Post on 07-Aug-2018
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 1/323
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 2/323
SelJ
G o d ,
and
Immortality
A
junresiarl
I n v e s t ~ a t i o n
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 3/323
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHYERIES
I . K enne th Laine Ketner , ed. ,
Peirce u r d Contetrlyornry
Tllotcglrt: Philosophi-
cal
Irrquiries.
2. Max H. Fisch, ed. ,
Classic Arnen’can Philosophers: Peirce, James,
Royce,
Suntaynrza, Dewey, Wzitelteud. Second ech tion, with an int roduct ion
by
N athan Houser.
3. John
E. Smi th , Experience
and God.
Second edit ion.
4 . Vincent G . Potter , Peke’s PI~ilos~~phicaE
erxpectives.
Edi ted and with a
preface by Vincent
M.
Colapietro.
5. R i c h a r d E.
H a r t
and Douglas R. Anderson, eds., Philosophy in Exyeti-
etzce:
Anrerican
Philosophy
in
Trunsition.
6 . Vincent
G.
Potter, Charles S .
Peirce:
O n Norrrrs ntrd Ide a l s . Second edi-
t ion , wi th
a n
in t roduct ion
by
Stanley M. Harrison
7 .
Vincent
M.
Colapiet ro , ed., Rerrson,
Experietlce,
atzd God: h z E . Swrith
it1 DiaEcgrre. In t roduct ion by
Merold
Westphal.
8. RobertJ. O’Connell, s .J . ,
Wil l ia t~]nmes
n The Courage to Believe. Sec-
ond edi t ion.
9. Elizabeth K raus,
T h e Metnplzysics
c Exyevieme: A Corrymion
to
W j i t e -
head’s “Process
u ~ d
eality.”
S e c o n d e h t i o n , w i th
a
new in t roduct ion
b y R o b e r t
C.
Neville.
10.
Kenneth W estphal , ed. , Pvngmntisn~,RCCISOW,d Novnzs:
A
Realistic As-
resswent-Essays
it Critical
Appreciation
qf
Frederick
L . Will.
11, B eth J. Singer, Pmgrnntism, RightJ, utzd D e m c r a c y .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 4/323
E U G E N E
F O N T I N E L L
SelJ
G o d ,
and
Immortality
A amesian Investigation
FORDHAM U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS NEW Y O R K 2 0 0 0
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 5/323
Copyright 000
by Fordham University Press
Au rights reserved
ISBN 0-8232-2070-2 (hardcover)
ISBN
0-8232-207 1-0
(paperback)
American Philosophy
Series,
no. 12
LC 00-037207
ISSN 1073-2764
Library
of
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Fontinell, Eugene.
Self, G od , and immortality : a Jamesian investigation / Eugene Fontinell.
O r i g n d y published: Philadelpha :Temple University Press, 1986. With new pref
Includes bibliographical references and ndex.
ISB N 0-8232-2070-2 (hardcover
:
alk. paper)-ISBN 0-8232-2071-0
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. James, W illiam,
1842-1910.-Contributions
in
imrnortalty.
2.
hmortahty-History ofdoctrines-20thcentury. I . Title. 11. Series.
B945.J24 66 2000
p. cm.- Am encan phdosophy series ; no. 12)
218-dc2 1 00-037207
Two poetry epigraphs arc used with the kind pennission of the publishers:
To Chapter 7 , from Ahce Walker, “Goodnight Wrllle Lee, I’ll See You in the Morning,”
Copyright 975 by Ahce Walker, from the book
Goodnight
Willie Lee, I’ll See You i n the
Monziq
by Ahce Walker. Rep rinted by permission
of
Doubleday Company, Inc.
To
Concludmg Reflections,
from
MariePonsot, “T he Great Dead,
Why
Not,
May
Know,”
from Admit Inzyedirnerrt by Marie Posnot,
0
by Marie Posnot, 1981, published by
Alfred
A.
Knopf
New
York.
T h e stanza fiom W.
€3.
Yeats
on
page 21 is
from
“The Song of the Happy Shepherd,”
from the Collected Poerns ofW.B. Yents, published in New York in 1956 by Macmillan, and
reprinted here with perrmssion. The lines
from
W e ’ s The Ninth Elegy on page 185
are
reprinted
from D~rirroElegies by
Rain er Maria Rdke, translated by
J. B.
Leishman and Ste-
phen Spender, with the pemussion
of
W. W. No rton Company, Inc. Copyright 1939 by
W . W. Norton P Company, Inc. Copyright renewed 1967 by Steph en Spender and J. B.
Leishman.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 6/323
For
my
parents
Helen
and Ernest
and
m y nieces
Justine and
Flannery
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 7/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 8/323
Looking into Napo leon's eyes Prince
A ndr ew though t of
the
insignificancc of
greatness, the unimportance
of
life which
no o n e
could
understand, and the
still
greater
unimpor tance
of
death, thc m eaning
of which no
one
alive could understand or
explain.
" L e o
T o k t o y
War
a d Pm-e
The question of
immortality
is of its
na tu rc
not
a scholarly question.
It is
a question
wclling up
f rom the in te r ior which the
subject must put to itself as i t becomes
conscious
of
itself,
"Saren Kierkegaard
ConcEtrdirzg
Unscierzt$c Postscript
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 9/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 10/323
CONTENTS
PART
I
PERSONAL IMMORTALITY:
POSSIBILITY AND
CREDIBILITY
3 World or Reality
a s
“Fields” 25
2 Toward a
Field
Model o f t he Self 44
3
James: Toward
a
Field-Self 60
4 James: Personal Identity 81
5
James: F J ~elfand
Wider
Fields 101
6
James: Se and God 132
PART
I1
PERSONAL IMMORTALITY: DESIRABILITY AND EFFICACY
7
Immortality: Hope or Hindrance? 165
8 Immortality: A
Pragmatic-Prucessiue
Model 200
Concludirzg
ReJAectiotu
2
19
Notes 235
Index 289
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 11/323
R e adm g D o nne aga in ,
I’m
reminded I k n o w n o t h i n g
ab ou t de ath , no thin g save the one irrefutable fact :
I
will die.
And
that means that
I’m
bound to pro jec t
my sorry thoughts beyond death, cheerfully imagining
the self I ca l l
my own
as st i l l hve-though dead
of course to ev ery on e wh o kn ew me-jubil izing
w ith family and friends in a sunny field, hardIy m issing
a t all a missing God. It’s immortahty w e crave instead,
tha t museum
of
ten thousand
thngs
stockpiled beyond
our fleeting earthly hours. Sure,
we
keep on w ith talk
of
flesh
made
spirit,
but
Donne
already
k n e w
we
balk
at an y th n g less
than
ourselves , the oneground
of
aIl
o u r hopes no t God and eternity, that unseen end ,
but the self curled com fortably around itseif again.
R o b e r t Cordmg
“Reahng D o n n e “
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 12/323
PREFACE
TO THE FORDHAM
EDITION
As we begin a new millennium, we f ind ourselves in a s tr ikmgly s imilar
si tuat ion to the one in which WliliamJames delivered his Gifford Lectures
(190l-l902), published as The Varieties
of
Rellgio~rsExperience I / RE). As
“science” soars to new and bewildering heights of complexity articulated
in various and often confl ict ing modes of material ism, we are at the same
t ime inundated wi th
a
var iety and hv ers i ty of religious and “spirituality”
movements.’ Similarly, James found himself inwor ld of surging material-
istic claims for science a n d proliferating sp irituahstic an d parap sycholog cal
claims
and,
in th e last decade
of
his l i fe, the beginning of rel igous
funda-
rnentalrsm. W h de he wrest led to the end wi th the compet ing
nd
conflict-
in g calls of science, rel ig on , and parapsychology, he refused to sur render
his keen intellectual powers to dogm atic assertions in any of these areas.
E l ~ e w h e r e , . ~have characterized James’s philosophyof r e l i g o n
as
an effort
to avoid what might be called the “fallacy of false alternatives”: either
sci-
ence or rel igmn, ei ther reason or faith, either absolutely certain knowledge
or relat ivist ic skepticism, either un ch an gn g ob ject iv e values o r chaotically
changmg subject ive ones. Expressed more posi t ively: James makesn effort
to forge
3
“third alternative”
to
the then rationalistic and empirical versions
of
religion..‘
Since t h s essay, and I use “essay” pr im ad y in i t s verbal connotat ion, is
subtitled “AJamesian Invest igat ion,”
a
w o r d o n how
I
understand “James-
ian” and the
use
I
make ofJames
is
in o rder. Jam esian in the broad est ense
of the t e rm might be unders tood
as
“in the spirit ofJarnes.”AsJames of ten
&d, I d o not hesi ta te to dra w on o th er thmkers w he n I t h n k th ey w ill
serve my purpose. Hence , in ordero construct and advance my controll ing
hypothesis,
I
ut i l ize Dewey
and to
a lesse r ex t en t W hteh ead
as
weU as a
few phenomenologts ts and
a
number
of
other th inkers . Concern ing these
I m ake
of
James, I ear ly o n n ot e that I a m p r i m a d y c o n c e r n e d n o t t o
explicateJames’s metaphysics but rather to utilize his language and ideas, as
well
as
that
of
others,
“in
the development
of
a
‘self’
open
t o t hepossibility
x
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 13/323
of personal immortality.” Nevertheless, I pre sent an extensive explication
o f James’s views, because it
is
in James that
I
have found the r ichest re-
sources for constructing
a
m ode l of the
self
and God that renders belief in
persona l imm ortality plausible. It
is
necessary, therefore,
to
describe care-
fully
and in som e detai l several of James’s central doctrines
in
order to
show tha t they embody a subtlety, com plexity, and p lausibdity that
a
m o r e
superficial presentation of Jamesmisses. Since in these instances I am mak-
in g James’s do ctr in e my
own,
the establishment of the fundamental reason-
ableness of his doctrine reinforces mine.
IfJam es is to b e a resource rather than a weapon,
I
must consider those
aspects
of
h s thought that threaten as well
as
support my h ypothesis . For
exa m ple, it is necessary
to
deal wi th the content ion thatJames’s ph i losophy
of the self is properly interpreted
as
a materialistic
o r
“no-sel f” d octr ine.
Unless I can make a reasonable case for an alternative reading, my claimfor
the congeniahty of
a
Jamesian field-self o p e n to
personal
immortal i ty
is
serio usly un derm ine d. SiInilarly, by s how ing
that
the vie w of the self that
emerges in James’s later w ork s
is
consistent with the vie w in his earlier
Ptitrciyles of Psychology ( P P ) , hough m or e deve loped and r e f i ned ,
I
am si-
mu ltaneou sly show ing that there is
a
do ctrine of the self that is sensitive
and
responsive to “scientif ic,” “metaphysical ,” and “re l igo us” con cern s.
Such a v i ewf the self
must allow
for the real ity of uniq ue and cont inu ing
indwidual whi le avoiding both body-soul dual ism and atomis t ic indvidu-
ahsm. H e n c e , t h e b e d e v h g , c o nt ro v er te d , a n d e lu si ve q ue st io n
of
“per-
sonal
identity”
must
be tou ch ed up on . Finally, s ince no plausible belief in
immortahty
is possible
un less
the inc hid ua l self is related to and partially
consti tuted by
a
“w ider self ,” the reality, character, an d role of “G o d” must
be considered.
In those chap ters in wh ich ames’s thought receives detai led descript ion
and analysis , what
is
of pr imary impor tance is n ot w he the r I present a
fundamen tal ly correct interpretation
of
James-though I thnk I do-but
whether there emerges f rom my readmg ofJames , supplemented bynum -
ber
of
o th er th n ke rs , an intrinsical ly reasonable doctr ine
of
the self that is
o p e n to personal mmortality.This is the ust if icat ion for suchdetailed
considerat ion
of
the James texts. n fol lowing Jamesas he at tempts to af f i rm
a nondualistic selfw ith ou t fall ing in to materialism,
to
affirm personal iden-
t i ty while avoidmgany substantial-soul view, an d to
affirm
a God
who
does
no t hm inish the s ignif icance of individual human actions, we are engaged
in questions that are very m u ch alive. No claim, of course, is mad e that
these issues are definitively resolved by either Jame sr m e . T h e m o r e
mod-
est bu t
s t d
rather am bit ious claim is that by showing that there is i n J a m e s
a coherent and co nsistent philosophy of wo rld/real ity, self , an d G od , I am
simultaneously showing that there
s
available a necessary and indsp ensab le
framework
within which b el ief in immortahty can be exp lored and af-
firmed.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 14/323
In an earl ier work, Toward
a
Rm?nstrr~t ion $Religion (TRR)
5
I suggested
ho w t ruth , rnorahty, God , an d rel igion m ight be envis ioned w i thin
a
r a d -
c d y process ive-relat iona l wor ld . In SeK God,
m d
Immortnlity
(SGI), he
v iew
of
God
presented earl ier s exten ded and, I hop e, enriche d, by relat ing
it to a processive-relational self and the po ssibility f and be lie f in and hop e
for personal immortihty. M y presupposit ions concerning two issues which
permeate S G I can, perhaps, be prepared for and reinforced by drawing o n
my t reatment of t h e m i n
TRR
and
a
pos t -SGI
essay.h
T he y are m etaphys-
ics/metaphysical assumptions and belief/faith.
The
me taphysics described and arg ued for in the first chapter of S G I
(“Wor ld or Reallty
as
‘Fields’ ”) can be labeled ei ther “f ield” o r “process-
ive-relational metaphysics”-“fields” be ing un de rsto od
as
“processive-re-
lational c ~ r n p l e x e ~ . ” ~t should be no ted a t the outset that affirmation of
the h n d of evolving or continually changing world/reali ty presented here
is not wedded to any particular version
of
Darwinism
or
particle physics
theory. I would maintain, howev er, that i t is compa tible with
and
i ndeed
reinforced by a variety f bo th .
Any theories that we are able to const ruct concerning the ch aracter of
theuniverse, he self, an d God must nsomefashionbederivedfrom
h u r n a n / p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n ~ e . ~
egarlng
anyscientific
or
philosophical
theories that allegedly describe o r enable us to “understand” the changing
wo rld, unless w e f i rs t encountered “ change” in our “everyd ay lives,” it is
hard to see how such an unset t l ing not ion wou ld ever have been
postu-
lated.
Of
course, the real i ty of changeas not been the formidable problem
confronting humans in a l l ages an d cultures . Rather , it is w h e t h e r i n t h s
wildly changing wo r ld there are any unchang ing reaht ies or Reahty. In
the W est , dom inant canchdates for such, of cou rse, hav e been essences,
mathematical laws, values, and
God.
(Other cul tures have thei r own candi-
dates.)
In TRR (38fT.), & sti n pi sh ed “classical metaphysics” &om“con tem po-
rary m etaphysics” on the basis of the role assigned to processes and rela-
tions.” Classical metaphysics, of co urse , ack no wle dg es that the world we
experience involves processes and relat ions, but t h s is not the wh ole or
most impor tant par t of the s tory. “Under lying” these real i t iess a wor ld of
unch anging principles ultimately groun ded, at least for some thinkers, in
an unchanging God to whom w e are related b u t w h o has n o real relat ion
to
us.
l o
O n the other hand, there are a variety
of
“contemporary” meta-
physics, am ong wh ich I locate “pragmatism,” wktch h owever different in
their refined
details
agree in their rejection of any m o d e of on to logxa l o r
metaphysical duahsm. H ence , I would suggest hat , w M e b o th classical
and contemporary metaphysics acknow ledge the reality of processes and
relations, here is a ra&caI andsignificantdifferencebetween
a
“world
involving processes and relations” and a “w or ld
in
process and relational
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 15/323
th rough and through.” S C I is an effort to articulate the implications for
the self, God, a n d i m o r t a i i t y i n t he l atte r hnd of w or ld . ’
A n d t e rna t e w ay of descllbing James’s m etaphysics is as a “metaphysics
of
experience.” I will later describe the distinguishin g features
of
experi-
en ce as a transaction betw een diverse “fields” o r centers of activity.
So
unde rstood, experience or transactional activity constitutes d l existential
realities from electrons toGod. Here I s imply wish to note what experience
is not. It is not “m erely psychological .” Further , James rejects any m eta-
physical
dualism
w hich
would
assign e xpe rienc e to
a
subjective order of
being and reason to an objective order. Subject and object, subjective and
objective are derivative categories functionally distinguished from within
wider field
of
exper ience and/or real i ty .”
A
Jamesian metaphysics
of
expe-
rience, therefore, maintains that all claims ma de abo ut
reahty
or the wor ld
as a who le, as well as any cIaims m ade ab ou t God, must be ex trapolated
from
and evaluated in terms f
human
experience.
A
crucial implication of James’s reject ion of experience as merely psy-
chological, of course,
is
tha t re l igo us a nd /or myst ical exper iences cannot
be easily dismissed o r reductively explained away. It was reassuring
to
those
a m o n g us w h o are theis ts wh en
a
few years
ago
the Am erican Psyctuatric
Associat ion removed rel igous exper iences
from
its list
of
mental
disor-
Of course, o u r enthusiasm may be somewhat t empered when we
remember that i t comes almost one hundred
ears
afterJame s in his famous
Virieties
of
Religious Experience crit icized that “mechcal materialism [ w h c h ]
finishes up SaintPaulbycalhnghisvision on theroad
to
Damascus a
hscharging les ion of occipital cortex . . . [which] snuEs o ut Saint Theresa
as anhysteric,[and]SaintFrancis of Assisi
as
a hereditarydegenerate”
( V I E ,
20). The Psychiatric Association now acknow ledges that “mystical
experience
or
various
forms
of peak [or] t ranscendent exper iences” can
have positive consequences. This appears to be suppo r t ive of james’s con-
ten t ion concern ing uch
experiences:
“We
must not content ourselves wi th
superficial
rn ek ca l talk, bu t inquire into their frui ts
for
life” VRE,
2 7 ) .
Nei ther James nor the Association
is
saying that alleged religious experi-
ences
may
n o t be pa tho lo g~ ca l . W ha t ames is saying explici tly, and the
Association a t least implicitly,
is
tha t we cannot de te rmine the wor th of
such
experiences n
priori
butonly by a complexongoing procedure,
w her eby
we
a t tem pt to de te rm ine both the osi tive
and
the negat ive con-
sequences of these experiences for both the individu al and the
commu-
nity.
W h a t n o w a b o u tmy reference
to
“metaphysical assumptions”?
Why
n o t
“me taphysical principles”? Since the time of Kant, of course, there have
be en conflicts in wh ich one person’s absolutely certain first principles are
anoth er person ’s assum ptions. W hether they are called “assumptions” o r
“principles” is
of
l i t t le importance for
the
pragmatist as lon g
as
the lack of
absolutecertainty is ackn ow ledge d. Long before“foundationalism”be-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 16/323
Pr&ce
to the
Fordhtlm Edition XV
came a nasty wo rd am ong
a
range of c ontempo rary thinkers , Jam es an d the
o th e r pragm atists had surrendered th e classical claims for certainty.15 O f
course, just because we are unable, whether in science, philosophy,r reli-
@on,
to
establish beyond a shadow
of
doubt those principles
and
beliefs
wh ich und erg rd all aspects of hu m an life does not mean that we cannot
make judgments concerning their worth and reasonableness. T h e dis tin-
guishing mark of “pragmatism,” howev er, is that , wh ile we can and must
construct the best abstract and conceptual argum ents possible, the decisive
feature of all claims are the “lived consequences” o r “fruits” that follow
from them . Fortuna tely, i t is n ot my present task to enter in to the
long-
running, cont inuing, and a t t imes bi t ter conf ic t over the ad equacy and
defens ibhty
of
t h s
feature of pragmatism.
I
will simply “assum e” it and
segue in to the other presupposi t ion refer red o above-belief/faith.
S G I does not claim that we can “know ” tha t G od exists an d tha t we
are
personally immortal.
What
i t does attempt to d o is to show that there can
be and argue
for
a “reasonable” belief in b ot h . T hi s takes us, of course,
into the long-running quest ions concerning the relat ion between fai th and
reason. N ot e that I say and no t or. To say the lat ter wo uld b e to
fall
i n to
o n e of those false chch otom ies m entioned abov e. Strictly spea km g, it w ould
be
more appropr iate
to
say the
dialectic
rather than simply “relation” be-
tween faith an d rea son in ord er o stress the d ynam ism
of
the relation. Not
only are there no belie& or fai ths uninfluenced by the character of the
believer’s reason, bu t the re is n o instance of human reason that is not in-
f luenced and indeed energized byaith-whether it is the faith of the envi-
ronmenta l i s t o r eco theologan concern ing whats ne ede d to save the earth
and hum ans f rom des t ruct ion, or Daniel Dennet t ’s belief that we will, in
the no t
too
&stan t future, create
computers
wi th consciousness inds t in-
guishable
from
human consciousness, or Ste ph en
Hawlung’s
belief that w e
wll
someday chscover the “Th eory of Everything.””
E1sewhere,I8 I co m m en ted on an art icle by the Ital ian philosopher Bat-
tis ta M ond in, enti t led “Fa ith and R e a s o n i n R o m a n C a t h o l ic T h o u g h t
from C lem en t of Alexandria to Vatican 11.” He based his article on the
following
premise: “The famous formula expressing the
Roman
Cathol ic
pos i t ion concerning the problem
of
the relation between fai th and reason
is: j d e s
now
destwit sed p e @ d
r&new.’’14
C o m m ent in g on th is,
I
state that
it teUs
only
half the story and is misleadmg unless combined with
a
mirror
claim: reason does n o t destroy b u t perfects faith. Unless these
two
claims
are held in existential as
well as
reflective tension, the t endency will b e
to
aff’rrm o n e pole of th e chalectic at the expense of the other. This is not to
deny, how ever, that existentially and psychological ly we a re, for the most
part, believers before we are kno wers. In a letter to Helen K eller, James
wro te : “The grea t wor ld , the bnckground, in
al l
of us, is the world of our
beliefs.”20T h a t such a view is expressed by James s not surprising, but
it
is
also
shared
by
the more “rationalistic”
Whitehead,
who
tells
us
tha t “we
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 17/323
philosophize because w e believe; we d o n o t believe because w e philoso-
phize. Philosop hy is a criticism of belief-preserving, dee pe ning , an d
mod-
i fying i t .”?’ Re aders w i l l, of co urse , recognize this
s
a conternporar)r ec ho
of
the t rad t ion al “faith seeking understandmg.”
O n e fur ther po in t concern ing the charac te rf “faith” o r “ be lie f” w h c h
underglrds SGk R el ig ou s bel ie f, part icu larly bel ie f in im m o r t a h yhas fre-
qu en tly bee n charged-most dramatically by Nietzsch e as w e shall later
see-with be ing escapist o r
a
means to superficial consolation.
I
wiIl argue,
to
the contrary, that belief in immortality/resurrection has the possibility of
deepen ing , enr ichng , and energ iz ing
our
efforts and life in th e “h ere and
now .”
T h e cent ra l and cont ro l ling ques t ion posed and responded
o
i n
S G I
is:
Can
w e w h o ave been touched y the intellectual and exper ient ia l revolu-
t ions o f th e co nte m po rary wo r ld still believe wi th a degree of coher ence
and cons is tency that we s individual persons are immortal?
A
key assump-
t i on of t h s essay is that the grad ual eros ion f belief in personal immo rtali ty
over the
last
several hu nd red years is b ou nd up with the collapse
of
the
dominant metaphysics of Western culture. This metaphysics , which
I
have
designa ted abov e as “classical,” co m bin ed a philosophy of the self as co m -
posed
of
sou l an d body-the latter being ma terial
and
subject to
dissolu-
t ion, nd he orm er pir i tual nd essential ly, tho ug hnot necessanly,
indmoluble-with a philosophy
of
an immutable, al l-knowing, al l-power-
f d
God w h o sends the immortal
soul,
after a period
of
testing in the moral
arena of “this wor ld ,” to e i ther e ternal heaven or e ternal hel l (wi thpossi-
ble s top along the way
to
the former in pu rga tory) .
This
v iew of the self
and G o d , along w i th
the
metaphysics in whch it is grounded-absolute
an d un ch an g in g essences, values, principles, an d laws-has b ee n assaulted
and
underm ined, though not def ini t ively drsproved,
by
a
drversity
of
sci-
ences and phdosophies.
In
addition, i t has become increasingly uncongenial
to the exper ience of a variety
of
persons, incluchng a num ber
who
v iew
themselves as rel igously con cerned .
This
situation
has
g v e n r ise
to a
variety and cbversity of responses. At
o n e e n dof the spect rum are those who cons ider the ques t ion
f
irnmortal-
ity closed. T h e m ost ext reme express ion
of
t h s denial of immortality, and
some
would
say the
most
consistent, is
that of
nihh sm -the total dismissal
of all
meaning, s ince “meaning” was int imately and inseparably bound up
w ith fa ith in
God
and im m or t ahy . The r e a re o the rs w ho , while deny ing
tha t G od and personal immortality are any longer l ive op t ions ,
s t d
strive
to
affirm meaning, though in com pletely imrnanent is tic and hum anis t ic
terms-thus various mod es of secular hum anism , In recent years there has
emerged a small b u t d r s t i n p s h e d g r o u pof thnkers f rom wi th in the major
r e l i gous t r ad t i ons
who
reject personal imm ortality b u t retain faith in God
and the impor tance of religrous activity, and endeavor to express meaning
in those t e rn s .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 18/323
Preface
f o the Fordham Editiotr x v i i
At the o ther end of the spect rum are those who s tdl bel ieve in personal
immo rtali ty and the meaning of whose lives is tied to t h s be li ef . Som e of
these imply accept inlmortahtyblindly ndunquestioningly.Others,
w he the r in sophisticated
or
unsophist icated form, retain the o lder meta-
physicsdescribedaboveand ind n o existential or intellectualconfhct.
There a re a few, however , who, aware of theproblems accompanying
trahtional metaphysics , endeavor to be responsive
to
con tem por a r y rejec-
tions of dualism, an absolutely imm utable and transcendent God, and a
m o d e of imortahty belief that is tho ug ht to diminish the s ignificance of
the present l ife. The se last, for the most part , are led merely to juxtapose
their bel ief in imm ortahty with their acce ptance of these contemporary
views.
T he re is,
I
believe,
a
great need at the present t ime fordialogue involv-
ing viewpoints that
affirm
and question personal
immortali ty.
These view-
pointsmaybe ocated ndlfferentpersons or, t o some exten tbutnot
equa lly, within the same person, as they are in my case . Wi thout such
a
& d o p e , the impor tan t l iab il it ies and possibht ies of both the aff irmation
and the denial
of
personal inmortalrty will n o t be faced adequately. T his
can result
only
i n a con t inued t hnn ing and f l a t t en ing ut of the beliefs of
those
on
b ot h s ides
of
the quest ion . O ne im po r tan t hase
of
such
a
h a l o p e
w d be reflective or speculative considerations of the implications of either
belief in or denial
of
personal immortality. Since it is usually m o re fruitful,
initially a t least, to explore a question from o ne perspective,
I
have cho-
s e n d v i d e d t hough I am-to appro ach the question from the sideof one
w h o affrrms personal
immortality.
My
essay is dwided in to
two
parts, b oth con cer ne d w i th personal im-
mortality: the first part, “Possibility and Credibility,” indirectly;he second,
“D es i r ab hy an d E fficacy,”
dmctly.
I
contend that these
two
cfistinct b u t
not separate aspectsof immortahty bel ief belong together and that thewo
parts
of
the
essay,
w he n read w hole, reinforce each other . I ts crucial first o
establish as “reasonable” the doctrines of a processive-relational or “field”
metaphysics that allows
for
a
c odn r r i t y of
narrower and wider dimensions
of
one
wor ld , of a holistic self that avoids b o th an unacceptable dualism
and
a
reductionistic rnateriahsm, and of
a
God in t imate ly and ex i s ten t idy
inter twin ed w ith hu m an lives. Unless t h s is done, the claims that immor-
tality be lief is
not
escapist,
that
it drec t s h u m a n m e r g e s t o w a r d r a t h e r t h a n
div em ng the m from the crucial tasks confron t ing us here and now, that
such a belief is not an expression of
a n
out-moded soul-doctr ine, and that
w e are cooperatively acting with God in the universal creative rocess-all
such
claimsare reduced
to
mere pious assert ions.
An
impor tantconse-
quence , then ,
of my consider ing immortahty belief w i t h n the process ive-
relational view
of
the
seK
and God is that such belief plays
a
significantly
different role within t h s v ie w t ha n i t d o es w i th in t he t r d t i o n a l v i e w o f
self
and
God.
In
sum,
the doctrines developed in the first part
of
the
essay
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 19/323
glve dep th and s uppor t to the extrapolations advanced in the secon d part;
and the extrapolations presented in the second part g v e specif ic ity and
concreteness to the doctr ines developed in the f i rs t art.
O n e
final
poin t : though
I
have argued for the viabil ity
of
belief
in
per-
sonal immortality,
1
have made n o effort to mask or sugarcoat those features
of hum an exper ience that threaten or t end to undermine such belief . In-
deed ,
I
have endeavo red to present
as
strongly as I could what I consider
the m or e serious objections to t h s bel ief . These object ions are not m erely
abstract o r “inteUectual” bu t co nc ret e and existential. T he y pervade the
thought
and
experience
of
any ref lect ive con temporary believer, and there
are
no
absolutely com pell ing argum ents I
know
of that
can
completely
ove r com e them .
Thus ,
particularly in the second part
of
the essay,
a
num -
ber of the speculations are quite tentative and characterized by a degree of
incom pleteness. This is consistent, however, w i t h a central claim of the
essay, w h ic h is that belief in perso nal immortality for those consciou s of
and sensitive to the ds t inguishing features f the contemporary wor ldnev-
i tably and inescapably involves unresolved and perhaps unresolvable
ten-
sions.??
NOTES
1. It should
be
noted a t the outset that it is not only theists and philosophers
who
have deep and a t times acerbic disagreements. Similar conflicts
can
be
found
am ong contemporary D arwinists, whether biologists, paleontologxts, or cognitive
scientists, in spite of their shared metaphysical materiahsm.An indication
of
such
conflicts can
be
gleaned
from
two articles
by
Stephen Jay
Gould, followed
by a n
exchange of letters in the N ew
h r k Review
ofBooks (“Darwinian F udam entalism,”
6/12/97,
pp. 34-37; “Evolution: T he Pleasure of Plurahsm,” 6/26/97, pp. 47-52;
“Evolutionary Psychology: An Exchange,” 10/9/97, pp.
55-58).
Regarding cog-
nitive scientists’ conflicts,
the
one noted in
Self; Gad, and ImmorfaIify
( S C I )
(246
n .
9)
between Daniel Dennett and John Searle, continues and intensifies. (See New
York
Review
c$’Booh, 12/21/97, pp. 83-85.)
2. George Johnson’ssplendid work, Firen the Mind: Science,
Faith,
and the
Searchfur Order ( F I M ) (New
York:
Vintage Books, 1995), might be said to
present
us with a “metaphor” of the contemporary situation concerning science(s) and
religion(s). Northern New Mexico is the site of the atom-bomb-era Tech Areas of
Los Alamos and the present National Laboratory
as
well as
the
Santa Fe Institute
which “has become the center
of
search
for
laws
of
complexity, which seek
to
explain how our unfeeling universe gves rise to life, mind, and society” ( 3 ) . nter-
woven with
or,
more accurately, juxtaposed to these cutting-edge science labora-
tories and scientists are communities of Tewa and other
pueblo
Indians, regularly
practicing their r i t es anddances; a varietyofAnglo and
Hispanic
Christian
churches and sects; and a diversity of New
Age followers,
believers, and prac-
titioners.
3 . Eugene Fontinell, “James: Religion
and
Inclrviduality,” in Classical Anrericun
Prupmtistn: Its Conteempurury
t.‘itality,
ed.
Sandra Rosenthal, Carl R. Hausman, and
Douglas
R.
Anderson (Urbana: University
of
Illinois
Press,
1999),
146-59.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 20/323
4. Cf. The tt’ill tu Believe
(W B ,
178), where James is critical
of
those w riters
who “have no imagnation of alternatives. W ith them there is no tertitrtn p j d
between environm ent and miracle.
Arrt
Crlesm-, atrt d l r r s Arrt Spencerism, nu t
catechism ” George Johnson’s F l M , cited above, might serve as an example
of
a
contemporary
effort
to
forge
a
“third alternative.” Early on he tells us that he takes
an “agnostic stanc e-betw een the extremes of science as discovery and science as
construction” (6). Later, he asks: “C an we find a middle g round between these
tw o extremes-[the Platonists and the cultural constructivists]-a way to separate
the patternswestamp
on
realityfrom the patterns that realitystamps on our
minds?” John son then makes a suggestion that I find congenial to the transactional
metaphysics hat is presented
in
S G I . “Perhaps,” hesuggests, “th e patterns we
discern are neither universal nor arbitrary, but the result of the interaction between
our
nervous
system
and
some
h n d
of
real world”
(324).
5.
(N ew York: Doubleday,
1970;
repr. New York: Cross
Currents,
1980).
6. “Faith and Metaphysics Revisited,” Cross Crrrretlts (Sunmer
1988).
128fE
7.
A
creative theory
of
“fields” is to be found in the writings of the biochem ist
Rupert Sheldrake, Rebirth of Nl~trrre: I e Greening oj- Science and God (N ew York:
Bantam Books,
1991).
Sheldrake proposes what he designates a “hypothesis of
formative causation” which “suggests that self-organizing systems a t all levels of
complexity-includmg molecules, crystals, cells, tissues, organisms, and societies
of organisms-are organized by ‘morphic fields.’ ” Sheldrake contends that “the
way
past hemoglobin molecules, penicdlin crystals,
or
giraffes influence the mor-
phic fields of present ones depends on a process called mwplzic resonance. the influ-
ence of l i k e
upon
like through spaceand time.” He goes on to say that “this
hypothesis enables the regularities of nature to be governed
by
habits inherited by
morphic resonance, rather than by eternal, non-material, and non-energetic laws”
8.
Cf. John J. McDermott, 77w Culture
$Experience
(Ne w York: New York
University
Press,
1976), 110:“T he impact ofjames’s philosophy
is
that an analysis
of hum an activity turns ou t to be an ‘ultimate’ metaphysics, or there is no reality
to he
hscussed
apart
from
our participation and formulation.”
9.
When I made my “metaphysical m ove” years ago,
I
did not then,
nor
do I
now, have any dus ions concerning my or anyone else’s ability to refute “classical
metaphysics.” Indeed, I believed at the time,
and
my belief has been borne out,
that there would con tinue to emerge new, sophisticated, and formidable articula-
tions within science, philosophy, and theology that would utilize arid enrich many
if
not all of the basic claims associated with such metaphysics. The persistence/
resurgence of “Platonism” am ong mathematicians,physicists,andphilosophers
supports
m y
belief. O n e
of
the most impressive manifestations
of
the viability
of
“Platonism ” can be found in the works of the analytic philosopher Thomas Nagel.
See, forexample
T7w
Last
Word (New
York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1997).
Nagel, whom I later cite
as
a n
exponent of the “absurd” (SGI, 277, n.
S 7 ) ,
does
not hesitate to assert that the “last word” is “truth.” He contends that “whoever
appeals to reason purports to discover a source
of
authority within
himself
that is
no t merely
personal,
or societal, but universal. .
.
.,’
He
goes on to say that “if
t h s
description sounds C ar t e s i m
or
even Platonic, that is
no
accident” 3-4). NageI’s
belief in objective truth, however, does not lead him to believe in o r
even
desire
the existence
of
God.
In
a
strihngly
honest
and direct description
of
his
position
(110-11).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 21/323
xs Pr@ce to the Fordlram Editiotl
on the God-question, Nagel states: “I want atheism to be true and I am made
uneasy by the fact that
some
of the most intelhgent and well-informed people I
kn ow are religous believers. It isn’t just that
I
don’t believe in God and, naturally,
hope
I’m
right in my belief.
It’s
that I hope that there is no God I don’t want
there
to
be a
God; 1
don’t want the universe
to
be like that”
( 1
30).
10.
Cf.
The Basil Writings qf St . Tltontas Aqninas, ed. Anton C. Pegs, 2 vols.
(Ne w York: Ran do m House. 1945),
1:283).
Aquinas states: “As the creature pro-
ceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside of the whole creation, nor
does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce
the creature
by
necessity of
His
nature, but by His intellectand
will
. .
.
Therefore,
there is
no real
relation in God
to
the creature, whereas in creatures there is a real
re la t ion to God; because creatures are contained under the d ivine order, and their
very nature entails dependence
OR
God”
(emphasis added).
11. For an example of
a
recent imagmative, provocative, and controversial ef-
fort
to rethink theology within a radically processive-relational world , see Diar-
muid 0 MurchG, Qunnt t r r - n
Theology
{New York: The CrossroadPublishing
Company,
1997).
Th ree short texts will give hint of perspectives presentedby
0
M u rc h k “In m od em physics the image of the universe
as
a machne has been
transcended by the alternative perception of an indivisible, dynamicwhole whose
parts are essentially interrelatedand can be understood only as patterns of a cosmic
process” (35 -36) . “W e humans arenot themasters
of
creation ; w e are participators
in
a
co-creative process that is
much
greater than
us
and
probably quite capable
of
getting along w ithout us
.
. .”
( 3 3 ) . I
suggest that the doctrine of the Trinity is an
attempted expression
of
the fact that the essential nature of God is about relatedness
and th e capacity to relate, that the propensity to relate is, in fact, the very essence
of God”
(82).
As an example of how two thinkers, both Christians and well-schooled in the
claims of contemporary physics
and
cosmology can arrive
a t
radically opposing
theo logc al conclusions, contrast 0 Murchu’s work with that of Fred Heeren’s
Sltotu
M e
God (Wheeling, Ill.: Day Star Publications, 1998).
0
Murchd states: “It
no w appears that the
‘once-for-aU
process’
is
only utle of a
number
of
evolutionary
cycles, in a universe that may be trihons rather than bdions
of
years old” (183).
H e
aIso
maintains “that the entire Bible, aiong
with
the sacred texts of other reli-
gions,
is first and foremost a story, and not a record of definite facts
and
events”
(1
14). Heeren, on the other hand, accepts the
“big
bang” theory as conclusive,
thereby establishing that the universe
had a
begmning. Further, “a universe with a
beginning requires
a
Begmner, . . pointing most naturally to a C reator that exists
outs ide
the universe” (xvii; emphasis added). Heeren also argues in this volume,
and he
intends to
argue in three m ore volumes, that “H ebrew revelation
is
the
only religious source com ing
to
us from ancient times that fits the modern cosmo-
logcal
picture. And in many cases, 20th-century archaeologists and myth experts
have also been forced to turn from older views that treated the Bible
as
myth to
ones that treat it
as
history” (-y.).
12.
Cf James,
Essays
irz
R a d i c a l Empiticism
( E R E ,
271):
“ 7 I e
attributes ‘strbject’
and ‘object’ t n e a n , t h m , a procticnl
distinctiun
qf the utmost itqmrtunce, btrt a distinction
udlich is o a FUNCTIONAL order
only,
and lzot a t
all
ontolugicul m understood
by
cllssical dualism.’
13.
New
York
Tirrrex,
2/10/94,
p-
A16.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 22/323
14.
Far an insightful t reatment of James’s “ph losophy of my sticism’’ and its
sinlrlarity and dissirmlarity to current “cons tructivist” views, see G . W llliam Bar-
nard , Exploring
Unseen
U’orids:
W i l l i m J t m e s and
the PIzilosoplzy ofhdysticism (Albany:
State Universi ty
of
N e w
York
Press,
1997).
Barnard
dso
makes
creative
use
of the
“fie lds withm fie lds” metaphor which
i s
t he cen te r and g round f the speculations
presented in SG I .
15. Cf. P a u l J e r o m e Cr o c e , cience arid
Religiotl
irl the Era c?f WilliartiJames: Eclipse
qf
Certainty, 1820- 2 880 (Chape l Hill: Universi ty of North Carol ina Press ,
1995),
vol.
I.
Croce proposes “ tha t
on
issues relating
to
the in te rsec t ion
of
science and
religion,
the middle to la te n ine teenth century is the era of Willianl James.” H e
goes
on
to
say
that “Volume 1 is abou t Jam es a nd his circle in con text of certainty
just entering an ecl ipse . Volum e I I w d cover James’s early adulthood and the
formula t ion
of
answers
to
u n c e r t a i n t y - a n d o f
a
template
for
twent ie th-century
intellectual life” x-xi). Given the quality
of
v o l u m e I , the second volume is ea-
gerly awaited.
16. T h e need
to show
that faith and
reason
are distinct but related and reconcil-
able dimension s of human be ings has been a Qstinguishing feature of
my
own
re l igous comm uni ty , Roman C a tho li c i sm, f rom the t ime of C l e m e n t of Alexan-
dria to the present . I t was
on ly a
few years
ago
tha t Pope John Paul 11
issued
an
encyclical
on
this quest ion. Of course, at
no
t h e , u p to and including the present ,
has the re bee n u nan imo us ag reem en t n the character of the faith-reason relation.
As is qui teevident ,however , he went ie th-centuryradica lrevolu t ions n
our
understanding of “reason” havehadformidable consequencesfor here levant
speculations, similar o but perhaps more profound and sure ly more unse t t l ing than
the changes that ensued
pon the
emergence of h i s t o t e l i a n i s m in the High Middle
Ages.
17.
For
a s t r i h n g a c k n o w l e d g m e n t
of
such foundational “fa i th” expressionso n
the par t of a distinguished scientist , see c h a r d Lewont in’s rev iew of Carl Sagan’s
The Denlon-Harcnted I.Vorld: Sciena ns a Candle in the Dark New
KJrk
Rewicw
of
Books,
1/9/97,
pp .
28-32).
Two tex t s
wdl
ind ica te the thrust of Lewont in’s
cr i -
t iqu e: “T he case for thescient if icmethodshould tse lfbe‘scient if ic’andnot
merely rhetorical. Unfortunately, the argum ent may no t
look
as good to the un-
convinced as it does to the bel ievers” (29); “ O u r w d h n g n e s s to accept scientific
claims
that
are against common sense
is
the key to understanding of the real strug-
gle
between science and the supernatural . We take the side of science
in
spite of
the patent absurdi tyof some of its constructs, in
spite
of i ts failure to fulfill m a n y of
i ts extravagant p romises of health and Jife, in spite of the tolerance
of
the scient if ic
community for unsubstant ia ted stones, because we
have
a prior c o m m i t m e n t , a
cornrni trnerl t to materia l ism”
(3
1)-
18. “Faith and M etaphysics Revisi ted,” noted above.
19. Dialogue
G AIliance,
I, No.1. (Spring 1987),
18.
20. Ci t e d i n Ra l p h Ba r t o n Perry, The Tl2ought
and
Chnruc.fero M’iiliamJ~mts, 2
vols. (Boston: Lit t le , Brow n and Company, 1935)II:455.
21 Alfred North W hi tehead , “The H arva rd Lec tu res for the Fall of 1926,”
cited
in
Lewis
S.
Ford,
7 7 r P
Enrergeme of Wlritchend’s
Metuplrysics,
1925- 1929
(Al-
bany: State Universi ty of N e w York Press, 1984), 309. Perhaps even more surpris-
i n g t h a n W h i t e h e a d ’ s a e r m a t i o n
f
the foundational role of belief is the follow ing
text
of
Nietzsche’s:
“a
‘faith’ mu st be there first
of
all
so
that science can acquire
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 23/323
f rom i t a direc t ion , a meaning ,a limit,
a
m e t h o d , a right to exist” (Friedrich Nietz-
sche, Otr the Gerlenlogy o Mortzls t rans. Walter Kautinann
and
R. J .
Hollingdale
[ N e w York: Vintage Books, 19693,
151-52).
22. I
believe hat heprocessive-relational o r “field”metaphysicsand
my
hypotheses concerning the self, G od , an d i~nmortality resented in S G I are reason-
ably
consistent with the b n d of world sug gested, direct ly and indirect ly ,
by
the
various sciences. This consistency
(or
perhaps lack
of
significa nt incon sistency ) is
more p re supposed than
formalIy
argued for but is frequently noted and touched
upon. For an example of work tha t dea ls more d i rec t ly wi th the re l ig ion-sc ience
rela t ion and in which there are both convergences with and divergences
iom
S C I ,
s ee J o h n P o l l u n g h o m e , 77w Faith
rf n
Phyricist: R@ections c r f
a
Bottom-Up
Tltinker
(M inneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). I have already noted and wil l develop more
fui ly in the body
of
the tex t
James’s
insistence that
al l
speculat ions concerning
realityand God must be der ived f rom hum an exper ience . He is, there fore , in
Pol lunghome’s t e rmino logy , a “ B o t t o m - U p ” t h n k e r . T h e well-real ized intent ion
of Pol lunghome’s
work is to
show the com patibi l i ty with, and in
some
instances
theenhancemen t of, Christiandoctrines by conte mp oraryphysics.“Ult imate
hope ,” however , cannot be rea l ized through a world devoid of a “sav ing” God , a
G od w hi ch physics a lone can never reveal . This ast conte ntion, how ever differen t
in deta i ls , and from
a
philosophical rather than a theological perspective, is the
central claim of SGI-no God, no iumlor ta l i ty-no inmlor td i ty , no trltirrmfe hope
I o p e n e d
by
suggest ing that we find ourselves in
a
situation similar
to
the one
James found h im se l f in
at
the turn of the last cen tury as regards the re la t ion(s)
be tween “ re l igon” and “ sc ience .”
For
a direct and accessible presentat ion of h o w
diverse and confl ic t ing twentie th-century scient ists can be when confron ted with
questions and
problems concerning the re la t ion between religon and science, see
Comas, Bios,
Tlleos, ed .
Henry
Margenau and Ro y Ab raham Varghese (La Salle,
Ill
Open Court, 1992). In addi t ion to a
series
of interviews w ith thirty scientists.
there is included a deba te be tween
two
formidable analyt ic philosophers, H.
D.
Lewis and An thony
Flew,
on
the rational necessity
for
God.
Again, this debate
is
inchcative of how a con t roversy t akmg on new u rgency du r ing the t ime
ofJames
contin ues and rem ains unre solve d to the present- just, James would add, as i t
should and wi l l cont inue
to
be .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 24/323
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I f one of the central claims of this essay is valid, then I m u s t acknowledgc a
debt to everyone wi t h w ho m I have bcen related i n a n y way, since who
we
arc as individual persons
is
inseparable from a multiplicity
a n d
diversity of
relations, past and present. Of course, no t a l l thc relations that ente r into the
constitution
of
our selves are cqually important. Hencc
I
ow e a special debt
to
a num ber of f riends who, over the
years,
directly and indirectIy, con-
sciously and unconsciously, have in varying degrees contributed to the for-
mation of whatever reflective life I may
possess.
M y
oldest
professional debt is
to
the late Ro bert Pollock, w ho intro du ced
m e to W iiliamJarnes and Am erican p hilosophy many years ago at
Fordham
Universi ty. W hether teaching medieval , m od er n, o r A merican philosophy,
Pollock possessed
a
gcnius for or ient inghis students
to
the living features of
thinkers within these periods.
M y
o w n efforts to teach Jame s have benefited
from the ques t ioning
nd
criticisms
of
m y s tudents
at Queens
Collcge,
C i ty
University of New York. Over m an y years and in different ways, m y col-
leagues in thcPhi losophy Dcparttnent have been responsible, of ten un-
know ingly, for my thinking and rethinking m any of the issucs
with
which
this wo rk is concerned.
Th ree friends of lo ng st an din g have bcen continually and crucially sup-
portive.
Joseph
Cu n n een w ho, w i th
his
wife Sally C un ne en , has edited the
journa l
Cross
Cwrenfs
for
more
than
thirty-five
years , encouraged
me
a t
the
earliest stage of the project.
Versions
of Chapter s
7
and
8
appeared as articles
in
Cross
Cuvrentr ( Sum m er 1981; Spring
1982).
Th os e art icles and the scc-
tions
of
this
book
that incorp orate the m we re edited creatively
by
William
Birm ingh am . He also read an early, very rough draft of the manuscr ipt and
made suggestions for i ts organizat ion and developm ent that were of ines-
timable value.
M y debt toJohnJ. McDermott is threefold. Firs t , I am in debt to him, as
are
all
s tudents
of
William
James,
for
his comprehensive edition
ofJames’s
xxlii
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 25/323
XXiV Ackrrowledgrrtrrlts
writings (The
Writings qf
Wil l innrJmes, N e w Y ork: R a n d o m H o u s e ,
1967),
which appeared almost
a
decade before the first
volumes
of the
superb
Ha wa rd Un ivers i ty Press edi t ion ofJames’s works . Second, both th rough
his
essays and perso nal com mu nication s over the years ,
I
have been led to
ever new appreciat ion of the range and subt le ty ofJames’s thought .inally,
McDermott’s cr i t icismsof m y views, even when they weren conf l ic t wi th
his ow n, w er e always construc tive and aime d at helping
me
give hese
views heirstrongestarticulation-withneveranattempt to urn hem
toward his own concerns .
Everyone
at
Temple Univers ity Press wi th w ho m I had dealings during
the product ion
of
the first edition was both exceptionally gracious and
invariably helpful.
I
must , however ,
single
o ut several persons. Jane C uIlen,
senior aquis it ions edtor , reviewe d the man uscr ipt in
a
rough, unf inished
form
a t a t ime whe n
I
had set i t aside beca use
of
other concerns . Her
recogni t ion of i ts possibilit ies and e nthusiastic supp ort an d enco uragem ent
gave me the impetus to br ing the project to c losure . Mary D enma n
Ca-
pouya, product ion edi tor , cont inual ly keptme informed of the myriad de-
tails conn ected with turning
a
manuscr ip t in to book and gent ly but
irmly
pressed
me
to m aintain the product ion schedule . Pat r ic ia Ster l ing’s copy-
editing
was
sensitive and insightful;
her
changes and suggest ions invariably
served to clar if i and further
my
intentions.
M y
bro ther ,
F. J.
Fontinell ,
was of
gre at help in the on erou s tasks
of
r e c h e c h n g t h e numerous textual citations and the reading of the proofs
against themanuscr ipt . Further,
his
chasteningwitkeptme aughingly
aware
of
the gap between the scope and com plexi ty of the issues under
cons iderat ion and my t reatment of them.
Finally, wis h to express a w ord
of
apprec ia t ion to Joseph Ann ent i ,
e d t o r
of
T h e
P q i n Gedenkscll@:
Dinwnrions
iut
the
Hunran Religinrrs Quest
(Ann Arbor : U nivers i ty M icrof ilms Internat ional , 1986)’which includes a
memorial
essay incorporat ing segments
of
several chapters, principallyrom
Chapter
5 .
I should like to express my thanks to Robert Cordrng for permiss ion o use
his “ K e a d m g Donne” as the epigraph to this new edit ion and
to
An-terica
magazine, where the poem first was pu blish ed ; Sal M iceli, of Q u e e n s
Col-
lege
of
The
City
Univers i ty
of
New
Yo&;
and
Dr.
M a r y
Beatrice
Scbulte,
Execut ive Edi tor of Fordham Univers i tyPress, and her colleagues there for
the ir assistance in bringm g this new edition
to
fruition.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 26/323
LIST
O F
A B B R E V I A T I O N S
Where
available, The
Works
of W illiam Jnmes
has
been
used. This critical edition of
James’s
writings is being
published by Harvard
University Press
with
Frederick
Burkhardt, General Editor,
and Fredson
Bowers,
Textual
Editor. Each volume
of
thc
Works ncludes the definitive critical edition of the text, extensive editorial notes, and
an introduction
by
a distinguished scholar.
Where a
second
datc
appears,
it is
the
year
of
the
work’s
original publication.
C E R
EP
E R E
HI
L
WJ
M S
M T
P
PBC
PP
PU
SPP
VR
E
W B
Coltelred
E s s q s nrtd
Reviews,
New York: Longmans, Green, 1920
Essays i t1 Philosophy, 1978
Essnys
i n
Radicd
Empiricism, 1976; 1912
Human Itnrnortality: TUJOupposed Object ions to the Doctritw, 2d
ed.,
with
preface,
Boston: Houghton MiWin, 1899
Letters o j
William j nmes ,
2
vols., e d . Henry
James,
Boston: Atlantic
Monthly
Press,
1920
Mernories n r ~ d tudies, New York: Longmans, Green, 1911
The Meatling o j Truth, 1975; 1909
Prqpatisrrr, 1975;
1907
Psychology: Briejer C o m e ,
1984; 1892
Principh ofPsycldogy, 2
vols.,
I981; 1890
A
Pl~rrdisticUrliverse,
1977; 1909
Some
Probkms
ofPhilosophy, 1979;
1911
The Varieties sf
Religious Experience,
1985; I902
T h e
Will
t o Believe, 1979; 1897
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 27/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 28/323
Introduction
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 29/323
Oh, wh y is no t man imm or ta l ?
. . .
W hy these
bra in
centcrs
a n d
the i r convolu t ions , why v is ion ,
specch, feeling, genius,
if
all
this is destined to
go in to the ground, u l t imate ly to growcold
together with the earth 's crust , and then for
millions
of
years to whir l wi th i t a round the sun
wi thou t aim or reason? Surely it is not necessary,
mere ly for the sake of th isooling
and whirl ing,
to draw man, w i th h is superior, almost godlike
intelligence,
o u t of oblivion and
then,
as
if
in
jest , to tu rn h im into clay.
" A n t o n C h e k h o v
Ward Six
T h u s o u r pcrsonali ty shoots, grows and ripens
without ceasing.Each of i ts nzomt 'ntss
some th ing new added to what
was
bcfore. We
may go fur ther : it is no t o n l y something new,
bu t so m eth ing unforeseeable .
-Henr i Be rgson
Crea t i ve
Evolution
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 30/323
There
would seem to
be
r hy thm s
of
emph asis in the his tory of Wcstern
thought that manifes t per~d ulum like swin gs . Th esean bc broad and
cultur-
a l
or narrow and tcchnical. Usually they are both. Am ong the mo st per-
sistent
swings
is the rationalistic-rom antic, wh ich takcs many forms. Onc
of the earhest was the Hellcnic-Hcllcnistic; evcn carlicr was the mythologi-
cal-rational. T h e primacy
of
the my thological
o r
religious should
bc
noted;
thcn, with the Greek creation o f philosophy, there begins
a
dialectic that
is
never pure andnever identical in its rcpeatcd manifestations but continues to
the present. F rom the first m om en t that an altcrnatc m ode o
thc
m ytho log-
ical account
of
the world em erge s, the dialectic begins.
Thc
mythological is
never completcly eradicated even fr o m Greek philosoph y
at
i ts apex, but
there is surely
a
shift
i n
dominance . I f it can be said that evcn Plato and
Aristotle retain certain mythological dimensions,
hey
are surely diminished
from
those foun d in hepre-Socratics.
I n
broad cultural erms, t would
seem that Nietzsche
is
right-sorncthing is killed, never to rct ur n in pre-
cisely the same form, by “Socratic rationalism.” However fulfilling a nd sat-
isfying thc exerciseof “reason” m ay have bcen for an e litc group of philoso-
pher/scien tists, t failed to satisfy thegenerality
of
humanbeings.
T h e
emergence and persistence of the Orphic a n d Elcusin ian m ys t er y d i g i o n s
alongside and con current w ith
Greek
philosophy is an early indication that
some aspect
of
hu m an experiencc, so m e nced, s notmetby“reason.”
W hether o r n o t the Hcllcnistic period was
a
“failurc
of
nerv e,” it represents
a period of varied and competing claims f o r human allegiancc,
only
one of
wh ich is the “rationrii.” Nevertheless, the rational hen ceforth w ill be
at
Icast
m e of the claims and will fulfill
a t
least one
h u m a n
nced. On ce this mode of
consciousness has em erge d, there is no
possibility of ever again com pletcly
suppressing it. It may and ndeed will be transformc d and mo dified,
bu t
i t
remains one
of
the con tinuin g charactcristics of the hum an si tuat ion.
More,
it
has
shown itself, particularly in the Wcst, to
bc
o n e o f
the
t w o
3
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 31/323
serious claims-the csthctic bcing the othcr-able to serve as alternatives to
religion.
Th c emergence
of
Christ ianity out of thc Hellenistic context moves the
dialectic to
a
new stagc. Very early the tension and outright onflict between
reason and faith appea rs.
This
faith /reaso n dialcctic has continucd
down
to
the present. Within the culturc
a t
large, w e havc tw o simple and clear posi-
tions: faith alone is su fic ie n t; reason alone is su ffk ien t. For most of Wcstern
history, however, the do m ina nt vicws have m ad e attem pts to account for
bo th. Th e Tertul lianantirationalisticpositionexpressedwh at has bcen a
continuing claim, but the view of Clement ofAlexandria that faith n r d rea-
son are both goo d and necessary
has been
the one that has held most Chris-
tians as well
as
mo st Jewish and Islamic thinkers.
Of
cou rsc, the abstract
assertion that faith and reason can no t be in r e d conflict is one thin g. Con-
crete dem ons tration th at existential and intcllcctual conflicts are o nly nppar-
etlt is quite another matter.
I
would suggest that no formal expression of the
relation betwe en faith and reason can ever bc perrnanc nt or definitive. At
best these expressions
can serve
as guidelines, as regulative ideals. Only in
the individual person can thewo
be lived
with a degree
of
relative har m on y
and reconc iliation; and even there thc tendency has becn for juxta po sition
rather than existential synthesis o r fruitful dialectic.
During the M iddle Ages and whilc the Ch urc h was the do m ina nt for-
mative factor, culturally and individually, the disputes conce rning the pr op -
er relation betweenfaithandreason were for the most part confined to
university c ircles.
All
this began to chan ge with the rise
of
the scientific
revolution.Whatever the m erits of the echnicalquestions hat em erg ed
concerning claims for the ncw science, this revolution
was to
have an effect
far bcy on d the intellectual milieu fro m w hi ch it originated. Ironically, the
anti-Galileo
ecclesiastics saw
or
sensed
this
more
perceptively
than
m a n y
defenders
of science,
includmg Galdeo himself.
What was com ing to
an end
was a world, a wo rld in w hich theistic faith (if no t m yth )
was
the central
and
controlling factor not only in matters explicitly eIigious but in
all
aspects of
hu m an life-political, cc on om ic, familial, and artistic.While dur ing he
Middle Ages phi losophy/sciencc had to show that it could
be
reconciled
with re l igion, f rom the eighteenth century on it was increasingly the
other
way around: religion had
to show
that it could
be
reconciled w ith science o r
reason. ln place
of
an earlier
view
that faith
d o r t e
was sufficient, the
En-
l ightenment brought forth
a
counterclaim that reason d o n e was sufficient.
just
as earlier fideists had view ed reason as a threat
to
the integrity of faith,
so the new rationalists viewed religious faith as a threat
to
the integrity
of
reason.
T he success of
the
ncw science and the new claims
for
reason can hardly
be exaggerated; there is
no
aspect
of Western
culture-and soon
one
will be
able to
say
of the world-that has rem aincd untou ched , for better or worse
or bo th ,
by
science and i ts consequences, proximate and rcrnote. Again,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 32/323
Irltrodrrctiorr
5
howevcr, as in
the
Greek period, reiigion did not fold its tent and silently
slip away. T h c rcsponscs a m on g those w h o sti ll af i rm ed religion, as in the
earlier period, were varied and divcrse, ranging from com plete rejection of
scientific
or
rational claims, insofar as they touch cd upon an y fundan lental
religious o r moral values,
to
a complete rationalization of religion as the
highest flowering of reason. Between thcse extremes werc numerous efforts
to m odify the claims o f bo th science and religion in such
a
way as to s how
that both werc justifiable.
T h e present situation presents a bew ildering array o f positions reflecting
mos t of the previous responses
plus a number
peculiar to thc
age.
T h e c o m -
parison o f this age
to
the Hellenistic is well taken: it is
a
period characterized
by suprem e and near miraculous achievements
in
science and technology
cornbincd with a pro fou nd sensc of alienation, frustration,
a n d
despair (per-
haps unexceeded in hum an history), giving rise to a variety of cults, re-
ligious and other, al l pro m isin g personal salvation. I t has been pointed o ut
by
a
num ber
of
thinkers that as our know ledgeof the cosm os has incrcased,
our kno wledg e of ourselve s has no t. Earlier in the century , Max Scheler
noted that for the f irst t ime in history, man had beco m e profound ly prob-
lematical to himseIf. Paradoxically, knowledgc or knowledge claims per-
taining
to
thc hum an have become
so
massive and conflicting
as
to
under-
mine almost completely our earlier confidence in the human species as well
as in individuals.
To the earlierquestion “What am
I?”
and he sorncwhat more recent
“ W h o a m
I ? ”
has been adde d, wh ether
from
Eastern sources
or
Western
decon structionist sources, the ques t ion “Am I?”
T h e r e
is
perhaps no
more
astound ing shift
in
such a short period than the twentieth-cen tury shift of
the radicalizing seg m en t of the Westcrn intellcctual co m m un ity from hu-
manisticexistentialism to an antihum anistic tructuralismorpoststruc-
turalisrn. In the first half of the twentieth century,
ome
o f o u r most creative
thinkers were insisting
o n
the reality
of
the human subject and dcfending i t
against various modes ,of objectification, wh ether from science,
m a ss
cul-
ture,
technology,
o r
intellectualism. For about the
last
twenty-fiveyears,
however,
some
of the most brilliant and creative thinkers have heralded t h e
disappearance of
the sub ject, the self, the ego, the individu al, and the like.
T he hu m an sciences, i t is claimed, must surrender the human “subjcct”
if
the human is
to
be an “object” o f science. Th us we are confro nte d with
a
situation in which “no-self’ doctrines
are
advanced by subtlc and soph isti-
cated
thinkers. A feature of some Eastern religions that
is
said to show their
superiority
to
W estern religions is that they are no t ego cen tric, that they
recognize the illusory character
of
the indiv idua l self.
To suggest, at this time, not only that the individualself
is
real but that it
may possess a reality such that its existence will no t b e restricted to its pre-
sent spatio-temporal conditions, is pro ba bly
more
foolish than daring. And
yet, and yet
.
. .
it mus t
bc
done
if for no ot he r reason than the fact that thc
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 33/323
6
Ititroductiort
question of m y person seems to me unavoidable. If, of course, this is an
isolated and idiosyncratic feeling, then my efforts will have only
a
personal
therapeutic effect at most. But I do not believe that it is only my question,
and the only way to find out is to ask, however haltingly and inadequately,
and listen for a response.
Of
course, if the only task were to ask a pollster-
like question about the afterlife, it would be quite simple and, for some,
reassuring: it would seem that a surprisingly high number of human beings
still
say
they believe in an afterlife. But while such data are not completely
irrelevant, they do not take us far in relation to the crucial question: namely,
can we who have been touched by the intellectual and experiential revolu-
tions of the contemporary world still believe with any degree of coherence
and consistency that we as individual persons are immortal?
To
respond to
this question-it is not a question that has an “answer”-is to participate, in
however modest a way, in that long and continuing effort to show that one’s
faith is not only not in essential conflict with the best insights and achieve-
ments of contemporary thought and experience but that indeed this faith is
deepened and enriched by such insights. It is not false modesty to say that
the most I can hope to do is to hint at, or point to, or suggest how such a
harmonization might be realized. Whatever the merit of any particular effort
to realize consistency between “faith” and “reason,” I share with John Her-
man Randall, Jr., the view that it is an eminently worthwhile effort. This
attempt to bring “religious beliefs into accord with philosophic truth” is
designated by Randall “rational” or “philosophical theology.” As he states:
“Its worth lies not in the formulations of the moment-they will soon give
way to others. It lies rather in the conviction that it is supremely important
to make the never ending effort to understand.”l
No response to the question, “Is the individual person immortal?” is pos-
sible without
a
prior response to the question, “What is the nature of the
individual person?” Or, in keeping with the kind of objections already re-
ferred to, “Are there such realities as individual persons?” In raising this
question, one opens
a
Pandora’s box, for there emerges a bewildering vari-
ety of allied questions-some with long histories, and others that involve
very technical matters. Among these questions are the following: Are
human beings completely accounted for in terms of matter (bracketing the
question as to what matter is)? Are human beings composed of both matter
and spirit, body and soul? If
so,
what is the role and relation of each? Are
these really distinct principles or only distinct functions? What is the nature
of consciousness? Is it substantive or only epiphenomenal? Are mind and
brain identical? If not, how can they be differentiated? What is the nature of
the human body? Is there personal identity? If
so,
how can it be accounted
for?
Is
there a distinction between the individual and the person? If so, what
is it? Is the human being identical with and reducible to her or his behavior?
Is the human being reducible to the various social structures that constitute
it
?
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 34/323
Itztvodiiction 7
The literature on these questions is vast, varied, and in many instances
highly technical, both philosophically and scientifically. Yet one can say
with reasonable assurance that there is no one position concerning the
nature of the human person, philosophical or scientific, that has anything
approaching a definitive consensus. Perhaps there will someday emerge an
understanding of the human
so
overwhelmingly persuasive that only cranks
will dissent. For the foreseeable future, however, anyone reflecting on this
question will have to make some crucial choices, assumptions, or acts of
faith. At what might be called the relatively unreflective leve1,“you picks
your horse and bets your money” and let it
go
at that. Some will accept
without question that we are merely what can be seen and touched, weighed
and measured; others who insist that we are more than
our
bodies will sim-
ply assert that this “more” is spirit or soul. The first group does not even
consider immortality. Its view is expressed succinctly in such time-honored
phrases as “seize the day,” or “you only live once,” or “eat, drink, and be
merry for tomorrow we die,” or “when you’re dead you’re dead.” The
second group has its own time-honored phrases: “What shall i t profit a man
if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?”; “this life is but
a
preparation for the next”; “the visible world is temporal while the invisible
world is eternal”; “I’m but
a
stranger here-heaven is my home.”
Both views have a variety of more or less reflective and sophisticated ex-
pressions, but they can be broadly reduced to two classical modes: namely,
materialism and dualism. Materialism has no difficulty with the question of
immortality, since it is ruled out from the start. Whatever versions of mate-
rialism are advanced, they all share the view that the individual human self
has no reality apart from or beyond the particular material complex called
the “body.” The situation with dualism is a bit more complex, because
while all materialisms exclude immortality, not all dualisms affirm immor-
tality. Aristotelian dualism, for example, apparently does not, or at least
does not clearly, allow for immortality. Thomistic or Cartesian dualism, on
the other hand, affirms at least the ontological possibility if not the necessity
of personal immortality.
Perhaps any affirmation of immortality must involve some mode of du-
alism. If so, the defender of immortality must face the formidable anti-
dualistic views that have proliferated in the twentieth century. The various
critiques of any form of Cartesian “ghost in the machine” have come close
to an antidualistic consensus. Such issues, however, are not settled by a head
count, even if those heads are impressive philosophical
or
scientific ones;
hence, it would be simply incorrect to say that dualism has been philosophi-
cally or scientifically refuted. Arthur Lovejoy’s The Refirtation o
Diralisni,
written over fifty years ago, in which the claims of a variety of impressive
philosophers to have overcome dualism are seriously and subtly challenged,
still stands as a caution against those who would lightly dismiss dualism. In
addition, the work of such respectable contemporary dualists as H. D.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 35/323
Lewis, Peter Geach, and Roderick C hi sh ol m serves as evidence that dualism
remains
a
respectable philosophical option.
Even thou gh dualism does not necessarily entail personal imm orta lity,
there can be no question that it
is
em inently cong enial to it , and that any
doctrine
of
im m or tali ty m ay be at least implicitly dualistic. This wou ld be
so
i f dualism w ere defined so broadly as to includc any view claiming that
the reality of the individual
self
is not confined to ts visible spatio-temporal
coordinates . Such a definition of dualism , however, seems un w arran tedly
broad since ma ny philosophies that claim to be antidualistic-such as vari-
o u s
forms of phenomenology-deny
along
with M artin He idegg er hat the
self is enclosed within the envelopeof the skin. As I
see
it, there are numer-
ous
and often conflicting cfforts to devise
a
doctr ine
of
the
self that escapes
bo th classical materialism and classical du alis m . Th es e efforts, in m y opin-
ion, offer the richest possibilities for an adeq uate do ctrine of the self. M y
particular concern is w heth er th ey inev itably exclude th e possibility
of
per-
sonal mmortality. That m os t of
t h e m
claim to do so is unqu estionable;
whether
a
non-dualistic do ctrine that does no t exclude imm or tali ty is plausi-
ble is the que st ion w ith w hich I am concerned.
What I
would
like to suggest and broadly sketch is
a
doctr ine of the sclf
that
is
reasonably consistent w it h
a t
least
one
m o d e
of
contemporary anti-
dualism-namely, pragm atism principally
as
expressed in the work of
WilliamJames and to a lesser extent in Jo h n Dewey)-and yet is open to the
possibility of belief in personal im m orta lity. i f such belief can be rcasonably
justified, therefore, it wou ld not find itself in conflict w ith or m ere ly jux -
taposed to a do ctr ine of th e self essentially uncongenial to such bclief. I
think doctrines of the self and im m ort alit y are needed that m utua lly rein-
force one anothe r . He nce, while
I
do
not
believe it
possiblc
to construct
a
view o f the
self
that logically entails im m ort ality ,
I
do
no t think i t enough
to
have a self that m e d y does no t positively and absolutely exclude irnrnor-
tality. What is needed is
a
self
that w ould be essentially enhanced
by
its
extension t o life bey ond the visible present. B y the sam e toke n, an
irnrnor-
tality belief merely jux tap os ed or tacked
on
to the existential self wili no t
do. Such
belief
must be s h o w n
to
be here urd now significant and effective; i t
must not merely refer to some fut ure realization-though i t will involve
the
future-but
bc
a contributing factor to the on go ing existential consti tut ing
of
the self.
M y
essay, thcrefore, has two bro ad divis ions , distinc t bu t not separate:
the possibility
of im m orta lity, and the desirability
of
immortality. The first
will focus on the nature
of
the self and endeavor to const ruct
a
doct r ine or
model that is internally coh erent, reasonably consistent, and also congenial
to immo rtality.
A
crucial corollaryof this doctr ine of theelf is an organica l-
ly
related doctrine of God, since it will be argued that only a self that has
as
one of its co ns titu en t relations he relation
to
God has the possibi l i ty for
immortality.
The
second
part
of
the essay
will
at tempt
to
show that imm or-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 36/323
Irjtrodtrction 9
tality is desirable, both in pointing toward an attractivc mode of life and in
energizing hu man beings here and now.
PRAGMATISM’S ME TAPHY SICAL
ASSUMPTIONS
Before presenting doctr ines
of
thc self and G o d,
it
will be neccssary to indi-
cate something of
how
I view the character of thc “w orld ” or “reali ty.”
W hy, it may be asked, if onc is conccrncd with the quest ion
of
immortal i ty ,
is it necessary to take
o n
such all-encompassing and ov erw he lmin g qucs-
tions as “W hat is thc wo r ld?” or “W ha t is reality?” To do so is to leap into
that intellectual thicket in wh ich ma ny formida blc thinkers have bec om c
hopelessly lost or to step intoan intellectuai quicksand that has relcntlessly
consumed precious hu m an energies.
To
put i t crudely, wh y ope n up the
metaphysical “can ofworms”? The simplest response is
to
no te that
a
wor ld
from which personal inlmortai i ty is excluded and
a
w orld in w hich it is
possible are radically digerent-and that difference gives rise to experiential
consequences o f great significance.
Does this mean that unless w e can present a fully dcvelopcd and systemat-
ic metaphysics, wc are prohibitcd from reflecting n the question of immor-
tality?
I
sincerely hope not , for
uch
a n accomplishment is
m u c h
beyond the
intellectual capability not only
of
most reflective humans but
of
most pro-
fessional philosophers. There is, however,
a
less formal sense o f metaphysics
that touche s, in various degrees, practically all
of us.
I refcr to metaphysics
as
an
“anglc of vision” or perspective from wh ich
we
view the wo rld and by
means of which w e interact with a n d pcrhaps con stitutc the wo rld. This
perspective involves a num ber
of
fundamen tal assumptions which, though
for the most part unquestioned, influence o u r lives in their various
sphcres
andactivities-assumptions,forcxam plc, hat herc is
a
wo rld; that his
world is independent of us; that we can know this world;
that
there is truth
and crror,rightand w ro n g; that w e as individualsexist. I use the erm
“assumptions” deliberately because mo st pcop lc simply take fo r gran ted ,
w ithou t q ues tion , th e principles or values by w hich they livc.
O f coursc, that hum an activity which has bcen designated “philosophy”
has always had as part of its task the qu estio ning of thos e assu m ption s, a nd
the various positions
takcn in regard
to
thc m havc givcn rise to a rich variety
of philosop hies. While in on e sense this is quite obv ious, in anothc r sense it
is less
so.
Nietzsche pcrhaps ov erstated the
case,
but
not
by m uch, when hc
accused philosop hers of failing to question their assum ptions. Philosophers
have never been hesitant to question other philosop hers’ assum ptions, but
they have ofre11 claimcd that their ow n w er e “g iv en ”
or
“sclf-evident”
or
“provcd” (by them). M ost philosophers today are more mo dest than that
about their philosophical claims, but whilc few would maintain that abso-
lute certitudc is rcalizable, m os t reject skepticism, radical subjcctivisrn, and
destructive relativism.
We might designate two
broad
tasks as involved in any philosophical
cn-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 37/323
10 Irltmductiort
deavor. Th e first is to clarify, articulate, and describe thc me taphysical as-
sumptions that govcrn one’s inquiry. While these principles are not, strictly
spcaking, provable and
arc
in a sense acts of faith, they m ust nevcrthcless be
reasonably cohcrcnt
and
consistent with data from all kinds
of
experience-
ordinary, scientific, csthetic, religious, and m ora l. Th e sec on d task, there-
fore, is to present evidence an d/ or ar gu m en ts in supp or t of these
assump-
tions or principles and to draw out hcir
inlplications-theoretical
and prac-
tical. The diverse way s in wh ich these tasks are executed result in the variety
and diversity o f philosophies manifest in every age but particularly in the
twentieth century.
O n e twen tieth-century way has been designated “pragmatism”-which
doesno t tell usvcry much,since here
arc
probably
as
manydistinct,
thoug h not totally different, pragm atism s
as
there are pragmatists. But since
I claim that
my
approach to the quest ion of personal immortality is “prag-
matic,” I m us t
indicate
what I am presupposing
when
I
usc
the term. The
m o d e
of
pragmatism-though
i t
is bu t on e version-to wh ich I incline and
which I am presupposing for the purposes of this essay can bc described as
processive, relational, pe rsonalistic, and pluralistic.
Additionally, I will understand pragmatism as both
a
metaphysics and a
method
of
evaluation.
1
use the ph rase “method
of
evaluation” rather than
“theory of
truth”
in order to bypass
the
long,
tortuous,
and often conten-
tious
criticism
of
pragmat ism
as
a theory of t ru th . I would, however, insist
o n
one
point: regardless of whether one speaks of “pragma t ic t ruth” o r
“pra gm atic evaluation,” neither can be dealt w ith ad equ ately with ou t ac-
kno wled ging the distinctive metaphy sics that accom panies and is insepara-
ble f rom them.
Now to speak of “pragmatic metaphysics”may seem ox ym oro nic , s ince i t
is
well
kn ow n that.p rag rna tisrn is antimetaphysical
if
me taphysics is under-
stood in its classical sense as know ledge of the ul timate and unchang ing
character of being- or reality-in-itself. In this senseof the term, pragmatism
t
mo st can be described as
a
m o d e of metaphysical agnosticism, since it denies
that
we
can
know
what is, or whether there is, “ultimate rea1ity”“that is,
reality constituted in itself unrelatcd to
h u m a n
experience;’ further, though
pragmatism describes reality in
terms
of processes, it remains agnostic con-
cerning any ult imate origin or end of
the
world process or processes. Ncv-
ertheless, pragmatism does no t hesitate
to
venturc so m e metaphysical
guess-
es or con s t ruct
some
metaphysical myths by way of extrapolation from
concrete experience
as
to
what characterizes reality or the world.While, on
the
basis of
what is available to human experience, therc can
be
no absolute
origin or absolute end, stil l we can discern and/or speculate about possible
direct ions and op t to w ork for som e direc tion s an d against others. Such
efforts, o f course, must be cnergized byeliefs and hop es wh ich, hough not
“provable,” are nevertheless “reasonablc.”
This
last point brings
us
back
to
“pragmatic cvaluation,” which
I
will
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 38/323
considcr a bit latcr. First, let me rctu rn to thc fou r eatures
of
pragmat ism
as
I
dcfinc i t . Instead o f vicwing
t h e m as
featurcs
of
pragmat ism, howcvcr,
I
will trcat them as characteristics
of
reality or the world; thus, t hc world
prcsupposcd thr ou gh ou t this essay is proccssivc, clatiunal, p cr so ~~ al ist ic ,
and pluralistic. T h e first tw o characteristics arc devclopcd thr ou gh ou t thc
body
o f thc tcxt; in sum m ary ,
a
world of processes and rclations contrasts
sharply and im portantly w ith
a
world of permanent or unchanging sub-
stances,
laws,
esscnccs, and valucs. Pragm atism’s wo rld cxcludcs bo th mcta-
physical du alism wh crcin reality is divide d into cha ng ing and unchanging
or tcrnporal and eternal rcalitics, and any atomistic individualisnl whcrein
beings (atoms o r gods)
exist
as
cssentially u nr cl at io n~ l, isolated. self-
enclosed, o r sclf-suficicnt.
I n
the language of Ja m es , this is
a n
“unfinished
universc” o r a “w or ld in the making”
a n d
is thercby opcn
to
radical novchy.
All modcs of
h u m a n
activity take on 3 potential ly creat ivc r o k
i n
such a
world. What thc world will bc depends, a t least in pa rt, o n o u t thoughts ,
beliefs, lovcs, ho pe s, hates, and actions. T h e nature and rolc of i ~ n r nor t a l i t y
belief within such
a
w orld is, of course, a central concern of this essay.
W O R L D O R REALITY
AS “PERSONALISTIC”
Therc
is
a
s t ronger and
a
wcakcr
S C ~ S C
n
wh ich the wo rld or reali ty
call
be
designated “personalistic.” In the wcaker
sense we would
have
a
world that
includcs
o r
gives rise to
s a n e
beings categorizcd as “p crs on s.” A pcrson-
alistic w orld
117
the s t ronger sense would
bc
one in which all rcal beings arc
characterized by “pc rson ho od .” For mostpeoplc, the firstclaim s
ob-
viously truc and the sccond ob vio us ly false. W hich of these senscs wo uld
express pragmatism’s m ean ing of “personalistic world”? A s stated, neither;
propcrly modified, howevcr, p ragmatism’s rncaning would be
closer to the
stro ng sense. Pragmatism’s version
of
such
a
world claims to find in pcrson-
a1
expcricnce traits c o m m o n
to
all realities. Therc arc hints, t hough n o de-
veloped prescntation, of such a vicw in Jamcs, Dewcy, and Alfred Nor th
W hitehcad, who-on this p o i n t at east-can bc brought undcr the
u m -
brella of pragm atism. Befo re rcview ing tcxts in which these thrce thinkers
maintain that a n y metaphysical gcneralizations
must
be groundcd in immc-
diate
experience, it is impor tan t
to
understand what is m ean t by “experi-
ence” throughout this essay, particularly because much
of
wh at will be said
abou t self , G od , an d im m orta l i ty will
be
extrapolatcd from
pcrsonal
expcr-
ience.
T h e nature and rolc
of
“experience” within pragmatismis
a
sto ry in itself,
a
lon g an d no t always clcar on e. For prcsent
purposcs,
a
fcw
key points will
sufflcc. “Expcriencc,” for the pragmatists, is
not
identical with the “experi-
encc” o f classical em piricism stemm ing from D a v i d Humc and John Stuar t
M ill. T h c differences are described clcarly and sharply by Dcwcy in
a
1917
essay cntitlcd, “TheN e c dfor a Rccovery inPhilosophy.”3
He
contrasts
what
I
shall
call
the
traditional and
the
pragm atic views o n five points. First,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 39/323
whereas xperience n the raditionalview is primarily a “knowlcdgc-
affair,”
for the pragmatist it is “an affair
of
the intercourse
of
a Iiving being
with its physical and social cnv iron m en t.” Se con d, expcricnce fro m the tra-
ditional perspectivc is pri m ari ly psychical and pcrrncated by “subjectivity”;
to the pragmatis t , experience suggcsts an object ive world modifying and
modified by human actions and sufferings. Third, experience is traditionally
seen as tied to th c past o r as “given ”; in i ts pragm atic mode
it is
experimcn-
tal, oriented to ch ang ing the given and thereby having conn ection with a
futu rc as its salient trait. Th e fou rth po int of contrast is between an “em-
pirical tradition committed to particularism” and o n e
for
which experiencc
is “p reg na nt w ith con nc ction s.” Finally. experience and thoug ht are anti-
thetical terms from the traditional p erspectivc, wh ercas pragmatism’s expe-
rience is “full of inference”and hereb y ende rs reflection“nativeand
constant.”
Stated
most
succinctly and i n Deweyan language, experience for the prag-
matist is an organism-environm ent t ransactiona4 Since there arc a variety
and diversity of such transactions, therc is a variety o f experiences differing
in scope and quality, suc h as cogn itivc exp erience, c sthctic cx pcrience, affec-
tive exp erien cc, and religim s expe:iencc. W hile we can distinguish hese
various experiences, they never operate in complete isolation, nor d o thcy
relate
to
separate
modes of
reality.
How
these different modes of experience
relate,
overlap, and interpcnetratc is
a
most complex question and can never
be
described with definitive clarity. An y distinctions betwe en them are nev-
er made “for thcir ow n sake” or in an at temp t to mirror the way hese
experiences allegedly
are
“in themselves.” Rather, thc distinctions can only
be justified pragmaticaIly insofar as thcy deepen , enrich, and illuminate the
quality of hu m an ife.
Bearing in m ind
this
view
of
expcrience
as
transactional,
let
u s
look
a t
a
few texts
that
point toward pragmatism as a “metaphysics of experience,” In
his essay “Th e Philoso phy of W hitehca d,” De we y notes hat whatever their
otherphilosophical differences, “the back grou nd and point of depar ture
seems
to
be the same for both of us.” T he crucia1 point held in co m m on is
that “the traits of experience provideclews for form ing‘generalizcd dcscrip-
tions’ of nature.” Dewey goes o n
to
emphasize the importanceof this shared
claim:
The idea that the imm ediate traits
of
distinctively human expericncc are highly
specialized cases of what actually gocs
on
in every actualized event of nature
does
infinitcly more han merely deny the existence of an impassable gulf
between physical and psychological subject matter. It authorizes us,
as
philos-
ophers engaged in forming highly general ized descript ions
of
nature , to use
the
traits
of
immediate experience 5 clews
for
intcrprct ing our observat ions f
non-human and non-animate na ture .
5
Ther e
is
l i tt le do u bt that Dewey has correctly represented W hitehead’s per-
spective,
for
early in Process and Renli ty we are told that “the clucidation of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 40/323
Itltrndtlctiorr
13
immediate experience is the sole justification for any thoug ht; and the start-
ing point for tho ug ht is the analytic observationof components of this expe-
riencc.”hElsewhere,Whitehcadstates: “Theworldwithin
cxpcricncc
is
identical with the
world
beyond e x p ~ r i e n c c . ” ~
Earlier than either Dewcy o r Whitehead, James insisted that personal ex-
pericncc is the crucial pathw ay to w hatever reality is available to us. In his
last work, unpublished a t the t ime of his death, James asks “whetherwe are
not ‘here witnessing in our own personal experience what is really the es-
sential process of creat ion” (SPP, lOS} *
And
in the last w o r k
he
published,
he maintained that “ the onlymater ia l we haveat
our
chsposal for making a
picture of the w ho le wo rld s supplied by the various por t ions
of
that world
of
w h i c h w e
have
already had exp erience ”
(PU,
9).
A
s i d a r
point
had
been expressed elsewhere: “No philosophy can everd o more than in te rpre t
t he w ho le , w h ich
is
unknown, af ter the analogy of
some
particular part
which w e k n o w ” (CER,449).
I
will later discuss the w ell-known-some m ig ht say notorious-Jamesian
no tion that life o r experience “excceds
our
logic” and its corollary thatexpe-
rience o r feeling brings us to a deeper and richer reality, to “m or e” reality,
than we are ever able
to
verbalize or conceptualize. Here I wo uld like merely
to to uch upo n this them e insofar as it indicates
a
dim ension o f wha t is im-
plied in the claim that we live in a personalistic univcrsc.
Ralp h Barton Perry does not hesitate to say that the priority of original
experience over representations or descriptions is “ the mo st general princi-
ple
in
Jam es’s p h i I o ~ o p h y , ” ~ames himself emphasized “the gaping contrast
between the richness of life and the po verty
of
all possible formu las”
(TC,
11:127),
and ma intained that “so m ethin g forever exceeds, escapes fro m state-
ment ,wi thdraws from definition,mustbeglimpsedand fel t, no t old ”
(TC,
II:329).
It
is
in relig ion that th e personal an d feeling characteristics
are
mo st in evidence, for “th e religious individual tells you that the divine
meets
him o n the basis of his personal concerns” (VRE,387). Further, “feeling
is
the deeper source of religion,” a nd that is w h y Jame s calls theolog ical for-
mulas secondary. H e do ub ts that any philosop hic theolog y wo uld ever even
have been framed “in a world in whichno religious feeling had
ever
existed”
( V R E ,
341). o
The point I particularly wish to stress here is that while the personal and
experientialarepreeminently fou nd inreligion, heyarenotexclusively
found
there. Jam es ma intains hat scientific and religious ruths are con-
sis tent and ho m og en eou s
because,
insofar as their final appeal is
to
experi-
ence, they are bo th “truth s of experience”
(TC,
I:451). A mo re imp or tan t ,
and su rely mo re controversial claim
is
that o u r deepest and fullest grasp of
reality is by means o f th e personal rather than the impersonal: “So long as
we deal w ith the cosmic and the gen eral , we deal only with the syrnbols of
reality, but
as
soon a5
we deal
with
the
private
and
personal yhenometja
a5
S U C ~ , e
deal
u d h
realities
in
the
completest
sense
of
t h e
lerm”
( V R E ,
393).
