, thedimension of arrows reflectsestimates, not exact size of flows
BUT: the dominantperception…
Perceptions,on the other side
Clandestine crossings dominate the debate also because…(Victims* at wider European borders, 2005-2007, Fortress Europe)
To the Canary Islands2005: 185
2006: 1,0352007 (till 10/25): 444
Sicily channel2005: 4372006: 302
2007 (till 10/28): 529
Aegean Sea2005: 982006: 73
2007 (till 10/22): 138
Adriatic Sea2003: 292004: 28
No reported victims since 2004
* Including missing migrants.
To Southern Spain/Ceuta/Melilla
2005: 1232006: 184
2007 (till 10/22): 37
Cross-Saharan routes1,578 deaths reported since 1996
EU/EEA SCH/FM
Policy responses: spheres of EU institutional openness to human mobility
EU/EEA SCH+FM
EU/EEASCH/FM
EU/EEASCH/FM
TC AA/NO-VISA
TCAA/VISA-FAC
TC AA/VISA
TCNO-AA/NO-VISA
TCNO-AA/VISA
EU=European UnionEEA=European Economic Area
SCH=Schengen zoneFM=Freedom of movement
TC=Third countryAA=Association agreementVISA-FAC=Visa facilitation
Policy responses: the European multi-layered migration control model
1. Sample controls within EUborders (e.g. on workplaces)
2. Sample controls at internal borders
3. Border controls and surveillance strictly defined
4. Patrolling at high sea 5. Privatisation of controls: carriers’ responsibility
6. Visa offices in consulates 7. Outsourcing to third states
Policy responses: the main financial chapters in EU migration policy, millions €, 2007-
2013)
External Borders Fund 1,820
European Return Fund 676
European Refugee Fund 699.3
European Integration Fund 825
Do migration controls work?Evolution of smuggling routes in the Mediterranean (as
consequence of new push factors + international cooperation and law enforcement)
1991-2001
1999-2001
Early 2000sLate 90s
Early1990s-2006
Since late 1990s
Since mid-2000s
From 2006 on
Since 2005
Relative effectiveness of international law enforcement is confirmed by figures on apprehensions upon disembarkment +
rescues by coastal regions (000s, peaks for each line in red - Source: Min. Interior)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Apuli
a
28.4 46.5 19.0 8.5 3.4 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.2 0.06
Sicil
y
8.8 1.9 2.8 5.5 18.2 140 13.6 22.8 21.4 16.6
Calabri
a
0.8 1.5 5.0 6.1 2.1 0.2 0.02 0.08 0.3 2.0
Sardini
a
/ / / / / / / 0.008 0.09 1.5
TO
T
38.1 50.0 26.8 20.1 23.7 14.3 13.6 22.9 22.0 20.1
Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa (different sources)
Transit routes from Sub-Saharan to North Africa (logistics and practicalities)
► Until 1973-4: Only formalControls►1973-1985: Unilateral and competitive closure►1985: Schengen agreement►1990: ImplementingConvention►1995: Entry into force in thegreen core ►Italy, Austria, Greece as red “transit belt”
Core and periphery in the European migrationcontrol system: STAGE I
STAGE II: The Southern enlargement of the core
► 1997-8: Full integration of Austria and Italy►2000: Greece is alsoadmitted as part of the core►Eastern Europe emerges as “transitbelt”►Western Balkans, Turkey and North Africastill perceived more as sources
STAGE III: The Northern and Eastern enlargements
► 2001: Scandinavianenlargement (limited impacton irregular migration patterns)►2004: EU-10 accession►2007: EU-2 accession►2007: Schengen Easternenlargement (EU-10 butCyprus) ►Western Balkans, formerCIS, Turkey, N. Africa, etc.in “transit belt” (transit boom)►2005 Ceuta and Melilla; 2006 Lampedusa andCanarias: focus onSub-Saharan A. as source
►July 2006: Rabat EU-Africaconference on M&D►November 2006: TripoliEU-AU+ Conference on M&D►December 2007: Lisbon Africa-EU Summit►Migration Great Gameenlarges to whole Africa:New “candidates” as “transitcountries” (i.e. privileged controlpartners): Senegal, Niger►When transit countries arefailed states, intervention notruled out (Chad)
STAGE IV: The Transit Belt expands further South
Being a “transit country” and performing a control function on behalf of neighbours has
advantages and disadvantages
COSTS BENEFITS
Altering priorities: Neglecting immigration or emigration might be internally destabilising
Access to EU and bilateral targeted aid
Worsening of political/economic relations with poorer neighbours
More bargaining power in negotiations about own emigration (e.g. quotas)
Impact on migrants’ rightsinternational reactions
Overall gain in strategic relevance