Thus,
from
James’s perspective, the “impersonality of
the
scientific attitude” is shallow.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 41/323
Bu t James docs not consider the im pers on al w orld dcscribed b y m od ern
science a s the last word, even for science.
T h e
spirit and principles
of
science
are
mere
affairs of
method; there
is
nothing
in them that need hinder science from dealing successfully w i t h a wor ld
i n
which personal forces are t hc starting-point of new effects. T h e only form of
things that we directly encounter, the only experience hat we concrctr ly
h a w ,
is o u r own
personal life. .
. . And
this
systcmatic
denial on science’s
part
of
personality
as
a condition
of
events, this rigorous
belief
that in its ow n essen-
tial and innermost n a t ~ l r e l l r world
is a
strictly
impcrsonal
world,
may,
con-
ceivably, as the whirligig
of
t i m e goes round,
prove
to be thc very dttfcct that
o u r descendants will be most surprised
a t
in o u r own boastcd science, he
omission
that to
their
cyes
will
most
tend
to
m a k e
i t
look
perspcctiveless
and
shor t .
( W B ,
241)
In sum , then, pragm atism’s universe can be said to be “personalistic” or
“expcricntial” because transactional activity, which is most immediately and
richly evidenced in persona1 experience, is generalized o r posited as “rncta-
physical”: that is, as con stitutive
of
all realities. “ H u m a n ” experience, there-
fore, is not in
ome
magical fashion superad ded to nature; rathcrt
is
but
onc
of
a
multiplicity
of
modes
of
transactional activity. Hence, James insists that
the “word ‘activity’ has no irnaginab lc content w hateve r save these experi-
ences
of
process, obstruc tion, striving , strain, or rclease, ultimate q u a l i a as
they are of the life given us to be known.”
We
cannot, therefore, suppose
activities to
g o
on outs ide our exper ienceunless we suppose them in forms
like these ( E R E , 84).
T h c
metaphysics presupposed by pragmatism, then,
might properly be designated “transactional realism.”
PLURALISTIC
U N I V E R S E
T h e processive-pluralistic character of reality will
be
in cvidence thro ug ho ut
the body
of
the text. We shall com e to see in more detail that in the w orld
presupposed by pragmatism there is a multiplicity of ccntcrs of activity, no
one of which
is
completcly isolated or unrelated and no onc of which in-
cludes all the othe rs.
If
we designate this “ontological pluralism,” then we
cancall itscorrelativepluralism“epistemological.” Inasmuch as this is
a
“pluralistic, restless univ erse,” the entire univ erse can not
be
encompasscd
within any single po int
of
view
(WB,
136).
According toJames, “We have
so
many differcnt businesses with nature that no one
of
the m yields us
an
all-
embracing clasp”
(PU,
19).
1
Experience
shows
us that the universe is “ a
m or e many-sided affair than any sect, even thc scientific sect, allows fo r”
( W E , 104). Since “to no one
type
of mind is it given to discern the totality
of
t ru th” ( W B , 224),James is led to suggest that “co m m on sense is better for
one sphere of Iife, science for ano ther, ph iloso phic criticism for
a
third” I),
93). Such epistemological pluralism is, of course, a m o d e of perspectivism,
but
it
is
not-or at least no t ob vio us1 y”a m od e
of
destructive relativism
and superficial subjectivism. Pragm atism ackn ow ledges that every tho ug ht
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 42/323
claim is perspectival and partial, bu t it does no t th ereb y con ccd c that we are
prohibited from making reasonable choices am on g such claims or perspec-
tives. W hich brings us to the nature and role of “pragmatic e valuation.”
PRAGMATIC INQUIRY AND EVALUATION
An y pragm atic inquiry is indefinitely open-ended, particularly when deal-
ing with such issues as
self, Go d, and imm ortality. The initial stage m igh t
be
designated “ pro bativ e” o r “e xp lorato ry.” n this stage,
a
hypothesis must
be constructed that is no t glaringly contradictory or inconsistent. T h e evi-
dence in favor of the hy po thesis m ust be bro adly described and its possible
fruits indicated. This stage will, for the most part, bracket r move gingerly
over
many technical details an d difficulties to w hich the hyp othe sis gives
rise.
(It
is within this stage that,
for
the mo st part, the present essay will be
located.) Subsequent stages
of
a pragm atic inquiry will have to deal with
these diffrculties and eithe r ov erco m e them or m od ify the hy po thesis ac-
cordingly. C oncu rrently, the projected “fruits” will
have
to beevaluated.
This meet ing of diff’culties and evaluation of frui ts wil l bc co ntinuous and
ongoing, and he hypo thesis will remainviable on ly as lo ng as, “on the
whole,” the d i f f~cul t ies are not insuperable and the fruits are sufficiently
abundant .
In regard to the investigation and evaluation of personal imm ortali ty, the
pragm atist insists upo n two things. First, i t cann ot be either proved or dis-
proved.
Second, and
more im po rta nt, believers have the obligation to evalu-
ate their belief and to search o u t its “justifying re3sons.”12 Such evaluation
must evcntuaIly relate to conc rete cxpcrienc e. Morc specifically, it must re-
spond to the extentpossible to the overwhelm ing mass
of
cumulative
expc-
rience, wheth er qu otidia n, histo rical, artistic, scientific, moral, o r religious.
Any
conclusion s xcachcd in this evaluative process will always
be
tentativc
and subject to modification under the
press
of fu turecxpcricncc. but we are
not thereby cxcused from ma king the mo st “reason ablc” case possible at
any moment . l 3
Without pretending to present 3 fuIly developed description of pragmatic
inquiry and cvaluation, I would like to call attention to
a
few crucial p oin ts
both for
the purpose
of
clarification and to avoid
a
gross misunders tanding
of the claims ofp rag m atisrn . To begin with, whatever thc diffkulticsassoci-
ated w ith pragmatism’s “method”-and thcy are
n u m er o u s
a n d
wcll
docu-
mented-there is n o possibility of unders tanding it
unless
one remains
aware
of
itsmetaphysicalassumptions, alrcadyalludcd to. Pragmat ism
posits
a
processive-relational w or ld, an “unfinished universe,”
a
“world in
the making.” Within such
a
wo rld, prag m atism opposcs-in thc language
of Dewey-any “p art itio nin g of erritories’’ wh ereb y “facts” are assigned to
science and“values”
to
philosophyandreligion.
I t
denies hatscience is
grounded
o n
reason while mo rality and religion are gro un dc d o n faith. I
Pragmatism very early surrendered the great Western dre am , bro ug ht to
a
crescendo by Rcn6 Descartes and reprised by Ed m un d Husscr l,
of
ground-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 43/323
16
Irrtrodt.rctior1
ing ph ilo so ph yls cie nc e on n absolutely certain foundation.1s This rejection
does not lcad the pragmatist to embrace either irrationalism
or
subjectivistic
relativism. Reason has
a crucial and indispensable role to play i n human life;
it is , however, bu t on e m od e
of
experience, on e m od e
of
transaction
be-
tween poles o f reality, and it neither exists nor operates in isolation from
other modes .
For pragma tism, the wo rld is neither simply “rational” nor “irrational,”
though i t involves dim ension s of both. There is evidence for belicving that
the world
is b e m r r i q
more rational and that humans have a crucial role
to
play in that rationa lizing
process.
“T he w or ld, ” James tells
us,
“has shown
itself, to a great extent, plastic to this dcmand of ou rs for rationality.” H e
goes
on
to
say that the only mc ans
of
f inding out how
m u ch
m o r e
i t
can
become rational is t o t r y ou t ou ronceptions
of
m ora l as well as mechanical
or logical necessity ( W B , 115). 6 In surre nd ering the quest for absolutes-
wh ether found ations, truths, values, o r ends-pragmatism is not
surrender-
in g its q ue st fo r “ r e a s ~ n a b l e n e s s . ” ~ ~urther, the denial of final c losur e on
anyqucstion does notexclude thepossibility of-indeed, thcnecessity
for-intellectual
a n d
existential judgments anddecisions. All nontrivial
judgments and decisions will have the characteristics of incompleteness and
tentativeness and will lack the feature
of
absolute certitude.
Of
course,
if
probab ility and provisionality were merely cha racteristics
of
pragmatic in-
quiry and evaluation, it wou ld hard ly
be
of mo me nt. Pragm atism insis ts ,
however, that the limitations of inq uir y are due not to the incompetence of
pragmatis ts but to the nature of the
world
within wh ich inquiry and valua-
tion are exercised. James conced es that pragm atism can be legitimately re-
proached with “vag uene ss and subjectivity and ‘on-the-whole’-ness,” but
he quickly adds that the “entire life of man”
is
liable to the same reproach.
“If
we
claim only reasonable probability, it
will
be as mu ch as m en w ho ove
the truth can
ever
a t
any g iven moment hope to have within their grasp”
( V R E ,
266, 267). 9
All pragmaticevaluations, whether of ideas, beliefs, valucs, or institu-
tions, are always
open
to modification and correction. As statcd by D ewey:
“A ny
onc of
our belicfs is subjcct to criticism, revision,
a n d even
ultimate
elimination hrough hedevelopment of
i ts ow n mp licationsby intcl-
ligently directed action.”2o If pragmatism’s method cane said to
bc
model-
ed
o n
that
of
modern
science, it
is
insofar as it share s with cience the feature
of self-correction. This is
a
co m m un ity process with “later views correct ing
earlier ones” (PP, 1:191), resulting in a continually cumu lating espericncc.”
This cumulative experiencc nables us to build on earlier successes, however
partial, n an eff ort oengenderne w successes, howeverpartial. While
“there are no successes
to be
guaranteed” ( V R E , 299) and n o certain, uncor-
rectable conclusions to
be
reached,wcare not thereby “playing into the
hands of ske pticism .” Jam es insists that it is on e thing “to ad m it one’s lia-
bil ity to correct ion ” and quite another
“to
embark upon
a
sea
of
wanton
doub t” (
V R E , 267).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 44/323
1ntr.odrtctiorl
17
Granted tha t pragmatism excludes any definitive “once and for
all”
m o d e
of cvaluation, ho w m igh t it be described rnorc positively? Statcd simply,
much too simply,wecan say that w ith in the processive-relational world
presu pp ose d by prag m atism , idcas, beliefs, sym bo ls, and institutions-all
of wh ich originate in experience-can bc jud ge d on ly on the basis
of
the
experientialconscquences or qu al ity of life they brin g forth . Th is is ex-
pressed most succinctly in Dewcy’s pragmatic test foranyphilosophy:
“Does i t end in conclusions wh ich, wh en they are referred back to ordinary
life-experiences and their pred icame nts, rend er thc m m o re significant, m o re
luminous to us, and mak e our dealings with them more frui tful?”” The
conscquentialism that distinguishcs pragmatism is by no means crystal clear
and consistent, nor does it have an identical me an ing
in
Charles Sanders
Peirce, Jam es, and Dew ey. W ithout making any at tempt to delineate what
the methods of these three pragmatis ts share and wherehey diverge, let me
simply draw
o n
a
few
texts ofJa m es, since his approach is most congenial to
my purposes.
To begin with, thcre is a well-rccognizcd am big uity in James’s pragm atic
rncthod that allows for bo th
a
positivistic and a personalistic rcading.
T h u s
Elizabeth Flower and M urray G. Murphey note a certain relaxation o f the
pragmatic cr iter ion whereby i t is broadened “from verifying consequences
in particular sensible expericnces to consequences for the quality of hum an
living.”23
I t
is the personalistic o r human istic crnpha sis to w hich I am at-
tracted and which
I
conside r mo re faithful to the
full
range ofjamcs’s notion
of experience. S om eth in g of his is expressed by H.
S .
Thayer: “T h e partic-
ularly extraordinary feature o f Prugrmztisrn
.
. . is its reflection ofJames’s ar-
dent concern to bring philosophic thought into immediate contact with the
real perplexities, the uncertainties and resurgent hopes that permeate ordi-
nary human experience”
(P ,
xxxv ii). Perry, in no ting that
for
James “the
basic dogmas of religion are not wholly wi thout evidence,” addshat James
compiles this evidence by “appealing to experience in the broad sense, and
rejecting that narrower or positivistic vc rsion of experience which already
presupposes
a
naturalistic world-order.”24T h i s broadened meaning of expe-
rience is expressed in whatwasperhaps Jarncs’s last formulat ion
of
the
“pragmatic rule”: “T he pragmatic rule is that
the
meaning
of
a concept may
always be fou nd, if not in s om e sensible particular which it directly desig-
nates, then
in
s o m e
particular difference in
the
course
of
hu m an experience
which its being true will make” ( S P P ,
37).
In stressing the practical consc qucn ces, for “any one,” of an idea or a be-
lief, Jam es left himself o pe n
to
the charge of fos ter ingnarrow and destruc-
tive subjectivism.
There
can
be
no do ub t that his failure to make so m e cru-
cial distinctions lent some support to this ~ h a r g e , ~ 5hough I am persuaded
that the weigh t and totality
of
his th o ug ht is against it. Jame s
surely
in-
tended
to
make satisfaction
of
the individual
a
crucial factor in any prag m at-
ic evaluation,
but
what
is no t u sually adequ ately stressed is that Jame s
re-
jected the atomistic individualism that is a necessary co m po ne nt of
the
kind
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 45/323
18 Itttrodrrctiott
of subject ivism with which hc was oftcn charged. I t is the burden of a largc
segment of this essay to spell out
a
relational view of the indiv idua l self
which was, as a m i n i m u m , ituplicit in James’s thou gh t. Jud gin g wh at is “sat-
isfactory” or “satisfying”
for
such
a
self is im me nsely more com plex than
describing w hat
appears
to satisfy some imaginary or psychically isolated
ego. In a letter to Perry, written
a
few years before his de ath, Jam es ex-
pressed his dismay at being misunders tood.
T h e pragmatism that livcs inside of me is so different from that of which
I
succeed in wakening the idea inside
of
other
pcoplc,
that theirs makes me feel
like
cursing God and dying. When I sny that,
other
t k i t p
bcirlg c g t r n l ,
the view
of things that secms more satisfactory morally will Iegitin~atcly e t reated by
men
as
truer
than
the
view
that
secrns
less
so ,
they
prole
t t ~ ~
s
s a y i t ~ ~ q
hat
anything
morally
satisfactory c a n
be
treated as true,
no
matter how unsatisfac-
tory it may be from thc point
of
view of its consistency with whatw e already
know
or
believe to be true about physical o r natural
facts.
Which
is
rot (TC,
II:468)
BecauseJarnes’s
rclationalism was so often overlooked, his pragm atism is
reduced
to
such crude formulat ions as “any thing is t rue or
good
if it makes
som eon e feel good.” Inasm uch as emotion ally “feeling good”
is
but onc of
num ber
of
relevant factors
in
the s i tuat ion f an yndividual, itcan never serve
as the
sole
cri ter ion of wha t is judg ed
“good.”
James quiteexplicitly rejccted
such a view wh en he said that “w hat imm ediately feels m os t ‘good’ is not
always m os t ‘true,’ w h e n rneastrred 6 y the uerdict
oftlzr
rest o j e x p e v i e n c r . .
.
.
I f
merely ‘feeling good’
could
decide, drunk enne ss wo uld
be
the supremely
valid h um an expe rience” (VRE, 22; i talics added). T he sam e failure to ac-
kno wled ge the elational context that
ames
takes forgra ntcd results in reduc-
ing pragm atism tself to cru de ormulas: “w hatever w orks for the individual
is
good,”
for exam ple. in suppor t
of
such an interpretation on e m igh t cite
lames’s
claim that pragmatism’s “only test
of
t ruth is what works best i n the
way of
leading
us.”
What would be lef t out in suchn interpretation, hgwcv-
er, is the rest of the sentence in wh ichjam es adds som e ualifications: “ w ha t
fits every part
of
l i fe best and combines with thecollectivity o f experience’s
demands , nothing being omit ted” (P , 44; italics added). H e expresses the sam e
acknowledgment of the co m ple xity of evaluation as
follows:
“ l f t h e o f o ~ q i c n l
ideas prove t o have
a
vaiuefor concrete Ji Jk they wi l l be true, f o r yragrtratistlz,
it1
the
sense ofbeing
goadfor
so
t n u c h .
FOY
ow
much
wmre
they
are
trtte,
will
depend erlrirely
O H heir relations to f h e other trzrths that a h ave to be a C k t md e d g e d ” ( p , 40-41).26
I am not for a moment sugges t ing that Jameschieved such complexeval-
uation
of
any
of o u r
rcligious o r m or al bciiefs, and
I
am most certainly not
suggesting
that I will realize such achievem ent in what
follows. I
am sug-
gesting,however, hatwhatever shor tcomingsp r agm at i s m may have, it
cannot
properly be
charge d with taking the easy road to evaluation. Indeed,
it points toward
a
m ethod that for even partial reaiization would
be
im-
mensely dem anding and r igorous.
In
The
brietier
of
Religious
Experience,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 46/323
James designated threc tests that are applicable to religious truth: immediate
luminousness, philosophical reasonablencss, and moral h elpfulness (VRE
23). Perry notcd that “thesc arc new name s for cri tcria of kn ow led ge w hich
appear repeatedly in
James’s
philosophy”
(TC,
1~ 334) .
n
A
Pluvulistic
Utai-
ueyse,
James said that “ratio nality has at least four dmensions, intellectual,
aesthetical, moral an d practical.” He addcd that “to find a w orld rational
to
the maximal dcgree
r l a l l
these respects
s imdtnneous ly
is no easy m atter.’’ T h e
task wo uld be to get “a con cep tion wh ich will yield thc largest balnrlce o f
rationality rather than o ne w hi ch will yicld pcrfect rationality of cvery de-
scription” ( P U , 55). Since I a m
suggcsting
that “pragmaticevaluation”
claims
to
be a m o d e of “rational” evaluation, thesc last texts serve to rein-
force m y claim that pragm atism, while affirming person al cxperience as its
ultirnatc touchstone, involves
a
divcrsity of subtle criteria in its effort to
rcach any concrete evahation of thc lived conscqucnccs of an dea, belief, o r
institution.
It
is againstuch back groun d resupp ositions that
I
willmaintain
throughout this
essay
that the wor th of any bclief in imm orta lity ( o r its
countcrbelief) must be evaluated in rclation to hum an cxpcricncc. Louis D u -
pr6 has sug gcstcd that
“ the
belief in life after death appcars to have gro w n
out
of
actual expericnccs more than
out
of
reasoning proce~ses .” ’~ Whether
or
not
Dupr@
s correct conce rning the origin
of
this belief, I
would
main-
tain that in thc past
i t
has been a significant belief on ly to the ex ten t that it
has bornedirectly o r indirectlyupon personalexperience.By he
s a m e
token, it has tended to become insignificant in proportion to its distance
f rom heongoing lives of humanbeings. A pragmatic nquiry nto he
nature and wor th of bclief
in
persona l imm ortality must, therefore, bring
forth the positive and negative, actual and implicit, conseq uence s
of
such
belief, Th is kind
of
approach, i t
is
impor tan t
to
note ,
is
not restricted
to
description, even assu m ing that such description could bemore nearly com-
plete than it ever is. Pr ag m atic inq uir y also includes a spe culative o r critical
component that suggcsts possibilities
for
a future course of action. Put s im-
ply,
on
the
basis
of the way things are an d have
been,
the pragm atist ven-
tures
a
guess as to
how
they m igh t be-“guessing” that takes the
mode
of
extrapolation.
PRAGMATIC
EXTRAPOLATION
Any effort
to
ta lk about
a
fu ture mode of the individual self
or
the
cosmic
proccss, o r even abo ut this process considered as
a
totality
o r
as a whole,
takes
us
beyond both direct experienc e and nferential reasoning , strictly
considercd.28
Such
a movement m ight be designated specu lation, irnagina-
tion, or the term em ployed here, extrapolat ion. Any pragmatic extrapola-
tion
of the future, as I have pointed
o u t
elsewh ere,29 mu st ulfill
at
least four
cond itions. First, i t mu st procee d from data given in experience. Second,
this
projected future must
be
plausible-that
is,
i t must not
be
in fundamen-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 47/323
tal conflict with the data from wh ich it s an cxtrapolat ion. T hi rd , the futurc
state m u s t be sufficiently differcnt from the present statc o that the f utu re is
not me rely the present indcfini tcly extended. F ourth and most impor tan t ,
the
extrapolation m ust rcnder
our
prese nt lifc-in bo th
its
individual
and
com m un al aspects-morc meaningful, m o rc significant, and more rich.30
Since the goal of extrapolation in the prcsent endea vor is
to
produce
a
m d e 2 of the self and the cosm ic procc ss wh ich is ope n to immortal i ty , a
word should be said ab out how “m ode l” is to be unders tood. Ian Barbour
has givcn us an cxcellent description o f thc naturc and role
of
modcls in both
science and religion. A ltho ug h
I
cannot c la im Barbour for the pragmat ic
tradition-he calls him self a “critical realist”-I will ap pr op ria te so m e f his
language concerning models which
I
f ind eminently congenial to pragma-
Broadly speaking,
a model
is a sytnbolic represcntation of selccted aspects
of the bchaviour of a com plcs syste m for a r ticular purposes. I t is a n imagina-
t ive tool far ordinary experience, ra ther than a descript ion of the world. .
.
.
Models arc taken seriously
but
n o t literally. T hc y are nei the r literal pictures
of reality nor “useful fictions,” but partial and provisional
ways
of imag in ing
what is n o t obscrvablc; they arc sym bolic reprcsentat ion of aspects
of
the
wo rld wh ich are not directly accessible
to
us .
Models in religion are
also
analogical.
They
are organizing images used
to
orde r
and interpret pat terns of experience
in
h u m a n life. Like scientific mod-
els, they are neither literal pictures
of
reality nor useful fictiom. . . . Ult imate
models-whether
of a
personal
God
o r
a n
imp erson al cosm ic process-direct
a t tent ion to particular patterns in events and restructure the way on e secs the
world. ( M M P ,
6-7)R1
T he kind o f pragmatic mod el called for would not pretend to give
us
either
a
pictorial or
a
conceptual representation
of
reality. Its chief function
will be to enable us
to
participate m or e creatively in and w ith reality. Such
a
mo del mu st result from an extrapolative process that begins
in
and relates
back t o conc re te e~ p e r i e n ce .~ ’ike any pragmatic evaluation, i t will be sub-
ject to criticism in terms of consistency, cohercncc, and cont inu i ty ofcxpe-
riencc, but its ultimate worth will be determined
by
the qu ality of ife that i t
suggests, cncourages, and
makes
possible.33
PE RSONAL
I MMOR TALtTY
O n e f inal in t roduc tory poin t : thc conccrn of this essay is yersorral immor-
tality-by which is meant s imply and crudely the survival o f thc “I” or the
At least five other modes of immortality have been suggested: ab-
solute spirit imm ortality (we are imm ortal insofar as we are absorbed with
the Eternal Spirit , or the Everlasting God, o r t h e
O n e ) ;
cosmic im mortal i ty
(we
are
immo rtal insofar as we crnerge f rom and return to the
cosmos
o r
nature); ideal immortality(weare mm ortal nsofar as
we
participate
in
timeless values
or
eternal ideals); achievement im m or tal ity
we
arc immor ta l
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 48/323
th rou gh ou r creative acts
or
dceds); poster i ty immo rtali ty (wc arc i ~ n n l o r t a l
through our chi ldren, or the com mun i ty ,
or
the race).3s
N o w whatcver their differcnces and howcver v ah a b lc thcir rcspcctive in-
sights, thesc fivc m od es all have on e th in g in com mo n-the individual per-
son will cease to
bc,
hc o r she will be w ith ou t rernaindcr,
at
thc
m o m c n t of
death.36 M y con tentio n, in contrast tho ugh not totally in op po sition , is that
the loss involvcd in such modes ofyevsorzless inlmortal i ty is directly propor-
tional
to
the worth of the individual pcrson;
flirther,
fai l ing personal immor-
tality, that there are n o adc quate surrogates which can serve to allcviatc the
pain of loss . Assuming that human pcrsonsareprecious calizations of
nature or the cosmic process, th c failure to maintain thcse persons in that
m ode
of
individua lity upo n wh ich heir prcciousness dcp en ds
m a y
be
a
harsh truth to
be
endured
but
surely not to be celebrated. Finally, while
beliefs in im m ortality throu gh idcals, achievements, nature, hu m an kin d, o r
God havc becn k n o w n to and can continu e to inspire and cncrgize a por t ion
of humanity, the
exclusion
o f
the
individual person from these modes can-
no t bu t have a radically dirninishcd pragm atic efficacy for the ov erw hclm ing
numbcr of h u m a n beings.37
Further, the con tem po rary awareness of the proba ble obliteration, natu-
rally or hum anly induced ,
of
the earth and
its
inhabitants has dcprived
at
lcast three
modes
of imm ortali ty (cosmic, achicvem cnt, postcr i ty) of m u c h
of their attraction even for thcse sclcct grou ps . From am ong thc num erous
expressions of pessimism concerning the earth’s futurc,
it
will sufice to citc
two, one f rom a philosopher (Bertrand Russcll) and onc f rom a poet
(W.
B.
Yeats).
Tha t all the labor of th e ages,
all
the devotion, all th e inspiration, all the
noon-
day brightness of h u m a n
genius,
are dcstined to extinc tion in the vast death o f
the solar system, and that the whole temple of M an’s achievemcn t m ust inev-
itably be buried bencath the debris of a universe in
ruins-all
these things , if
not
quite beyond dispute, arc yet so nearly ccrta in, that no ph ilosop hy w hich
rejects them
can
hope
to
stand.3*
T h e wander ing
ear th
herself may be
O n l y a sudden f laming word ,
In clanging space a m o m e n t h e a r d ,
Troubling the cndlcss rcverie.39
Ther e is perhaps no more plaintive cry against any kind
of
immortal i ty
that excludes the individual person than the on e f o u n d in T f l e
Brorhevs
Ku-
ramarov:
“Surely 1 haven’t
suffered,
simply that I , m y crimes
and
my
suffer-
ings, may manure
the
so il o f t he f u tu r e h a r m on y , f o r s om ebody
Ise.
I want
to sec wi th m y ow n
eyes
the hind l ie do wn with the l ion and the victim rise
up and ernbracc
his
murderer . I wa nt to be there when everyone suddenly
unde rstands what it has all been
Ther c
is
a
certain irony here ,
of
course,
in
that Dostoevsky
puts
thcse
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 49/323
22 Introduction
words in the mouth of Ivan-the “unbeliever.”. Whatever Fyodor Dos-
toevsky’s overt belief, or overbelief, in personal immortality, his artistic ex-
pression is more ambiguous and more characteristic of the modern sen-
sibility. “There is only one supreme idea on earth,” he tells us in Diary ofa
Writer, “the idea of the immortality of the human soul, since all other ‘high-
est’ ideas man lives by derive from it.” Further, “without the belief in the
existence of the soul and its immortality human existence is ‘unnatural’ and
~ n b e a r a b l e . ” ~ ~nequivocal as this statement is, it cannot be taken in corn-
plete isolation from Dostoevsky’s literary expressions. As Ralph Harper
notes, “In spite of the superficial or thodoxy of Dostoevsky, he, not Nietz-
sche, was the first to outline the consequences of the absence of God and
i m m ~ r t a l i t y . ” ~ ~ne need not accept Harper’s evaluation of Dostoevsky’s
orthodoxy to acknowledge that no one could describe this absence
so
viv-
idly and sensitively unless he had in some fashion experienced it. This an-
guished ambiguity is, in my.view, the inevitable condition of those attempt-
ing to be responsive to contemporary thought and experience while
themselves believing in
God
and personal immortality.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 50/323
P A R T
I
Personal
Imm
o
rta
it
y
:
Possibility ind
Credib
il ity
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 51/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 52/323
C H A P T E R 1
World or
Reality
as “Fields”
Now I will do no th in g bu t i sten,
To accrue what I hear into this song, to let sounds
I hear bravuras o f birds, bustle of
growing
wheat,
I heat the sound I love, the
sound
of t h e h u m a n voice,
1
hear
all
sound running toge ther , combined , fused
or
following,
I am cu t by bit ter and angry h ai l , I lose m y breath,
Steep’d amid honey’d morphine , my windpipe throt t led
A t length
let
up
again to feel the puzzle of
puzzles,
and that we call
Being.
contribute toward i t .
gossip of flames, clack
of sticks
cooking
m y meals,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in fakes of death,
“ W a l t Wh i t m a n
“Song
ofMysel f ’
We kn ow existence
by
participating in
existence. .
.
.
Existence then
is
the pr imary
d a t u m . But this existence is not my own
existence as
an
isolated self. If i t were , then the
existence of
a n y
Oth er wo uId have to be proved,
and it could no t be
proved.
What
is
given
is the
existence
of
a
world
in which we participate.
” j o h n
Macmurray
Persons
in
Relation
Som e years a go John J. M cD errnott sugg ested that i t was “ unfortun ate that
James
did not s tay wi th
he
language he ut i l ized in preparing
or
his Psycho-
logical Se m inary
of 1895-1894. A t
that t ime ,
he
resorted to the metaphor
of
‘fields’
in
order
to
account descriptively
for
the prim al activity o f the process
of experience.”’ While I share M cDc rmo tt’s view, m y concern here is no t
primarily to explicate
James7s
metaphysics in term s of fields b ut to utilize his
language
as well
as that
of
others to const ruct
a
“field” model , for whichmy
pr imary purpose is to em ploy i t in the developm ent of a “self’ open
to
the
possibility of personal immortality. Since a key feature
of
both the self and
the mode of immortal i ty I wish to sugges ts their cont inui ty wi th theexpe-
rienced world or reality, it will be nccessary first to present the distinguish-
ing
charactcristics
of
this wo rld, beg inning with “fields”
as
the pr imary
25
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 53/323
26 Persotlnl
Dnmortality:
P o s s i b i l i t y
ntrd
C r e d i b i l i t y
metaphor , in
an
effort to un de rsta nd all reality. It mu st be strcssed that t he re
is no pretensc of giving a mir ror imag e
of
som e outer “real i ty in i tself’
when reality
o r
the world is described as
a
plurality of fields. A pragmatic
approach co nsciously employs i ts pr imary terms m etaphorically, having as
i ts chief aim th e d evelop me nt
of a
metaphysical language that will serve
to
expand, deepen, and enr ich humanife through varied and diverse
modes
of
participation in reality, rather than claiming that such languag e gives us
a
conceptual “picture” of
a
reality cssentially ind ep en de nt of human exper-
ience.
Let me beg in with
a consideration ofJarnes’s notes
for
thc Psychological
Seminary, in w hic h “fields” is em ployed as the ccn tral category.’Jamcs con-
siders three supp osit ions neccssary “ i f .
.
. one w ants to describe the pro-
cess of experience in its simplest terms with theewest assumptions.’’ Bcfore
looking at these supposit ions, we should focus
n
the sentencejust cited. As
so
often
happens
with James, his graceful style and felicitous expression
mask the profound and complex ques t ion wi th which he is struggling. In
this instance, o f course, i t is no thi ng less than the perennially sim ple an d
recurring qu estion: “W hat is reality ?” Fo rJarn es, th is q ues tion, ike all ques-
tions, must be answered in terms ofexp erience , but that at tempt imm ediate-
ly gives rise to the allied qu estion, “W hat is experience?”
Now
one might concede that such ponderous ques t ions re the stock-in-
trade of tho se usually genial b u t often peculiar beings called philosoph ers,
but for those wh o live by “c om m on sense,” they are of little con cern. As I
have already indicated, though
few of
us-even those involved in the hilo-
sophical game-are metap hysicians in the full sense
of
that term, we are all
metaphysicians in the sense of thinking and act ing w ithin a set of ideas,
principles,
and
assumptions. W hen James and other pragmatis ts suggest
a
language shift , then, they are
ot
t ry ing
to
refute “c om m on sense”
so
m u c h
as they arc trying to m ake us aware of ways
of
looking
a t
reality that ar e
obstacles to richer ways of l iving. Whilc the concern of this cssay is
not
with
the technical specifics and the historical polemics in wh ich the prag m atists
were engaged, i t
s sei11
impor tan t
to
note that thcy were at tem pting to bring
forth ways of thinking that we re in sharp conflict with ma ny deep ly in-
grained perspectives a nd intellectual customs.
Th is is best illustrated, perhap s, by presenting James’s three “field”
sup-
posit ions and indicat ing someof the not ions to wh ich they are opposed.
( I )
“Fields” that “devclop,” undcr he categories of continuity with each
other-[categories
such as]:
sameness
and
otherness
[ o f ]
hings [or
f ]
thought
screams, fulfilln~ent f one field’s meaning inanother field’s content,
“postula-
tion” of one field
by
another, cognitionof one field by another, etc.
From the first part o f this sup po sitio n w e learn that reality is pluralistic
(“fields”), processive
“develop”),
and c ont inuous (“cont inui ty”) . I f
we add
“relationality,” w hic h is im pli ed in the categories described, w e have fou r
distinctive features
of
the world wi thin which
I
will develop m y views
o n
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 54/323
World
o r
Reality as “Fields”
27
the self and immortal i ty . For
the
moment it is suf ic ient to notc that what
s
imp licitly rejected by this field, o r proccssive-relational, view is a n y rcality
that
is
unchanging or unrelated.
(2)
But nothing postulated whose whatness
is
not
of
some
rwtltve
given in
fields-that is, not
of
field-stuff, datum -stuff, experience-stuff, content.
No
pure ego, for example, and
no
material substance.
In this suppo sition w c have James’s radical rejection of all modes
of
csscn-
tialism, whether rnatcrialistic, idealistic,
or
dualistic. Thc fuller implications
of this supposit ion will em erg e as the character and
rolc of
fields is de-
scribed, but it is alrcady evident that to view rcality as “fields” excludes any
underlying substance having universal
and
unchanging esscntial characteris-
tics.
(3) All the fields comnlonly
supposed
arc inconlpletc, and
point to
a complc-
nlent beyond their own content. T h e f inal content . . . is t ha t
of
a plurality
of
fields, morc or less ejective to each othur,
but
still continuous i n various ways.”
The impor tance
of
this suppo sition for my purpo scs cann ot be exagge-
rated. I t provides the ground for thc recognition of individuals
while
avoid-
ing any atomistic ndividualism
or
isolating egotism. While
all
fieldsarc
“incomplcte” and continuous with others , they are not
so
cont inuous
that
reality is reduced to an undifferentiated monistic flux. “Plural i ty” is just as
real as “cont inui ty ,” and whe n
we
add to these three sup po sitions James’s
latcr no tes that there is “around cvery ficld a w ide r field that supcrced cs
it . . . ( the t ruth of cvery moment thus lying beyon d itself),” we are pre-
sented with
a
wo rld that can be mo st succinctly dcscribed as “fields w ithin
fields
within fields.
.
. .” 4
“What
have w e
gained,”James asks, by substituting fields “forstable
things and changing ‘ thoughts’?”
We certainIy have gaincd no
stabiliry. The
result
is
an almost maddening rest-
lessness.
.
.
.
But we have gained concreteness. T h a t is, when asked what we
rneart by
knowing,
ego, physicai thing, memory, etc., we can
point
to a defi-
nite portion of content with 3 nature definitely realized, and nothing is postu-
lated whose na t u r e is not fully given in experience-terms.
T h e goal of “concreteness”-fidelity
to
concrete exp erience-would
ap-
pear
to
be
s imple and easy
of
realization,
but
it
is
deceptively
so,
as
a
diverse
group
of late mo dern and con temp orary philoso phers have at tested. John
He rm an Randall, Jr. , ma intains that metaphysics can best
be
described as
“the criticism of abstractions.” He further claims that this is
the metaphysical method
of
Bradley, Dewey, Whitehead;
of
the Hegel upon
whom
they all draw; of
the
continental post-Hegelians, criticizing the ‘lintel-
lectuahm” of the Hegelian tradition in the light of “life” (the LEber~rplrilosoylri~
of Nietzsche and Dilthey)
o r
Exisrcnr
(EGerkegaard); of
the phenomenol-
o g s t s ,
criticizing
the formalism
of
the Neo-Kantians
(Hussrrl) ,
and
of
the
existentialists (Heidegger, Jaspers, Tdich); of Bergson, opposing experienced
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 55/323
28
dllre‘t
t o “ T h e ‘t’ of physics,” and
of
W illiam James opposing “im me diate ex-
perience” to the emp iric ism of Mill; and o f m any oth er late nineteenth- and
early twentieth-century philosophies of exper ience5
Randall
is
no t sug ge sting that the specific features
of
the views o f such
a
variety of thinkers are identical
or
even always compatible. W hatever the
differences, however, the importance of their converging emphasis upon the
primacy of concrete experience and the rigorous reflection de m and ed for its
apprehension should not
be
minimized. Throughout this essay, therefore, I
will repeatcdly stress th e necessity o f relating any speculations, extrapola-
tions, or models to the experienced
world
within which wc live, think, and
act. W hat attracts me to James is his passionately relentless effort to be
as
faithful as
possible
to the range
and
varieties
of
experience. So m ethin g of
this cffort is expressed by Ralp h Barton Perry:
Thus by
the
inclusion of expericnces of tendency, meaning, and relatedness,
by
a recognition of the m or e elusive fringes, margins, and ransitions hat
escape a coirser scnsibility, or a naivepracticality, or an unconsciously ar-
tificial analysis-by-such inclusion, thc
field
of imm ediately apprehendcd par-
ticularity becomes a con t inuum
which
is qualified to standas the metaphysical
reality. (TC,
I:460)
A no the r im po rtan t aspect ofjamcs’s empha sis upon and quest for con-
creteness is its strongly pers on alistic charactcr. M an y
years ago,
Rober t Pol-
lock stressed this relation betweenJames’s conce rn for concrete reality and
his celebration of personal activity:
Evidently, forJames, pragmatism
s
an *‘attitudeof orientation” by which man
can achieve a vital contact with concrete reality and along innum erable paths,
by a iming not s imply a t the abstract relation of the mere on looke r bu t at a
relation hat is perso nal,directand m mediate ,and nvolvingparticipation
with
one’s
wholeheartandbeing. . . . James was endeavoring o ake se-
riously the fact that reality does not addre ss itself to abstract
minds
bu t to
living persons inhabitinga rea l wo r ld , to wh om t makes known some th ing of
its
essential
quali ty only
as
they
go
o u t to meet i t through act ion.
I t is
this
concrete relation of ma n and his world, realized in action. wh ich acco unts fo r
the fact that
our
power of affmnation outruns
our
knowledge, as w hen we feel
o r sense the truth beforc w e
know
i t . ToJames, therefore, pragmatism was
a
doctrine designed to enlighten the whole ofhurnan act ion
nd
to givc
meaning
t o
man’s
irrcpres sible need to act.6
O n e
final
point concerning the central i ty of concrcte cxperience
i n
the
thought ofJames has to do with diEerentiating his view f rom narrow and
excluding
modes of
empir ic ism. A text
from
Perry will suffice to un derline
the
open ness ofJarnes’s wo rld: “Th is fluid, interpenetrating field of given
existence,as James depicts i t , embracing the ins ight
of
rcligious mysticism
and
of
Bergsonian intuition, is far removed from the sensationalistic ato m -
ism
of
the
discredited empiricists”
(TC,
I:461).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 56/323
M4rld o r
Reality
ns “Fields”
29
CHARACTERISTICS OF
“FIELDS”
Th ere is an inevitable circularity involved in discussing o r analyzing an y
alleged “ultim ate” cate go ry o f reality. For exam plc, f reality is bestde-
scribed in term s
of
“fields,” as is being sugge sted here, then
it
would seem
that we mu st describe fields themselves in terms o f
“fields.”
Since prag-
matism does no t aim a t o r believe possible any definitive conc eptual escrip-
tion
of
reality, ho wever, this circularity is neither vicious no r pa rticula rly
unsett ling. T he aim of pra gm atism is part icipation in, rather than abstract
representation of, reality. A ny circ ula rity involved in the analysis o f fields,
therefore, must be ju dg ed on i ts abil ity to expand and enrich experience in
both its cxplanatory and lived dimensions.
Bearing in
mind
that
“field”
is
a
metaphor and that images
r
concepts
are
employed in its analysisor the purposes o f insight andutilization rather than
definitive description, letm e touchbriefly upon thechief characteristics of
a
“field.” A field can be described
as
a proccssive-relational complex, but this
term would be g rossly m isleading
if
we imagined that “things” called pro-
cesses and “things” called relations have co m bin ed to m ak e
a
field. Nor is it
adequate to posit plurality o fprocesses that subseq uently enter intoelations
such that fields result. Give n the limitation of langua ge and its inevitable
tendency
to
reify and deternpo ralize reality, pe rhap s the best w e can
do
is to
express the con stitutio n of fields dialectically.
Hence,
w e must insist that
processes are relational and relations are processive. T h er e a re n o unrelated
processes and n o nonp roccssive relations. T h e concrete reality (actually eal-
ities) is always a un ity inv olv ing n ever changing multiplicity. D ep en din g on
the specific field, hesemultiple“elements”will
be
variouslynamed: for
exam ple, electrons, neutrons, and
protons
in the atom ic field; molecu les,
cells, and genes in the org an ic
field;
planets in the solar field.
N o w negativcly speaking, this field view rejects any “ultim ate” elem ents
o r atoms o r particles un de rstoo d as indivisiblc, impenetrable, unchangeable
units. This
does
no t, however, exclude
all modes
of metaphysical atomism.
Whitehead,
for
exam ple, maintains that “the ultimate me taphysical truth is
atomism. . . . But atomism does notexclude com plexity and u niversal rela-
tivity. Each atom is a sys tem of all thing^."^ Whitehead’s label for these
ultimate atoms is “ac tual entities,” which he describes as “d ro ps
of
cxperi-
ence, complex and interdependent” (PR,
28).
The
fieId metaphor that
I
am const ruct ing must acknowledge
a
character
of in terdependence both “within” and amon g f ie lds
(I
use quotat ion
marks
to call attention to th e relative character
of
“withinness”).
A n
adeq uate field
theory,
from
my perspective, must allow for a multiplicity
of
distinct indi-
viduals while avoiding anyenclosure or isolation
of
these individuals. A s the
James text with wh ich we be gan indicates, fields are continuous w ith
other
fields; hence there are noabsolute, definitive beginnings and endings of any
individual field. W hitehead expresses some thing of this continuity:
“ W h e n
we
consider thequest ionwithmicro scopic accuracy, ther e
is
n o
defi-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 57/323
30 Personal Immortality:
Possibility mid Credibility
nite boundary
to
determinewhere hebodybeginsandexternalnature
ends.
.
. . T h ebo dy requires heenvironmen t nord er o exist.”8
Of
course, i t must be quickly added that discreteness is ju st as real and funda-
mental as continuity. We can no t sha rply m ark
off
the bord ers of an indi-
vidual f ield-there are no suc h bo rde rs to be m ark ed off, given that fields
insensibly shade in to o th er fields; nevertheless, fields really are distinct (n ot
separate)
from
each oth er, nd pluralism-not monism-is the meta-
physical view sug geste d here . Given this perspective, there m us t be
a
real
and significant sense in w hic h w e can speak of discrete individuals having
irreducible centers . This point will be extrem ely imp ortant to the view o f
the
individual self that will present, but for the moment wish to main ta in
thatwhateverdiscrete ea litiesexist, heyare
al l
characterized
by
being
“centers
of
activity.”
As
James expressed it inhis unpublished notes: “Be the
universe as much of
a
unit as you like, plurality has on ce for all br ok en ou t
wi th in it.
Efectiuely
there are cen tres of reference and act ion.
. . .
and these
centres
dsperse
each other’s rays” (TC, IE:764). In a similar ve in , D ew ey
states: “In a gen uine al thoug h not psyc hic ense, natural beings exhibit pref-
erence and centeredness.”S
N ote that Dewey does not eq uate c entered activity w ith psych ic activity.
To
the end, James l ir ted with panp sych ism, and there s a difference am on g
the comm entators as to wh ether or not he succ um bed . think that Dewey’s
approach
is the more fruitful and thus
would
sug ge st that panactivism is
a
more accuratedescription of reality han panpsychism. Panactivism ex-
cludes any completely passive entities or Whiteheadian “vacuous actualities”
and, while affkming centered act ivi ty s the ma rk of all real bein gs, restricts
“psychic” to a specif ic m od e
of such
activity. In
a
world of “fields within
fields,” of course,a field that has its o w n center of activitywillsimul-
taneously
be
a consti tuent
of
another field with its
own
ce nte r of activity.
This is mo st simp ly illustrated in the case of
an organism where the
indi-
vidual cells are cen ters
of
activity wh ile also constitu ting org an or tissue
fields, w hich in turn are consti tuents of the organ ism as a “w ho le,” w hic h
also has its distinctive center.
DEWEY’S “SITUATION”
While not
using
field language as his dom inant terminology, Dew ey does
present
a
m o d e
of
field
metaphysics.
A
briefconsideration
of
Dewey’s
meaning and use of “situation”wil1 illustrate this and am plify certain field
characteristics already introd uce d. D ew ey
suggests
that his use of the t e rm
“situations” antedated “the introd uctio n of th e field idea in physical theo-
ry.”l0 W hat is im po rtan t , however, is not priori ty of use but the utili ty of
Dewey’s situational view for the construc tion of an adeq uate f ield meta-
physics.
“Situation,” De wey ma intains, “stands for som ething inclusive of a large
num ber
of
diverse elem ents existing across wid e areas o f space and lon g
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 58/323
World or Reality
as
“Fields”
31
periods of t ime , bu t wh ich, nevertheless, have their ow n unity.”” Else-
where, Dewey empha sizes the non isolat ional character of situations, ob-
jects, and events . Objects and evcnts are neverexperienced
o r
known in
isolation “b ut on ly in connec tion with
a
contextual whole
.
. .
called
a
‘sit-
uation.’” Dew ey docs no t d en y the reali ty of objects and events but insists
that they are special parts, phases,
o r
aspects “of an environing experienced
world-a situation.” He nce, there is “always a j e l d in which observation
of
this
o r thar
object o r event occurs .”12
I me ntioned earlier that a field view must acknowledge interdependence
both wi thin fields and between o r a m on g f ields. Th is “interdep ende nce” is
m os t forcefully expressed in Dewey’s no tio n
of
“transaction.” In
1949,
he
coauthored
a
work wi th Ar thur
F.
Bentley
in
wh ich “transaction” wa s in-
troduced as a mo re apt term than “interact ion” for purp oses of describing
reality and knowing.
3
“Interact ion ” wa s judge d inadeq uate ecause i t con-
veyed the mp ression hatchange nvolvesactionbetween ubstantially
complete and un changing enti t ies. From
a
situational, contextua l, o r trans-
actional perspective there are no such indep end en t en tities; there fore ,
“in a
transaction, the com pone nts them selves are subject to chan ge. The ir char-
acter affects and
is
affected by t he t r an ~ a c t io n . ” ’ ~s ano the r com m enta to r
expressed it: “W ithin the vario us trarlsactional situations, th e related aspects
are ndeed m utu alandcom pletely nterdep ende nt , as hey are nany
‘field.’
” 1 5 Hence, when terms are “understood transactionally,
. .
. they do not
name i tems
or
characterist ics of org an ism s alo ne, no r d ohey name i tems
o r
characteristics of en vir on m en ts alone; in every case, they nam e the al t iv i ty
that occurs ofboth
together”
( K K , 71).
Reverting to field languag e, we can say that it is the “nature” ofevery
ield
to flow into or shad e off to o th er fields in such fashion that the fields so
related are mu tually constitutive
of
each other. T h is will
be
of
crucial im po r-
tance later, when I will extrapolate a relation between the h um an an d divine
fields that renders belief in personal imm ortality plausible. To prepare the
g r ound
for
this extrapolat ion, let me here
draw
upon Dewey’s i n s igh t f d
descriptions of the relationship between an organism and i ts environm ent.
Because this is, of course, a transactional relationship, what he says
about
it
can serve
to
reinforce points already m ade.
“We
live and act,” De we y tells
us,
“in connection w ith th e exist ing environment, not in connection
with
isolated objects”
( L ,
68).
W hen xperiences
viewed
as an organism-
environment transaction, this must not be understood as the co m ing to-
gether
of two
essentially co m ple te and separate realities-‘“organism”
and
“environment.” Indeed, we can now more aptly describe this relat ionships
between wider
and
narrow er fields that are
distinct
though not
separate.
T h u s
Dewey is led to
say
that
“an
organism does not
live
in a n environmen t , i t
lives by mea ns of an env i r onm en t” (L,
25).
W hen Dewey elsewhere speaks
of seeing “the organism
in
nature, the nervous system in the organism, the
brain in the nervous system, the cortex in the
brain,”
he
quickly adds that
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 59/323
“whcn thus secn they will
be
seen i t ] , not as marbles arc in a box but as
events are in history, in’ a m ov ing , gro w ing never finished
process”
( E N ,
295). h
I t
should
be
noted that “environment”
is
an open-ended term
as
Dewey
uses i t . “En vironm ent,”w e arc told,
“is
wha tever conditions interact with
personal needs, desires,purposes and capacities to create heexperience
which is had”
( E E ,
42).
Another aspcct
of
Dewey’s transactional cxperiencc
that I will utilize in m y latcr extrapo lation (though in
a way
that
would
probably
not
please
Dewey)
is his description of organic life as a process of
activity involving an en viro nm cnr as ‘ ‘ a transaction extend ing beyo nd the
spatial limits of the organism” (L,
25).
Th ro ug ho ut this section
I
have stressed the characteristic
of
transactional
mutuali ty among all related fields, and the following texts indicate how far
Dewey was willing to
push
this mutuality.
Adaptation, n fine, is as
m u c h
adaptation o the envirotmlent
to
our own
activities
as our
activit ies to the enviro nm ent.
17
Habitsare like
functions
inmanyrespects,and especially in requirin g
the
cooperation of organism and environm ent. B reathing is an affa ir
of
the air as
truly as of he lungs; digesting an affair of food a5 truly
as
of tissues of s t o m -
ach.
Seeing
involves
light
j u s t
a s
certainly as it does
the
eye and
optic
nerve.
Walking implicates the gtound
as
well as the legs;
specch
dem and s physical air
and hum an comp anionship and audience as well as vocal organs .
Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irrcspon-
sibility are no t private possessions
of
a person. They are working adaptat ions
of
personal
capacities wi t h cnvironing forces.18
Such phenomena as are described in these and ot h er field-supportive texts
constitute in part the expe riential groun d from which
I
will extrapolate the
transactional character of th e relations between the divine and h um an fields.
JAMES’S
“ P U R E
EXP ER I ENC E” A S PRIMORDIAL FIELD
It is one thing
to
call attention to the dif icult ies of an o ntological dualism
and quite another to showhow
such
a dualism is to be overcome. Nowhere
is
this mo re evid ent than in James’s radical empiricism o r theory
of
pure
experience. Th is th eo ry s no tor iou s for its lack of cla rity , its inconsistencies,
and
its incom pleteness; to render it clear,
consistent,
and comp lete would be
a formidable achievement. l 9 No pretense of do ing this
or
even showing that
it spossible is here made. In kee ping with m y general approach, I will
consider James’s the or y of pure experience insofar as it can con tr ibute to the
construction
of a
field model
of
th e self. M o re specifically,
I
will indicate
those aspects
of
the pure experience doctrine that seem in conflict with an
adequate field metaphysics and those that are congenial with and supportive
of such a perspective.
We have already sugge sted hat James’s pri m ary philosophicalconcern
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 60/323
World
or Reality
U S
“ F i e l h ”
33
was to dcvisc Imethod that
would
enable us to have greater acccss
to
and
mo re intimatc participation in “the concrete”-which, as
I
have n oted and
will continuc to stress, is the feature of a
“fields”
model that most corn-
mends it t o the purposes
of
this essay.
A
quest for the concrete was the
dom inating mo tive in ames’s con struc tion
of
his thcory of pure experiencc.
Therc is an irony of sorts here in t ha t this is perhaps thc
most
technical and
vague of Jarncs’s do ctrines, and often ch aractcrized by that vcry “ab stract-
ness” which he frequcntly criticized in oth ers .
Of
course, James
is
not the only twentieth-ccntury thinker w h o in an
effort
to realize concrcte expericncc has
appeared
to bring forth the ir icst
of
abstractions. Hcn ri Bcrgson , Edm und Hu sserl , and M artin He idegg er im-
media te ly com e to m ind . On e mig htustifiably say
of
these thinke rs,
tnutatis
nlntarrdis,
w hat M cD errn ott said ofJames: “Hc does not utilize the notion of
‘pure cxperience’ to close off chc analysis of thc real bu t to giv c
i t
new
imp etus and send i t away from traditional but narrowcategories. Perhaps he
mea nt it as a heuristic device, as
a
sort of waiting game” (WW’, xlv). These
w or ds are equally applicable to the incipient ficId theo ry w hic h is the focus
of o ur concern. I wo uld add, and hop e to show, that had James employcd
morewidelyandconsistently
his
“field” ang uagerather hanhis “pure
experience” language, he w ou ld have better realized his goals while avoiding
some
unfortunate interpretations of his doctrine. A s already noted, howev-
er,
m y concern throughout my exp osi t ion ofJames’s doctr ines 1s not wi th
these doctrines in them selves but insofar as they, as I in terpret them , are
a
rich resource for doctrines of self and God that are con gen ial to and con-
sistent with belief in personal immortality.
James
was of the op inio n hat the traditional doctrines and assumptionsof
dualism, idealism, and materialism had run their course. W ith ou t de ny ing
that
each
had its insight and relative utility, he maintained that each
gave
rise
to problems that were unsolved and would remain insoluble unless certain
fundamentalpresupposit ionsweresurrendered.
T h e
key presupposition
was that mind and/or matter axe ultimate substanccs or essential modes of
being.
T h e dualist held that bo th are “reaI”; the idealist, that m ind alon c
is
“real”; thc materialist, that matter alone is “rea l.”
Of
course,
James
was no t
denying that mind and
matter
are
if
some sense “rcal,” but the metaphysical
question was,
“ I n
wh at sense are thcy real?” While i t is not qu ite accuratc
and ndeed, as weshall see, is ~n isl ca di ng , et
us
give
an
initialJamesian
response to this question within the frameworkof thc classical qucst for the
“rrrstof’
or ultimate character
of
reality. Thus we would
say
that reality is
ultimately neither m ind no r ma tter, neith er subjective nor objective,
but
is
instcad “pure experience”o r “ p u re xperiences.” We wo uld then account for
mind
and
rnattcr, subjective andobjective, in terms
of
pure cxpericnce,
sho win g ho w they are derived from this reality as a result
of
diverse func-
tions and relations.20
James p rcsented
his
doctr ine
of
pure expericncc in
a
series
of
essays
pub-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 61/323
lishcd individually between 1905 and 1907and latcr collectcd under the title
E s s a y s i r l
Rndical
E n ~ p i r i c i s m .T h ou gh m uc h in these essays is technical, elu-
sive, inconsistent, and m isleading, a
few
texts from them, combined w i th
some un pubIished notes ,
will
be suf ic ient
for
my purposes.
In
a n unpublished note wri t ten around 3904,
James
indicatcs thc intention
of
his theory
of
pure experience.
By the adjective “pure” prefixed to the word, “experience,” I mean to denote
a form of being which is
a5
yet neutra l or ambiguous, and prior to the objcct
and
the subject distinction. m e a n
to
show that thc a t t r ibut ion e i therf
mental
or physical being to an experience
is
due
to
noth ing in the immediate stuff
of
which
thc experience is composcd-for the same stuff will scrvc for either
attribution-but
rather
to
two contrastcd
groups
of
associates with either
of
which
. .
. our reflection . .
.
tends to
connect
it.
. . .
Functioning
i n
the
wholc context of other experiences in one way, an cxpericncefigures as a
mental fact. Functioning in anotherway, it figures as a physical object.
I n
itself
it is
actually
neither, but virtually both. TC,I:385)
In his we ll-know n if no t we ll-understoodessay
“Does
Consciousncss Ex-
ist?” James con tends
that in
answering this question negatively, hc means
“only
to
deny that the word s tands or an entity, but to insist most emphat-
ically
that
it does s tand for a func tion. There is ,
I
mean,
no
abor iginal s tun
or quality of being , contrasted with that of wh ich material objects are made,
ou t of which our thoughts of the m are made” ( E R E ,
4).
Co nsiste nt w ith his perspective, jam es could also have written
an
essay
entitled “Does M atter Exis t?” Had he done so, he would have denied ami
affrrrned thc reality of matter in the same sense in which he denied and
affirm ed COI-ISCiOUSheSS. Ja m es d id no t w ri te such an essay, because he be-
l ieved that his point concerning matter as an ultimate substance had already
been ma de by
George
Berkeley:
“Cunsciolmess
as
ir
is
ordinnvily
trnderstood
does
r w t
ex is t ,
arly
more t h m does
Ma t t e r
to which
Berkeley
gave
the
coup de gr ice”
( E R E , 271).
Well, if ultimate reality
is
neither mind nor ma tter, wh at is it?
James’s
answer appears to be quite s imple: “Th ere s only one primal s tuff or rnate-
rial in the world, a stuff of wh ich ev erything is composed, and .
.
.
w c call
that stuff ‘pure expe rience’
”
( E R E ,
4). And elsewhere, af ter denying the
heterogeneity
of
thoughts
a n d
things, he adds: “ T h e y w e rttade uforte u r d
h e
same
stu
w h i r h
as such cannot
be d e j n e d
but
only
experietlced;
and
w h i c h ,
$one
wishes, one can call
the
stu$ofexpevience irr general” ( E R E , 271). T h e simplicity
of this answer, of course, is most deceptive, for in the sa me essay in w hich
he speaks
of
“private stuff,”he states that “there is n o general stuff of which
experience at large
is
made. There areas man y stuffs as there are ‘natures’ n
the
things
experienced”
( E R E ,
14).
Whether employed in the singularor the plural, the notionof “pure expe-
rience” gives rise to a host of dificulties and inconsistencies a t wors t , a n d at
best is grossly mislead ing wh en it is un de rstoo d
as
the ultimate substance(s)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 62/323
Wurld
or
R e a l i t y as “Fields” 35
ou t of which
al l
things are made. Jamesm u s t unqucstionably be held at least
partially rcsponsible for this result, but it mu st be bo rne in mi nd that he
made n o pretense of having given a finished doctrine. Further, he was
per-
suaded
of
the
necd
to
break out
of
thc classical
CUI-de-sac,
and there is
a
decided exploratory and experimentalcast to all his writings conc erned with
pure exp erience. Some of the con fusion, I would
suggest,
arises from his
tendency to conflate the epistem ological and on tological pcrspcctives. I a m
not conten ding that hey can
bc
completely separated, but m ethodologi-
cally, at least, they
must be
distinguished.
Let us brieflyconsideranepistemological explanationandshow how,
when
this is tak en with ou t furth er qualification as an ontological explana-
tion,
we
land n
a
doctr ine hatwould
seem
to be unreconcilablewith
James’s ove rall philo sophy. After asserting “that there
is
only one primal
stuff’ and designating “that stuff ‘pure experience,’ ” James
goes
on to say
that “k no w ing can easily be explained s a particular sorto f relation towards
one
another into which port ions of
pure
experience
may
enter. The relation
itself
is a part
of
pure experience; one of ts ‘terms’ becomes the subject
or
bearer of know ledge, the know er, the other becomes the object known”
(ERE,
4-5).
It would
seem that,
for
Jame s, “pure experiences” beco m e ei-
ther physical o r psychical dep end ing on the co nte xt or elations into wh ich
they enter. Thus, he maintains, “experiences are originally of a rather single
nature.” W he n, however, these experiences “e nte r into relations
of
physical
influence . .
.
we make o f them a field apa rt w hich
wc
call the physical
wor ld .” W hen
they
enter into
a
different sct
of
relations,
when
“they are
transitory, physically inert, w ith
a
succession which docs
not
follow
a
deter-
mined order but seem s rather to ob ey em otiv e fancies, we m ake of t hem
another field which we call the psychical w or ld ”
( E R E ,
270).”
James
ex-
presses this sam e view conc erning the “neu tral i ty”
of
experiences consid-
ered in themselves in “HOWTwo Minds C an K now O ne Th ing” :
This
“pen,”
for
example,
is, in
the
first
instance,
a bald thnt, a datum,
fact,
phenomenon, content,
o r
whatever other neutral o r ambiguous
name
you
may prefer to apply. I call i t
.
. . a “pure experience.”
To
get
classed either as a
physical pen
or as
some one’s percept of a pen, it must
assume a f i w t i o n ,
and
that
can
only
happen in a
more complicated world.
( ERE, 61)’z
Whatever the
uses
th is doctr ine m ight
have
as
an epistemological
o r
phe-
nomenological expression, it is most inadequate
if
translated without quali-
fication into an ontological doctrine. A s such it suggests that reality in itself
is
a multiplicity
of
“thats” or “p u re experiences,” which are transformed
into mind or matter as a result of their relations and func tions.
A .
J. Ayer,
among o thers (beginning wi th Ber t randussell), labels this theory “neutral
rnonism.”*3RichardStevens co m m en ts that“Ayerseems to imply hat
James envisaged the units of p ur e experience
as
a series of ontologically
neutralbuilding
blocks
.
.
.
as elem enta ry ato m ic particles”
( J H ,
17-18).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 63/323
While
I
think Stevens suggests
a
more fruitful interpretation
of
the doctrine
of p ure experience, there can be lit tle d o ub t that James gives go od gro unds
for nterpret ing his radical empiricism as
a
m o d e of “neutralmonism,”
thoug h this is quite eviden tly in conflict wi th oth er aspects
of
his philoso-
phy. James stated that “th e pu rc experiences
of
our ph i losophyare, in them -
selves considercd, so m any little absolutes” ( E R E ,
MI).’“
John W ild, corn-
m en tin g n this assage, no tes that as “littlebsolutes”hese “pure
experiences” w ou ld be “w itho ut relat ions to anyth ing outside.”Such
a
view,
Wild correct ly points out , wo uld ead to “that abstract atomism” that James
so often attacked. “How can this be reconciled,” Wild asks, “w ith the field
theory, according to w hic hevery focused experience is sur rounded by a halo
of
fringes
from
wh ich it canno t be separated except by
a
reductive abstrac-
I t is James’s desire to des cribe m ind empirically,
to
avoid locating it “out-
side” or“beyond”experience, that und oub tedlycontr ibu tes o he un-
acceptable interpretation of his doctrine of pure experience abeled “neutral
monism.” As a
minimum, therefore , wecan say (with Eliza beth Flower and
Murray G . M urp he y) that “th e po int he s m akin g is that experience is what
is given before any categorization at all-before the divisio ns of internal-
external, subjective-objective, apparent-real, and therefore certainly before
phenomenal-physicalndhcWhilet wo uld ot have “so1ved”’the
related pro blem s, Jam es m ight have at least avoided s om e of the confusion
to which his do ctrine of pu re exp erien ce has given rise
if
he
had
used the
mo re neutral term “field” or “fields” to
call attention
to
that inclusive
fea-
ture
of
reality
w i t h i n
which categorizations such as those
just
listed are con-
structed. I will return
to this
when discussing pure experience
as
“pr imor-
dial field,” b u t first
a
word should be said abou t the am biguityof experience
and
of
the term “expericnce.”
Stevens notes
“an
unresolved ambiguity” in James’suse of the term “ex-
perience.” In the Principles of Psychology, James mak es personal ownership
the first characteristic of consciousness: “It seems as if the elementary fact
were no t thought or this thought or that thought, but
w y
thought, every thought
being owned” (PP,
1221).
Stevenspoints
out, however,
that“elsewhere,
James seems to m ea n by ‘experience’ a kind of neutral and unowned given-
ness which is pr ior to the emergence of anyact of personal appropriation.
This linguistic am biguity may account for
the
obscur i ty which
seems
to
permeate his insufficiently articulated th eo ry of pu re xperience”
CJH,
92).*’
Jame s m ight well reply that the terminological ambiguity
is
gr ounded in
experiential ambiguity. Several texts fro m his essay “ T h e Place of Affec-
t ional Facts” will indicate the direction such a response might ake.
tion’”’5
Th er e is no
original spirituality o r materiality
of
being, intuitively discerned,
then;
but only a
translocation
of
experiences
from one
world
to
another;
a
grouping
of them with one set o r another
of
associates for definitely practical
or
intellectual ends
( ERE,
74).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 64/323
World
or
Reality ns “Fields”
37
If “physical”a n d “mental” meant two differentkinds of intrinsic nature, im-
mediately, intuitively, and infallibly discernible, and each fixed forever in
whatever bit of experience it qualified, one does not see how there could have
arisen any room for doubt or ambiguity. But if, on the contrary, these words
are words of sorting, ambiguity
is
natural.
.
.
.
The obstinate controversies that have arisen . .
.
prove how hard it is to
decide by bare introspection what it is in experiences that shall make them
either spiritual or material. It surely can be nothing intrinsic in the individual
experiences. It is their way of behaving towards each other. Their system of
relations, their function; and all these things vary with the context in which
we find it opportune to consider them. (ERE,76-77)’*
Had James utilized his field language in the considerations expressed in
these passages, I think he would have retained his focus upon the concrete,
would have taken account of the ambiguity and fluidity accompanying such
terms as “physical” and “mental,” “spiritual” and “material,” while safe-
guarding his doctrine against any metaphysical atomism or metaphysical
dualism. This would have necessitated, however, affirming relation, func-
tion, context, and the like as fundamental features of all realities rather than
additions to some ultimate realities designated “pure experiences.”
But if we do not understand “pure experiences” as irreducible meta-
physical atoms, how are we to understand this doctrine? Charlene Seigfried
makes a most helpful suggestion by noting that James has submitted “pure
experience” as a supposition or hypothesis. Further, she points out that to
use “the words ‘stuff and ‘material’ in connection with pure experience is
misleading. It is not a clay-like iiratevia
yrinza
out of which other things are
fashioned” (CC,
39).
Seigfried goes on to say that “James is not asserting a
metaphysical sub-stratum”
(CC,
40).
but is presenting pure experience as
a
hypothesis that “gives a better explanation of knowing, of subject and ob-
ject, thought and thing, perception and conception, than does the alternate
hypothesis of primordial dualism”
(CC,
50).
If pure experience is taken
as
a hypothesis, we are faced with the rather
peculiar consequence that it is neither “pure” nor “experience”: that is, as
“pure” it is not experienced, and as experienced it is not pure. Let me try to
indicate the difficulty by considering texts where James does appear to claim
instances in which experience can be had in its purity.
The instant field of t he present is always experienced in its “pure” state, plain
unqualified actuality,
a
simple
that,
as yet undifferentiated into thing and
thought, and only virtually classifiable
as
objective fact or
as
someone’s opin-
ion about fact. ( E R E ,
36-37)
The instant field of the present is at
all
times what I call the “pure” experience.
I t is only
virtually
or potentially either object or subject as yet. For the time
being, it is plain, unqualified actuality or existence,
a
simple
that.
( E R E ,
13)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 65/323
38
Persorial
Immortality:
Possibility
atid
Credibility
The inclusion of tensed language in these passages- “as yet,” “for the time
being”-suggests an interpretation fraught with great difficulty: namely, the
positing of an existential “that” which is not
a
“what.” The difficulty would
seem to be compounded if we posit a multiplicity of heterogeneous “thats,”
for this would seem to imply that, for example, the pure experiences
of
“pen” and “table” are differentiated in the absence of any essential (what)
differentiating characteris ics. Despite his language, therefore, James would
not seem to be saying that literally there is a time in which we grasp a “that”
which is chronologically prior to our grasping it as a “what.”
The closest he comes to saying something like this is in the following text:
“Only new-born babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses,
or blows, may be assumed to have an experience pure in the literal sense of a
that
which is not yet any definite
wh at ,
tho’ ready to be all sorts of whats”
( E R E , 46). The operative phrase here is “may be assumed,” for while (as I
will shortly indicate) there are some experiential grounds for this assump-
tion, its hypothetical or suppositional character must be constantly kept
in
mind. Seigfried is again helpful here, for after asking in what sense pure
experience can be spoken of meaningfully if it is never “pure as experi-
enced,” she replies, “I think that it can be as a limit concept which enables
James to dethrone dualism as the primordial beginning
of
all experience”
(CC, 49). Seigfried goes on to refine the nonexperiential character
of
pure
experience:
James does not say that pure experience is never experienced, but that it is
never immediately experienced and communicated as such because as soon as
anyone
is
conscious in a human sense, he already structures that consciousness
according to conceptual and verbal categories. Pure experience is indeed the
immediate flux of life which furnishes the raw material to later reflections,
which is inextricably intertwined with conceptual categories.
(CC,
51)
In pointing out that the “immediate flux of life” can be experienced but not
communicated, she is indicating what I believe to be one of the more fruitful
features of James’s radical empiricism. Attention was earlier directed to
James’s claim that experience exceeds logic, that verbalization and concep-
tualization-however necessary and useful-are never adequate to nor ex-
haustive of the concrete flow of e~perience.~~hen the doctrine of pure
experience is grasped as an effort to keep us open and present to reality in its
overwhelming richness, depth, and experience, the difficulties previously
noted are not removed but become peripheral and secondary. Even, then, if
“pure experience” can never be experienced “as such,” postulating it serves
the purpose of keeping
us
aware of the fact that categorizations, concep-
tualizations, theories, and the like are not mental representations of concrete
reality. The further recognition that categories, concepts, and theories are
derived from a wider, everflowing field gives a measure of “experiential”
justification for postulating pure experiences that are neither physical nor
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 66/323
World or Reality as “Fields”
39
mental, subjective nor objective, spiritual nor material. In this way dualism,
idealism, and materialism are, if not disproved, at least shown to be them-
selves derivative modes of human thought and experience.
It is, however, when pure experience is treated as
a
primordial flowing
field(s) that it offers the richest possibilities for a field metaphysics. The
phenomenological grasp and description o f this field as the immediately
given or immediately present or immediate appearance is congenial to a
speculative effort toward the construction of a metaphysics of fields. While
it is not their principal concern, both Stevens and Seigfried in their analyses
of pure experience can be useful in the development of such a metaphysics.
Though it is merely a matter of emphasis, I wish to rely on Stevens in
describing the “givenness” of this primordial field and Seigfried in stressing
its flux or processive character. In both instances, o f course, relations are
inseparably present.
Stevens maintains that James’s “resolute return ‘to the data of experience”
is a “rediscovery of an absolute sphere of givenness, which antedates every
entitative distinction” (JH, 15).30 f the “original field of givenness, i.e., the
data of pure experience,” is rigorously analyzed, we do not discover the
dualistic “distinction between a subject-entity and independent-Object en-
tities.” We find “only interrelated patterns of givenness”
(JH,
68).31
As
an
“absolute sphere of givenness, which embraces both mind and body, con-
scious states and their contents,” pure experience cannot be reduced to or
identified with “a subjective stream” JH,
2).
Hence, as we saw earlier,
“pure experience is intrinsically neither objective nor subjective, but a larger
area within which the &nctional differences between consciousness and the
physical world can be defined.” As Stevens notes, this “larger area” or pure
experience
is viewed by James as “a neutralized sphere or field” (JH,
10).
One further point concerning this primordial field is noted by both Ste-
vens and Wilshire: namely, the phenomenological, though not necessarily
ontological, self-sufficiency and self-containedness of this field. Stevens
contends that “the whole purpose of James’s theory of Radical Empiricism
was to promote the discovery of an absolute field of experience, a zone of
pure givenness which would depend upon nothing beyond itself for justifi-
cation”
( J H , 115).
In a similar vein, Wilshire writes:
I think that James’ notion
of
the “originals of experience,” which he develops
in the
Prirrciples,
is the root-no tion
of
his later m etaphysics o f pure experience.
T h e key idea of that me taph ysics is that experience is pu re in the sense that “it
leans o n nothing”-it is the self-contained fou nda tion. A pure experience is a
“specific nature”-a “fact” in the sense that it has an irredu cible m eanin g, not
in th e sense that i t is necessarily a tru th a bou t the actual physical w orld. (
W’P
167)
Let me suggest now how this primordial given might be expressed in
more speculative and metaphysical field language. Suppose we postulate
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 67/323
40
Persorid Immortality: Possibility atid Credibility
pure experience as a primordial inclusive field(s) capable of being differenti-
ated into distinct fields such as the mental and the physical. Since both the
mental and the physical are within the field of pure experience, there is no
ultimate ontological dualism. This in itself, of course, does not tell
us
what
it is that determines fields to be physical or mental, but it keeps
us
focused
upon concrete experience in our effort to make such determination. By hav-
ing to make any distinction such as mind and body, subjective and objec-
tive, spiritual and material in terms of distinct functions and relational pro-
cesses, we are enabled to continually expand our awareness of the concrete
while not confusing it with any theoretical entities such as sense data, phys-
icochemical atoms, ideas, and the like. Any distinctions made will be recog-
nized as derivative rather than ultimate and will have to be justified in terms
of their experiential fruitfulness rather than as allegedly mirroring or corre-
sponding to different ontological entities or orders of being. By grasping
reality or experience relationally rather than atomistically, we are led to rec-
ognize both its continuities and its discontinuities. By grasping it pro-
cessively, we avoid locking reality into one form or another but instead
recognize its characteristics of shifting, overlapping, fusing, and separating.
A s I indicated in the general discussion of “fields,”
a
larger field is always
constituted by narrower fields that are both continuous with and distinct
from the wider field. This wider field is homogeneous, being neither re-
ducible to nor simply identical with its narrower fields. Since the wider
field, like all fields, is dynamic, it is continually giving rise to new fields.32
Hence, for example, one “portion” of this field acting upon another gives
rise to
a
distinction that can be designated as knower and known, or mean-
ing and content, or subject and object. The important point in terms of
James’s radical empiricism is that there is no need
to
go outside or beyond
experience (ever widening field) to account for “real” distinction and dif-
ference of function
of
one portion of this field (experience) upon another.
They are really distinct because they are two different functions involving
two distinct sets of relations, but they are not ontologically different because
they are and remain two different functions of the
same
experience (field).33
Just as important as the “givenness” character of the primordial field(s) of
pure experience is its “flux” character. James’s recognition of and emphasis
upon the processive, changing, or developmental features of reality are pre-
sent in his earliest writings, but only in his final years does he draw out the
full metaphysical implications of the experience of reality as changing. For a
period of about two and a half years between 1905 and 1908, James recorded
his reflective efforts to meet certain criticisms of his doctrine of “pure expe-
r i e n ~ e . ” ~ ~n
a
1906 note, James raises against himself a crucial question:
“May not my whole trouble be due to the fact that I am still treating what is
really a living and dynamic situation by logical and statical categories?” He
goes on to say that “if life be anywhere active, and if its activity be an
ultimate characteristic, inexplicable by aught lower or simpler, I ought not
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 68/323
World
or
Reality
ns
“Fields”
41
to bo afraid tw postulate activity”
(TC,
II:760). In
his
Hibbert Lecturcs-
delivered in 1908-09 and Iatcr published under the title A
PItdrulistil
Uni-
verze-James, cn coura gcd by
his
enco unter with Be rgson, bites the meta-
physical bullet and makes “flux” the heart of his metaphysics. In
doing
so,
he does no t den y-th e utility and ecessity of concepts and conceptualization,
but
hc
explicitly rejects their ability to give
us
reality
i n
its “thickness.” He
readily gra nts that irect cquaintance nd onceptual kn ow led ge re
complementary,
but if, as rnctaphysicians,
we
are more cur ious about the inner
ature of
reality
or
about what
really
mrnkes
it
go,
we
must
t u rn
o u r
backs
upon
our
winged
concepts altogether, and bury ourselves in thc thickness of those
passing Ino-
rnents
over the surface of which they fly, and on particular points of which
theyoccasionally rest andperch. .
.
. Dive
back
into thc flux i tself, hen,
Bergson
tells
us, if
you wish to
k t m reality, that flux wh ich Platonism , in its
strange
belief that
only
t he imm utab le is excellent, has always spurned; t u rn
your
face
toward sensation, that flesh-bound thing w hich rationalism has al-
ways loaded
with
abuse. ( P U , 112-13)
James goes
o n
to say that “the essence
of
l ife is i ts c ontinuo usly chan ging
character,” and it is this distinctive feature of reality as given “in the perccp-
tual flux wh ich the conc eptual translation so fatally leaves
o u t . ”
Since “ o u r
concepts are all discontinuous and
fixed,” we
can make them coincide wi th
life on ly by sup po sin g that life intrinsically contains “positions of arrest .”
This dart to make our concepts congruent wi thife o r reality is doomed to
fail, since “ yo u can n o more dip up the substance
of
reali ty with thcm than
you can dip u p wa ter with
a
net, however finely meshed”
( P U , 113).
Th is “flux ” em ph asis s already present in James‘s do ctr ine
of
“p ure expc-
rience”:
in
“T he T hin g an d ts Relations,” published early in 1905, he states,
“‘Pure experience’ is th e na m e wh ich I gave to the imm ediate f lux
of
lifc
which furnishes the material to o u r later reflection w ith its conceptual cate-
gories” ( E R E , 46). I earlier called attention
to
Seigfried’s suggestion that
“pure experience is
a
l imit co ncep t, an explanatory hypothesis which can be
postulated but no t expcricnced
as
such.”
Given
the definition of pure experi-
ence
“as
the instant field o f the present, the imm ediate flux of life before
categorization,” she furth er po ints ou t that “th e s trea m of consciousness
provides an experiential correlate wh ich comes closest to pure expe rience
and therefore is a useful mo del for explicating the m ore ob scu re hy po th-
esis.” A
fruitful consequence of “propos ing
a
cont inuous , unbroken flux as
the basic paradigm o f experience” is that
we
will thereby “be induced in our
ordinary, interpretcd experienc e to takc continuity
and
flux seriously and
will,
consequ ently, experience the transitions and
not be
fixated o n the ob-
jectified world” (CC, 51-53).3s
James’s evident conce rn-indeed passion-for the co nc rete in no way di-
minishes the irnportancc of conce pts, abstractions, theorics, symbols , be-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 69/323
liefs, and the
like;
rather it increases thcir importance so lon g as we continue
to recognize
that
these are not ends or e ntitiesn thcnlselvcs bu t processes o r
activities by wh ich we are cnab led
to
participate ever more fully in that
ong oing reality wh ose dep th can
be
touched and ap preciated but never ex-
hausted through either perception or conception.
Later, with specific reference
to
personal imm ortal ity , the impor tant im-
plications and consequences of this continuingdialectic between the human
field(s) in its individual and collective mo des and the wider
icld(s)
of reality
will be explored.
For
now, let
m e
call attention to th ccharacter of “activity”
as belonging t o
all
fields. “Bare activity,” Seigfried points o u t, “is predicable
of
the world
of
pure
expe rience.” Such distinctions as actor
and
acted upon,
cause and effect, d o n o t apply to experience in its imm ediacy , thoug h they
can qui te proper ly be int roduccd “when theield of expcricncc is enlarged.”
Seigfried contends-quitecorrectly, I believe-that “the m ean ing of .ac-
tivity, in its immediacy, is ju st thcsc experiences of pro ce ss, ob stru ctio n,
strain and release” (CC, 96). This phenom enological descript ion seems to
me suppor t ive of
a
metaphysical cxtrapolation that would postulate activity
as characteristic o f all realities. As mentioned above, panactivism rathcr than
panpsychism would seem
o
be
a
m ore fruitful way o f characterizing James’s
metaphysics,dcspite his ow n language.BruceKuklick nterprets A Plir-
ralistic Utriverse as an affirmation of panpsychism and a rejection of neutral
I
find Kuklick closer to James’s tendency on this ma tter than
Perry, w h o 1amentsJames’s co m pro m ising the “th eo ry that mind is a pecu-
liar type of relat ionship amo ng term s w hich n themselves are neither phys-
ical nor m enta l , . .
.
through ident i fying the cont inuum
of
experience with
consciousness great and small” (TC,11592). It is ju st this identification that
Kuklick reads as expressive ofjarnes’s view
as
expressed in his last philoso-
phy. Having got ten beyond conceptualization, James
found
that “neutral
experience
w a s
n o w not neutral, b u t throbbing,
alive,
constantly coalescing
and recoalescing.
This
conscious experience was
not
unitary but contained
ever-widening spans of consciousness within some
of
which human con-
sciousness might lie” ( R A P , 333).
This
not ion
of
“ever-widening spans of consciousness” is most impor tan t
for the purposes
of
this essay. I t is not necessary, however,
to
posit spans of
consciousness as coexten sive w it h reality. H ere aga in, field languag ecan
keep us open to this feature of reality without universalizing it and giving
rise
to the problem s attached to panpsychism.
To
employ Kuklick’s lan-
guage, we m igh t say that
a l l
fields-from electronic to divine-are “th ro b-
bing, alive, co nsta ntly coalescing and recoalescing.” T he re is n o need, how-
ever, to c onclud e that all
fields
are “conscious” as lon g as we
do
not ,
a
priori ,
identify “consciousness” and “activity.”
Further,
there
is
an ambigui ty in he
way
Kuklick em plo ys the term “n eutr al .” Wh ile “p ure experience’’ can be
neutral as rega rds the physical o r psychical, it ca nn ot be ncutral as regards
process and relation. B y this I me an that pure experience is
open
to man-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 70/323
World or
Renlity as “Fields”
43
ifestation as either physical
or
psychical, bu t i t
is not
open to being non-
processive o r nonrelational. Sincc
a l l
ficlds, as we have seen, are processive
and relational,
hence
“c on sta ntly coalescing and recoalescing,” reality has
a
continuity and
commonness
that
exclude
ontological dualism. Since, how-
ever, the processes
and
relations constituting
any
field
are
multiple and var-
iegated, we avoid any m onis m , affirm ing instead rnctaphysical
plural ism.
Our
distinguishingconsciousfields
from
nonconsciousfields, herefore,
must be based upon distinct functions rather than ultimately different kinds
of
being.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 71/323
C H A P T E R 2
Toward
a
F i e l d
Model
of the
Self
What an abyss of uncertainty, whenever
the
mind
fcels
overtaken by i r s e l ~
when
i t , the seeker, is
a t
the
same time the dark
region
through which i t
must
go seeking
and
where all equipment
will
avail it
nothing.
“Marcel
Prous t
Retnemhrmce sf
Things Past
When I find myself, I
always find
that
self
coexisting
with
something
facing
that
self,
something in front of it
and
opposing it; the
world or the circumstance,
the
surroundings.
I t
is certain that this something does not exist by
itself, apart from
me.
.
.
.
But neither
do
I
ever
exist alone and within
myself; m y
existing
is
coexisting with that which is not
I .
Reality, then,
is
this interdependence and coexistence.
-Jose Ortega y Gasset
Some
Lessorrs
in Metaphysics
It is, perha ps,
a
suggest ive irony that
we
live in an age characterized
by
bo th
an obsessive concern for the ego or individual self and
a
denial that th ere is
any such reality.
The
first characteristic is man ifest in the charges that con-
temp orary expe rience is best described as narcissistic,
o r
that the present
generation is the
“ m e ”
generation,
or
that ours
is
a hedo nistic culture in
w hi ch self-satisfaction is
the
do m in an t if no t exclusive value. T h e denials of
the ego o r the individual self co me from the more intellectually sophisti-
cated segments of the comm unity, taking such various forms as
Buddhist
“no-self” doctrines
and
structuralist nddeconstructionistmovements.
Both perspectives have vaIidity not
only
as d escriptions but, mo re imp or-
tant,
as
expressions
of
significant human concerns, neither
of
which
can
be
ignored in a n y effort to const ruct a viable view of
the
human self. Yet the
sharp co ntr as t an d conflict between these apparently op po se d perspectives,
combined with the mult ipl ici ty
f
technical problem s inv olved, should tem-
per any hopes for
the emergence in the near
future of
anything approaching
a
definitive doc trine of the self. “ Ev cry thing one says about the self,” as
Ralph Harper perceptively notes , “should be regarded
as
tentative, born in
swirling mists
of
conflict and self-conflict.”l
Such
a
cautiona ry warn ing is
44
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 72/323
45
even m o re nccessary in an cffort wh os c dclibcrate p urp os e is the construc-
tion of
a
model
of
the self
that
is open to the possibility of immortal i ty or, as
a
bare min im um , do es no t conclusively excludc a belief i n imnlortal i ty o r
resurrcctlon.
C O N C E R N I N G A “F lEL l )
M O D E L ” FOR
T H E “SELF”
M y modest but s t i l l dat ively ambi t ious a imhcre is not
to
present
a
“theo-
ry” of the sclf, or even
a
“m od el” in thc mo re technical and developed sense
of
these tcrms, but rather
to
describe the broad outlines
of
what
a “field-
sclf” ought to involve. The developmentanddetailedfilling-out of this
sketch
would necessitate relating an d ap ply ing it
to
a
variety
of
disciplines
and
areas of human experience.
For
exam ple, i t
would
be necessary to
relate
the constructed model to data and theo ries in physics, chemistry, biology,
psychology, and sociology. Further, o ne w o ul d have to sho w that this mo del
is suggestiveand lluminating as regards moral, political,and eligious
que st ions. M ost imp ortant wo uld be to indicate how i t mig ht
allow
for
fruitful transactions betwee n a nd am on g thos e vario us disciplines and dis-
tinct spheres of experience. A s with any theory or mod el, therefore, a field
model
o f the
self
w ou ld have
to
be
tested and then
developed,
modif ied,
or
rejected in terms of its experiential fruits. This testing, of course, is really
a
collcctive, long-run testing an d is no t
to be
realized by any individual o r
restricted group of individuals.Indeed,within
thc
pragmat icf rame, he
most that could be hoped for would
be
a relatively complete confirmation in
the form of an ever expanding and enriching dialectic between cumulating
diverse data an d the relatively stab le bu t ever develop ing ficlds that con-
stitute the self.
T h e
open-ended character of such an cndcavor is in kecping
with
the
kind
of
world already described.
The
most that can be claimed for w hat
folIows
is that it suggests a direc-
t ion and som ething of w hat m igh t be achieved b y the utilization of the
“fields” m ctap ho r in relation to the h um an self. As such, i t might be desig-
nated
anontological
o r
metaphysicalspeculat ionwhich houghdistinct
from m us t also be consistent with
both
empirical and p henorncnological
inquiries.Needless
to
say, such a speculationneithersupplantsnor sub-
stitutes
for
either
of
these activitics. Finally, a particular concern
of
this spec-
ulation will be
to open up ethical and religious possibilities an d indicate
how
these activities might be just if icd.
Even in this rather vague, initiating stage of speculative inquiry, however,
one must do m or e
than
advance airy generalizations or gratui tous h ypoth-
eses.
Hence, the model constructcd must
be
“reasonably” coherent and con-
sistent; that is, it must not involve gross illogicalitics, and i t mu st not be in
conflict with well-attested an d firm ly gro un de d data from the va riou s ntel-
lectual disciplines. Further,
i t
m us t flow f r om , be consistent with, and help
develop the processive-relational w orl d that is being presupp osed.
In
sum,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 73/323
46
Personal Immortality: Possibility and Credibility
in keeping with the assumed pragmatic perspectiire, this model of the self
must
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
do-or at least allow for the possibility of doing-the following:
preserve individuality without falling into atomistic individualism
or egocentric isolationism;
account for change, growth, and development;
account for a range and diversity of relations;
account for continuity, identity, sameness, and difference;
account for a variety of structures or dynamic systems such as the
psychological, personal, historical, cultural, social, and religious;
indicate how individuals
both
make and are made by language, his-
tory, art, science, religion, and other institutions;
allow for creative participation in wider processes or fields;
allow for radical transformation without obliteration or absorption
into another reality or process.
Now what, it might be asked, does such a self have to do with immor-
tality or resurrection? The claim made is that such a self is not necessarily
prohibited from continuing its reality and activities beyond the parameters
of what is customarily described as
“this world.” At the same time, any
concern for immortality must be shown to deepen and intensify rather than
diminish participation in the “here and now.” Hence, given the kind of
world or reality already described, continuance in
a
new life is not in itself in
conflict with such participation. The kind of world, therefore, in which
personal immortality is
a
possibility would be a richer and more variegated
world than one from which it is definitively excluded.
SELF
AS
“FIELDS
WITHIN
FIELDS
. . .”
Let me try to describe this self explicitly
as
“fields within fields.
.
. .”
I
want
to suggest that a self is composed of submicroscopic, microscopic, mac-
roscopic, and ultramacroscopic fields. Without any pretense to an ex-
haustive enumeration, we can list the following fields as continuous and
overlapping but nevertheless distinct. Among the submicroscopic fields
would be found atoms, electrons, neutrons, protons, and whatever may be
the latest particles designated by the physicists. Cells and molecules are, of
course, microscopic fields, themselves constructed of the submicroscopic
fields just mentioned. We enter the realm of macroscopic fields when we
focus on organs such as the brain, heart, and liver as well as muscles and
bones. Again, these macroscopic fields are constituted by distinctive cell
fields and in turn constitute the individual organism, itself
a
macroscopic
field. At this point it might be useful, to distinguish between “inner” and
“outer” macroscopic fields that enter into the reality of the individual orga-
nism. Those just listed would, of course, be “inner”; among the “outer”
would be atmospheric and environmental fields such as oxygen, hydrogen,
water, foodstuffs, and other organisms. We move into the realm of ultra-
macroscopic fields when we locate the multiplicity of macroscopic fields
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 74/323
Toward a Field Model ofthe Self
47
within the earth field. This field in turn is located within the solar field,
which is within the galactic field, which is within the universe field, which
is within . .
. .
To this point the description of the self is most uncontroversial, but it is
also most incomplete: uncontroversial because
I
have included only those
fields whose “observability” and “reality” evoke a high level of consensus;
incomplete because
I
have not included those fields that most distinguish
human selves from other organic fields. When we focus on any human or-
ganism, we are compelled to acknowledge additional fields: the uncon-
scious, the dispositional, the conceptual, the social, the personal, the cultur-
al, the religious, the historical, and the like. I have deliberately avoided
labeling these fields as physical and psychological or mental, in order to
avoid any ontological dualism. It may be useful later to reintroduce such
distinctions as functional categories; for the moment, however, I wish sim-
ply to stress that all these fields are real and interdependent, and are involved
in the structure of the self. Any reductionism that would give an ontological
priority to any field or group of fields is unacceptable. This is not to say that
all these fields must have the same degree of intimacy in relation to the self.
Whether they are all inseparable from the reality of the self is a speculative
question that must be addressed later.
For the moment, it will suffice to describe the various aspects characteriz-
ing the self from the field perspective. When James speaks of the self as “all
shades and no boundaries,” he is
rejecting any encapsulated self-any self
enclosed within the envelope of the skin or in some inner ego or mind.2 As
John Herman Randall, Jr., has noted: “It is indeed amazing that students of
man should ever have convinced themselves that the mechanisms of human
behavior are located exclusively within the skin of the organism, or within a
private and subjective ‘mind,’ in view of the obvious fact that everything
that distinguishes man from the other animals is a common and social
possession. ”3
I t is this image of the self as radiating “outward” and overlapping and
being overlapped by numerous other fields that must constantly be kept in
mind as we focus our attention on particular aspects. Initially and tenta-
tively, therefore, let
us
understand “the self’4 as the widest and most in-
clusive field in relation to the plurality of subfields mentioned earlier, O f
course, it is wide and inclusive only in relation
to
these subfields, because in
relation to suprafields it is itself a subfield. Whether this “field-self’ is a
postulate and what grounds there are, if any, for such a postulate are ques-
tions that can be addressed only after we have attempted to describe the
distinguishing characteristics of this self.
THE FIELD -S ELF A S N O N D U A LI S T I C
As the history of philosophy repeatedly attests, any shift in perspective or
any new idea emerges and can be understood only in reference to the per-
spective or idea it is endeavoring to replace. The Introduction notes that a
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 75/323
48 Persorlnl Znrrnortnlity:ossibility n t t d
Credibility
processview
of
reality ejects an y metaphysical or ontologicaldualism
whereby reality sbifurcated into he chan ging and he unch anging , he
temp oral and the eternal. Similarly, a field view of the self rcsists such du-
alisms as mind-body, psychical-physical, spiritual-material, subjective-ob-
jective, insofar as these terms refer to essentially different o rde rs of reality.5
This is not
to
sug ges t that these distinctions have no meaning
o r
utility, or
that therc is n o difference betwcen, for exam ple, thinking and walkin g, or
willing and running . T h e question is how to acco unt for such differences,
and
a
nondualisticviewdenies hat heymustbeaccounted orby di-
chotomizing the
self
and the world in such a m anne r as to locate one set of
activities in a realm desig nated spiritua l and the othe r set in
a
realm desig-
nated m aterial.
More
positively, the
field
view suggestcd here will attempt
to account for these real differences and distinctions in terms of funct ions
and processes, so that w hile rejecting various m od es of ontological dualism,
it will not hesitate to afirrn
a
variety offunctional dualisms.
Of mo re imm ediate conc crn s w heth er, given the stated aim of this essay,
it will be possible to avoid attr ibu tin g features to the self that render this
model
vulnerabk to s om e
of
the objections raised against Since
I
intend t o describe or const ruct
a
model that does n o t cxclude the possibility
of the se i fs continuing and participating in
a
life beyon d the parameters
of
what we customarily call “this wo rld,” some will see such effort as a “bad
fai th” at tempt to escape co ntem porary argum ents again st dualism . He nce,
let
me
say imm ediately that if an y view
of
the
self
that allows it a reality and
life not con fin ed to th e explicitly localizable and identifiable param eters of
“this w orld” is called “dua lism,” the n of course m y view m ust be so desig-
nated.
While I believe such
a
definitionunjustifably e strictive,what
is
impor tan t
in
the final analysis is not the partic ular label bu t w he the r per-
suasive eviden ce and argum ents,
as
well as plausible speculations, can
be
marshaled
in
s uppor t o f
a
field-self.
PRAGMATIC OBJECTIONS TO D U A L I S M
Whatever the differences between Gr eek , medieval, and m odern expression s
of dualism, they all affirm the reality of an irnmatcrial substance o r substan-
tial principle. W heth er des igna ted m ind, intellect,
or
sou l , this principle
or
entity is made
of
a
kind
of
being and belongs
to
an ordcr
of
rcaiity essen-
tially different from the body
to
which it is joined-mysteriously o r natu-
rally. T h e
nonexistence
of such a principlc
cannot,
of course, be proved, and
pragmatismmakes no such claim. “Our reasonings,’’ am esconceded,
“have no t established the nonexistencc
of
the Soul; theyhave only proved its
superfluity for scientific purposes” (PP, I:332).
We
miss the thrust and ite
of
James’s criticism if wc understand“scientific” in a narrow positivistic sense,
which
would
leave open the possibility
of
accounting
for the
soul by
a
“philosophical” method. It is the uselcssness of the “soul” for
the
purposes
of the broade st intellectual inquiry that leads the pragm atist to exc lude it
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 76/323
Toward a Fieldodel ofthe Se l f 49
from
any explanatory effort. James expresses this view: “ M y final conclu-
sion, then, about the substantial Soul s that i t explains nothing and guaran-
tees nothing” (PP, 1:331). M an y years later, with his customary ph ilosophic
generosity, James conceded that “s om e day, indee d, souls may get their in-
nings again in philosop hy,” but this will happ en “only when someone has
found in the term
a
pragmatic significance that has hitherto eluded observa-
tion”
( P U ,
95-96). James is, pcrhaps,beingunduly gracioushcre,since
“souls” with “pragm atic significance” wo uld not
be
the same “ S O U ~ S ”as
those being rejected.
N o w a defender of a soul theory would undoubtedly reply that the soul is
posited precisely b e m r e of its explan atory powe r and pragma tic signifi-
cance.
The
soul serves
as
a
rational explanation
of
w hy an o r gan i c
eing
has
unity, identity,continuity,and ndividuality.
T h e
pragmatist, as w e shall
see, must indeed account for these characteristics of the self and give so m e
indication of how th is mig ht be don e witlzoul po siting a substantial soul.
Even
apart
from
these features, however,
it
might
be
argued that great prag-
matic significance attaches to an imm aterial substance
or
soul insofar as its
simplicityand ncorruptibilityguarantees tsnatural mmortality.James
does not deny that such
a
soul would
be
immortal ; his claim
is
that the
immortal i ty would be such hat most people would not desire i t .
The Soul, however, when
closely
scrutinized, guarantees no immortality of a
sort U M cnrefor. The enjoyment of the atom-like simplicity of their substance rr
saecula saecrrlorum would not to most people
seem
a consummation devoutly to
be wished. T h e substance must giverise to a stream of
consciousness
continu-
ous with the present stream, in
order
to arouse o u r
hope,
but of this the mere
persistence of the substance per
se
offers
no
guarantee. (PP, I:330)
I will explore this text
more
fully in presenting a substantive self as
a more
fruitful mo del than substantial soul. For th e m om en t, et i t serve to indicate
why, from a pragmatic perspective, the substantial soul is considered devo id
of
significant experiential fruits.
T h e oldest , mo st persis tent , and strongest argum ent
or
the exis tence o fa n
immaterialubstance stems from thatntellectualctivitywhich dis-
t inguishes human beings from other consciousbeings. The arg um en t takes
a
variety of forms,but as Randall describes it, the co nte nti on is basically that
since humans are able to grasp universals wh ich
are
simple and immaterial,
they
“m us t ‘have’ o r ‘possess’ a ‘single unextended immaterial spiritual prin-
ciple’ [called ‘M ind’] with which to
do
it ”
( N H E ,
218). Randall presents three
major reasons why th is argument does ‘ h o t s ee m to present-daymeta-
physicians very fruitful.”
T h e
first
reason is that to posit a distinct princip le for every distinct ac-
tivity would destroy the possibility f explanation and intelligibility: “Every
distinguishable process of Na ture wo uld then have
to
be accom plished by
a
principle uniqu e and proper to itself.” Such
an
indefinite multiplication of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 77/323
50 Persmal Immortality: Possibility atld
Credibility
principles would lead to intellectual chaos, rendering it impossible
to
“ex-
plain” an y ph eno m en on . Randall asks
us
to
imagine what physics would
look like “h ad Na ture been really so con stituted that each of her distinguish-
abk product ions required
a
specifically diKcrent mechanism
as
its necessary
condition ” ( N H E , 218-19).
Randall’s second reason for rejecting the characterization of “Mind”
as
an
immaterialsubstance is that to do so is “to convert heoperat ion of
a
‘power’ in to i t s o wn mech anism and condi t ions .” T he argum ent h eres that
merely to posit “m ind ” as the “pow er” to act “is to remain wi th a mere
statement of the observed facts, w i thout a t tem pt ing any fur theranalysis of
the complex mechanisms involved.” In oth er words, to at tem pt to explain
thinking by saying wehave the “power” to think s to say an d explain noth -
ing. Randall considers such
a
view analogous to the famous satirical exam -
ple
of
Moliire “of t ry ing
o
‘explain’ the observ edaction
of
o p i u m u p o n t h e
hum an organism as due to i ts ‘do rm itive powers’ ”
( N H E ,
219).
Randall’s final objection
is
that cons t ruing “M ind” as a unique kind of
substanc e makes the factors involv ed in thinking “wh olly private and inac-
cessible” and thereby “obsc ures all the cultural and environ me ntal factors
wh ich are in reality necessary con ditions of any ‘functioning m ental ly’ ”
(NHE,219-20).
In
sum, then, the objections raised
by
Randall, which accu-
rately reflect the views of both Jam es an d Dewey, no t o nly call attention
to
the emptinessof the substantial soul principle but , more important , empha-
size
that the po si t ing
of
such a principle tends
to
diver t energy f rom m ore
concrete and fruitful avenues of investigation.
Dew ey was particularly sensitive
to
w ha t m igh t be called the existential
consequences
of
any ontological dual ism. H e notes ho w s u c h a perspective
leads
to
the extremes of both o bject ivism and subject ivism, which, though
o pp osed , g iv e im petu s ~ dustification one to the o ther . Theocation
of
the
“objective” an d the “subjective” in essentially different .and discontinuou s
orders of reality results in reciprocal excesses. “A n ob jectivism which ig-
nores initiating and re-organ izing desire and imagina tion will in the end
only strengthen that
other
phase o f subjectivism which.
consists
in escape to
the enjoyment of inward landscape.” This ontological split inevitably eads
to a split nphilosophywhereby
we
have
a
“realistic”philosophy “for
mathematics, physical science an d the established social ord er; an oth er, an d
op po sed ph iloso ph y for the affairs o f personal life” (EN,
241).
Dewey goes
o n
to say:
The objection
to
dualism
is
not just that i t is
a
dualism, but that it
forces upon
us
antithetical, non-convertiblc principles of formulation
and
interpretation. I f
there
is a
complete split in nature
and
experience then
of course no ingenuity
can
explain it
away;
it must be accepted. But in case no such sharp division
actually exists, the evils of supposing there is one
are
not confined
to
philo-
sophical theory. Consequences within philosophy
are
of
no
great
import.
But
philosophical dualism is
but
a formulated recognition of an impasse in life;
an
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 78/323
Toward n Field Model of the
Self
51
impotence in interaction, inability to
make
effective
transition,
l imitation of
power to regulate
and
thereby to understand.
(EN,
241-42)
T h e years since D ewcy w ro te these wo rds have hardly served to diminish
the potentially disastrous consequencesof dividing reality an d hum an xpc-
rience into woworldshavingsu ch basically differentconstitutionsand
touch ing and com mu nicating with each othe r on ly indirectly, accidentally,
and incidentally.
As
the allegedly “imp ersonal” and “objec tive” orders of
science, technology, and society have grown
to
overwhelming propor t ions ,
there has emerged in response the passionate call for the recogn ition and
practice o f activities hat flow from anddependalmost o tal lyupon al-
legedly ‘‘inner experience” or “person al faith”
or
“hum anis t ic ins ight” or
“religious revclation.” A t no time in history, perhaps,
as
ther e been a grcat-
er need to overcome the isolating oppo sition of these distinct “aspects” o f
reality and experience, an d to create fruitful m eans and chann els o f transac-
tionand com mu nication. This , needless to say, is
a
formidable ask hat
dem ands the fullest participation
of
a diversity
of
hum an beings bringing
their distinctive exp eriences to bear up on this ques tion . Th ere will be
no
shortcuts and many deadends, as there are in an y kind of experimental ac-
tivity.
A s
a min im um , however, an ef fort must b e m ade
to
rid ourselves o f
that deep ly ngraine d prejudice hat has converteddistinctfunctionsand
processes, which flow intoand
,overlap
one another , n to d i scont inuous
realms o f reality and experience.
FIELD-SELF
AND MATERIALISM
There have been threc me taphy sical accou nts, thoug h with ma ny ariations,
of reality and human beings. In addition to the dualism just iscussed, there
have been
two
forms
of
m on ism . Idealistic
monism
m aintain s that all reality
is ultimately reducible to m ind or is a m o d e
or
manifestation of m ind o r
idea. Materialism,
as
the po lar , oppo s i te of idealism, has insisted that all
reality is reducible to matter-including m ind, w hich is no th in g bu t
a
m o d e
or manifestation of matter.’ W here are we to locate field metaphysics? M y
suggestion is that while partaking of aspects o f all three of these traditional
views, field metaphysics
is
not reducible to
o r
completely identifiable w ith
any of them. Abstractlyconsidered,
a
field model is indifferent to these
three
views
and hence could qu itc easily
be
employed
by
any o r
a l l
of them.
Only after I have spelled
out
in m ore conc rete detail a field mo del that I
ju dg c adequate will we be able to see wh at is shared and not shared with
these other views. Yet inasmuch
as
bothJames and Dewey can
be
and have
been read, a t least in pa rt, as materialists,
a
few preliminary w ords
are
in
order.
T h e various expressions
of
contemporary m aterial isms a re
a
long way
fro m th e relatively clcar-cut ma terialism of Democri tus , in which atoms of
varying sizes and shapes alone we re con side red real and the apparen t dif-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 79/323
ferences we experience due solely to the arrangement of these atoms.
When
the anthropology
of
Cla ud e Levi-Strauss and the histo ry f Fernand Braudel
are described as ma terialisms, it is eviden t that som ething mu ch mo re su btle
is
a t
workVg
ortunately, it
is
not the task
of
this essay
to
delineate
thc
dis-
tinguishing features of these intellectual expressions.
I
need on ly indicate a
few b road and relatively unrefined meanings of materialism to differentiate
it from the field metaphysics that is here proposed.
Reductive materialism is the oldest and most uneq uivoca l expre ssion of
materialism.Simplystated, tclaims hateverything real is reducible
to
whatever happens to be unders tood as “mat ter .”
Thus,
how ever different
things may appear, ultimate analysis reveals them to be flotlzincg but the basic
constituents
of matter variously organized. This reductionist perspective is
succinctly and explicitly expressed by a character in one of Stanislaw Lem’s
science fiction short stories.
Are not we as well, if you exa m ine us physically, m echanistically, statistically,
andmeticulously, nothingbut heminisculecaperingofelectronclouds?
Positive and negative charges arranged in space? And is o u r existence not th e
result of subatomic collisions and the interplay of particles, thou gh we our-
selves
perceive hosemolecularcartwheels as fear, longing , or meditation?
And w hen you daydream , what t ranspires within your brain but the binary
algebra of connecting and disconnecting c ircui ts ,
he
continual meandering
of
electrons?’o
Such a reductive ma terialism is subject to rather wide spread criticism,11
and am on g its critics we
can
safely
place
pragmat ism with
its field meta -
physics.
We
have already asserted that all fields o r relational processes are
real and that the
task
of in qu iry is to discover the distinctive featuresof these
fields and their relations and transactions withou t assigning metaph ysical
priority or exclusivity to any of thcm. M aterial ism, as Randall indicates,
illustrates
w h e r e
one gets when one does n o t take activities and processes as
primary and irreducible subject-matter.
A
soun d m etaphy sics wo uld say, ac-
tivities, operations, and processes “exist,” and areffected by m eans of mecha-
nisms distinguished as factors involved in those processes. “Materialism” lo-
cates the mcans and mech anisms involved; then by reductive analysis, holds
that o d y these mech anisms can be said
to
“exist”-what hey do does not
“exist ,” but
is
merely something else.
(NHE,
306)lZ
James raises whatmightbe called an existential or moralobjection to
materialism:
A phi losophy whose principle is
s o
i ncommensura te w i th ou r m os t in t ima te
powers
as
to
d e n y t hem all relevancy in universal again, as to annihilate their
motives at one blow, will be even more unpopu lar than pessimism . Better ace
the
enem y than the eternal Void T h i s is w h y m a t e r i a h m wil1 aIways fail of
universal adoption, however
well
it may fuse things into
a n
atomistic unity,
howev er clearly it may prophesy the future eternity.
For
materialism denies
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 80/323
reality to the
objccts
of
almost
all the impulses which we
most cherish.
T h e
real
n z ~ n ~ i r l l gf thc impulses, i t says,
is
something which has no emot iona l
interest
for CIS whatevcr. WB,0-71)
Now
while it is clear that pragma tism’s field metaph ysics escapes th e net
of rcductive ma terialism, it is n ot
so
evident that i t escapes w hat migh t be
called “effective materialism.” By this I mean any view which, while dcny-
ing that the self and its activities are idcntical w ith o r rcducible to the phys-
icochcmical fields to w hi ch they are intimately relatcd,
also
denies that the
self and its activities can have any existential reality apart fr o m these spel- c
physicochemical fields.
Such
a
view, of coursc, u ndcrm ines thc chief concern
of
this essay.
b 3
It is
incumbent upon me to con s t ruct
a
field model of the self that does not e s -
dude
the possibil ity of the selfs co ntin uin go exist independently of 5ome of
the fields w ith wh ich it is presently involved. Notc that there w ill
be
n o
claim ofproving that such an existence
is possible. The task is to show that
this is an open possibility, there by allow ing for
a
reasonable “faith,” w hic h
will have to be suppor ted by grounds other than thosehat
emerge
f rom the
analysis and construction of a field-self. I will co ntinu e to dra w principally
upon Jam es and Dew ey in the construction
of
a model of the field-self.
Rem ember, the intention is no t to sho w that ei ther of these th ink ers has a
fully developed view of the self bu t rat he r to utilize often inconsistent as-
pects of the ir thou ght. This means that I may apply their insights and ideas
in ways that ar e no t explicit in their texts and that
may
even in some in-
stances bc in opposi t ion to some of their conclusions.
Ov erall, this will be so in the case of Dewey more than of James . The
question of effective materialism is a good exam ple. James, though often
inconsistcn t in details, is surely
open
to
the kind
of
field-self here suggested,
particularly when his thought is considered
in
all its aspects, including th e
ethical and the religious. Dewey,
o n
the o ther hand ,will have to be classified
as an effective materialist, since he holds “thatall the subject-matter
of
expe-
rience is dep en de nt up on physical conditions.”14 Nevertheless, th e issue is
not as clear-cut and unequivocal as it first appe ars, and I wish to show that
much in Dewey is congenialo a f ield view o f th e
elf
in spite of
his
unsym-
pathetic attitude toward any speculation abou t imm ortality.
DEWEY’S
RELATIONAL VIEW O F “MIND”
AND
“MATT€R”
Dewey gives two closely connected reasons as to w h y hc d id “no t com eout
franklyand use the wo rd mateviolisrn.” Together , theyare a succinct cx-
pression
of
his
more
developed relational
view of “mind”
and “matter .” His
first reason for rejecting the label
of
materialism is that philosophies s o des-
ignated posit
a
metaphysical view of
substanre
in which mattcr is a substance
and “the only substance.” Since Dewey rejects all modes of metaphysical
substantialism, he
also
rejects materialism as
a
mode
of
substantialism.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 81/323
Dewey’s second reason is but
an
em pirica l specification
of
the first . Mate-
rialism is an a ntithetical position o pposin g m atter to the psych ical and me n-
tal posited
as spiritual.
Hav ing aban done d this an tithetical perspective,
Dew-
ey ails “ to
see
whatmeaning m atter’and ma terialism ’ have for Phil-
osophy.” He goes on to notehat “matter has
a
definite assignable meaning in
physicalscience.
I t
designatessomethingcapable of beingexpressed n
mathematical symbols which are dis t inguished from those defining nergy.”
T h e general izing of this defini te meaningof “matter” into the philosophical
view of ma terialism is
no
more legit imate than “general izing what is desig-
nated as en erg y in ph ysics into spiritualistic me taphysics.” I f one employs
the term “m atter” philosophically, therefore, “this m ean ing . . . should be
to
nam e
a
jirrrctiorzal
relation rather than
a
substance.”
I t
w o u l d t h e n
be
appropriate
to
use the t e rm “ma t te r”
as
“a name for exis tent ia l conht ions
in thei r funct ion as c o n h t i o n s of all special forms of socio-biotic activities
and
values”
(EKL:
605).
W hatever diffkult ies this doc tr ine mig ht pose
for
the field view of the
self, the following text clearly expresses
Dewey’s
rejection of reductionistic
materialism.
Butrecognition that all theseactivities andvalues are existentiallycondi-
tioned--and
do
not arise out of the blue
or
out of a separate substance called
spirit-is far from constituting materialism in its metaphysical sense.
For i t
is
only by setting out
from the
activities and values in experience justas they ore
experienced that inquiry can find the clues
for
discovery
of
their conditions.
DeniaI
that
the former are just what they are thus destroys
the
possibility of
ascertaining their conditions
so that
“materialism” commits suicide. It
is
quite
possible to recognize that everything experienced,
no
matter how “ideal” and
lofty, has its own determinate conditions without getting into that generaliza-
tion
beyond limits which constitute metaphysical materialism.
( E K V ,
605) i5
O v e r
a
decade earlier, Dew ey
had
presented his ideas o n the mind-m atter
question in his great metaphysical work, Experience avld Nuture,16
T his rich,
subtle, and
complex
text does not admi t of
easy
sum m ariza tion or articula-
t ion; my con cern s to hig hlig ht few passages that pointn the directionof a
field metaphysics and
a
field view of the self. In doing so, of course, I must
touch upon and quickly pass over a number
of
questions and aspects
of
Dewey’s philosophy that meri t much fuller t reatmen t. Am ong these would
be
the nature and rolef “events” in his me taphysics; the question f “mean-
ing” ; the . impo r tance
of
“qu ali ty”; the dis t inct ion between “having” and
“kno win g” and he all ieddo ctrine that th ere is no immediate knowledge; and
the nature and role of “mind,” “m at ter,” “consciousness ,” “spi r i t,” and the
like.
Deweymaintains hat he endency of mod ern cience o ubst i tute
“qualitative events” for “the old er no tion f fixed substances” p oints “to the
idea
of matter and mind as significant characters
of
events presented in dif-
ferent contex ts, rather than und erlying and ultimate substanc es”
(EN,
xi).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 82/323
T o u d n
Fie ld
Model of the Self 55
At first glance, it m igh t se em that Dew ey is positing “even ts” s the ultimate
constituents o f reality, neither me ntal nor material bu t bec om ing so accord-
ing to the contcxt into which they enter . Such an interpretat ion would be
similar
to
the “neutral m onism” interpretation ofjarnes’s doctr ine
of
“pure
experience” and would be subject to the same criticisms. Again, therefore,
wo uld sugg est undc rstanding “events” as fields-as processive-relational re-
alities. For Dewey , such events can be “h ad ” or imm ediately grasped, bu t
they cannot be “kn ow n.”17
Nevertheless, by seeing nature as
a
complex
of
events,
we
are kept aware
of its processivc-relational character and can avo id identifying it with
or
reducing it to any specific quality. T hu s, Dew ey tells us, “wh en nature
is
viewed as consisting o f events rather than sub stan ces, it is characterized by
his tor ies ,
that s, by co ntinu ity of change proceeding from beginnings to
endings” ( E N , xi-xiii). Further,“events,beingcventsandnotrigidand
lumpy substances, are o ng oin g an d hence as such unfinished, incomplete,
indeterminate” (EN, 159).
8
W hen Dew ey comes to describe m ind and matter , he ssigns bo th to “ the
complex of evcnts that constitute nature” ( E N ,
75).
H e finds “the notion
that the universe is split in to tw o separate an d discon nected rea lms of exis-
tence, o ne psychical and the ot he r physical
.
.
.
the acme
of
incredibility”
( E N ,
267-68).
I f on e begins w ith the assumption that mind and matter are
“tw o separate things,” then one has the task of restoring the c onnection
between them.Both“mechanist icmetaphysics”and“spiritualistic meta-
physics” begin w ith this assu m ptio n, tho ug h they account for the restora-
tion in diam etrically opp osite ways. For the form er, the “cause” hat ac-
cou nts for the other’s existence
is
“mat ter”; for the latter, it is “mind.” In
bo th instances here s
“a
breach n he con tinu ity of historic process,’’
which can be avoided
by
sim ply ob serv ing such processes
as
“gr ow th f r om
infancy to maturity,
or
the development of
a
melodic theme” (EN,
273-74).
It is the notion of grow th, acco rding to Dewey, that enables on e “to detect
the fallacy in b oth views.”
The reality is the growth-process itself; childhood and adulthood are phases
of
a
continuity, in which just because
it
is
a
history, the
latter
cannot exist
unti l
the earlier exists “mechanistic materialism” in germ); and in which
the
later
makes
use
of
the registered
and
cumulative outcome
of
he earlier-or,
more
strictly, i s its utilization “spiritualistic teleology” in germ). The
real
existence
is
the history in its entirety, the history as just what it is. (EN,275)
In stressing the processive character
of
reality, D ewe y is not affirm ing a
doctr ine of chaotic, undifferentiated flux. We can distinguish and differenti-
ate realities and aspects
of
realities
on
the bases of “rates
of
change”
and
breadth
of
connections o r relations. Not all processes change or proceed at
the same rate. “T he rate of change of some thin gs is so slow,
or
is so rhyth-
mic, that these chan ges have
all
the advantages
of
stability in dealing with
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 83/323
more ransi toryand rregularhappenings” (EN, 71). Dcw ey inds t
a
mark
of “sound practical sense” wh en the slow er an d regular events are
designated “structure” and the more rapid and irregular
nes
“process.” But
this is
a
“rela tiona l and fun ction al distinc tion” that both spiritualistic ide-
alism a nd ma terialism treat “as som ething fixed and ab solute. One doctr inc
finds structure in a fram ew ork of ideal forms, the o ther f inds it in matter”
Just as “structurc”an d “ process” are differentiatcd on th e basis o f a “rela-
tionaland unctional distin ction ,” so are“mind”and“matter.” Dewey,
along with
a
number of other contemporary thinkers ,
as
called attention
to
the misleading feature of la ng ua ge wh ere bywe are led to posit substantive
things
or
entities wherever
we
encounter
nouns:
“ I t
is
a
plausible prediction
that if there were an interdictplaced for a generat ion upon the use of mind ,
matter, consciousness as nou ns, and we were obliged to em ploy adjectives
and adverbs, conscious and consciously, mental and men tally, material and
physically, we shouId f ind many of our prob lems mu ch simplif ied” (EN,
Note that Dewey
does
not cla im that our prob lem s wo uld
be
“solved”
by
a mere shift in termino logy bu t that they w ould
be
“m u ch simplified.” We
might
a t
least avo id
a
nu m be r of dead-end “solutions” w hich, while giving
us
a
kind of abstract coherence o r rationality, divert o u r attention and ener-
gies from the m ore con crete exp erien tial aspects of reality. 1 have suggested
that such refocusing is
a
definite fruit of describing reality in
terms of
fields,
of processive-relational com plexes, rather than in te rm s of cssentially differ-
ent “ things” or ord ers ofbeing, and this is the direction of Dewey’s reflec-
t ions on m in d and matter .
Dewey urges us to think “of bo th m ind and m atter as different characters
of
natural events,
in
w hich m atter expresses their sequential ord er, an d m ind
the order of their me aning s in their logical connections and dependencies”
(EN,74).20Ag ain, we mu st avoid thinking
of
“na tural events” as the ulti-
ma te, rreducibleconstituents
of
reality hat com bin e indifferentways
called “mind”and“m atter.” Recall thepointm ad e earlier oncerning
“fields”: namely, that you do n o t have “processes” and “relations” that com-
bine to ma ke a field,
but
rathcr that a l l processes are relational and all rela-
tionsareprocessive. T hi s processive-relational or field view is evident, I
believe, in the follow ing an alogy :
( E N ,
71-72).
75).
Thc “mat te r”
of
materialists
and
the “sp i r i t”of idealists is a creature similar to
the constitution
of
the United States in the minds of unimaginative persons.
Obv ious ly he real constitution is certainbasic v e l n t i o r d z i p s among the ac-
tivities
of
the citizensof the country; i ts a proper ty
or phase of
these
processes,
so connectedwith hem as t o influence their rate and direction of change
[italics
added].
B u t by literalists it is often conceived of as something external
to them; in itself fixed, a r ig id f ramework to
which
a l l changes must accom-
mod ate themselves.
(EN,
73)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 84/323
Deweyrejects theview“thatma tter, life andmindreprcsentseparate
kinds o f Being,” maintaining instcad that they are man ifestations of “levels
o f increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among natura1 events”
( E N ,
241).
Here again,
I
thin k Dewey’s doc trine is congenial to and suppo r-
tive of a me taphysics that describes reality as “fields w ithi n fields w ithi n
fields. .
.
.” Th us Dewcy contends:
While thcre is no isolated occurrence
in
nature, yet interaction and connection
arc
not
wholesale and hom ogeneous. nteracting-events have tighter and
looser ties, whichqua l i fy hemwithcerta inbeginningsandendings,and
which
mark
them
off from
other fields of interaction . Suc h relatively
closed
fields come into
conjunction
at
t imes
so
as to interact
with
each other, and a
critical alteration
is
effected.
A
new
larger
field
is
formed, in which
new
ener-
gies are released,
and
to which new qualities appertain.
( E N , 271-72)
Dewey goes on to distinguish “three lateaus
of
such fields,” the physical,
the living, and the mental. T h e physical field is constituted by “narrow er
and mo re externa l interactions,” wh ich are articulated in t h e mathematical-
mechanical system discovered by physics.” T h e second level is that of life,
whichmanifests“qualitativedifferences, ike hose of plantandanimal,
lower and
higher
animal forms.” The dis t inguishing characters of the third
plateau are “association, com m unic ation , par ticipatio n.” Th is me ntal level
“is still furth er ntern ally diversified,consisting o f individualities.
I t
is
ma rked throu gho ut i ts diversit ies , however, by co m m on p ropcrt ies , which
define mind as intellect;possession
of
and response to meanings” ( E N ,
272).21
W hile each of these Icvels “h av ing its o w n characteristic empirical traits
has
its
ow n categories ,” Dewey insists that “they are no t ‘explanatory’ cate-
gories, as explanation is som etim es u nd ersto od ; they do no t designate, that
is, the op eration of forces as ‘causes.’ T he y stick t o em pirical facts notin g
and de no ting characteristic qualities and consequcnces peculiar to various
levels of interaction” (EN,272-73).22
The field character of Dewey’s metaph ysics is also implicit in his notio n
“that
a
highe r organ ism acts w ith reference to
a
spread-out environment as a
single situation.” T h e crucial point being emphasized is that an organism
acts w ith reference to
a
tem po ral spre ad as well as a spatial spread. “Thus an
environ me nt both extensive
and
enduring is immediately implicated in pre-
sent behavior. ope rative ly spe akin g, the rem ote and the ast are ‘in’ bchav-
ior
making it wh at it is. T h e action called ‘organ ic’ is no t ju st hat of internal
structures; it is an integration of organic-environmental connections” (EN,
279).23To express this in field language,
we
mig ht say that an organism is
consti tuted by and through part icipation in
a
diversity of fields varying in
complexity and spatial and temp oral scope, overlapping and shading into
each other. T h e co nt in ui ng intellectual task is the delineation of these fields
in terms
of
their distinctive characteristics, activities, and relations w ithout
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 85/323
58 Pusorla1 Immortality: Possibility arld Credibility
losing sight of the concrete and unique situation that they constitute. This,
o f course, is an open-en ded task that becom es increasingly tentative as we
focus on wider and more complex fields, such as human selves.
We m igh t cite Dewey’s distinction betw een “mind” and “consciousness”
as an example of delineating fields of different spread and scope.
Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied
in
the
workings
o f organic ife; consciomness in a being with
language
denotes
awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception
of
meanings;
it
is the
perception
of
actual events, whether past, contemporary
o r
future, it1 their
meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind
is
only implicit
in
any ,conscious act
or
state; the field of mind-of operative meanings-is
enormously
wider
than that
of
consciousness.
Mind
is
contextual and per-
sistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, s o
to
speak, structural,
substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness
is process, a series of heres and nows.
(EN,
303)24
Of course, Dewey does not mean by this last sentenc e that min d is
a
static
struc ture related
to a
processive consciousness. Bearing in m ind the “func-
tional an d relational distinction” previously made betwe en “structure” and
“process,” we might say that mind is a field characterized by a slower pro-
cess and
a
wider and more numerous set
f
relations in com paris on w ith the
processes and relations that characterize the field of consciousness.
To illustrate the relation between
mind
and consciousness, Dewey asks us
to ref lect upon what happens
when
we read a book. In o ur reading we are
immediately conscious
of
meanings that come to
be
and pass away; these
existential meanings Dewey calls
ideas.
We are able to have such ideas, ho w-
ever, only “because of an organized system f meanings of wh ichwe are not
a t
any time com pletely aware.” Our ideas o r particular apprehensions, then,
are possessed and determ ined by syste m s
of
mean ing, examples of which
would be “mathem atical mind” or “political mind.” Th ere is , D ewey con-
cludes, a con t inuum or spectrum between these co ntaining system s “and
the meanings which, being focal and urgen t , a re the ideas
of
t he m om en t .”
Dewey faults th e “o rth od o x psych ological tradition” for “its exclusive pre-
occupation with sharp focalization
to
the neglect of the vague shading off
fro m the foci int o a fieldof increasing dimness” (EN,
305).
H e later gives the
following description of the concrete situation:
If we consider the entire field from bright focus through the fore-conscious,
the “fringe,” to what is dim, sub-conscious “feeling,” the focus corresponds
to the point
of
imminent need, of urgency;
the
“fringe” corresponds to things
that have ust been reacted to or that wiIl soon require
to
be h o k e d after, while
the remote ou tlying field corresponds
to what does not have to be modified,
and ‘which maybe
dependably counted
upon
n dealing with imminent need.
( E N , 311125
O n e final text , f rom Huntan
Nature a n d C o r h c t ,
will serve to illustrate
how radical and pervasivewas Dewey’s processive-relational doct rin e of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 86/323
Towrwd
a Field Model of
the
Self 59
mind. He points o u t that we canno t but
be
perplexed
“by
the problem
of
h o w a c o m m o n mind, common ways of feeling a nd believing and purpos-
ing, comes into existence,” assuming that “we start with the traditional o-
tion
of
mind as som eth ing co m ple te in i tself.” This would mean that
we
have
a
multiplicity of essentially independent minds, and
w e
must then ac-
count for the fact
tha t
they realize the character of “commonness”
or
shared
perspective and fecling.
T h e case
is qui te o therwise f we recognize that
in
any case we must start with
a grouped action, that is, w i t h so m e
fairIy
settled system of interaction
m o n g
individuals.
The
problem
of
or ig in and developrncnt of the various groupings,
or
definite customs, in existence at any particular t ime in any particular
place is
not solved by reference to psychic
causes,
elements, forces.
I t is to
be
solved
by
reference to facts
of
action, demand for food, for houses, for a
mate,
for
someone to
talk to and listen to o n e
talk, for
control
of
others.26
Processes and relations, thcrefore, are no t realities added o n to separate
individualminds, herebybringing hem ogether in a looselyfederated
co m m on m in d. Rather, processes and relations are the constitutive factors
present from
the
beginning of the emergence of an y
mind.
Th us min ds are
for m cd transactionally and always involve concrete en vir on m en tal factors in
their formation. Shared perspectives, customs, feelings, and values
are
to be
expected, then, since the m inds that share them come to be and develop
through
thc
transactional emergence of these perspec tives, custom s, feel-
ings, and values. A m ind isolatcd f rom or comp letely independent of such
features is an empty abstraction. I will later address the questionof whether
a
field
view that excludes the po ssibility of any
isolated
m i n d o r
self
also
excludes the possibility
of
any individual mind or self.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 87/323
C H A P T E R 3
Jumes:
Toward a Field-Self
An
ulterior unity, but not a factitious one. .
.
.
Nor facititious,
perhaps
indeed
ali the
more real
for being ulterior, for being bo rn
of
a m o m e n t o f
enthusiasm w hen i t is discovered to exist among
f ragments which need only to be jo ined
together;
a
unity that was unaware of itself,
hence
vital and not logical, that did not prohibit
variety, dam pen inven tion.
“ M a r c e l Proust
Rernenrbvnnce
of Thitlgs Past
The
self
in which I believe with a primordial
certainty is no t
a
th inking
thing
enclosed within
itself. I t is op en to a ield
of
independent persons
and things with which
I
am
intimately and really
connected by m y cares and concerns.
”John
Wild
“Will iam James and the
Phenomeno logy of Belief’
O n the surface, James’s doctrine of the self would seem to have developed
through three s tages. Beginning with
a
methodological dualism
in
his
P h -
riples
of Psychology, James
apparent ly moved to a “no-self” doctr ine in the
Essays
on Radical Empiricism, and finally to th e affirmation of a substantive
self in
A
Pluralistic Universe.’ T h is three-stage view is basically so un d an d
helpful as long
as
i t is no t un der stoo d as sug ges ting any clear, linear, and
uneq uivoca l deve lopm ent. In fact, the re are ten sion s, shifts, inconsistencies,
and
even contradictions, notonlybetweenbut alsowithin these
broad
stages. Throughout , James is
much
less clear and confidentabout his
positive affirmations and solutions than
he
is
in describing the problems and
what he wishes to avoid.2
The most ser ious threat to the interpretat ion suggestedn this essay,
as
we
shall later see, is found in those texts in which
James
appears to opt for a
materialistic o r beha vioristic account of the self, o r in which he seems dr aw n
toward a denial of th e reality of the “self” or the “ego .” W hile in other texts
he affirms
opposi t ion
to
such views,3 i t wil l only
e
by
keeping
in
mind
his
overall philosophy, including
his
ethical and religious doctrines, that we can
con fiden tly d eny materialistic o r “n o-self” interpretations
ofjames’s
philos-
60
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 88/323
ophy o f self.“ It is also im po rta nt
to
rem em be r that fidelity to experience in
all its variations and ambiguities was his prima ry concern, rather than any
systematic conceptual consistency. Ra lph Ba rton Perry has well noted that
James
feared “thinness” muc h mo re than “inconsistency.”5
Rather than attem ptin g t o follow the twists and turns, the argurnentativc
subtletiesandobscurities hataccompany the historicaldevelopment
of
James’s doc trin e of self, let us s imply
assume
that he is
from
the first m ov ing
toward a field v iew o f the self. Hcnce, I will select and concentrate
o n
those
texts and aspects
of
this thought which contr ibute to such
a
field view an d
ignore or minimize whatever may point in another direction.
James
a t
t imes speaks primari ly n terms
of
experience that is neither men-
tal nor physical, and
a t
other t imes in terms
of
consciousness. Bo th term s
can easily and properly be encompassed under t h e rubr ic of
“ficld,”
which,
as
we have already
scen,
is one way of und erstandin g “pure experience” and
which, as we shall see , is also on e way t o understand “consciousness.” In
what follows, we m ust ke ep in m ind w hat has previously been said abo ut
fields as processive-relational complexes. M os t i m p or ta nt
is
the point that if
the self is a complex of ficlds-“fields w ith in fields w ith in fields .
.
.”-
then there is no “self in itself.” Th is does not , of course, solve traditional
questions such as “w ho ”
or
“w ha t” is doing the act ing
or
thinking-ques-
lions that
gave r isc to doctr ines
of
the substantial soul or transcendental ego
or
to the denial that there is any “who” or “what .” A field perspective o r
assu mp tion do es, however, shift the focus of
our
attention and present
us
w ith the task, at least initially, o f describing the characteristics of those ac-
tivities co ns titu ting the self,
If we were restricted to citing one text from James that describes m os t
concretely the field character of the self, the fol lowing would d o as well as
any:
M y presentfieId of consciousness is a centre surrounded by afringe hat
shades insensibly into a subconscious more.
I
use three separate terms here
to
describe this fact; bu t I m ig ht as well use threc-hundred, for the fact is all shades
and no boundaries.
Which
part
of
it proper ly is in m y consciousness, which
ou t? If I name wha t s
out,
it already has c o m e i n . T h e c e n t r e
orks
in one way
while the margins work in another, and presently overpower the centre and
are central themselves. W hat we conceptually identify ourselves w ith an d say
we are thinking
of
at any t ime
is
the centre; but
ourfirll
self
is
the whole f ie ld,
wi th ail those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase that
we can only feel with out conc eiving , and can hardly begin to analyze.
The
collective and disruptive ways of being coexist here, for each part functions
distinctly, makes connexion with its own peculiar region in the still wider rest
of
experience
and
tends to draw us into that
line,
and yet the whole is some-
how felt as one pulse of o u r ife,-not conceived so, bu t felt so.
( P U ,
130)
T his passage includes explicitly or inlplicitly most of the characteristic fea-
tures
of
the self that
I
will
be
em ph asiz ing. First, however,
I wish
to
focus
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 89/323
62
Personal Immortality: Possibility and Credibility
briefly on the implication of the last phrase of the text-“not conceived so,
but felt so.” That implication is the primacy and pervasiveness of “feeling”
throughout the life and work ofJames. This point was touched upon earlier
when we discussed James’s acceptance, in his last work, of Bergson’s invita-
tion to “dive back into the
flux.”
We noted then that, for James, the “thick-
ness” of reality could not be grasped by means of concepts or conceptualiza-
tion. Stating this point now in more positive language, we might say that
the “thickness” of reality can be “felt” but cannot be known conceptually,
since there is a “gaping contrast between the richness of life and the poverty
of all possible formulas” (TC,11:127).
I earlier called attention to pragmatism’s concern for the concrete; in
James’s stress upon the primordiality of “feelings” in contrast-though not
in opposition-to concepts, we have further evidence of this concern. In
any effort to describe our experience, of course, we are compelled to use
words and concepts, and this gives rise to the danger that James designated
“vicious intellectualism.” The perennial temptation of the rationalistic tem-
per is to confuse “reality” with the concepts that we necessarily employ in
our efforts to render more satisfactory our transactions with and within real-
ity. James’s concern for the concrete and his suspicion of abstract concepts
were present almost from the start of his intellectual journey, but it was only
in his later years and with the aid of Bergson that James felt that he had
broken the “edge” of intellectualism. In A Pluralistic Universe, the last full-
length work published during his lifetime, he unequivocally affirms that
“feeling” exceeds both conceptualization and verbalization. After all the
talking, James tells us, “I must point, point
to
the mere that of life, and you
by an inner sympathy must fill out the what for yourselves”
( P U , 131).
If we
break reality into concepts, we can “never reconstruct it in its wholeness.”
There is “no amount of discreteness” out of which it is possible to “man-
ufacture the concrete.” O n the other hand, “place yourself at a bound, or
d’emblie, as Bergson says, inside of the living, moving, active thickness of
the real, and all the abstractions and distinctions are given into your hand”
( P U , 116).
James’s concern for the concrete and his recognition that “life exceeds
logic” should not be interpreted as
a
mode of irrationalism or antiintellec-
tualism except insofar as rationalism and intellectualism are understood as
confusing concepts or ideas with the full richness of experience and reality.
Similarly, his insistence on the centrality of “feelings” should not be under-
stood
as
a mode of “emotionalism” or “pseudo-mysticism.” This is not to
say, of course, that James denies the reality and importance of our emotive
or affective life, as well as authentic mystical experiences. What is impor-
tant, however, is that his insistence on taking mysticism seriously stems
from his profound desire to explore concrete experience in all its richness,
depth, variety, and vagueness. In Some Problems o Philosophy, published
posthumously, James maintains that “the deeper features of reality are found
only in perceptual experience. Here alone do we acquaint ourselves with
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 90/323
lames: Toward a Field-Self
63
continuity, or the immersion of one thing in another, here alone with self,
with substance, with qualities, with activity in its various modes, with time,
with cause, with change, with novelty; with tendency, with freedom” ( S P P ,
For our purposes “feeling” and “perceptual experience” can be considered
the same,6 and this text and its implications will be repeatedly reflected
when we come to discuss more specifically the various aspects of James’s
“self.” The point here is that “feelings” is the term James employs to keep
us
focused on and open to original experience. Perry has emphasized this and a t
the same time cautioned against a narrow reading or misreading ofJames’s
use of “feelings.”
54).
It
may,
I
think, be said that James’ works contain the most thoroughgoing
attempt which has ever been made to carry all the terms of discourse back to
the original data of sense, or to other immediately discriminated
qcralia.
Like
Whitehead, he suggested that “feelings” was the best term to employ for these
originals. “Sensation” is too narrowly associated with apprehension through
recognized end-organs. “Thought,” “ideas,” and “representations,” all of
which have been used for this or a similar purpose, are too closely associated
with the processes of the intellect. If the term “feelings” is used, this term
must also be freed from its own characteristic limitations, its exclusive associa-
tion, namely, with affective or emotional states. The term must be used in a
sense that makes it natural to speak of a “feeling of relation,” or a “feeling of
identity,” or a “feeling of drink-after-thirst,” or a “feeling of pastness and
futurity.
”7
Are “feelings,” then, physical or psychical? As with “experiences,” we
must say, at least initially and descriptively, that they are neither and both,
the purpose of this paradoxical response being to prod us to look “beyond”
the traditional categories
of
“physical” and “psychical.” Thus, by em-
ploying the term “feelings,” James alerts
us
to the irreducibility of our con-
crete experiences. “It is hard to imagine,” he tells
us,
“that ‘really’ our own
subjective experiences are only molecular arrangements, even though the
molecules be conceived as beings of a psychic kind.” How much more diffi-
cult it would be to imagine, James implies, if molecules were conceived as
beings of a material kind. He continues by noting:
A
material fact may indeed be different from what we feel it to be, but what
sense is there in saying that a feeling, which has no other nature than to be felt,
is not
as
it is felt? Psychologically considered, our experiences resist conceptual
reduction, and our fields of consciousness, taken simply
as
such, remain just
what they appear, even tho facts of a molecular order should prove to be the
signals of appearance.
(SPP, 78)s
The distinctiveness and irreducibility of “feelings” are further rnafiifested
in the fact that we can feel more than we can name. Thus James contends
that “namelessness is compatible with existence.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 91/323
64 Persord Itnmorrality: Possibility u t d Credihil i fy
Th er e are innumerable cunsciousnesses f empt iness, no on eof which taken in
itself has a nam e, bu t all different from each other. T h e ordinary way is to
assume that they are all emptinesses o f consciousness, and so that same state.
But the feel ing
f
an absence
s
toto
coelo
other than the absence
f a
feeling; it
s
an intense feeling. (PP, 1:243-44)9
This last sentence succinctly and vividly illustrates that some phenomena
are available on ly thro ug h im m ed iate xperience.
No
kind of “a r gum en t” or
“external” eviden ce could possibly com pel one to affirm what is here dc-
scribed. I will later sug ges t that there is a “depth” or character to the sclf
wh ich a field view illuminates even if it d oes not “explain” i t . Som ething o f
this “ de pt h” is indicate d, th oug h in dualistic language, in James’s claim that
“tendencies” arc grasped fro m “w ith in ” as well as
from
“wi thout” :
N o w w h a t I contend for, and accurnuiate examples to show,
is
that “tenden-
cies”are not only descript ions from w ithout , but that they are amo ng the
objects
o f the stream, which is thus aware of them from wi th in , and must be
described as in very large
measure
const ituted o fj d ir rg r oftendency, often
so
vague that we are unable to
name
th em at all.
(PP, 1:246)10
I t is
.
. . the re insta tement o f the vague and inarticulate
to
its propcr place in
our
mental Iife which I
am
so
anxious
to
press on the a t tent ion.
( P B C ,
150)
James’s desire to reinstate the “vag ue and inarticulate” is therefore not a
defense of obfuscation or romantic cloudiness. Paradoxically, it is an effort
to describe o ur experience as rigo rou sly as possible and to avoid any pro-
crustean cuttingof experience so as to fit
it
neatly into wh at can be nam ed o r
conceptualized. Thus, in our at tempt to construct a f ield m od el of th e self
we will draw ge ner ou sly fromJarnes’s descriptions an d
his
approach, which
takes seriously o ur
own
experience. Robert Ehman has noted that James “is
suspending consideration
of
thos e dim ensio ns o f th e self that are accessible
through inference or through the observat ion f
a
third-person witness.
He
appeals to ou r own first-person exp erience and de scribes the self as it ap-
pears prior to theoretical elaboration.”lI This in n o way denies th e legit-
imacy and even necessity of extrapolating from o r speculating upon o u r
personal experiences. It do es , however, caution against explaining away that
which is present in our immediate experience. We must
begin
from this
experience; indeed, we
must
re turn
to
it-though if
our
speculative and
imaginative forays are successful, the experience
to
which we return wil l be
immeasurably richer and more complex than that from which we began.”
THE “SELF” O F THE P R I N C I P L E S
The chapter entitled “ T h e Consciousness o f thc Self,” on e of the longest
chapters
in
T h e Principler ofPsychofogy
(P P ) , is
filled with
a
richness of de-
tailed description and observation which to this day remains w o rth y of re-
flective con side ration , qu ite a pa rt from its technical and theoretical aspects.
James presents
us
with
a
view
of
the self that has been read by so m e
as
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 92/323
jarrles: Toward n
Field-Self‘
65
anticipating behaviorism and by oth ers as pr o to -phcnon~ eno logy . W i thou t
doing violence to thc text and in keep ing with the funda me ntal thrust of
jarnes’s tho ug ht,
I
believe it can also be read as moving toward a doctr ine
of
the
self
as
a
complex
of
fields.
T h e
yrocessive-relational characteristics
of
all
fields is
m uch in evidence in every im po rta nt feature o fJamcs’s “self.” W hat-
ever obscurities, inconsistcncies, and gaps attach to this do ctr ine , it is qui te
clear
that
it excludes any view
of
thc self as
a
finishcd, permanent, essentially
enclosed enti ty or thing. At the outset , Jam es notes “that we are dealing
with a fluctuating rnatcrial” (PP,
I:279).
3 Th is is not surpris ing, given a11 we
have previously said ab o ut James’s process metap hysics.
I t
is not accidental
that the chapter on the self immediately follows the most famous chapter n
the
Princ-ipler,
the on e in w hich “strcarn”
is
in t roduced
as
thc prima ry meta-
phor for “ though t” o r
As already noted , hrou gho ut he Pvinciyks James ssumes a meth-
odological dualism, which hewill deny in his later metaphysics, but there is
widespread agreement among the commentators that the more imaginat ive
and insightful aspects
of
the book resist being incorporated within any on-
tological dualism.
Let
us assum e, therefore, that any dualistic langua ge we
encounter is to be read
only
as expressing a d ve rsi t y
of
functions-a func-
tional
dualism. Hence, the implici t dualism in the phrase “stream
of
con-
sciousness” is easily circu m ven ted, an d is more in keeping withJanles’s
fun-
dam en ta l in ten ti ons, by designa ting it “ s t r eam o f e x p e r i e n ~ e . ” ~ ~imilarly,
when w e
find
James speaking of the “m e” s objective and the I” as subjec-
tive, we will rem em ber that in his m or e dev eloped metaphysics he views
“objective” and “subjective” as functionally rather than onrolog ically dis-
t inct . Thu s, in discussion of the “me” o r the
“ I , ” the “object”
or the “sub-
ject,” it will be understood that we are
not
referring to different o rd er s of
being but rather focusing
on
different aspects o r functions
of
the self,
As
James himself noted: “the words
I
and me signify nothing m ysterious and
unexampled-they are at bo ttom on ly
names
of emphasis” (PP, 1:324n.).
T h e
field o r processive-relational character OfJames’s do ct rin e
of
the self is
present at the outset of the “Se lf” chapter: “h ts upidesr
possible
sense .
.
. a
man’s
Se l f i s the sum total
ofal l
that he
C A N cull hir,
not only his bod y and his
psychic powers, bu t his clothes and his house, his wife and ch ildren, his
ancestors and friends, his repu tation and w ork s, his lands and horses, and
yacht and bank-account” (PP,
I:279).
Recall that
in
Chapter
1,
1
m a d e
the
point that “relations” are no t extrin sic to the “essence”
of
a being, some-
thin g accidentally added on to
its
substance. Rather, they are constitutive o f
i t; they enter into the very fabricf
a
being, making i t what i ts. Let
us
look
a t
the text ju st cited w ithin this perspective. T he re is no “se l f” to which a re
extrinsically added a body, clothes, wife, o r lands; these are relations that
continu e to form and fashion , build and diminish, expand and narrow, en-
rich and impoverish that reality referred to as “the self.”*6
T he legit imacy
of
such
a
field reading
is
borne out by the ways in which
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 93/323
66
Persor~nl
Zmrrlortnlity:
Possibility atld
Crcdibil i ty
James describes “the C on stituen ts of the Self.” Th ese are first divided into
“the em pir ical sel f’ (me) and the “pure Ego” I) , with the former further
divided into the ma terial, social, and spiritual selvcs. 1 will first consider the
empirical self an d its constituents; after an excu rsus on “the bod y”
I
will
return in the next chapter
to
the “pure Ego” in relation
to
lames’s imp orta nt
but con troversial doctr ine that the thinker is the “passing Tho ugh t.”
To begin w ith, we m us t be on gu ard against understanding the terms
“m aterial,” “social,” and “spiritual” in a traditional, com mo nsense, o r du-
alistic ma nner. N o t surprisingly, Jam es tells
us
that “ the body
is
the inner-
most par t o f
the
material Sew’’ What is
a
bit surprising-and may be an effect
pf
James’s Victorian milieu-is that “clo thes com e nex t,” after wh ich he
adds family, hom e, and property
(PP,
I:280).
Now
it is no t fo r
a
m o m e n t
being suggested here, or in the consideration
of the
other selves, that all
con sti tut ing relat ions are on the sam e p lane and enter into the self w ith th e
same degree
of
intimacy. T h e role played b y different relations and their
relative weight in the determinat ion
of
the self can no t be de term ined a pri-
ori; nor are these set once and for all.
The
self
is a
constant ly changing self,
and a relat ion that ma y be an int imate con sti tuent today ma y be peripheral
tomo rrow and none xistent the day after. Wh ether there are any relations
wi thout which
an
individual
self
wo uld cease
to
be is a question that mu st be
conside red later wh en we focus mo re explicitly on the possibility that the
self
is imm ortal . The point to be s tressed here is that the relations being
described are “real” con stitue nts
of
th e self-in
a
sense each
is
the self or
a t
least a part of the self. “O ur im m ed iat e family,” James s tates , “is a par t o f
ourselves. . . . W hen they die, a par t o f our very selves is gone. If they do
anyth ing wrong, i ts our shame.” This s no pious or sent imental or roman-
tic expression onJarnes’s part, for healso insists that
our
clothes, home, and
pro pe rty are “w ith differentdegrees o f int imacy, pa rts of ou r empirical
selves”
(PP,
11280-81).
T ur nin g to the “social self,” w e see that the ways in whic h w e are re-
garded by ou r fe llow hum ans determine us to be the selves we are. Just as
we should properly have spok en of o u r m aterial selves (rather than self), we
shou ld speak
of
our social
sehe5,
since “ a man
has
as rnany
social selves as there
are indiv iduals who recognize him and carry an imag e of him in their min d”
Whatever
one
may think
of
the suggested interpretation
of
the material
and social selves,
the
phenomenadescribedbyJam es are relatively un-
problem ed, and mo st thinkers wo uld agree that hey have
some bearing
upon the self, though the precise nature of this bearing might b e disputed.
The case of the “spiritual self’ is quite different, beginn ing with the very
desig nation “spiritual,” for it is James’s desc ription
of
this self that lends the
suppor t to
a
materialistic or behavioristic reading.
H e begins innocently enough: “B y the.Sp iritua1 Self, so far as it belongs
to the Emp irical Me ,
I
mean a man’s inner
o r
subjective being, his psychic
(PP,
I:281-82).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 94/323
James:oward a Field-Self
67
faculties
or
dispositions, taken concretely’’ (PP,
I:283).
N o r is it particularly
upsetting, dcspite
a
degree of vagueness, when James goes o n
to
speak of
the feeling that w e havc o f “a sor t of innermost centre wi thin theircle, o f a
san ctua ry with in the citadel, constituted by the subjective life as
a
whole”
(PP, I:285). When he asks,
“ W h a t
is this
serfof all the other selves?”
his initial
description seem s appro priate t o a self that is designated“spiritual.”
He
notes that “probably
a l l
men would describe i t” as
the active elem ent in all consciousness. . . . I t is what welcomes or rejects. I t
presides over the perception
of
sensations, and by giving or withholding i ts
assent
i t influences the movements they tend
to
arouse. It is the h o m e of in-
terest. . .
.
It is the source of effort
and
at tent ion, and the place from which
appear
to em anate the fiats
of
the w ill .
(PP,
:285)
T he basic consensus bcgins to dissipate, however, w he n an effort is m ad e
to define more accurately the precise natureof thiscentral self. “S om e
would say that it is a simple active substance, the
soul,
of which they are
conscious; o thers, that it
is
no th ing but
a
fiction, the imag inary being de-
noted by the pronoun I ; and between these extremes of op ini on all sorts of
intermediaries w ould bc f ound”
(PP,
:286). James puts to the side for the
moment the ques tion o f w h a t this “central active self” is, preferring to begin
by at tempt ing to describe as precisely as possible ho w it is felt, for “this
central nucleus of the
Self,
.
.
. this central part of th e Self isfelt.” His gener-
al description o f ho w “th is pa lpita ting inw ard ife” feels is still relatively free
of problems. “ I am aware,”Jame s ells us, “of
a
constant play of
fur-
therances
and
hindrances in
m y
thinking,
of
checks and release, tendencies
wh ich run with desire, and tendencies which run the ot he r w ay ” PP,
1:286-
87). Th e bo m bsh ell s dro pp ed (at least for those who resist a materialistic or
behavioristic inte rpreta tion ofJames) when
he
tells us that forsaking general
descriptions and
corning t o theclosest possible quarters with the facts, it is
d i f i c r r l t f or
nte
to
detect
in the ac tiv ity any purel y spiritlrnl elenletlt
nt all.
Whenever my introspectiw gluttce
succeeds itr
twtzirlg
round quickly enough to catch
o w
of these
matrifestrltions
ofsparr-
tuneity it1 the act, all
i t
can everf eel d is t i rdy is some bodily process , f o r the most part
taking pluce within the head.
(PP,
I:287)
Now
what is significant here is that James explicitly includes acts o f at-
tending, assenting, negating, making an effort, rem em bering , and reason-
ing. Th ese acts usually designated mental
or
immaterial o r spiritual are felt
by James “as mo vem ents of som ething in the head” o r nearby.
T h u s
the
rather startling conc lusion is reached that the central nucleus of the “Spir-
itual Self,’’ the
“‘SelfufJelves,’
when
curefilly examined, i s faund t o conrist
main-
l y of the collection
of these
pecul iar mot ions in the head
or
between the head and
throat.”
James quickly adds that he does no t
for
a m o m en t say that this is
all
it consists of,” and a few pages
later
he concedes “that over and above these
there is an ob scu rer feeling
of
som ethin g more.’’
I
will later attempt
to
ex-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 95/323
ploit this “something more,” which is
a
recurr ing phen om eno n in James’s
thou ght , in favor o f
a
non reductionistic field-self. It m us t bc ackno wledg ed,
how ever, that in this section
of
The
Prirrcipler o Psychology,
James
is
per-
ilously close
to
a
denial o f th e subject o r self and an afiirrnation of
a
reduc-
tionistic behav iorism. l 7 T hi s becomes manifest w hen he speculates on the
consequences of w h a t he concedes
is
a hypothesis: namely, “that our
elltire
fee l ing ofspir i tual act iv i ty ,or what contmody passes b y
thnt
na me , i s real ly
nfeeling
ofbodily
activities whose
exact
nnture is b y most wren overlooked” (PP, I:288). T h e
key consequence of this hypothesis would
be
that “ a l l that is expericnced is,
strictly con sidered, objective”; hence, it wo uld
be
mo re appro priate to de-
scribe the s trea m of tho ug ht as
“a
stre am of Sciousness” rather than ‘‘con-
sciousness,” which
would
be
a
“thinkin g i ts ow n xistence along with what-
ever else it thinks.” I t w ou ld follow, ac cording toJarncs, that “ th e existence
of this thinker would be given to
us
rather as a logical postulate than as that
direct inner perception o f spiritual activity which we naturally believe our-
selves to have.” H e go es
on
to say that such
a
speculation violates
common
sense an d that he will henceforth avoid it (PP, I:291). When we come
to
consider his not ion of the thinker as
the
“passing Thought ,” however , we
will again have to ask w he the r Jamesis do ctri ne can be utilized in the con -
struction of the kind o f substantive self that would allow for
a
belief in
immortality.
Ehman makes a corrective criticism ofJames’s view
of
the self that wo uld
have to be incorporated in the mod el of the self suggested in this essay.
Briefly stated, the criticism is that in his description o f self-feeling an d
self-
love Jam es overlook s the reflexive character o f these experiences and hence
Ioses,
or
appears to
lose,
the “self.” A central feature ofJamcs’s do ctr ine is
that hematerial,social, and spiritual selves are all manufactured o u t of
“objects” that are interesting and aro use the d esire
to
appropriate them “for
their ow n
sakes.”
In bodily self-love, social self-love, and spiritual self-love,
what is loved is always some object-a co m for tab le seat, the image of m e
in
another’s m ind , m y loves and hates. In non e of these instances d o I love a
pure principle o f self
or
a Pur e Ego (PP, 1:303-7).
E h m a n
does not deny the
accuracy o f James’s descrip tion,buthe
does questionw heth er t is ex-
haustive. What James fails to recognize is “the felt reflexivity, the felt refer-
ence back
to
self, that is present in a11 self-feeling and self-love on the adult
hu m an level”
( N E P ,
260).
E h m a n
makes
a
similar point concerning
James’s
claim that the “present pulse of ou r conscious life” can become an objectof
knowledge
only wh en it
has
passed. C on ced ing this, Eh m an nevertheless
insists that our present pulse can “feel prereflectively its own existence in its
very act.”
The present pulse must
feel
itself
as
the central self; it cannot
have
the central
self as
a
mere
object before it. For in this case
i t
could not in a radical sense feel
bodily motions,
sensations,
attitudes, and locations as its own; and in appro-
priating peripheral objects
to
its
bodily
center,
i t
would
not appropriate them
to itself: In order for the present pulse to feel the warmth and intimacy
of
the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 96/323
69
body
and
bodily
life, it must feel that this is close to itself. Thcre is a m o m e n t
of
self-relation in the
very
experience
of
intimacy: intimacy is intimacy
t o ;
and
for
an
anonymous ,
nonreflective consciousness everything would simply
ap-
pear
a5
prcsent, as objective; nothing
would
appear warm and int imate .
The
body would always in this case appear as an external object, never
a s
its own
body, as the location of its o w n life. ( N E P , 263-64)lR
I believe tha t E hm an is here m or e faithful t o the overall th rust of James’s
thought than
is
James himself when hc suggests that the
elf
may be noth ing
more than a collectivity of “objects” within an imperso nal s tream of con-
sciousness. Recall the earlier stress placed up on James’s no tio n of “feelings”
and his insistence that we can feel mo re than we are able to conceptualize.
He
is con sistent ndcny ing that he
self
can
be
kn ow n directly, ince
through reflective consciousness we are always prescnted with “objects.”To
say, thcrefore, that we can directly kn ow the self or the subject
of
o u r ac-
tivities w ould be to say that the subject can be known as an ob jcct. Th is is
why James
(as
well
as
Hume) can never discover the self thro ug h an intro-
spective o r reflective act. B ut given the weight that James (unlike H u m e )
attaches to “feeling,” it
is
no t inconsistent to acknowledge a prereflective felt
awareness that accompanies all our conscious acts. I y
This crucial notion
of
the sel fs felt awareness
will
be
considcred again
when
the “passing T h o u g h t ” and its relation to unity, continuity, and iden-
tity are analyzcd. Before do ing so however, I m us t briefly discuss a m os t
complex and bedcvi l ing topic: thc “body” and how
t
might be unders tood
within
a
field view of the self.
EXCURSUS:
“THE
B O D Y ”
We have already seen that Jame s has described
the
activities of the “spiritual
self’
in terms
of
bodily feelings.
I
wish to consider those
and
other texts in
wh ichjarnes apparen tly presen ts the “self’ and the “bod y” as interchange-
able . M y purpose is to und erline the am biguity involved in James’s usc of
the term “b od y” and
try
to show how a
field
interpretation of
“body”
is
moreconsistentwith his tho ug ht ha n is
a
materialistic or behavioristic
interpretation.
First, however, I would like to call attention to the fact that any am big uity
attached to the term is by n o m ean s un iqu e toJa m es. n the Wcst this explicit
am biguity goes
back
a t
least as
far
as Paul, wh o ,
in
response to thc quest ion,
“How are
dead
people raised
a nd
what sor t of body do they have when they
com e back?” answered by distinguishing “earthly bodies” from “heavenly
bodies.”ZO Christian thinkers have been deba ting and speculating o n Paul’s
meaning from the earliest t imes, a n d they con t inue to do so. Not surpris-
ingly, there is
a
great range and variety
of
intcrprerations; in spite
of
this
diversity, how ever, it is safe
to
sap that on one point there is a cmsensus-
the “resurrection body” cannot be s imply
and
uncquivocally identical w ith
the bod y as it
is
commonly known and exper ienced.”
Th e absence of univocal m eanin g in “ bo dy ” language is not , of course,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 97/323
70
Personal Itnmortality: Possibility and Credibility
found only in the West. In Eastern thoug ht there are lengthy reatises on the
“astral,” “sub tle,” and “etheric” bodies, all
of
which are differentiated from
the “ph ysical” body. In addition, there is
a
long tradition within Buddh ism
of the “T r iple Bo dy
of
t he B uddha . ”
Since Pla to, the Western p hilosophical tradition has endeavo red to restrict
the meaning
of
t he t e rm “body” so as to highligh t the non bod ily aspect of
human nature usually designated “soul ,” “spirit ,” “reason,” or “m ind.” In a
sense, this effort culminated in Descartes’s “clear an d distinc t” divis ion of
hu m an beings in to tw o essentially different substances-mind and body-
to
which subsequent mod ern phi losophy has responded n one of three
ways:
acceptance of two ult imate substances (dualism); reduction
of
matter
to mind (idealism); reduction
of
m ind
to
ma tter (materialism). It is only in
the twen tieth century that there have eme rge d various philosophical efforts
to articulate an und ers tand ing of “ the bod y” that doe s notasily fall into any
of
the
three traditional classifications. I believe that pra gm atism
is
one such
effort.
Th e m ov em en t that has brou ght forth the mo st explici t, developed, and
technical expression of the am bigu i ty b elong ing to “ the bod y,” owever , is
phen om enolo gy. An y in-depth conside ration of this issue is beyond both
the l imits o f this essay and the com petcn cy
of
its author. Still, since
I
will
later utilize several ph en om eno log ical com m en tators
o n
Jamcs in sug ge sting
a field interpretation of his use of the term “body ,” i t m ight be helpful
to
show f rom the works of prom inent phcno men onlogis t s tha t James i s no t
alone nreferring to the bod y in amb iguous , vague,and even confusing
ways.
T h e indispensable insight in all
“sou l”
views is that the human person or
self is “mo re” than wh at
is commonly
un de rstoo d as “th e bo dy ”: that is, an
object that can be weigh ed, me asured, located in ma thema tically exact spa-
tial and temp oral coord inatcs, and reduc ed to recise kinds and quantities of
chemicals. T h e task co nfr on ting all nonm aterialistic philosoph ies is
to
ac-
count for th is “more” in a way that do es no t create such
problems
as the
classical Cartesian one o f having to explain how tw o essentially different
substances can interact in such a way as to fo rm on e being. Without claim-
ing to be able to prove that James and the ph eno m en olo gists succeed in this
task,
I
believe it is im po rtant to ke ep n
mind
what they are at temp ting
if
we
are
to
ma ke any sense o f their often
elusive
language. Negatively, they wish
to
overcome the difficulties and lack
of
adequate explanatory power in du-
alism,materialism,and dealism. M or e positively, hey w ish to describe
hu m an beings in
a
mann er dis t inct from but not in opp osi t ion to science,
and faithful to hum an expe rience in its most conc rete and subtle expres-
sions.
T h e explici t dis t inct ion between “thing-body” and “lived bo dy ” proba-
bly originated with
Max
Scheler,” bu t the ph en om en on he describes is a
concern
of
a l l
phenomenologis ts .
A
few
excerpts
from
the thought of jean-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 98/323
James:
Toward a Field-Self 71
Paul Sartre, Maurice M erleau-Ponty, and Gabriel M arcel will su fic e
to
indi-
cate a similarity of intent and direct ion am ong these thinkers and berwecn
them and Jam es, the ifferences o f overall philosophy and technical language
notw ithstanding . For m y purposes,
a
key similarity is that
all
these thinkers
speak in te rm s of processes and relations-fields-rather than in term s of
underlying substancc and unchanging principles o r essences.
Sartredistinguishesbetweenhebody
as a
“being-for-itself’ nd a
“being-for-others,”
and
h e insists hat “the ycannotbe educed
to
one
another.”
Being-for-itself
must
be wholly body and
i t
must be wholly consciousness; i t
cannot
be urrited
with a body. Sinlilarly being-for-others
is
wholly body; there
are
no
“psychic phenomena” there
to
be
united with the body. There
is
noth-
ing bekitrd the body. But the body is wholly “psychic.”23
Whatever e k e may be said
a b o u t
this far from self-evident text, i t is clear
that Sartre is calling attention to a phen om enon -the body as being-for-
itself-that eludes bo th scientific nd com mo nsenseobservat ions . One
othe r passage can be cited to exem plify the relational character o f the bo dy
as being-for-itself:
“We
kn ow that there is no t a for-itself on the one han d
and
a
wo rld on the other as tw o closed entit ies
for
which we m us t subse-
quently seek some explanationas to how they commun icate . The for-itseIf
is
a relat ion to the w orld ” (BN,306).
The irreducible distinctiveness
of
the l ived bod y
as well
as its p rocessivc-
relational character is a lso a a r m e d by Merleau-Ponty :
The
outline
of
my
body
is
a
frontier which ordinary spatial relations
do not
cross. This is because its parts are interrelated in a peculiar
way:
thcy are not
spread out side by
side,
but enveloped in each other. . .
.
Psychologists oftcn
say
that
the body image
is
dynamic.
Brought down
to
a precise sense, this term
means
that my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain
existing
or possible
task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that
of
external
objects
or
like
that of
“spatial sensations,”
a spatiality
ofposition, but
a
spntiality
ofsitrration.24
W hether Gab riel M arcel can properly be called a phe nom enolo gist is per-
haps
open
to disp ute , bu t there can be no d ou bt that his reflections o n the
body , halting and unsystem atized as they may be, are strik ing ly relevant to
the concerns
of
this
essay:
O n e aspect
of
Marcel’s view of the bod y is o f
particular imp ortan ce: his strong person alistic em phasis. T h u s he remihds
us that “it
is
not a body, but
my
body, that we arc asking ourselves questions
about .”
He
goes on to say that “speaking of m y b o d y s , in
a
certain sense,
a
way of speaking of myself ’ ; hence, it is proper to say, “I art1 m y body . ” A s
soon as w e d o so, however, w e’e nc ou nte r that am biguity to wh ich we have
previously referred, and M arce l is explicit in d eny ing th at the identification
with
“ m y b o d y ” an
be
proper ly unders tood as a m o d e o f m a t e r i a l i ~ m . ’ ~
I
am
my
body only in
so
far
as
for
m e the body
is
an
essentially mysterious
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 99/323
type of reality, irreducible to those determinate formulae ( n o matter how
interest ingly com plex they m ight be)
to
which i t would be reducible
if
it
could be
considered
merely
as
an objec t” ( M B ,
I:103).
M arcel concedes that
there is
a
strong temp tat ion to reat the bo dy
in
a
detached fashion
as
a
“kind
of ins t rument .
.
. which permits me to act upon, and even intrude my self
into , the wor ld” ( M B ,
I:99).
O n the contrary,
I nm my body in
so far
as
I succeed
in recognizing that this body
of
mine
cutlnof,
in the last analysis, be brought do wn to thcevel of being this object,arl
object,
a
some th ing o r other . I t is at this point that wc have to bri ng in the idea
of the bod y not as an object but as a subject.
( M B ,
i:101)
These views o f Ma rcel, expressed in his
Gifford
Lectures of
1949, were
anticipated many years earlier in his
MetuyhysicallulJmaI.’h
In
a
note wri t ten
in 1923he acknowledged the nonconceptualizablc and nonobjectif iablehar-
acter of “my body.”
Since the fact for m y b o d y of being my body is not som eth ing of which
I c a n
genuinely have an idea, i t is not som ething that I can conceptualize. In the fact
of
m y body there is som ething which transcends whatcan be called materiality,
some th ing wh ich canno t
be
reduced to any of its objective qualities.
.
. . T h e
non-objectivity
of
bod y
becom es clear to o u r min d as soon as
w e
remember
that it is
of
the essence of the objec t as such that i t does not take me into
account. In the measu re in which i t does no t t ake me in to accoun t my body
seems t o
me
no t to be
m y
body. AU,315-1 6)
Two other aspects of “ m y b o d y ” as unders tood by Marcel should be
noted: namely, “my bo dy ” as “fel t,” and as extending beyond the envelope
of the skin. M arcel maintains “that t n y body is mine inasmuch as, however
confusedly, it is felt. .
.
. If I am m y bo dy this is in so
far
as I a m a being that
feels”
( M I ,
243).
A
key
idea in Marcel
s
“feeling
as
a
mode
o f participation.”
While he on ly hin ts at i t , he does suggest that we participate in reality on ly
insofar
as w e are bodies; more, we “feel” rcality on ly in sofa r as we feel
our
bodies.
From th is poin t of iew it seems, therefore, that m y bod y is endowed wi th an
abso lute priority in relation to everything that I can fee1 that is o t h e r t h a n m y
bo dy itself; but then, strictly speak ing, an I really fcel any thing other than my
body itself? Would not the case of m y fee ling someth ing else be merely the
case
of
m y
feeling
myselfas
feeling some thing else,
so
that
I
would
never
be
able to pass beyond various modifications of m y o w n elf-feel ing? ( M B , I:101)
The “felt” character of “ m y bo dy ” is closely bound
up
w ith its relational
character; that
is,
the fact that i t cann ot be localized with in na rrow spatial
and tem poral coordinates .
“I
am inclined
to
think ,” M arce l tells us, “that
there can onlybe a body where there is an act
of
feeling, and
for
there to be
this feeling the distinction between the here and
there
needs to cease to be
rigid” (MJ, 270). I will later argue that the
self’s
relations to a m or e encom -
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 100/323
Jmnes:
Toward a
Field-Self
73
passing reality are the gro un ds
for a
plausible
bclief
in i ts immortal i ty . The
experiential gro un d for su ch an extrapolation, how cver, is the evidcnce that
we are here and now co nst i tuted
by
relations that ex tend the reality of the
self “beyo nd” the confines
of
the “skin.”
Thi s
“tran sce nd ing” relational
fea-
ture
has
already been noted in refcrence to James’s do ctrine
of
“selves.” Th e
following text from M arcel can be cited as reinforcement for such
a
view:
I
am
m y body;
but I am also
my habitual surrounding. This is dcmonstrated
by
the aceration, the division with myself that acconlpanies exile from home
this is
a n
order of cxperience that Proust has expressed incomparably). Am I
my
body
in
a more essential way than I am my habitual surrounding? If this
question is answered in the negative, then death can only be a supreme exile,
not
an
annihilation.
T hi s
way
of
stating the problem
may
at
first
sight
seem
childish.But that,
I
think, is mistaken. We must
take
in their strictest in-
terpretation wordssuch as
belong
t o (a town, a house, etc.):
and
the word
Iacerutiora.
it
is as
though adhesions are broken.
( M J , 259)
M arcel and James,
I
suggest, use
a
sim ilar ph eno m eno n in their “belief,”
“faith,” “extrapolation” con cerning the divine. W hat is significant, how ev-
er, is that the phen om enontself is r ecogn ized by many who would no tlso
share the “faith”
of
a James o r a Marcel. Sartre bears this out : “M y bo d y is
everywhere: the bomb
which
destroys
t n y
house also
damages
m y b o d y i n
so far as the house was already an indicat ion o f m y b o d y ” BN,
325).
JAMES’S “BODY-TEXTS”
Let
us
re turn now to the previously cited body-texts of Ja m cs to see h o w
they may be interpreted so as
to
avoid a materialistic or physicalistic in-
terpretation. Recall that Jame s referred to the “Spiritual Self’ as the “central
active self,” the “central nucleus of the Self,” and
“this
self
of
all the othe r
selves.” T h e startling and confusing feature
of
James’s do ctrine em erge s
wh en, in at temp ting to descr ibe this
self
as concrctely as possible, all he
“can ever feel distinctly is som e bo dily proc ess .” Ev en suc hcts
as
attaining,
negat ing, and
making
an
effort are-so
James claims-“felt
as
movements
of something in the head.”
I t
is not surpr ising, then, that those sympathet ic
to materialism as well as many unsympathetic to it should interpretJames’s
doctr ine of the self materialistically o r behavioristically. “T he re is perhaps
nothing in Jam es,” Ehrna n contend s, “that has been m or e radically misin-
terpreted than
his
account at this point, and he has often been taken as a
mere materialist.” E h m an insists that there is no materialism here, “n o de-
nial of t hough t
or
emot ion, but s imply the observat ionhat w e are unableto
grasp
these
as
purely psychicaI, as nonbodi ly” ( N E P ,
262).
While I obviou sly share Ehman’s rejection o f a materialistic read ing of
these
texts,
the issue is,
I
believe,
a
bit more complicated. The complication
is evident
as soon
as w e ask not whatJames is deny ing but wh at hes affirm-
ing.
It
is always easier t o see wh at
a
creative think er is denying than wh at he
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 101/323
74 Persord Imnrortality: Possibility nnd Credibility
is affirming, and James is no exception. James shared the di%cu lty of our
own contemporary thinkers w h o desire to overcome dualism but are ham-
pered in their efforts by the dualistic language that is so deeply embedded in
the culture and in ou r psyche-body. Still, the dircction is evident, wha tever
difficulties Jam es and wehave in articulating that d ircction. Ehm an h elpfully
proposes hat “whcn James ssscrts hat he ‘acts of attending , assenting,
negating arc felt as m ov em en ts in the head,’ the term
us
o u g h t t o be taken
literally”
( N E P ,
262).27This
a t
least sugge sts that Jame s cann ot
be
under-
stoo d to assert any simp le unequivocal identi ty between the “sclf’ and the
“body.” Indeed,
James seems to acknow ledge
a
distinction when-a few
lines beforedescribing hefeelings of he spiritual self as bo dily move-
ments-he states that “w he n it [th e sp iritu al sclfj is fou nd , it is
f e l t ;
just
as
the body is felt” (PP, 1:286).
In spite of th e fact that materialism ca nn ot be reconciled with James’s
overall ph ilosop hy and that,
as
w e have seen, he explicitly rejects it
as
inade-
quate to fundamen tal hum an needs, textual sup po rt for
a
materialistic in-
terpretation o f his do ctrine
of
the self is no t co nfine d
to
a
few
passages in his
early wor k, The Principles
cfPsychology.
In an equally notorious ext
from
his
essay “Does Co nsciousnc ss Exist?”-som e fourteen years after publication
o f
his
Principles-James added m o re fuel
to
the flames
of
the controve rsy. In
the
penultimate paragraph, and after conceding that “to ma ny i t will sou nd
materialistic,” he states:
I a m
as
confident as I
am
of anything that , in m yself , the stream of thinking
(which I recognize emphatically as d
phcnomenon)
is o n l y a careless name for
what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of m y
brea th ing . The “I think” which Kant sa id
must
be able to acco m pany all nly
objects,
is the “I breathe” which actually does accompany them. .
. .
Breath,
which was
ever
the original
of
“spirit ,” breath
moving
outwards,
between the
glottis and the nostrils, is, I am persuaded, the essence ou t of which
p h i l o s e
phers have constructed the entity known to t hem
as
consciousness.
( E R E ,
19)
Harsh words ,
indeed
(“and some would walk wi th him
n o
more”) , but
as
w ith an earlier sayer
of
“h ars h words,’’ it is no t perfectly clear what is being
said. T he m o re tender-minded will take co m fort in James’s acknowledg-
ment that these words will s o m d materialistic,
to
which the more tough-
mindedwillmake he“if
it
looks like
a
duck .
. .”
response. The
phe-
nomenological ly oriented commentators
(who
can
be
classed
as
either tend-
er tough-minded thinkers or tough tender-minded ones) are, I believe, re-
sponsive to the texts u nder consid eration while remaining con sistent with
James’s broad er ph ilosophical conc crns and congenial to a
field
view
of
the
self. To begin with, there is no dispute conc erning James’s effort to find an
alternative to
the
traditional “soul.” Richard Stevens suggests:
Such crudely m aterialistic language seems to have
been chasen
by James as
part
of a stra tegy designed to e l iminate theast vestiges of soul-theory which
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 102/323
75
he
felt led
infallibly
to a
misunderstanding
of
the
body.
I f spiritual activity is
attributed
to
an incorporeal scparate entity, then the body is inevitably looked
upon as
a
mere instrurnent.28
Th e next poin t of agreement
is
that James “refuses to view the body, in
the fashion o f traditional dualism , as an extended mass in space”
V H , 73).2”
Closely allied
to
this is tha t the “bod y”
James
is positively affirming is, in
less technical Ian gua ge, the “lived bo dy ” of the phenom enologis ts . “ I t is
not ,” John Wild maintains, “the body
of
traditional dualistic thought, the
mere mass of ma tter extende d in space. I t is the moving , l iving, consc ious
body which expresses our emotions, and is the non-object ive centre of my
world.”
T h u s ,
according
to
W ild, James came o
see
“th at the elf is ncither
a
physical body, n o r
a
separated con sciousness, nor any com bination
of
the
two. . . . It is a living, sentient body dependent on the th ings among which
it has been thrown,
and
inse para ble from the w orld in which it exists.”3O
Finally, there can
be
l it tle dou bt , as Eh m an has poin ted ou t , that
James
opens
the door to misunderstanding by failing to distinguish clearly
between the body as a mere physical object
as
studied by physiology and the
body
as we feel and live through its movements in our actual conscious experi-
ence.
The
body as
a
physiological entity containing he central nervous system
and brain is
an
object
for
the detached attitude
of
science;
i t
is not our lo-
calized; felt subjective self. ( N E P ,
262)
An imp or tant aspect
of
all of
this is that the ambiguity
of
James’s body
references is not
merely
a terminological ambiguity. Earlier, in discussing his
doct r ine
of
pure ex perience,
I
m ade the po int that thc terminological
ambi-
guity “is groun ded in experiential am biguity”; in su pp ort , I cited several
passages from his essay “T he Place of Affectional Facts,” in wh ich Jam es
maintains that
“our
body
is the palmary instance
of
the ambiguous. Sorne-
times
I
t reat my body purely
as
part
of
outer nature. Sometimes, again, I
think of it as ‘mine.’ I sor t it with the ‘me ,’ and then certain local changes
and determina tions in it
pass
for spiritual happenings ”
( E R E , 76).31 I
sug-
gested that James’s do ctrine w ou ld have benefited fro m the
use of
field lan-
guage, and I would l ike now to expand this point a bit with referencc
to
his
doct r inc
of
the “body.”
Bruce W ilshire points o u t that James “treats the body as a topic know n
always as the sam e w ithin an O bj ec t that has field-like
as
well
as
stream-like
characteristics”
(W’P, 128).32A
brief consideration
of
the man ner in w hich
James understands “topic”
and
“O bje ct” w ill clarify W ilshirc’s statemen t
and
indicate som e gro un ds for the field view being suggested. T he ter m s
“topic,”
“kernel,”
and “fractional o bject” ll mean the same
or
James. They
point
to
or express a “par t” of t he Ob jec t w hic h is really
the
thought’s “en-
tire co nt en t or deliverance,neither more
nor
less.”Jam es llustrates his
point wi th he hou ght , “C olum bus d iscoveredAmerica in 1492.” Mo st
people,
if
asked
what in such
a
case is the object
of
one’s tho ug ht ,
would
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 103/323
76
Persorrnl
Itnmortulity: Pus5ibility a d
Credibility
reply “Columbus” or “America” or “th e discovery
of
America.” According
to James, however, “it is no th ing sh or t
of
the entire sentence, ‘Columbu s-
discovered-America-in-1492.’ ” Further, if we w ish to feel the idiosyncrasy
of
this thoug ht, we mu st reprod uce i t just “as i t was ut tered, with every
wo rd fringed and the wh ole sentenc e athed in that original halo of obscure
relations, w hich, ike an ho rizon, hen
spread
about i ts meaning” (PP,
1:265-64). Now if, as W ilshire sugge sts, “the Ob ject in its prereflective to-
tality” is the “field of consciousness” (W’P, 128), and the body is a “ topic”
within an “Object,” i t seems apt to describe it as a “field within a field.”
Such
a
description receives support, I believe, from James’s claim that ou r
bodies “are percepts in
our
objective field-they are sim ply the m ost in-
teresting percepts there. W hat happens to them excitcs
in
us
emo tions and
tendencies to action mo re e nergetic and habitua l than any wh ich re excited
by other portions,of the ‘field’ ”
(PP,
I:304).
Remember , I
am
not claiming that James is here, or in the othe r texts
cited, consciou sly and deliberately co nstructing a field do ctri ne of the self. I
am and will con tinue sugg esting , however, that these experiential descrip-
tions lend themselves to incorporat ion wi thin such
a
field metap hysics, and
the utili ty o f these texts for fashioning such
a
metaphysics-rather than the
explicit inten tio n ofJames-is
m y
primary concern. Consider ,
for
example,
the way in wh ich he spea ks o f th e multiplicity o f selves that constitute the
empirical self
or
“ m e ” ( w ehave still to conside r that other constituent of the
self-the pure Ego). Surely James does not mean that each o f these is an
ent i ty som eho w s tacked
up
within a container self, No physicalistic irnag-
ery will convey the fact that each of these selves is the self th rou gh an d
thro ug h. Bu t a field m etaph orwouldseememinent lyappropr iatehere,
since fields are overlapping and inclusive, able to co m e and go with both
continu ity and discontinuity.
A s
I
have repeatedly acknowledged, th e uti-
lization of the field m etap ho r does not “exp lain” how such overlap ping si-
multaneity o f multiple yet unified ealities is possible (th ou gh it do es turnus
away from
a
num ber of dead-end pathways while keeping
us
focused up on
the c onc rete ex per ien td f low )”no mo re, for ex am ple, than does speaking
of
thelived”
or
“live body” explain how, according
to
Merleau-Ponty, “its parts are inter-related in
a
peculiar way: they are no t
spread
ou t s ide
by
side,
but
enveIoped in each 0 t h e r . ” 3 ~W hatever they are
t ry ing tosay, it
is
clear that when James and Merleau-Pontyefer to “parts,”
wh ether of the self or of the body, they d o n o t mean “parts” in the same
sense as when speaking
of
parts of an automobile or even parts of o u r ob-
ject-body.
Th ere rem ains on e oth er crucial body-text to consider-a text at once a
suggestion
of
an d an obstacle to the field view of the self. What I
would
like
to do is
to
read this text in er m s
of
the field assumptions previously posi ted,
conceding the somew hat procrustean haracter of such an effort.
The
text in
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 104/323
question is part of a lengthy footnote to “T he Experience
of
Activity,”
orig-
inally delivered in
1904
as th e Presidential Address to thc American Psycho-
l o g i c a l A ~ s o c i a t i o n . ~ ~n this note James is responding
to
a cri tic w h o had
taken
h im
to task ‘ 4 f ~ rdcntifying spiritual activity with ccrtain mu scular
feelings,” basing the cha rge on the text we have already discussed. James’s
first point is that his intention was
to
show that “there is
n o
direct cvidcnce
that we feel the activity
of
an inner spiritual agcnt as such.”
He
goes on
to
disting uish three “ac tivitics.” First is the activity in “the mere
t trnt of
expcrj-
ence, in the fact that som eth ing is go ing
on.”
For my purposes, I will refer
to this as the strcanl
of
cxpcriencc-the gen eral flow ing
ficld
of reality.
W ithin that fieldJa m es furth er disting uish es “tw o wh ats, an activity felt as
‘ou rs,’ and an activity ascribcd
to
objects.”
H c
insists that in the dispu ted
text his concern was to eterminewh ich activity with inhe total
experience-process” ould prope rly e designated “o ur s.”
In
language
whosc
surface sen se is surcly m aterialistic o r bchavioristic, hc states: “So far
as we arc ‘persons,’ and contrasted and opposed o
a n
‘cnvironment , ’ move-
ments in our body f igureas o u r activities, and I am unable to f ind any other
activities that are o u r s in
this
strictly personal sense.”
James conced es that there is “ a
wider sense in w hich the w h o k ‘cho ir o f
heaven and furniture
of
the earth ,’ and their activities,
are
ou rs, for they are
our ‘objects.’ ” In this sensc, however, “‘we’ are
.
.
.
only another n a m e for
the total process
of
experience, another namefor
all
that is.”
This
last has
an
almost monistic ring to it insofar as i t suggc sts that there is one process
constituting all that is. When James’s later doctr ine concerning theelf-corn-
poundingof consciousness is considered,w ewillencounter hisnotion
again and with
a
pan theistic flavor. It will be seen that James is eager t o stress
the “intimate” character of the divine but in
a
way that does not deny the
reality
of
individuals. Hence, there w ill be an o verlapping o f consciousness
(“fields with in fields”) that
al lows
for both individuality and the encompass-
ing character of the divine.
I
am contending that the note under considera-
tion anticipates this laterdoctrine and that in bo th instances James’s in sig ht is
better expressed in field language. To illustrate furthe r, let us re turn to the
text in which James says that it is not “we,’ as the “ total process of experi-
ence” but the individualized self that was thc focus of his concern in the
previously cited texts conc erning the spiritual self and mo vem ents
in
the
head.
He
then
reinforccs
his
early expression:
T he individualized sclf, which I believe to be the only thing properly called
self, is a part of the world experienced. T h e world experienced(otherwise
called the
“field of
consciousness”) corncs
a t
all t imes with
our
body as its
centre, centre of vision, centre o f action, centre of interest. Where the bo dy is
is “here ”; wh en the body acts is “now ”; wh at the bod y touch es is “th is”; all
other things are “there” and “then” and “that .” These word s of emphasized
position imply a systematization of things with reference
to
a
focus
of action
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 105/323
78 Persorial Immortality: Possibility and Credibility
and interest which lies in the body. . . . The body is the storm centre, the
origin of co-ordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-train.
Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view.
Recalling the previously made distinction between the “thing-body” and
the “lived body,” our initial response to this text is, “To which of these
bodies is James referring?” The question is seriously misleading, of course,
if it implies that there are two bodies; it would then land us back in that
ontological dualism James was continually striving to overcome. On the
other hand, if we take “body” in the scientific or commonsense meaning,
we cannot avoid materialism. If there is implicit in James, as the commen-
tators have maintained,
a
distinction between the body
as a
physiological
entity and as “lived,” then it can only be
a
distinction of focus and function.
The thing- or object-body can only be the lived body viewed more nar-
rowly, viewed as
a
limited field within
a
more inclusive field. James is point-
ing,
I
believe, to that more inclusive body field which, while not separate
from the “thing-body,” is also neither reducible to nor simply identical with
it.
In Stevens’s commentary on the text under consideration, there is, in my
opinion, support for the kind of field reading being presented: “These terms
designate a network of positions, a system of coordinates, whose focal point
is always the body. No experience is possible for us, unless it fit into this
oriented system of references” ( J H ,
74).
While he does not say
so
explicitly
in this passage, Stevens is clearly referring to the lived body, as is evident in
a later passage in which he states that Husserl and James “both agree on the
ambiguous situation of the animate body which reveals itself simultaneously
as a Thing in the world and as the center of coordinates to which the rest of
the world is related”
( J H ,
88).35 tevens describes the body as “the func-
tional center of my consciousness,” and as “the zero-point, the locus of
every field of consciousness” ( J H , 143,
86).36
One other segment of James’s lengthy footnote merits consideration. It
immediately follows the last passage cited:
The word
“I ,”
then, is primarily a noun
of
position, just like “this” and
“here.” Activities attached to “this” position have prerogative emphasis, and,
if activities have feelings, must be felt in a peculiar way. The word “my”
designates the kind of emphasis.
( E R E ,
86n.)
Apart from the relational character of the “I,” this passage can be read as
implying, or at least not foreclosing, the reality of a personal self that is
“more” than an object in what Ehman called “an anonymous stream of
consciousness” ( N E P ,263). Recall that Ehman criticized James for the failure
to acknowledge “the felt reflexivity, the felt reference back to self,” in many
of our experiences. In his desire to stress that when we reflect, we always
encounter the self as an object within the stream of experience, James flirts
with
a
“no-self’ doctrine. The corrective for this tendency, as Ehman in-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 106/323
Jntiies: Touwd n Field-SeCf
79
sists, is to acknowledge the selfs prereflective awareness of its own exis-
tence. Does the passage just cited recognize this awareness? I t depends,
I
believe, on how we understand the “peculiar way” in which the activities
attached to the
“I”
are felt. Is the “prerogative emphasis” an act of prereflec-
tive self-reference without which the self would be reduced to just another
object in “an anonymous stream of consciousness?” If
so
understood, it
would certainly soften the “materialistic” implications of those passages
previously cited.
Important as they are,
I
do not believe that James’s doctrine of the self can
be constructed from these “body-texts” alone. Nevertheless,
I
have dwelt
upon them
a t
some length in order to show that they need not be read in
a
materialistic or behavioristic sense and that they can properly be read as
pointing toward a field view of the self. Since
I
have chosen to speak in
terms of “self’ rather than “body”-even “lived body”-it is important to
reemphasize why James was attracted to “body” language. The point has
repeatedly been made that James wished to account for the data of experi-
ence without recourse to any nonexperiential spiritual or transcendental
principle or any immaterial soul. But he also had a more positive reason for
describing experience in bodily terms: namely, that such languagc keeps
us
aware of the concreteness, immediacy, otherness, uniqueness, and centered-
ness that characterize the stream of experience while protecting us against a
deenergizing absorption in empty abstractions.37
These are also the features James wishes to emphasize when he makes
sensation, as Perry says, “the prototype of experience.” But Perry notes the
same kind of ambiguity attached to “sensation” that was earlier noted in
reference to “body.” Sensory experience
is
not, for James, what it is for
those empiricists who “reduce the concreteness of experience to sensational
atoms” or “limit the
qualia
of experience to the ‘six senses’
”
(SWJ,
47-48).
Nevertheless, according to Perry, “sensory experience is still typical of exis-
tence in respect of that character of fullness, direct presence, and shock of
externality which distinguishes it from thought, memory and imagination”
SWJ,
70).38Since concreteness and its allied characteristics are the claimed
advantages of the field metaphor, and inasmuch as it has been suggested that
the body can be understood in field terms, why use, as
I
do, “self language”
instead?
To
some extent the difference in speaking of “self field” or “body field” is
only terminological. Nevertheless, I would maintain that in view of the
aims of this essay (and I would say the overall aims ofJames’s philosophy),
“self’ is
a
less misleading term than “body” for referring to the& reality
of
the human being. Notice that I say “less misleading,” for the danger in
speaking of the “self’ is that while it is
a
more palatable term for contempo-
rary thinkers than “soul” or “spirit,” it may simply mask an unacceptable
dualism. Still, I believe the likelihood that “body” terminology will eventu-
ate in materialistic reductionism is greater than that “self’ terminology will
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 107/323
dissipate in to vacuous spirituality. T h e reason for this,
I
would suggcst, is
that we apparently have morc “exact” language for the body both in cience
and in
common sense. 3y The very vagueness of the term “se lf’ s an advan-
tage in that it keeps
us
open
to
dimensions of human reality never adc-
quately grasped when speaking
of the
“body.” This
is
reflected,
I
believe, in
ordinary langua ge that expresses a long-standing belief, insight, intuition,
or perhaps prejudice that we are
“more”
and
“other”
than o ur bodies.4o
But
the
dist inct ion between theself and the body is no t restricted to co m -
m o n
sense
or to the various
forms
of dua l i sm.
George
H er be r t Mead , w ho
is within the pragm atic tradition, shares ma ny assum ptions and principles
withJam es and Dewey, and has given us a very rich philosophy of the self as
social. Nevertheless,
he
explicitly asserts that “w e can distinguish very
dcfi-
nitely between the self and the body,” since “theelf has
a
character w hic h is
different from that of the physiological organism
Finally,
it is
more cons is tent wi th and fai thfulto James’s mo re d eveloped
view of the self, wh ich w ill be prcsented later,
to
speak in terms of the self
rather than the body. Ha ns Linsch oten has pointed ou t that “t oJ am es , the
Self was a proper ty
of
a bod y, al thoug h it can, and sometimeseven must, be
described
as som eth ing different from th e body.”43 Even in that section
of
The
Prirlciples
of
Psychology
in which Jam es describes the spiritual
self
as
“movements
in
the head” or “bod ily feelings,” he still seems to distinguish,
as previously noted, the spiritualself f rom the body:when insisting that the
spiritual self “is felt ,” he imm ediately adds, “just as
the
body is felt” ( P P ,
I:286). If this we re an isolated tcxt,
i t
wo uld prove nothin g, but i t is con-
sistent with the kind of distinct me aning that belongs to what James
will
later call the “ j d l self’ ( P U , 130).43
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 108/323
C H A P T E R
4
James: Personal Identity
Who is
it
that
can
tell
me
who I am?
King
Lenr
“Wil l iam
Shakespeare
For every man alone thinks h e hath got
To
be
a
Phoenix, and that then
can
bee
None
of that
kinde,
of
which
he
is,
but
hee.
”John Donne
“An
Anatonly
of
the World”
To
find wherein personal identity consists, we
must
consider what person
stands for;
which, I
think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has
reason and reflection,
and
can consider itself as
itself,
the
same
thinking
thing, in different times
and places.
-John Locke
Essay
Cortcerning
Human
Understurlding
Having had his say co ncernin g the em pirical self (m e) and its constituent
selves (material,social,spiritual),
James
nextdeclares hat thedecksare
“cleared for the strug gle w ith tha t pure principle of personal identity,” the
pure Ego (I) which has been repeatedly alluded to
b u t
whose description
was postpo ned. After noting that “ever sinceHume’s time, it
has
been
justly
regarded as the mo st puzzling puzzle w ith which psy cholo gy has
to
deal,”
Jamesconcedes hatwhateversolutionhe adopts “will fail to satisfy the
majority of those to whom it is addressed” (PP, 1:314).l
Ther e is hardly
a
m or e crucial issue
for
the purposesof this essay than that
of
personal dentity. U nle ss
a
“reasonable”
case
can
be made
for
a con-
tinually changing self thatnevertheless embodies
a
significant mode
of
“sameness” o r “identi ty,” any belief in imm ortal i ty or resurrect ion wo uld
be characterized by e m ptin ess a nd blindness. Before explicitly considering
“personal identity,” however,
and
the solution thatjarnes adop ts in
T h e
Prin-
ciples ofPsychology,
I
would l ike
to
recall and reemp hasize so m e crucial prin-
ciples and presupp ositions of his more general philosophy.
Again and
again
th roughout the Principles, James insists
that
he is con-
cerned only with th e psy cholog ical, not the me taphysical, d imen sions
f
the
81
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 109/323
82 Persotrnl
Imrrortrllity:ossibility
nttd
Credibility
various problems undc r conside ration. Ag ain and again, however, he mcr-
ges the tw o, a nd he latcr realized that they ca nn ot bc kcpt com pletely apart
regardless
of
one’s me thodo logical inten tions.‘ W ithout co mp letelyconflat-
ing the psycho logical (descriptive) an d the me taphysical (spec ulative), have
suggested that the deeper thrust and significance ofJames’s position
on
such
specific questions as truth, self, and God can
be
graspcd only by surfacing
themetaphysicalpresupp ositions hatperm eate his m o re particularized
responses.
Recall the carlier con tentio n that the pragm atists in general and James in
part icular arc best un de rstoo d w ithin the
framework
of
a mctaphysics of
process and relations, a m eta ph ys ic of “fields.” Again, I m ake no s ugges t i on
that his is a fully develop ed and systematized metap hysics,
or
that ndi-
vidual pragmatists-cspccially James-have beenperfectlyconsistent n
pursuing the implicat ionsof a radically ch anging an d relational world. Still,
the hypothesis governing this essay is that when pragmatism is understood
as presupposing such
a
world, it offcrs rich resources for the treatment of a
rangc of questions, including those that fall und er the head ing of “philoso-
phy of religion"-and am on g these is the quest ion
of
personal immortal i ty.
I will attem pt, there fore , to illustrate this point m ore co ncretely in the con-
sideration o f James’s do ctri ne
of
personal identity.
James’s insistcncc that
he
is presupposing dualism in is psychology gives
rise to the oft-noted conflicts and inconsistencies that populate h e Pritzciples
OfPsychofogy.
I have suggested tha t for the purpo ses o f this essay, Jame s w ill
be
read in the light
of
his latcr rejection of ontologica l dualism; therefore,
his dualistic langu age, which can not be com pletely avoided, will be under-
stood functionally rather than ontologically.
There
is o ne self with a variety
of functions; hence, I maintain
that
the distinction between James’s “objec-
tivc
me”
and “subjective I” is
a
distinction
of
focus and fun ction .
An
ex-
t remely imp ortant implicat ion of this perspective,
as
we shall see, is that
inasmuch as functions are “real” andare neither epiphenomena1 nor in need
of some underlying substantial principle, then if there are real I-functions,
there is
a
real
I.
An other central presupp osition, already tou che d up on , is that the deepest
features
of
reality-its “thickness”-are grap sed in “fee lings,” som etim es
referred to as imrnediatc or perceptual experiencc. T h e self, insofa r as it is an
identity-in-diversity,
a
sameness-amidst-differences,
a
unity-within-plu-
rality, m ust be “felt.” “Whatever the content of the e g o may be,” James
states,“it is hab itually felt
with
everything else by us humans , and m us t
form a
liaisorl
between all the hings of which
we
becomesuccessively
aware”
(PP,
~ 2 3 5 ) . ~ust how “feeling” is to be und erstood and wh ether it is
adequate t o account for personal identi ty are andre likely to remain matters
of intense dispu te, but-fo llow ing James--I believe it high ly unlik ely that
any claim
to
establish the reality
of
personal identity will
be
able to dispense
com pletely with feeling
o r
s om e th ing ak in t o it a4
An
important aspect
of
James’s un ders tand ing
of
“feeling,” of course, is that it must be seen within
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 110/323
his metaphysics o f cxpericnce and no t as so m e esoteric activity that is im-
ported
f rom a rcalm beyond experience when reason fails u s 5
To say that personal idcn tity is felt is no t to m ak eany exclusive claims for
the expcriencc o f sclf.
“In
James,’, Perry states, “the perso nal sub ject oses
all
of its special privilcges. It m us t su bm it to thc c om m on tcst.
I f
i t is thcr c a t
all it must give evidcnce of its cxistencc, and this evidcncc furnishcs, so far
as
it goes, the only clue to its nature and character.”‘) T hc “g ro u nd ” cvi-
dence, for James, is what is fclt o r what is prescnted
in
percep tual expcri-
ence. While this feeling or perccptual experience never admits o f exhaustive
cxpo sition, it is no t 3 representation
of some
kind of noum enon ly ing be-
hind or beyond the phc nom cno n. A s he wrote to
Hugo
M iinsterberg in
1900,
“ M y fundamental objcction to you r philosop hy is that
1
still believc
thc immcdiatc l iving m om en t
of
cxpericnce to be
as
‘dcscribablc’
as
any
‘scientific, sub stitute here for
can
be” (TC, 11:150).
I t
is thiscrediting
of
cxperience that led James to affirm thc irnportancc o fJ o h n Lockc insofar as
he had “m ade
of
‘personal’ identity (the only practically important sort)
a
directly verifiable e m pirica l ph eno m en on . W he re not actually experienced,
it is M y pointerc is no tomaintain thathisssertion
is
un-
problem ed but simply to stress the centrality of pcrceptual cxperiencc o r
fceling in James’s do ctrinc of perso nal iden tity.
O n e further
point
in this regard is tha t idcn tity or sameness as “ f ~ l t ’ ~ust
be distinguished from the identi ty or sameness that characterizes concepts.
I t was only in Jarnes7s ast philo sop hy that hc thou gh t hc had finally b roken
loose
from
the
“logic of
identity’’ that so ha m pcrc d his efforts
to
describe
the flux of expcriencc: “W ha t, th en , are the peculiar features in the percep-
tual flux wh ich thc conce ptual translation
so
fatally leaves o ut?” Jame s
re-
sponds
that the
cssencc of life is its continuously ch anging character, wh ile
concepts are discontinuous and fixed. “When
we
conceptualize,
wc
cut and
fix, and exclude everything but wh at we h a w fixed
.
.
.
whereas in thc real
concretc sensible flux o f life, experiences cornpe nctrate cach other so that it
is
not
easy
to kn ow just wh at s excluded and what is no t” (PU, 113)? James
brings ou t the importancc
of
thc distinction in his dcscription of the con-
t inuity and sameness that belong
to
personal expcriencc.
What I
do
feel simply when a a ter m om en t of my expcriencc succeeds a n
earlier one is that tho there are two moments, thc transition from
one
to the
other is
mrrtir~~rorrs.
ont inui ty herc i s a defini te sort
of
expe rience; just as
definite as is the di~CL7}1fittUily-PXpErieIIccwhich
I
find i t mpossible to avoid
w h e n
I
seek
to
make the t ransi t ion from an experience of
m y
o w n to
one of
yours.
. .
. Practically t o experiencc one’s personal con t inuum
i n
this
living
way is
to
know the originalsof the ideas
of
continuity and sanlencss,
o
k n o w
what the words stand for concrcte ly,
o
o w n
all
that they can ever m ean . ( E R E ,
25-26)
But
it
is
this experiential
sameness
a n d
co ntin uit y that are, according
to
the rationalists, excluded by logic. “‘Sam eness,” they have said, m ust be a
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 111/323
84 P e r s o d I mm o r t d i t y : Possibility
orld
Credibility
stark numerical identity; i tcan’ t run on f romnext
to
next. Co ntinuity can’t
mean mere absence
of
gap; for if you say two thin gs are n imm ediate con-
tact, at the contact how can they be two?” These thinkers end up “by sub-
st i tut ing
a
lot
of
static objects
of
conception for the direct perceptualxperi-
ences” ( E R E , 2 1 3 ) . ~hey consider i t absurd
to
ma intain that the “self-same”
funct ion s dfferen t ly wi th and wi tho ut som ething lse , “b ut th is i t sensibly
seems
to
do.” James does no t deny t ha t “qua this an exp erience is no t t he
same as it is
qr rn
that .
.
. b u t t h e qlras are conceptual shots
of
ours at its
post-mortem remains.” In its sensational immediacy, however, “everything
is at once wh atever ddfere nt things i t is
a t
o n c e a t d.”t is
only
w h e n
concepts are substituted for sensational life that inteuectua hsm appa rently
tr iumphs through i ts
claims
to p ro v e “t he mmanent-self-contradictoriness
of all this smooth- running f in i t e exper ience” (PU, 120-21).
A
central and disp uted featurc ofJam es’s doctrine
of
the self is that the
“passing T h o u g h t is the thinker.” I will later analyze this and suggest an
interpretation congenial both
to
a
field metaphysics and a belief in personal
immortality. A crucial feature of that analysis will be James’s no tio n o f t he
“specious present”-the claim that in imm ediate expe rience we grasp both
the receding past and th e e me rging future. A gain wish
to
stress that this is
no t
a
conceptual grasp but
a
felt grasp: “ T h e tiniest feeling w e can possibly
have comes with an earlier and a later part and with a sense of their continu-
ous
procession.” James insists that the “passing” m o m e n t is the m inim al fact
and that “if we do not feel bo th past and present in
one
field of feeling, we
feel the m n o t
at all”
( P U , 128).Th is “tem po ral” character o f experience and
reality, explicitly articulated in James’s later philosop hy , is imp licit in and a
key to unders tanding
his
earlier views on the self. At the heart of this tem-
porali ty is “con tinuou s ransi t ion”or“change,”which, as I have been
stressing, can be mm ediatelyexperienced o r felt butcannotbegrasped
through conc epts .
Th i s
is an extremely importan t point as rcgards any at-
tempt to understand the nature of the self; asJames notes, “personal histo-
ries are processes
of
change in t ime, and the c h a r y e itself is one
of
the things
inrrnediately experienced” (ERE, 25).
Th e general point I am at tempt ing
to
make in these introduc tory rema rks
to
a
description ofJames’s do ctr inc f th e elf as presented in The Principles of
Psychology,
is that this do ctrine is mu ch enriched wh en read w ithin the incip-
ient field metaphysics
of
James’s later philosophy. In the
Principks,
James
ma intains that he is restricting himself to a descript ion of experience, to the
structure
of
the m ind; he is bracketing the question o f “external” reality.
Whenhe ettisons thisontologicaldualism n he Essays in R a d i c d Em-
per ic i sm, he is able to ask, som ew ha t rhetorically, “S ho uld w c no t say here
that
to
be experienccd
as
cont inuous
is
to be really co ntinu ou s, in a world
where experience and reali ty co m e to the sam e th ing ?”
E R E ,
30). In recall-
ing here that for the pragm atists experienc e
s
the only pathway
o
an y spec-
ulation
or
extrapo lation conc erning the gene ral character
of
reality,
I
am
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 112/323
stressing h ow different is thc claim that changc or co nti nu ou s tran sitio n is
felt when that claim is understood not merely as a psychological description
but as an expression of ou r dccpest and most int imate penctrat ion into eal-
ity. Co nsid er, for exa m ple, how significantly differcnt are the implications
of the fol lowing text , depcnding on whichof these perspectives is assumed:
“In the same ct by wh ich I feel that this passing m inu te
is
a new pulse o f m y
life, I feel that the old life con tinuc s into it,and the fecling of continuance in
no wise jars upo n the simultan eous fecling o f novcIty. They , too, com pene -
tratc harm oniou sly” ( E R E , 46-47).
T h e fuIler implication
of
the sclfs fceling its ow n continu ity, w hcreby its
dimension
of
pastness is intimately bound
u p
w ith its dimension of newness,
can be appreciated only after w e have described James’s effort
to
account for
theunity,continuity,and idcnti ty
of
the self in termsof the“passing
T h o u g h t . ” I will a t
that
t ime sugg est that wh en these metaphysical presup-
positions are related to thc “pa ssing Th ou gh t,” wc areble to avoid accoun t-
ing for personal ide ntit y thr ou gh thc substantialist’s underlying principle o r
the transcenden talist’s propertyless transcendcntal cgo. Also avoided, how-
ever, will be that “thinness” and radical ephermerali ty that accom panies a
narrow phenomenalis t interpretat ion of the “passing Thought.”
THE
SENSE
O F
P E R S O N A L
IDENTITY
In the eighteenth century, Th o m as Reid asscrted that “the c onv iction w hich
every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory reaches, needs n o
aid of phi losophy to strengthen it , and
n o
philosophy can weaken it , with-
ou t f irst producing somc degree o f insanity.”*0 W hether philosophy can
strengthen o r weaken this con victio n may
be disputed, but there can bc no
do ub ting that personal identity has been
a
matter of continuing philosoph-
ical controversy.“Evidently,”Whiteheadstates, “th ere is
a
fact to
be
ac-
counted for”; hence,every philosophy “must provide some doctr ineof per-
sonal identity.”” This holds even if
one
conclud es that personal identity is
an
i llusion, for on e w ou ld still have to explain w hy hu m an be ings are
so
universally and persistently saddled w ith such an illusion-the task of such
thinkers
as
the Hum cans and the Buddh ists , w ho de ny the reali ty o f the
self. Jam es him self has been interpreted
as
present ing,
if
on ly implicitly,
a
view
of
the self
that
denies the reality of the subject, or
ego. I
will conten d
that in spite of
a
num ber
of
rnislcading texts,
such
an interpretation is
in
conflict with the deep er strains
of
his philosophy
when
considered in
its
overall thrust.13Unless I canestablish hisclaim, m y effort toem ploy
James’s d oc trine of the
self
as
a
gro un d for belief in pe rsonal imm ortality
will be radically u nd erm ined . H enc e the necessity for the close and detailed
consideration of som e sub tlc an d lusive features of James’s d oc trine.
Rccall that the central feature ofjam es’s des criptio n of the em pirica l self
(me) was that in all its ma nifesta tions it is experienced as
an
object . The
question that inevitably follows,
of
course,
is
who
or
what
is do ing the expe-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 113/323
ricncing, 1 J wh ich finally brings James to
a
consideration
of
“ the I , or pure
Ego,” w hich he had bracketed whilc dcscribing the empirical sclf.
I n
his
Psycldogy: BYie@Y C u t m e , James
a dm i t s
that “the I , o r ‘pure ego,’ is a very
much more diffrcult subject
of
inquiry than the
M e .
It is that which
a t
any
given m om ent
is
conscious, whcreas the Me is on ly oneof the things which
it
is
conscious o j ”
Hc
goes o n
to
say that the reference hcre is to thc
Thillker,
which immediately gives rise to thc question ,
“Whatis
the Thinker?” James
will eventually answer, the “passing T ho u gh t”
o r
thc “passing s ta te ofc on -
sciousness.” At the ou tse t, howcver, he acknowledges that the passing state
is the embodiment of change, “yet each o f us spontaneously considers that
by ‘I,’ he means someth ing always the samc” ( P B C , 175). I t is this
sense of
sameness or personal identity that must now bc explored in or dc r
to
detcr-
mine whether there is an alternative to thc three traditional accounts of this
phcnornenon-substantialism, transcende ntalism, and associationism.
Therc can be n o doubt that I feel I am the same person today that I was
yesterday, but it may
be
asked w he the r this feeling expresses fact or illusion,
w heth er in reality “ I am
the
same s e l f t h u t I was yesterday” (PP,
I:316).
Or, as
James cxprcssed it later,
41s
the snrne~lesspvedicared eally
there?”
(P’BC,180).It
must be dctermined jus t what is meant when consciousncss “calls the pre-
sent seIf thc
rnrne
with one of thepast sclves wh ich it has in mi nd .” T h ekey
here is the feeling of “w arm th an d int im ac y” that charactcrizcs
our
prcsent
th o u g h t o r self. We receive “an unceasing sense o f personal existence”
f rom
the “w ar m th ” that characterizes “th e feeling wh ich w e have of the thought
itself , as thi n ki n g ,” an d/ or “t he eeling o f the body’s actual existence a t the
m om en t.” We idcntify with those distant selves who are remembered with
warm th and int imacy, and those alone are
so
remcm bcred who were ini-
tially experienced with warmth and intimacy. James illustrates this point by
com par ing our though ts to
a
herd
of
cattle. Just
as
a t
roundup t ime the
owner picks out from a larger herd those cat& bcaring his brand ,
so
w e
gathcr tog eth er ou t of a larger collcction of thoughts those bearing our
brand-“warmth and intimacy.” When we add the feeling
of
corrtinuity that
we remember when referring to mo re dis tant
sclves
and pcrccive as ou r
present self continu ally fades into the past, weave the twocharacteristics of
personal identity-resemblance an d co nti nu ity (PP,
1:316-18).
N o w i t s h o u l d
e
noted that James maintains a t
this
point
thc
sam e criteria
for
the sameness perceived in the self and thc sam ene ss perceived
in
other
phenomena.Further,Jamescautions us againstclaiming m or e unity or
sarnencss than is warranted
by
cxperience, such as “metaphysical or abso-
lute U nit y in
which
all the differences arc ov erw he lm ed . T he past and pre-
sent selves compared are the same just o far forth
as
they are the same, and
n o
far ther .” T here is then
both
gcneric unity
and
generic
difference coexist-
ing
S O that
“f rom the one poin t o fview they are on e self, fro m oth ers they
are as truly not one but ma ny
clves.”
Finally, this sense of personal identity
vanishes when “the resemblance and the continuity are
n o
longer
felt”
(PP,
I:338).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 114/323
In so describing persona l identity, Jamc s notcs that he has on ly givcn a
version
of
“th e o rdin ary do ctr in c professed by thc em pirical sch001 .”~~t
this point, howcver, he diverge s from thc traditional empircists, chargin g
that “these writcrs have ncglectcd certain rnorc subtlc aspects o f the Unity
of Consciousness” ( P P , I:319).What is missing from the em pirical doctr ine
is
thc character of owne rship belonging
to
ou r tho ug hts . Rcverting to his
herd me taphor, Jame s states: “No bcast would
be
so branded unless he be-
longed to the owncrof the herd . Th ey arc no t is becausc thcy are brand ed;
they are brande d because thcy arc his.” It is this recogn ition that thougflts
are owne d which leads com m on sense to pos it “a purc spiritual entity of
some kind” as the “rcal O w ne r” (PP, I:319-20). Stated in othe r terms , what
is absent in traditional em piricism
is
an ackno wled gm ent that
a
multiplicity
of individua l thoug hts can be integrated only by means of a medium.
In
contradistinction to this em pirical doctrine, Jam es ma intains that in his ac-
coun t “the me dium is fullyassigned
.
.
.
in the shape
of
something
not
am ong the things collected, b ut superior to them all, nam cly, the rcal, pre-
sent onlooking, rerncmbering, ‘ judging tho ugh t’ or identifying ‘scction’ of
the s tream” (PP, 1:320-21).’”
Th ou gh yielding much , according toJames, this assumption still docs no t
satisfy thedemands
of
common sense ,since theunity achieved b y h e
Thought( thepresentme ntal s tatc) “do esnot existunti l th e Th ou gh t is
there.” This
is equivalent
to
a ncw settler lassoing wild cattle and ow nin g
them for the first time. Bu t the claim of
common
sense
is
that past thou gh ts
were a lways own ed, and this sugges ts that the Thoug ht has
a
“subs~ant ia l
identitywith
a
formerwner,-notmereontinuity or resem-
blance . . but
a
veal unity.” While James concedes that the “Soul” and the
“Transcendental Ego” are a t tempts toatisfy thisu r gen t dem and o f com m on
sense,
he
advances an alternative hypothesis
to
account for “that appearance
of never-lapsing ownership” (PP, I:321). H o w w o u l d it
be,
he asks, “if the
Thought , the present judging Thought , ins tead ofbeing in anyay substan-
tially or transcendentally identical w ith the fo rm e r owner of the past self,
merely inherited his ‘title,’ and thu s sto od as his legal representative now?”
(PP,
I:321).
James goes on to sugges t that jus ts a long success ion of herdsm en mig ht
come n to
possession
by herapid ransmission of he original i tle o f
ownership,
s o
m igh t “th e ‘title’
of
acollective self be passcd fr o m o n e
T h o u g h t to another .” Something very m uch l ike this patently occurs
when
“each pulse
of
cognitive consciousness, each T h o u g h t, dies away and is re-
placed
by
another.” In this stream
of
succession each later T h ou gh t, recog-
nizing the earlier T h ou gh ts
as
“warm ,” appropriates them and greets them
saying: “Thou art mine, and par t of the same self with me.” Hence, “each
Th oug ht is thus born a n ow ner, and dies ow ned, transmitting wh atever it
realized as its Self
to
its own later proprietor.” Jam es
is
sugges t ing, then,
a
process
of
“adopt ion”
o r
“appropr iat ion”whereby hepresent“pass ing
Thought’ ’ adopts or app ropriates the previo us T hou ght a nd all i t includes,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 115/323
which T ho ug ht had in turn adop ted the prcviou s T hou ght all the way back
to the ini tial m om en t of T h ou g ht . James concludes: “Who ow ns the ast self
ow ns th e self befo rc thc last, for w hat possesses t he possessor possesses the
possessed”
(PP, I:321-22).
W hile claiming that this sketch includes all the
vevlfiable
features
in
per-
sonal identity, James do es ad m it that the act qf appropriatiorz
is
somewhat
obscure, inasmuch
as “a
thing cann ot appro priate tself ; i t
is
itself.” Still less,
James continues, can it disown itself, since “there must be an agent of the
appro priating and disow ning.” This agen t as already been nam ed: “it is the
T h o u g h t to w h o m t h evarious‘constituents’ are k n o w n ”
( P P J I:322-23).
Nevertheless , his Th ou gh t ca nn ot beanobject to itself, no r can t ever
appropriatc or disown tself:
“ I t
appropriates
f a
itself, it is the actual focus o f
accretion, the ho ok from wh ich the chain o f past selves dangles, planted
firmly in the Present , which aloneasses for real, and thus kee ping the hain
from being
a
purely ideal thing” ( P P , I:323).
The present moment
of
consciousness, however, is “the darkest in the
whole ser ies,” for “nothingcan be know n about it till it be dead and gone.”
James concedes that “it may feel i ts ow n im m ed iat eexistence,,; neve rtheless,
Its appropriations are .
. .
less to itselfthan
to
the mo st intimately felt
p o r t
ofits
preserlr
O b j e c t ,
the
body,
a n d
The
cerltral adjtrstruettts,
which accompany the
act
of
thinking , in the head.
These
are
the
veal
nrrclerrs ofouvperrona l ident i ty”
(PP,
I:323).With this text that am big uity of the body, previously discussed,
surfaces again. Further, despite the qualification “less to i tself’ conc erning
the Tho ught’s approp riations, and the fact that a few lines before he main-
tained that the Thought “appropriates to itself,’’ it is easy t o see w h y James’s
doctrine of the “pass ing T ho ug ht as the Thinker” might be interpreted as a
“no-self’ doctrine.
If
all doctrines that deny the presence in the stream
of
experience
of
any
essentially u ncha nging principle rema ining absolutely identical a t all mo-
ments of its existence arc designated “no-self” doctrincs, then James’s view
falls into this classification. Th is no tion of identity, however, which b y defi-
nition restricts it to unc ha ng ing realities, is wha t Jam es is challenging. His
challenge here is part of his broad metap hysical challenge to the view that
reality in i ts essential struc ture is p erm ane nt or immutable. If existentiaI
beings are essentially changing beings, then the only identity they can pos-
sess m us t be that p eculiar
to
such beings.
The
numerica1 o r sub stantial
iden-
tity characteristic of static beings must be disting uishe d from the relative or
functional iden tity characteristic of changing beings. Hence, James m ain-
tains that the identity discovered by the
“I”
can be only
“a
relative iden tity,
that of a slow shifting in wh ich there is always so m e common ingredient
retained.
*’
He
goes o n
to
say that the identity which the “ I” finds in its “ m e” is only
“a
loosely con strued thing, an identi ty ‘on the whole’
”
(PPJ :352). In his
Psychlogy:
Brie&
Course,
James denies any
substantial
identity between yes-
6 6 .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 116/323
J a m e s :
Persorral I d e n t i t y
89
terday’s and today’s states of consciousness, “for w he n on e is here the oth er
is irrevocably dead and g on e.” Th ey d o possess firnctional identity, however,
since both know the sam e objects-including the by go ne me-to w hich
they react in an identical way, calling it their o w n in opp os itio n
to
all the
other things they know . Jam es concludes: “Th is functiona l identity seem s
really the only sort of identity in the thinker wh ich the facts require
us
to
suppose. Successive thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the same
past in the same way, form an adequ ate vehicle fo r all the exp erien ce of
personal unity and same ness wh ich we actually have” ( P B C ,
181).*9
Thus ,
James’s “passing Th ou gh t” do ctr ine excludes any view of the self as
sub-
stuance,
but I will later sugg est that wh en com bined with the iews on the self
that emerge in his last philosophy, the “passing Thought” an be reconciled
with a substantive view of the self.
First, how ever, it will be helpful to consider briefly James’s arguments
against the three traditional accounts of persona l identity.
I
am concerned
here no t so m uc h w ith the istorical accuracy o r fairness o f his interpretation
but
rather with what his criticisms tell us ab ou t his
own
doctr ine and their
implications for the field model
of
the self that
I
am endeavoring to
construct.
Jame s begins with an analysis
of
substantialism, which posits the soul
as
the nonp heno rnenal, und erlying, unch anging principle allegedly responsi-
ble for the unity, continuity, and identi ty belonging
o
the self. In
m y
earlier
treatment of pragmatism’s rejection
of
dualism,
I
noted that James does no t
ciaim to prove the nonexistence of the soul; rather,
he
rejects it
because
he
judges
it useless as
an
explan atory principle.
For
exam ple, the
soul
w ould
fulfill the need for that m ed iu m
of
union that Jam es fo und absent in ssocia-
tionism , but in rnercly asserting that distinct ideas and experiences are uni-
fied
“by
a
unifying act
of
the
soul,
you
say
little more than that
now
they
are
united, uniess you give
some
hint
as
to how the soul uni tes them”EP, 85).
It
is this “how,” James maintains, that his “passing Th ou gh t” hypo thesis ac-
counts for,
and
does so withou t positing any principle behind or
beyond
the
“phenomena1
and temp oraI facts”
(PP,
1:326-27). Co nsider the claims of
simplicityandsubstantialitymade
for
thesoul.Jameshasdescribed his
“ T h o u g h t ”
by
the metaphor “Stream” to convey its absence of “separable
parts.” Hence, it can be said to be “ simple.”
A s
fo r substantiality, “t he
pre-
sent Thought also
has
being,-at lcast
all
believers
in
the
Soul
believe
so-
and if
there
be
n o Being in wh ich it ‘inheres,’ i t oug ht itself
to
be
a ‘sub-
stance.’ ” Desp ite these sim ilarities, if similarities they
indeed
be, the dif-
ferences between the two doctrines s even
more
str iking.
T h e Thought is a perishing and not an immortal o r incorruptible thing. Its
successors may continuously succeed
to
i t , resemble
it,
and appropriate it, but
they are not i t , whereas the Soul-Substance
is
supposed to be a
fixed
unchang-
ing thing.
B y
the Soul is always meant something b e h i d the present Thought,
another
kind
of substance,
existing
on
a non-phenomenal plane.
(PP,
1:327)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 117/323
What James is affirming m ay not be compictcly clear, but what
he is
rejcct-
ing most certainly
is.
W hatever th e self may positivcly be, it is no t “a fixed
unchanging thing” or shadow reality located in a wo rld o ntologically diffcr-
ent
from
the world
we
expericncc.
James b egins his consideration of the associat ionist theory by com me nd-
ing
Lockc
for having grasped that “the jwpor rnn t unity of the
Self
was its
verifiable and
felt
unity,” accomp anied by
a
s o ~ ~ s c ~ o c ~ s ~ ~ e s sf diversity. It was
Hume, however , who
“showed how
grcat heconsciousness of diversity
actually
was.”
Nevcr thclcss , Hume cnds
up
as the mirror inlagcof thc sub-
stantialists: they say “t h e Self is nothing b u t Un ity,” wh ile he says “it is
nothing but Diversity.”
Humc
denies thephenomenal“thread” of
re-
semblance
“or
core
of
sameness” that lames contends s acknowlcdged
in
his
“passing Th ou gh t” hypothesis . T h e crucial deficiency in H u m c and all the
other associationists is their failure to rec ognize the connectedness that
is
given in experience. According to Hulne, “AI /OW
dirtjrlct
yerrpptiatlr
are
d i s -
tinst existences, arrd the mirrd trever perceives nrry teal conrtecriosl arttarzg dis-
tinct exisfences.”20 James, however, insists that w ith in the stre am of experi-
ence the connections arc jus t
as
“rcal”
as
the separations. This is the crucial
point a t w hich the difference in the meaning of “expcrience” significantly
separates
James
and he other pragmatis ts
from
the classical
empiricists.
This difference is explicit in the statem en tof fact and generalized conclusion
that
characterizes James’s radical empiricism.
The statement of fact is that the relations betwcen things, conjunctivc
s
well
as disjunctive, are just
s
much mat te rs of direct particular experience, neither
m o r e so nor less SO, than
the
things themselves.
T h e generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold
together from next to nextby rclations that are themselvesparts of experience.
T h e directly apprehended universe needs, in short, n o extraneous trans-ern-
pirical connective support , but possesses in its own
right
a concatenated or
continuous s t ruc ture . ( M T ,
7)
This
is
a key example of a claim presented as “psych ological” in
Tile
Prim’ples of
Psychology
having becom e “metaphysical” in Essays i t / .
Rndicd
Empir ic ism.
Presc indmg from the psycho2ogical/metaphysical ques t ion, the
important poin t here is that James mak es relations
of
con nect ion jus t as
m uc h mat ters
of
direct exper ience
as
relations
of
separat ion. Both the
asso-
ciationists and the t ranscendenths ts presuppose an ex per ience comp ris ing
a succession of separate or discrete ideas
or
sensations. The associationists,
ma intaining that these “distinct existences” are un co nn ec ted , must limit
any connec t ion or uni ty to some psychologrcalact in accor dance w i th
vague
“laws of association.” The transcendentalists, on the o ther hand,
accept ing the same assumption
of
exper ience
as a
succession of d w x e t e
psychic atoms, posit a “transcen dental Ego” as the necessary condition for
un it in g this mu ltiplicity. James discusses
John
Stuar t
Mdl
and I m m anue l
Kant as representatives of these two approaches.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 118/323
Though an associationist,Mill,according to James,
comes
perilously
close to positing som ething like thc Soul wh en he speak sof “ thc ilrexplicable
t i t
. . . which conn ects the present consciousness with thc past one.” Since
Mill goes on
to
rcfer to this “t ie” as “som ething in co m m on ” and “perma-
nent” (PP, I:338), ames sees here “metaphysical Substancc come again to
life.”” B ut Mill makes the same blunder
as
Hurne: “The sensations per se,
he thinks, have n o ‘tie.’ T h e tie
of
rescmblancc and co ntinuity wh ich the
remem ber ing Thou ght finds amo ng thcm is not
a
‘real tie’ but ‘a mere
pro du ct of the laws of thoug ht’ ; an d th e fact that the presen t Th oug ht ‘ap-
propriates’ them is also no real tie”
(P P ,
I:340).
James takcs Kant as representativc of the transccnden talist theory. Kant
posits the ranscend ental
E g o
as necessary
to
bring unity
to
the original
manifold of sensation. N o te a gain the assum ption that the basic building
blocks of knowledge-the data of sensation-arc in themselvesuncon-
nected and hcncc in need o f S O M C transcendental principle
of
unity, which
for Ka nt is the pure Ego .22 Thiss not
the
Soul,
howevcr, since w c can kn ow
nothin g posi tive abou t i t , inasm uch as it “has no properties, and fro m it
nothin g can
be deduced.” Granting that “k no win g m ust have a vehicle” by
which thc “many ” is known, the cornplcte em ptiness of the transcendcntal
Ego
cxcuses Jame s fr o m accepting it rather than his own “pre sen t passing
T h o u g h t . ” 111 unusually harsh language
for
James, he dismisses thc E g o as
“only
a
‘cheap and nasty’ edition
of
the soul .
.
. as ineffectual and windy an
abor t ion as Philosophy can show” (PP, I:341-45).
In
sum, then, Jamcss view of thc s t ructure
f
experience and/or reality is
concatenated and continuous as well as disconn ected and disco ntinuous. All
experiences and rcalitics are con nec ted and con tinuo us with oth cr experi-
ences and realities, bu t ev cry experience an d reality is not imme diately
or
directly connected
a nd
cont inuous wi th
evcry
o th cr expcricnce and reality.
Given such
a
world, there
is
n o
nced
to posit either
a
substantial o r transcen-
dental
“glue”
to hold ogetherontoIogical lyseparate realities. T h c
soul
a n d / o r transcendental Ego have bcen
prcsented as
the “gluei’ that holds the
discrete clements
of
the Self together, and
God
or the Absolute has been
claimed necessary to account for thc unity
of
the world .
I f
substantialisnl and transcendentalism
felt
compelled to go bcyond cxpe-
rience
to
account for the “m ed ium of union” or the “vchiclc
of
knowing,”
associationism faded to re cog nize thc need
for
such
a
m e d i u m
or
vehicle.
James can claim to both agrce and disagree with elcme nts
in
all thrce theo-
ries, since he maintains the
n e e d for
a
“m ed ium ” bu t locates it within the
stream
of experience-that “scction” of thc s tream that
he
has designated
the “pass ing Th ou gh t .” This is by n o m e a n s a problem -free claim; as pre-
viously mentioned, the notion of the “passing Th ou gh t” has
been
viewed as
inclining Jarncs in thc dircc tion of a “no-sclf‘” do ctri ne .
I
would l ike now
to
explore the ‘‘passing T h o u g h t” in relation to the self w ith
a
view
to
seeing it
as,
if
not
fully
consistent with the mo re substantive self
of
James’s later
philosophy, a t least not in irrcpa rable op position to it.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 119/323
92
Persotla1
Irrrrrrortal i ty:
Possibility
arzd Credibility
FIELD-SELF:
EARLY
SIGNS
Milic Capek maintains that “the dis tance between the ‘perishing thought’
f
The Principles of
Psychology
and‘the full se lf of A
Plurulistic
Urliverse is
considerable.”
In the first period, we find consciousness floating
over
a limited region
of
the
brain, following passiveiy the shifting maximum of
the
physiological excita-
tions along
the neural paths; it is a “perishitlg pulse of thought” about which
we are not even certain whether i t
has its
own autonomous and causally e a -
cient reality or is
a
simple epiphenomenon
of
the
brain. In the
last
period, we
face a
genuinely creative activity
whose
conscious moment
is only a
limited
manifestation of the whole personal life, embedded in the larger cosmic self
without
being
absorbed in
i t .23
I will later focus onJarnes’s “full self’ do ctrine , w hich Ca pe k, n op po sition
to Dewey and other beha vioristic interpretcrs, has m ost persuasively em-
phasized. His essay remains a splendid description o f th e various stages o f
the development of ames’s do ctrin e of theelf, as well as
of
the conflicts a nd
inconsistencies bo th w ithin a nd am on g th e various stages. Nevertheless,
as
oth er passages in Capek’s essay wo uld show , the description
of
the “first
period” in the text just cited is quite misleading if taken as the full story
of
the self in James’s early philosoph y. M y conc ern,
as
frequently noted, is not
to present James’s do ctr inc wit h all its shades and variations but rather to
select from his writin gs tho se features I believe most serviceablefor the
construction of
a
field view o f the self, W hile it s no t possible to com pletely
igno re certa in shifts and ifficulties, 1 will continue
to
touch upo n these only
insofar as they contribute to
m y
central purpose. Show ing that ven in those
places wh ere James’s doctrine seem s mo st cong enial to a bchav ioristic or
“no-self’ interpretation there are resources for
a
field-self streng then s the
case for the latter view. Similarly, indicating a t least the lack o f any essential
oppo sition betwe en the mo re “em pirical” self of the early James and the
mo re “m ystical” self of the late Jam es protects thc forme r from positivistic
closureand the atter
from
floating off in to
a
r e a lm
of
merelywishful
abstractions.
Recall no w
a
few of the earlier stated assu m ption s in term s of which
I
am
describing James’s self. T h e three funda me ntal field suppositions suggested
by James himself we re
“ ( I )
‘Fields’ that ‘develop,’ un de r the categories o f
con tinuity w ith each other . . . 2) Bu t no thin g postulated whose whatness
is not
of s o m e nulure given in fields. .
. .
(3) All the f ields com m on ly sup-
posed are incom plete and point
o a
complement beyond hei r own content”
(TC,
I1:365). I earlier suggested that the self be un de rstoo d as the widest
enco mp assing field in relation
to
the plurality of the c on stituting subfields
w ithin its com pa ss bu t no t in relation
to
the wide r fields within wh ose
compass the self exists.
Bea ring these presupp ositions in mind , let
us
see how w e
might
under-
stand the self described in The Principles
ofPsychology.
James gives two
sum-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 120/323
mary statements of his view. In th e first he says that “persona lity implies the
incessant presence
of
tw o elem en ts, an objective person, kno wn by
a
pass-
ing subjective T h ou gh t and recognized
as
con tinuin g in time.
Hereafier /e t 14s
use
the
words
M E
am i
I
fur
t h e
empirical
person
and
t h e
judging
Tllought”
( P P ,
1:350).
Later
in
the sam e chapter he states: “T he consciousness
of
Self in-
volves a
s t ream of thoug ht , ach par t of w hic h
as ‘I’
can
(1)
r em em b er t h o se
which w ent before, and know the things they knew; and 2) emphasize and
care param ountly for certain ones amo ng them as ‘me,’ and appropriate to
these
the rest . T h e nucleus of th e ‘me’ is always the bo dily existence felt to
be
present at the t im e”
( P P , 1:378).
N ow ho w are w e to understand these far
f r o m
clear and distinct texts?
First , they m igh t be und ersto od dualistically, in w hich case the
“I”
and the
“me” would
be
two essentially different principles, the
“ I ”
being the under-
lying principle that unifies the phenomena into
a “me.”
Second, they might
be understood epiphenom enally, in which case the objective body w ould
alone be real, w hile thc
“ I ”
would
be
merely
an
cp iphenomenon em erg ing
as the result of the activity o f the b ody, in particular the brain. W hile there
are grounds
in
Jam es for bo th these interpretations, I believe the re are far
better groun ds for anoth er :namely, a transactional or field interpretation.
In
a
transactional o r field view, th e pri m ary reality
is
the concrete f lowing
field o r stream within which specific fields o r functions are distinguished.
Let us unde rstand “the
sc lf ’
as this con crete flowing
field
or s t r eam wi th the
caution that “w ithi n” is not to be unders tood as “wi th in
a
container .” T he
self is not a container but a field o r relational process constituted b y a multi-
plicity of such processes. Further, since al l processes,
in
accordance with one
of ou r key metaphysical assumptions, are t ransactional , there are no pro-
cesses
or
fields existing “in themselves.” All fields o r realities are relational,
and wh ile the poles o f the relation can be distinguished, they cannot
be
separated. Thus any uni typossessed by a field
is
inseparably bound up wi th
a
multiplicity
of
functions
or
subfields.W hen he extscitedaboveare
viewed fro m this field o r transactional perspective, the
“I”
and the “me”
are
seen
to
have their reality only correlatively o r in transactional activity. Nei-
ther
the “ I” nor the
“me”
has an y reality a part
from
the other ,since that they
are and
what
they
are
is determin ed by processes o f co-consti tut ion. T h e
distinction, however, is proper and defensible because the “I” and the “me”
refer t o different functions
a n d
perspectives of o ne a nd the same self. T h e
self
is th us subjective-objective, these being derivative relational functions
of
the con crete flowing field or s t r eam . Th e imp or tan t po in t here
is
that the
“subjective
I”
and the “objective m e ” are equally real since, as correlatives, i t
is
not possible to have one witho ut the other . H ence the em pir ical , o bject ive
self
considered apart from the subjective
I ”
is
just as
much
an
abstraction
as
the subjective “I” considered apar t f rom the em pirical objective self. W hile
for a particular purpo se i t migh t be legitimate to focus o n either
of
these
poles w ith ou t specific reference
to
the o ther , when w e are faithful
to
the
experience
of
the self in its concreteness, both must be held
together.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 121/323
94
P e r s o t i d I t ii n z o v tn l i ty : P o s s i b i l i t y arid C r e d i b i l i t y
It is misleading, therefore, to take James’s view on the “passing Thought
as the thinker,” isolate it from the full self, and interpret it as a doctrine of
egolessness or of “the vanishing subject.” There is
a
sense in which James
dissolves and denies the ego, and it is the same sense in which he dissolves
and denies consciousness: he denies both insofar as they are understood as
entities, but he affirms both insofar as they are understood as processive-
relational functions.24Thus we might say that there is
a
function or activity
of the self whereby the self grows, cumulates, appropriates, and inherits,
and this activity is designated the “passing Thought” or the “I.” The “I,”
then, is as real as these functions and subject to the same metaphysical con-
ditions; that is, it has no reality in itself or in isolation from its “objects,” key
among which is the “me.”35 To question the reality of the
“I”
because it
cannot be directly known as it is in itself apart from its activities is to restrict
the meaning of “I” to either a substantial principle or a transcendental Ego.
It is just such a restriction that is denied by the effort to describe the “I” as a
transactional process located within the concrete stream of experience.
I believe that James was at least moving toward such a transactional Ego
even in The
Principles
o
Psychology: “The unity, the identity, the indi-
viduality, and the immateriality that appear in psychic life are thus ac-
counted for as phenomenal and temporal facts exclusively, and with no need
of reference to any more simple or substantial agent than the present
Thought or ‘section’ of the stream”
(PP ,
I:326-27). Two points to note here
are, first, that while James denies the need for a “substantial agent” as a
transempirical reality, he does affirm the reality of an agent; second, that this
agent is the “present Thought,” which is a “section” of the stream of experi-
ence. These same two features were encountered earlier when James, in op-
position to the associationists, insisted on the need for a “medium” of unity
and identity. He described this medium as “the real, present onlooking,
remembering, ‘judging thought’ or identifying ‘section’ of the stream” (PP,
I:321). If we are to make any sense of this view we must constantly resist the
tendency to think in terms solely of static concepts and continually bear in
mind James’s admonition that the flux of experience can be participated in
and pointed at but can never be adequately described in concepts or words
which by their very nature tend to be static.
Take, for example, James’s use of the term “section” in referring to the
passing Thought or identifying activity.
I t
is not accidental that this term is
placed in quotation marks, since to take it literally would be nonsensical.
The “I” as a “section” of the stream cannot be unqualifiedly the same as
“Queens” as a section of New York City. Yet the use of the term “section”
has some legitimacy, since James is trying to point to that activity within the
stream of experience whereby the stream appropriates and unifies. This ex-
pression has the advantage of avoiding any transempirical “I” while taking
account of a distinctive activity or process of the self or stream of experi-
ence.26 Hence, the distinction between the
“ I ”
and the “me” is one of focus
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 122/323
Jnwies: Persorznl lderttity 95
and function. This avoids any dualistic reification as well as any dissolution
of the “I” into an illusory epiphenomenon or grammatical fiction acciden-
tally attached to
a
totally objective “real” self.
All of this has been by way of suggesting that even in James’s early doc-
trine, the “self’ was wider and more inclusive than the “passing Thought.”
The self, therefore, is inclusive of the “I”
and the “me” in such fashion as to
be wholly both, that is, the self is
“I”
through and through and “me”
through and through. If this makes any sense at all, and I am not sure it
does, it makes sense only in light of the previously described transactional
relation between “I” and “me.” The self as “I” does not possess an additiotzal
part called “me,” or vice versa. It is one and the same self, whether grasped
as
“I”
or “me.” When it experiences itself as object or as the receptor of
other activities, it says “me.” When it feels itself as subject or as the initiator
of activities, it says “I.” While acts do not happen to “I” and “me” does not
act, it is one and the same self that acts and is acted upon. If the “I” remains
elusive in such a view
of
the self, it is because the self as continuously chang-
ing is always in a sense ahead of itself. This is why, when James introspec-
tively turns, he can not locate any reality other than the objective reality of
the empirical self or “me.”27The “acting part” of the self, the “I” has al-
ready moved on, as it were, and becomes “known” only in its residual mode
of past selves. Throughout this process, however, there is a feeling of the
process, an experience of activity,
a
feeling of tendencies,
a
feeling of effort,
none
of
which reduces to objectively known realities.
I t
is the self as a tem-
poral or continuously changing process-which, though real, defies objec-
tification-that is a central feature of the field-self suggested in this essay.
SELF AS CEN TER ED-A CTIV ITY FIELD
Assuming, now, that the “passing Thought” is
a
function of
a
wider, fuller,
and more inclusive self, I will henceforth refer to the “self’ without at-
tempting to restrict the characteristic under consideration to any specific
aspect or function of this self. I am, of course, proceeding within the pre-
viously described framework of a metaphysics of fields in which the self is
understood as a complex of fields or relational processes. Further, as we have
already seen, this self has a unity and identity proper to such a complex: that
is, a unity amidst plurality and an identity amidst change. In what follows, I
will increasingly though not exclusively draw upon the later James. When
I
do utilize texts from The Principles qfPsychology, I will not use them in their
earlier, more restricted sense. My justification for this
is
that whatever can
properly be predicated of a particular function of the self can also be predi-
cated of the whole or fuller self. Thus, for example, if it is correct to say that
the “passing Thought” cumulates or appropriates past selves, then it is also
correct to say that the self is characterized by a cumulating or appropriating
activity whereby it is continually changing while retaining in some fashion
its earlier modes of being.28
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 123/323
96
T h e first characteristic of selves that m igh t be no teds that they are centers
of activity. This, of course, does no t distin gu ish them , for s we earlier saw,
all
discrete realities are centcrs of activity. Co nc ern ing that plurality wh ich s
a
feature
of
the universe, James pointed
out
that
“efectioely
there are centres
of
reference and action”
(TC,
II:764). Also noted was Dewey’s contention
that “in a genu ine althoug h not psych ic sense, natural b eings ex hibit prefer-
ence and c e n t e r e d n e ~ s . ’ ’ ~ ~suggested that panactivism
is
a more accurate
description of reality han panp sychism . Thu s, wh ile centered activity
is
affirmed as the m ark of all real being s, thereby exclud ing any com pletely
passive entities,3” the term “ps yc hic,” or “consc ious,” will be restricted to
describing
a
specif ic mo de or m ode sof centered activity. Selves as cen ters of
activity, therefore, are not
unique
o r distinctive, since reality is
a
plurality of
such centers, Inasmuch as
we
have rejected any ontolog ical dualism , the
distinctive character of selves cann ot be located in a realm or m od e of e ing
“outside” or “beyond” the s t reamof experience. Any distinction, therefore,
mus t be due to the scope and complexity f th e self field that determ ines its
powers of com mu nication and initiation. Hen ce, consciousness will no t be
some totally new or co m plete ly different kind of being unrelated to and
radically discontinuouswithnonconscious entities or fields; rather,con-
sciousness will be an activ ity
of
tho se fields that have
a
wider range and
greater com plexity than the fields that are encom passed b y consciousness
and with wh ich i t is con tinuous.
In describing the self as
a
centered-activity field, of course, there is n o
posit ing of anystatic, unchanging center. Again, the controllingfield m eta-
phor mus t be kept in mind . The “center”f a field has no reality apart from
the relations that con stitute the full field
as
well as the cen ter itself. H ea ce ,
inasmuch as the field is continu ally chan ging and shiftingn relation to other
fields,
so
the center
of
every field is also con tinually ch anging and shifting.
Th is is not to sug ges t that all relations are ch ang ing a t the
same
rate
or
that
all centers change and shift at the sam e rates; there is a vast range
of
dif-
ferences b oth am on g fields and within a particular field. Thes e differences
are manifested in the variations in stability am on g individuals.
In
T h e
Vuri-
d e s ofRefigious
Exper ience ,
James calls attention to bo th the eality
of
and the
shifts in o u r centers of energy. He notes that even am ong the Bu ddh is ts and
Humeans , or
whom
“ thcsoul is only
a
succession of fields of con-
sciousness: yet there is found in each field
a
part,
or
sub-field, which figures
as focal and c ontains the excitem ent, and from which, as f rom a centre, the
aim seems to be taken.”
James goes o n to speak of “th e ho t place in
a
man’s consciousness, the
g r oup of ideas
to
which he devotes himself , and from which he works,” and
he
calls this
“the
habi tua l centre o his personal energy. . . It makes a great
difference to a ma n wh ether
one
set o f his ideas, o r another,
be
the centre o f
his
energy; and i t makes agreat diEerence,
as
regards any seto f ideas w hich
he may possess, wh ether they b ecom e central or rem ain peripheral in him ”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 124/323
James: Personal
lderltity
97
( V R E , 161
62).
T h e part icular
use
to w hich James was putting this notion
of a “centre of energy"-in this case, religious conversion-is n o t here of
concern. Independently
of
this
use,
what
is
described is a self whosc life is
always centered, howcvcr much the center
m a y
change
o r
shift.
In s tressin g the fact that the selfs center is constituted
by
sets of ideas,
James is presupposing
a
crucial distinction betwee n
w h a t
might be desig-
nated “activity” and “action.”31 “Sustaining, pcrsevcring , striving, paying
w ith effort as
we
go,
hanging on, and finally achieving our intention-this
is action” (ERE, 92).
T h o u g h
James docs no t explicitly and formally make
the activity-action distinc tion hat has beenarticulatedby contemporary
“action theory” philosoph ers, he recognizes this distinction in rou gh fo rm .
Hedesignates as “ba re activity
.
.
.
the bare fact
of
event or
change.”
I f
there is
such
activity, it would be devoid
of
direc tion , actor, and aim.
B ut in this actual world of ours, as
it
is given, a part a t least of the activity
comes with defini tc direct ion; i t comes with desire
nd
sense
of
goal;
it comes
complicated
with
resistances which i t overcomes or succunlbs to , andwith the
efforts
which
the
feeling of resistance so often
provokes;
and it is
in complex
experiences like these that the notions
of
distinct agents, and
of
passivity as
opposed to activity arise. ( E R E ,
82-83)32
At stake here,of course, is whether the self can prope rly be conside redan
actor, an agent,
a
center of initiation and originationwhose
conscious,
delib-
erate action makes
a
difference b oth to i tself and to the w orld . Th is issue,
variously describcd as “causal efficacy” or the “feeling of effort,” was
a
ma-
jor concern forJames from the beginning
o
the end
of
his philosophical life.
As Perry
points
o u t ,
“James’
scientific stuches dsposed
him
to accept the
view that m an is a ‘conscious automaton.’ . .
.
Consciousness
is
present,
but
has
n o vote; i t supervenes but
does
no t intervene’’
TC,
I:25). But
James
began very early to distrust this
view;
in an 1879 article, “Are We Auto-
mata?”33 he presents cmpirical evidence for the efficacy of consciousness. In
The
Principles ofPsythology, he
finds
it “quite inconceivable
that conscious-
ness sho uld have
nothing
to do with a business which it
s o
fa i th fdly a ttends”
(PP,
I:140). To itself, at least, every actually existing consciousness seem s
“to
be
a
fighterfor ends, o f w hi ch many, bu t for its presence, would no t be
ends
at
all” (PP, I:144).James is willing
to
concede that
“the feeling
of effort
certainly
m a y
be
an iner t accom paniment and not thective elem ent wh ich it
seems”; no m easure me nts are ever
likely
to
be made show ing that effort
“contr ibutes energy to the resul t .” But whi le grant ingo the mechanist that
our feeling
of
having an effect o n reality m ay be an illusion, he insists that
the mechanist grant that i t may
not
(PP , I:428-29). Even in the Principles,
then, James was co nvinced that “however inadequate
o u r
ideas of
causal
efficacy
may
be,
we
are less wide of the mark whenwe say thato ur ideas and
feelings
have it, than the Automatis tsare wh en they say they haven’t it” (PP,
I:
140).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 125/323
98
Som e years later, after James had articulated his radical em piricism
more
explicitly,
h e
again afflrrncd the reality of causal efficacy, not w ith certainty
but
surely with more confidence. T h e increased confidence clearly
flowed
from
his
more
assured attitude concerning
“feelings”
o r perccptual expcri-
e w e . J am es w as no tu n a w a r c that ma ny able thinkers insisted that m erelyto
feel active is not to be active and tha t “agents that app ear in the cxperience
are no t real agents , the resistances do n o t eally resist, the effccts that a ppea r
are not really effects a t
a l l . ”
Nevertheless, James expressed his own view
w ith passionate firmness:
No matter what activities thcrc may really ben this extra ordinary universeof
ours,
it is impossible for us to conceivc of any one of
them being
either lived
throughorauthentically
known
otherwise than in thisdramaticshapc of
something susta ining a felt purpose agains t felt obstacles, and overcoming
or
being ovcrcom c. W hat “sustaining” mean5 here is clear
to
a n y
om
w h o
has
l ived throu gh heexperience,but to n o
onc
clsc; j u s t as “loud,” “ red ,”
“swect,” mean
so m e t h i n g on ly to bcings with ears, eyes, an d ton gu es. Th e
percipi in thesc origina ls of experience is the
esse; thc
curtain is thc picture.
( E R E , 85)
Later in the same essay, James states “that real cffectual causation as an
ultimatc nature, as
a
‘category,’ if yo u like, of reality, isjust what
w e f 4 e l
it to
be” ( E R E ,93).34 n the posthumously published Sorne Pvoblents
ofPhilosophy,
Jame s ma intains that it is from (‘OU T w n personal activity-situations” that
the notion of causation is derived.
In all thesc what
w e
feel is that
a
previo us field
of
“ c o n s c i o u ~ n e ~ ~ ~ ’ontaining
(in the midst
of
i ts complexity) the
idea
of a resrllt, develops gradually into
another
ficld in which that result appears as accomplished, or else
is
prevented
by obstacles against wh ich we feel
ourselves
to
press.
.
.
.
I t
seems to on e that
in such a
continuously
developing exp eriential series
o u r
concrete perception
of causality is foun d in opera tion. If the word has any me aning at all it must
mean what there
we live
t h rough . ( S PP ,
106)35
Another
way
of expressing all o f this is to say that
as
selves
we
arc ini-
tiators of actions and lives
of
action that really make a difference in th e char-
acter
and
course of the world. Stated
more
simply, we
are to some
exte nt, at
least,
free
beings
who
havc the possibility
of
playing a role in the
develop-
ment of ourselves and
of
rcdity. Thus, as Edie notes , f reedom,
for
James,
“carnc
to
mean the deliberate n c h i e v e t ~ e n tof thc ability
to act:
on himself, on
others , on the wor ld .”36 And ames himself tells us that “th c w ho le feeling
of
reality. the whole sting and excitement
of
our voluntary life, depends on
our sense that in i t things
are r e d l y
beitjg derided
from
one m o m e n t to an-
other, and that it is no t the dull rattling
offof a
chain that was forged innu-
merable ages ago” ( P P , I:429).I n af f i rming “freedom,” James
insists
that
he
is not posi t ing som e “transph eno me nal principle of energy.” Rather, he is
describing that novelty wh ich emerges
from
fresh
“activity-situations.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 126/323
If a n activity-proccss is the form of a w h o l e “field of consciousness,”
and
if
cach
field of consciousness is not o d y in i ts totality uniq ue as is now
com-
monly admi t t ed ) bu t
as
its elements un iquc (since in that situation they re all
dyed n he otal),
thcn
novelty is perpetual ly entering hc world
a n d
what
happens there
is
n u t
pure
repet i t ion,
as
thc
dogma
of
l i teral uniformity
of
na tu re
requires. A ctivity-situations come
in
sh or t each with a n original touch.
( E R E , 9311.)
I t
should be noted thata pluralistic-processive world,
a n
“open” and “un-
finished” universe characterized by chancc
and
novclty, is
onc
that does not
reduce freedom to a subjectivistic or psychological aberration. T h e particu-
lar kind
of
world acknow ledged by ames and the othcr pragmatis ts is one in
which there are “original commen cements
of
series
of
phenomena ,
whosc
realization excludcs other series
which
were previously possible” ( C E R , 31).
In another place, James states: “Frec will pragmatically means
novelties
in dzc
world, the right to expe ct tha t in its deepest elements
as
well
as
in its surface
phen om ena, thc future may no t identically repeat and imitate the past” ( P ,
60).
T his insistence on th e relation between freed om and novelty appears
again in Some
P r o b l e m
ofPhilosoyhy, where James maintains t h a t the differ-
ence between mon ism and plural ism ests on the reality o r unreality of nov-
elty.
He
g o e s
on
to
say that the “doctr inc
of
free will”
is
“that we ourselves
may
be authors
of
genuine novelty”
( S P P ,
74-75).
Necdlcss to say,
I am
not presuming to handle the issue of f reedom and
determinism by citing these few texts. M y po in t is sim pl y to indicate that
the
kind of self prop osed here s an agen tcapable thro ug h its efurts of bring-
ing
some
degree of novelty into this ever chan ging wo rld.James
goes
so far
as to suggest that “effort seems .
.
. as if i t were the sub stantive thingwhich
we
are,”
that i t is perhaps “the one strictly undcrived and original contribu-
t ion which we make to the world ” Thus i t is
that
“not
only
our
morality
but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend on he effort which
we can make. ‘Will
you
or wot l ’ t yor4
have ir
so?’
is the most probing quest ion
w e are cvcr
asked.
. .
.
We answer by
conserlts
OY mn-consents and not
by
words” (PP,
II:11&1-82).
O n e final point concerning human causal activi ty has to do with w ha t
might be called its “m etaphysical implications.” Earlier,
I
stressed that for
pragmatists such as James a nd Dewey, w hatever can be predicated
of
reality
o r the wor ld
in
gene ral mu st in so m e fashion be give n in experience.
This
is
reflected when
James
asks, inreference to the novelties hatresult
from
hum an activity , “w hethe r we are not here witnessing in ou r ow n personal
experience w ha t is really th e esscntial process of creation. Isn’t the world
really growing in thcse activities of ours?’)
( S P P , 108).
I have already
sug-
gested that a world or reality that is con tinua lly gro win g can be viewed as
giving me aning o he belief in personal rnmortality,particularlywhen
h u m a n
persons
are viewed as here and
now
participating in that growth.
Ther e
is,
of
course, no
necessary
connection
between present participation in
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 127/323
IO0 Personal Immortality:
Possibility
aNd
C r e d i b i l i t y
the growth of reality and everlasting life. Still, given the obvious scope and
magni tude
of
the reality process, th e possibility of continuing participation
beyond the short t ime al lot ted in
“this
life”
would
seem to enhance rather
than dim inish
the
meaning
of
o u t
present participation.
This
crucial
and
controversial
claim
that belief in personal im m o rta lity is life-enhancing is
discussed at len gth in later chapters.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 128/323
C H A P T E R
5
James: Full Sel fand Wider Fields
Pulses of mind lay beating and absorbing beside
my
own little pulse, and together we were a
whole, connecting within this wholeness with
the myriad differing wholes that each f these
people had formed in their lives, were
continuously forming in every
breath
they took,
and through this web, these webs, ran
a
finer
beat, as water
ran everywhere in the stone city
through channels
cut or
built in rock by men
who were able to grade the liftor the fall of the
earth.
”Doris Lessing
Briejirlgfor n Descerrt
irtto
Hell
But
i t
is not man alone who can be properly said
to “connect,” n o r is it human
powers
alone that
are the necessary condition of the functioning of
Connectives. I t is existence cooperating with
man that “connects.”
”John Herm an Randall, Jr.
Na tu re
nr rd Historicnl Experierrce
It is my contention that
a
plausible belief
in
person al imm ortality is inti-
mately bou nd up wi th
a
belief in G od . M or e specifically, I will argue that
the relation between the person and
God must
be such that a belief in per-
sonal immortal i ty has
expe riential groun ds-not groun ds in the sense of
offering a comp elling necessity to infer imm ortality, but in the softer sense
of being basically consistent with and open to such belief. In keeping, then,
wi th this experiential me thodo logy, there
must
be som e “justifying” evi-
dence for the extrapolated belief in a divine-human relationship. T h e prin-
cipal grounds
for
such e xtrapolated belief
are
fou nd in the view of the self
that emerges injarnes’s later writings.
What
I
wish to do now is t ry to co nstru ct the essential features of wh at
James himself calls the “full self,” In ma kin g this
attempt, I
will d raw prin-
cipally upon material from
The
Varieties of Religious Experience, Essays in
Radical Empiricism,
and A
Pluralistic
Universe, without deal ing wi th impor-
tant differences
of
concern and context am ong hese works . Nor will I deal
with inconsistencies, real
or
alleged,
o r
with
a
num ber
of
technical
ques-
101
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 129/323
tions (particularly in RndicaI Enyiricisrn), which a close textual and systcrnat-
ic s tudy wou ld demand. I wis h sim ply to indicatc that thcre is a c o m m o n
thrust
to
these works, as well as to
S ome Problems ofPhilosophy
and several
essays o n psychical research and mysticism. Th is thr us t, as w e shall see,
is
toward articulating
both
the self an d reality in term s of overlapping
fields
of
consciousness. A n alternative way
of
describing this
is
as the tcm poraliza-
tion of real i ty. The stream o r process character of consciousness o r experi-
ence described in The Principles $Psychology is extend ed to all rcality.
T h u s ,
as RalphBartonFerrynotes, “Radical em piricis m consistsessentially in
converting
to
the uses o f metaphysics that ‘stream
of
consciousness’ which
was designated originally for psychology” (TC,
11:586).*
O n e w ay of view-
ing
the relationbetween James’s
Principles
and his ater“metaphysical”
works
is
that n he forme r, mm ediate persona l expe rience or fecling s
viewed psychologically within
a
dualistic m etaphy sics; in the latter, this ex-
perience becomes
the
pa rad igm for all reality as well as the p athwa y to real-
ity in
i ts depth and “thickness.” In A
Pllrralistic U r z i v e n e ,
James insists that
“Bergson is absolutely r ight in contendinghat thc whole
life
of activity and
change is inwardly imp enetrable to conceptu al treatme nt, and that i t opens
itself only to sympathetic apprehension a t the han ds of imm ediate fecling”
( P U ,
123n.).3
EXPERIENCE O F “ S O M E T H I N G M O R E ”
I have already tried t o show
that
even in those sections of
The
PrirJciples
of
Psycho/ogy whereJarnes’s view o f th e elf is m ost capable o f
a
behavioristic or
materialistic interp retatio n, there is evidence of
a
self much fullcr and richer.
I suggested hatreading heseearly extsfrom
a
field perspcctivekeeps
James’s doc trine o pen to the more inclusive self. When we turn to the Iater
James, the case
is
much more com pel ling
for
a
field
view
of the
self
that
more clearly and successfully escapes he egoless, epiph eno mc nal tendencies
earlier evidenced. I no ted that even in those bedeviling texts in w hic hJ am es
seems to identify the self with the bod y-w here the self is ‘ ‘ forwd to consist
mainly of the collections of these peculiar rnotions
i n
the head or
6etr.ueerl
the h em i
arld
throd-e ven hereJames quickly adds that no t for a m o m e n t is hc suggest-
ing “that this
s
all it consists of.” A bit later he explicitly concedes “thatover
and above these there is
an
ob scu rer feeling of someth ing more” (PP, :288,
292).
In exploring this “more,” I hope
to
sh ow that the processive-relational or
field character OfJames’s “self’ becomes increasingly m o re cxpIicit an d cen-
tral. This is due in great part, I believe, to the fact thatJam es bec om es more
conscious
of
and co nfident about those m etaphysical presuppositions that
he derived from personal expe rience. Having flirted with the notion of an
egoless self and an epiphenomena1 consciousness,
in A
Pll4rulistic Universe he
spcaks in field langua ge, which
is
m uch more congenial to a “substantive”
view
of
the self and consciousness
that
is open
to
the possibility
of
personal
immortality.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 130/323
I have already n oted that w he n selves are viewed as transactional centers
of activity-as fields-consciousncss is not m erely an ep iph en om en on , no r
is it imported from
some
transcmp irical realm
of
bcing. Consciousncss is
itself
a
field con tinuous with both conscio us and nonc onscio us fields, the
distinction bctwccn the conscious and nonconscious fields being determined
o n the basis o f range, complexity, and modes o f selectivity and initiation.
The task remains of phcnornenologicallydescribing h especific charac-
teristics
of
those fields designated “consc ious,” b ut the distinct adv antage o f
such a field approach
is
that there is n o need to go “outside” cxpcrience in
describing consciou sness in
order
to avoid
a
materialistic
o r
bchavioristic
reductionism.Thus, i n the final analysis, he copeandcomplexity of
hu m an consciousness can bc dete rm ined on ly experientially. H crc, howevcr,
a crucial dis t inct ion must be made:onc repeatedly refcrrcd to as the distinc-
tion between the descriptive or phenorncnological and the cxtrayolative or
speculative. It is the sam e distinc tion that is a t work , as we shall
see,
w hen
James distinguishes
what
is religiously
expeuietrced
fr o m overbeliefs concern-
ing this experience.
I
wish to utilize this descriptive-extrapolative distinction in considcring
the self as it em erges in James’s later w rit in g s. T hc first task will be to de-
scribe
as
faithfully as possiblewhat can bc immediatelycxyeriencedand
then to suggestplausibleextrapolations from his expericnc e. It m us t be
stressed a t the
outset,
how ever, that this is a functional distinction, the bor-
ders of wh ich arc shifting and can vary from time to time as well as f r om
person to person.
For
examp le, following James, I will contend hat he
reality of God is an cx trap olatio n.or overbelicf, b ut
a
mystic would makc a
s tr on g er ex periential ~ l a i r n . ~ T h e
cy
point here is that ifJames’s position is
legitimate, thc nccd for extrapolation o r ovcrbclicf may be d u c o n l y to an
accidental, non perm anen t imitation in hedevelopment
of
human con-
sciousness.
T h e
possibility that the mystics’ expcricntial claim is a delusion
cannot,
of
course, be definitely excluded. GivenJamcs’s experiential criteria,
then, nothing shor t of im m ed iate cxpcricnce o f the divine
would
bc
ade-
quate or com pletely satisfying. In the present stage of thc human condi t ion,
howevcr, the
most
that can bc clairncd philosoph ically is that such an experi-
ence is
a
possibility that no t on ly do cs no tonflict with reality as irnrnediate-
ly
experienced andmetaphysicallyarticulatedbutalso
is
consistent with
such
experience-indeed,
is
possibly an enrichment,
a
deepening and con-
tinuation of o ur narrow er quo tidian experiences.
While evcryone m ight ag ree that wh at is immediately experienced is be-
yond dispute, it is quite evid ent that jus t w ha t it is that is imm ediately expe-
rienced is a matter of great dispute. This is made obvious by the variety of
competing, inconsistent, and even contradictory claims of imm ediate expe-
rience. James and host o f twcn tieth-ccntury phen om enolog ists havc signif-
icantly decpencd our awareness of ho w dif ic ul t i t is to describe with com-
plete
fidelity thc charactcristics
of
expericnce.Therewould
be
no s uch
difficulty if imm ediate cxpe rience wc re lcar, distinct, a nd unam biguo us i n -
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 131/323
104 Personal Im m rt a l i t y : Possibility and Credibility
stead of being characterized by ob scuritie s, shades, ma rgins, fringes, pen-
umbras , and what James
has callcd
“the vague and inar t icu1ate””which
returns us to the ques t ion of the “m or e” that accompanies all experiences.
“All that
is,”
James tells
us,
“is
experiences, possible
or
actual. Immediate
experience ca rries a sense oftmre. . . . T h e ‘more’ develops, h arm oniou sly or
inharmoniously; and terminates in fulf il lment o r check.”
Hc
goes
on
to say
that “the pro blem is
to
describe the universe in these terms” (TC 11:381).
In his o w n effort
to
describe the universe n such terms, Jame s oves non-
systematically from the imm ediately eviden t “m ore” hat is present as “mar-
g in” or “ f r ing e”
to
such perceptua l fields as the visual and au dit ory ; to the
“m o re ” that is involved n epistemological-ontological questions such as
objective reference, kn ow ing
two
hings together , knowing other minds ; to
the “more” involved in metaphysical-religious questions such
as
the “wider
self” and overlapping consciousnesses, including divine and human. James’s
doctr ine
of
the “full self’ must include
all of
these “mores.”
I t
is obvious
that there is not an equal consensus regarding hese diverse “m ores”; that s
why James , or anyone at tempt ing to const ruct
a
doct r ine of the
self
along
Jamesian lines, m ust first establish the general character of this expe riential
“m ore” f rom experiences wh ere
the
evidence is mo st wide ly com pelling
before considering exp eriences
of
“more”
that are less universal a nd m or e
controversial. James’s central claim, and t he one crucial for the purposes of
this essay, is that the structure of o u r visual fields, for example, is in some
respects th e sam e as the structure of m ystical experience.
“ O u r f ie lds of experience,” according
to
James, “have no more defini te
boundaries than have o u r fields
of
view. B o th are fringed forever by
a
more
that continuou sly develop es, and that continuou sly supersede s them as life
proceeds” ( E R E , 35). Let us followJames
as
hedescribes hismarginal
“more”
that accompan ies o u r field
of
experience. Th is w ill serve as
the
para-
d igm to be em ployed later in his c onsideration o f mystical experience.
M y ta lk
is
merely a description of m y present f ie ld
of
expe rience. Tha t field is
anexperience o f physical hings mm ediatelypresent,
of
“more” physical
things “always there beyond” the margin, of m y personal self “there,” and of
thoughts and feelings belonging to the
self,
toge ther wi th “o ther” thoughts
and feel ings connected with
what
I call “y ou r” personal selves.
Of
these vari-
ous
item s s om e, as fully realized, are “su&cients”; others, the physical things
“bey ond ” and “you r” thou ghts, com e as insufic ients-they connect hern-
selves wi th the m argina l “m ore .” B ut
.
.
.
that marginal “more”
is
part
of
the
experience under description. No one can use i t mystically and say that
self-
transcendency
or
epistemological dualism is already involved in the descrip-
tion-that the “m or e” is
a
referencebeyond he
experiejtce.
T h e “ m o r e ” is
more than the vividIy presented
or felt; the “beyond ”
is
beyond the centre
of
the field.
TC,
I:371)
James’s
use
of
the term “mystically’*
in
this
text
might be misleading
if
taken as his own understanding of mystical experience. H e is here using it,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 132/323
as it is often use d, to c onve y the introduction of a nonexperiential realm
of
being. He is opposed to this notion of “m ystic al” jus t as he is op posed
to
in t roducing
a
transcendental Ego or substantial Soul t o avoid accounting for
the experiences ju st described in behavioristic or epiphe nom enalist terms.
T h e “sense of more” that belongs to all the selfsexperiences is an indication
of relations with a wid er reality than is curre ntly in
focus.
It is the task of
metaphysics and religious philosophy, of course, to suggest jus t what the
scope and characterof this w ider reality is, and we shall later follow James s
he describes it in term s of wider fields of consciousness. The only point to
be made at this time is that James’s affirmation of
a
wider real i ty or wider
consciousness or w id er self does no t involve inferr ing o r postulat inga real-
i ty or realm of being hat
is
essentially, completely, and permanentlydiscon-
tinuous with the experiential.
T h e reality of “something more” in our immediate exper iences evidenc e
o f that co ntinu ity that characterizes the self. We have already no ted James’s
conten tion that the felt experience of one’s ow n con tinu ity is the most inti-
mate grasp
of
that c ontin uity that is characteristic of reality or the world.
Ag ain, this is a variation o n James’s processive o r temporalistic metap hysics.
Perry calls co nti nu ity ‘‘one
of
the ma ster keys to the understanding ofJames’
thought .
I t
is
the do m inan t feature o f his last metaphysics”
(TC,
:524).
This
is another instanceof a feature thatJa m es first delineates psychologically and
phenomenologicallyand atercomes to utilizemetaphysically. A meta-
physical ex pression of co ntinu ity is found in the first and third “field”
sup-
positions, which were presented arlier: “ 1) ‘Fields’ that ‘develop’ un de r the
categories of con tinuity with each other ,” an d “ 3)All the fields commonly
supposed are incomplete and point to complement beyond thei r own con-
tent. The final content . . * is that of a plurality of fields, more or less ejec-
tive
to
each
other, b ut stil l con tinu ou s in various ways”
(TC,
II:365).
A processive or “growing” world, l ikea processive
or
grow ing self, m ust
involvecontinuity.Thiscontinu ity, however, is neither heabstract con-
t inuum of mathematics nor the permanent, unchanging substantial pr inciple
of an earlier me taphysics. Dy nam ic continu ity involves an overlapping of
fields and an a pp rop riation or inh eritan ce
of
past fields b y present ones.6
This is not to suggest that everyth ing is continuous with or imm ediately
related to everything
else.
The rc are discontinuities as well as continuities,
and there are diverse m od es
of
both .
The
way in which
a
self
is
cont inuous
w ith its ow n experiences is n ot identical w ith the way in which it is continu-
o u s
w ith another’s experience^.^ T h e distinctive C ontinuity w hereby theself
app ropria tes t o itself its previous fields
of
experience
is
w ha t in part, at least,
constitutes the selfs individua lity. Bu t since there is no self-continuity that
does not simultane ously involve continuity with other fields (air
breathed,
objects kno wn , persons enco untered ), we have a world-of radically plural
individuals withou t atomistic or isolating individuation. T h e crucial aspect
of
this question
for
my purpo ses is whether there is
a
sense
in
w hich
the
divine
and
human consciousnesses can be co ntinu ou s.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 133/323
106
Pennrlnl
Zmnrortality:
Pussibitity
m d Credibility
C O N S C I O U S N E S S
A S SELFCOMPOUNDING
In order to arr ive t somc unders tanding of how James ,n his latcr writi ng s,
saw the rclation between thc div ine an d hu m an fields of consciousness, we
m ust ollow him-however briefly and superficially-as heconsiders
a
questionwithwhich
he
hadwrestled for many years: thequestion of
whether “states of consciousness, so called, can separate and com bine them -
selves freely, and keep their own ident i ty unchanged
while
forming parts of
simultaneous ficlds of experiencc of wider scope”
( P U ,
83). In
The
Principles
ofPrychology,
he
had appa rently answ ercd in the negative whcn he rejected
the “ mind-s tuff ’ or “m ind-du s t” theory : that is, the theory that our higher
mental states are co m po sed of smaller states. James insisted there that each
psychic state was
a
unit-novci, un ique , and individual-and no t
a
collec-
tion of pr imordial a toms
of
sensation that remained unchanged in them-
selves wh ile entering into various comb inations. For example, according to
the “mind-stuff’ theory, the taste of Icmonade would
be
s imply the a tom-
istic sen sations of water , lemon, and sugar conjoined. According to James,
however, the taste of lemo nad e is new and uniquc, and does not contain the
atomistic sensationsof water, lemon, and sugar.In spite o fJame s’s statem ent
in his Presidential Ad dress to the Am erica n PsychologicalAssociation n
1894
that in the interest
of
ha rm on y he was giv ing up his principle that
mental s tates ca nn ot com po un d (EP,
SS),
i t would bc more accurate to say
that he came slowly to modify it .8
In T h e Prirzciples
of Psychology,
as previousIy noted,
James
was allegedly
adhering to
a
methodologicaldual ism.Hence, hough each thoug ht
or
mental s tate was unique,
wo
minds could know
a
co m m on object. In Essays
in
Radical-Ewpiricism, James laims
to
surrender the dualismbetween
thoughts m t d things, conten ding that reality is co m po sed of pure experi-
ences wh ich in them sclves are neither me ntal nor physical but can becom e
either, depen ding
o n
the context o r relational functions. For examp le, the
pu re experience “p en ” is in itself neither mental no r ph ysical, belongs to
neitheryourmindnorm ymind.But since t is the. “same’t pen that is
known and
is
wri t ten wi th , and the “same” pe n that
you
and I know, it
would appear that “an identical part can help to comritt.rte tw o fields.”
T h s
doctrine, of course, is in conflict with the position of
The
Principles
ufPsy-
cltology,
which denies that m en tal states can have “parts .”
I t
was B.
H.
Bode
a nd
Dickinson M iller w h o, according to Jam es,
picked
u p
the contradict ion,
and their object ions ledJameso
keep
notes-totaling several h un dr ed pages
over tw o and
a
half years, in which
he
continually s truggled with the
prob-
lems
involved,
In a
1905 note, he asks, “How-can
two
ields be
units
if
they
contain t h s c o r n o n
part?”
And he irnmedrately adds, “We m u s t overhaul
the
whole business
of
co nn ectio n, confluence and the like, and
do
it radi-
cally”
(TC,
W750). James ends these notes durin g his wri t in g of the Hibber t
Lectures, which
were delivered several months later
and
subsequent ly pub-
lished as A
Pluralistic
Universe.
It is in this w or k that Jame s advan ces his
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 134/323
Jarwes:
Full Se l f n t r d Wider Fields 107
radical overhaul
of
thecharacter
of
confluentconsciousnessand allied
questions.
This “radical overhaul”
was
actually a somewhat more consistent and ex-
plicit articulation
of
insights and conccrns that
had
been present in
some
form inJames’s earliest eflection s. “He was simplyreaffirming,”Bruce
Kuklick q uite correctly notes, “the primac y of the concrete and immediate
over the abstract and the de r i~e d” ~-a nd , w e m igh tadd, the pervasiveness
of processes and relations that an acute attention to the con crete bring s to
awareness. Recall that on e of the advantages of employing
a
field model
of
reality is that it enables us to
be
m o re faithful to the “concrete.”
It
is interest-
ing to no te that in his reflections o n the “Miller-Bode O bjec tion s,” James
wonders
whether he might not
be
guilty
of
that “sin
of
abstraction”
(TC,
11:759) with which he had so often charged others. In A
Pl~mdis t ic
Universe,
he comes
to
realize that “ t he di ac u l ty o feeing ho w states
of
consciousness
can compo und themselves . .
.
is the general conc eptualist difficulty of any
one thing being
the
same wi th many things , e i ther t once
o r
in
succession,
for the abstract concepts o f onen ess and rnanyness m us t needs exclude each
other”
( P U ,
127). This “conceptual is t d i f fmdty” s bound u p with the tradi-
tional “logic o f identity,” wh ich Jame s finally feels com pelled to g ive up
“fairly, squarely, and rrevocably”
( P U ,
96).j0
T he central charge against
this logic is that i t denies the continu ous universe, wh ich was a concern
of
James throughout his reflective life: “T ha t secret of a con tinuous l ife which
the universe know s b y heart andacts on every instant cannotbe
a
contradic-
tion incarnate. I f logic says it s one,
so
m uch the w or s e f o rogic” ( P U ,94).
EXPERIENCE OVERFLOWS CONCEPTS
A running theme in James’s thought, which reaches its crescendo in A Plu-
ruZistic
Utliverse,
is that various mo des
of
rationalism
or
intellectualism have
repeatedly endeavored to su bs tit ut e clear, distinct, and chang eless conc epts
for the rather murky, messy, and ever c han gin g experiences of on go ing life.
James, no ting that “framing abstract conce pts s on e of the ublimest
of
our
huma n prerogatives,”
g o e s on
to find it understandable that earlicr thinkers
have forgotten that “con cepts are only ma n-m ade extracts from the tern-
poral flux”;as
a
result, however, they ended up treating concepts “as
a
supe-
r ior type of being, bright, changeless, true, divine, and utterly opp osed in
nature to the turbid, restless low er w orld ”
(PU,
98-99).
When
we
concep-
tualize, w e cut out a section o f t he flux
of
experience and fix it in a static
form, thereby excluding everything else in experience b u t th at wh ich we
have fixed. In c on tras t, experiences in the real sensible flux of life ‘‘corn-
penetrate each other
s o that it
is
not easy to kno w jus t
what is
excluded and
what is no t” (PU,
13).
James maintains that intellectualism, after “destroy-
ing
the immediately given coherence of the phenomenal wor ld ,” inds itself
unable
to realize cohe rence hroug h ts conc eptual substitutes and hence
must
“resort
to
the absolute for
a
coherence
of
a
higher type.” May there
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 135/323
108 Personal Immortality: Possibility a n d Credibility
not, however, be present in the
flux of
sensible experience an overloo ked
rationality? Instead, then, of disintegrating co ncrete ex perience through in-
tellectualist criticism and substituting “the pseud o-rationality
of
the sup-
posed absolute point of view,” the real remed y is to focus more attentively
and intel l igently upon the imm ediate flow
of
experience ( P U , 38). O ur ex-
perience is too rich , too comp lex, too textured and many -sided to be ade-
quatelyrepre sen ted in abstractcategories.“Rea lity, ife,experience,con-
creteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows
and surrounds i t” ( P U ,
96).
Attent ion must be given here to an ambigui tyn this “immediate experi-
ence” to which Jamesso frequently refers and from wh ich
e
wishes to draw
so mu ch. Som e crucial implicat ions of this ambiguity w il l appear when w e
con sider James’s claim that
we
are “part and parcel of a w ider self.” Let m e
begin by suggest ing thatJames
came
to realize that no t ev eryth ing in imm e-
diate experience was “im mediate.”
I
th ink we m ust dis tinguish immed iate
or concrete exper ience f rom “pure immediacy.” Theatter wou ld refer only
to w hat is in conscious focus, including the conscious margins;
the
former
would include “vir tual it ies” and “other” elations that ma y be or ma y note
brought to consciousness
at
a later time. Sinc e these are con stituents of the
concrete experience, we m igh tsay that they are experienced subconsciously.
Several ofJam es’s late notes, com bined with his v iewsn
the sublim inal self
( to be treated
later),
support the dis t inct ion
here
suggested. O n November
26, 1905,James wonders whether he might be omitt ing somethingital in his
eKort “to run things by pure immediacy.”For the world to run as i t should,
“ a n other than the mmediate”seems to be required . He goe s on o ask
whether it would
be possible to “trea t this oth er as equiva lent to stsbtonsciour
dynam ic operat ions between the parts of experience, distinct from the con-
scious relations wh ich the po pu lar term ‘experience’ connotes’’ (TC,II:753).
So m e m on ths later (June
8,
1904),James writes:
The “cosmic omnibus”around about experience,
s
the “being”
of the
experi-
ences and what not
immediately
experienced relations they may stand in. All
these facts are uir~ually xperienceor mattersof later experience, however.
.
. .
Not all that
an
experience virtually “is” is content of its immediacy. .
.
. The
cosmic omnibus for any given experience would thus seem to be only other
correlated experiences.
TC,
II:758)*1
In exploring any ex perience, then, i t would seem that
we
are obliged to
range much more widely than the realm f “pure immediacy.” This is w h y
such exp loration is open-ended an d on going; why i t must involve hyp oth-
eses,
speculations, a nd extra pola tions if, parado xically,
we
are to move
more
deep ly into “ imm ediate experience.’’
These sam e characteristics of process and relation that I have repeatedly
stressed beco me more explicit as James realizes how much “s tat icahty” has
remained in his articulation of experience.
A s
late as September
of
1906, he
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 136/323
James:
Full
S e l f a d
W i d e r
Fields 109
asks: “May not m y whole t rouble be d uc to the fact that
I
an1 still treating
what is really a l iving dynam ic s i tuat ion
by
logical and statical categories?’
He
goes
on to say that he o ug ht to have the courag e to postulate activity, to
intro du ce agents-in sh or t,
to
“vivify h emechanism of change ’’ (TC,
II:760). Bu t mo re than
a
year later (Feb ruary 1908)he still wonders whether
part
of
the difficulty is du e to “a retention of staticality in thenot ion of ‘that’
and ‘is,’
”
Th is is the period, however, during w hich Jam cs is wri t ing w hat
will later be published as A P11mlistic
Universe,
and so he has seen the neces-
sity for surrende ring logic if w e are to cnter into the depth and thickness o f
living cxperience. He nowrealizes that the pro blem is to
state
w itho ut para-
dox the intuitive or Iive constitution
of
thc active life. This can
be
done
“only
by
approximation, awak ening sympathy with i t rather than assum ing
logically
to
define it; for logic makes all things static.” I t is the processivc-
pluralistic-relational character of the universe that James is now stressing:
“Be the universe as m u c h
of a
unit as you like, plurality has once
for
all
broken out within i t .” What the niverse e ectiuely manifcsts are “centres of
reference and action . . . an d these centres disperse each other’s rays.”
T h u s ,
James tells us, no l iving “it
is
a
stark nu m erica l un it. Th ey all radiate and
coruscate in man y directions; and the nanyness is du c to he plural ity round
them .” W hat all this adds u p
to
is
that “neither the world nor things are
finished, but i n process; and that
process
means more’s that are continu ous
yet novel. This last involves the whole paradox of an
i t
whose modes are
alternate and exclusive of each other, the sam e and not-sam e interpen etrat-
ing” (TC,
II:763-64). 2
CON
AND EX
When we com e to
focus
more direct ly o n self-compounding consciousness,
we shall see that this involves “the sam e and not-sam e interpenetrating.”
First, how ever, it is necessary
to
consider an ailied que stion , wh ich takcs the
form
of a
series of what might bcdesignated
con (LO)
nd
ex
problems-how
individual realities can be both with and wi thout each other . The mo st cru-
cial
of
these problems for m y purposes is how h u m a n
persons
can
be cot2
God an d’ .ex God; both cont inuous and discont inuous wi th God; both pre-
sent to and absent f rom God.
James’s approach, of course, is to give a hypothetical or speculative re-
sponse to this question after having shown the
cot1
and
ex
characteristics of
all concrete experiences. O n intellectualist grounds, he says, this
is
impossi-
ble: “ T h e intellectualist sta tem en t is that
esse
and
sentiri
are the same,
a
state
of m ind is wh at i t
is
realized as. I f M
is
realized as
con
a, then it i s con a, and to
be identical with its own self mu st always be con a; wha tever else it may
be
CON
w ith, it can never
be e x n .
That
M must
permanently carry
u along
w i th
it”
(TC,
II:763). B ut as we have already seen and will further see, “the im-
mediate experience o f life solves the problems which so baffle our concep-
tual intelligence”
( P U ,
116).
We
have also already seen
and
will
further
see
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 137/323
110
Persotial Immortality : Possibility and Credibil ity
that given the processive-relational or field character of experience, every
“bit of experience” is
cot1
and ex other bits. Further, since these fields are
continually shifting, gaining, and losing, other fields that were ex will be-
come
cot?
and vice versa.13
Using Bergsonian language, James describes this processive-relational
world as “an endosmosis or conflux of the same with the different: they
compenetrate and telescope” ( P U , 114). In such a telescopic and endosmotic
world “there is no reason why A might not be
co-
and ex-B, i.e., continuous
in any direction with something else.” This would be a universe in which
nothing “is absolutely cut off from anything else, and nothing is absolutely
sofidaire”
(TC,
II:762).l4 This is a dynamically continuous world rather than
one of discontinuous “plural solipsisms”
(
TC,
II:757). The experiences con-
stituting this world change in such fashion that there is a continuous overlap
of the earlier and the later. The view that emerges is never an absolutely
novel creation following a complete annihilation; rather, “there is partial
decay and partial growth, and all the while
a
nucleus of relative constancy
from which what decays drops off, and which takes into itself whatever is
grafted on, until at length something wholly different has taken place.” The
universe is continuous, then, without being one throughout. “Its members
interdigitate with their next neighbors in manifold directions, and there are
no clean cuts between them anywhere” ( P U , 115).15 While logical distinc-
tions are insulators, “in life distinct things can and do commune together
every moment”
( P U ,
116). The logically distinct experiences diffuse, and
connections are made; for this reason, reality cannot be penned in; “its
structure is to spread, and a$ect”
(TC,
II:762).
l7
Unlike our concepts, our
concrete pulses of experience are not pent in by definite limits. “You feel
none of them as inwardly simple, and no two as wholly without confluence
where they touch.” Interrelatedness, then, is essentially characteristic of all
realities. “The gist of the matter is always the same-something ever goes
indissolubly with something else. You cannot separate the same from its
other, except by abandoning the real altogether and taking to the conceptual
system” (PU, 127, 128).
In the light of all this, James contends that the old objection against the
self-compounding of states of consciousness-that it was impossible for
purely logical reasons- “is unfounded in principle.” I think that James
might have more accurately said, “unfounded in fact or concrete experi-
ence,” for he never does explain, nor does he claim to, how states of con-
sciousness can be compounded.
As
early as 1895, to the question as to
whether we can account for complex facts “being-known-together,” he
responded: “The general nature of it we can probably never account for, or
tell how such a unity in rnanyness can be, for it seems to be the ultimate
essence of experience, and anything less than it apparently cannot be at all”
(EP, 78).18 If we cannot explain, at least by means of concepts, the unity in
diversity that characterizes all experiences, we can point and describe, how-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 138/323
James: Full S e l f a d W id er Fields
111
ever inadequately. Again the distinction of James lies in his having brought
so brilliantly to our awareness the details of the flux of experience. When we
focus on the concrete, we become aware of the overlapping complex of
fields peculiar to the tiniest bit of experience as well as to the largest. “Every
smallest state of consciousness, concretely taken, overflows its own defini-
tion. Only concepts are self-identical; only ‘reason’ deals with closed equa-
tions; nature is but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs
into the more” ( P U , 129).19 As for mental facts compounding themselves,
James maintains that in spite of what he said in his Principles OfPsychology,
they “can
.
. . if you take them concretely and livingly, as possessed of vari-
ous
functions. They can count variously, figure in different constellations,
without ceasing to be ‘themselves’
”
(TC,
II:765).
It is clear that if we are to speak of the self as the “passing Thought,” as
James did earlier, we must understand this “passing Thought” in terms of
James’s later metaphysics of experience. By doing so, we are presented with
a self immeasurably richer than an epiphenomenalist or behavioristic self.
The self is always the self of the “passing moment,” but we have seen that
every passing moment radiates outward and consists of numerous and di-
verse overlapping fields, many if not most of which are not in conscious
focus. “There are countless
co’s
that are immediately undiscerned as such,
unanalyzed.” These include the continual co of our organic sensations, the
sense of the immediate past, of outlying space, of the background of in-
terest, and the like: “All these are so ready to be distinctively experienced,
that we deem them experienced strbconsciotrsly all the while.” James then asks
us to “suppose that total conflux, possible or actual, is really the ‘bottom’
fact, suppose it actual ‘subconsciously,’-then the problem is that of the
conditions of insulation” (TC,
II:757). This, as James notes, is the problem
of his 1897 Ingersoll lecture, published as Human Immortality-the problem
of individual human consciousnesses being immersed in a wider con-
sciousness of which they are only sporadically aware.
Before turning to that problem, we can conclude this section by present-
ing again that text which, along with another cited earlier,20 constitutes
perhaps the most succinct and significant statement by James as to the char-
acter of the self. This text can serve as a summation of what has just pre-
ceded, and as an anticipation and experiential ground for the more spec-
ulative and extrapolative considerations to follow.
M y present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by
a
fringe that
shades insensibly into a subconscious m ore.
I
use three separate term s here to
describe this fact; bu t I m ig ht as well use three-hund red, fo r the fact is all
shades and n o boundaries. Which part of it proper ly is in m y consciousness,
which ou t? If
I
nam e what is out, it already has com e in. T he centre wo rks in
one way while the margins work in another, and presently overpower the
centre and are central themselves. What we conceptually identify ourselves
w ith and say we are thinking
of
at any time is the centre; but o u r j il l self is the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 139/323
112 Personal Inlrnortnlity:
Possibility
ntrd
Credibility
w ho le field, w ith all those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of
increase that we can onl y
feel
without conceiving, and can hardly begin t o
analyze. T h e collective and disruptive w ays
f being
coexist here,
for
each part
functions distinctly, makes connexion w ith its ow n peculiar region
in
the still
wider rest ofexpcrience nd tends to dra w us into that l ine, and yet
the
whole
is
sornchow felt
as
o n e pulse of o u r life,-not conceived so, but
felt
s o .
( P U , 130)
WI DER C ONS C I OUS NES S
Th e gro un d w e ave jus t covered, w hich led
us
toJames’s description
of
the
“full
self,”
can profitably be explored-or reexplored-by focusing ou r
at-
tention m or e directly o n th e reality,
or
a t least the possibility, o f a wider
consciousness with wh ich individual hum an onsciousnesses are in ouch by
way o f their subconscious o r subliminal selves.
As
Perry has no ted, “T he
idea o f consciousness ‘beyond thc margin’ o r ‘below the threshold’ was a
metaphysical h yp oth es is of the first impo rtance. This hypo thesis afforded
an experimental approach to religion, and constituted the only ho peful
pos-
sibility
of
givin g scientif ic su pp or t
to
supernaturalistic faith” (TC,
11:160).
In
a letter
to
Bergson, James himself expressedhe v iew “ tha t
he
inchpensable
hypothesis in a philosophy of pure experience is that of many
kinds of
other
experience than ours, that the question
of
[ ~ ~ : ~
its conditions,
etc.) becomes a m ost urgent quest ion” (TC, IJ:610).
Tentatively, we might distinguish
four
groups of exp eriential data or ex-
periential claims, varying in deg rees of imm ediacy and acceptance, which
are involved in the extrapolation
of
a wid er self or w iderconsciousness. The
first group would be made up of those fields of cxperiencc that include but
are no t restricted to th e fields
of
our special scnses (auditory, visual, tactile).
These w ere descr ibed in the previous sect ion, and I stressed their con stitu-
tion
as
processes an d relations having centers and m arg ins
or
fringes in
a
continually shifting relationship. They,
of
course, have the highest
degree of
immediacy and acceptability. The second group would consist o f the
sub-
conscious
or
unconscious evidenced in psychotherapeutic situations and ar-
ticulated in psychological theories. He re the imm ediacy w ould be less com -
pelling, but the successful results, real o r believed, co nse que nt upo n pres up-
posing
uncon scious factors have led to a fairly widesp read acceptab ility.21
The th i rd group would include
all
those experiential claims
o r
phenomena
that
are
referred to as psychical or parapsychological.Jam es, as is well
known,
was
most interested in and sympathet ic tohese experiential claims;
for m an y years
he
suppor ted and
to
a limited degree participated in psychi-
cal research.Nevertheless, one year beforehisdeath,afternoting n he
“Final Impressions o f a Psychical Researcher” thathe had been in touch with
psychicaI resea rch literature for twe nty-fiv e years, he confessed: “Yet
I
am
theoretically no ‘further’ than
I
was at the beginn ing”
( M S ,
175).22
I
a m g o i n g t oabel the four th group ofxperiences involved in the extrap-
olation
of
a
wider
self
“mystical expcricnces.” These are the
most
impor tan t
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 140/323
James:
F d l
Se l fn t rd
Wider Fields
113
experiences
or
experiential claims fo r m y
purposes,
and I am deliberately
distinguishing them m ore sharply f rom parapsychological claims than did
James. He tended touse the term “myst ical” more widelyhat I will do, but
the
difference
is
more
functional or methodological hansubstantive.
I
wo uld adm it that ifthe p arapsyc holog ical claims are authen tic, then they arc
evidence o f that wi de r consciousness manifest in mystical experiences if
they
are
authen tic. M y justification for this distinction is James’s o w n prag ma tic
one-the “fruits” that have apparently been fo rth co m in g in
one
case and
absent in theo the r . Thos e w hom w esually thin k ofa sgreat mystics appear
to have brou ght for th bothn their ow n lives and in those touche d y t h e m a
deep ening, an illumination and enrichm ent. Suc h fruits are dccidedly less
evident in the lives
of
tho se usually classed
as
“psychics” or “spiritualists.”
James himself ather eluctantly nd adly onclud ed hat “ th e spirit-
hypo thesis exhibits a vacancy, triviality and incohe rence of m in d painful to
think
of
as the state o f the depa rted” (CER,
438-39).23
I am not sugges t ing ,
nor didJam es, that my stical experiences could be employed to “pro ve” th e
exis tence of Go d or the imm ortal i tyf th e self. Following James,
however,
I
am maintaining hatmysticalexperiencesare he trongestexperiential
grounds upon which we can
base
any ex trapolation concerning a m ore en-
compassing reality.
James w as desirous of br inging for th a hypothesis that would cover the
phenomena in
all of
the gro up s have rou gh ly delineated. It was his hy po th-
esis, variously
expressed, of the “wider self” that he believed did so most
successfully-although even in
The
Kwiet ies qf Religious Experience and A
Pluralistic Universe, we are given t most a sketch and suggestive hypothesis.
Before considering these works, let s lo ok briefly at
some
o f the other exts
in w hich James expresses his views concerning a “wider consciousness.”
To
begin
with ,
1
would l ike
to note
that
James’s
position
on
this matter
cannot be separated from his long-standing religious belief
to
t he effect tha t
we are engaged in a process not adequately accounted for in traditional
re-
strictive ma terialistic or naturalistic terms. In one of
his
talks to teachers,
James stated:
“No
on e believes mo re s trongly than d o that w ha t ou r senses
kn ow as ‘ this wo rld’ is only one por t ion of our mind’s total en viro nm ent
and object.”24 And several years earlier, in
“Is
Life W orth Living? ” (1895),
he hadexpressed th e view hat“whatever else be certa in, his at least is
certain,-that the w or ld
of
our
present natural knowledge
s
enveloped
in
a
larger world of m m e sort: of w hos e residual properties we at present can
frame no positive idea” ( W B , 50). B ut even years before these texts were
w ritten, James’s gene ral cou rse w as se t, for w hateve r the impo rtant an dpe-
cific differences he hadwi th his father,
he
never wavered in his belief tha t the
world of his father’s religious conce rns was the deeper w orl d. James’s
“sci-
entific”
bent,
co m bin ed w ith his religious sensibility, gave rise to wh at a t
times appears to
be
almost a schizophrenia.
But
he never accepted the con-
flicts between religion and science
as
permanent
and
irresolvable.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 141/323
114 Persorrol Itnmortnlity: Possibility m d Credibility
James’s
continuing concern was to
show
that one could acknowlcdge the
achievements o f science with ou t
surrcndering a
religious belief in realities
anddimensions of h u m a ncx perk nc e that m ust ever eludc sciencc. Al-
though
he
never system atically reco nciled his scientific and religious
pro-
clivities and
a t times
seemed to assume irreconcilable positions, I believe
that as h is m etaphysics slowly took form, a
more
harmonious relation be-
tween science and religion w.as incre asin gly sug ges ted. T his d irection is in-
dicated in
Perry’s
text cited above, b ut no te that he
saysJarncs’s
metaphysics
offers
the “possibility
of
giving scientific
support to
supernaturalistic faith”
(TC, I:
3
60;
emphasis added) not cient i f ic yvooJ
Both
in
our
m oral l ife and
in ou r relig iou s ife-indeed, even
to
a degrec in ourcientific life-Jamcs in-
sisted upon the necessity
of
beliefs o r faith com m itm ents ,
to
whatever
ex-
tent such acts might be reinforced
by
rational
or
scientific investigations.
EXCURSUS:
FREEDOM AS POSTULATE AND
METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE
A brief
look
at the phe nom enon of “f rcedo m ” wil1 serve
to
illustrate how
James’s later metaphysics came to lend su pp or t to,
b u t
no t prove, his long-
stand ing b eliefs. In an o ft-cited text
from
his 1870diary,
in
descr ibing how
he
pulled back from the br ink
of
self-destruction, he stated: “ M y first act
of
free will shall be
to
believe
in free
will”
(LWJ, I:l47). 25 Fourteen years
later,
in
“The D i l em m a o f D e t e r m i n i sm , ”ames expressed this sam e point:
“Our
first act of freedom, if
we
are f ree, ou gh t in all inwa rd propriety to
be
to
a f h m that we a re frec” (
W B , 115).
Again, in
The Principles ofl)rychology, we
are told that “freedom’s first deed sh ou ld be to affirm itself.” At this tim e,
James
has
not yet broke n f ree of dual i sm ,
t
least as
a
methodological postu-
late, and thus hc can only juxtapose “the great scientific postulate that thc
world
must
be
on e unb rok en fact” alongside “a
rnorul
postulate about the
Universe,
the postulate that what ought t o be can 6e” (PP,
II:1177).
James begins, then , w ith freed om as a m oral po stulate or an act
of
faith,
and there is a sense in which i t remains s o to the end. Any alleged proof or
rational dem ons tration w ou ld be inimical
to
the radical character
of
free-
dom.
Ifwe are rationally coerced
to
afflrm freedom , then we are deprived of
a significant dimen sion of freedom-the freedom
to
af ir rn f ree do m . Yet
w hileJ am es never denies a faith dim ens ion to human
freedom,
it becomes
less
and
less
a
“blin d” faith
as
he g rows
rnorc
confident
of
his metaphysics.
W hat began
as
a desperate act o f faith and a moral postulatc is gradualIy
transformed bybeingorganical ly ncorporatedwithin a metaphysics.
A
pluralistic-processive-relational
wor ld ,
an
“open” nd unfinished
uni-
verse”
characterized
by
chance an d novelty, is one that
does
not reduce
free-
dom to a subjectivistic o r psycho logical juxtaposition at best a n d
an
aberra-
tion at
worst. As noted earlier,
the
particular kind
of
world affirmed
by
James
is
one
in which there are “or iginal comm encemen ts o f series of phe-
nomena ,
whose
re ah at io n exciudes oth er ser ies which were previously
pos-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 142/323
siblc”
( C E R ,
31).2h In one of his last w rit ings , Jam es insists that the dif-
ference betwecn mo nism and pluralism rests on the reality o r unreality of
novelty. He goes on to say that “the doctr ine of free will” is “that we our-
selves may
be
authors
of
genuine novelty” ( S P P ,
75).
James no lon gc r posits du alism , even m ethodologically, for he
n o
longcr
thinks in ter m s
of
an “objective” determ ined wo rld that is the conc ern of
science and
a
“subject ive” undetermined world that gro und s mo rali ty and
religion. T he re is
one
w orl d, he says, however pluralistic and diverse it may
be; and chance , novelty, and self-origination in somc sense characterize this
world in a11 i ts dimensions. A rnctaphysics of experience that overcomes
ontological dualism is, of course,
a
crucial and indispensable factor in an y
effort
to
br ing
about
greater harm ony betw een scicnceandreligion. An
experience which,
in
its m ost irnm cdia te and tinicst bits, involves dimen-
sions that escape a mechanistic-materialistic reductionism is op en to beliefs
in realities “ thi ck er” an d m ore extensive than those portrayed by the
cus-
tomary category
of
“sense-data.” These realities, while not encompassed or
exhausted by thc mo re im m ed iate and sensible experience
of
the moment ,
are nevertheless viewed as cont inuous wi th
these
m om en tary experienccs,
thereby obviating the necessity to posit a radically discontinuou s “othc r”
or
“spir itual” world b eyond “this world.”
WIDER CONSCIOUSNESS:
DIVERSE
MANIFESTATIONS
A s
with “freedom ,” Jam es was aware of and affirmed
a
m o d e of “wider
consciousness” so m e years befo rc his metaphysics crystallized suficicntly to
account
for
i t rathcr than sim ply juxta po se i t
to
the physical w or ld.
I n
his
early psychical research
as
well as in Ellitnut1 Imrrmrtulity, dualism is still pre-
supposed.
in The Vuvieties
ofReligiour Expeuieme,
it is implicitly overcome; in
Essays
in
Radical
Etnpiuicism,
A
Pllrrulistic
Utliverse,
and
S o r w
Probletm
of
Phi-
losophy,
it is formally and ex plicitly rejected. By considering how James
viewed an d em ployed this “wid er consc iousness,” we can best understand
its natu re and im porta nce s well as its utility fora
belief in personal immor-
tality.
Lct us begin with the role assigned a “larger consciousness’’ in James’s
Hrsn1nt7 I ~ n m o r t d i t y ,n which he responds to tw o objcctions against pcrsonal
immortality. The second objection, wh ich is of secondary importance for
the
question
of
a
“wid er consc iousness,” migh t be Iabcled the “logistical
objection"-how could God pos sibly ma intain in existence the billions of
people
who
have
existed
and w h o will
come
to exist? James’s respo nse, in
brief, is that we can no t judg c Go d’s capacity in ter m s of o u r finite limita-
tions: “G o d, w e can say, has
so
inexhaustible a capacity for love that
his
call
and need is
for
a literally endless accumulation
of
created lives”
( H I , 42).
T h e first objection, and the onc directly relevant to ou r present concern,
is that if
“tlzotrght
is a juzct ion o the braitz,” consciousncss cannot survive the
brain’s dissolution. James acc epts
the
postulate
of
thoug ht as
a
function
of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 143/323
116
Persoad Itnmortnlity: Possibility and Credibility
the brain, buth e suggests that there are w o diEerent kinds of function, both
of wh ich are possible b ut on ly one of which excludes personal immortality.
First, there is the “prod uctive function,” wh ereby the brain w ou ld prod uc e
consciousness
as the
electric cur rent prod uce s lig ht or the eakettle
produces
steam.
I f
this is the function of the brain, then of course consciousness can
have no reality a part from
thc brain. But there is another possibility: name-
ly, the “transmissive function” by which the rain serves mercly to transmit
consciousness whose source is located outside the brain, as
a
stained-glass
window ransmits ight ( H I , 10-14). Obviously, if consciousness is only
transmitted rather than produced by the brain, thcre
s
no necessity
for
con-
sciousness to cease to exist when thc b rain
does.
“The s phe r e of being that
supplied the consciousness
would
still
be
intact;
and
in that m ore real wo rld
with which, even whils t here, i t was continuous, the consciousness m igh t ,
in ways u n k n o w n to us, continu e still” ( H I , 18).
According to
James,
both production and transmission arc hypotheses
polemically on a par, for “ in strict science, we can on ly w rite do wn thebare
fact
of
concomitance.” But considered in a widcr way, the transmission the-
ory has “positive sup eriorities.”
To
begin with, i t
is
not necessary to gener-
ate consciousn ess anew in a vast
nurnbcr of
places; “it exists already, behind
the scenes, coeval with thc w orld .” F urth er th ere is w ho le class of experi-
ences better accounted for by the transmission theory:
“such
phenomena ,
namely, as religious conve rsions, providen tial leadings in answer to prayer,
instantaneous healings, prem onit ions, appari t ions
a t
the time of de ath, lair-
voyant vis ions or impre ssions, and the w hole rang e of me dium ist iccapaci-
ties.” T he pro du ctio n the ory has
a
hard imeexplaininghowsuch
phe-
nomena can be p roduced by our sense organs, whereas for the transmission
theory, “they don’t have to
be
‘produced.’
”
Instead, “they exist ready-made
in the transcen dental world, and all that is needed is an abno rma l lowe ring
of the brain-threshold to let the m thro ug h” ( H I , 20-27).
In describing our relation to this larger consciousn ess, James speaks
of
“the con t inui ty
of
our consciousness with
a
mother-sea’’ ( H I ,
27).
in his
preface to the second edition o f the book,
ames
notes that this led
some
critics
to
accuse him of allowing only for the continu ed existence of the
larger consciou sness, o u r finite persons hav ing expired w ith the brain. In
reply, he maintained that the transmission theory allows one to “conceive the
mental
world betzirrd
the
veil
in
as
irdividualistic
a
form
ns
one
pleases .”
I f
one
takes theextreme ndividua listic view, the n one’s “finitemundanecon-
sciousness would be a n abstractfrom
one’s
larger, tru er personality, he
latter having even now some sor t of reality behind the scenes” ( H I , vi-vii).
In
spite o f James’s explicit su pp ort of the possibility of personal immor-
tality in this essay, I think this supp ort sho uld be received w ith some cau-
tion. It is true, as Perry noted, that “the transmission theory was clearly an
anticipation of the hypothesis developed in his later metaphysics and philos-
o p h y
of
religion, in wh ich the my stical and similar experiences w ere
in-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 144/323
J m e s : F d l
S e l f a d Wider Fields
117
terpreted a s an overflow of superhuman mental i ty through
a
lowering of the
normal threshold” ( X , [1:133).Nevcrtheless, much in this theory
as
it is
presented in Hzrlnarz
lrnnwrtality is
in conflict w ith wh at I believe arc
the
richer and m ore fruitful features ofJarnes’s me taphysics.
I t
is
clear, for ex-
am ple, that James places his theory against the back groun d o f a dualistic
reality, as is evidenced in his asking us to
“suppose
. . . that the w h ol e uni-
verse of material things-the fur nitu re of earth and choir ofheaven-should
turn o u t to be
a
m ere surface-vei1 o f phenomena, hiding and keeping back
the world of gen uine realities” ( H I ,
IS). This
sound s frightfully close
to
that
rationalistic world with which thc experiential
James
never ceased to strug-
gle. Further,
it
is a w orl d essentially static and peopled by hu m an bein gs
w ho are passivc transm itters
of
a
higher reality. This
would
seem
to
hold
wh ether that “higher real ity” s und crstood in
a
pantheistic or individualistic
sense. In the latter casc, persons would be reduced to instrum ents g athering
experiences
and
me mo ries for som e “larger, truer person ality” wh ose real
wo rld is elsewhere. Absent in all o f this are those real con tinuities and real
individual agents thatJames a t his best did
so
much to i l luminate. W hether t
is possible to extrapolate a plausible mode of personal immortal i ty depends
on
whether an experiential self fashionedalo ng Jamesian lines can
affirm
the
richness and significance
of
our
personal lives “here and now” while
re-
maining open to a co ntinu ing existence.
I
would
like
to
consider next an essay w ritten some six months before
James died-“A Sug gestion abou t Mysticism” (EP, 157-65).
Based
on sev-
eral experiences that took place after
1905,
this essay presents, perhap s in i ts
sharpest form, both the experiential
a n d
ambiguous character of this wider
consciousness w ith wh ich Jam es had been concerncd
for
s o
many years.”
In each of threc experiences, James tells
us,
there was a very sudden and
incomprehensible enlargement
of
the
conscious
field, accompanied b y
“a
curious
sense of cogni t ion
of
real fact.”
Each
experience lasted
Icss
than
two
minutes, and in each instance it “brok e in abru ptly up on
a
perfectly corn-
monplace situation.”
What happened each t ime was that I seemed
all
at onc e tobe reminded
of
past
experience; and this reminiscence,
ere
1 could conceive or n a m e i t distinctly,
developed intosom ething urther hatbe longedwith t , his
in
tu rn n to
som ething further stil l, and so on, until he process faded out, eaving me
amazed
at
the sudden vision
of
increasing ranges
of
distant
fact
of wh ich
I
could give n o articulate account. T h e mode of consciousness was perceptual,
not conceptual-the
field
expanding so fast hat here seemed no t ime for
conception or identification to get in itswork. .
.
T h e feeling-I wo n’t call it
belief-that I had had a sudden
opening,
had seen th rough a window, as it
were, distant realities that incomprehensibly belonged with
m y own
life, was
so
acute that
I
cannot shake it
off
to-day. (EP , 159-60)
W hat suggest ion or hypothesis doesJames offer to account for these and
other “m ystical” experiences?
To
gr asp his hypo thesis, it is first necessary
to
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 145/323
describe what he m ean s
b y
“field of conscioctsncss” as wcll as thc “thresh-
old” metaphor he
employs .
The
field
is compos cd
a t
all
t imes
of
a
mass
of
present sensation, in
a
cloud
of
me m ories, em otions , conc epts, etc. Yet these ingredients, which have to be
named
separately, arc not scparate, as the cons cious field contain s them .
Its
form is that of a much -at-once, in the unity
of
which the sensations,
memo-
ries, concepts, impulses etc., coalesce and are dissolved.
The
present field
as
a
whole came con t inuously ou t
of
its predecessor and w ill melt into its suc-
cessor continuously again, one sensation-mass passing into another sensation-
mass giving the character of a gradually changing present to the experience,
while thc memories and concepts carry t ime-coefic ients whichlace whatever
is
present in
a
temporal perspect ive more
o r
less vast.
(EP ,
158)
Now
it is impor tant , hcrc ,
to
distinguish the succeeding masses of scnsa-
tion f rom the m cm ories, con cepts, and conational states that also enter into
the “field
of
consciousness.” Wc do not
know
how fa r we arc “marginal ly”
conscious of
thesc
latterconstituents; in
a n y
event here is
n o
definite
boundary “betwcen what is central and what is marginal in C O ~ S C ~ ~ U S ~ C
nor does the margin itself have a definite boun dary. Let us imagine thc field
o f consciousncss in the fo rm o f
a
wavc or inverted
“U”
with
a
horizontal
line dcsignatcd
the
“threshold” running through
it. T h e
closed end of the
wave above thc threshold is “ordinary consciousness,” and the open-endcd
segment below the threshold is marginal
or
transmarginal consciousness or
subconsciousness. Just as
the
sl ightest movem ent of the cye will bring into
the
field
of
vision objects that had always
been
there,
so,
James hypothe-
sizes,
a
nlovenlcnt
of
the threshold downwards will similarly
bring
a mass
of sub-
conscious nlernorics, conccptions, emotional feelings, and perceptions
f
rela-
t ion, e tc . , into vicwall a t once; and
. .
. if this enlargcment of the ninlbus that
surrounds the sensational present is vast cnough, while no onc of the i tems
i t
contains attracts our attention singly , w c shall have the con ditio ns fulfilled
for
a kind of consciousness in al l cssentiai respects like that termed mystical.
I t
will be transient, if the changeof the thresh old s transient. I t will be of reality,
enlargemen t, and il lumination, possibly rapturously so. I t will be of unifica-
tion, for the present coalesces in it with ranges of the remote quite out of i ts
reach under ordinary c ircumstances; and the sense of relafiorr will bc greatly
enhanced.
( E P , 159)
James concludes
by
noting, as he did in describing his own experiences, that
the form is intui tive o r pe rceptual , not conceptual . All of this leads to
the
“suggestion
. .
that states
of
mystical intuition may
be
only very sudden
and
great
extensions
of
the ordinary ‘field of
consciousness.’ ”
This is, o f course, a mo st anlbiguous suggcs t ion
as
r e g a r d s the “wider
consciousness,” w hic h is apparcn tly realizcd in mystical cxpericnccs.
D.
C.
Mathur, concerned
to
stress the “naturalistic” currents in James’s tho ug h t,
interprets i t as appa rently “giving
a
‘naturalistic’ description of ‘mystical
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 146/323
Jmres: F d l S e l f
nrrd
Wider Fields 119
states.’ ”zx I believe th is is a possiblc interpretation which is no t as a t variance
w ith James’s treatme nt of my stical states in The Vnrielies
ofRelkiorrr
Experi-
ctzce as M athur sug gests it is. Even in those texts in which James is drawing
o u t “religious” o r “supcr-naturalistic” possibilities, he never
denies
that the
phen om ena, as such , cann ot “prov e” the reali ty
of
any consciousness bc-
yond the human.
As
we shall scc, the af irrn atio n
of
such rcality o r realitics
is an extrapolation
or
overbelief, which m u s t involve not only the bare
phc-
rnorncna of “mystical states” but a lso othcr human
rlecds
and experienccs.
T h e Vnrieties
was
w rit ten so m e years beforeJames undcrwent the cxperi-
ences just dc scrib cd . Th us, wh ik this wor k is a trcasurc trove o f descrip-
tions of personalxpericnces,hcyre, withneotable pre-
sented by James seco nd han d;
from
thc enjoy me nt o f mystical experienccs,
he tells
us,
he was alm ost entire ly excluded by his
own
constitution.-30B u t it
is the mass and universality o f experiences variously called religious, my-
stical, psychical, or hallucinatory that irnprcsscd Jam es and that he chided
science for igno ring .”’ Thc
bulk
of the Varieties consists
of
descriptions of
experiences that James feels have n o t been adeq uately accou ntcd for
in
thc
usual scientific languagc. Ha ving pres ente d thcse experienccs, he atte m pts
to distiil from them shared characteristics and thcn suggest h a w thcy m ig ht
bc accounted for in bo th psy cho log ical
a n d
religious terms, wh ich, while
distinct, are not ncccssarily o pp ose d.
There is a plethora of h um an experiences-philosophical, religious, psy-
chological-that testify, correc tly or incorrectly, to the “reality of the un-
seen."
The ir range and mu ltiplicity lead James to sugg cst that “it isas if
there were in the hum an consciousness
a
setlrc ofrenlity, afeelirrg af‘obective
yrese tm, LJ perception of what we may call
‘ m d z i y g
thew, ’ marc deep and
m or e general than any of the spccial a n d particular ‘senses’ by wh ich the
currentpsychologysupposesexiste nt realities to bcoriginally evealed”
( V R E ,
55). j2
For m a n y
of
thosc in th c rcligious sph ere, the objec ts
of
their
belief are presented
to
them “in the form
of
quasi-sensible realities directly
apprehended.”
For those
who
have thcm , suc h cxpcriences are as con vin cing
“as
any direc t sensible cxpcriences can
be”
and usually “much
more
con-
vincing than thc
rcsults
cstablishcd by m erc logic ever are” (I’RE,
59, 66).
In
his phenorncnological consideration of “convcrs ion,” James describes
i t as involving “forces seem ingly outside of thc conscious individua l that
bring redemption
to
his lifc.” Psych ology an d rcligion are in agrcc m cn t on
the reality of such forccs wh ile disag reein g as to their ultimate locus. For
psychology they are “subconscious” and d o n o t “transcen d the individual’s
perso nality” ; rcligion , at least Christianity, “insists that
they are
direct su-
pernatural opcrations
of
the Deity”
(VRE,
174). James will eventually en-
deavor to incorpo rate b oth thesc perspectives, and the m ediu m b y wh ich he
will do so is the
self
regarded as a “ficld of consciousness.” A gain, James
describes how o u r
mental fields continually succeed each oth er an d
how
their centers and m arg ins are ever shifting. Further, “som e fields are narrow
fields and
some
are w ide fields.” Wc rejoice wh en ou r ields o f consciou sness
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 147/323
arc widc,
for
“w e then see masses of truth togethcr, and o ften get glimpse s
of relat ions which we d ivine rather than see.” O n the other han d,
when
we
are drowsy o r ill or fat igued “o ur f ields ma y narrow almo st to a point”
James maintains that “the most important fact wh ich this ‘field’ for m ula
com me mo rates is the indetermination of the ma rgin.” Since “ord inar y psy-
chology’’ is no t able adequately to account for this margin, James holds hat
the discovery, “first mad e in 1886,”of the subconscious (or the subliminal
self) is the mo st imp ortant s tep forwa rd in psych ologyince he bega n study-
ing it. The claimmade, nitiallybyFrederickM yers, is that,“incertain
subjects at least, the re is not on ly the consc iou sne ss of
thc ord ina ry field,
with its usual centre and m arg in, bu t n addition thereto in the shape
f
a
set
o f mem ories, thoug hts, and feelings which arc extra-marginal and outside
of the primary consciousness al together, but yet m ust be classed as con-
scious facts of so m e so rt, able t o reveal theirpresencebyunmistakable
signs”
( V R E ,
190).33
A
self so consti tutcd, of course, is subject to incursions
f rom what m ight be called an un kn ow n, open-endedsource.W hile his
source may be them o re hidden aspects of one’s ow n personality, i t may also
be a reality actively present to the indiv idu al ield but hav ing a life extend ing
far beyond it.34 T ha t
is
a
ques t ion which,
as
already noted, cannot be set-
tled-if it can be “settled” a t all-solely on the basis of the reality of
a
subco nscious o r subliminal self. In
a
note, Jamesstates: “ I t is thus ‘scientific’
to interpret all otherw ise unac coun table invasive alterations of conscious-
ness as results of the tensio n o f sublim inal m em ories eaching the bu rsting-
point. Bu t can do r ob liges m e to onfess that there are occasional bursts in to
consciousness of results of w hic h i t is n ot easy t o d ernonstratc any pro-
longed subconscious incubation” (
V R E ,
19211.).
T h r o u g h o u t t h e
Varieties,
James wishes
to
describe the self in suc h fashion
as n ot to foreclose its co nti nu ity w ith a “ hig he r reality,” yet
at
the same t ime
no t to confuse a possibility with a certainty. Ju st as in
Humnn
Immortality he
endeavored to show that viewing thought as a function of the brain did not
exclude the possibility of person al imm ortality, so here he insists that th e
reference
of a
phenom enon to
a
subliminal self does not altogether “exclud e
the notion
of
the direct presence of the De ity”: “It is logically conceivable
that i f there
be
higher spiritual agenc ies that can directly touch us, the psy-
chological condition o f their do in g
so
might
be
our possession
of a
sub-
conscious region wh ich alone should yield access to th em . . .
.
If there
be
higher powers able o im pre ssus, they may get access to us only th rough the
subliminal door” (V R E , 197-98). 35
If the reality of the subco nscious or sublim inal elf does not foreclose the
possibility of a divine reality, neither does the existence of mystical states
guaran tee su ch reality. “T h e fact is that the m ystica l feeling of enlargement ,
union, and emancipation has n o specific intellectual con tent w hatever
of
its
own.” While
such
s ta tes wield no autho r i ty “d ue s imp ly to thei r b eing m ys-
(VRE,
388-89).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 148/323
Jntnes:
Frrll
Selfntrd Wider
Fields 121
tical states,” they d o overthrow “the pretension of non-mystical states
to
be
the sole and ultimate dictatorsf what we may elieve.” Th at is w h y “i t mu st
always rema in an open question wh ether my stical states may no t possibly
be
.
.
.
super ior points of iew, windows through which
he
mind
looks
o u t
upo n a mo re extensive an d inclusive w orld ” (VRE,337-39).
Beforeconsidering he“wider self’ as it is apparentlyma nifest n re-
ligious experience, let me
brieffy
focus on an allied notion as presented in a
key metaphysical essay, “T he Experience o f Activity.” James tells us that
when discussing
the
ultimatecharacter of
our
activityexperiences, we
should remember “that each
of
them is but
a
por t ion of a wider wor ld , one
link in the vast chain of processes of experience ou t of which his tory is
made.” E very partic ular process, then, is part
of
a largcr proccss n the same
way, as I earlier sug gested, that every particular field is enco mp assed by a
larger field. “Each partial process, to him who lives th ro ug h it, defines itself
by i ts origin and goal;
bu t to
an observer with a wide r mind-span w h o
sho uld live outside of i t , the goal would appear but s a provisional halting-
place, and the subjectively felt activ ity wo uld be seen to cont inue intoobjec-
tive activities that led far beyond.” James goes on
to
say that we bec om e
habituated to defining activity experienc es by their relation to s om eth ing
more.
T h us there arises
a
ques t ion as to what kind
of
and
whose
activity it
is. While we think we are doing one thing, we ma y in reali ty be
doing
som ething quite different, s om eth ing
of
wh ich we are unaware, “For in-
stance, you think you are but drinking his glass; bu t yo u are really creating
the liver-cirrhosis that will end yo ur days”
( E R E ,
87-88).
Eventually the quest ion “Whose s the real activity?” is tan tam ou nt to the
question “What will be the actual results?” Ac cord ing toJarn es, this is mere-
ly a version of the old dispute between
mate r i d i sm
(“elementary short-span
ac t i ons s um m ing thendves ‘ b l i nd ly ’
”)
and
releofagy
(“f ar foreseen ideals
com ing with effort into act”), Jam es distinguishes three philosophical ac-
counts
of
the ul t imate ground or real agent or agents of activity: a “con-
sciousness o f w id er time-span than ours,” “ideas,” and “nerve-cells.” T h e
pragmatic difference in m ea nin g is vastly different and significant, reducing ,
as just indicated, to materialism o r teleology. W hileJames is not c la iming to
prove w hich is the c orrect ac coun t, his sym path ies clearly rest w ith the hy-
pothesis
of teleology and
a wider
thinker. “Naively we believe, and human-
ly and dramatically w e like
to
believe, that activities both
of
wider and nar-
rower span are a t work in life together, that both are real,
and
that the long-
span tendencies
yoke
the others in their service, enco uragin g them in the
right direct ion; and damping them whenhey tend in oth er ways.” Ju st how
this steering of small tendencies b y large ones is accomplished
remains
a
question to
be
pondered
by
metaphysical hinkers “for m any
years
to
come’’ ( E R E , 90-91). W hile James will n ot reach
a
solution to this question,
in A Pfrmlist ic Universe-written s om e f ou r years later-there is a sense in
which he is more confide nt, as
we
shall sh or tly see,
of
his belief that w e can
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 149/323
retain our individuality a nd agency cvcn
if
w e ar t encompasscd by, or co-
conscious and
confluent
with
a
larger consciousness. ThatJarncs was already
reaching toward such a view in his earlicr essay, how ever, is clearly indicated
in the description given there
of
the pragmatic meaning
of
a
widcr thinker:
I f we
assurnc a wider
thinker, i t is evident
that
his
purposcs cnvciope
mine. I
am really Iccturing4v him; and altho i cannot surely know to what end, yct i f
I
take him rcligiously,
I
can trust
i t
to
be a
good
end ,
and willingly
connive.
can
be
happy
i n thinking that my activity transmits his impulse ,
and
that his
ends
prolong
my own. So
long
as I take him religiously, in short, he
does
not
de-realize
my activitics. He tcnds rather to corroborate the reality of them, so
long
a s I believe both them
and him to b e good. ( E R E , 89)
“PART
AND PARCEL O F
A WI DER
SELF”
Let me
re turn now to A Pluralistic
Utr ivem, in
which, combined wi th
The
Varieties
of
Religious Experience, we find some of the richest texts
for
the
construction of
a
field model o f the self. I t is, as has been repeatedly under-
lined, James’s field-self tha t m ost ade quately accou nts for flow ing, co ncrete
experience while remaining open to
those
dimensions of rcality affkmed by
speculative an d fait h activity. We earlier saw that after establishing thc rcality
ofelf-compoun-ding
consciousnesses-overlapping
consciousnesses-
James reached the conc lusion that since
our states
o r
fields of consciousness
overlap bo th successively and sirnultaneously, the ‘j‘idl se l f”
is
nothing less
than the “whoIefieId,” B ut here we enterupon
a
key speculative or extrapo-
lative path, one that leads to th e heart of any effort to const ruct a model of
the
self
open to personal immortality. “Every bit
of
us at every moment is
part and parcel
of
a w idc r self, it qu ivers alon g various radii like the win d-
rose o n a compass, and the actual in its cont inuously one wi th ossibles not
yet in ou r present sight”
( P U ,
131).
This text, com bined with the earlier
cited “full
self”
one ,
while
n o t necessariIy in essential conflict w ith the pre-
sentation of the self in T h e Principles of Psychology, is nevertheless signifi-
cantly beyond i t .
We earlier saw that a materialistic inter preta tion ofJames’s do ctrin e of self
seemed plausible, particularly
if
such statements as the fol lowing were aken
in isolation: ‘‘
The
‘S e l f o f selves,’ when
carefdly
e x a t ~ i ~ ~ e d ,s forrnd to covtsist
trtaitrly of th e cirllectiorr o these peculiarrnotiorrs in the
head
or betweer1
the
head and
the throat”
( P P ,
I:288).
I
suggested that even texts
such
as
this on e arc better
und erstood wh en placed within a field model
of
the self and that the later
James would bear
out such a reading; the same is true
of
those difficult
“body-texts” n wh ich
James
appeared to identify the individu alized
self
with the.body.
A
particularlyunsettling one-“The wo rld experienced
(otherwise called thc ‘field of consciousness’) com es at all tim es with our
body as
its
centre, ccntre o f vision, centre of action, centre
of
interest”
( E R E , 86n.)-was prcsented in
a
long no te in “T he Experience o f Activity,”
and
I
think it interesting
that
a
note
to
the “part and parcel
of
a wider
self’
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 150/323
text sho uld bo th clarify that text
and
sup po rt the field-self doctrine bcing
suggcstcd:
T hc conscious
self
of the momcnt, the centra l
sclf,
is probably dcterrnimd to
this privileged position by its functional connexion with the body’s imminent
or present acts. I t
is
the present n c f i q self. Tho the more that surrounds i tmay
be “subconscious” to us, yet if in ts “collectiv e capac ity” i t also exerts an
active function, it may be conscious in a wide r way, conscious, as it
were,
Over
heads. ( P U , 131n.)36
Again we are con fronted w i th that am biguous , vag ue,nd elusivc “morc”
that we have been everishly pursuin g hroug h he aby rinth of con-
sciousncss. Let
us
assault
i t
again, this time from James’s description of re-
ligious
experience. T hi s experience, he says, despite
a
mult i tude of diverse
expressions, has
a
co m m on nucleus wi th two par t s o rtages: a felt uneasiness
and
a solution o r salvation through remo val
of
this uneasiness.
T h e
un-
easiness takes th e fo rm of sense of wron gne ss, and insofars the individual
suffers from and criticizes
this
wrongness , he is already beyond it and possi-
bly in tou ch with som ethin g highe r. T h e religious person, then, is aware of
compris ing a
wr ong
pa rt and-at least in germ ina l form-a better part.
When
the
solut ion
o r
salvific stage is reached, the person idcntifies
his
real
being with the germinal higher partf himself: “ H e
becomes
comciocrs
that this
higher part is conterrninorrs and cotztinuorrs w i t h a more of the same
qun t i t y ,
w h i c h is
operat ive
in
the
universe
outside of h i m , and which hecan keep in workirzg touch w i t h ,
a n d in a f a r h i o n g e t
on
board o and save h imre l fwher t
a l l
his towev
beitg
hasgotre to
pieces in the wreck”
(VRE, 400).
Several years latcr, in A Plrrralistic Urliuerse,
James repeats this description in very similar terms:
T h e believer finds that the tcnde rer parts of his personal life
are
cont inuous
with
a
rnorc
of
the same quali ty which
is
operative
in
the universe outside of
him and w hich he can keep in touch wi th , and in a fashion get on board and
save himself, when a l l his lower being has gone
to
pieces it1 the w rec k. In a
word, th e believer is cont inuous,
to
his own consciousness,
at a n y
rate, wi th a
wider self f rom which saving experiences
flow
in. ( P U , 139)
To this po int, fam es has given a vivid description o f th e way in wh ich
num erous individuals have experienced profound personal transformation.
Th e obvious ques tion , of course, is w heth er their experiential claims are
simply projections
of
their
own
subjective psyches or w he the r indeed they
are manifestations of the touch of a higher power. In sho rt , is this “more”
merely their ow n no tion ,or do es it eally exist? an d if so, in what shape? and
is italso
active?
Here speculative and theoreticcategories in a l l religions
come in to play, as well as significant divergencies of interpretation. That the
“m o re ” really exists and acts
is widely agreed
upon,
whereas there are great
differences as regards its shape (personal god, gods,
nature,
Being) and the
mode of “union”
with it . James n ow wades in with his ow n hypothesis,
which he
hopes
will
be
acceptable
to
science w hile remaining
open
to
the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 151/323
124
Personal
Imrnortality:
Possibilityndredibility
claims of religious experience. T h e m ediating term, Jam cs fcels, m igh t be
the
subcor~scious
elf,
wh ich has bec om e an acceptable psychological entity.
Prescinding from an y religious considerations, “there is actually and liter-
ally m ore life in ou r otal soul than we
re
a t
any time aware
of”
( V R E ,
402).
In a text from Frederick M ycrs, wh ichJarnc s now ma kes is own, this depth
dimension of the hu m an sclf is succinctly and convincingly exp ressed:
Each of us is in reality an
abiding
psychical
entity far more extensive than he
knows-an individuality
which
can nevcr exprcss itsclf
completely
through
any
corporeal
manifestation. T h e
Self
manifests through the organism; but
there is always some part of the Self unrnanifested; and
always,
as it seems,
some power of organic expression held i n abeyance or reserve. (I’RE, 403)37
Given the reality, th en , of a self w ho se life and reality extend far beyond
w hat its state
of
consciousness may be
a t
a particular m om en t, James
is
n o w
equipp ed t o fashion his mediating hypothesis: “W hatever it may be on its
farther
side, the ‘more’ with wh ich in religious ex periencc we feel ourselves
connected is on its
hither
side the subconscious continuation of our con-
scious life,” What James appears
to
be saying is that in the first instance
the
“high er” pow er expe rienccd in thereligious life is “ prim arily the high er
faculties
of
our
hidden mind.” Hence, “ the scnse
of
union with the power
beyond us is a sense of som ething not m erely ap paren tly, but literally tru e”
( V R E ,
403).
Without reference to an y overbeliefs, according to James,
we
can posit
as
a fact “thor
the
consciot.rsyersotl is continrcouswith a wider se l f t h r ough
which saving experiertces
come.”
T hi s gives us a “posit ive content of religious
experience which . .
.
is
Iitertllly a t d objectively t rue ns
-far as i t
goes” ( V R E ,
405). Of co urs e, the qualification “as far as it goes” is James’s mediating
phrase,for tobligates thepsychologists to takereligiousexpericnce se-
riously o n his terms, wh ile not closing
off
the
‘ 3 r f h e r
side”
of
the “more”
fro m reflective living, speculation, and overbelief.
A fuller trcatment
of
this ‘yurther side o f the ‘more’ ”
and
the extrapola-
tionsandoverbeliefsrelat ing to i t m us t await o ur laterconsideration of
“God” as fashioned along Jame sian lines. We m ust here , however, follow
James
as h e sugg ests the plausibi li ty of the co ntin uity of our individual
hum an consciousness wi th som e superhuman consciousness or conscious-
nesses. Having established as
a
“certain fact” that sma ller, more accessible
portions
of
our
m ind can self-compound, Jam es contends that
w e
must con-
sider as a legit imate hyp othesis “the peculat ive assum ption of
a
similar
but
w ider com pound ing i n r em ote regions.’’ Ina sm uch as men tal facts fun ction
both s ingly and together , “we f ini te minds may sim ultaneo usly
be
co-con-
scious wi th one ano ther n
a
sup erh um an intel ligence”
( P U ,
132). Further, in
descr ibing the makeu p of the “full self’ with i ts shif ting m argins, we see
that we are at every moment co-conscious with
our own
momentary mar-
gin.
Is
i t no t possible, then, that “we ourselves form the ma rgin of some
really central seif in things wh ichs co-conscious w ith the w ho le
f
us?
May
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 152/323
not
you
and
I
be confluent in a highc r consciou sness and confluently active
there, tho
we
know i t not?”
( P U ,
131).
James was aware f th e act that this was an area in wh ich on e m ust dare to
hypothesize in the wildest and most imaginative fashion if one hoped to
realize evcn
a glimm er of il lumination conc erning its character. Analogies
and hypo theses sugge sted by and c onsistent with the smaller versionsf o u r
experience-not stric t for m al logical deduc tion-are the only tools avail-
able for
some
unders tanding of that vast region
of
reality with which weare
in “ ord ina ry” experience only marginally related. Th is is w hy t he views of
the psychophysicist Gustave Fechner were attractive to James and w hy he
devoted an entirc chapter in A
Plmdis t ic
UIziverse to an exposition
of
those
views.
Fechncr posited a hierarchy of overlapping souls o r consciousnesses f rom
God dow n through anearth-soul to unobservablesubconsciousstates.38
T h e aspect o f Fechner’s hyp othesis with wh ich James
is
most concerned,
and the one most relevant to the w or ld of overlapping ficlds suggested
thr ou gh ou t this essay, “is the belief that the m or e inclusive fo rm s of con-
sciousness a re in
part
consti tuted by the m or e l imited forms” witho ut being
“the mere sum
of
the more l imi ted forms.” Thcre m ight , then, be
a
wider
field with purpo ses and forms wh ich are unable
to
be
known
by
our
nar-
rower fields. Thu s, w hile we are closed against its wo rld, that world mig ht
be open
to us.
That larger world might
be a
great reservoir, po oling and
preserving hum an mem ories , and when the threshold lowcrs in exceptional
individua ls, informa tion not available to or din aryconsciousness may leak in
( P U ,
78, 135).
O n e can immediately see th e attractiveness of this hypothesis for anyone
at tempt ing
to
sugges t theplausibility of personal immortality. If we are here
and no w constituted in part
by
and par t ly cons t i tut ing
a
consciousness of
imm easurably wider, perhap s everlasting, life, thcn
a postdeath continuing
relation with such a consciousness cannot be immediately and with certainty
ruled out. We may, un kn ow n to us, be already living “w ith in” this larger
life, and certain
of
those fields now constituting the individua l self may
already be playing a role in and in a sense con stitutin g this largcr life. H enc e,
w hen
Some
of the fields o r relations n ow co ns titu tin g personal selves dis-
solve, it is possible that othe r prese ntly con stituting fields mig h t
be
con-
tinued in existence through the activity
of
this large r self.39
The
description
James gives of Fechner’s view of our relation to the earth’s sou l is along such
lines:
Fechner
likens
our individual
persons
on the earth unto
so
m a n y sense-organs
of
the earth’s soul. We add
to its
perceptive life
so long as
our
own life
lasts.
It
absorbs our perceptions, just as
they
occur, into its larger sphere
of knowl-
edge,
and
combines them with other
data
there. When one
of
us
dies, i t is
as if
an eye of the
world
were closed, for all perceptive contributions from that
par-
ticularquarter cease. But the memories
and
conceptual relations that
have
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 153/323
126
Personal Iirztriortality: Possibility and Credibility
spun themselves round the perceptions of that person remain in the larger
earth-life as distinct as ever, and form new relations and grow and develope
throug hou t all the future, in the sam e way in which o ur ow n distinct objects
of thou gh t, once stored in mem ory, f orm n ew relations and develope through -
ou t o ur wh ole finite life.
( P U ,
79)
In a fascinating, if somewhat obscure, passage at the end of his short essay
“How Two Minds Can Know One Thing,” James maintains that the char-
acter of “pure experience” is such that “speculations like Fechner’s of an
Earth-soul,
of wider spans of consciousness enveloping narrow ones
throughout the cosmos are . . . philosophically quite in order.” These
words immediately follow a passage that appears almost whimsical, given
the context in which James introduces it. It emerges within the context of
his effort to show that
a
pure experience- “pen,” for example-is in itself
neither physical nor mental but becomes one or the other depending on the
context or relations into which it enters. I have already expressed my diffi-
culties with this doctrine and with James’s conclusion that “pure experi-
ences . . . are, in themselves considered, so many little absolutes.” Immedi-
ately following this conclusion is a passage as elusive as it is tantalizingly
attractive for my purposes:
A pure experience can be postulated with any amount whatever of span or
field, If it exert the retrospective an d ap prop riate function on any o ther piece
of experience, th e latter thereb y enters int o its ow n conscious stream . And in
this operation time intervals make no essential difference. After sleeping, my
retrospection is as perfect as it is between tw o successive waking m om ents
of
m y time. Acc ording ly, if millions o f years later, a similarly retrospective expe-
rience should anyhow com e to birth, m y present though t would form a genu-
ine portion o f its long-span conscious life. “ Fo rm a portio n,” I say, but no t in
the sense that the two thin gs can be entitively o r substantively one-they can-
no t, for they are num erically discrete facts-but on ly in the sense that the
jhtictiotis
of my present thought, i ts knowledge, i ts purpose, i ts content and
“consciousness,” in sho rt, being inherited, w ou ld be continued practically un-
changed.
( E R E ,
66-67)
James goes on to insist that if we are to accept the hypothesis of wider spans
of consciousness enveloping narrower ones, the functional and entitative
points of view must be distinguished. He apparently wishes to avoid a static
motion of identity between the wider and narrower, which is what would
follow if the minor consciousnesses were treated “as a kind of standing ma-
terial of which the wider ones consist” (ERE,67).
“ C O N T I N U U M
OF
C O S M I C C O N S C I O U S N E S S ”
In his later writings and with increasing confidence, James expressed the
view, already present in his earliest reflective experiences, that we are not
alone in the universe, that we are not the highest conscious beings: “I firmly
disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form
of
experi-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 154/323
James: Full
Self
a n d Wider Fields
127
ence extant in the universe”
( P , 143).
There are many worlds of conscious-
ness of which our present consciousness is only one, and these other worlds
must contain experiences that have meaning for our life. While, for the most
part, our world is insulated from these other worlds, they do “become con-
tinuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in”
( V R E ,
408).40James
felt, then, that the evidence was strongly moving us “towards the belief in
some form of superhuman life with which we may be in the universe as
dogs and cats are in our libraries, seeing and hearing the conversation, but
having no inkling of the meaning of it all” ( P U ,
140).41
Thus, despite his
doubt and uneasiness concerning the various “psychic” claims, he tells us in
“Final Impressions of a Psychical Researcher” that from his experience “one
fixed conclusion dogmatically emerges”:
We with our lives are like islands in the sea, or like trees in the forest. . . .
There is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our indi-
viduality builds but accidental fences, and into which our several minds
plunge as into a mother-sea or reservoir. Our “normal” consciousness is cir-
cumscribed for adaptation to our external earthly environment, but the fence
is weak in spots, and fitful influences from beyond leak in showing the other-
wise unverifiable connection. Not only psychic research, but metaphysical
philosophy, and speculative biology are led in their own ways to look with
favor on some such “panpsychic” view of the universe as this.
( M S , 204)42
This passage, of course, is reminiscent of the transmission theory encoun-
tered in Hirrnnn Irnimrtnlity, reprising as it does the “mother-sea” metaphor.
The crucial difference, however, is the metaphysical framework within
which the metaphor is now suggested. To begin with, the dualism presup-
posed in Human Inznzortality is no longer operative in a metaphysics of expe-
rience that differentiates physical and mental on the basis of functions and
relations rather than ultimately different modes of being. In his discussion of
Fechner, James notes that for his own purposes, Fechner’s most important
condition was “that the constitution of the world is identical throughout”
( P U , 72).
Needless to say, as indicated by the title
A
Pluralistic Urziverse,
James does not mean “identical” in any monistic sense, either materialistic
or idealistic. But how can reality be “identical throughout” and pluralistic at
the same time? Only,
I
believe, if we recognize that the multiplicity of expe-
riences constituting reality are “fields” or processive-relational complexes,
constituting and constituted by other fields, continually changing and shift-
ing and transacting in various modes of exchange. We have followed James
in his later writings as he described this world of “fields within fields within
fields . . .” in terms of continuous and overlapping conscious fields charac-
terized by co-constitution, self-compounding, narrower enveloped within
wider. If we remember that all fields are “centers of activity,” we also avoid
the danger attached to the transmission theory, as presented in
Hurnarz
Im-
mortality,
of making human fields the merely passive instruments of a larger
consciousness or consciousnesses. Continuous transaction is a determining
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 155/323
3
28
P e r s o d Immortality:ossibility nrtd Credibility
characteristic
of all
fields, wide r and narrow er, highe r and lower,which
enter into the consti tut ion
of
reality.43 In a review essay James ‘ w ro te in
1903,
ust such a field metaphysics
is
expressed rather strikingly:
T h e o n l y fully comp lete concrete data are, however, the successive m om en ts
of
o u r ow n several histories taken with their sub jective person al asp ect,
s
well
as with their “objective” deliverance or “context.” After the analogy of these
m o m e n t s
of
experiences must all complete reality be conceived. Radical em-
piric ism thus leads o
the
assumpt ion
of a
collectivism of personal lives
(which
may
be of any g rade of compl ica tion , and superhuman or i n f rahuman as well
as human),variouslycognit ive of each other,variouslyconative and im-
pulsive,genuinelyevolvingandchanging by effortand r ia l ,and
by
their
interaction
and
cumu lative achievements
making
up
the
world.
(CER,
443-
44)
44
FIELD-SELF AS “SUBSTANTIVE-SELF”
Before shifting ou r focus
to
the “wider self’ extrapolatedas “God,”
I
would
like
to indicate the propriety
of
designating the field-self
we
have been de-
scribing as a “substantive-self.” Recall tha t the central
purpose
o f m y con-
cern
with the “self ’ is to
show
that it is possible to const ruct
a
model of the
self wh ich, wh ile faithful to the low of experience,
is
nevertheless open to
a
co ntinu ing existence after the cessation of some of the pa rticular spatio-
tem po ral fields by w hich it is presently constituted. I believe tha t the more
fully developed doctrine of the self suggested here avoids both the classical
Soul Substance theory and
the
classical empiricist o r phenom cn i s t one . The
former posits
a
perm anen t principle ontolog ically different
from
and under-
lying o r “be hin d” the experienced appearances or phenomena . T h e latter
identifies heself as
a
“bundle” of discreteappearances orphenomena
st reaming into and immediately out ofxistence.
We have already noted that James’s doctrine of the self as the passing o r
perishing T ho ug ht un do ub ted ly lends i tself to a phenom enistic interpreta-
t ion. When,however, this “passing T ho ug h t” is seen as related to
or
continu-
ous wi th or nveloped by a “more”-that is,
a
w ide r self or consciousness-
at
every m om en t, however brief, o fi ts existence,
a
phenomenistic interpreta-
tion is ruled out . At the same t ime the experientialharacter of the “passing
T h o u g h t ”
is
retained, and there s
no
relapse into
a
substantialist perspective
positing
a
shadow principle “behind”
our
experiences. To say, however, that
there is nothin g “beh ind” our experienced activities is n o t to say that these
activities,
as
we are
a t
any m om ent aware of them ,exhaust the full reality of
the self. For ex am ple, Freud’s “unconscious” is not “b ehin d” or “under-
neath” consciousness; rather it is anlIeged present-acting process “outside”
the present margin
of
consciousness.
The
self a t any m ome nt , as has been
repeatedly claimed, is constituted y
a
variety o f fields
or
relational processes,
m os t o f w h ichre no t in “focus” but re o n or “beyond” the margin or f r inge
of
consciousness.
Some
can
be
brought w i thin focus ; others
can
be dis-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 156/323
Jotnes: Full
Selfartdider Fields 129
covered on ly indirectly, as in thc case of cells or org an s. M ystic s laim that a
self
o r
consciousness of which we are ordinari ly unaware has co m e int o
focus-moved from the ma rgin, or beyo nd, of con sciousn ess to theenter.
Jame s ma intained in his
Pvirlcip/es
$Psychology
that he could dispense with
the So ul Sub stance theory because his theory of the “pass ing Thought”
accounted for
such
features of the self as unity, identity, continuity-which
had traditionally
been
the justification for posit ing the reali ty of th e “soul .”
But James never held that the notion of “substance” was a total ly empty o r
useless
one, for
in his earliest and last w ritin gs he insisted that the c ateg ory
of substance expressed an indispensable feature n ot on ly of the self but of
reality. “To say that phenom ena inhere in
a
Substance,”
he
tells
us,
in the
Principles,
“is at bo ttom on ly to reco rd one’s protest against the notion that
the bareexistence
of
thephe nom ena is the otal ruth. A phenomenon
would
n ot itself be, w e insist, unless there were so m eth ing mort. than the
phenomenon”
(PP,
II:328). B u t even earlier, in an unpublished essay writte n
probably around 1874,James affirms the utility
of
“substan ce.” This essay,
“Against Nihil ism,” was
a
critique
of
Chauncey Wright’s positivism, which
reduced the world “to
an
assemblage of par ticular phenomena having n o
ulterior connections-ideal, substantial o r dynam ic.” According
to
Perry,
James viewed such positivism as
a
“sort
of
philosophical ‘nihilism,’ affirm-
ing that beyond the part icular phenomena there is ‘nothing’” (TC,
1524).
T h e central criticism of “nihilism” and the primary justification for theate-
gory of
substanc e is that the forme r denies “continuity,” while the latter
recognizes it . T h e est of substantial reality, according to ja m es , is “d yn am ic
conn ection with other existence s.” W hich is to say that “ a thing only has
being at all as it enters in some way into the being of other things , or con-
stitutes part
of a
universe or organ ism.
. .
. As to their
beirzg,
th ings are
continuous, and
so
far
as this is w ha t
people
mean
when
th ey a f i r m
a
sub-
stance, substance must be held to exist .”Jamess aware that som ething m ore
than this is usually m ea nt,
such
as ‘‘an other and
a
pr imordial thing
on a
plane behind that of the phenomen a, but numerical ly addit ional to them.”
Bu t Jam es nsists that
a l l he means by “substance” is the “unity wh ich com es
from the phenomena being cont inuous wi theach oth er”
(TC, I:525).45
T he emphasis upon cont inui ty , as
we
have
already
seen, did not diminish
bu t intensified as James’s metaphysics matured. While “substance”does not
bccorne
a
central term in
his
m etap hy sical writin gs it is significant that in his
last work,
Sorne Pvobl~nrs
fPhilosophy, he touches again upon the theme of
“Against Nihilism”:
What difference
in
practical experience is it supposed
to
make that w e have each
a
personal substantial
principle?
This difference, that
we
can remember
and
ap-
propriate
our
past,
calling
it
“mine.”What difference that in this book there is a
substantial principle?This, that certain optical and tactile sensations cling per-
manently together in a cluster. The fact that certuirr perceptual expericnces do seem
to
belong
together
is
thus all that
the
word
substance means.
( S P P ,
66)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 157/323
130
Pcrsonnl Itnmortnlity:ossibility and Credibility
James th en goe s on to “ inqu ire wh ether instead of
being
a
principle, the
‘oneness’
affirm ed m ay no t m erely be nam e like ‘substance,’ descriptive of
thc fact that certain
specific
a d erifiable tomect ions arc found among the par ts
of
the experiential
flux”
(SPP,
66).
In keeping w ith the pra gm atic evaluation of a11 conc epts, the n, th e desig-
nation of the self
o r
reality as “substantive” is im po rtant only ins ofar as it
keeps
us
aware of or avoids closing us off f rom impor tan t d imens ions of
experience. This is w h y in a n y Jamesian consideration of personal immor-
tality, i t is im po rtan t to insist o n th e substantive
character
of
the
self while
rejecting the traditional So ul Su bstan ce theo ry. We have earlier seen that in
his critique
of
the
soul
theory, James rejects the argument that the souls of
practical importance because its alleged simplicity and substantiality are the
groundsfor nferr ing mm ortal i ty. In
a passagealreadycited,James on
“practical” grounds rejects this argument:
The
Soul, however, when closely scrutinized, guarantees no immortality of a
sort
we carejot-. Th e
enjoyment
of
the atom-like simplicity
of
their substance
in
saecula saecrrlorrrm would
not to
most people
secm
a
consummation devoutly to
be
wished.
The
substance
must give
rise
to a
stream
of
consciousness continu-
ous with the present stream, in
order
t o arouse
our
hope, but of this the
persistence
of
substance
per
se
offers
no
guarantee.
(PP,
1:330)
It
is,
of
course, this “stream of consciousness continuous with the present
stream” that has bee n stresse d in the do ctrine of flowing field-sclf, and i t is
this characteristic that is the experiential ground for any pragmatic extrapo-
lation of persona l imm ortality.
In
The Principles ofPsyclrology,
James
is polemically engaged w ith the ra-
tionalists an d hence conce rned
to
unde rline the limitations of a substance
view
of
the self.
In
the essay
“The
Sent iment
of
Rationality,” however, he
chides the antisubstantialist empiricists or failing to recogn ize an extrem ely
im po r tan t fun ct io n of “Substance”: namely, to fulfill
the “deman ds of
ex-
pectancy.” Consider
“the
not ion of immortal i ty . . .
.
W hat is this bu t
a
way
of saying that the determination of expectancy is the essential factor of ra-
tionality?” He agrees with Mill and the other empiricists that nothing is, or
need be, added to th e description of past sensational facts
by
positing an
inexperienced
substratum.
“B ut w ith r ega rd to the acts yet to
come
the
case
is
different, It do es not follow that if substance may be dropp ed from
out
conception
of
the irrecoverably past, it need
be
an equally e m pty complica-
tion to
our notions of
the
future.”james
is insisting here that “desire to have
expectancy defined” is
so
deep and central to human life “that
no
philoso-
phy will definitively t r iump h wh ich in an emp hatic ma nner denies the pos-
sibility o f gratifying this need ” W B , 69-70). He does not develop his point
further in
this
essay, b u t
it
is clear here and elsewhere that belief
in
personal
immortal i ty is one-though by n o means the only-expression of this ex-
pectancy, In an example not given by
James,
we might sugges t that any one
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 158/323
James: Full S e l f n r d Wider Fields 131
w ho struggles for the realization o r fulfillmen t of
a
future goal or
urpose-
achieving
a
degree, w ri ting
a
book, paint ing a picture-manifests such ex-
pectancy. Every person
so
engaged firmly believes that however much he or
she may change in the interim and however long the inter im, the person
who experiences the realization will be “substantively” the same as the
per-
so n w h o initiated thc process or processes that lcd to i t .44
A compar ison
of
the soul theory with the substantive field-self theo ry
reveals obvious similarities andsignificant differences. Bot h claim to ac-
count for unity,continu ity, dentity,endurance, ndividuali ty,and inte-
riority.
T h e
substantive-self, however, unlike th e
soul, is
not
a
principle in
itselc i t is not
a
nonempirical principle belonghg to anontologically differ-
ent order
of
being; and
it
has no reality-in-itself apart fr o m its co ns titu ting
fields.
T h e
implicat ions or mm ortali tyareagainsimilarbut different.
While personal immortality is possible for b oth , it is a “positive” possibility
for the soul. T he m os t that can
be
claimed for the substantive-self is that it
has a “negative” possibility; that
is,
i t do es no t positively exclude the pos-
sibility. Since the soul is allegedly sim ple, it is “naturally” incorruptible; and
though i t could
be
annihilated by
God,
w e can logically and rationally infer
its imm ortality. Since the su bstantive-self is an ever ch an gin g field depen-
dent
for
i ts reali ty at every m om en t up on the ields that constitute it, theres
no logical necessity for it to con t inue upo n the essation of those constitut-
ing f ields most evident to ourexperience. Inasmuch as o ne o f its here-and-
now constituting relations is with a wider field o r consciousness, however,
the possibility ca nn ot be ruled out
that this wide r field will ma intain the
hu m an self after the cessation of other cons t i tut ing
fields.
It is not legitimate
to logically infer such continuing existence, because such existence depends
upon the unknow n purposes of this wider consciousness, which may o r
may not include the continu ing existence o f those narrow er fields that are
now constitutive with it. If there are other expe riential groun ds, however,
for
believing that these na rro w er fields,
along
with their ideals, purposes,
s trivings and the l ike, are included within the purposes of the wide r con-
sciousness, then the substantive field-self as herein described presents no
logical o r experiential obstacle t o the realization
of
such purposes.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 159/323
C H A P T E R 6
James: Sel fand G o d
But life, life as such,
he
protested inwardly-it
was
not
enough. How could
one be
content with
the namelessness of mere energy, with the
less
than individuality
of a power, that for a l l
its
mysterious divineness, was yet unconscious,
beneath good and evil?
”Aldous
Huxley
Eyeless i n Gaz a
Nothing is
more
reasonable than
to
suppose that
if there be anything
persona
at the bottom of
things, the way we behave to it
tnrrst
affect the
way it
behaves to
us.
“F.
C. S.
Schiller
“Axioms
as
Postulates”
The
general hypothesis governing this essay is that
a
plausible belief in per-
sonal imm ortal i ty dep end s upo n self ope n
to
con tinu ing existence beyond
the spatial and temp oral param eters of w ha t is usually referred
to as
the
“present life.”
A
key step in the direction of sup po rt ing this hypothesis
has
been taken hr ou gh the s tablishment
of
a
field-self that participates in and s
constituted by
a range
of
fields, some
of
which
can
be designated “wider” in
relat ion to the identifying “center” of the individualelf. Following
James, I
have described these wider fields in terms of
a
superhuman consciousness or
consciousnesses,delaying ill no w
a
more detailedspecification
of
such
wider consciousnesses. This br ings
us,
of course, in to the thorny and
to
s om e extent impossible question o f “God.” How ever tentative and mini-
malist a phi losophy of God may emerge, there
is
no avoiding some
consid-
eration of this question, inasmuch as
I
wish to argue that the possibility of
an
imm ortal self depends upon thegraciousness of
God.
For many-if n ot most-believers in perso nal imm ortality , it s sufficient
to believe in a divine promise of eternal lifc, avoiding any and all unsettling
dif icult ies or quest ions
by
taking
refuge
in the “mystery”
of
G od.
To some
degree, of course,
all
God-believers
must take
refuge in mystery.
But
in an
essay in p hilosophical theology, it is incu m be nt up on me, as a m in im um , t o
indicate a
view of G od that is reasonably consistent with my controlling
I32
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 160/323
Junes: Selfarld God I33
metaphysical assu m ption s, as well as with heview of thc self
already
presented.
In thiseffort
to
construct aGod-hypothesis,
I
will co ntin ue o utilize
James’s ideas and app roac h w ithou t claim ing to pres ent James’s definitive
doctrine
of Cod.
Rather,
I
wo uld l ike to suggest wh at mig ht bc mo re accu-
rately described as a ‘yamesian” God.
In
doing
so, I
will draw directly o n
James whe re I de em him useful, explicating points that may bc on ly im plicit
in his expressed doctrine
and
extrapolating a view of God f rom a v iew o f
reality andexperiencefundamentallyconsistent butno t otally identical
w ith that
of
janlcs. While
I
may.incidentally allude
to
s o m e
of
the dif icul-
ties and technical pro ble m s attached toJarnes’s
doctrine
of
God,
I
will for
the
most part bypass
them
in
an
at tempt
to
const ruct
a
God-hypothesis that
allows for and
is
suppor t ive
of a
belief in personal im m ortali ty .
HistoricalIy,
all
doc t r ines o fGod have em erged
from
and been bo und up
wi th a particular view
of
reality having profoun d imp lications for the ay
in
which life ou gh t to be l ived . Th us, as one com m entatorhas correctly noted:
For
James,
the mcre question as to whether to believe in
God has
momentous
practical
bearings,
regardless of whether the believer
is a
practicing Christian,
Jew.o r whatever. This is necessarily
so
because the question of God is not just
a question about the existence of another being;
t is
a question concerning the
nature of the universe, not on ly taken as a whole, but taken as its individual
parts
as
well.
1
As no ted earlier, I am presupposing m etaphysical assumptions significant ly
different fro m tho se of lassical philosophy, and any viewo f
God
consistent
with hemetaphysicalassumptions
of
pragmatism wil l
be
significantly,
tho ugh not totally, diEerent from the view
of God
drawn f rom the meta-
physical assu mp tions
of
classical thought. More specifically, as
I
shall
later
indicate,
a
radically processive-relational w orld s uch as that presuppo sed by
pragmatism
is
not cong enial to the traditional view
of
God as immutable ,
om niscient, and o mnipotent .
I
am furthe r assu m ing tha t all language, including God-language, is his-
torically, culturally, and perspectivally conditioned.
A
crucial corollary of
this assu m ption
is
the re jection of any s im ple cor resp ond encc
r
representa-
tive vicw
of language; hence, there can
be no
claim to describe God as he is
in himself.
All
God-language is sym bolic in
the
Tillichian sense
of
point ing
“beyo nd itself while participating in that to w hic h it points.”’ We ca nn ot
evaluate ou r sym bo ls, then ,
o n the
basis of so m e alleged corrcsp onde ncc
with “objective reality” but
only on
their serviceab ility
for human
life. This
does no t m ean , however, that w hat is being suggested
is
an unqualified
sub-
jectivism.
The
pra gm atic perspective rejects
bod1
classical o bjec tivism and
mod ern subjectivism3 when the former
is
unde rstood as claiming
that our
language represents
an
object (God) as it is in itself, ind ep en de ntly
of
the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 161/323
h u m a n knower, and the latter s unders tood a s reduc ing the reality of God to
nothing but a projection of thc human psyche .4
Jarncs
has
frequen tly bccn misun derstood as presenting a subjectivistic
view
of
God,
A s
Ralph Ba rton Perry notes, howcver, James “insisted up on
retaining no t on ly the ideality but also the actudi ty of God-as a conscious
power beyond, with which one may cornc i nt o b encficent ~ o n t a c t . ” ~ J a m e s
himself argued, in a letter
to
Char les A . Strong, that God could be 6otf1
existent and ideal: ‘I do
not
believe it
to
be hcalthy minded to nurse the
notion that ideals are self-sufficient and require n o actualization to make us
content.
.
.
.
Ideals ou gh t to aim a t the tvarlsfbvrnation of reality-no less ”
Perry points out that James
was
not “prcpared to abandon the object ivi ty
of Go d,” however much he em phasized the vital. pcrsonal, and pragmatic
features of religion (TC,
II:348).
Thu s wh en Jam es says,
“I
myself bclieve
that the evidence for God
l ies p rim arily in inner personal cxpericnces”
P,
56), he is no t to be un der stoo d as reducing the reality
of
G od to hum an
experience.Nevertheless,hc
docs
hold hat any claims m ad e ab ou t G od
must be grounded
in
and ultimately cvaluated in tcr m s of hu m an experi-
ence. Given the am big uity in James’s use of “im m edia te experience” such
that not everyth ing
in
irnmcdiate experience is “ilnrnediate,” howcver, the
exploration of cxperience takes us bcyond the realm of “p u re imm cdiacy.’’
Th rou gh ou t this essay I have
designated
such exploratory activity “cxtrapo-
lation ,” wh ich is neith er intuitio n no r inference, neither immcdiate aware-
ness nor dedu ccd conc lusion, but ma y incorpo rate characteristics of both
these modes
of
activity. Rem em ber, extrapo lation is
a
spcculative
or
imagi-
native endeav or that mu st proceed from data given in experience, and thc
extrapolated co nclusion must b c rcasonably co nsistent w ith and potentially
enriching
of
the experience from which i t bcgan.
Whi leJames does not formally
speak of
extrapolation,
I
fccl that the
ap-
proach hc
makes
to thc God-question is best described as suc h. “Go d,” for
James,
is
aE1rrned b y a belief o r ovcrbelicf, and the obvio us qu estion is w ha t
these have to do with any extrapolating. I would suggcst that ust as thinkers
w ithin the classical tradition were not conten t simply to affirm
a
bclief in
God but a t tempted to construct rat ional arguments
for
God’s existcncc,
so
one
making a pragmaticapproachmustattempt to show thc“reason-
ableness” of
God
belief
b y
means
of
extrapolation. Thus, extrapolation
would seem to fal l somewherc between a blind , c m ative faith and an absa-
lutely compell ing logical argument. Therejection of rational arguments for
the existence of Go d, thc refo rc, s not to be equa ted with radical cxclusion
of “rcason”
from
the spherc of faith. Reflective bclicvcrs m us t atte m pt to
sho w that faith in G od is gro un de d in cxpcrience and that an yth ing w e can
legitimately say about this God must no t be in fundam ental conflict w ith
this experience b ut m us t have the possibility of cxpanding
and
deepening it.
Furthcr, faith in God must
be
dem onstrably in harm ony wi th other experi-
(LWJ, 111269-70).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 162/323
entia1 claim s. “ T h e t ruth of ‘God ,’ ”Jam es ma intains, ‘‘has to run the gaunt-
let of all ou r oth er t ruth s. i t is
o n
trial by them and they on trial by it”
(P ,
56)-
James is in the broad Kantian tradition that denies
he
possibility
of
prov-
ing or disproving the existence o f God , wh ile leaving the doo r open for
belief
or
faith in God. It
is
no t that James patronizcs o r
scoffs
a t effor ts to
construct absolutclycertainarguments for God’s existence. Nor doeshe
consider it necessary to “discredit philosop hy by laborious criticism
of
its
arg um en ts,” since as
a
matter of his tor y it fails to provc its pretension to bc
‘“objectively’ convincing” or universally valid. Philosophers do w ha t
all
hu m an s do-attempt to find a r gum en t s
for
their convictions,
“for
indeed it
[philosophy]
has
to
find
thcrn.” In
brief,
then,
the
arguments serve
to
con-
firm the beliefs of bclievers b ut ar e useless for atheists
( V R E ,
344).
Of coursc, James’s reasons for rejecting the classical arg um en ts
go
m uch
deeper than sim ply no tin g that they lack univcrsal acccptance.
T h e
meta-
physics and epis temology to which
he
is com mitted exclud e thc possibil ity
of any absolute proofs, including those relating to G od . All argumen ts for
the existence of God-explicitly, the “design argurnen t”-prcsuppo se, as-
sum c, or con sid er self-evidcnt that w e live in an essentially ord ere d world,
whereas James views
order
and d isordcr
as
“purcly
human
conventions.”
Moreover,hecontends,“thereare in reality nfinitely m ore hin gs ‘un-
adapted’ to cach oth er in this wo rld than therearc things ‘adapted’; infinitely
mo re hings with rregular relations han w ith regular relationsbetween
them. But we
look
for the regular kind of thingxclusively, and ingeniously
discover and preserve it in our rncmory” (VRE,34th.). Rationalism, then,
is jus t as inadequate when arguing for God and rel igion as wh en arg uin g
against thcm . This is in kceping, of course, w ith James’s conten tion that the
whole of
o u r
me ntal life exceeds that part accounted for by rationalism.
“If
you have intuitions at all,” hc tclls us, “they
comc
from
a
deeper level of
your nature than the loquaciousevel which rationalism inhabits” (VRE,67).
I have already cited
James
to the effect that thc “evidence for
God
lies
primarily in inner persona l experiences” ( I ) , 56).7 I t
is
important , however,
to
indicate thc character of that evidence so as to avoid any interpretation
that would lead to a claimhat xperience,
evcn
my stical xyericnc c,
“proves”
the
existence of God. I have also called attention toJarnes’s conten-
tion that
a
range and variety
of
experiences sug ge st
a
“reme
o f u e a l i t y ”
present
to hu m an consciousness that
is
deep er and xnorc general than any reality
revealed by the special and p ar tic d ar senses ( V R E , 55,
58-59).
Anlong such
expericnccs are distinctivcly religious cxpcrie’nccs w ith in w hic h,
for
those
w h o have them, the objcctsof their belief arc present in “the form f
quasi-
sensiblc realities direc tly app rehe nde d” rathe r than
in
“ thc form of mere
conceptionswhich h cir ntcllectaccepts as t rue” (VRE, 59). T h em o s t
heightened form of suchexperiences are those repor ted by my stics, but
respectful
as
James
is
of
mystical experience,
he
explicitly denies that
it
can
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 163/323
136
Persorlal Irnntortality:ossibility atrd Credibility
be employed to draw con clusio ns bind ing up on all reflective and reasonable
persons. For the individua l w h o has the expe rience, i t is sufficient. If the
my stic can livc by it, and his
o r
her life manifestsfruitfulconsequences
flowing from i t , no one as
a
right
to
denigrate this experience. At the sam e
time, the my stic is not entitled to claim that oth ers , lacking such experi-
ences, mu st accept the mystic’s interpretation ( V R E , 336): “M ystical states
indeed wield no author i ty due s imply to thei rbeing mystical states. Bu t the
highe r one s am ong them point in direct ions to wh ich the religious scnti-
ments even
of
non-mystical men incline. They tell of thc supremacy of the
ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety, and of rest. They offer us hypotheses,
hypotheses which we may voluntarily gnore,
but
wh ich we as thinkers
cannot
possibly upset”
(VRE,
339).
I
wish
to
suggest that i t is the r ichness of the experience of those w h o ge t
singled out as mystics and the “germ
of
m ysticis m ” in all of us that serve as
the ground and st imulus for cxtrapolat ing theeali ty of God. I t is the task of
philosophical extrapolation to winnow outhose features of mystical experi-
ence that offer the g reatest possibilities for
hum an
fife. This is, of course, a
never ending process
whose
conclusions will always bc tentative andn need
of further dcveloprnent and refinement. I t mcans a con tinu ing evaluation of
the fruits
of
our
o w n experiences as well
as
those of oth ers .While
we
cannot
avoid employing “some sort of
a
standard of theological probabil i tyof o u r
ow n whenever w e assume to estimate the fruits of other men’s religion, yet
this very stan dar d has
been
begot ten outof the dr i f t o f commonife” (
VRE,
265). Elsewhere, James noted that the “gold-dust” of religious experiences
must be extricated fro m the “ quartz-san d” (“superstitions and wild-grow-
ing over-beliefs o f
all
sorts”). Yet he cautions ag ainst trying to short-circuit
this process of extrication, for the historical results of such short-circuiting
are “thin inferior abstractions” suchas “the
hollow
unreal god o f scholastic
theology,
or
the unintelligible pantheistic mo nster” of Absolutc Idealism
( P U ,
142-43). Philosophy has the task of eliminating through comp arison
the “local an d accidental” eatures hat nevitablyaccompany all “spon -
taneous eligiousconstructions.”Historic ncrustationscan be removed
from both dog m a an d w orship; b y uti lizing “th e results
of
natural science,
philosophy can also eIiminate doctrines that are now known to be scien-
tifically absurd or
incongruous”;
and “sif ting ou t in this way unw orth y for-
mulations,
she
[ph iloso ph y] can leave
a
res iduum
of
conceptions that
a t
least
are possible. With these she can deal as hypotheses, testing them in all the
m ann ers, wh ethe r negative o r positive, by which hypotheses are ever test-
ed” (VRE, 359).
Now it must
be
m ad e clear that
in
calling for extricating, sifting out, and
refining our God-reflections, James is not suggesting-even
as
an ideal-
that w e should strive to formulate one definition of Go d to wh ich all hu-
mans o ug ht to subscribe. Now here is James’s plural ism m or e in evidence
than in his denial “that the lives
of
all men shou ld show identical religious
elements.” He insists:
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 164/323
The divine can
mean no single quality, i t must mean a group
of qualities,
b y
being champions of
which
in alternation, different men may al l
find
w o r t h y
missions.
Each
attitude being a syllable i n human nature’s total message, it
takes thewho le
of
us
to
spell
the
meaning
out
completely.
.
. .
We
must
frankly recog nize the fact‘that we live in partial systcms, and
that
the parts
are
not interchangeable in the spi ritua l life. ( V R E ,
384)R
T h e field mo del em ploye d hroug hou t this essay is , I believe, eminently
congenial to this pluralistic view of the divin e. It involves diverse and over-
lapping fields, thereby al lowing for various modes of mutual part icipation
n o one of which exhausts any f ield, wide or narrow. The divineife, under-
stood as the widest field, enriches and is enriched by the variety
of
fields
w ith w hic h it is related. Thus , the plurality of rel igions may not
be
a neces-
sary evil to be endu red until the on e true religion is formed; rather his
plurality may be the
necessary
and only means by which the richness
of
the
divine life can be l ived and comm unicated. Needless
to
say, this does
not
diminish the need for and importance
f
abolishing those features of partic-
ular religions that lead
to
destructive relations with those belonging o other
com m un ities. Th e po int be ing ad van ced , however, is that plurality in rc-
Iigion is n o m o re destructive in itself than is plurality in art, literature, o r
music.
9
A
variation onJamcs’s doc trine that the evidence for God is found in our
inner experience is that bclief in G od is a
response
to inner needs: o u r belief
in God
“is
not due to o u r logic , b ut to our em otional wants” (TC,k493). It
would seem that there arcat least five distinc t kind s
of
needs-logical, mor-
al,esthetic,practical,
and
religiou s. Ideally, perh aps,
a
fully
realized per-
sonal life should incorporate all of these, b ut on e that does so is
a
very rare
phenomenon;
the
m or e usual s ituation is that there is
a
decided difference, at
least as to which is primary, in needs
among
individuals.
In
his essay “ 1 s Life
Worth Liv ing? ”
James argues that science is a response to a need every bit as
much
as
m ora lity or religion is. W ithout claiming to know the ul t imate
origin
of
such needs, James neve rtheless insists that there is hardly a scien-
tific law or fact “which was not first sought a f ter
. .
to gratify an inner
need.” He goes o n to say, “The inner need of believing that this w orl d of
nature is
a
sign of something more spi r i tual and eternal thantself is ju st as
strong and authoritat ive in those w h o feel i t , as the inner
need
of
uniform
laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head” ( W B ,
SI).
While James never
claims
that the need
for
God is sufficient to establish
God’s existence, he does maintain that such
a
need
a t
least suggests the pos-
sibility of such
a
reality, for
“if needs
of ou rs ou trun the visible universe,
w hy may not that
b e
a sign that an invisible universe is there?” (WB, 51).
Further, James con ten ds
that
the
only
determinat ion we can make concern-
ing the nature of G od depends upon the k indof beings we are. In an early
essay,
“Reflex Action and T heism ,” James
argues
for
a
correlation between
God and the
human
mind. He first notes
that
many wri ters
were
currently
arguing that the doctrine of reflex action h ad given “the coup de gr ice to the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 165/323
138
superstition of
a
God,”
while in
an earlier t im e “reflex action and all other
harmonies between the organism and the wo rld we re held to
prove God.”
Sidestepping the ssue o f proof o r disproof, James limits himself to
showing
that a God, whcthcr ex is ten t o r not, is at a l l events the kind of being
which , i f he did exist, would form
the
rrrosf
adeqrrm possible
ubject for
minds
framcd l ike our own to conceive as lying
a t
the
root of
the universe. M y
thesis . .
.
is this: that some outward rea l i ty of
a
naturc defined as
God’s
nature
mus t
be defined, is the
only
ult imate object that is at
the
sam e time rationa1
and possible for the h u m a n mind’s contemplat ion. Atlyflriq shor t qfGod is
rlot
rutionnl,
n r t y t h i r z g m o v e thotz
God
i s riot
y o s s i b l ~ , f t h e h u m a nmind be in t ru th the
t r iadic structure of
impression,
reflection, and rcac t ion w hich we t rhe outse t
allowed. (
W B ,
93)
Th oug h James in
his
later w ritin gs refines his
view of
the human mind , he
continues to the en d to peak of
God
only in terms of hu m an needs .
In
Th e
hrietier
ofReligiocfs
Expeuierrce, he states: “T he
gods
we stand
by
are thegods
we
need and can use,
the
gods whose demands o n s are reinforcements of
our dem ands on ourselves
and
o n
one another” ( V R E , 266). Further, as we
change, so will our concept ions of God, for “w hen we ceasc
to
admire or
approve w hat the definition
of
a
deity implies,
we
end by deeming that dei ty
incredible” ( V R E , 264-65).
In
a
later section I
will
develop more fully this point of the relation be-
tween
h u m a n
change and chang e in conceptions of G od , and perhaps in
God
himself. For the
moment,
let me say
a
word abo ut an
obvious
objec-
tion to James’s ty ing our h i t h in G od to o u r concrete necds: is
he
not , one
might ask, simply reflecting the historicalandculturalconditions of th e
Victorian age in wh ich he lived? While
a
description of the psychological
needs ofJames and
his
brother and sis ter Victorians would more often than
not involve
a
need for some kind of reality beyond the ordinary, how can we
bc su re that at a later
time
such needs
will
not be nonexistent?
The first part
of
the response to the objection, of course, is that ncither
James no r any on e else can “be su rc” that these necds will always be present.
But if a s i tuat ion should emergeas it already hasemerged for ome) in wh ich
such needs gene rally are tlot prcscn t , then there would no longer bc even a
question
of
the existence
or
nonexistence of God. This ,however, would only
confirmjames’s view that faith in
od
is
inscparably
bound
up
with
concrete,
specific human needs.
T h e
abstract possibility of the disappearance of such
needs wo uld not be, forJam es, theecisive issue. While on ced ing, ofc ou rse,
that
all
conceptions, including those ofscience, areistorically and culturaliy
conditioned, James does
not
accept that this entails
a
passive skepticism or a
dcstructiverelativism. T he re are good gro un ds, tho ug h ncver absolutely
certain ones, for b d i e v i r z . that certain features
of
thc
human
cond ition will
continue to cxist
in
somc form as long as hu m an s exist. James would contend
that the history
of
religions
indicates som ethin g
of
those
features, however
vaguely and inadequately. Further, he believes, an d can supply “justifying
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 166/323
reasons”
fo r his belief, that religious
needs
and theefforts to satisfy the m have
profoundlyenriched anddeepenedhuman life. It is possible that these
needs an d efforts will disappear in the fu tur e, b ut
if
they do-James w ou ld
con fiden tly hold-the result
will
,be
a
radical ly diminished human si tuat ion.
I t might be argued, analogously, that we cannote absolutely certain that in
future world the long-standing, o far universaI, and pcrvasivc need for art in
its various forms wdl not also disappear. Is i t possible for anyone to posi-
tively conceive of s uch
a
w or ld
as
ot he r th an radically imp overishe d?
Whatever di&culties attach
to religious c laims, James is insistent
u p o n
the
im po rtan t difikrence they ntroduc e nto heworld.The difference, o f
course, is m os t significant in
thc
modes
of
l iving to w hic h they give rise
wh ich, w erc they fundanlcntal ly the same
as
thosc brought for th
by
natu-
ralism, would be rendered worthless.
The whole de femc of religious faith hinges upon action.I f
the
action required
or inspired by the religious hypothesis is in n o way differcnt fromchat dictated
by the naturalistic hypothesis, thcn religious faith is a pure sup erfluity, better
pruned away, and cohtro vetsy abou t its legitimacy is a piece of idle trifling,
unwor thy of serious minds. 1 myself believe, of course, that the religious hy-
pothesis
gives to
the
wo rld an expression which
specifically
determines our
reactions, and
makes them
in a large part unlike what
they
m a y be
on a
purely
naturalistic
scheme
of belief. (
W B ,
32n.) 13
Commit ted asJames was t o m oder nscience and Da rwin ism , he nevertheless
was unsympathetic to the antireligious conclusions that m anywerc drawing
from them. Hc saw the hum an comm uni ty , if dcvoid of religion, as
faced
wi th a dcencrgizing anxiety border ing on despair, whichcould be con-
fronted
a t best
only wi th a kind of
stoic
rcsignation:
For naturalism, fed on recent cosmological speculations, mankind
is
in a posi-
tion similar
to
that
of
a set o f peoplc l iving on a frozen lake, surrounded by
cliffs over
which
there is no escape,
yet
know ing that l i t t lc
by
littlc the ice
is
melting, and hc nevitablc day drawing near
when
the
last
film of
it will
disappear,and
to
be drowned gnom in ious ly will
be
thehumancreature’s
portion. The merrier the skat ing, the warm er
and
more sparkf ing
the sun
by
day, and the uddicr he bonfires a t night , the
more
poignant hesadness
which one m ust take in t he mean ing of the tota l si tuat ion.
( V R E ,
120)’3
Religious experiences m ust ultim ately bc judged
on
the basis
of
“that
ele-
ment or quality in them which we an meet nowhereelse”
(VRE,
44). I f the
universal rncssage
of
rcligion were
to be
cxpresscd n
a
singlephrase t
would be: “All
is
not vanity in this Universe, whatever thc appearances rnay
suggest” ( V R E , 38-39). The empiricist rnay wellsneer
a t
this
“ as
being
empty through its universality.” We may bc
unable
to meet the empiricist’s
dema nd that wc “cash it by its concretc
filling
. .
.
for nothin g can well be
harder .”Jamcs
goes
o n to ay, howcver, that
“as
a
practical fact
its
meaning
is
so
distinct that when
uscd
as
a
prem iss in
a life, a
w ho lc charactcr may be
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 167/323
140 P e r s o d Immortal i ty: Possibility attd Credibility
impar ted to
the life
by it . I t, l ike
so
m an y universal concepts, is a t ruth of
orientation, serving not to define
an
end, but to detcrrninc a direct ion”
(TC,
I t
wouId be
a
grave misunderstanding
of
James’s position to view it as
restricting the implications
of
religion to human experience with no conse-
quences for the large r w orld. W he n th e w orld s interpreted religiously, it is
not the “materialistic world over again, with an altered expression”; it must
be
a differently constituted
world
such that “different events can
be
expected
in i t , different con duct mu st be required ”
C’RE, 408).
Hence, James consid-
ers the view of A bs o lu te idealism- “refined supernaturalism”-incredible
because it claims that the cxistence of G od in no way alters the com plexion
of any
of
the conc rete particulars o f experience
(VRE,
41
I).
A
G o d w h o
wo uld m ak e no difference in such experiences or wh o wo uld m ak e a dif-
ference
only
at the end of the
world
would be meaningless and
merely
ver-
bal. Insofar, how ever, as o u r conceptions of God “d o involve such definite
experiences, G o d means something for us, and may
be
real” ( C E R , 425).
When asked where the differences due to God’s existence are in fact
to be
fou nd , James confesses that he has “no hypothesis to offer beyond what the
phenomenon of ‘prayerful communion’ . . . immediately suggests.’’ H er e
he
refers again
to
that
“wider
world
of
being”
and the subliminal
self
that
were discussed
in
the last chapter.
God
can be viewed as the sym bo l for
those “transm und ane energies” that seem to pr od uc e im m ed iate effects in
the natural world with which our experience is cont inuous (VRE,411-12).
James notes that petitional prayer is only o n e m o d e of prayer and a narrow
one at that. Prayer in the
“wider
sense as meaning every kind
of
inward
c o m m u n i o n
or
conversat ion with the power recognized as divine” remains
untouc hed by scientific criticism and “is the very soul and essence of re-
l igion.”James concedes that i f nothings transacted th rou gh su ch prayer, “if
the wor ld is in no wh i tdifferent for its having
taken
place,”
then
religion is
the delusion that “m aterialists and atheists have always said it was” (VRE,
Religion, then, stands
or
falls “by
the
persuasion that effects of some sor t
genuinely do occ ur” ( V R E , 367). According to
James,
the instinctive
belief
of m an kin d is that “G od is real since
he
produces real effects.” Hence, “we
and
God
have business
with
each o ther ; and in op enin g ourselves
to
his
influence ou r d eepest destiny is fulfilled.
T h e
universe, at those
parts of
it
which our persona l being constitutes, takes
a
tu rn for the worse or
for
the
better in propor t ion
as
each of
u s
fulfills or evades God’s demands” (VRE,
406-7).
Inasmuch as it pro du ccs rcal effects, James feels that we are not
phiIosophically justificd in desig nating
the
“unseen or mystical world un-
real.” C om m un io n w ith this world results
in
work being done upon
our
finite personalities that tu rn s
us
into n ew hu m an beings, and consequences
in the way of conduct ensue in the “natural world upon our regencrative
change”
( V R E , ,
406).
1~503;
lso
TC,
II:448).
365-67).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 168/323
Faith in
God,
therefore, cann ot be rcstricted to a claim about and effects
upon the individual believer
or
even upon human exper ience. Only when
faith says som ethin g abo ut rcality, such as “God’s cxistcnce is the guarantee
of
an
ideal order thatshallbe permanentlyprcserved,”does ai th“gct
wh olly free from the first imm ediate subjective cxpcricnce, and bring
a veal
hypothesis int o play.” James conten ds that a go od scientific hypothesis, in
order to bc sufficiently prolific, m ust in clud e p rop crties othe r “th an thos e o f
the ph eno m eno n it is immediately nvoked to explain.”
For
thisreason,
“God, meaningonlywhaten ters nto he religious man’s expcrience of
union, falls sh or t of being an hypothesis of this m or e useful order.
He
nceds
to enter into w ider cosmicrelations in order
to justify the ubject’s absolute
confidence and peace”
(
V R E ,
407).
Before a t tempting to spell ou t a bit m or e fully the charactcristics of a
Jamesian God, I would like to touch briefly upon
a
com plex and sensitive
issue: the qu estion of wh ethcr rel igion supplies som ething mo re than mo-
rality. T h e radical q uestion of l ife, forJa m es, is “wh ethe r this be
at
b o t t o m
a
moral or an unmora1 univcrse” W B , 84).James, of course, opts or its being
a moral univcrse, and its being so does m t depend on there being a God:
Whether
a
God
exist,
o r
whether
no
God
exist
.
.
.
we
fo rm
at any rate
a n
ethical republic. . . . And the
first
reflection wh ich this
leads
to is tha t ethics
have
as
genuineand
real
a foothold in a universewhere the highest con-
sciousness is
h u m a n , as
in
a
universe where there is a God a s well. “The
religion
of
hum anity” affords a basis
for
ethics as
well as
theism does.
( W B ,
150)
Yet tho ug h faith in Go d does not constitute thedifference between morality
and no morality, tdoes make a differencebetweenmoralities.
A
solcly
humanist icmorali ty
does
not have thepotential orenergizinghuman
beings to their
fullest:
‘41n merely human world withouta God, the appeal
to our moral energy falls short of its ma xim al stimu lating power’’
( W B ,
160). According toJames, it
is
thc diffcrence betwecn the casygoing and thc
s t renuous
mood
that m ake s th e dee pest practical diEerence in the mo ral life
of humans
(
W B , 159). Unfortunately, he wea kens his case by implying that
the s trcnuous mood is foun d only
among
religious believers, leaving him-
self open to the objection “that neither Jame s nor anyb ody clse has ever
oEered em pirical evidence for the assertion that unbelievcrs
lead
less active
or stre nu ou s lives than believers.”16 Jam es a dm its tha t “th e capacity for
the
strenuous m ood probably lies s lum bering in every man,’’ but he goes o n to
suggest that withoutbelief in God this capacity will remain unfulfilled WB,
160-61). In m y
opinion,
his
case wo uld have been stronger had he ma de a
weakcr claim: that is, that thc ov erw helm ing nu m ber of those who have
manifested and are manifesting thc strc nu ou s
mood
are encrgized by a re-
ligious belief involving either God or
a
God-surrogate such as art, science,
or
posterity. M o re speculatively, and
as
an expression o f faith, he could then
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 169/323
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 170/323
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 171/323
emerging out of the e ternal wor ld processes . Whilehis view has attracted
a
few sophisticated philosophers, for ob vi ou s easons it has not been attractive
to those with explicit religious concerns. The third generalview, also great-
ly
influenced
by
evolutionary theories and mod ern and contemporary sci-
ence, extrapolates a G od as coeternal but not identical with a plurality of
processes that are in part con stituted by a nd constitute the divine. Since the
relation betw een Go d and these w or ld processes is ever chan gin g, G od also
is ever chan ging. The divine chan ge, owever, does not exclude such eternal
aims as love, harmony, and unity. These aims, it is imp or tant to note , can-
not be
realized b y G o d alone but depe nd in part for their realization
upon
the cooperative endeavor of a t least some of the processes coexisting with
God.
The most systematical ly developed mode
of
this th ird general view is
found in those process theologies hose do m ina nt influence is AlfredN o r t h
W hitehead. I t should be evident , and I hope wil l become more
s o ,
that a
Jamesian p hilosoph y of G o d is also a variant of this view.
I t is in his P l r m l i s t i c Utliverse that the me taphy sical groun d for James’s
version of G od is most explici tly developed, Thiswork w a s originally deliv-
ered as a series of lectures a t Manchester College, O xf or d, in 1907. While
the principal target of the lectures was the philosophical absolutism that
do m inate d late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy, R ichard
Bernstein quite correct ly n otes that James gives us “n oth ing less than a cri-
tique of Western philosop hic thoug ht” ( P U , xxiv) . Some of the more specif-
ic and semitechnical cr i ticisms are som ewhat dated, inasmuchs the “Abso-
lute” is n o lon ge r at the center of the philosophical stage; nevertheless, a
brief review of James’s arguments is useful
for
m y purposes because they
orient us in relation to th e crucial elem ents that mu st be incorporated into
the Jamesian ph iloso ph y of God, e leme nts that I hold indispensab le for
a
viable belief in personal immortality.
A s a recent insightful commentator has noted, “Int imacy
was
the princi-
ple of ord er in James’s hierarchy of universes from 1904
on?’
N ow her e
is
the impor tance
and
centrality of “int imacy”
more
evident than in A
Pltr-
valistic Universe. Jame s irstdistinguishesmaterialistic from spiritualistic
philosop hies, giving short shrift to the forme r because it defines the wo rld
in such
a
way as
to
leave the hu m an “as
a
sor t of ou tside passenger o r alien”
( P U ,
16).
He then ifferentiates two species
of
spiritualism-duaiistic
theism an d mon istic pantheism. While not de nying
ail
intimacy
to
dualistic
theism, James m aintains that a
“higher
reach of intimacy” is suggested by
pantheistic idealism insofar
as
it
makes
“us entitatively one with God” ( P U ,
16).
He
faults dualistic theism bec ause,
picturing
God
and his creation as entities distinct from each other, [it] still
leaves the human subject outside of the deepest
reality in
the universe. God is
from
eternity complete,
it says,
and suficient
unto hirnsclc he throws off
the
world by a
free act
and
as an
extraneous substance, and he throws
off
man as a
third substance, extraneous to both the
world
and
himself.
( P U ,
16-17)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 172/323
j m e s : Se f
u r d
G o d
145
Such a viewrenders
us
foreigners-outsiders, as it were-in relation to
God. W hat James finds lacking
hcre
is thc “strictly social relation ” of reci-
procity, since while
God’s
action can affect us, “he can never be affected by
ou r reaction”
( P U ,
17).
T h e “theological machinery” of ou r ancestors
is
no
longer serviceable fo r a hum an imagination formed by “the
vaster
vistas
which scientific evolutionism has opened
and
the rising tide of social de m o-
cratic ideals.” T h e “older mo narchica l theism” has been rendered obsolete;
“the place of the divine in the world must be mo re organ ic and int imate”
(PU, 18).
As
always for James, any speculative claim m us t be evaluatcd in term s o f
itsconsequencesforconcrete iving. Th us heprag m atic “difference be-
tween
living against abackground
of
foreignness and one
of
intimacy means
the difference between a general habit of wariness and one of trust.” James
suggests
that his is really a social difference, “fo r after all, th e c o m m o n
socius
of
us
all is
the
great universe whose children
we
are.” I f we are mate-
rialistic, “we must be suspicious of this socius, cautious, tense,
on
guard. If
spiritualistic, we ma y give way, embrace, and keep n o ultimate fear” PU,
19). Insofar, then,
a s
the. spiritua listic interpreta tions of reality give our life
and actions a de pth an d richness absent in materialism, he o pts fo r the for-
mer.
B y the sam e tok en , he rejects dualistic theism in favor
of
the
“pan-
theistic field
of
vision, the vision of God as the indw elling divine ather than
the external creator, and f hu m an life as part and parcel o f that deep reality”
( P U , 19).
James is convinced that
only
“some kind
of
an immanent
or
pantheistic
dei ty working n things rather thanabove them” is congenial
to
our con t em -
porary imagination (P ,
39).
But that
is not
the full story, for the brand o f
pantheism current at the t ime
was
mo nistic or absolutistic panth eism, fea-
tures
of
which clashed at least
as
stron gly with specific needs and James’s
metaphysical principles as d id dualistic theism. “As sc{ch, the absolute nei-
ther acts nor suffers, nor loves, nor hates; i t has no needs, dcsires or aspira-
tions, n o failures
or
successes, friends o r enemies, victories or dcfeats” ( P U ,
27).
Qu ite obvious ly, an Absolute o r a God so devoid of all the charac-
teristics that James discovers in life and experience could on ly
be
viewed
by him as the acme of irrelevance. W hile the “A bso lute Mind” as the substi-
tute
for God
is allegedly
the
“rational presupp osition of all particulars of
fact
.
. .
i t rema ins supreme ly indifferent
to
wh at the particular facts in
our
world actually are.”James compares the Absolute
o
the “sick lion in Esop’s
fable, all foot pri nts lead in to his den, but
rzulln
vestigia M ~ Y O Y S U ~ ~ I . ”T h e Abso-
lute then maintains no conn ection w ith the concreteness of life, and while
we are assured that all is eternal ly wel l wi th him, e leaves us to bc saved by
our own temporal devices (P , 40).
It is significant, I belicve, that while James in his later works is criticaI of
the Absolutc for
doing noth ing to aid our salvation, in an early essay, “Re-
flex A ction and Theism”
1881),
he w as critical
of
the Calvinis t ic G od for
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 173/323
doing everything: “A G o d
who
gives so little scope to love,
a
predestination
which takes from endeavor
all
its zest w ith all its fruit, are irrational concep-
tions, because they say to o u r m o s t cherished powers,
There
is
no object for
you”
( W B ,
100).
Yet there
is
n o inconsistency betwe en these texts, nor is
there any essential shift in James’s doctrine. Early and late
he
affirmed
a
religious need for a pow er greater than the natural: “M an is too hclpless
against the c osm ic forces, unless ther e be a wider Ally” (TC, I:383). Sirni-
lady,
at
all stages of his tho ug ht he resisted any view that deprived indi-
vidual
h u m a n
action of significance and enicacy. I t is clear, there fore, that
the
only God consistent withJanm’s long-standing concerns is on e who is
available to hum ans in their struggles bu t
who also
depends
upon
h u m a n
initiative and creativity in order
to
reaiize the divine aims.
Thos e same long-stand ing concern s ledJam es to reject absolutistic mon-
ism in
favor of
pluralism.
A
decade before writ ing A Plnrcllistic
Ul l iue rse ,
he
suggested that “th e diEerencc between monism and pluralism is perhaps the
most pregnant
of all
the di f fere xe s in phi losophy”
(tt’B,
). He nce it is not
surprising to find hi m m aintaining in the later w or k that
pluralism, in exorcizing the absolute, exorcizes
thegreat
de-realizer of
t he
only
life
we are at home in,
and
thus redeems the nature of reality
f rom
essen-
tial foreignness. Every end, reason, motive, object of
desire
or aversion,
ground
of orrow or j oy
that we feel is in the
world
of
finite multifariousness
for
only in
that
world
does
anything really
happen,
only there
do
events
come
to
pass.
( P U , 28)19
W hile affirming a pluralistic
mode
of pantheism, therefore, James rejects
that abso lutistic
brand which,
“reared
upon
pure logic,” spurns the dus t of
concrete life.
A s he
states in an oft-cited text: “ T h e prince of darkness may
be
a
gent leman,
as
we are told he
is,
but whatever the God
of
ear th and
heaven is, he can surely be no gen t lem an .
His
menial services are needed in
the dust of our human trials, even m o re than his dignity
is
needed
in
the
empyrean”
(P,
39-40).
Absolutistic pantheism is rep ug nan t to James, therefore, because it triv-
ializes
the
cha ng e, strugg le, and pain that characterize our daily living, ren-
dering them surface appearancesof the eternally unchanging ground
f
real-
ity.
In
notes for his
1903-1
904 seminar, “A Pluralistic Description o f th e
Wor ld ,”James commented , “Thecsscnce
of
m y s ys t em
s
that there is really
gr ow th.” We added that for him “ the wor ldexists only once, in one edition,
and then ju st as i t
seems.”
For the philosophies in vogue at the time, o n the
other hand, there was a comp leted eternal edit iondevoid of growth and “an
inferior, side-show, tem po ral ed itio n, in wh ich thing s seem illusorily to be
achieving andgrowing nto hatperfectionwhich really preexists. . . .
Transcendentalism has two ed i t ionsof the universe-the Ab solute being the
edition
de h e ’ ’
(TC, II:384).
in ma intaining that there is
o n l y o n e
universe, how ever, James
is
not af-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 174/323
James: Sei fnr ld
G o d 147
f i rming a naturalistic cductionisrn. H e is persuadedbymysticalphe-
nomena and religious cxp erience “that ou r no rm al cxperiencc is only
a
frac-
tion”
of
experience (TC,
II:384). Phcnomcna such
as “new ranges
of
life
succeeding
on
our
most despair ing mom ents” would never
havc
becn
in-
ferred by
reason,
since “thcy are discontinuo us with the ‘natural’ cxperi-
ences they succeed upo n and invert their values.” Cr eatio n wid ens to the
view of those undergoing rel igious experience, leading to the suggest ion
that “ou r natu ral experience,
our
strictly mo ralistic and pru dential expe ri-
ence , nuy be only a frag m en t of real hum an expcricnce” ( P U , 138). This
indispensability and irreplaceability of religious expericnces, and thc inade-
quacy of “rea son ,” has been previou sly otcd and cannot
be
over-
emphasized.
In
his
1906
address to the Unitarian
Club
of
San
Francisco,
James points ou t the am biguity
of
“facts”: wh ile there are both mo ral and
physical facts suppo rting he righteousn ess, order, and beauty of reality,
there
arc also
“contrary facts in abundance ,” and the “rat ional” conclusion
reached will depend on wh ich facts havc been singled ou t. Indeed, if the
decision is left to “re aso n” alone, James is
of
the op inion that it would be
bad news for religion:
I f
your
reason
tries
to
be impartial,
if
she
resorts
to
statistical
comparison
and
asks which class of facts tip
the
balance,
and
which
way
tends the drift , she
must, i t seems to me, conclude for irreligion, rrrdess
you
g i ve her so111e more
spec$c religious experiences t o go by, for the Iast word everywh ere, according to
naturalistic
science,
is the word
of
Death, the death sentence passed by Natu re
on
plant and beast, and man and tribe, and earth and s u n
and
everything that
she has rnade.20
Returning
to
the quest ion of m on ism versus plural ism, i t must f irst
be
noted that James
ejects
bo th
in
their absolute
modes.
T h e
wo rld is both
one
and many-“one ju st so far as its parts hang togethcr by any definite con-
nexion” and “many jus t
so
far as any defini te connexion fails to ob tain ” (E‘,
76). T h e plural ism James affirms, therefore, rejects both a world that is
al-
ready comp letely o r essentially unified and one that is totaily chaotic.
Plu-
ralism
has
n o need of that dog ma tic rigoristic temp er displayed by those
who maintain that “absolute unity
brooks no
degrees.” All James’s plu-
ralism asks is that one grant
‘‘some
separat ion am on g thin gs, som e free play
of
parts,
some
real novelty
or
chance, however m inu te.”
Given
this,
“she
is
amply satisfied and willallowyou anyamount, howevergreat, o f real
union” (P ,
78).
Radical empiricism and pluralism, according o James, s tand
for
the legit-
imacy o f
s o w .
James
here touch es upon “the great question
as
to whether
‘external’ relations can
cxist”
( P U , 40-41). The d o m i n m t view of the abso-
lutism he
is
criticizing is that they could no t . The doc t r i ne of internal rela-
tions ho ldin g that everything is esserzfiaIIy included in and essentially related
to everything else, leading inevitably
to
the
Absolute
as
the
on ly
truly real
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 175/323
being, is the do ctrine Jam cs challenges.
T h e
technical aspccts
of
this contro -
versy necd no t concern us; for m y purposes , the impor tanceof this question
is that in affirming external relations,ames
is
allowing for a plurality of real
beings and excluding
a n y
all-inclusivc being. This in no way compromises
James’s
me taphysical relationalism, since all realities a re relational bu t are
not related to a l l oth er realities with the sam e deg ree of immediacy and
intimacy. W hat is pos ited is
a
“strung-along” rather than an “all-at-once”
universe. It is
James’s
co nte nti on that “radical empiricism
.
. . holding
to
the each-form and m ak ing of God only oneof the eaches, affords the higher
degree of in t imacy” ( P U , 26).
This view, howcver, has an impor tant and controversial mplication: t
limits
the reality
of
God.
“If
there be
a
God,
he
is
no
ab so lu te all-experiencer,
but s imply the experiencer of widest actual conscious sp an ” A d T , 72)”
This br ings us, of course, to
Jarncs’s
doctr ine of G o d
as
finite.
GOD
AS
FINITE
Whilelames is wil l ing to jet t ison the Absolute, he
s
not wil l ing to dispense
with
God
or a higher co nsciousness.
But if we drop the absolute out
of
the
world,
must
we
then conclude that
the
worId contains nothing better in the way of consciousness than o u r own
con-
sciousness? Is our whole instinctive belief in
higher
presences,
our
persistent
inner turning towards divine companionship
o
count for nothing? Is
i t
but the
pathetic illusion of beings with ncorrigiblysocial and imaginativeminds?
put63)
James contends that even if i t should prove probable that the Absolute does
no t exist, i t will no t in any ay follow “that G o d like that of D av id, Isaiah,
orJe sus may not exis t”
( P U ,
54).
He
f inds n o logical imp edim ent
to
believ-
ing in “superhum an beings w i thout ident ifying them w ith the absolute .”
The
only thing that the God
of
the
Old
and of the N ew Testament has in
com m on w i th t he A bs o lu t e is “tha t they are
a l l
three greater than m an”
In the previous section, I tou che d up on James’s affirmation
of
the reality
of “external relations.” Put very simply, this do ctrine m aintains that no t all
real relations are included in the ssence of a being. For example,
to
say that
the
“book
is
OH
the table’’ doe s not seem to imp ly
hat
the
book
is imp licated
or involved in the inner s tructure of theable OY vice
uersa.
For the absolutist
this appearance of the externality of relations would result in
a
chaotic world
of unconnected or unrelated and unrelatable realities. Hence, there
must
be
an all-inclusive mind in which all appearances of externality are overcome,
and this alone guarantees the ration ality of reality. Jam es, of course, never
claims to be able to disprove the reality of the Absolute but he
oes
find the
arguments in favor of i t unconvincing and,
more
impor tant , the not ion of
an Absolute as seriously und ermin ing
the
reality and authenticity
of
experi-
( P U ,
63-64).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 176/323
ence. H e f inds both absolutism and plural ism o
be
hypotheses and the latter
to be the more plausible one: “W ha t pluralists say is that
a
universe really
connected loosely, after the pattern of our daily experience, is possiblc, and
that for certain reasons it is the hyp othe sis
to
be preferred”
( P U ,
39).
Ther e
is no
ground
for even suspecting the existence
of
a reality oth er than “that
distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality wh ich we finite
beings swim in” ( P U ,97). Since the “abso lute is not forced o n o u r belief
by
logic,” its rival, the “strung-alon g un finished w orld in time,”
m ay
exist ju st
as it se em s, n ot in the sha pe of an all but rather as
a
set of eaches
( P U ,
62).
The crucial implication o f a11 this, o f course, is that any God consistent
with m etaphy sical pluralism m ust be finite. W hereas absolutism maintains
that God is fully divine only in the
orm
of
totality, pluralism is “willing
to
believe that there rnay ultimately never be an all-form a t all, that the sub -
stance o f reality m ay never get totally collected, that so m e o f t m ay rema in
outside of the largest com bination of i t ever m ade”
(PV,
0). Thus w h i l ewe
are, for Jam es, “internal parts of God and no t external creations,” God is
himself a “part” rather than the Absolute when conceived pluralistically.
T h e divine functions, then, can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to ur own
functions. All realities, inc lud ing the divin e reality, have an en vir on m en t.
Since this me ans that
God
is in t ime and wo rking out a his tory just as
we
are,
“he
escapes from the foreignn ess from all that is hu m an , of the static
timeless perfect absolute”
( P U ,
143-44). Pluralism, pragm atically interpre-
ted, simply me ans that everyth ing, however vast o r inclusive, has some sor t
of genuinely “external” environment. While things are “with” one another
in man y ways, th ere is no reality hat ncludes or do m ina tes ev eryth ing .
Hence,
“ever
not
quite” has
to
be
said
of
the
best
attempts anywhere
n
the universeat
attaining all-inclusiveness. The pluralisticworld is thus more like
a federal
republic than Iike an
empire
or kingdom. However
much
rnay be collected,
however much may report itself as present at any effective centre of con-
sciousness o r action, something else is self-governed and absent and
unre-
duced to unity. ( P U , 145)2*
James contends that it is precisely th e claim that the abs olute has abso-
lutely nothing
outside
of itself that gives rise to those irrationalities and
puzzles from wh ich the finite
God
remains free. H e
goes
o n to say that
the
finite God “may conceivably have alrnost no thin g ou tside of himself .”
He
may indeed have already triumphed
over
and absorbed
“all
but the minutes t
fraction of the universe,” but however small that fraction outside him, it
reduces Go d to a “relative being, and in principle the universe s
saved
from
all the irrationalities incidental to ab so lut ism ”
( P U ,
61).
T h u s ,
whether in
theology o r philosophy, the line of Ieast resistance is to afirrn “that there is a
God,
bu t that he is
finite,
either
in
power or know ledge , o r n bo th at once”
( P U ,
141).
Such
a
God,
according to
James,
is quite com patible with
re-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 177/323
150 Persorlnl Zrnrllortality:
Possibility
n ~ ~ dredibility
l igious experience, w hich c an no t “be cited as uneq uivoca lly supporting the
infinitist belief,” T h e o n lyuncq uivoc al testimony o f religious experience “is
that
wc
experience un ion w ith something larger than ourselves and i n that
union
find
o u r
grcatest
peace.”
James
insists that the practical necds
of
re-
ligious e xperienc e are adequ ately met by this elicf in
a
power a t once larger
than and con tinuous with i t (VRE,
413).
We arc incurably and inseparably
rooted in
the temp oral and f inite point of view
( P U , 23).
Exh ortat ions such
as those
of
Em er s on to “lift mine eye up ” to he s tyle of thc A bsolute which
is the on e tru e way are fruitless. “I am,” James tells us, “finitc once
for
all,
and all the categories
of
m y sym pathy are kn i t up w i th the f inite w or ld ds
such, and with things that have a his tory” ( P U , 27).
Again we see
how
James is concerned
to
safeguard the reality and signifi-
cance of concrete human exper ience. Thingswould
be
different if w e
were
merely
readers
of the cosm ic novel , “b ut we are not the rcaders
but
the vcry
personages
of
the wor ld-drama”
( P U , 27).
And it is becauseJames
also
be-
lieves that God is one , thou gh not the only one, o f the personagcs in this
drama that heefuses to excuse hi m fro m he limitations and the obstacles that
confront
a l l
the part icipants . An omniscient and omnipotent Godwould,
of
course, escape all this, but the existence of such a
God
wo uld imp ly that the
battles that
seem
so
real and imp or tant to
s
are b u t
surface events in relation
to
the “rea lly eal.” O n the contrary,Jarnes tells us, “th e facts ofstruggle seem
too deeply characteristic of the wholc frame of things for me not to suspect
that hindrance and experiment go all the way through” (TC, II:379). Elsc-
where, he a sserts:
God himsclf, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being
from o u r fidelity.
For
my
own
part, I d o not know what the sweat and blood
and tragedy
of
this
life
mean,
if
they mean anything hort
of
this.
I f
this life
be
not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by
SUCCCSS, it is no better than a game of private theatricals
from
which one may
withdraw
at
will.
B ut
i t j e l s like a real fight-as
if
there were somethingreally
wild in the universe which we, with
all our
idealities and faithfulnesses, are
needed to redeem. (WB,
55)
It is evident , then, that only a finite
God
can help us a n d be in real need of
our help. He
must be
sufficiently powerful to be able to help us and be
worthy
of
our t rus t and conf idence, but
e
cannot
be
so
powerful
as
to
find
our effortsunnecessary, the reb y trivializing the mand obbing hem of
meaning and ~ igni f icance . ’~ Someth ing ofhis is captured by Perry: “ T h u s
pluralism means a finite God, who evokes
a
passionate allegiance because he
is in some measure hampered by circumstances, and dependent on theid
of
others; or because, the evil of the world being external to him, he may be
loved without reserve” (TC,1I:211-12).
Fr om James’s perspec tive, one
of
the key fruits of the notion of God as
f inite or having an environmen t o ther than himselfs
that
it avoids the clas-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 178/323
Jattres: Selfartd
God
151
sicaI
paradox of
how there can be evil in
a
world creatcd by an infinitely
good and all-powerful G od . In the final analysis, perhaps, evil is a mystery
to be lived with rathe r than a problem to be solved, wh ether on James’s
terms
or
those
of
an yo nc else. Still, w e are no t en titled to
use
thc mys tery of
evil as an excuse fo r no t reflecting upo n it and attemp ting, a t
least, to re-
move the m or e
egregious
contradictions. T h e resolutions of both absolute
idealism and classical theism are unacceptable
to
Jam es, the forme r because
it denies the reality o f evil, and the latter bccause it involves
a
dualism rife
wi th the difficulties tha t we havc been detai l ing. Whatever the shortcomings
OfJames’s app roac h to evil, one th in g s clear-evil is real and is incapable of
being
overcome simply by being subsumed wi thin a higher min d. In his
h i e t i e s
ofRaligiorrs
Experience,
James
faults the attitude
of
“healthy-minded-
ness” because it fails to reco gniz e th e evil facts that m ak e
up
a gen uine por-
tion of reality
( V R E ,
134). Elsewhcrc he states: “W hatever Indian m ystics
may say about overcoming the bonds of good and evil, for
us
there is n o
higher synthesis in which the contradict ionmerges.” He
goes o n
to say that
we
should
“adm it that, whilst
some
parts are go od , oth ers are bad, and
being bad
ought
not
to
have been . .
.
possibly might not have been” (TC,
1x538).
Th is last raises,
of
course, the thorny metaphysical issue
of
the or igin of
evil and sugge sts a kindof
Manichaean account whereby evil originates out-
side God. W hile James does l i t tle more than hint a t such an accou nt, it is
consistent with his pluralism. Evil wo uld not eed to be essential if we scrap
the monistic view and “allow the world
to
havc existed from its or igin in a
pluralistic
form,
as an aggregate o r collection
of
higher and lower things and
principles.” Fro m suc h
a
perspective, evil “might
be
and ma y always have
been, an indep end ent port ion that had
no
rational or absolute
right
to live
with the rest, and wh ich we migh t onceivably ho pe
to
see go t rid
of a t
last”
(
V R E ,
1
13).24
am es conten ds chat popular
or
practical theism has not been
upset w ith a “universe
composed
of ma ny original principles”; i t has only
insisted that God
be
the supremeprinciple-in which case “God is n ot nec-
essarily responsible for the existence
of
evil; he would only
be
responsible if
it
were
not finally overcome” ( V R E , 112).
In the final analysis it is evil as a practical, n ot a speculative,
problem
that
concerns pluralistic metaphysics. “Not whyevil sh ou ld exist
at
all , but how
we
can lessen
the actual am ou nt
of
i t ,
is
the
sole question we need there
consider” ( P U ,60). This
concern for
thc lessening of evil seems tohave been
paramount in James’s m ind fro m his carlicst years. In
a
let ter to Tho m as
Ward in
1868,
he wrote: “If we can
only
bri ng ourselves to accept evil as
an
ultimated inscrutable fact, the way m ay be op en tow ards a great practical
reform
on
earth, as our aims
will be
clearly defined, and o ur energies con-
centrated” (TC,1:161).
Th us, it isJames’s co ntention that in the religious
life of
ordinary people,
God
is no t the
name
of
the whole
of
things. Rather, he
is
a
‘‘superhuman
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 179/323
152
person who calls us to cooperate in his purposes, and w ho furth ers ours if
they are worthy. He works in an external environ me nt, has limits, and has
enemies.” All
of
this leads James to assert: “I believe that he on ly God
w or thy o f t he nam e
mlrst
be
finitc”
( P U ,
60).
O n e final wo rd conc erning the lassical and continuing problemof recon-
ciling div ine om nipoten ce with divine goo dne ss. The re have
been
in the
past an d are in the present some sophisticated and intellectually respectable
eEorts at such reconciliation, but, following James, I think that they are and
will continue
to
be fatally flawed and unpersuasive. No com plex a r gum en t s
or
modes of reasoning are needed to indicate why,
for
m any a t least, it is
literally
inrredible to
suggest that there
is
a morally good being w ho has the
power
to
alleviate the pain and suge ring of mil l ions of innoc ent hum an
beings but for reasons know n only to him self freely chooses not to do so.
7’wo texts, on e fro m
a
modern novel and the other from
a
con tem por a r y
theological work, succinctly and sharplydelineate the
incredibility
of
such a
being.
How
mu ch
reverence can you have for a Supreme Being who
finds
i t neces-
sary to include such phenomena as phlegm and
tooth
decay n His divine
system
of
creation? What in the world
was
running through that warped,
scatological mind of His when
H e
robbed old people of the power to control
their bowel rnovementsT25
A God of absolute power who either causes
or
deliberately permits everything
that happens must take full responsibility for it himself. No thing can take
place unIess he
wills
i t . That includes Auschwitz and our devastation of Viet-
nam. Can a God
who
willingly tolerates such outrageous suffering be called
good?Is he
not
callously indifferent to both the integrity and the welfare ofhis
creatures?
A God like
that cannot be worshipped by
thinking
people today.
An y man or woman who
has
a modicum
of
human decency
is
morally superi-
or to
hirn.26
Any at tempt
to
say an yth ing specif ic abou t G od, a f ter hu ndred s of years
of
arguments and efforts, has about it a decided dimension of foolishness.
Nevertheless, i t is no t po ssib k to believe in Go d wi thout ventu r ing some
sugges t ion concerning the character of thatn wh ich on e believes. As H.
D.
Lewis has expressed
it, “No
on e can expect
or
believe any thin g w ithou t
having
Some
idea
of
wh at i t
is
that he
expect^."'^
Let m e state wh at, for
me,
is
a
minimalist belief conc erning the nature o f God: that
God
is
a
moral
person who is at least as good
as
the very best hu m an being imaginable. I
submit that we w ould j udge any hu m an being morally deficient w h o failed
to exercise all the pow er he o r she
possessed
to alleviate human suffering,
and that we therefore can no t ex pec t less
of God.
T h e classical response that
God
has
limited his use o f power
out
of respect for human freedom is
pro-
foundly
unconvincing. Imagine
a
parent who, wishing
to
respect the free-
dom
of
the
child, allows this child to
do
something
that
is
disastrous for
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 180/323
J m e s : ScIJand God 153
itself or for ano ther wh en i t is within the power
of
the parent to prevent it.
This is really “unimaginable.”
Recallfarnes’s contention that “when
we
cease
to
admire or approve what
the definition
of a
dcity implies, we
end
by deem ing that dei ty incredible”
( V R E , 264-65). Hence, i f God does no th ing w h en conf r on t ed by the pro-
found suffering of millions of innocent hum an beings, the only p ossibil i ty
for believing in the moral goodness of that
God is
that he was unable to d o
anything. As
Clark M.
Witliamson has expressed it,
“God
does all that God
can possibly do for
us.”28
In reviewing Williamson’s w or k, Jo hn K. Roth
criticizes this sta tem en t because he qu estion s wh ethe r a God of
such
limited
power
“is fully w or thy of worship,” The alternative Roth suggests,
howev-
er, is rather astounding: “Certainly men and wom en do no t always
do
the
best they can. T h e Ho locaust and its antece dents in th e anti-Judaism
of
the
Chris t ian church, however, may testify that God is not o n e w h oalways does
the best either.”29 Unless I
am
miss ing something here , Roth seems to be
saying that it is m ore possible to worship
a
God w h o has unlimited power
but does not alwaysxerc.ise it in the best way possiblc.
I
do not see
how
such
a God
could
be judged other than mo rally defective.
We are confro nted, then, with two inadeq uate and not total ly sat isfying
images
of
the divine:
a
God
w h o
at
every m om ent employs
all
his limited
power, or a God of unlimited power w h o fails in
numerous
instances to use
this power
for
what would appear to be very worthwhi le ends. Whether
able to be worsh ipped o r not , the former s surely a lovable Go d.
As
for the
latter God, I would not wish to worship h im and would find
i t
difficult if
not imp ossible to ove
RELATIONAL
SELF-RELATIONAL
GOD
1
have been describing reality in terms
f
a
plurality
of
fields, at least
some
of
wh ich are conscious fields. Further, we have seen that the human field of
consciousness is related to and thereby in part consti tuted y a w ide r field o r
superhuman consciousness. The fol lowing text from Perry succinctly de-
scribes James’s view
of
these relational spans
of consciousness:
Turning to the problem of unity of the world, he explained such degrees and
varieties of unity as the world possesses in terms of experienced relations. To
avoid subjectivism, he argued €or the “conterminousness” of minds, t h a t is
their convergence in
o r
towards the same experiences-defending this view
against the skepticon the one hand and the absolutist on the other. Borrowing
Peirce’s term, he adopted the “tychistic” theory that the ultimate origins of
things
are
both pIuraI and spontaneous. No philosophy, he said, can really
avoid the recognition of a sheer datum at some point. But beings of indepen-
dent and accidentalorigin can come into interaction with one another, through
a spreading“consciousness of transition.” This notion
suggests
different
“spans” of consciousness, and the possibility of a consciousness
such
as God
with
a
span far exceeding
that
of
man.
.
.
It
eliminates the problem
of
evil,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 181/323
and “goes withempiric ism,personalism,democracyand reedom.” TC,
111373-74)‘’
I have been speaking of this wider field
of
consciousness specificdly as
“G od ” or “divin e,” and have indicated w h y this reali ty mu st
be
wider and
morepowerful han hehuman,
but
not necessarily all-inclusive or
all-
pow erful. Further, follow ing James,
I
have insisted on the significancc and
e f k a c y of h u m a n initiative and activity, thercby rejecting a n y versions of
Go d tha t de ny or adically dimin ish this ef icacy. Though not refcrring spe-
cifically to James, Ian Barbour
has
described
a
vicw of agen cy wh ich is
complctely consistent with that ofJamcs.
God’s
r e h i o n
to
other
agents
seems
to
require
a
sociaf
or interpersonal
analo-
gy in which a plurality
of
centers
of
initiative are pre sen t. Th e biblical
model
of
Father, after a11,
alIowed for
the presence of m a n y agcnts, rather than con-
centra t ing on the divine agent a lone.
.
. . in the process rnodcl more than one
agent may
influence
a given event, so that both God’s action and that of o the r
agents can
be
represented.3’
There is , of course, a mu ch wid er con sensus con cerning the relat ional
character of th e hu m an self than there is con cerning thc claim that on e of
those constituting relations, indeed the cen tral on e, s the relation to
a
super-
humanconsciousnessdesignated“G od .” The
most that I have claimed
throughout this essay is that
the
field-self, w hic h is widely man ifest in the
diverse modes of experience and reasonably confirmed by
a
n u m b e r of in-
tellectual disciplines, is open to
a
relation to a field that can be called divine.
Recall ju st h o w th e self as field
is
Characterized by
such
openness: as a
“f ie ld ,” the boundaryof the
self
is opcn, indefinite, and continually shifting
such that other fields are continually leaking in and leaking ou t. Th ere is,
however, s uffk icnt stab iljty and difference in the rates
of
shif t ing among
selves
and all other fields to allow us to speak of individual fields. T h e indi-
viduality of all fields, bu t pr ee m in en tly self-fields, is relational, hence rela-
tive in the sense hat inas m uc h as i tsco nstitu ting fields arecontinually
changing,
so
is the individual. Further, individual entities, including selves,
are characterized by being, and can exist
only
so i ong as they arc, centers of
activity. Since these centers a r e const i tuted by their transactions with other
centers, they are in te rdependent .
The
most crucial question, for
m y
pur-
poses,
is
w h e t h e r t h e h u m a n
elf
has,
as
one
of
i ts constituting
relations
a n d
transactions, a relation to
a wider
and
mote po we rful consciousness,
which
consciousness is able to m ain tain ts consti tut ing relation to th e self eve n in
th e absence
of
oth er relations that m ay now also partially constitute it. The
possibility of persona l imm ortality, as I have repeated ly insisted, depe nds
u p o n t h e reality of such
a
relation.
What is
needed,
of course, is a model of an emergent
self
that is consistent
with the best philosophical and scicntific evidence concerning the self
and ,
as
a
m ini m um , does no t exclude thc possibi li ty
of
such
a
superhuman con-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 182/323
James: S d f n r l d God 155
stitutingrelation.
Such a
model would have to
be
const ructed a long the
following
lines.
T he hu m an self em erges f rom f ields designatcd “physical,”
bu t this self
is
ncithcr identical w ith
n o r
reducible to the physical fields fro m
which
i t
emerges and o n w hic h i t present ly depends. T he gr ou nd s for this
claim wo uld, of course,
be
th e fact that th e self pe rfo rm s activities that are
really different from the disting uish ing activities o f physical fields. W hile we
may be unable to answer
why
such
a
distinct field emerges
or
even
to
de-
scribe precisely haw or exactly when it emerges, there would appear to be
rather compelling evidence
that such a self
does emerge. There
are
both
“subjective”and“objective”data n sup po rt
of
this contention. Subjec-
tively, there is the
fprt
awareness
of
identity, continuity, freedom ,
and
the
like. Objectively,
we
are
able
to dcscribe behavior
that
is neither identical
with nor reducible
to
the behavior of o th erentities, such as plants, animals,
cells, or
atoms.
An “emerged” self has access t o and is able t o act
upon ,
participate in, and
transformoth er real fields, nclu ding self-fields,
in
a distinctivefashion,
Thu s the individual elf is a m o re encornpassing field than thos e from w hich
it em erge d and w hich are sti l l involve d in i ts cons titution. Further, this self
is able to participate
in fields
m ore enc om pas sing than itself , such as l in-
guistic, cultural, and social fields; and it does
so
in
a
m ann er no t available
to
its own subf ie lds w hen they aresolated fro m it.
I t
would seem legi t imate to
suggest that the self now takes
on
characteristics
of
those wider fields
so
as
to give i t a reality “be yo nd” the fields from w hic h it
has
emerged and upon
which tstilldepends. All
of
thisseemsphenomenologicallyverifiable,
quite apart from thc quest ion of the divine field. If so, this becomes the
experiential groun d which, wh en comb ined with
religious
experience, al-
lows
for extra pola ting the reality
of God.
Assu ming this extrapolation along the lines previously described , it may
be useful here
to
under l ine a few key aspects o f the relation between the
divine and the hum an fields. In keepin g with the m etaphys ical pluralism
discussed earlier,
I
wish
to
stress that whileall things are conn ected, they
re
not all connected to all others with a relation of immediacy. Hence, though
G od is connected to all things, and thoug hhis connections o f imm ediacy are
the greatest in existence, evenGod is not connected inmediately
to
all thing s.
More, there are degrees of imm ediacy even between God and
those
beings
w ith w ho m he is imm ediately related.
Suppose
we characterize the hu m an on the basis o f i ts imm ediacy
to
the
divine. The re wo uld be a w ide rang e and difference in the degree of this
imm ediacy even within the hum an species,
a
species distinguished as such
on t he basis
of the
potential of i ts individual members for a relation of im-
mediacy withG o d .Both individual lyand collectively, how ever,
human
beings w ou ld have to str ive, wh ether consc iously o r unconsciously, directly
or
indirectly,
to
realize and increase this relation. T h e mystical m ight serve
as the paradigm
of
the relation
of
imm ediacy between the divine and the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 183/323
156 Persotla1
Itnrrrortality: Possibility
atrd Credibility
human, bu t i t wo uld be neither the exclusive nor the com plete mo de of
imrncdiacy. The long nd rduou s volutiona ry nd historicalprocess
wo uld seem almost fr ivolous if the highest mode possible of immediacy
betw een Go d and the wo rld had lready been o r is no w realized in the expe-
rience o f even on e mystic.33 Hence, this relation of imme diacy must be
a
gro win g on e, and its realizations bo th past and present can no t be restricted
to explicit mystical
or religious cxpe riences. G reat poets, scientists, artists,
composers, statesmen-indeed all truly great hum an beings, wh ether pub -
licly recognized or not-can
be
viewed as manifest ing mo des of im m ed iate
relations to a wider and r icher eality. Qu ite obv iously not every ones led
to
articulate this relationship explicitly, and even am on g th os e w ho do, it will
be variously described.
Some
might express the experience
of
a
reality “be-
yond” that of their narrow ly “person al” reality in term s of poetry, painting,
music, nature, or science. A few have, o f course, described it
in
t e rms of a
personal be ing, traditionally referred
to
as Go d.
It is this personal relationship betw een the individual and that wide r, su-
perhuman consciousness designated “God” that is th e necessary presupposi-
tion for anybelief in per son al imm ortality . Un less elief in
a
personal
God
is
possible an d plausible, there is
no
po int in even considering the possibilityo f
a belief in p erso na l i r n r n ~ r t a l i t y . ~ ~hatever difficulties Jam es ha d w ith tra-
ditional theism, he never seemed
EO
su rre nd er that personalistic character of
God that was
so
essential to it . Neg ative eviden ce for this can be found in
James’s lectu re no tes for
a
course called “Th e Phi loso phy of Ev olut ion,”
given some half-dozen times in th e years
1879-96.
Much of the coursewas
taken up w ith criticizing H erb ert Spencer’s “evolutionism,” in particular
rejecting its claim that the “unknowable” could serveas a suitable object for
religious faith. Not so, according to James: “Mere existence commands
n o
reverence whatever,
or
any o ther emot ion u nt i l i ts qual i ty
s
specified* Nei-
ther does mere cosm ic ‘power,’ unlcss it ‘makes for’ something which can
claim kinship from our sympathies.” He concludes that we might
as
well
“speak o f being irreverent to Space or disrespectful o f the Equator’’ (TC,
I:486).
A
more
positive expression of theism’s God as personal is found in “Re-
flex Ac tion and The ism.”The
two
essential features
of
theism are that “God
be conceived as the deepest power in thc universe” and that
he
be conceived
“under the form
of
a
mental pcrsonality.”Jarnes
goes
on
to
say that “God’s
personality is
to
be regarded, like an y oth er personality, as som eth ing lying
outside
of
m y ow n and o ther than
me.”
Finally, w ha tcv er the differences
between
the
div ine and hu m an personalities, they “b oth have purposes for
wh ich they care, and each can hear the other’s call” (
W B , 97-98).35
Else-
wh ere, Jam es note s that o u r religions represcnt the ‘‘more perfect and eter-
nal aspect of the universe . . . as having a personal form.”
He
goes on to say
that if w e are religious, “the unive rse is no lon ge r a mere I t to
us,
bu t a
Thou,”
and hence we.areable
to
have any
relation
with i t that
w e
are
able
to
have with another person ( W B ,
31).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 184/323
j d m e s :
SeI fa t ld
God
I57
In
his
I h i e t i e s of Religious
Experience,
James
con tend s that religious indi-
viduals sce their personal concerns as the grounds
o n
which
they
encounter
and are encountered by God ( V R E , 387). Hence, “the pivot round which
the religious life
.
.
.
revolves,
is
the interest
of
the
individual
in
his private
personal destiny” ( V R E , 387). This personal God witnessed to by religious
experience is contrasted w ith the G od recogn ized b y science. Th e latter is a
“God of
universal laws exclusivcly, a
God
w ho does a wholesale, not
a
retail
business. H e cann ot acco mm oda te his processes to the convenience of indi-
viduals” ( V R E , 390). T h at Go d was explicitly affirmed by Albert Einstein
w hen
he
said that he believed “in Spinoza’s G o d w h o reveals himself in the
orderly harmony of w ha t exists , no t in
a
God w h o concerns himself wi th
the fates and actions
of
human beings.”36
In spite ofJames’s assertion that “religion
. .
.
is a mon ume nta l chapter n
the his tory
of
human egot ism” ( V R E , 387), i t
would
be g rossly misleading
to unde rstand his stress o n the individual and personal dimension of re-
ligious experience in terms
f
an atomistic individualismo r an isolating ego-
tism. The whole drift of James’s relational metaphysics, as we have repeat-
edlyseen, goes against such a narrow ing and em pty individua lism. Less
than
a
year
before
his death, he wrote
a
letter
to
his friend
and
fellow-prag-
matist,
F.
C. S. Schiller, c hid ing him fo r failing to adequately recognize the
social dime nsion
of the human si tuat ion:
It seems to
me
really fantastically formal
to
ignore
t h r
much
of
the truth
that
is
already established, namely,
tha t men do
think
in
social situations.
.
. . I
s i m p l y n s m m e t he social situntion, and
I
am sorry
that .
.
.
you balk at i t so
much.
It is not assumed merely
tactically,
for those are the terms in which I
genuinely think the matter. (TC, I:510)
James’s lan guag e has undo ubtedly
at
times been misleading, and his fer-
vent desire to affirm t he reality of the individual perhaps led h im to fail to
emphasize
sufficiently those
social
relations that w ere so stressed by Karl
M arx and John Dewey. The charge that James was a supporter of “rugged
individualism,” howeve r, is s imply w i thout mer i t . He explicitly called for
philosophers of all stripes to joi n in com batt ing “the practical,conven-
tionally thin king man , to
whom
. . . noth ing has true scriousness b u t
per-
sonal interests”
( C E R ,
24-25).
Henry Levinson is right
on
the mark
when
he contends that James “did not p it the personal and the private against the
social experience-on James’ groun ds bo th indiv idu als and their religio ns
were inevitably social. James pits the sociality of persuasion-the sociality
of friends and com patriots-against th e sociality of coercion-the sociality
of sovereigns and subjects”
(RIW’, 132).
O ne m igh t add that
by
t he s am e
token, James pits the individuality
of
persons (the individuality that is con-
structed and developed
by
transactions with other persons)against the indi-
viduality
of
ego tism (the indiv idu ality that isolates an d impo verishes itself
by turning ow ard that maginaryunrelationalcenterwhich is in tru th
“nothing”) .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 185/323
158
Persorial Imttiortality: Possibility
arid
Credibility
The self as essentially social or relational is a doctrine that has appeared in
many forms in contemporary thought-not only in pragmatism but also in
Marxism, existentialism, and phenomenology, as well
as
in certain psychol-
ogies, sociologies, and anthropologies.
37
Ralph Harper gives an existen-
tialist version strikingly similar to that ofJames. “No one,” he tells us, “can
become a ‘true self’ without the encouragement of others. Identity depends
on presence, on being singled out.” Harper adds that “to be a person is to
look for a person, first to confirm one’s own reality and identity and next to
set up a relationship of mutual f~ l f i l lm en t . ”~ ~n the Principles, James sug-
gests that “a man has as m a ny social selves as there are individuals w h o recognize
and carry an image of him in their mind”
(PP,
I:281-82). He later claims that
of all our more potential selves,
the potentia l social se lf
is the most interesting,
in virtue of “its connection with our moral and religious life.” When I act
contrary to the wishes and judgments of my friends or family or “set,” and
thereby experience a diminution of my actual social self, I am strengthened
by the thought that there are “other and better possible social judges.” Even
if I have no hope of realizing the ideal social self during my lifetime or
expectation that future generations will know anything about me,
I
am still
called to pursue an ideal social self-one “that is at least worthy of approving
recognition by the highest
possible
judging companion, if such companion
there be.” James adds that “this self
is
the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the
permanent Me which I seek. This judge is God, the Absolute Mind, the
‘Great Companion’ ”
This accounts for the impulse to pray, which is
a
“nec-
essary consequence of the fact that whilst the innermost of the empirical
selves of a man is a Self of the social sort, yet it can find its only adequate
Socius in an ideal world”
(PP,
I:300-301).
Needless to say, James is only claiming here to give a phenomenological
or psychological description of distinctive human experience. It is interest-
ing to note that Dewey recognizes this same phenomenon: “One no sooner
establishes his private and subjective self than he demands it be recognized
and acknowledged by others, even if he has to invent an imaginary audience
or an Absolute Self to satisfy the demand.”39 O f course, where Dewey will
remain or become convinced that this higher self is merely “imaginary,” or
at least not “real” in any sense which might be called “objective,” James
insisted on the right to believe that this higher self-God-has
a
reality not
reducible to human or “natural” reality.
Concerning the possibility and plausibility of any belief in personal im-
mortality, then, it is inseparably bound up with our belief in
a
“Great Com-
panion” who cares for us and will bring to realization that in
us
which is
worthy of realization. In
a
late essay, James makes an observation about
those who are beset with
a
secondary personality;
I
believe that it can be
applied, properly qualified, to all human beings: “What they want in the
awful drift of their being out of its customary self, is any principle of stead-
fastness to hold on to. We ought to assure them and reassure them that we
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 186/323
James: Sel fand God 159
will stand by them, and recognize the true self in them to the end”
( C E R ,
508-9). Is not something very like this what we ask of God, whom alone we
believe to be capable and desirous of recognizing our true selves and keeping
them from sinking into that abyss of nothingness from which they have
emerged and which remains a continuing threat to the integrity and the very
reality of our lives? I must explore this crucial.point later; for the moment I
wish simply to emphasize our radical dependence upon God for any hope of
a life that does not, in spite of our greatest efforts and the efforts of our
human lovers, dissolve into a nothingness ultimately indistinguishable from
a
life that has never been.
It is this individual and personal relationship with God that has always
been at the center of any belief in a continuing life. According to
R.
H.
Charles, “Jeremiah was the first to conceive religion as the Communion of
the individual soul with God.
.
. . Thus through Jeremiah the foundation of
a true individualism was laid, and the law of individual retribution pro-
claimed. The further development of these ideas led inevitably to the con-
ception of a blessed life beyond the I have been suggesting
throughout this section that because we can believe w_e aie here and now in
part constituted by and in transactional relation with God, we can believe
and hope that God will maintain and continue this constituting relation even
after other relations that now make up our being have been terminated.41
I t
would seem to be a life-sustaining relation such as this of which Luke
joyfully tells us: “Now he is God, not of the dead, but of the living; for to
him all men are in fact alive.”42
The key to life, present or future, would seem to be “love.” Essential to
any love worthy of the name would seem to be a care, concern, and desire
that the one loved realize to the fullest his or her aims and ideals insofar as
this realization brings enrichment and enhancement
of
life not only to the
beloved but also to the others with whom the beloved is life-related. Where-
as God’s life is essentially love, endeavoring at every moment to enable those
loved by him to realize their life potential, all nondivine beings-humans in
particular-can fall short of their love for God and those toward whom
God’s love is directed. This, of course, is saying neither more nor less than
that loving God is inseparable from loving those whom God loves. One
cannot truly love God unless one loves those who are loved by God, since
not
to
do
so
would be in essential conflict with the aims and desires of the
beloved.
As for belief in personal immortality, it is evident that everything comes
down to the possibility of there being a loving God capable of sustaining a
relationship
of
value that has come into being within the creative process.
That we are invited to participate in this process and are promised a share in
its fruits would seem to be at the center of Christian faith. We cannot, of
course, know or feel guaranteed that we will personally share in eternal life,
but by the same token, we cannot exclude the possibility that our mode of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 187/323
160
sharing wii1 be p erso nal. In the final analysis, perhaps, o u r love and t rus t in
the divine must
be
such that we here and now accept whatever mode of
sharing is possible for G od w ith ou t in any way lessening ou r dedicat ion to
those goals, values, and ideals that enhance life. O ur p rim ar y focus mu st
be
on co ntr ibut ing to the realization of
the
very best features of the creative
process and thereby to an enr ichmentof both human and divineife. In such
endeavors, we mu st be willing to act in spite
of
our ignorance as to the
precise form the ultimate fruits
of
our actions will take.
In
the final analysis,
Christians and m any o the rs believe that they live and m ove and
achieve
their
being within
a
process richer and
more
encom passing than can be know n,
one suffused with a my s tery of promise
and
vitality.
CODA BY WAY O F A N OBJECTION
A
formidable objection to a central claim of thischapter-and indeed to the
entire essay-must be ackn ow ledged , thoug h I have no fully satisfying re-
sponse to it.
I
have advanced as plausible and believable a God whose power
is
limited as
regards
the evils of experience, yet
who
is powerful enough to
save us from com plete annih ilat ion. The obv ious object ion is that , o n the
face
of
it,
more
power w ould seem necessary t o overcome the ab soluteness
of death than to overc om e mo st earthly evils.
Both
the immediate and the
reflective response to this objection can only be that we are here confronted
with an irreducible and insuperable mystery.
Every reflection up on G od m us t at some point take refuge in “mystery,”
but much depends on wh ere the m yste ry is located. T h e traditional view,
posit ing an omnipotent God, m u st say that it
is
a my stery wh y such an all-
good
God
does not use his power to alleviate suffering and obviate death.
My
view, po siting a
good
but finite
God,
m us t
say
that i t is my stery how
God’s
power
is insuf ic ien t to pro tec t us
from
suffering and death b ut sufi-
cient to
save us from t o t a l annih ih t ion . That
God
does not protect us f r o m
suffering and death is a matter
of
ind ub itable experience; that he
may
save us
from annihilation is
a
matter of faith.
On
this there is no significant dis-
agreem ent. W hat is in dispute is the kind of G o d w h o is cr ed i b l e . T h e tradi-
tional God, in possession of an eternally fulfilled and self-suffkjent
life,
de-
sires out o f his goodness to sha re this life wi th
his
creatures and freely opts
to
do
so
by su bm ittin g the m to suffering and death.
A
God unders tood
along the lines suggested in this essay wo uld
be
one w ho se ever developing
life, characterized by an intrinsic desire rzd need to share this ife, slowly and
processively brings forth diverse and distinct expressions of the div ine life.
At
a
particular stage in this process there is realized
a
m o d e of life that is
preciously close
but
still imm easurab ly distant from the center
of
the divine
life. Go d, de siring a
more
intimate union with those individua l bearers
of
this m od e of ife, chooses
to
bring this union about in
he
only way possible
by
submit t ing himself and them
o
the transform ative experiences
of
suffer-
ing
and death.
Thus,
in a life process that
is
everlastingly bringing forth new
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 188/323
and richer modes of life by means of t ransformation of itself, death may be a
necessary characteristic, both in the divine and nondivine modes
of
the pro-
cess.
I f
death, propo rtional to the mo de o f life, is the only means by which
new
life
can
come
for th , whether
in
God
or his creatures, then thc
goodness
of Cod is in
no
way compromiscd by the suffering and death which these
creatures must
endure
and which in
some
way are shared by
God
himself.
This does
not remove the mystery,but it do es relocate it to the center
of
the
div ine life itself.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 189/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 190/323
PART
I 1
Personal Immortality:
Desirability
and
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 191/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 192/323
C H A P T E R 7
Immortality:
Ho p e
OY Hindrunce?
I f the hope
w c
have
learned
to rcpose in Christ
belongs to this
world
only, then we are
unhappy
beyond
all othcr
m e n .
-
Corinthians 15:19
Looking
down
into
my
father’s
dead face
for
the
last
rime
my mother
said
without
tears, without
smiles
without regrets
but with
civility
“Good night, Willie Lee, I ’ l l
see
you
in the morning.”
“Alice Walker
“Good night Willie Lee,
I ’ l l See You
in
the Morning”
In
recent years philosophers and theologians have do ne dy ing to death, and
death to no w he re n particular after the occurrence
f that catastrophic event.
“Whether we are
to
live in a future s tate,” Bishop Joseph Butlera id som e two
hundred and f if tyyears ago , “as it is the mo st impo rtant question wh ich an
be asked, so it is the most intelligible one w hic h can be expressed in lan-
guage.”’ A few contemporary thinkers consider immo rtali ty an im po rtan t
quest ion; none to m y knowledge argues
that
it is th e “ m o st intelligible.”
Among the wider population, in America
a t
least, the majority that claim to
believe in imm ortal i ty seem to conside rhat belief periph eral to faith an d life.
W hether we are to live
in
a future state seem s
to
have become
a
ques t ion
intellectually
and
existentially irrelevam2
I t
is surely “an unde niable
act,” as
HansJonas has noted, “ that the mod ern tempers uncongenial to the dea o f
i r n r n ~ r t a I i t y . ” ~hen faced with the direct question, Do you believe in
a
life
after death?” com me nts Hans Kiing, “even theologians a re e r n b a r r as ~ ed .” ~
Someth ing of this embarrassment is reflected
in
an essay by the Rom an
Catholic
thinker Joseph Blenkinsopp,
ho,
after acknowledging that it
is no
longer
easy to speak both theological ly and honest ly about
ife
after death,”
goes on to say that “the subject conveys
a t
least for the developedcon-
165
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 193/323
sciousness
of
Western man,
a sense
o f unreality and an absence
of
existential
concern.”S T h e process thcologian Schubert
M .
O g d e n g o e s fur ther : “What
must refirse to accept, precisely as a Chris t ian theologian,
s
that belief in ou r
subjectivc existence after deaths in
some
way a
necessary article
of
Christ ian
belief.”6
Within thecon tem po rary intel lectual andculturalambience, hen, he
most
judicious response to the immortality question would appear to
be
silence. “If
one is
asked
abruptly,”
says W illiam E rnest
Hoclung,
‘ Wha t
do
you th ink about dea th? or of the imm or ta l ityf m a n ? o r o fhe
total
sense
of life?’ assuredly one’s first im pu lse
is
~ i l e n c e . ” ~nd in
the
famous text
with which Ludw ig Wittgenstein closes his
T r ~ ~ r n h l s ,e
are admonished:
“What we cannot speak about
we
must pass over in silcnce.”8 Add to
all of
this the observation ofJon as that “in mo re than two thousand years proba-
bly everything has bcen said there
is
to
say”
( P L ,
263),
coupled w ith the
com m ent of Hock ing that “ there is an arom a of triviality attending most
argum ent about imm or ta l ity”
Mi,0),
and the case for silence seems al-
most ironclad.
Almost-but notquitc.Thequcstion stillouches toom a n yopen
wounds, superficially covered over
by
intellectual and emotional band-aids,
to allow us the luxury of total exclusion fr om ou r reflections. W hat some of
these wounds a r e will beco me eviden t later in this chap ter, but onc “topical”
comment is perhaps in order a t this point. T h e fierce resurgence of un-
critical religious e m otiv ism , East an d West,
from
the rclatively benign
to
the
positively de structive, f ro m evangclicals an d charismatics to theological tcr-
rorists and mind -destroying cults-such
phenomena,
as a minimum, indi-
cate the continue d presenc e
of
a need for m ean ing that is not being me t.
Even
if
i t wereevident that hesemovementsare b u t manifestations of
atavistic or pr imit ive longing, of infantile nostalgia, of
a
“failure of nerve,”
all
attached to an illusionary
or
delusionary desire and hope for an othe r life,
i t
would still be wor thwhi le to explore such desire and hope.
But strikingly, in the last two decades it has become increasingly evident
that we are no more conf ident of and satisfied with our simplistic
psycho-
logical and sociological explanations for these human activities than we are
with simplistic theologicalexplanations. The need to move beyond
such
inadequate accounts of the hum an con di t ions as imp ort an t as it is evident.
Even if we can no t at this stage of hum an history ma ke any signif icant
new
mo vem ents , i t might s ti ll
be
helpful to understand why we cannot. Reflec-
tion
upon
and clarification of
the
possibilities available to u s,
a t
least,
would
seem to be wor thy
of
considerat ion. “Thus,” as Jonas states, “an exam ina-
tion at this ho ur will be as m uch an examination of ourselves as an examina-
t ion of the ssue of im m orta l i ty;
nd
even
if
i t should
throw
no new l ight
o n
th e latter
.
. . it may
yet
throw some l igh t
on
the present state o f
our
mortal
condi t ion” ( P L ,
263).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 194/323
167
PRAGMATISM AND FAITH
It was Kant , a long wi th Hurne,who initiated a decisive shift w ith in W cstern
culture in the approach to the ques t ions of God , f reedom , and immortal i ty .
Kan t tells us that he “ foun d it necessary
to
deny
knowledge,
in
order
to
m ake
room
forfa i th.” For
thc
m o rc positivistically rnindcd, the K antia n exclusion
o f God, f reedom, and immortal i ty from th e hallowed halls of science radi-
cally diminished the importance of such concerns and confined them
to
the
realms o f sub jectiv ity a nd em otio n. O the rs, tho se religiously inclined, saw
in the Kan tian critique wh at Kan t eviden tly intended-a way of saving re-
ligion w ith ou t placing it in fruitless co m petitio n with science. Th e lo ng ,
comp lex, and oftcn contentious his tory of the post-Kantian dispute con-
cerning science and religion is ot
of
concern here except
to
locate m y prag-
maticperspective. I believe itdefensible to placc prag m atism with in he
broad Kantian tradition insofaras it rejects all claims t o absolute certainty
or
absolute knowledge9 bu t does n ot ex cludc, indeed insists u po n, the neccssi-
ty of faith.
It
is im po rta nt to recall the processive world being assum ed, for
faith with in such
a
world takes on a m or e crucial role than does fai th within
a
wo rld wh ose struc ture and values are already essentially rcalized. Faith
within a world-in-process is not merely
a
guess as to the
way
thin gs are that
are not yet known;
rather,
it is a creative process playing
a
role in the very
making of the world-in its stru ctu re, goals,
and
values. While enhancing
the importance of faith, a processive world also increases the
risk,
personal
and collective, that accom panies all beliefs or faiths. l o
It goes w ithout saying that from the prag ma tic perspective, n o faith, in-
cluding the Ch ristian faith, is ex em pt fro m these faith conditions. Thc need
for a reflective or critical faith has been present since well before the time of
early Chris t ianity; a segment of
the
Ch ristian co m m un ity (as well as
of
other rel igious communit ies) has always felt obliged to reconcile the best
fruits of secular culture an d experience with i tsbeliefs and faith. Th at suc h
reconciliation emains a neccssity is wid ely ecogn ized . Less wid ely ac-
knowledged, ho w w er , is that the efforts to bring Chris t ianity o r
any
other
religion into harm ony wi th contemporary thinking, experience, and sen-
sibility is inlrncasurably m or e comp licated and religiously dangerous than
were earlierefforts. I f wc are
to
avoid“badfaith” o r self-deception, w e
cann ot pursue critical inqu iry pro tecte d by the absolute assurance that
the
beliefs investigated
will
remain fundamental ly unchanged or even that they
will survive such inquiry.*2
T h e more
conservative members of religious
communities-Christian and other-have always been highly sensitivc to
the threa t that critical inq uir y poses to traditional doctrines, and they have
no
d i f f d t y in m a rs ha lin g m o u nta in s
of
data in support of their view s. It is
disingenuo us, therefore, to pre ten d tha t critical reflection upon
one’s
faith
can serve
only
to
deepen and refine it. I f on e is asked, “Can
you
assure me
that if I sub ject m y belief in thc resurrection and eternal ife-beliefs that are
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 195/323
168 Persotla1 Irttnzortality:
Desirability
n r t d
E f i c a q
the life-blood of my sp i r it and the ground
of
meaning in
m y
life-to the
w itherin g gaze o f critical consciousness, I will not have my faith demol-
ished?” the only honest response must
be No
W ould a ny san e believer,
then, run
such
a r isk? Only i f he or sh e also believes that any faith that
cann ot stand the mo st severe critical scru tiny is no t w or thy of a h u m a n
being.
The advantages for thepurposes of a consistent imm ortality elief offered
by some m o d e of classical m etap hy sics mu st be readily
conceded.
It was
no ted above that a m in dl b o dy dualism is most congenial to and consistent
wi th the possibi2ity of im m orta l i ty. Similarly, a metaphysical dualism that
posits an essential bifurcation between the temporal
and
the eternal has rela-
tively litt le difficulty in sho w ing that belief in im m or tali ty is w orth wh ile,
significant, and reasonable-in sh or t, desirable. “T his w or ld, ” the tem po ral
world, is a kind
of
moral arena within which we are given the op po rtun ity
to prove by the m oral quali ty of our l ives that we me rit union with the
Eternal . Th e m an y and varied mo des of this view, in their diverse Eastern
and Western forms, share the judgment that the Eternal s alone that which
gives value and meaning. The temporal is of value only insofar as it is
a
reflection o f o r articipation in the Eternal or stepping-stone
to
this higher
reality. The purpose of “this wor ld ,” therefore , s to give us an opp or tuni ty
o f
so
l iving that we areiberated f ro m it. The meatzing o f this w orld is merely
located
in
the “other” wor ld .
Given such
a
world view, it makes sense to govern and direct ou r lives on
the basis or belief in im m ortality . This belief gives us our funda me ntal goal
and meaning , as well as
our
basic mo ral criterion: whateve r contributes
to
the saving of m y soul is
good;
wh atev er ob structs this salvation is ba d.
Of
course, there are both
rude
and sophisticated versionso f
such
a
belief struc -
ture.
I
have no intention of patronizing this wo rld view,
nor
of pretending
that I have disproved o r that any one can disprove it. I t is
a
long, honorable,
and in ma ny respects im m easu rably rich tradition, and I firmly believe tha t
it incorporates insights and qualities that can be igno red b y a ny altcrnative
world view only at the peril of trivialization. I t would
be
rash as well as
potentially false to c la im hat heworld viewpresentedhereadequately
achieves such incorpo ration. T h e m o st that can be claimed is that this is the
intention; it will remain
more
implicit than exp licit
and
for
the
most part
unrealized in what follows.
Recall that the task set
for this essay is to determine whether a belief in
immortal i ty is “reasonable,” given the assum ptions of pragmatism’s world
view. It should be noted that there is n o pretense of arguing for the s tronger
hyp othesis that imm ortality belief is the only “reason able,” life-enhancing,
meaning-giving belief, I propose a m uc h weaker hypothesis for exploration:
namely, that such belief is a reasonable or plausible
one.
To
support
this
hyp othesis, i t w ill
be
necessary to
show
not
only that immortality belief is
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 196/323
not an obstacle to life-aE1rrnation but that it contributes, or at least has the
possibility
of
contributing , distinctive insights and qualities to human life.
But how doesa pragmatist go abou t show ing that ei ther this or an y oth er
belief
is
a
w or thy
one?
T h e sh o rt answer, as already given, s on e m ust
observe whether the experiential consequences and quali tyf life that follow
from this belief are worthy.
Recall
the key points ma de in the Introd uction
concerning pragmatic evaluation. First, all conclusions of any argume nt are
for
the pragmatis talways tentative and subjecto modification
or
jet t isoning
in the light of n ew evidence. Second, a prag m atic evaluation
of a
question
such as thc one under consideration mustbe as responsive as possible to the
overwhelming mass of cumulative experience; hence, it m u st be responsive
to the data f ro m all areas
of
experience as well as from histo ry and thc
sciences. Th ird, pra gm atism s not restr icted to description-even assuming
that such description could be
more
co mp lete than it ever is-since it
also
includes a speculative or extrapolative component whereby it suggests
pos-
sibilities for
a
future course of action. Put simply, on the basis
of
the way
things are and have been, the pragm atist ventures a guess as to how they
might be.
IMMORTA LITY: ITS DESiRABiLITY
Is
immo rtali ty desirable? T h e wo rd s can be viewed as two different ques-
tions, distinct thoug h not com pletely separate. T h e first addresses itself to
the “state of imm ortal i ty” and asks wh ether i t is desirable. Everything
here
depends on
s o
describing this state thato u r response would be, “Whether or
not
such a state is possible,
I:
do not
know , but I would l ike i t to be.” Few
would dispute that
a
l ife fro m w hic h disease had been banished is desirable,
and that is a l ife both imag inable and reasonably possible, if no t prob able , in
the future. Bu t wh at ab ou t a
life
from wh ich death has been banished, an
unend ing, limitless life?
O n e o f he most repug nant pictures o f such intermin able life is fo un d
in
Ctrllivev’s
Travels.
* 3 While visiting the
Lt.rggntrggians,
Gulliver is asked if he
has yet seen any “StvuIdbvcrggr , or Imnzortais.” Me is informe d that “these
Productions were not peculiar to an yfamily, but a m ere Effect
of
Chance .”
Gulliver’s initial en thus iasm for imm ortality is quickly extinguished once
the lives of those “Immortals” is described and observed: “They commonly
acted like M orta ls, t il l ab ou t T h irt y Years old, after w hich b y D egrees they
grew me lancholy and dejected, increasing in both till they came to
Four-
score.”
Lacking
any signif icant memory and devoid o f curiosity, they we re
also physically m on strou s: “Besides the usual D efor m ities in extre m e old
age,
they acquired an additional Ghastliness in Proportion
to
their Nu m be r
of Years, which is n o t t o
be
described.’’ LittIe wonder, then, that Gulliver’s
“keen Appetite for Perpetuity of
Life
was much abated.”
The British analytical philosopher Be rna rd W illiams presents us with an
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 197/323
equally depressing though
less
graph ic picture of life witho ut death in his
oft-cited essay, “The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium
of
im m or -
ta l i ty*”14Williams
argucs
that “death is no t necessarily an evil.” Death can
be
a
misfortune; hence,
we
are justified in o u r anti-Lucretian
hope
for
a
longe r rather than a shorter li fe. Bu t does i t fol low that we are “co m m itted
to want ing to be immor ta l?” No, for an endless life w ou ld be endlessly
bo ring . W illiams cites the case of Elina M akr op ulos ,
a
character in
a play by
Karel Capek. In the sixteenth century, she had received
an
elixir of life from
her father, a court physician.
A t the
time
of the action
she
is aged
342.
Her unending life has
come
to
a
state
of boredom,
indifference and coldness. Everything
is
joyless: “in the end i t is
the same,” she says, “singing a n d silence.” She refuses to tak e
the
elixir
again;
she dies; a n d the formula is deliberately destroyed
by a young woman a m o n g
the protests
of
s o m e older m e n . (E‘S, 82)
Boredom,Will iamsargucs, is not
a
co nting en t fact of ifc or Elina
Makropulos
b u t
is inseparable from an endless hum an life. He considers
several alternative rnodcls to that of Elina-among them
“serial
and disjoint
lives” and “an after-life sufficiently unlike this 1i fc”“ bu t
f inds
no convinc-
ing ground for excluding boredom: “Nothing less wil l
do
for eternity than
som ething that
makes
b o r e d o m ut7thinknb2e.”
This
question of how “think-
able” a futu re life m us t
be in
order tobe credible
is
crucial and
must
eventual-
ly be considered. For the m om en t , le t m e s imply under l ine the “profound
difficulty,” noted by Williams, “of providing any model of an unending,
supposedly satisfying,
state
o r activi ty w hich w o d d not r ightly prove bor-
ing to anyone w h o remained conscious of himself and w h o had acquired a
character, interests, tastes and im patie nce in the course of living, already, a
finite life”
( P S ,
94-95).
ThoughJames would reach , o r at least incline toward, a different conclu-
sion conc erning imm ortality, he passionately described the boredom and
longin g to escape that overcom e us when confronted wi th “ the paint ing of
any paradise o r utopia, in heaven or
on
earth.”
Th e wh ite-robe d harp- playin g heaven o f o u r abbath-schools and the ladylike
tea-table elysium represented in
Mr.
Spencer’s Da ta ofEtlrics, as the final con-
summat ion o f p rogre ss ,
re
exact ly o n a
par
in this respect-lubberlands, pure
and simple , one and
a l l .
We
look
u p o n t h e m
from
this
delicious
mess
of
in-
sanit ies and real i t ies, st r ivings and deadnesses, hopes and fears, agonies and
exul ta t ions , which forms our present state, and ted ium
vitae
is the only senti-
m ent they awaken
in
o u r breasts. To our crepuscular natures, born for
the
conflict, the Rernb randtesque m oral chiaroscuro, the shifting struggle of
the
sunbeam in the gloom, such pictures of l ight upon l ight are vacuous and ex-
pressionless, and neither to beenjoyed or unders tood. I f this
be
the frui t
of
the
victory, we say; i f the generations of ma nkin d suffe red
and
laid dawn the i r
lives; if the prophets confessed and mar ty rs sang in the fire, and al l
the
sacred
tears were shed for no o ther end than
that a
race of creatures of such unex-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 198/323
arnpled insipidity should succeed, and
protract
irr suecula
sflenrlorrrm
their
con-
tented and inoffensive
lives,-why, at such a
rate,
better lose than win the
battle,
o r at all
events better ring
down the curta in beforc
thc last
act
of
h e
play,
so
that a
business
that
began
so
importantly
m a y
be
saved
from
so
sin-
gularly flat a
winding-up.
(
WB, 130)
Depressing descriptions o f a future life, as Jamesmakes clear, are n o t
confined
to
a
futu re life in anothe r wo rld; Spencer’s evolutionary Elysium
has all the tediousness of M ilton’s regained paradise. T his aises the qu estion
of
whether hope for a fu tu re life is possible on ly if we can describe it in
detail. Pcrhaps no t. B ut
I
think that those w h o believe in such a life must at
least offer
a
rough sketch of what i t ought
to
involve. In the next chapter, I
will suggest
by
way
of
extrapolation some characteristics
of
a
“desirable”
state of immortality.
First, however, f would l ike to consider
a
rnorc impor tan t meaning
of
thc
question:
Is
immortal i ty des i rable? This second meaningocuses on thehere
and now, and asks wh ethe r belief in im m orta lity is wo rth y of the best in
human beings. Is this belief life-enhancing? Does i t give depth, scope, and
meaning to human existencc? Docs i t , or at least can it, release or create
possibilities that oth erw ise w ou ld be lost or dim inish cd? In sho rt, is belief in
imm ortali ty energizing
or
dcenergizing?
An
adequate response
must
s h o w
that not only is such belief not
an
obstacle to life-affirmation bu t th at it d oe s
(or
can)
contribute distinctive insigh ts and qualities to hu m an life.
Corliss Larnont
has
stated: “The gen eral pra gm atic effects, for good o r ill,
of belief in a future existcnce a re w rit large n he his tory of the race,
whether we exam ine th e practices of ancient tribes or modern civilized na-
t i o n ~ . ” ~ ~ecause these effects are both good and bad , and because they are so
numerous and complex , any s imple judgmentased on the conse quen ces s
prec lude d. Yet indiv idua lly and collectively,
we
d o
take
posit ions on ques-
tions such as im m ortality , and n the abscnce of anyth ing appro aching rnath-
ematical proof. There remains a division on the worth o f belief in irnmor-
tality or
in
God because to this point
in
h u m a n history
the
data
embody
considerable ambiguity.
Of
course, this itself
is a
j u d g m e n t
on
which indi-
vidual pragmatists disagree. Dewey saw little r no am biguity; the vidence,
he increasingly came
to
hold, pointed to the need to rid ourselves of life-
obstructing religious beliefs.
James,
on the o ther hand , read the cumulative
record of hum an expe rience differentlyandcontinued to the end to see
positive possibilities
in these
beliefs.
Whether belief in imm ortal i ty has
a
future is
a t
best debatable. We can be
reasonablysure,however, hatunless an effort is
made
to confront he
charge that i t is antilife, it will continue only as
a
nostalgic
or
superstitious
relic even
among
those who give i t nominal consent. N ote that 1 say “con-
front,” not “refute,” for the
scope
and depth of this charge are such that
a t
best it might be neutralized, thereby leaving the door open for the ent ry of
more
positive possibilities.
There
are M arxia n, Fre ud ian, existentialist, hu-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 199/323
manist, and pragmatic expressions of the charge that bel ief in im m orta l i ty s
both essentially and historically destructive of thc fullness
of
life. Whatever
their diKerences, all suc h exp ressio ns view this belief as escapist, as a be-
trayal
of
the ear th , and s sapping the hum an com mun i ty
f
energies needed
for the continuing struggle to ameliorate thevils at tending the hum ancon-
dition and to
create new potential
for
hum an dev elopm ent . “O f belief in
immortal i ty,” Dew ey states, “m or e than any other elem ent of
historic re-
ligions it
holds
g o o d ,
I
believe, that ‘religion
is
the
opium
o f the peoples’
”
(11, xiii),
BELIEF AND COUNTERBELIEF-AN EXISTENTIAL
DIALECTIC
An acceptable m od c of im m orta l i ty belief cann ot be s imply and unequivo-
cally opposed
to
its counterbelief, Abstractly or conceptually they are op-
posed-either wc are im m or tal or w e are not-but
what
we must t ry to
describe s
an
existentialsituation h ateludessuch
a
conceptualistic ei-
ther/or.16
Ca n tho se different b u t not necessarily contradictory ways of
thinking and believing
be
located within thc sam e individual? If we take
“believing ” and “think ing” existentially, as modes of life rather than as ab-
stract systems of concep ts,
I
think they can. Indeed,
I
wish
to
sugge st that
this is increasing ly the case for rcflective believers-whether in
God
o r in
hum anity. Abstractly, belief and do ub t exclude each o th er; concretely, they
coexist in an ever ch ang ing existe ntial dialectic.
Let M C t ry to relate this to th e belief in pers ona l im m ortality . In his read-
a b k and suggestive book Deatfl
and
Beyond, Andrew Grceley concludes that
“one must choose between meaning and absurdity .” ls N o w for many, per-
haps most, people this
s
an unders tandablechoice, but for otherst does not
appear
to
be
so.
T h e r e a r e t h o s e w h oxperience meaning and absurdity not
as things that one chooses but as structural characteristics of
the
h u m a n
condit ion that should be freely affirmed and acknowledged. Meaning and
absurdity do n ot exclude each o the r bu t co nfro nt us inseparably
bound
u p
w ith each other. Th e que stion is
this:
is it possible t o “live” a life suffused b y
bo th meaning a d absurd ity? M ay it not be the task, if no t the destiny, of
a t
least some to refuse the d i ~ h o t o r n y ? ~ ~h e hope is that
a
r icher modc of
human life m igh t thu s emerge-a m od e w hic h, tho ug h i t can no t yet be
conceived
and
is
a t
most vaguely
felt,
can
be
hoped
and
worked
for.’O
Just as m ean ing and absurd ity resist co nceptual reconciliation,
s o
too do
immo rtali ty and tragedy. Again we con front an abstract ei ther/or . Either
we are imm ortal an d the hum an s i tuat ions not tragic,
or
it is tragic because
we are
not
im m or tal. Th us Ju lius Seelye Bixler sees the alternative
as
“cither
belief in imm ortal i ty or m or e tragic view of life.”21Now i t may be that the
denial of immortal i ty involves
a
move tragic view o f life than its affirmation,
but
I would insist that such afi rm atio n ought
IZOC
o be
a
means for avoiding
the essentially tragic dim ens ion
of
h u m a n
life.22
Th is is perhaps the most
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 200/323
sensitive aspect
of
the immorta l i ty quest ion for anyone a t tempt ing
o
a f i r m
personal imm ortal i ty wh ile rem aining fai thful to the hum an cond it ion
in
som e of i t s deepest and most ser ious fea tures. M odern and contem porary
experience have intensified the tragic aspect. T h o s e w h o have lived con -
structively and creatively with conscious belief
in
the eventual annihilation
not only of them selves and those they personally loved bu t of al l human
beings have displayed a profound and admirable courage. Even if we were
able to sh ow that no on e has lived
or
is able to live with the belief in such a
total annihilation-that in spi te
of
their manifest beliefs, they have been
motivatedby surro gate im m ortali ty beliefs such as imm or ta l ity through
fame
or
posterity-even so, there is no do ub t that they have lived w ith the
acceptance
of
the cessation
of
their ow n
personal
m od e of eing. At the very
least, those
who
do
not share their belief can no t bu t
be
edified by their
dedicated disinterestedness. Bu t this is not enough;
a
defensible belief in
im m ortali ty will share the tragic experienc e occasioned by the reality
of
death. Belief in immortali ty without tragedy risks
moral
cowardice.
Many charge-and
I
find it unsettling-that the C hr is tia n faith in resur-
rection or eternal life m anifests a “failure of nerve.” Because
of
metaphysical
and mo ral cowardice, i t is alleged, Christians lack the co ura gc to face the
fact and finality
of
dea th; they palliate th e pain
of
finitude by sug arcoating it
w ith an i l lusory doctr ine
of
future
life,
Let m e say at on ce that I am unaware
of
any com pletely satisfying response to this charge, and the present go rt
is
no exception. W ithout
a
response, however, C hristian ity will become either
a
revered relic o f the past
or
an emotional crutch in the prcsent. O n e un-
satisfactory response, wh ich ironically draw s upon twen tieth-century cri-
tiques of atte m pts to establish absolute certainty, is
to
point out that since
immorta l i ty is impossible to prove o r disprove, w e are ree to believe in it. It
is naive
to
sugg est that we can dismiss M arxian, N ietzschean, Freudian, and
allied cr it iques because they have no t pro du ced w ater t ig ht arg um en ts rov-
ing the nonexistenceof
God
o r the impossibili ty of imm ortali ty. We are no t,
of
course, obliged
to
accept slavishly the conclusions
of
these critiques,
but
we cannot use ouraith to shield us from thos e features of the human condi -
tion that m any serious an d sensitive con tem po rary think ers a nd artistshave
bril liantly and disturbingly i llum inated. He nce, i t is not en ou gh
to
say that
while
I
believe in
a
future
o r
new life, I ack no w ledg e the abstract possibility
that this belief may be an i llusion. T h e possibility o f i l lusion mu st be
exis-
tential, lived, experiential. Instead
of
being juxtaposed, i t
m u s t
permeate
belief in imm ortality. B u t even this is
not
en ou gh . T he mm ortal ity-bel iever
may no t escape o r be excused from confron tat ion with the eali ty of finitude
and death. Hans Jonas,
in
descr ib ing the “m odern
temper,”
says: “We do
not wish t o
forgo
the pang and poignancy
of
finitude;
we
insist
on
facing
nothingness and having the strengtho l ive with i t”
( P L , 267-68).
Lael Wer-
tenbaker, in describing h o w her husba nd faced death, recalls a l ine f ro m Jean
Giraudoux’s
Amphitvyotz
38
in which Jupi ter
says
of
the
gods:
“But
we
miss
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 201/323
174 Persotla1 Imm orta lity: Desirtlbility
n r r d Ejicaiy
som ethin g, Mercury-the poignance
of
th.e transient-the ntimation
of
mortality-that sweet sadness o f grasping at’something you canno t hold.”23
It
may
be
a
Combination
of
m on um en tal self-deception, s loppy sentimen-
tality, an d p hilosoph ical absu rdity to claim that o ne can simultaneously
be-
l ieve in imm ortality or resurrection an d still experience the “pang and poi-
gnancy
of
finitude,” “the poignance of the transient.” The issuc cannot be
engaged if we remain
a t
thc psy cho logic al level, however, for the very belief
in immortal i ty maygive rise to an intem pe rateandunw orthy fear o f
death.24The t ask is to sho w wi th som eeasonable consistency that belief in
immortal i tyneither avoids thepainoffinitudenor undialectically
jux-
taposes two ant ithetical e xp er icn ce ~. ’~ T he res no question here of con-
structing
a
conc eptual mo del in wh ich these tw o experiences are perfectly
reconciled. At the sam e t ime we mu st s tr ive to ndicate h ow they m ight be
in a dialectical relationship that transforms but does not obliterate thceality
of
bo th experiences. Recall that hequestionposed f rom theoutset is
w heth er it is possible to believe in im m ortality or resu rrectio n wh ilc par-
ticipating in that contem porary sensibility w hich is to such a great extent the
consequence of the “death of G od ” an d thc dcnial of personal imm ortali ty.
T h e task is to sugg est how thexperiences of a Con temp orary believer in and
a
contemporarydenierof mm ortal itymight
s i g n i j c a n t l y
overlap. It
is
im po rtan t to avoid both making the dis tance between the two so great that
their sharing is per iphe ral and superficial, and afirrning
a
similarity so close
that, pragmatically, there is n o diEerence between them.
Whatfollows arenotes oward heconstruction
of
a more developed
tho ug h never inal onceptual m od el. I begin
by
drawingdirectly on
William James, o n wh os e wo rk m y ow n reflections are
to
a great extent a
gloss. M ore im po rtan t , in his person and inhis philosophy, James embodied
an uneasy ension between heism and
humanism,
a
tension still felt by
those striving
to
be faithfu l to bo th these traditions.
Consider two texts f rom James:
Where God is,
tragedy
is only
provisional
and
partial, and
shipwrcck
and
dissolution
are
not the absolutely
final
things.
(I’RE,
407)
Pluralism
.
. is
neither
optimistic
nor pessimistic,
but melioristic, rather. T h e
world, it
thinks,
may
be
saved, on conditiorr that
i t s
parts do their best. But ship-
wreck
in
detail,
or
even
on
the
whole,
is
among
the
open
possibilities.
(SPP,
73)
When reflecting
on
these tcxts, i t is im po rta nt to recall James’s meta phy sical
presuppositions.
We
live
in a
processive-relational world, an“unfinished
universe,”
a
“wor ld in the making .” s “personal centres of energy,” we are
related to a wider, m ore en com pa ssing processive field of energy by which
we l ive and to whose reality we co ntrib ute thro ug h our creative activities.
Finally, as a matter of belief-or “over-belief,”
as
Jam es wo uld call it-we
may designate the wider reality that is prese nt
to us
as “God.” In the two
texts und er conside ration,
we
seem
at first
to
have tw o conflicting views
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 202/323
conc crning tragcdy : the first sces t ragcdy as “ o d y provisional and part ial”;
the second affirms the possibility of
total
tragedy. The first rejccts the final-
ity of “sh ipwreck” ; the secord docs n o t . An apparent ly s imple way of re-
mo ving inconsistency bctwe en thc texts is to sce thc first as an expression o f
belief o r faith, the second as a philosophical s tatc m ent. Th ou gh no t com-
pletely inaccurate, such a n intcrpretation is more misleading than helpful,
however, sinceJamcs held that the ase o f every philosoph y is an act o f faith.
How then might thcse two texts
be
reconciled so that thcy arc secn as
expressing
a
healthy and creative tension rather than cither an irrational op-
position or a mere existential juxtaposit ion?Thc key,
I
believe, rests in
James’s
own
des igna tion o f his pragmatic-pluralistic philosophy as “rnclior-
istic” rather than “optimistic” or “pessimistic.” Dcscribing thcse viewpoints
in terms of world salvation, “op tim ism ” m ainta ins that the world is already
saved; “pessimism,” thathe wor ld
is
not and cannot bc saved; and
“mcliorism,” or “pragm at ism,” that the wor ld m y e saved.
It
can
be
ar-
gued that thc faith of the n lcliorist or pra gm atist, thoug h existentially and
conceptually distinct f rom that of cithe r the op timist or the essimist, shares
expcricnces with both of them.
Let us first com pare the pragm atist and the pessim ist. To begin w ith, i t is
im po rtan t to s tress that in co m pa ring
the
view that the wo rld
m a y
be
saved
with the vicw hat t cannot, wc are ma king
a
comparison not between
bclief and unbelief but betw ecn twobelief o r faith structures.
A
crucial pre-
supposition here is that thc human situation is characterizcd by metaphysical
ambiguity. In their fun dam ental faith both the pessimist and the p ragm atist
co m m it themselves to an interpretation of this am biguity. W h e n the prag-
matist belicvcs that “wherc God is, t ragedy is on ly provisional and partial,”
he neither has no r believes that
he
has remo ved the am biguo us charactcr
fro m t he existential situation. Unless
hc
continues
to
share certain expc ri-
cnces with the pessimist , he cannot s in~ultaneouslyelieve in the nonfinality
o f tragedy w hile possessing a lived awarcncss of i ts possible finality.
Now this is more than
an
abstract consideration of tw o possibilities.
T h e
pragm atist believes that tragedy is on ly provisional and hence commits h im-
self-stakes his life, as it were-on this belief.
A s
a belief, howevcr, i t offers
no guarantec and involves profound r isk. M ore im po rtan t for
my
purpose,
it does not obliterate thoseexperiences that are shared with theessimist and
that
givc
rise
to
the
awareness hat “s hip w rec k in detail,
or
even
o n
the
wh ole, is among the op en possibilities.” T h e pragmatist
and
pcssimist have
overlapping experiences bu t differ p rofo un dly in interp reting man y
of
the
data of these expericnces. T h e pragm atist, because of an cssential charac-
teristic o f his faith, can claim neither to have resolvcd the pessimist’s ques-
t ions or problems nor to have climinated those
experiences
that give rise to
the pessimist’s faith. The pra gm ati st w ho llowed his faith
to
dilutc o r m ask
such
experiences and thc evcr present threat o f nihilism they cm bo dy w ould
be
guilty
of
“bad fai th.” U nless
the
abyss brought
to
consciousness in
con-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 203/323
176 Persorral
Dnmoriality:
Desirability
n r d
Eficncy
temporary thought and experience remains
a
constant possibility, faith is an
escape and a means to
a stlperJiciul
consolation.
In the concluding chapter of Pvugrnatism, James contrasts the faith o f “re-
l igious optim ism” with hat
of
his own pragmat ism.
H e
makes it qu ite clear
that the faith to w hic h a t least so m e pragmatists give assent
is
no t escapist, is
no t such hat heseriousness andsor rowso fhuman l ife arc hidden or
attenuated.
May not religious optimism be
coo
idyllic? Must d l be saved? Is
110
price to be
paid
for
the work
of
salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is
all
“yes,
yes” in
the
universe? Doesn’t the
fact
of
“no’’ stand
a t the very core of
life?
Doesn’t the
very“seriousness” that we attribute
to life
mean
that
ineluctable
noes
and
losses
form
a
part
of
it,
that there are genuine sacrifices somewhere, and
chat
something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of its
cup?
(P,
41)
James goes o n to say that he is “w illing to take the universe to be really
dangerous and adventurous, without thercfore backing ou t and crying ‘ n o
play.’
”
An d then in lines that can
be
related d irectly, I believe,
to
the
ques-
tion of persona l imm ortality, he says, “I am willing that there shouldbe real
losses and
real
losers
.
.
.
even th o the lost eleme nt migh t be onc’s self.”
Finally, James m aintains that the “gen uine prag matist . . . is willing to live
o n a schem e of uncertified possibilities w hic h he trusts; willing to pay with
his ow n pe rson , i f eed be,
for
the realization of the ideals which he frames”
James insists that the negative an d painful features of human experience
are constituents of the world process; they are not removed by the alvation
process, tho ug h w e can believc that hey arebeing ransformed hereby.
Further, while not excluding the possibility of
a
personal share in the fruits
of this wo rk, i t
does
not make such rewarda condition
of o u r
participation.
Paradoxically, only by at tending to the
tasks
at hand “for their own sakes”
can
we legit imately ho pe for the i j
of
sharing in whatever future ifc m igh t
result. A m od el of personal imm ortali ty developed along these lines wo uld
go
a lon g wa y towa rd me eting objections that such belief is both escapist
and egotistic. A sketch of such
a
m od el will be presented in the next chapter.
First, however, it w ill be useful
to
amplify the existential dialectic related to
belief in personal immortal i ty by cons ider ingeveral thinkers w h o ar e igh-
ly critical
of
any such belief.
Z‘, 142-43).
NIETZSCHE:
I MMOR TALI TY
BELIEF
A S
ANTILIFE
De spite an occasiona l shrillness, it is Friedrich Nietzsche w h o presents
us
with the most scar ing and brutal cr i t ique of
od,
religion, and immortal i ty .
It is not
a
critique that can be refuted
or
gon e aroun d. W hether i t can be
gone
through
without consuming those who dare the journey remains a n
open question. W hat emerges
from
Nietzsche’s critique
is
not an abstract
question but a Nie tzschean one-existential andexperimental-one hat
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 204/323
Immortality: Hope o r Hindrance? 177
m us t be lived rather than merely conccptualized and, shor t of the grave or
perhaps madness, admits
of
n o j n n l res ting place
or
answer.
it is a comm onplace among the more perccptive comm entators to note
that there
is
no sho rtcu t to Nietzsche’s tho ugh t. Excerpts can be bo th bril-
liant and trivial w hen rem ov ed fromNietzsche’s vital and experimcntal con-
text. I t migh t be said that Nietzsch e prove s nothing but il luminates every-
thing. Though sorncthing
of
an overstatem ent, the quip
docs
caution us
against seeking proofs or arg um en ts in the usual form and, finding non e,
assuming hatnothing
of
worth has beensaid.26W hat is it, hcn , that
Nietzsche has i lluminated? N oth ing less than the l~urna n si tuat ion loosed
from both i ts philosophical and rel igious underpinnings.ietzsche’s notori-
ous
parable
of
the “death
of
God”
signals the collapse
of
Western civilization
and
the death
of
hum anity as i t has hitherto been a nd been
known
to itself.
Nevertheless Nietzsche refuses to accept nihilism as the last w or d. N ihil ism ,
on pain of self-deception, must
be
gone throug h; but , at
the
risk of self-
dissolution, we m ust endeavor to go beyo nd it. In his doctrines of will to
power, revaluation, the overm an, and eternal recurrenc e, Nietzsch e strives
to avoid the abyss.
The extent t o w hich he succeeded and/or failed is no t m y concern here .
Suffice
i t
for m y pu rpo ses to say that his is perha ps the mo st radical effort
ever made to live in a to ta l ly inlmanen tal wor ld . God,
the
immor ta l soul,
platonic forms, eternalvalues, absoluteunch ang ing essences, imm utable
scien tific laws-all ar e for Nietzsche cowardly at tempts to persuade our-
selves that we live in a rational, purposeful, meaningful world. More impor-
tant, such beliefs serve
to
obstruct the emergenceof the on ly life
worthy of
hu m an beings-one in w hich we courageously accept responsibility for the
creation of our values and ourselves. For Nietzsche,
the
only truly authentic
life
is
one s t rong eno ugh to reate meaning in
a
fundamentally m eaningless
world. To place o u r faith and ho pe in any kind
of
transcendent reality
is
to
trade
our
human bi r thr ight for amess of otherwordly pot tage. Inasmuchas
there is n o “bey ond,” an y transcend ent belief is an expression of the wors t
and most t ruly destructive mode of nihilism. In
The
Antichrist, writ ten in
the last year of his sane Iife, Nietzsche expresses
his
view trenchantly and
powerfully:
When one places life’s center of gravity not in life but in the “bcyond”-iin
nathingtms-one deprives Iife of its center of gravity altogether. The great lie
of personal immortalitydestroys all reason,everything natural n the in-
stincts-whatever in the instincts is beneficent and life-promoting
o r
guaran-
tees
a
future now
arouses
mistrust.
To
live
so,
that there
is no
onger any
sen se
in living,
that
now becomes the “sense”
of
life. Why communal sense, why
anyfurther gratitude for descent and ancestors, why cooperate,trust,pro-
mote,
and
envisage any common welfare?27
Nietzsch e, then, wishes to overcom e nihilism but insists that this can be
do ne on ly in high ly qualified sense.28H e tells
us
that nihilism is
ambiguous,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 205/323
ma nifesting itself in
clclive
and
passive
modes .
I t is
the latter, represented by
all “otherw orldly” philosoph ies and religions, that
h e
denounces n
such
passionate term s and describes as “decline an d recession of the power
of
the
spir i t ,”
L‘Active
ihil ism,” on
the
other hand,
is
celebrated and pur suc d, for t
is
“ a
sign of increased pow er
of
t he sp i r i t. ”29 Theneatness of this distinc-
tion, however, masks the depths and terrors
of
nihilism wh ich Nietzsch e
experienced in his ow n
life
and wh ich he saw as the forthcom ing fate
of
humanity.3* H e did not ake lightly, herefore, he“death
of
God,” and
some
of his stronges t crit icism was directed against “th os e w ho
d o
not
be-
lieve in God,” since they have no t faced’up to th e radically threatening con-
sequences of the loss
of
religious
belief.
Nietzsche feared that when the
generality of h um an beings became fully conscious
of
the collapse of
the
foundations
of
their individual and cultural ives, they wo uld lose all zest for
living. This, then,
is
the existential parado x m anifest in the “death
of
G o d ” :
We
live in a world
witlzartt
a goal , purpose , or meaning, but we cann ot live
without a goal , purpose,
or
meaning. In oth er terms, the task Nietzsche sets
himself is to evok e “hope” in a world that is essentially “hopeless,” to say
“yes”
to
lifc in the face
of
the pervasive threat an d inevitable realization
of
“nothingness .”
However elusive their m eaning and wh atever
he
conccptual d i6c ul t ie s
to
wh ich they give rise, Nictzsche intcnds his doctrines
of
“the overman” and
“eternal recurrence” to
be
l i fe-af fkning. Th e overm an m ust eplace God as
the ground
of
meaning and
hope: “The
overman is the meaning
of
the ear th.
Let your will say: the overm an
shall
be the meaning of the earth I beseech
you, my brothers, r e n z a i n j i i t h j i d to t l t e
ear th,
a n d d o
not
bel ieve those who
speak
to you
of
otherwor ld ly
hopes.”3*T h e
overman w ill be
the
o n e
(or
ones) strong e nough to
accept the responsibility
for
legislating values,
a
role
previously assigned to
God.
In
addit ion, the overm an
will
be
s t rong
en o u g h
to
m ak e of the doct r ineof eternal recurrence not an abstract affirmationbut
a
l ived affkmation. The
affirmation
an d experience of eternal rccurrence will
characterize the inn er structu re
of
the overm an’s being3’ W hatever else i t
m igh t connote-and the ran ge and diversity of interpretations suggests that
it connotes
m u c h
more-the doctrine of eternal recurrence was
expevierlced
by Nietzsche as his most radical
aairmat ion of
the wor th
of
life. I would
note only
two features
o f this affirmation. First, against
the
threat of all
escapist eternalisms and narrow em poral hedo nism s, he nsists up on an
eternity that is no t opp ose d
to or
separable f rom t ime b ut
is
the depth of
Each tem po ral m om en t has an eternal depth that lends
to
this life
a
significance denied by the eternalist
a n d
missed
by
the hedonist.34 A second
and perhaps
more
crucial aspect of the doctrine of eternal recurrences that
it
expresses Nictzsche’s
effort
to
refuse to mask-or to hold out any ho pe
for removing-the suffering and terror that are perm ane nt and inevitable
characteristics of life, an d still say a joyful “yes”
to
this life.35 For N ietzsch e,
it is th e belief in eternal recurrence that m akes tolerable, for th os e
who
have
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 206/323
the spiritual strength, an intolerable situation.
I t
does so by testing the ex-
tent to w hich they rcally attirm life. O n ly those w h o can love life w ith
all
its
pain and meaninglessness are tru c lovers of l ife and not escapists into so m e
illusory world.
The rc is perhaps no on e oday who could accept literally Nietzschc’s doc-
trines of theovermanandeternalrecurrence. Nevertheless, anyonc w ho
seriously reflects on the qu estio ns with wh ich hey are concerned ca nn ot, or
a t least o ug ht no t, avoid them-particularly anyone syrnpathctic to th e per-
spective prcsented in this essay. Those dirncnsions
of
human reality so dra-
matically described by Nie tzsch e can no t be avoided in experience, and n o
at tempt should be madc o avoid them in thought.
A M E L IO RA T IO N : YES
SALVATION:
NO
O ve r twen ty years ago , in an essay entitled “T h e American Angle of Vi-
sion,” John J. M cDcrrnot t wrote: “Over agains t the doctr ine of obsoles-
cence in which the h istory of
man
waits patiently for a paradisiacal
Dew ex
macbirza, theAm erican ernpcrpoints
to a
tcmporalizcdeschatology n
which the Sp irit ma nifests itself genc ration by generation and all counts to
the In
a
subsequent scries
of
perceptivcndrovocative cssays,
M cD crrn ott has developed, directly and indirectly, the notion
of
a
“tem-
poralized e ~ c h a t o l o g y . ” ~ ~ncreasingly, his position tends to cxcludc belief
in
God and mm ortal i ty. Since we share so many metaphysicaland epis-
temological assu mp tion s, and since m y ow n reflcctions have been so deeply
influenced by him,
t
is imp or tant tocall attcntion to the divergence between
us on the question
of
Go d and immor ta li ty .
The simplest way to describe the difference might be to say that on this
question McDerrnott’s tilt
is
Deweyan, whcreas
mine
is Jamesian. Whilc an
epistemolog ical agno sticism characterizcs both perspectives,
belief
in
God
and immortal i ty is viewed morc sympathcticaIly by one than
by
the other.
Dewey felt that religious experience-in an y w ay invo lving Go d and
im-
mo rtality, at least-had
for
the
most
part exhausted itself, whilejames to the
end of his life viewed the positive possibilities of reIigious experience as
indispensable for the growth and development of the human communi ty .
Despite the fact that M cD er m ott is on e of the most insightful and imagina-
tive con temp orary interpreters of James, I read h im as increasingly siding
with Dewey
as
regardsreligiousexperience.McDermot tdoesnot abso-
lutely rulc
out
the po ssibility
of
God and imm ortal ity ,
of
course, but he
effectively does so for the purposes of
his
reflective existential lifc.
For
him,
this
belief
is n o long er, in James’s sense, a “livc hypo thesis”: that is, “one
which appeals as a real possibility
to
h i m ” ( W B , 14).
I f
M c D c r m o t t has not
totally excluded belief in God and imm ortal ity f rom
his
reflections, he has
most certainly removed it from the vital centero the periphcry of his reflec-
tive life. In so
doing,
I
think that he has sharpened and deepened the force
and bite
of
his positive insigh ts. This is m os t in evidence in his essay
“The
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 207/323
Inevitability of Our O w n D ea th : The Ce lebra tion
of
Tim e as
a
Prelude to
Disaster” ( S E , 157-68). While Mc D erm ott disavows any “final kno wled ge”
concerning imm ortal ity claims, the tone
of
the essay clearly dim inishes the
seriousness and v iability
of
any and all such claims. We are told that “over-
belief in so m e
form of
salvation
or
immor ta l i ty” is
“a
major way in which
many persons shun the. trauma of death.” Further , “many of us cling t o the
existence of one or m o r e of these solutions, as a redoubt ,
a
t rum p card or
a
last-minute reprieve fro m the ov erw he lmin g evidence that we are terminal”
(SE,
162).
M cD erm ott is underlining hat self-deception which M arx, Nietzsche,
Freud , and others have maintained is at the roo t of a11 belief in God and
immortality.
I
will tou ch up on this
a
bit mo re fully
later,
but the obvious
question
I
will raise then, as I raise it now, is whether this is the whole
story-has the entire ty
of
religious experience been accou nted for by the
revelation that self-deception is perhap s to so m e d eg re e characteristic
of
all
religious experience? First, how ever, I would like to consider a few m o r e
aspects of M cDerrnott’s doctrine in order
to
illuminate
a
hypo thesis that I
consider real and formid able but, as the fun da m enta l thru st
of
this essay
indicates, not fully persuasive.
I
wish to s tress at the outset the extento wh ich share wi th M cDermot t
Jamesian view of th e self, a self wh ich, in M cD errno tt’s wo rds, “is self-
creating
in
i ts ransactions w ith heenv i r onm en t” ( S E ,
45),
andwhich
“risks belief in hy po thes es so as to elicit data unavailable were an agnostic
posit ion ad opted”
( S E , 49).
Where our perspectives diverge is in the scope
of
the “environment” and the range
of
available “data.”
In
the chapters
“James: Full Self and W ider Fields” an d “James: Self and
God,”
I have ar-
gue d, withJam es, the plausibi li ty o f believing that we are con tinuous “w ith
a
wider self f rom wh ichsaving experiences
flow
in”
(PU,
139).
McD er m ot t ,
o n the other hand, with Dewey, “acknowledges no forces at
work, neither
Dionysian nor Divine, other than the constitutive transactionsf hu m an life
w ith the affairs of
nature and the wor ld”S E ,
167).
Both hypotheses presup-
pose experience as transactional, bu t on e suggests a personal transcendent
pole, w hil e the oth er effectively denies it.
The divergence
is
indicated by th c different interpretation or emphasis
that McDerrnot t and 1 would give to the following text ofjarnes:
ifwe survey the field o f history and
ask
what featureall great periods of revival,
of
expansion
of he human mind, display
in
c o m m o n , we
shall
find,
I
think,
simply
this: that each and all of
them
have said
to
the human
being,
“The i n m o s t
nature
of
reality
is
congenial to
powers
which you
possess.” (WB,
73)
McD ermot t comments : “In this text ofJa m es, the fun da m en tal dialectic of
our
situation is laid bare in one trenc han t sen tenc e. Reality has its given ness,
its obduracy, its nature’’
( S E ,
106).
To
which
I
would add : i ts mystery and
mo re enco mp assing dime nsions, wh ich ossibly are manifestations
of
a
cre-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 208/323
ative principle st rug gli ng
to
incarnate itself and in part dependent upon
s
to
d o
so. I share wi th McD ermot t
his
desire to affirm a h u m a n future that
“doe s not await
some
natural or divine
deus ex machina” (SE,96).
Whcther i t
is possible
to
const ruct
a
Go d-hyp othesis that allows for and indeed necessi-
tates hu m an
effort
w a s the burdenof th e previous chapter. I have repeatedly
maintained that the possibility of any immortali ty bel ief depends o n th e
plausibility of such a God-hypothesis. It is m y symp athy for this hypothesis
that leads me t o & ver ge
from
M c D e r m o t t o n th e m e a n i n g
of
the future,
time , and salvation.
In the late 14 60 s“th e era of the “co untercu lture”-the you ng w ere often
said to fear that they had no futurc. To the extent that this was true, perhap s
the you ng were going proxy for all those
who,
in the wake
of
the searing
modern cr it iques of ph iloso ph y and religion and th e m or e recent disillu-
sio nm en t w ith the saIvific possibilit ies of
scicnce,
feared that hlrmanity had
no future. I t was Nietzsche w ho m os tdramatically explored this possibility,
and McDermott shares with him the effort to say “Yes” to life and to strive
to build a future in the bsence
of
those self-deceptive beliefs up on w hic h an
earlier “sense of the future” depe nded . B oth thinkersesire a
fu ture wi thout
i llusions. In M cD ermo tt’s languag e, “Th e fund am ental qu est ion s wh ether
there is
a
median
way
betw een the self-deception
of
immortal i ty ,
on
the one
hand, a nd the radical co m m itm en t to t he m o m e n t , on he o ther hand”
( S E ,
164).
T h e
task,
as
he sees it, is
to
avoid the “twin pitfalls of the humdrum,
ennui, and boredom , and the equally dehum anizing at tempt to escape the
r hy thm of t ime on behalf of a sterile a n d probably self-deceptive eternal
resolution” ( S E , 168).
Concerning the possibi l ity of
a human
future , the terminality-believer
and he mmo rtality-believerare confrontedwithcontras t ingproblems.
Paradoxically, bo th beliefs threaten to impo verish the present. Term inality
belief threatens the depth of the present by emptying it of any significance
beyond the moment , inasmuch as eventually all dim ens ion s of the m om en t
com e to nothing . Imm ortal i ty belief , on the other hand, tends
to
view the
prese nt as at best
a
mere means, something to be escaped and overcome in
a
fut ure life. Th u s the task of th e terminality-believer is to show that
the
pre-
sent has a l ife and role beyond the m om en t in spite
of
the absence
of
any
absolute or eternal future: hence M cDerm ott’s “temporalized eschatology.”
T he immortal ity-believer, in con trast , m ust sh ow that th e only non ma gical ,
nonescapist fut ure life
is
one
so
organical ly boun d up w ith the present that
the quality o f that life is in pa rt, at least, d ep en de nt on the way in which the
present is lived, the on ly access to
a
significant future being an intensely
lived present
Fromeith er perspective, here is a recognit ion h at hepresent is en-
hanced, deepened, expanded when viewed and lived in relation to
a
future.
Historically, no co m m un ity has ever been energized except insofar as its
members believed
that
their efforts were co ntr ibu ting
to
some
future life,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 209/323
either
for
them sclves o r thcir hcirs. A serious do ub t can be raised, thcrefore,
that humans-cither individually o r collectively-would co nti nu e to sacri-
fice and struggle
if any and
all
belief in
a
fLlturc life wcrc surrendcred. Prag-
matically sp eak ing, then , therc is n o qucstion
of
thc fruitfulness
of
such
belief. W hat is in que stion is the character of that futurc lifc. Will those
individuals who are a t present striving to build i t participate
i n
it directly
and personally, o r merely indirectly and symb olically?
Inseparably rclated t o the
qucstion of
thc futu re is thc qucstion
of
“tirnc.”
For M cD cr m ot t , “ t im e” m us t
be
rcscucd from both thc classical
perspec-
tive, in w hic h it is but a surface that must
be
penetratcd and cscaped in order
to realize rcfugc in the perrna ncnt, eterna l depth, an d from those co ntem po-
rary pcrspcctives
in
wh ich thc entire significance
of
time
is exhaustcd in the
thin plcasure an d pain of the mo men t . T ime s tands in need of redemption,
but it can
be
rcdeerned, if
a t
all, on ly by hum an eE or t . In one of his more
touching passagcs, McDcrrnott writcs: “I believc that time is sacred. I t
is
not sacred, however, because it has bcen en do w ed by God o r by the Gods,
o r by nature,
o r
by any other extra
o r
intra force. I believe that tim e is sacred
because hu m an histo ry has so endowed i t , wi tho u r suffcrings, our commit-
ments and
with
our anticipations” ( S E , 167). In asserting
its
sacredncss,
M cD erm ot t in no way intends
to
sugarco at the destructivc and dissolving
features of t ime. Living as we do “wi th in the bowels of the temporal pro-
cess,” M cD er m ot t believes “tha t w e sh ould cxperience o ur livcs in thc con-
text of bcing permanently afflicted, that is, of
bcing
terminal” ( S E , 164). H e
here join s
w i t h
a n u m b e r
of
other contcm porary
thinkers
w h o insist that
unless we can accept and to some degre c aff irm thc f inali ty of ou r ow n
dcath, we cann ot ive truly hu m an lives. It is the unde rstandable butencrvat-
ing and somewhat unw or thy fear of death that leads hum ans to believe in
and
hope
for
an
i l lusory immortal i ty . “Time
is
the tooth that gn aw s,”
Dew-
ey tells us. “ I t is the roo t of wh at s som etim es called the instinctive belief in
immortality. Everything perishes but men are unab le t o believe that
perish-
ing is the last word .”38
BothDeweyandMcDertnott recognizedeath as “th e last w ord ,” bu t
neither will accept it as the only wo rd. W hile M cD erm ott insis ts that we
sh ou ld experience ourselves as terminal , he also insists that we can “live
a
creative, prob ing, building life.” It s no t su fic ien t to ay that
we cmz
live this
way ; rather “it is only in this way that
we
can
live
a
distinctively hum an life”
( S E ,
364).
T h e very possibility of growth is stimulated by recognition of
our termina lity, since “hanging back, while waiting to
be
rescued u ltirnate-
ly, from the flow,
will
not generate growth”
( S E ,
166-67).3y I t appears to
me that M cD crr no tt is saying we can live a creative life in spite of death
rather than because of it. Influenced as he
has
been for ma ny years by th e
work of N o r m a n 0 Bro wn ,4o he nevertheless refuscs to jo in in Brown’s
Dionysian death-dance. In M cD erm ott’s jud gm en t, B row n asks us to mar-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 210/323
r y our ow ndcath” ( S E , 163). UnlikeBrown o r Nietzschc, McDermot t
hopes for a mode
of
l iving availabk to m or c han
a
few isolatcd, idiosyncrat-
ic, and hcroic individuals. In a rclativcly carly essay, hc asks:
How can h u m a n
life,
collectively
unde rs tood ,
sustain such a vision. such
a
Ioncly vigilancc
on behalf
of h u m a n
values,
str ipped of their guarantec
and
lightcd only by thcir h u m a n quali ty?
I
speak
not
of
this pcrson
n o r that person,
not of
Camus, nor
ofWil l ianlJanlcs , nor u f John Lkwcy, nor
o f H a n n a h
Arcndt,
but
rachor ofthosc
who gdthcr
togcthcr
without
such
insight
and livc
in a n d off
t he
“cveryday.”
We canno t ,
after all, in
Buber’s
phrase,
live
o n l y
with
t he
“spasmodic brcakthroughs of
the glowing deeds
of solitary spirits.” ( C E , 64)
in
thc tradit ion ofJames and Dcwcy, M cD erm ott is dcdicated to forging
a
philosophy that isof service not only to thcpecialist bu t in some way to the
widest range of persons possible. H e m us t act o n th e
bclicf
that not just thc
few but the m any can corne to tcrms wi th theabsence
of
salvation and bend
their energies to ameliorat ing the human condit ion. Nictzschc said, “Those
who
cannot
bear the scntcncc, Therc is no salvation, orrgqlrt to pcrish ” 4 ’
While M cD errn ott w ou ld no t accept the harsh “014ght to pcrish,” hc does
imply, as we have seen, that thc surrendc r o f thc hope for alvation is essen-
tial to living
3
distinct ivcly hum an life and contr ibu ting
to
whatever
ame-
lioration of the hum an situation is
possiblc.
I h a w presented M cD crm ott’s view at such length because in additio n to
i ts emerging from the sam e metaphysical assum ptionss
docs rninc,
it
poses
a serious and strong hypo thesis in sha rp conflict on key points with my
own.
T h e
fundamental , and I believe decisive, divergen ce betwe cn us,
as
already ndicated, has to do with the role o f theGod-hypothesis
in
our
respective doctrines. I would l ike to consider a few “sticking points” for me,
but wi thin the f ramework of
he
“existential dialectic,” in the
mode
of ques -
tioning responses rather than alleged refutations.
To
begin with , M cDe rrnott’s assertion
of
“the overw helm ing evidence
that we are terminal” would seem in need of
much
fuller exposition. T ha t
we
arc “termin al” in
some
sense, that we “die ,” is of course
beyond
ques-
t ion. Thedisp utc has todowi thw he the r
we
are ahsdrrtely terminal,
whether “death comes as the end.” M uch depends o n what is
to
count as
evidencc, and herc it would
seem
that reasonable men and wo m en arc divid-
ed.
What seems
to
d r o p o u t
of
M cDerrnott’s picture is that vast amb igu ou s
body of religious ex pcricncc considcred so impor tan t
by
James which is
central to my hyp othesis. At the sam e time, there is no denying-as I have
acknowledgcd f rom the first-that the ov erw he lmin g nu rnb cr of thc mos t
creative thinkcrs and artists in the modern and contemporaryworld seem to
livc
a n d
act within
a
belief framew ork that takes the absolute cessation
of
personal life for granted. But at least at th is moment in human evolution,
there rema in, even in thc West, large
n u m b e r s
of dedicated peoplc-indi-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 211/323
184
Pevsorlnl I m n r o r t n l i t y : Desirability and E f f i c n c y
viduals voluntarily living with and serving the poor, families adop ting dis-
abled child ren, and the like-who believe that neither their lives n or th e
lives of th ose they serve are exhausted in their m om en tar y existence with in
the
visible world.
Another c la im of M cD erm ot t ’s that I conside r open to qucstion is that
immortality belief is an obstack to g ro w th and creative activity, whereas
terminality belief
is a
st imulus. It would seem that there is n o compell ing
evidence eithe r way. Im m ortality belief does dcenergizc some, becoming an
obstacle to the ir participation in the “building of the ea rth .” Yet the sam e
belief spu rs oth ers o engage in
a
variety
of
modes of creative activity. Here
I
will cite
no
less an autho ri ty than M cD erm ott himself . Some years ago. in
an essay in which
he
argued for the nonobsolescence of
the
Puritan experi-
ence, he stated: “Th e history of Calv inis t doctr inen the hand s of the A mer-
ican P uritans is
a
revealing instance of the t ransmutat ionof theological asser-
t ions for purposes of gr ound ing
a
more extensive society while therc is still
com m i tm en t to the fundamen tal Chr ist ian concern for redemption”
(CE,
77-78). A nd
just
as imm or tali ty belief can lead to engagement or disengage-
me nt with the task of
the human communi ty , so terrninality belief can lead
either to the courageous building
of a
constructive life or to a debilitating
despair or destructive narcissistic hedonism.
In urging us to live creative lives wh ile expe riencing ourselvesas terminal,
M cD erm ot t a lso urges us to ask “for no guarantees and for n o ul timate
signif icance to be at tr ibu ted to our endeavor”
( S E ,
164). This last phrase
would seem to conflate tw o q ui te different questions: that of “guarantees”
and that of “ultim ate significance.” Th ere is n o d o ub t that for many, faith
and hope have been accompanied by claims of cert i tude and guara ntee. I
share wi th McDermot t theamesian view o f belief
or
faith
as
risk-laden and
devoid of any guarantees,
but
w he the r su ch faith necessarily excludes
a
hope
that o u r efForts have ultimate significance is qu ite ano ther qu estion . M cD er-
m ott is no t as clear o n this po int as he mig ht be. Aftcr qucstionin g the
overbelief
of
salvation or immortal i ty , he quickly adds:
I do
not refer here
to a kope
that
somehow,
somewhere, somewhen,
al l will
go
well for all of
us
who are,
have been
or will be. Certainly,
such
a hope is a
legitimate and understandable human aspiration. To convert this hope
into
a
commitment, a knowledge, a conviction, is
to
participate in an illegitimate
move from
possibility
to
actuality.
It
is
understandable
that
we
wish
to
escape
from peril, but it is unacceptable to translate that desire into a belief that
we
have
so
escaped.
( S E ,
162)
I
find this passageperfectlyacceptable nsofar as it
quite
properly dis-
tinguishes
hope
from know ledge and p ossibil i ty
from
actuality. What I do
not understand
is
what the first two sentences mean
for
McDerrnott , given
his
terminality belief. How is itpossible
to
“hope that somehow,
some-
where,
somewhen,
all
will go
well
for
a l l
of
us”
if
one
believcs that each and
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 212/323
every
one
of us
is
destincd for absolute a ~ ~ n i h i l a t i o n ? ~ ~am not , of coursc ,
suggesting that McDerrnott claimscertaintyconcerning ou r annihilation
anymo re than I claim certainty as rcgards o u r salvation.While his view,
then,
does
not
exclude
the abstract possibility
of
hope
for
salvation,
I
a m
questioning the existential cfficacy of such hope w ithin
the
f ramework
of
terminality belief.
Th ere are tw o o ther passages in M cD erm ott’s cssay in which he appears
to me to soften the harsh consequences of his terminality belief. “ Memo-
ries,” he tells us, “save th e loss of places and the loss of persons f ro m total
disappearance” ( S E , 164). But d o they?
For
a time,
of
course, yes-but on ly
(‘for a time,’’ and a very short t ime a t that. If
h u m a n
m em or y is the sole
source
of
protect ion ag ainst “total disappearance,” then the overwhelm ing
num ber of the bil lions of hu m an beings
who
have existed have already and
irrevocably disappeared, and “in time” all huma,nsand all traces of humans
are likely
to disappear as the
cosmos
returns to the preorganic s tate ou t
of
wh ich hum an life
emerged
for its brief, fleeting m om ent-“ trou blin g the
endless
reverie.”
M cD ermo tt c onclu des his essay by citing one of Rilke’s elegies:
.
. .
Just
once,
everything, only
for
once. Once and no more. And we
too,
once.
And
never again. B u t this
having been once, though only once,
having been once o n earth-can
i t
ever be canceIled?d3
To
wh ich M cD errnott respond s: “Inde ed, can it,
we,
ever
be
cancelled? I
think not. Celeb rate” ( S E , 168).
Here
I m ay be missing
some
subt le ty in
both the poet and the p hilosophcr, but
I
cannot resist asking,
w h a t
docs it
mean
to
be terminal if
it
doe s not mean
to
be
canceled?
For
mc,
thc s t rength
of
M cD erm ott’s cssay is its insistent celcbration of
h u m a n
lives i t1
spite o
their inevitable termination
u r d
cancellation.
GOD:
YES
I MMOR TALI TY: NO
A n effort to
show
that the cessation of th e ives of individual persons is both
a
necessary and
a
constructivecharacteristic of reality s ound n the
thought
of
Ch arles Ha rtshorne. “Th e basic reason for mo rtality,” he tells
us,
“is simple and
clear,
in
my
opinion,
and
it
is
aesthetic. Life
is
interesting
because of birth and death, not in spice of them.
. .
T h e y
give life
form,
and witho ut form there s n o satisfaction and no value, I really believe it is as
simple
as that.’y44 Ha rtshorne is neither alone no r particularly original in
comparing individual l ives to works of art
and
finding an unending life as
repug nant nd defective as an unendin g play orMore dis t inct , how-
ever, if not unique, is that H artsh orn e locates ou r individual dramas within
cosmic one. It wo uld seem that for him, only insofar as ou r lives have a
transcendent
reference
can they
be
said
to
have meaning. Hence, he
ofikrs
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 213/323
186 Pcrsorrol Irnntortality:
Desirability
nrld
Eflcncy
the doctr ine of “con tr ibutionism ” as a solut ion to the problem of de ath.
While we can no t, after o u r death, benefit from “hav ing lived well,” there
mu st be supposed som e l ife that does benefit : “O n ly if
we
can believe in
a
superhuman and in
some
strict sense divine form of ife, to w hi ch
o u r
lives
make contr ibutions proport ional to their goodness or beauty, only then is
the permanenc e of our con tr ibutions clcarly irnplicd.” Hartshornc adds hat
“this docs solve the basic question about death, wh ich is how thc meaning
o f life can survive its term ination.”46
I t i s God, then, whosaves ou r lives fro m
to ta l
extinction by receiving the
fruits
of
these l ives an d incorp orat ing them within his ow n. Ha rtshorne
do es not hesitate to refer to G o d
as
“ the Cosmic organism” and to assert
that “ w e are as cells in hedivineorganism.”
I t
fol lows hat“we serve
God
.
. by furnishing prosper ing, happycells to contr ibute
to
his own joy,
to
the aesthetic goodness and richness
of
his life”
(PAT
II:88-89).
In spite of Ha rtsho rnc’s prod igiou s intellectual pow ers, I find it difficult to
avoid a response characterized by bo th rep ug na ncc an d frivolity.
He
softens
the picture somew hat by maintaining that
we
“will serve God, not
as
pup-
pets in his hand s, but as, in hum ble me asure, co-creators w ith Him ” (PAT
II:87). T he b ot to m line, however, is still that wc arc to act in
such
a way as to
m ake
life
interestingand enjoyable or hedivine pectator-participant.
Hartshorne’s view
seems
close to one descr ibed, though not shared,by M i-
guel d e U n a m u n o :
Before
this
terr ible mystery
of
mortality
. . .
man ad opts different a t t itudes
and seeks in various ways to console himself for having been born . And
now
it
occurs to him to take i t as a diversion
and
he says to himself with Renan that this
universe is a spectacle that God presents
to
Himself,
and that
i t
behooves us to
carry out the in ten t ions
f
the great Stage-Manager nd con t r ibu te tomake the
spectacle
the
most
brilliant
and the
most
varied
that
may
be.
( T S L ,
51)
I t is diff icult to understand why we should
be
particularly motivated to put
on a “g oo d show,” even for such
a
distinguished audience. Despite the m a n y
and suggest ive comp arisons between life and a s tage, most of us tend to
believe that “real l ife” e m bo dies a de pth and m ean ing that forbid us to re-
duce it to mere “play-acting.”
In “Immortal i ty and the Modern Ternper” ( P L , 262-81), HansJonas
presents
a
doctr ine of im mo rtali ty s t r ikingly s imi lar to H ar tshorne’s but
more consciously tentat ive and perm eated by
a
m oral rather than aesthetic
overtone . Jonas suggests a metaphysical my th, within wh ich his view on
imm ortal i ty is developed: “In the beginning, for unknow able reasons, the
gro un d of being, or the Divine , cho se to give i tself over to the chance a nd
risk and endless variety of bec om ing .” Jon as insists that the Divine gave
itself withou t rema inder; “on this unco nditional imm anen ce the mo dern
tem pe r insists” ( PL, 275). I t would seem that for Jonas, God has sunk him-
self completely
in
the evolut ionaryprocess; subsequently, its m od e of be ing
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 214/323
Itnmortality: Hope or
Hindrance? 187
will be totally dependcntuponwhatburgeonsforth from thisprocess.
Every stage of the cosm ic process is
a n
instance of “God’s tryin g ou t his
hidden essence and discovering himself thro ug h the surp rises of the world-
adventurc”
( P L ,
276).
W ith thc appearance
of
life, but particu larly
h u m a n
life, we have
“a
hesitant emergenceof transcendence from the opaqueness of
immanence”
( P L ,
275).
A price must be paid, however, for the em ergen ce of indiv idual ife, and
that price is death: “M ortality is the very cond ition of the sepa rate self-
hood .
.
.
so highly prized throug hou t the organ ic wo rld”
(PL,
276).
As
in
Hartshorne’s view, God is the chiefbeneficiary of this mortality,sincc
through births and deaths, sufferings and joy s, love and even cruelty, “th e
Godh ead reconstitutes i tself.” Hen ce, “this s ide of the
good
and evil, G od
cannot ose n he great evolutionary gamc” ( P L ,
277). Are
we hum ans ,
then,
to
have
no
share in the fruits of
o u r
efforts; is human life completely
devoid of any imm ortal ch aracter?t is consequences such as these that Jonas
strives to avoid. Since the indiv idual, in particular the person ,
is
“by nature
temp oral and not eternal,” there is no possibility of personal survival (PL,
278).
Th is is not the wh ole s tory, owever, for Jonas suggests that
s
experi-
ments
of
eternity, we may achieve imm ortal i ty throug h our deed s.“Not the
agen ts, wh ich mu st ever pass, bu t their acts cn ter into
the
becorning
god-
head. . . and in this aw esom e im pact of his deeds on God’s destiny, on the
very complexion of eternal being, lies the im m orta l i ty
of
m a n ” (PL, 274,
277).
47
Jonas dra w s tw o crucial ethical conclusions fro m his metaphy sical my th:
f irst , ou r deeds and how we l ive our lives takes on a “transcendent impor-
tance”; seco nd , through our deeds and our ives “we can nour ish andwe can
starve divinity, w e can perfect an d w e can
disfigure
i ts image”
( P L ,
278).
He nce, “we literally hold in ou r faltering hand s the future
of
the divine
adventure,” for inasmuch as he has “given himself whole to the becoming
world, God
has n o more t o give: it is
man’s
n o w
to
give to him ”
( P L , 281,
279).
A s
to our s take in the future , “al though the hereaf ter is not ours , nor
eternal recurrence of the here, we can have im m orta l i ty at heart wh en in our
brief span
we
serve ou r threaten ed mo rtal affairs and help the suffering im-
mortal God”
( P L , 281).
Th e positions of Ha r t shorne and Jona s a re ak in to that of Whitehead.
Un like hem , however,Whiteheaddoesnotpositivelyexclude hepos-
sibility of personal imm ortali ty-“subject ive immo rtali ty,” in W hitehead-
ian langua ge; the significant similarity is evident in
his
doctr ine
of
“objec-
tive im mo rtality.”
No
doct r ine ofWhitehead’s is easy
to
sum ma rize, but his
view on the ma tter unde r conside ration is som ething like the following .
Reality is best described as a multiplicity of related processes, the basic un its
of wh ich are designated actual entities r actual occasions. Actual entities are
submicroscopic centers of activity, which come
to
be throughacts that are a t
least partially self-creative an d tha t pe rish alm ost instantly, “Perpetual per-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 215/323
188 Personal Itnnrortdity: Desirnbility u r d Eficacy
ishing,” which characterizes all actual entities with the exception of God, is
not a total perishing.W hile actual entities cease to be as regards their subjec-
tive immediacy, they co nti nu e to be-are “irnrnorta1””insofar
as
they are
appropriated and enter into the consti tut ion
f
new actual entities. T h e relat-
edness that characterizes actual entities is, W hitehead tells us, “ w ho lly co n-
cerned with the appropriat ionof the dead by the living-that is to say, with
‘objective imm orta lity’ wh ereb y wh at is divested of i ts ow n l iving imme-
diacy becomes
a
real component in otherivingmmediacies of
be-
coming.”4*
In the concluding chapter o f Process urd Reality W hitehead at tempts
to
show that “ the object ive immo rtali ty of actual occasions requires th e pri-
mordial permanence
of
G o d ”
( P R ,
527).
h
so
doing , he is endcavoring,
perhaps, to give
a
me taphysical justification
for
a rather s trong claim h e
made a few years earlier (1925): “T he fact of the religious vision, and its
history o f persistentexpansion, is o u r one ground for op t imism. Apar t
from it , hu m an life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a mass
of
pain and misery,
a
bagatelle
of
t r a n s i e n t e ~ p e r i e n c e . ” ~ ~n the later work,
Whitehead nsists hat “objective im m or tali ty w ith in the temporal wor ld
does .n ot solve the problem set by the penetration
of
the finer religious in-
tention. ‘Everlastingness’ has been lost; and ‘everlastingncss’ is the co nte nt
of that vision upon which the finer religions are built” ( P R , 527).
Whitehead goes on in
a
series of what might becalled dialectical para dox -
es
to afflrm essential interdependence and interpenetration (bu t n ot iden tity)
between
God
and the wor ld . All tem poral occas ions em bo dy G od and are
em bo died in Go d. “Each actuality has its present life and its im m ed iate pas-
sage int o novelty; bu t its passage is no t its death. This final phase of passage
in
God’s
nature is ever enlarging itself. . . . Each actuaIity in the tem po ral
world has its recep tion into
God’s
nature”
( P R ,
528-31).
W hat remains un-
clear, however, is whether the unique individuality characterizing those
so-
cieties
of
actualentities called “persons,” has its“reception nto
God’s
nature.’’
F r o mm y perspective, thephilosophies of immortality expressedby
Har tshorne,
Jonas, and
Whitehead realize
a number of admirable
insights,
some version of whichmus t bc included in anyreasonablysatisfactory
model of immortal i ty .To begin with, they present an immortality ar supc-
rior to
and
hum anly r icher than th e
one
so
beloved
of
the
Greeks
and still
so
prevalent, f on ly implicitly, n th e co nt em po ra ry world-namely, fame-
i r n m ~ r t a l i t y , ~ ~hose l imitat ions and moral shortcomings have becom e in-
creasingly evident to reflective persons, however strong thc desire for
fame
may
cont inue to be in mostchievers. “HOW oon they forget” might be the
lament of all but a very
few
of the billions w h o have pop ulated the earth.
Further, with the en d
f
the earth and
he
hu m an racc a distinct possibility, if
no t ce rtainty, it becom es incrcasingly likely that in
the
lon g run we will all
be forgotten.
We
need not,
however,
project
so
far
ahead
to
recognize the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 216/323
moral inadequacy
of
any imm ortal ity through fame. I t too often happens
that those w ho m igh twell be deem ed wo rthyof fam e pass unn oticed, wh ile
the
more
reprehen sible achieve a fam e that keeps th em in the min ds of pos-
terity: given
a
fame-immortality perspective, as Jonas lam ents, “the Hitlers
and the Stalins o f o u r ra wo uld have succeeded to extract im m orta l i ty from
the extinction
of
their nameless victims’’ (PL,
265).
Anothermer i t of he kind of mm ortal itysugges tedby these hree
thinkers is that it imm easu rab ly enh anc es the significance of human acts ,
individual and collective. Pragmatically speaking, an account of human ac-
tions that sees them 2s not only having an intrinsic me aning but also con-
t r ibut ing to the enr ichment anddvance
of an eternal process is far sup erior
to t he m any m odes
of
w hat m igh t
be
called passive Platonism: that is, supe-
rior to an y view that posits essences, values,
or
form s as eternally com plete
and ully realized, the reb y est rict inghum an action to mere imitation.
Som ething close to such “passive Plato nism ” is conveyed,
I
believe, by San-
tayana:
“ H e
w h o lives in th e ideal an d leaves it expressed i n society o r in art
enjoys
a
double immortal i ty . The eternal has absorb ed him while he lived,
and when he is dead h is in fluencc br ings o thers to the same a b ~ o r p t i o n . ’ ’ ~ ~
Finally, Hartsho rne, Jonas, and W hitehead , ach in a somewhat dis t inct ive
fashion, have madeormidable efforts
to
be faithful
to
that radical
imm anen tism wh ich has been
s o wide ly and diversely advanced by con tem-
porary thinkers . A t the same t ime hey have striven to avoid the sm oth erin g
and suffocating character o f suc h im m ane ntism , w hich too ofte n can give
rise to
the fecling
of
being locked in
a
cosmic madhouse. Jonas,after notin g
the reality and pervasiveness
of
t ime, adds: “An d yet-we feel, tem po rality
cannot
be
the wh ole story, because in man it
has
an inherently self-surpass-
ing quality, of which the very fact and fumbling
of ou r idea of eternity is a
cryptic signal”
( P L ,
268).
I t may well be that forsome t im e to
come,
th e best that reflective thinke rs
can
do is
call at tention to the “cryp tic s ign al”
r
the “ rumor
of
angels,” T h e
efforts o f the Hartsho rnes, Jonascs, Whitehe ads, and their l ike to affirm an
eternal,
a
transcendent, a G od that does no t serve as a refuge or an escape
from the scratchings an d sufferings of human agents, are as needed as they
are 1ikeIy to fall short . Whatever the shortcom ings of such at temp ts from
thk poin t of
view of systematic conce ptualization, their d irection, I feel con-
fident, is the one that offers th e m os t hop e an d the richest possibilit ies for
both the deepening and expansion of o u r present life and the contribution
toward significant hu m an life in th e fu ture. The m od est criticisms and ten-
tative proposa ls that follow are to a great extent but
a
variation and a gloss
o n the ideas o f such thinkers.
It is important
to
stress that while n o pretense is m ade of anything ap-
proaching
“proof’
o r refutation, there
is a
necessity for a t least attempting
to
move beyond any sent imental pos ture w hich ho lds that both thernrnor-
tality belief and its cou nterb elief can
be
reconciled w ith neither pain nor
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 217/323
190
P e rs o na l I m m o r t a l i t y
:
D e s i r a b i l i t y at id E icncy
loss. Nevertheless, as already noted, we are obliged to listen to these and
other counterclaims and their accompanying arguments with an “existential
ear.” A pragmatist, while not excused from attending to the signs of argu-
ment and the need for systematic conceptualization, must continually re-
main sensitive to those lived liabilities and possibilities that ever elude argu-
ment and conceptualization. Finally, the need for continuing critical evalua-
tion does not exclude the necessity for a simultaneous commitment. Evalua-
tion and commitment experiments must persist in an unending dialectical
relation that excludes both j n a l evaluation and
closed
commitment.
My chief objection to the views of Hartshorne, Jonas, and the dominant
version of Whitehead is that within their perspectives the priority and cen-
trality of the individual person tends to become subordinated to some high-
er value.52 I have already suggested that the gain or loss in relation to im-
mortality is directly proportional to the worth of the individual person and
that no surrogates can serve to alleviate the pain of loss. It seems quite well
established that belief in some kind of immortality preceded both belief in
a
personal God and belief in the unique value of the individual person. But as
John Hick notes, “what is important is the fact that the idea of a desirable
immortality, as distinguished from that of an undesired because pointless
and joyless survival [for example, in the Greek Hades or the Hebrew Sheol],
arose with the emergence of individual self-consciousness and as
a
correlate
of faith in
a
higher reality which was the source of value.” Hence, “the belief
in a desirable immortality depends, logically and historically, upon the no-
tion of
value
both
of
the human individual and in a higher reality which is
superior even to the power of death.”53 O f course, it does not follow that the
reverse is true-that the value of the person depends upon immortality-
but that is not my claim. What I am contending is, first, that there was and
is a reasonableness in relating immortality to the value of such realities as
human persons; and second and more evidently, that the annihilation of such
valuable entities involves
a
profound and irreparable loss.
‘‘Person
signifies,” according to Aquinas, “what is most perfect in all
nature-that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”54 Whatever the
shifts in the meaning and metaphysics of persons, it is safe to say that, if
anything, the value of persons has increased in the contemporary world. An
eminently supportable claim and a decent argument might be made to the
effect that individual persons are, among all the realities of our experience,
the most valuable. Without here attempting to prove that claim, let me sim-
ply assert that in theory and intent, if not in practice, persons are so re-
garded. To illustrate this assertion, let
us
imagine the following situation:
I
am in a room occupied also by the most precious art object ever produced
and
a
child. There ensues a fire such that
I
have the time and the ability to
save either the art object or the child. Would not the overwhelming number
of human beings in such a situation-learned or no-make the painful
choice to save the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 218/323
ltnmortnlity: Hope or Hindratice?
191
The person as supreme value might be and has been challenged by those
who make that claim for eternal or timeless or absolute values. Wherever
one comes down on this long-standing dispute concerning the nature, pos-
sibility, and reality of such values,
I
think most would agree that many
human beings have lived lives rich in consequence both for themselves and
others in the light or pursuit of “truth,” “goodness,” “justice,” and the like.
It may be that these values have
a
reality in themselves apart from human
experience, but surely the most compelling evidence for believing that they
are in any way “real” is found in the lives of individual persons who believe
in them. Further, apart from their incarnation in individuals and commu-
nities, these values are always in danger of becoming empty and lifeless
abstractions. Finally, even granting the supremacy of “timeless values,” the
human person takes on a very high value in virtue of the ability to grasp,
share in, or live by such values.
If individual death, as in Hegel, serves the universal or absolute Spirit, or,
as in Hartshorne and Jonas, serves the development and enrichment of di-
vine life, then there is a meaning to individual lives and a
propriety to their
cessation. Such perspectives, however, cannot avoid reducing human beings
to
the status of a “means,” thus placing these perspectives in opposition to
the principle advanced by others, most notably Kant, that a human being
may never be used as
a
means but must always be regarded and treated as an
“end-in-itself.” There is no dispute concerning the unacceptability of any
individual’s or group’s use of other individuals and groups as a means to an
end from which those
so
used are excluded. When the user becomes Nature,
or Spirit, or God, or Mankind, the issue is less clear and the consensus less
than total; nevertheless,
I
would insist that using humans, whether indi-
vidually or collectively, as
a
“means” to some end or life outside themselves
is just as repugnant in the latter instance as in the former. John Hick quite
forcefully rejects both religious and humanistic justification for human suf-
fering. Religious justification is exemplified in St. Paul’s text: “Will what is
moulded say to its moulder, ‘why have you made me thus?’ Has the potter
no right over the clay?”56 The humanistic justification posits “a more real
humanity or superhumanity in the future which will have evolved out of the
painful process of human life as we know it.” Hick finds both unacceptable
because “they imply
a
view of the individual human personality not only
as
expendable in the sense that he can be allowed to pass out of existence but,
more importantly, as exploitable in the sense that he can be subjected to any
extent and degree of physical pain and mental suffering for a future end in
which he cannot participate and of which he knows nothing” (DEL, 158-
Assuming, then, that human persons are precious, if not the most pre-
cious, realizations of nature or the cosmic process, the failure to maintain
these persons in that mode upon which their preciousness depends can hard-
ly be viewed as grounds for celebration. At the same time,
I
do not believe it
59).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 219/323
I92
Persotla1 Immortality:esirability
arid
EJcacy
possible
to
argue from the value of human individuals to the rational neces-
si ty of their immortal i ty.
n his Ingersoll Lecture, Ju lius Seelyc Bixler m ad e
a simp le but telling point against such an argume nt: “If the universe is ra-
tional o r ju st, they say, it can no t ruth lessly stam p ou t its fairest prod uct,
personal life. The arg um en t is no t convincing, however, because w e kn ow
so little of wh at rationality as applied to th e universe can be”
( P M , 30).
Bixler, of course,
is
still presu pp osin g that some m od e of at ionality belongs
to the universe. In the wak e
of
powerful Nietzschean and existentialist
cri-
tiques, however, the possibility o f an “absu rd” rather than “rational” uni-
verse cannot be ruled out. The se critiques have rendered questionable, at
least, all claims conc erning “rationality.” While it is not possible to “prove”
that we l ive in an absurd wo rld any mo re than wean “prove” that we live in
a rational one, still the specter of abs urd ity hov ers over and touches all our
undertaking^.^'
Another effort
to
establish the rationality of immortality has been based
on the evo lutionary process. The argument here is that since human beings
are the highe st specim ens produ ced by the long evolution ary process, t
wo uld be irrational
for
this process now
to
allow its finest achievem ents to
com pletely d isappear. Corliss L arnon t justifiably criticizes those advancing
this argument, noting that
at
one t ime the dinosaurs “were the highes t
orm
of terrestrial l ife” and, had they been capable
of
thou ght , wo uld have mad e
the same claims as does the imrno rtalist 11,
185).Of
course, we can never be
certain that we are n ot grist for the e volutiona ry mills ju st as previous
spe-
cies have b een, and henc e fated for the sam e extinction. As already indi-
cated, however, immor ta l i ty is
a
ques t ion notof certa inty bu t of credibility,
and the credibilityo f im m or t a l i t ys int imately bound up wi th anotherues-
t ion of credibili ty: namely, whether we can believe with som e deg ree of
just if icat ion that th ro ug h the evolutionary process there has em erged
a
spe-
cies whose individua ls have the possibility of achieving
a
distinct, personal
relation to the divine.
Even
if
we admi t God in to the p ic ture , theres no obvious rational neces-
sity for personal immortality,as the wr i t ings of Har t shorne and Jonasllus-
trate. There is, however, an im po rta nt difference
in
the nature and quality
of
ref lective inquiry w hen a shif t s ma de from an imp ersona l naturer cosmic
process
to
a
personal,oving A s a m i n i m u m , such ahiftends a
certain poignancy
to
the situation. Let
us
presuppose a God w h o is existen-
tially related
to
human persons such that we can speak of this relation as an
essential constituento fh u m a npe rson ho od . Further, et us posit with
Whitehead
a
divine activity characterized b y “ a tende r care that nothing be
lost . .
.
a
tenderne ss which loses noth ing that can be saved” (PR,525). As-
suming, w i th Har tshorne, Jonas , a n d mo st W hitehead ians, that individual
persons are not
among
that which “can be saved”
and
hence must, in spite
of God’s “ tender care ,” be judged los t , what fol lows? Surely sadness , not
only hum an but ,
more
imp ortant , d ivine.5y Gran ting hat
n o
simp le idenci-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 220/323
ty can be made between hum an and divineove, it is still hard if not impos-
sible
to imagine the character
f a
personal love in wh ich on eof th e partici-
pants in the relationship was not sorely grieved by the loss of the other.
It may
well
be,
as
some
serious and formida ble thinkers assure
us,
that
keeping us in mind is the very best Go d can do, bu t that can hardly be said
to be something
for
us t o l ook f o r w ar d t o . j u s t s it is good
for
hum ans t o
rem em ber loved
ones,
so i t may be go od for G od to
do
so, but in neither
case-if tha t is all there is-can i t bc said to bc good for the Ioved ones.
Here
one
must agree with Epicurus and Lucret ius that the nonexistent can be
neither harmed nor benefited. I f i t ma kes sense
to
say that for human beings
it is imm easurably better to sustain loved one s in reality rather than me rely
in memory , why
does
i t no t m ak e sense
to
say
the
same
abou t G od ,
even
if
we mu st reluctantly conclude that he possesses
no
m or e such power than
we,
beyond
a certain point?
No wh ere, perha ps, is theeffort to give ndividu al lives some meaning
beyond the fleeting moment m or e touchingly portrayed than when Hans
jonas discusses “the gassed andburntchi ldren
of
Auschwitz”and he
“numb erless v ictims of the other man-made holocausts of our t imc.” For-
bidden by his principles
to
accord the m personal im m ortality , Jonas nev-
ertheless refuses to bclicve that heyare“debarredfrom
an
immortal i ty
wh ich even their torm en tors and m urd erer s ob tain ecause they could
act-
abom inably, yet accou ntably, thu s leaving their sinister
mark
on eternity’s
face.” Instead, he asks,
“should
we not bel ieve that the immense chorus of
such cries that has risen u p in
our
lifetime now han gs over o u r w or ld as
a
dark and accusing
cloud?
That e terni ty looks d o w n
upon us
with a f rown,
wounded and per turbed in its dep ths?” Jon as will say no m or e than that it
would
be
f i t t ing if , on th e account of the slaughtered,
“a
great effort w ere
asked
of
those alive to l if t the sha do w from
ur
br ow andgain
for
tho se after
us
a new chance of serenity by restoring i t o th e nvisible wo rld” ( P L , 279-
80).
When confronted wi thevil of the magni tude of that manifest in theHolo-
caust an d allied ho rro rs, he on ly relatively app ropr iatehumanresponse
would seem
to
be silerlce-a “silence” no t on ly in the W ittgensteinian sense,
which is due to thc ack of any language adequate to such events, but more
imp ortant , in the ense of wh at mig ht be alled a “silence
of the
spirit.” This
lat ter mo de
of
silence brings
us
as
close as possible to an experience
of
the
unexperienceable abyss of nothing ness; i t is an evoca tion o f that radical
emptiness which accompan ies not a11 experiences of death but all experi-
ences of the death of
a
beloved wh ose being
had
been jo ined wi th our own in
a
m o de of metaphysical int imacy. Against the background of such silence,
a l l explanations or accounts of the me aning
of
death have a character of
superficiality and triviality. Yet silence ca nn ot be the total and exhaustive
response, as has
been
evidenced from the d a w n
of
civilization in the plethora
of
religious rites, sy m bo ls, p ractices, philosoph ical explana tions, biological
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 221/323
justifications,nditcrary and artis tic Yet while wc must
speak, we must do so against
a
ba ck gr ou nd of silence such that we never
cease to be aware of the radical inadequacy o f o ur anguagc.
BELIEF
IN I M M O R T A L I T Y :
ESSENTIAL O R DISPENSABLE
FOR C HR I S TI ANI TY?
Belief in imm orta lity is n ot insep arablc from religion in
gcncral . Thc
East-
ern religions, for the m ost part, hold no imm ortal ity doctr incs ,
though
I
find sugge stive the persistence o f reincarnation as
a
belief in all segments-
learned and unlearned-of Eastern religious com m un ities, inclu din g tho se
accepting non theistic forms
of
B ud dh ism . In spite of th e differences-and
they are num erous, subtle, and mpo rtant-among doctr ines
of
imrnor-
tality, resurrc ction , and reincarna tion, all seem
to
reject th e tota l annihila-
tion
of
whatevcr is understood as m y “authentic” o r “true” self.
When we turn to the Western mo de of eligion, in particular C hristianity,
there can be little d o u b t that belief in personal survival has been a central
characteristic. A s James pointed out, “religion, n fact, for the great m ajority
of our race means imm ortal i ty, and nothin g else. G od is the prod ucer of
immortal i ty ; and whoeverhas dou bts
of
imm ortal i ty is wri t ten down as an
atheist”
( V R E ,
412).
John He rma n Randall,
Jr. ,
maintains that belief in per-
sonal survival was the f irst of “th e
old
religious doctr ines” to bec om e a
casualty of the cr i t iques s temm ing f rom the adv ent of mod ern science. H e
quickly adds, however, that “immortal i ty was a far m or e vital belief than
that in
God”
and that “the re persisted
a
deep yearnin g for imm ortality, even
if vicarious”-a yearning by no means confined to the unsophist icated and
the conservative, though the immortal i ty of theace often replaced im m or -
tality
of
the person: ‘‘In giving
up
i t s hope of personal survival, religious
faith,
even
of the m od ern ists a nd iberals, had staked everything o n the
im-
mortality
of
ma nkind . Eve n eighteen th-century materialism had assumed
the permanence o f t h e universe as it is, and with the prom ise f an unlimited
social
progress” PAD, 19).
That immortal i ty
or
resurrection-belief has been
a
ccntral and significant
feature of W estern religion is one thing; wh ether itmurt and
s h o d
cont inue
to be s o is, of course, qui te a
different
matter. Unamuno’s response is
un-
equivocal: “Once again
I
m ust repeat that the longin gfor the im m orta lity of
the soul , for the permanence, in some form
or
another , o f ourpersonal and
individual consciousness, is as much o f the essence of religion as is the long-
ing that there may be a
G o d ”
(TSL , 221). Bu t Un am uno ’s voice is by n o
means representative
of
contemporary thinkers . Many, though sympathet ic
to religion, contend that it can be purified only by surrendering any andall
belief in imm orta lity. Bixler, for example, insists that “the religious require-
ment that life
be
ma de wo rth wh ile, and that values be achieved for their
own sake,
has
a11 the more force when the
hope
for
a
final adjustment is
removed” ( I P M ,
40).
61
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 222/323
A rnorc formidab lc obstacle for the Ch ris t ian wh o wishes to retain a be-
lief in some m o d e of personal survival is the argumen t “that the C hris tian
hope of resurrection is
. .
misinterpreted as survival of death.” T h e con-
tem po rary theological scholar Jose ph Ble nk inso pp advances this v iew po int
in
a
sensitivc
essay
in which he endeavors, by means of a hermeneutical
effort,
“ to
get inside traditional (and this, o fc o u rs c , includes biblical) state-
me nts abou t resurrection and ife after death in ord er to gra sp thexpericncc
and the immediacy from which they spr ing and
to
discover w hether such
experience is still available to m od ern m an , w heth er i t an speak to his expe-
rience of himself and the world in which
he
lives” (ZR, 16). Without going
into thedetails of his argu m en t, let me cite Blenkinsopp’s conclusion, which
to
m y
nonhermcneutical eye
does
not
follow
from the biblical evidence
presented.
W hile we will rccognizc t hc po pu Iar idea
of
the resurrcction-a
new
body
waiting for us “on the oth cr side” l ike a new sui t ready
o
pu t on-as a rather
ridicuIo us ca ricature, it is still difficult even for a sophisticated Wcstern Chris-
tian to t h ink o f
i t
i n anything but ndividualistic erms. Hence t must
b c
stressed that the resurrection of the dead is
not
the guarantee of personal sur-
vival after death. If we wish to remain faithful to t h c biblical test imony, we
must no t
separate
the
destiny
of
thc individual
from
that
of
t he communi ty -
the body of Christ-and of the entire creatcd order, T h e resurrect ion of the
body exprcsses prim arily and essentially the destiny o f th c new communi ty ,
the eucharistic body, the
body of
the r isen Christ , which is the nucleus of a
world-widc communi ty . (ZR, 25-26)
I am aware that hermeneutical theology strives to relate the carlicr cxperi-
ence and articulations of the Ch ris t ian com mu nity to present-day lifc. I t
does not t ry o describe the psychological consciousness o f earlier Christians
bu t to uncover throug h subtle reading
of
received texts the still vital core
of
lived expe rience and mean ing-structure. I admire wi thout c la iming to fully
understandBlenkinsopp’shcrn~eneutical efforr.Nev crthcless, he csults
raise a n u m b er of questions.
My initial reaction to the passage qu ote d above was, “W hat in heaven’s
name could he possibly
be
trying to say?”
To
which
it
might
bc
replied,
“You’ll f ind out only wh en and if you get to heavcn.” But s ince such a
heavenly destiny
seems
very unlikely on Blenkinsopp’s terms,
it
is nccessary
to
make
a few
m u n d a n e
comments.
To
begin
w ith , if, in calling the idea
of
a
new body awaiting
us
like
a
new suit of clothcs
a
caricature, Ble nk inso pp is
cautioning
against
any at tempt
to
picture
the
rcsurrcction, thcn
there
can be
little dispute. His criticism appears m uch strongcr, how ever; hc states that
“the Christian
hope
of resurrection is
aIso
often misinterpreted as survival
of death”
( I R ,
119). Now thcrc is no difficulty in unders tanding this-
though there may be in accepting it-if Ble nkin sop p me ans tha t death ter-
minates our personal cxistcnce and hence any “h op e o f resurrection” mu st
pertain to
a “here
and now” existential t ransformation. Such
a
reading,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 223/323
however,
is
no t easy t o reconcile with ano ther passage that rcfers to “deter-
mining the precise form of the Christian hope for
l i f e
u j e r death” ( I R , 116;
italics added).
Blenkinsopp stresses “that the resurrection
of
the dead is
not
the guarantec
ofpersonalsurvivalafterdcath.” N o te that the tern1 “n ot” rather han
“guarantee” is i talicized. Were it the oth er way a round , we m ight conc lude
that w hat is being rejected, quite properly, is any effort to “prove” that we
survive, using
such
belief as a hedge against the terrors of life. Such
a
view
would not only be s imilar to the one advanced earlier in this cssay but also
con cur w ith Blenkinsopp’s previous statement: “To speak in term s of
a
ra-
tional certitude threatens to void of meaning b oth death and the C hris tian
promise
of
new life from death.” But Blenkinsopp would not seem to
be
stressing the
fai th
character
of
the resurrection. Instead, he appears to be
deny ing “p ersonal su rvival” w hile affirming “new ife
from
dea th.” Perhaps
the apparent conflict between these assages is overco me through the notion
that “thc resurrection o f the b od y expresses primarily and essentially the
destiny
of
t he new com m uni ty”? I R , 119,
126).
As we saw abov e, Blenkin-
sop p insis ts that “w e must not separate thc dest iny of the individual from
that of the co m m un ity” an d he furth er dentifies this “ncw com m uni ty” as
“the eucharis t ic body, the body
f
the risen Ch rist, w hic h s the nucleus
of
a
world-wide communi ty .” Two simple questions, which are really one
ques-
t ion, must be asked con cerning this new com mu nity. First, granted that it is
imp rop er to “separate the destiny
of
the individual fr om that of the cornmu-
nity,” is i t permissible toeparate the des tiny
of
the conm umity f rom hat
of
theecond,oes (or can)his newommuni tynclud e as con-
st i tuent members those individual persons,past and present, w h o have been
invited to jo in in and w h o have worked for its corning?63
M y final quest ionconcerning Blenkinsopp’sprovocativearticle is far
from simple.
I t
requires, indeed,
a
digression in the form of an apology.
Any effort
of
religious reconstruction has the dif iculc task
of showing
h o w
interpretations of Christ ianity great ly influenced by mo dern thoug ht and
experience maintain significant co ntin uit y w ith the earlier faith experiences
of the comm uni ty . Those w ho under take such a task dare not overlook the
possibility that they may con tribute to the dem ise
of the
very communi ty
they strive to serve. At best, an interpretation that diverges from the dom i-
nant mode
of
understanding-as,
for
example, that
God
is changing-will
have a entative, hy po the tica l characterand must
be
submit ted o ong-
range testing through reflection and action. The re are two prem ature and
immature responses
to
such innov ative interpretations: unq uestioning ac-
ceptance and unhesitating rejection.
And so, to
m y
final
question: Does not any interpretation of resurrection
belief that excludes the possibility of s o m e m o d e of personal postdeath par-
ticipation in the divin e life radically unde rm ine the justificatio nfor the con-
tinued existence
of
this belief?
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 224/323
i mmo r t n l i t y :
Hope or
Hindvatlce? 197
Let us assum e that theolog y will increasingly hold, with Blenkinsopp,
that to believe in personal survival o f death is to misinterpret the doctrine o f
resurrection. I believe it can be sh ow n hat belief in persona l resurrection has
played
a
role
in the life
of
the Chr is tian comm uni ty comparable
to
and
inseparable from God belief. Not only have the overwhelm ing numb er of
Christians in all stations of l ife, and from the earliest mo m en ts of the com-
m un ity life, believed that so m e m od e
of
personal survival is emb odied in the
divine promise
of
eternal life, but it has inspired and energized liturgy and
ritual, poetry and painting , philoso phy and theo logy, med itat ion and prac-
tice.““ I am not rul ing out , a priori , a case for continued allegiance
to
Chris -
tian tradition in the absence
of
belief in personal im m or tali ty or personal
resurrection, but that
case
has
not yet been made. Nor do see what Chr is -
tianity devoid o f such
belief
is
able
to achieve or contribute that cannot be
realized on otherfaith grounds, grou nds mu ch ess problematic and burden-
some than those
of
Christianity.
T h e pragmatic perspective honorsno digerence in ideas o r ideals that does
not make
a
difference in experience. With reference to religious faith, James
has stated the issuc succinctly:
The
whole defense
of
religious faith hinges
upon
action.
I f
the action required
or
inspired by the religious hypothesis s in no way different from that dictated
by the
naturalistic hypothesis, then religious faith spure superfluity, better
pruned away, and controversy about its legitimacy
is a
piece of idle trifling,
unworthy
of
serious minds. ( W B , 32)
T h is raises a com plicated issue. Reflective Christian s, it seem s
to
me, m us t
ask themselves and each other wh eth er the existence
and
continuance of
Christianity makes a differencc. Sup pose wh atever s of vaiue in Ch ristianity
can
be
envisioned or realized by other means.
I t
mig ht the n m ake sense
to
maintain mem bership in this venerable com mu nity for psyc holog ical and
sociological easons, bu t he necessity nd eriousness
of
membersh ip
would be immeasurably diminished.
Let us pose the quest ion of whether C hr is tiani ty makes
a
difference in
terms of a belief in G o d to the exclusion o f personal survival
of
death. Una-
muno
recounts
an
incident in which he
proposed
to
a
peasant “the
hypothesis
that there might indeed be a G o d w h o governs heaven and ear th , a C o n -
sciousness
of
the Universe , but
or
all that the
soul
of every man may no t be
imm ortal in
the
traditional and concrete sense. He replied: ‘Then wherefore
God?’
” (TSL,
5). Near the conclusion of his
Trugir
Sense
OfL-if,
U n a m u n o
addresses himself
direct ly and dramatical ly
o
the relation between God and
immortal i ty : “We d o n o tneed G od in ord er hat he may teach us the t ru thof
things, or the beauty
of
them, or
in
order that he may safeguard morali ty y a
system of penalties
and
punishments .
but
in order that He may save us, in
order thatHe may no t let us die utterly” (TSL,
319).65
Now
w hil e it is ev ident that
a God
wh o doe s “no t le t
us
die utterly”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 225/323
rnakcs
a
diffcrencc, it docs not follow that this is the only kind of
God
who
would make
a
diffcrencc.
I t
might be suggested that belicf in God and sym-
bolic resurrection directs and energizes us toward personal transformation
and self-realization, to ward
a
respectandconcernfor ou r fellow
h u m a n
beings, oward
a
removal
of
the ineq uities an d injusticcs hatplague he
world,
and
toward a new com mu ni ty in which love would
be
the deterrnin-
ing and controlling quality. All these goals and others that mig ht be mcn-
t ioned are em inently wo rthwh ile, but wh at s not evident is that these goals
need God, m uc h less symbo lic resurrect ion, for either their conception or
their realization. Even if it could b e sho w n that historically they all entered
human consciousness within a religious contex t, i t does not ollow that they
can now be pursued
m l y
within such
a
contex t. Indeed , thesegoalsand
values arc affirmed by m any enlig hten ed secular humanists.
If , thcn, herc
is n o
exp erien tial diEerence-either inactuality o r pos-
sibility-betwecn a n enlightcncd thcist and an cnlightened atheist, the prag-
matist insists hat
there
is no significantdifference. T h e conscquence, as
James no ted , is that the “religious faith
is
pu re superfluity, better pru ne d
away.”
I
suggest that a Christianity crnptied o f any vital belief in the
pos-
sibility of some rnodc
of
personal survival is irrelevant
a t
best, and obstruc-
tive and burdcnsorne
a t
wo rst . Ap plying a vcrsion
of
thc principle
of
par-
s imony,
the
contcnt ion is that the enorm ous bagg age belon ging to religion
in general and Christianity in part icular should n ot continue
to
be carried
if
what it a t tempts to
affirm
and realize can be achieved more simpIy.
I f
funda-
mentally the sa m c values can bc realized through the faithof secular human-
ism, then the mon umen tal energies employed to sus tain Chr is t ianity are
crimina1Iy wasted.
Think, for example, of thc dedicat ion andffort
of
thosc theologians striv-
ing to intcrpret and pur i fy and develop Chr is t ian doctr ine.f the goal
of
their
efforts is no t dig cren tfrom that
of
the humanis t , s i t no t a gravc misdirection
of human energy, when therc areo many concre tc human problcmshat cry
out for attention and imaginative rcsponse?t m ig ht be lcgitirnate to cont inue
to s tudy theeligious experienceof hu m an kin d, past and present , in order to
distill fro m it insigh ts fo r incorpo ration into thcffort to allcviatc the human
condit ion. But the maintenance ofrel igious inst i tut ions and the theologicals
well as personal dcfenseof
the
beliefs and practices of religious communi t ies
would
secm
to be both unduly burdensome and point lessf thc best fruits
of
such efforts can be oth erw ise achievcd. T h e negative features o f religions,
including Christianity, are well known and well documented . T h e record
of
religion, past and present, discloses inhurnanitics ran gin g from th e pett y to
the petr ifying. Th c con t inuing s t ruggle to overcome the debil i tat ing and
dehumanizing characteristics of religion through thepurification
of
religious
experience a nd
the
t ransformat ion of i ts forms and inst i tut ionscan be justi-
fied only if a t least so m e positive possibilities w ith which religion is con-
cerned ar e available
in
no
other
way.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 226/323
One such possibility would be expressed in the bclicf that we are here urd
rrow participating in
a
proccss more encom pass ing than what
is
ovdinavily
available to consciousness an d on e in wh ich we can hope for a cont inuing
participation
in
a
new
life.
Suc h
belief m igh t
give
hu m an life
a
depth ,
scope,
and vitality w hich , wh ile no t n conflict with the cst fcaturcs of hu m an ism ,
wou ld nevertheless be significantly different.
IMMORTALITY:
H O P E
O R
H I N D R A N C E ?
I t is evidcnt that m y rcsponsc
to
thc tit lc questionof this chapter
is
“both .”
1
have already suggested and w ill continue to su gg es t that the need is for an
existential dialectic w hc reb y im m ort ali tybelicf engenders and
decpens
hope
withou t m asking thosc aspects
of
such
belief that hindcr
responsible
living.
Aspects of hindrance are inevitably and existentially intertw ined with the
hopc to w hic h bclicf in personal im m orta l i ty gives rise, and these hindering
elements must
bc
continually and honestly faced, and efforts made to lessen
i fn o t complctciy eradicatc them. I want to stress, however, that
a
mixture of
hopeful
and hindering aspects in relation
to
the meaning
of
hu m an life is
not
a characteristic on l y
of
tho sc w ho belicvc in personal im m ortality ; i t is
a n
inescapable dimension
of
the human condi t ion, and there will be as many
different combinations
of
hope
and hindrance as there
arc
individual faiths
and l ives. T h c distinctive mix w ill be the result, a t
least
in part, of thc cre-
ative effort of cach pcrson. Immortality belief, then, is not an except ion jonl
the human condit ion but a specification o f it.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 227/323
C H A P T E R
8
Imrnortdity: A Pragmatic-Processiwe
Model
I am the
resurrection and
the
life.
If
anyone
believes in me, even t h o u g h he dies
he
will live,
and whoever lives and believes in me will never
die.
Do
you
believe this?
”John
11
25-26
Leap,
life
Leap
and
dance.
Dance o u t of death.
Leap.
Dance.
Life,
sun-filled,
touch
the phoenix
self
of
death
to
life.
Death
to
life:
al l death
to
life
in flame.
-William Birmingham
“ T h e
Phoenix”
Just as it is unacceptable to advance a beIief in Go d with ou t ve ntu ring som e
guess
as to
the character of the divine,
so
it would be fruitless to present a
belief in im m or ta lity that did not-however tentatively and sketchily-sug-
gest what a ne w life would, or at least ought to, involve. As John Hick has
noted:
“A
doctr ine which can mean anything means nothing.
So
long,
then,
as we refrain fro m spelling o u t o u r faith it remains em pty .”’ In the same
vein, H.
D.
Lewis conten ds that
‘‘no
one can expect or believe anything
without having some idea
of
what i t is that he expects.”2 The task of this
chap ter, then, is
to
sugges t
a
model
of
the cosmic process that would jus t i fy
belief in imm ortality as attractive andas life-enhancing. In kee ping with the
experiential character and this-worldly focus
of
the pragmatism I espouse,
an y acceptable model will have to offer possibilities for the en han cem ent and
enrichment
of
life.
It will
be
unacceptable to the extent
that
it is an
escape
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 228/323
Immortality: A Prugmnti~-ProcessiveModel 201
from life as we here and now expe rience it .3 I t will be acceptable to the
extent that i t is an invitation to enter more dee ply and fully into such life.
Readers mig ht be aided by me ntally placing the te rm “th is life” in
quota-
tion ma rks, because the
nature
and scope
of
hu m an life is precisely w ha t has
been an d will l ikely co ntinu e to be m atter of intense dispute am on g reflec-
tive hu m an beings.
A
crucial aspect o f the dispute centers
on
w hat ough t to
be the relationship between the present and future haracteristics of this life.
Apart from a superficial “eat, dr ink , an d
be
m er r y” m ode of hedonism,
most reflective efforts have involved
some
vision or phi losophy of the fu-
ture. For example, n o thinkers have been more passionately opposed to any
philosophical or religiouspositing of anyotherworld han
Marx
and
Nietzsche.
In
i ts eschatological dime nsions, M arxism invok es
a
dedication
to
the
present in virtueof a belief that one is there by co ntrib uting to futu re
utopian state. Nietzsche , despite his radical individualism and fierce attacks
on
religion, manifests a profound concern for the future . However var ious ly
they may
be
interpreted, his doctr ines of revaluation, the overman, andeter-
nal return are calls to m ov e beyon d the present s ituat ion and bring forth
a
m o d e
of
life m or e creative an d fulfilling.
Ther e is,
I believe, a rather wide consensus
mong
contemporary th inkers
to shun both
a
view
of
the present devoid of s ignificant future and view
of the future hat reduces the present o
a
sheer means. Two texts from John
Dewey express a mode of this present-future dialectic:
We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only
by
extracting
at
each present time the full meaning of each present experience are
we prepared
for
doing the same thing
in the
future. This is the only prepara-
tion
which
in the
long
run amounts
to
anything.
The ideal
of
using the
present
simply
to
get
ready for the future contradicts
itself.
4
Albert Carnus expresses a similar sentiment when he notes ha t “rea l gener-
osity towa rd the future lies in giving
all
to the p r e ~ e n t . ” ~ illiam Ernest
Hocking, who is as sym pathetically inclined toward belief in im m ort ality as
Dewey and
Camus
are op po sed , asserts: “TO e able
to
give oneself whole-
heartedly to the present one must be persis tently aware that i ts not all. O n e
must rather be able to treat the presen t mo me nt as i f i t were engaged in the
business allotted to it by that total
life
which stretches indefini tely beyon d”
( M I , 155). A t the sam e tim e he rejects-quite properly, in m y view-any
not ion of the future thatwould give meaning
to a
presently me aningless life:
Unless
there
is
an immediately
felt
meaning there is no meaning at all; no
future meaning
could
compensate
for
a compIete absence o f meaning in the
present moment; and whatever meaning life may come to possess hereafter
must
be
simply the ampler interpretation
of
the meaning which it now has.
MI,
59)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 229/323
202
Persord Znrnrortnlity:
Dcsirubility nr ld E J c n ~ y
Chr i stopher M ooney makes an allied point in som ew hat different language:
“C hristia n ho pe in resurrection will have me aning for us on ly to th e ex tent
that we have some inkl ing
of
resurrcction now, so m e experience o f fullness
of
life, o f self-discovery, love o r creativity.”6 Finally,
H. D.
Lewis co nsiders it
a great travesty
of
Chris t ian t ru th to suppose tha t we should think
of
o u r
salvation solely in t e rms
of
some destiny
to
be achieved later. I t is a present
reality, and the full realization of this is essential
to
the appreciation of Chris-
tian
claims and the impact they an have on our present a t t i tudes.B ut however
impor tan t th is emphasis may
be,
and however necessary in the commendation
of Christianity today, i t would
be
o d d , to say the least, if the
peculiar
rela-
tionship established between God and men in the coming of Christ were con-
cerned wholly
with
the presen t life.
I t
must
surely
be unders tood
in
thc
con-
text
of
an abiding fellowship. ( S I ,
207-8)
Th ese latter texts sugg est that an adeq uate mod el of the creative process
deman ds the m ost intense l iving in the present ,
a t
the same t ime remaining
open to the possibility of participating in transcendent and future mo des o f
existence.
To
arg ue in favor of belicf in immortality, i t is not necessary to
claim that such belief is necded to avoid a superficial presentism o r hedo n-
ism;
it is sufficient to show that there
is
nothing intrinsic to this belief that
leads
to
diverting energies fro m th e tasks
a t
ha nd . O ne can readily concede
that i t is possible for individuals
to
work in the present to builda fut ure life
in wh ich they believe they will havc no person al share; it does not follow,
however, that
a
belief that we rtlall be personal participants in this futu re life
is
a
deterrent or an obstacle to ou r living fully
at
thc prcsent moment. After
all,
few
wo uld claim that it is either unreasonable or unw or thy
of
young
persons to believe and to be taug ht that the efforts they are m ak ing at the
m om en t will affect the quality of their lives as adults. Indeed , the signifi-
cance
and depth of youthwould seem to be immeasurably increased
by
the
belief that youn g person s are participating in a process in which the futu re
depends upon the present.
PRAGMATIC-PROCESSIVE MODEL
T h e general fcatures of pragm atism’s mod el
of
the
cosmic
process have al-
ready been touched upon in m y earlicr discussion of metaphysics and the
self.
Keeping n min d
the
mode
of
pragmaticcxtrapolationemployed
thr ou gh ou t this essay, it rcma ins now
to
explore this m od el w ith specific
reference to im m orta l i ty or the po ssibility of new l ife conse quen t upo n
dea th. RecalI that for the p ragm atist the w orld is characterized by processes
and relations that can be expressed metap hysically in termsof ever changing
“fields within f ields.” T h u s the w orld or reality can be described
a s
a pro-
cessive-relational continuum or f ield embodying and bringing forth a plu-
rality of subfields, each with
a
unique focus but depend ent upo n, overlap-
ping with , an d sha din g in to o ther fields.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 230/323
Imrnortality: A
Pragmnric-Processir,e
Model
203
From the pragm atic perspective, reality is pluralistic rather than m onistic.
Hence, it is a bit misleading to speak , as I have spok en, ofn o r the cosmic or
creative process. I t is more accurate
to
speak of
a
plurality of processes with
a
variety o f relations and interrelations. T ho ug h such
a
perspective
does
not
exclude th e possibility that on e of these processes is wider and more encom-
passing than all othc rs, it doe s exc lude the con cep tion o f this process as
absolute, with the n arrow er processes abso rbe d by it . M oreover, to afflrm a
plurality o f processes is no t t o a@lrrn chaos-nor is it to deny some kind
of
unity. This un ity can no t b e an essentially completed or finished unity, how-
ever, nor can it bc on e th at excludes plurality
or
makes plurality periphcral
or
accidental. W hatever uni ty b elo ng s to the coIlectivity of processes must,
to
be
con sistent with prag ma tism’s pluralisti: universe,
be
constituted
by
these processes. The con tribu tions these processes makes to this u nity are
no t necessarily e qua l; it is perm issible to believe that so m e m ak e signifi-
cantly greatcr contributions than others. Unity so viewed is itself
a
process:
reality is
a t
every moment “one,” and is
a t
every mo men t “becom ing one .”
Thus
the unity that pragmatismafflrms doe s no t exclude disunity. Indeed, if
our extrapolation retains experiential rootedness,
it
must include both uni ty
and disunity as characteristics of reality. None
of
this, how ever, excludes
a
belief in and a working toward increasing the unity and dim inishing the
disunity, toward a world of ever increasing harmony.
This
model
allows, then,
for
the highest and most intense mode
of
inter-
relationship and participation w itho ut los ing the distinctivencss and inde-
pendence o f th e participating p rocesses. S ince all these processes, according
to the specific qu ality o r character
of
each, are contr ibuting to the develop-
ment and enhancement of the collective who le, on e can speak w ith reason-
able consistency of their living
or
acting “for their ownsakes” while simul-
taneously con tribu ting to othe r processes-narrower and wide r. He nce, in
the language of present and future,
we
can plausibly live fully for the pres ent
while contr ibu ting to the em erging ife
of
the future.
This mo del is quite obvio usly evolution ary, and in sugg estin g an evolu-
tionary process in wh ich there em erge individua ls capable of sh arin g in life
beyond death, i t is hardly unique. Interest ing a nd frui tful comparison could
be
mad e wi th the models descr ibed
by
Henri
Bergson,
Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin, and Sri Aurobindo.’ O n e similarity w orth me ntioning is that they
all in so m e way affirm
a
co ntinu ity be twe en ou r experienced life and any
wider o r fu tu re l ife.8
This
means that ou r present acts are here and no w
contributing to a process o r processes far m or e extensive than is eviden t
to
ourordinaryconsciousness. O u r actions have presentandfuture conse-
quences for the character
and quality o f those p rocesses which can at best b e
only vaguely grasped. “It ma y be true,” Jam es tells us, “tha t wo rk is still
doing
in
the world-process, and that we are cal led to bear our share. The
character of the world’s results may in part dc pe nd up on ou r acts” (SPP,
11
2).
Elsewhere, James confesscs that he does not see “why the very exis-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 231/323
204 Persottdmttortali ty:
Desirability and Eficacy
tcnce of an nvis ible wor ld may not in par t de pend on the personal response
which any one
of
us m ay m ak e to the rel igious appeal. God himself, n
shor t , may drawvital streng th and increase of very being
from o u r fidelity.
For m y ow n pa r t ,
I
do no t kn ow w ha t the sweat and blood and t ragedy o f
this life mean , if they m ean an ything sho rt of this. If this life be not a real
figh t, in w hich som ethin g is eternally gained for the universe by success, i t
is no better than gam e of private thcatricals fro m w hi chone may wi thdraw
at will”
(
WB, 5) .
This,
of
course, is an cxpression of a hope, but
so
i s the human is t or
M arxist claim that o u r present actions have a bearing, for better and for
worse, upon the future condi tion of humani ty . T he de pt h and scope of the
process needed for
a
plausible belief in im m or tali ty is ad m ittedly greater,
but all such claims share a com mitm ent to the prese nt based at least partly
o n a belief in consequences, many f w hi chwill be realized, f ever, on ly in
a
distant future.
Al though
I
a m c ertainly n ot sug gesting that these views are substantially
the same, the model I am arguing for s bo th l ike and unlike hum anist ic and
traditional “religious” approa ches. Later t will maintain that
a
transforma-
tionist character is essential to a n y n e w ife, and this moves m y m od el n the
direction
of
more traditional beliefs concerning
an
afterlife. T he p oi nt here
und er conside ration is
closer to
the human is tic emphasis
upon
th e signifi-
cance of present acts. Since “work is still doing in the w orld-proce ss,” our
actions have conseq uenc es radiating far beyo nd the boun ds
of
a narrowly
conceivedspatio-temporalpresent.Feeding hepoor,caring or
a
child,
tending he s ick,creat ingworks of art,so lvin g scientific problems-all
these and man y o ther hum anctivities m u st be seen as in
some
way advanc-
ing and deepening the quality of the world-processes, ju st as o ur negative
actions must
be
seen
as
impeding and d iminish ing them.
The pragmatic model contrasts sharply with one that w ould picture this
life as
a
test w hic h, if successfully e nd ure d, will deliver us from the tem-
poral process in to the etern al wo rld. Pra gm atism rejects th e classical du-
alism b etween the tempo ral
and
the eterna l. Since prag m atism affirms con-
t inuity between the narrower and m ore immed iate fields of ou r experience
with the wider and mo re encompass ing ones, o u r everyday activities take
on grea ter significance than n raditional religious
or
humanis t ic views.
Historical and cosm ic processes-known an d unknown--arc no t processes
from which w e are s t r iving
to
escape, nor are they tales “to ld by an idiot,
signifyingnothing,”Howevermysterious hedeeperandmoreultimate
characteristics of these processes are, a pragmatic perspective allows for
a
belief and a hop e that t ranscend, without negating or diminishing, the mo re
imm ediately accessible fruits and consequen ces of these processes. T im e is
not something to b e g o n e t h r o u g h o r g o t t e neyond; i t
is
itself reality inso-
far as i t br ings forth nov elty and growth
as
we11 as loss an d d i r n i n ~ t i o n . ~
Since chance is
one
characteristic
of
creative processes, their outcome
is
nei-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 232/323
Itnmortality: A Pragmotic-Processive Model 205
ther preset nor totally determined, even by the divine participant. T h e char-
acter and quality of the processes that constitute reality, present and future,
will
be
determined
by
the free creative acts
of
all the participants, only
a
few
of
which, perhaps, are actually know n to
us
a t
t he m om en t .
Any model of the creative processes that allows for im m orta lity m ust
account no t on ly for the elation
of the present world to some future wor ld
but
also to dimensions
of
the present world to wh ich we do not usually
attend. Further, no m od el of reality would serve belief in immortality if i t
allowed only for the em ergen ce a t some future t ime
of persons
capable
of
participating endlessly in the divine life. This would exclude a possible im-
mo rtality for all hum an persons involved in the evolutionary process save
those w ho had the
good
for tune to emerge in
ts
final stage .
THIS WORLD-OTHER W O R L D
Whateve r
we
may think
of
those lengthy and at t imes tor tuoush e o l o g d
speculations concerning im m ed ia t e j udgm en t and inal jud gm en t , the s ta te
of souls prior to the resurrection, and the like, they were concerned w ith
a
question that no imm ortality extrapoIa tion can avoid: namely, the continu-
ing existence of
those persons w h o die prior to the eschaton. Thou gh the
detailed mode
of
such
existence may be almostcomp letely beyond ou r
imaginative powers, th e belief in
such
an existence is plausible only if it is
also plausible to extrapolate an othcr wo rld dis t inct but not separate
from
this one.
But
will this n ot
be
an escape into that oth crw orld ines s that has
been
so
sou nd ly criticized in the m od crn era ? Perhaps,
b u t
thcre are indica-
tions that this question has no t been as decisively settIed as m a n y o n b o th
sides imagine.
T h e difficulty rests in the not-so-evident m ea ni n g ormeanings attached
to
the phrases “this wo rld” a nd “othe r w orld.” The quest ion involv eds som e-
whatanalogous
to
thatconcerning“natural”and“supernatural.”When
there was a consensus on the nontranscenden t mean ing of nature, affirma-
tion of transcend ence me ant that the theist posited so m e kind of super-
natural, which the secuIarist denied. But when nature is taken
as
provision-
al, processive, and open-ended, the question
is
t ransformed: wenow seek to
understand the various dimensions
of
nature or reality, a nd th e supernatural
is either relativized (as is nature) o r irrelevant. Similarly, when “this world”
was understood in
a
m o re restricted materialistic-mechanistic
scnse,
or
in
the Greek-Medieval scnse o f a closed and finished republic
of
natures, then
afirrnation
of
an “otherworld”was indispensable to avoid cutting OK
im po rtant hu m an possibilit ies. N o w that this dialectic appears to have ru n
its course, a ne w mo de l is called for, on e that will avoid an escapist other-
worldliness and a superficia1 this-worldliness.
There are, to begin wi th , good grounds
for
extrapolating worlds other
than
those
more commonly recognized .
For
example, it is quite evid ent that
any refercnce
to
“this w orld” is relative and perspectival.
l 2
Remaining close
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 233/323
206
Persorid I m m o r t a l i t y : D e s i r a b i l i t y nrid Ejicncy
to ordinary experience, we can see that a t every moment and a t different
moments we are engaged in a plurality of “worlds.” We speak, for example,
of the “workaday world,” the “world of art,” the “scientific world,” the
“world
of
common sense.” We do not designate one of these the “real
world” and call the rest “subjective” or “imaginary.” Each is real insofar as it
bears upon the concrete presence and continuing development of life. If the
mystical world or the divine world meet this criterion of vital presence, and
that is the claim and belief of many, then these worlds are no more and no
less “other” than, say, the world of art or the world of science. I do not
claim for them the same kind or degree of evidence, but I do argue that the
reality of an other world cannot be rejected solely because it is not identical
with some alleged “this world.”
Of course, for the pragmatist, such other worlds are always matters of
belief, but at least one pragmatist- William James-maintained that such
belief, or overbelief, was neither alien nor opposed to experience. “If needs
of ours outrun the visible universe,” James argues, “why
riiay
not that be a
sign that an invisible universe is there?”
( W B ,
51).13Two texts show how
seriously James entertained the notion that we participate in worlds of which
we are unaware or only vaguely aware.
The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our
present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that
exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a
meaning for our life also; and that although in the main their experiences and
those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous
a t
certain
points, and higher energies filter in.
(VRE,
408)
In spite of rationalism’s disdain for the particular, the personal, and the
1.111-
wholesome, the drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us very
strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we
may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious. We may be in the universe as
dogs and cats are in our libraries, seeing the books and hearing the conversa-
tion, but having no inkling of the meaning of it all.
( P U , 140)14
I find that last sentence the experiential base for the extrapolation of other
worlds. l 5 It is important to recall that an extrapolation is not constructed in
air but must be an imaginative construct suggested by data given in experi-
ence.
l6
Moreover, successful acts of imagination enrich and enhance experi-
ence and reality, often in ways not immediately evident.17 We could add to
the situation cited by James innumerable instances in which organisms are
totally unaware of processes which at every moment contribute to the con-
stitution of their being. Focusing on human experience, we have evidence of
what might be called “unaware participation.” To what extent are most
human beings ,aware of their involvement in social and historical worlds,
processes that have a reality not simply reducible
to
the consciousnesses of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 234/323
Iin mortality :A
Pragtna
ic- Processive Model
207
their constituent members? Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiries, Freud’s psy-
choanalytic techniques, Marxist and structuralist analyses all claim to reveal
the underlying structures of morality or the psyche or history or language.
These are imaginative efforts to bring to light worlds that are operative in
human life but not attended to consciously.
O f course, the most significant data pointing toward the reality of a world
or worlds other than or beyond the customary one are the claims of those
we call mystics. From the pragmatic perspective, these claims do not prove
the reality of such worlds but, as James argued in
The Varieties ofReligious
Experience, they may not be lightly dismissed. The pragmatist would insist
that despite the mystic’s claim to direct experience of God or the O ne or the
Absolute, there is still
a
faith or interpretive dimension to these experiences.
The issue here, however, is not whether the mystic is correct in describing
his or her experience as intuition or higher knowledge or enlightenment.
Whatever the description, we have an enormous number of individuals dis-
tributed over the length of human history and a variety of cultures who
make experiential claims which, to say the least, remain decisively unac-
counted for within a narrow space-time framework. Such data, combined
with other factors, contribute to the plausibility of extrapolating as real
some dimensions that transcend the narrow confines of our conventional
world. Such data will, of course, fail to persuade someone who has not had
at least an experiential inkling of what the mystic points toward. Unless one
has, minimally, a vague sense of something “more” to life than that which
constitutes our quotidian experience, the extrapolation
I
propose will lack
meaning and validity. l8
C O N T I N U I T Y B E T W E E N P R E S E N T LIFE A N D N E W LIFE
Granting the plausibility of extrapolating the reality of an other world, what
characteristics would make a new life in it desirable? Bernard Williams, who
rejects the desirability of immortality, nevertheless lists some of those char-
acteristics. The first is “that it should clearly be me who lives forever.” I have
already stressed at some length that personal survival is crucial to any signif-
icant immortality. l 9 Williams’s second condition is “that the state in which I
survive should be one which, to me looking forward, will be adequately
related, in the life it presents, to those aims which
I
now have in wanting to
survive at
A process model along the lines suggested allows for this effective con-
tinuity between our present life and any new life. I t does
so
in its insistence
that we act in the belief that we are contributing to a process or processes
wider in scope and longer than those of which we are immediately aware.
While not limiting any future participation
to
the exact mode in which we
are now participating, we must believe that those aims, goals, and ideals that
now energize us will remain in some way operative in any new life.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 235/323
Any adequate model of the reative process and extrapolated immor ta l i ty
will have to take account of the eternal. Even Nietzschc, though ready to
surrenderG od ndm m orta lity, is unwilling to partwith eternity,”
Zarathu stra sings
a
h ym n proclaiming that “all joy wan ts eternity
/
Wants
deep, wants deep eternity.”21 Nietzsche wants an eternity located neither in
somedistant uturenor nsomeotherworldprcsently inaccessible to
h u m a n
experience.
An impor tant e lement
of
the Christian tradition also
insists,despitedifferences, on th e possibility-indeed thc necessity-of
here-and-now participation
in
the eternal. Friedrich Schleiermach cr insists
that just such participation is the authcnt ic modeof immortal i ty .
The goal and
the
character
of
the
religious
lifc
is
not
the
immortality
desired
and
belicved
in by many. . .
.
I t
is
no t the immorta l i ty that is outside
of
time,
behind i t , or rather after i t , a n d which still is i n time.
I t
is the immorta l i ty
which we can n o w have in
this
temporal life;
it
is the problem
in
the solut ion
of which
we
are forever to be engaged. in the midst of f ini tude to be one with
the Infinite
and
i n
every
m o m e n t
to be
cternal is the immortality of religion.”
T h o u g h w i t h
a
slightly different emphasis,
Soren
Kicrkegaard makcs m uch
the
same point : “Immortal i ty cannot
be
a
final alteration that crept in,
so
to
speak,
a t
t he m om en t of death as thc final stage.
O n
the contrary, it is a
changelessness that is not altered by the passage
of
the yca~s . ’ ’ ‘?~
T h o u g h
the
pragmat ic modcl
of
reality wo uld not employ the language of
SchleierrnacherandKierkegaard,and nparticular w ou ld no t acceptany
literal meaning
of
“changeless,” it remains open to the dep th
of
experience
they call for. W hat it wo uld need is an accou nt allowing for, cvcn insisting
upon,
a
relation to
God or
thc divine o r the eternal
that is
evcrlasting wich-
ou t
being
everlastingly the
same.
In such an account, “changeless” might be
accepted as
a
s ym bol
of
the constancy or t rustworthiness
of
divine love
but
would not exclude some kind
of
chan ge in both the divine and the human
relata.
To
shift the focus
a
bit-it is exactly evcrlastingness that
is
questioned as
to whether i t is hu m anly desirable by ma ny who reject person al imm or-
tality. A t stake here
is
whether durat ion is
a
value that ma kes an endlessly
endur ing
life
desirable. Williams, who argues against Lucretius that “ m o re
days
may
give
us
rnorc than
one
day,” nevertheless denies that unending life
would give us an ythin g over and abovc wh at can be realized in a life that
ends: “There is no desirable or significant property
which life
would have
more of,
or
have more unqualifiedly, if
we
lasted forever”
( P S , 89).
The
coun terview is expressed by Hocking:
“ D w a t i o n is
a
dimwsion
ufunl-
u e . ” Ge org e Santayana maintains that “len gth of things is vanity, only their
height is Butccording to Hocking, “it is theormalestiny
of
experience
to be
prolonged in propor t ion to itsheight,not n versely”;
hence,
“life
is objectively
worth morc
as
a
continued than
as a
closed affair”
( M I , 68-69).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 236/323
209
N E W LlFE: DURATlON AND TRANSFORMATION
T h e attractiveness or unattractiveness
of
durat ion wil l depend upon how i ts
to
be un ders too d. Be rgso n, find ing it t tractive, describes i t as “the continu-
ous
progress
of
the past which gnaws into the futureand w hich swells
as
i t
advances.”2c)O n the other hand, those w h o f ind
endless
duration unattrac-
tive presup pose that it involve s an unending con tinuance of fundarnental ly
the same mode of life. Thus Williams, in citing the M akrop ulos case
as
evidence that one would become bored
by
an immortal life, describes a life
that had really no t cha ng ed for some three hun dred years, a life devo id of
significant gro w th an d rcal novelty. This. same presupp osition, that
a
life of
unending duration would
be
merely an indefinite extensiono f h u m a n ife in
the
same
mode
as
it
now
exists, und ergirds the view s
of
those
who
dis-
tinguish it fro m the etern al life o f Christian tradition. “E ternal life,” we are
told
byStewartSuthe rland, “is no t to
be
equa ted w it h endless We are
not told, howevcr, just what the digcrcnce is between the two,
and
while
conceding that any new life can no t bc identical wi th o u r present one, I con-
fess that I am completely unable to g rasp w hat an eternal life wo uld be that
excluded the characteristic
of
everlastingness. T h e d istinguished Am erican
philosopher John Smith has expressed
a
view similar to those being chal-
lenged; thoug h mo re und erstandab le,
i t
retains the presupp osition
of
un-
ending sam eness. Sm ith conside rs “historically inaccurate” the “belief that
the Judaeo-Christian tradition espouses a doctr ine of ‘immortality.’
On
the
contrary, he
symbol of
‘eternal life’ expresses
a
new dimens ion or new
quality of life and in no sense
implies
merely the endless continuation
f
the
same.”28
While
I
qu estio n, in part, his interpretation
of
Judaeo-Christian
tradition, I can understand Smith’s existential interpretation of eternal life. I
have already expressed str on g reservations concerning the efficacy
of
any
such
interpretation; m y concern here, however, is wit h his assertion hat
everlastingness is to be unders tood as “forever more of the same.” M u c h
closer
to the ma rk, in m y opin ion, is John Baillie’s view that “t he soul’s
ho pe has not been for m or e of the same, but for something al together high-
er and better.”29
What
we need is a doctr ine of transformation that enables
us
to acknowl-
edg e bo th con tinu ity an d difference between the present life and any new
life that m ight be hoped for. Tha t transforrnationist views are congenial to
those reflecting within
a
Christ ian framew ork
is
evidenced in the following
texts from
E.
J. Fortmann and William Frost:
Does the end
of
the world mean its annihilation and re-creation)
o r
merely its
transformation?. .
.
Today the second view, transformation and not annihila-
tion, seems to be growing stronger and stronger. Those whohoId it think that
the biblical passages should be construed as “change-passages,” not as “anni-
hilation-passages,”if they are taken in a fuller biblical context.3*
This
theology
of hope
places imagination in
a
Christian context. Christ,
the
Messiah, is portrayed
as
one
who does
not simply
take the facts of
life for
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 237/323
granted.
In
his
un ique
contribution to
the
human
race
he encourages us to
work
and
labor for the transformation of things so that
the
kingdom may
become
a
reality. .
.
.
This
emphasis
on
transformation
of
reality
in
the
name
of
life’s
promises
and
expectations culminates
in
the narratives
of
Christ’s
rcs-
urrection.
Thus Christians receive
the
promise o f a life beyond
the grave.31
Any process
model
of reality is andmustbe ransforrnationist,but
whether this is a h elp or a hin dra nc e to belief in personal im m orta l i ty is a
much more com plicated quest ion. Any evolutionary theory that extrapo-
lates some m o d e
of
new be ing or ne wconsciousness must confront
a
dilem-
ma: if the chan ges in h um an naturere su ch that this nature rema ins asical-
ly as we no w kn ow it , then there is n o possibility for the kind of divine
com mu nity projected by the best visionary thinkers; if ,
on
the other han d,
such
a
co m m un i ty is ma de poss ible by a tota l t ransformat ion of h u m a n
nature, then w e n o lon ge r have hum an nature as w e n o w
know
it. Because
the available ev olutio nary data are am big uo us , i t is possible to m ak e two
very diKerent extrapolations of the futu re: o ne in wh ich hu m anity con tinu es
to exist, houg h in a profoundly t ransformed m anner ; another in which
huma nity disappears and a ne w species em erg es. Initially, this second in-
terpretat ion would seem to be m or e consistent with our present knowledge
of
theevolutionary process.After all, therevolutionaryand,formany,
threatening aspect of Darwinism was that it posited the ‘‘transformation of
species.” T h e crucial consequence of evolution would seem to be that justs
t h e h u m a n e m e r g e das a new species from a species
no
longer in existence,
in the distinct fu ture there will be such a transformation of the hum an spe-
cies that
it
will become extinct .
While this
is
surely a plausible extrapolation, it is not strictly entailed by
the evidence. To begin w ith, w e are no t compelled to assu m e hat the way
in
which evolut ion will c ont inu e
to
take
place
is
identical with the way n
wh ich it has aken place. Indeed , such an assum ption wo uld seem to
be
contrary to o n e
of
the
more
exciting features o f evolution-the em erg enc e
of the radically new. He nc e, wh ile up to this point the transformation
of
species appears to have resu lted in
a
loss of fundame ntal ident i ty between
the old an d the new, we cannot defini tively rule out a change
in
the evolu-
tionaryprocess tself w he reb y
future
transformation-whether in “this
world” or in an “o the r world”-wilI result in enrichm ent witho ut the loss
of
identity.
I suggest that there are a l ready some grounds
or
such an extrapolation in
both individual and collective development. The t ransformat ion of a fertil-
ized
egg
in to
a
relatively helpless, speechless, instinctive infant and then into
an adult capable of wondrous feats
of
creat ivity wo uld not seem to be
qualitatively
less
s ignificant than the t ransformat ion o f a fish in to
a
reptile.
Yet there is
a
m o d e of identity present
in
the form er transform ation that
is
absent in the latter.Further,wenowrecognize hat the earlierstages of
individual h u m an lives
have
a
value
and me aning in them selves wh ile irnul-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 238/323
irnmortdity: A Prgtrratii-Pr#cessive Model 21 1
taneously c on tribu ting, positively o r negatively, to the ransform ed later
stages in which ide ntity continu es, how ever profoundly t ransformed.
Shifting o ur focus to the hu m an collectivity, we are able
to
detect further
grounds
for
affirminggreat ransformativedevelopmentwithoutsimple
loss of identity. Co nsider the evolution
of
Homo,
which began w i th
Horno
habilis abou t two and a half million years ago, was transformed into Homo
erectus abou t one and a half million years
ago,
and became Homo
sapiens
some three hundred thousand years ago. Although anthropologists arc not
in com plete agreement as to ho w “CIOSC”
Horrto bnbilis
was to th e prcsent-
day Homo
sapiens,
they
do
seem to be making two judgments . Fi rs t , they are
distinguishing the earlicstHomo fro m that speciesof which it was a transfor-
mation. Second, they are affkming
a
mo de of “identi ty” betw een hat origi-
nal
Horno
and the present-day
one.
Sincc no on e would deny the profound
chang es that have
taken
place
within
hum ani ty over those two and
a
half
million years-or even over the three hu ndre d thou san d years of
Homo
sa-
piens-transformation and ident i ty cannotbe asserted as mu tua lly exclusive.
Some modesof t r amformat ion doresult in lossof identity, but others result
in transformed iden tity.
that
a
new qual i ty or
mode
of
l ife has already emerged from
the
evolution-
ary process, on e that allows for an even greate r trans form ation w ithou t loss
of identity than
in
the previous stages of evolution. Hence, one m igh t now
extrapolate
a
new level o f human existence that will be inconceivably diger-
en t f rom butnevertheless fundamental ly continuous with our present
mode
of lifc. T h e alternative e xtrapolation, which has already been criticized, s to
view h um anity as a means o r preparat ion for the emergence f
a
new species
(whether n“thiswor ld” o r inany“otherworld”) hatwil lre ta in he
hum an only in the way in w hich we now retain the subh um an f rom wh ich
we have evolved.
Ther e
is
a form idable diff iculty w ith the mode of extrapolation I favor,
and i t must be faced, tho ug h I
do
not know h o w to resolve it even
to
my
ow n satisfaction. It can be o bjected that I am cond a t ing two distinct time-
space continua
by extrapolating om
the
evident time-space c o n t i n u u m
available to science to the not-so-evident time-space continuurn
of
an other
world. Thus , even if on e w ere to c once dehat there will be a fut ur e transfor-
mation
of
the
hu m an species along the lines
1
have suggested , this
is
radi-
cally different from some future o r new life entered into by all humans-
past andpresent as well as future-on th e occasion of their ndividual
deaths. T he mo st serious threat to th e perspective here advanced is that a
claim that such a new life is already available t o th o se w h o die renders the
long evo lution ary process irrelevant. One way o ut is to say that the purp ose
of evolution, or at least
a
consequence of it, was to br ing for th
a
species
whose individualsare so constituted hat death henceforthhas he pos-
sibility
of
t ransformation rather than obli teration. While som ethin g suc h
as
Further, i t m igh t be sug ge sted , as Teilhard de Chardin apparent ly
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 239/323
this mu st be held if m y claims for
personal
imm ortality are to stand, it still
leaves un settled the que stions of w hy evolution should be continuing and
w h y we should be working here and now to br ing about a fut ure transfor-
mation
of
the human communi ty .
In response,
1 must revert to
the
contention that our actionsand heir
consequences are not con fined within thos e processes available to ordinary
and scientific consciousness. M y entire case dep end s up on a belief such as
that which w e havc already heard expressed by James:
T h e world
of
u r present consciousness is
only
one out of many
worlds
of
consciousness that exist, and
.
.
.
those other worlds must contain expcriences
which have a meaning for o u r life also; and . .
. al though in
the main their
experiences
and
those of this
world
keep
discrete,
yet
the two
become
contin-
u o u s at
certain points, and higher
energies
filter
in.
(VRE, 408)
Given such
a n
overlapping an d interpenetration of processes and worlds, it
makes sense
to
excrt o ur fullest efforts toward trans form ing the wor ld or
worlds
most
imm ediately accessible to us, spu rre d on by he belief that thcsc
efforts bear fruit we are unable toperccive clearly at th is mo me nt .
T h e
evo-
lutionary process, therefore, is multidimensional,and human participa-
tion-past, pre sen t, an d future-is n o t restricted
to
the most imm ediately
conscious
Incidcntally, an evolutionaryodel such as this is
congenial,
I
believe, to a reconstruction
of
the traditional doctrine of the
com m union
of
saints and the practice
of
praying for and to the dead.
N E W L I F E : P O S I T I V E CH A RA CT E RI S T I CS
However radical the transformation that brings about
a
new life would be, it
cannot be such as to obliterate all trace
of
those characteristics that presently
constitute hum an Me. P ro m ine nt am on g the characteristics
of
human l ife
that seem inseparable fr o m it are creative action, g ro w th , self-development,
love, joy, laughter, com mu nity, suffering, struggle, and loss.
I f
we are to
extrapolate these as
also
be long ing t o any newife, it cannot
be
too s t rongly
stressed that
by such extrapolation we are able to kn ow as m u c h and as little
about the new life mo de of thesecharacteristics as
we
can about them when
they are extrapolated
as
belonging to G o d . T h e same possibilities and lim-
itations tha t attach to talking
abo1.1l
God would attach to talking
a6out
any
new
l ife. T he most obviou s l imitat ion at tending any “new life” extrapola-
tionconcerns he“new ” aspect, ofw hic h lit tle ornothing can be said
positively. That
a
f u t u r e life such as the one here suggested and hoped for
must be new in an inconceivable and unim aginabie way seems both
con-
genial to and man dated by faith and reason. The ‘‘newness” ch aracterizing
the risen Chr i s t is a belief of
long
s tanding.
A s
one com me ntator succinctly
expresscd it, “T he Resu rrection was no t merely
a
corning back to life, but a
birth into a new life wh ich Ch rist did no t have in his bodily human ity.”34
The
evidence from reason for the necessity
of
newness is quite simply
the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 240/323
immortality: A P r g ma t i c - P r o c ~s s i l ~codel 213
dissolution which, in o ur experience, acconlpanics all living beings. Unless
there is a “n ew ” character realized thr ou gh death and the saving gracc of
God, thcrc is
no
possibility
of
a l ife withou t dissolution-w ithout death.
Let
me
no w briefly discuss the necessity that the positive characteristics
of
human life continue in some way in an y ne w life. It is quite obv ious that
since pragmatism’s process metaphysics denies any absolute permanency or
status, i t cann ot consistently allow for any new life from which process or
change is completely absent. But
a
central feature of process or change is
that a t its best i t brings about growth. Hence, pragmatis t could not extrap-
olate any divine o r
new
hu m an life that w ou ld exclude the possibility of
growth , Thcre s
a
growing consensus, despite metaphysical and theological
differences, that an y ne w life m us t
be
a
gr ow ing or proccssivc on e.
“ A
cer-
tain growth,” Piet Sch oon enb crg tells us, “also remains possible i n thc final
fulfillment. Otherwiseeoulderh aps cease to be
Ignace
Lepp ma intains that “the idea of progress is in fact so intimately related to
that of life that we
can
only conceive o f eternal life
as
cternal growth.”36
Similarly, Jo hn Shea rejccts the no tion of a static heaven, noting hat “m an y
people cannot conccivc of hum an happiness except in terms of grow th”
( H H , 86).37
Grow th, wh ether hum an, cosm ic, or divine, is possible
only
insofar as
the participative realities o r beings
have
the power of crcativc action. Diverse
as
the
activities may be, all realities-from electro ns to God-are real in
vir tue of and to the extent that they arc centers of activity. I t follows, then,
that o u r extrapolation of
a
new life will include the possibility of propor-
tionate crcativc activity for the participants
in
such
a
life. “ I t is the yearning
after continued action,” according to B erg son , “tha t has led
to
thc belief in
an after-life.”38
And
Goethe . in
a
letter toJ. P. Eckermann asserted: “To
m e
the eternal existence
of
m y sou l is proved by m y idca
of
activity.’’39
The
creative activity
performed
by those entities dcsignatcd selves is di-
rectly or indirectlyboundupw ith self-developm cnt o r self-realization.
Pragmatism shares the view of those who insist that the self is
a
project or
task, not
a
fully realized given. I t is the task of self-creativity beg un in this
life that m us t be extrapolated as co ntinu ing in an y ne w ife. Joh n Shea makes
clear that such
a
viewpoint is not restricted to a pragm atic extrapolation:
“When t imeand history arc no t viewed as terrors but as m edium s ofhuman
development, heaven will not
be
viewed as external and static perfection.
Heaven will be
a
t ime for continued growth and moral progress . T h e pro-
ject of each man’s life which is bcgun in this world demands more t ime to
develop” ( H H , 86). Similarly, Hocking contends that there can be no sense
to
a co ntin uin g life unless “t he reflective self is concrete a nd active, carry ing
on that qu est ioning wh ich is
the
identity of its life here” ( M I , 66).4‘
In his “justification”
of
the desire for irnnlortality, Ralph B arton Perry
note s that “the re is always
some
unfinished busincss.” Further, “t he desire
for
m or e life springs from the belief that life o n the wh ole
is
goo d, and
to
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 241/323
214 Persutlnl
Imrttortality: D e s i r n l r i l i t y arzd Eficacy
ask for mo re t ime s
to
have
s o m e
affirmative
reason
for its use.”41
erry w a s
in
all likelihood nfluenccd n his m atte r by his mentor, William
Janlcs.
Perry tells us:
AsJames grew oldcr he came to belirve i n irnnlorcality. in
1904
hc had acquired
a feeling of its
“probabil i ty .” Although hc did not
feel a
“rational need”
of
it,
he felt a
growing
“practical need.” What
was
this practical motive ?
I n
explain-
ing w h y he was now, late in
life,
acquiring the
belief
for thc first t ime, he said,
“Because I
a m
j u s t get t ing fit to live.” .
.
. W ith his temperamental
love of
the
living, his affectionate sympathies,
and
his
glowing
moral admirations, he had
come
m o r e
and more
to feel
that dcath was a wanton
and
unintclligible n ega-
tion of goodness. (TC,11:356)42
N o n e
of
this,
of
course,
i n
any way provcs that we arc im m orta l . T hc m ost
that can
be
claimed is that it indicates a certain memitrg and
propriety
that
would accompany a new life in wh ich the projects and asks”inc1uding thc
task
of
self-creation-that have becn be gu n an d that death a l w a y s lcaves
un-
finished, would bc c on tin ue d a nd b ro ug ht to fu llcr r e a l i z a t i ~ n . ~ ~
T h e activity w hich above all ot he r hu m an activities secms to cry o u t for a
continu ance withou t end is, of course, love. “ T h e surest warrant for im-
mortal i ty,” according toJames, “is the yearning of ou r bowels for ou r dear
ones” (PP,
RY37). Mooney
poin t sou t that “hu m an love
.
. .
is quite
shameless
in
hop ing for immor ta l i ty and believes against all evidencc that it
will no t be affected by dea th” (PAT, II:146).44Gcorgc Maloney
suggests
that
“ our love relations here a nd now determine the true, future direction
of
o u r
psychic
powers
and the degree that they will be realized” (PAT, 1:147).
Whether or n o t love is a s ign o f a continuing life, there
seems
to
bc
no
question that it is the human expe rience mo st painfully frustrated by the
event of dea th . The love relation has an en du rin g character that the present
conditions make difficult if not impossible to realize. The love relation is
continua lly strained and ravaged b y a mu ltiplicity o f factors, but those loves
that endure seem to express most adequately theessence o f lovc. One o f t h e
painful features of ou r present m o d e
of
existence
is
that some
loves do cnd,
o r become incapable
of
being maintained in their richest
mode
and greatest
intensity.Nevertheless, tappears to be humanly mpossible to love and
simultaneously accept w ith ou t pain that love
will
end ab solutely and with-
o ut remainder, as
death seems to
indicatc.
The
death
of
a loved one is almost
beyond q uestion the m ost tragic experience human beings undergo.
Th is tragic antithe sis betw een Love and death is
po ign antly expressed by
Th om as Ha rdy in his
Tess
o f t h e
D’Uvbervilles.
A s Tess is leaving her hus-
ban d, An gel Clare, short ly before sh e is to be hanged , thc following ex-
chan ge takes place:
“Tell me
now,
Angel, do you think that we shall mcet again after we
are
dead?
I want to know.”
H e
kissed her
to
avoid
a
reply
a t
such
a
t ime .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 242/323
It~lrnurrality:A Pragrnntic-Pvocessiv~lModel 215
“ O h ,
Angel-]
fear that
means no ” said she
with
a
suppressed
sob. “And
I
wanted so to see you again--so much,
so
m u c h What-not cvcn you
and
I,
Angel, who
love
each
other so weIi?”4s
Tess
docs not fcar death; what she finds intolerablc is that thc lovc betwe en
herself and Angel will en d w ith her dcath-and it will end exc eptas a mem-
o r y
for Angel if shc ceases to be. I t would seem that if death is the annihila-
tion
of
the individua l, one cann ot rcally be said to love sornconc who
has
died. If lovc involves the tou ch ing of tw o relational ccnters,
the
cessation of
one of these cen tcrs necessitates th c cessation of love. I t
would not
scern
possible to really love a nont‘xistcnt,
a
nothing. Of course, i t migh t
bc
ar-
gued
that love is ma intained through
a
mem ory , bu t unless the mem ory
involves somc kind of “prescnce”
of
the othe r, it is short-lived, as experi-
ence repcatedly shows. Gabricl Marcel has sensitively and perccptivcly
ex-
plored the rolc of “presence” in thc relationship betwe cn love and death.
“Fidelity truly exists,” hc maintains,
“onIy
w hcn it defies abscncc, wh en it
triu m ph s over absencc, and in particular, over that absence w hich we ho ld to
be-mistakenly n o doub t-absolute, and wh ich we call death.’’46
Love, then, is the
experience
that
gives
the
deepest
ground for
and
great-
est impe tus to extrapo lating
a
l ife that is not absolutely terminated by death.
Further, any desirable new life m u s t be such
that
the love relations
so
haltingly and imperfectly bcgun here, including those interrupted
or
diver-
ted,will have an op po rtun ityor reconciliation,enewal,nduller
realization.
A central feature of pragmatism, as
was
seen earlier, is that human indi-
viduals are consti tuted
by
their social
or
co m m un al relationships. T his view,
of course, is no t peculiar to pragm at ism but s shared by a range
of thinkers
in
thc twentieth century.47 An immediate corollary
of
the conlmunal nature
of hum ans is the need to construc t com mu nit ies or
a
com m uni ty
that
will
enrich and expand the actualities an d possibilities of hu m an life. T he re is a
consensus that to this point in history the communi t ies
that
have emerged
are radically deficient in terms
of
enab ling their mem bers to reach the full-
ness
of their potential. There follow s, then, if not a consensus, a widely
shared notion
that h u m a n
efforts ought to
be directed to creating a t ruly
hum an com m un i ty
free
from those features that n ow
limit
and destroy so
many.
Whether
in Utopian, M arxian,
or
Deweyan form, the
call
for such
a
co m m un ity involves an extrapolat ion from past and present experience
to
future cxperience. An y sug ge st ion o f a desirable immortality must include
an extrapolation similar to though obviously not identical with
such
future
comm unity extrapolat ions. I t will sha re with these 4‘secularist” extrapola-
tions the notion that we are “h ere and now” str ivin g to crcate a better com-
munity that will, we hope, bc realized in the future. At the same timet will
not
restrict the param eters of this com mu nity, either in its present strug-
gling fo rm or its future realized fo rm ,
to
a
narrowly conceived “this world.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 243/323
Further, and
most
impor tant , the k ind of extrapoiation called for will no t
restrict
membership
in the
“ n c w
co m m u n i t y ” to
those
individuals who
had
the good for tunc
o
c o m e
i n t o
existence concurrent with thc fruitfulrealiza-
tion o f the often pow erful efforts o f
so
many o ther ind iv iduak48
N E W LIFE:
NEGATIVE
CHARACTERISTICS
To
this point the extrapolation
of a
desirable immortali ty has focused on
w hat m ight be callcd thcpositive aspects
of
an y new life that m igh t be
forthcoming after death. I f
we
are to avoid
a
kind
of
self-dcception or “bad
faith,”however, wecannot ignore certainnegativeaspects hat properly
should be extrapolated as likely to accompany this new life. Let me ment ion
three such aspects-struggle,suffering,and loss-and indicate w h y
a n d
how they shou ld be incorporated into a developed extrapolation of irnmor-
tality.
T he evolutionary process
at all
levels and stages gives n o evidence
of
tak-
ing
place
w ithou t the see m ingly essential character
of
“ s t r ~ g g l c . ” ~ ~
n ex-
trapolated life totally
devoid of
s t ruggle would
scern
to involve
a
discon-
tinuity, which has been prev ious ly rulcd out, betw een the pres ent life and
the
new
Iifc . T he m ore en com pa ssin g process extrapolated f rom t he more
immediate
processes
of
our
experience has been described as con tinuo us
w ith these processes.
In
other terms, that divine
life
in w hich any
new
life
would be a participation
is
already in
a
real relation to and hence in
some
way
a
participation in the wor ld
of
immedia te
experience, just
as hu m an life
is really related to and already p articipating in the divin e life. I t follows that
God is a part icipant n he evolut ionary struggle.50 How hen could
we
properly extrapolate
a
ne w life that wo uld
be
transformed p articipation in
the divine life,
while
excluding fro m such
new life
that strugglc wh ich even
the divine
does
not escape?
No,
the struggle that is inseparable fr om hu m an
life appears to
be
related
to
on e that is cos m ic and cven in
a
sense “trans-
C O S M ~ C . ” ~ ~
This ,
of
course, touches upon that decpcst
of
myster ies, the mystery of
evil. With
no
pretense
to
resolving the irresolvable, let
m e
sim ply indicate
a
respons e consistent with pragm atism. First, pragm atism , as
we
saw in the
chapter “Self and Go d,” st rongly objects
to
any view
of
evil that sees it
either
as
incorporated within the eternal lan
of
an ornniscicnt , omnipotent
God
o r as preserved but overco me w ithin the W hole
or
the Absolute . T h e
only philosophical account of cvil cong enial
to
prag m atism is one that ener-
gizes hum an being s in their strugglc to lessen and ov ercom e it . He nce, any
pragmatic
im m ort ali t y belicf will
be in
part
motivated
by
the h ope and de-
sire
of
havin g n ew oppo rtuni t ics for cont inuin g th e strug gle gainst evil in
which hum a ns are present ly engaged.
An
almo st inevitable acco m panim ent
of
the evolutionary struggle,partic-
ularly
as
manifest
in
the hum an species,
is
suffering.
I t
is
significant, I be-
l ieve, that m ore and m ore efforts have been m ade
to
sh o w
that
a
G od int i-
mately invoIved
in
the crcative process
m u s t be a
“suffering G0d.”52 Again,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 244/323
lwmortal i ty:
A
Pragmatic-Processille Model
227
therefore, any cxtrapolatcd ncw life cannot exclude thc possibility of suffer-
ing in som e form .
Thcrc remains the qu est ion of “loss” as i t m ight pertain to a ny new l ife.
Perhaps thc m ost crucial aspect
of
this question has to do w ith th e loss
of
everlasting union with the divine. Since
I
havc alread y extrapolated
a
con-
tinuing strugg le after death, i t would follow that the achieverncnt of ever-
lasting union with the divine may depend o n actions that ar e’ n ot restricted
to “this
life.”
I t is because it is increasingly hard to beIieve that th e actions
of
most human
brings
in the time allotted them n this life are of such
a
nature
as to me rit them either cternal ifc o r eternal dam nation that thinkers such as
joh n Hick suggest a
succession
of l ives, whereby a co ntinu ing purification
will take place such that there
wil1
emerge individuals wor thy
of
the most
intimateunionwith
God.
Elsewhere, I
have
expressed my reservations
about Hick’s success ivc l ives th~ory~~- -heails, in
m y
j u d g m e n t ,
to
safe-
guard that individuality which I consider esscntial to significant personal
immortal i ty. Here I wish to take issue with ano the r aspect of his philosoph-
ical theology : n am ely,
his
affirmation of “universal salvation.”54 Finding the
idea of hell o r eternal suffering repu gn ant, H ick argu es hat the divine love is
such that all will eventually be saved, tho ug h so m e may have to und er go
a
succession o f
a
greater
numbcr
o f lives than others in or de r to achieve ade-
quate self-purification.
T h e question that mu st be aised here is wh ether the doctrine of niversal
salvation, highIy motivated tho ug h it may
be,
does not dimin ish the “se-
riousness” of human experience. While I d o n o t hink that hel lf ire and eter-
nal torment ought to
be
presented even as a possibility, I am not sure hat in
order to avoid them
we must
assert that all hu m an bein gs
will
necessarily
be
united with God in
a
un ion of joy fu l immediacy. At stake here, of course, is
the nature and scope of
h u m a n
f reedom. W ithout even touching
upon
the
numerous subtle issues related to
this freedom, let me simply sugge st that
there is a pro fou nd difference between a
h u m an
freedo m wh ose exercise
mrrst lead to union with God and one that llows for the possibilityof eternal
separation from God. This in
no
way rules ou t
the
possibility that all hu-
mans will eventually be united with each other within the depth s of the
divine life-indeed, this should be o u r h o p e . I t would seem, however, that a
world in which there can only be winn ers s a less serious w orld than one n
which the possibility of
the
deepest loss is real. From
a
perspective such as
Hick’s, the goal
is
assured; the only qu est ion is ho w lon g an individual will
take to reach it-as
if
God has said to us, “You’rego ing t o kee p do ing it i ll
you get i t r ight.”
Hence,
while I think that Hick has advanced
a
very
sug-
gestive and su pp ort ab le hypothesis-namely, that the process of creating
ourselves and thereby m ov ing closer to God m ust cont inue beyond “this
life”-he has unnecessarily weakened and soften ed it by assertin g that the
finat
goal is preset an d certain to
be
reached. Hell-understood as th e ever-
lasting separation
of
the individual from the divine cen ter
of
love-must
rema in a live option for radically free hu m an beings.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 245/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 246/323
Concluding
ReJections
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 247/323
No,
I
shall not die, I shall live
to reci te the dceds of Yahweh;
though Yahwch has punishcd me of ten ,
he has not abandoned me t o Dca th .
”Psalm 118:17-18
S o m e
suppose
that this post-natal
life
where
all we have
is time, is fetal life,
is where
as
wc bounce and f lex
i n
t i m e
o u r
years
of
moons change u s
into
beiugs viable not here
but somew here a t tent ive . Suppose,
b o r n e d o w n o n ,we are birthed
in to a universe where love’s not crazy;
and that split out
of
time
is
death in to
a
m e d i u m w h e r e
love
is
the elerncnt we c ry
o u t to
breathc,
big love,
gencral
as air
hcre,
specific as breath.
“ M a r i e Ponsot
“The Great Dead, Why
N o t ,
M a y K n o w ”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 248/323
Fro m the available evidence, it w ou ld appear that immortality bclief and
terminality belief have been present in varying degrees
of
explicitness and
with shif ting degrees of dom inanc e f rom the daw n of hum an conscious-
ness. I t is interesting to note that in s ome of the earliest religious literature,
it
is
death rather than imm ortal l ife wh ich
is
seen as the destiny
of
hum an
beings. In response to Gilgamesh’s poignant but fruitless search for immor-
tality, the Ale-wife informs him:
The
life thou pursuest thou shalt not find.
W hen the gods c rea ted m ankind ,
Death
for
mankind they set aside,
Life in th eir own hands retaining.’
Her advice
to
him is echoed latcr in Ecclesiastes, where we are told:
This, then, is my conclusion: the right happiness for man is to eat and
dr ink
and be content with all the w ork he has to do under the sun , dur ing the few
days God
has
given h i m t o
Iive, since this
is
the
lot assigned
him.
. . . What-
ever
work you propose to d o , d o i t while you
can, for
there is neither achieve-
ment ,norplanning,norknowledge ,norwisdom inSheolwhereyouare
going.3
Contemporary express ions
of
such sent iments are numerous , of course,
but what dis t inguishes them, perhaps, is that they emerg e out of and over
against
a
culture that for m ore than tw o thousa nd years
was
saturated w ith
the belief that “this life” was the pa thw ay to an oth er ife and that the way in
which nd ividuals ived“here and now ” would determine the qual i ty of
their
lives
“he reafte r.” Th is belief was articulated in bo th
the
philosophical
and religious traditions in su ch fashion that both the “ratio nality ” and the
existential meaning
of
hu m an life were organical ly bound
up
with a belief in
and a hope f o r som e m ode of its continuan ce beyon d the grave. It
is
this
belief and perspective w hic h, as
was
noted
at
the outset, has
been
rendered
radically problematic by mo dern and contem porary thoug ht and experi-
221
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 249/323
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 250/323
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 251/323
tion in order to realize tho se son lcw hat tenu ou s aspects of rcligious cxperi-
ence that secm no t
to be
covered by sclf-deception.
While
I
concede that
the
danger
of
sclf-deception appears to be greater
for
the religious believer, I stron gly reject a n y su gg est ion that self-deception is
exclusively
a
feature of religious belief. Rather, the cvidcnce would seem to
indica te that it is
a
characteris tic of the hu ma n cond it ion in
a
variety
of
its
modes .
1s
it so clear that Nietzsche with his doctrinc of the overm an, Marx
w ith his prediction of
a
near-Utop ian rnillcnnium , and Freud with his
hopes
for psychoanalysis were completely free of self-deception? I f it is possibly
self-deception to believe
that
ou r lives may not
be
totally extinguished at
death,
is
it
no t also possibly self-deception-wishful thin kin g, an illusion-
to believe that we
can
build a
world
in wh ich hum ans wi ll
lead
contented,
fulfilled lives, fully aware that they will absolutely cease to
bc
after
a
brief,
f leet ing moment
of
existence?
Self-deception, then, might properly
be
called a “two-edged sword,” and
anyone ref lecting on im m or ta l i t y o r erminali ty must constantly keep bo th
edges in mind.
A
few brief
examples
will serve to concretize this point. The
religious believer, w ho qu i te or rect ly notes the extent
o
which many of the
best
values
o fh u m a n
culture
arederived
f rom
religious expcricncc,
is
tempted to argue, incorrect ly , that re l igion
s
the on ly logical and cxistcntial
gr ou nd fo r these values. Those w h o reject religion will concede that histor-
ically these values w ere associated with relig ion, b ut will co nten d that they
could be maintainedwithout fear of loss if religionwere to disappear.
Hence, the possibility that we are still living off the “fat” o f religion is not
seriouslyentertained.But
i t
o u g h t to be,for as on e thinker renchantly
expressed it: “Perha ps
all
o f us . . . are l ike children of r ich men w h c live
unknowingly
OK
a
still sum ptuou s inheritance (while
we
think it already
exhausted). Perhaps we are going to leave our descendants a
misery
far
deep-
er than
we
can
O r consider the all to o accurate c hargc that imm ortal i ty bclief is an un-
edifying effort to escape the
harsh
reality
of
death,g
and as
a consequence
our responsibilities
for
the present state
of
the human condi t ion are great ly
diminished.
On
the o th er ha nd , the belief that death is absolutely final has
an
escapist dimension as well, as Ham let suggests:
To die--to sleep-
No
more;
and
by
a
sleep
to
say
we end
The heart-ache and
the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to ,-“ t is
a
c o n su m m a t i o n
Devoutly
to be
wish’d. (Hamlet 3 .1 )
If
im m orta l i ty belief has its mode of consolat ion, cannot
the
belief that our
responsibility ceases totally with our deathcarry
with
it a consolation
of
its
o w n ?
The
belief
that
our
life
is
not
comp letely terminated
at
the
grave
does
not
in itself assure o r exclude rcsponsibiiity; hence , we might reasonably
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 252/323
claim thc p ossibility of i ts deepening this responsibility. T he gr ou nd s for
such an
extrapolation are located in the experiential fact that rcsponsibility
for our actions usually extends beyond the mo me nt-wc arc responsib le for
the future consequences
of
ou r acts
as
well as for our past actions.
Is
i t not
plausible, then, that we might be rcsponsible i n some new life for the way
in
which
wc are
now living, and wo uld not such consciousness lend a depth
and significance to o u r present actions?’o
N E E D S AND
VALUES
We
have considered James’s insistence on taking seriously those needs in
response to whichreligions have em erge d. Th ere is
n o
claim, of course, that
a
feIt need
for
salvation or mmortality “proves” thereality o r even the
possibility of salvation o r im m or tali ty. T he m os t tha t is claimed is that
a
need or nceds that have been widespread and persistent cannot be dismissed
out of
hand.
If,
of course, one
is
persuaded that those heeds which have
from theearl iest momcnts of humanconsciousness to thepresentbeen
expressed i n various nmdcs o f religion-ranging then and now from benig n
to
destructive, from insightful to frivolous,rom umanizing to de-
humanizing-that hoseneeds are nothing but modes of self-deception,
then every effort
should be made
to
expose them
as
such and
to
replace them
with more constructivc needs. If, however, one believes that such needs, in
spite of their often horrend ous ma nifestations, areexpressive
of
that dirnen-
sion of
the human self
which
opens i t
to
the deepest rcsonanccs of reality,
then one
must
bend one’s efforts towa rd the red irection of those nceds and
the reconstruction
of
the modes in w hich they arc exprcssed.
We may not bc as confident today as James was that “immortality is one
of the great spir itual needs of m an ” ( H I , 2), but neither can we be certain
that it is
not.
Having surrendered certainty either way,
I
have been attem pt-
ing to suggest that such belief s a worthy, desirable, and hence “reasonable”
belief. It is a reasonab le belief if
it docs
not involve the loss of impor tan t
values and has the possibility of realizing some values that otherwise wo uld
be lost. If on e avoids o r minimizes the escapist temp tation that often ac-
compan ies belief in imm ortality , i t is hard to see just wh at im po rtant values
would be lost through suc h belief. I have sugg ested that quite possibly im-
mortality-believers might be spur red to
work
harder even for those
values
that are
at
the center o f th e ives
of
secular
humanists-more hu m an e politi-
cal, economic, and social structures, for example.
Detailing the distinctive values that m ig h t be gained by immortality belief
is more
difficult. Perhaps the m os t tha t an
be
claimed, and it
s
not a modes t
claim, is that all the values associated with h u m a n life thereby take
on a
greater depth and richness. An d perh aps the mo st crucial value is that of th e
human person.
A
central feature of this essay has been the construction of a
model of the h u m a n person constitutcd in part by its relation
to
a
transcen-
dent person , G od. have maintained that
a
view of theperson as
open
to
the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 253/323
possibility of a life con tin uo us w ith everlasting divine life
is
a richer view
than on e that restricts the real ity of th e person t o visible spatio-temp oral
parameters.
The
key
valu e gain ed by im m ortality elief, then , is inseparablc fro m that
transcendent dimension of reality traditionally symbolized s “God.” Expe-
rientially, Jamesm ainta ins, he reality
of
G od m eans“the presence of
‘promise’ in the wor ld . ‘God r no God?’means ‘promise o r
no
promise?’”
( M T , 6). Elsewhere, he suggests that
belief
in God “changes the dead blank
it
of
the wor ld into a living thou, with whom the whole man may have
dealings”
( W B ,
101). Now 1 am no t argu ing th at the values related to belief
in
the
divine are logical ly inseparable from im m orta l i ty belief , b ut
I
am
suggesting that those values tak e
o n
a dis t inct ive dimension when weelieve
that we have more than
a
m om en tary rol e to play in their realization. Take
the value o f “love,” for example. O f coursc, this may be nothing m ore
han
a hu m an em oti on or activi ty that emerges from hu m an experience and is
restricted in its m ean ing and reality to this expe rience. Let us assume,
how-
ever, that human love is a continuation and specification of
a
more encom-
passingprinciplewhich, given our processive world, is endeavoring in-
creasingly to incarnate itself.’ N ow im m ort ali ty belief is no t necessary for
believing pa rticipation in this principle
of
love-indeed,
I
will shortly
sug-
gest that, paradoxically, the m ost fruitful participation would seem to ex-
clude undue focusing on person al imm ortality. N evertheless, the possibility
that our participation in this everlasting principle of love is mo re than mo-
mentary does tend
to
disting uish it from participation in which the lasting
fruits of all love activity are retained by this principle alone.
O n e of the mo st impo rtant fruits associated with the belief in personal
immortal i ty is that of a moral universe. Note, I say “moral universe,”
no t
“mo ral order ,”
and
w ith this distinction
I
am diverg ing somewhat f rom
James’s usage for, as
we
saw earlier, Jarncs m aintained that ethics has “ a s
genu ine and real a foothold in a universe w here the highest consc iousness s
human, as in
a
universe where there is a God as well” ( W B , 150). Nev-
ertheless, James con tend ed that in the absence of faith in God, human beings
will not be ene rgize d to their full potential. T h er e is no question, then, that
James recognizes
a
significant difference between
a
universe in which
God
and person al mm ortality are realities and on e from wh ich they are
ex-
cluded. Following James, in part,
I
wish
to
acknow ledge the possibility
of
morali ty within the second kind of universe but insist that it will be re-
str icted to a dim ensionof this universe, w he rea s in the first kind of universe,
morali ty would in some sense flow fro m its de pth nd center. Given this real
difference,
I
think it proper
to
describe a universe involving God and per-
sonal imm ortal i ty as a “moral universe.” A universe in wh ich these realities
were absent could quite proba bly be said
to
I ’ N V O I V P a “moral order”
but
no t
to be
a
“m oral univcrse.” I t is qui te
possible
that morality
is solely a
creation
of
h u m a n
beings and
that
it
takes place within
a
nonmoral universe.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 254/323
C o n c l u d i q Rejectiorlr 227
O n e of the control l ing assumptions
f
this essay has been that he classical
claim that reality
s
rational has been radically un de rm ine d by the thought and
events
of
the mod ern and contemporary wor ld. T h e world, as Nietzsche,
Sartre,
C a m u s ,
and oth ers conte nd, may be essentially meaningless and ab-
surd so
that our incorrigible longings
or
just ice, p a c e , harm ony, and ife arc
doomed to utter frustration. Pragm atism, as has been indicated, strives to
form an alternativeposition-onewhichdenies hat
a
world o f finished
rationalityand
one
of i r redeemableabsurdity are theonly alternatives.
Hence, we may believe that the world is becoming rational, moral, and that
the all to o evident feature of ab surd ity m ay eventually be overcome. A s has
been stressed, however, at this m om en t of hu m an volution i t is not possible
to
claim that these
are
more
than possibilities.
Thus
there can
bc
no decisive
refutation of either the classical view that the un de rlying struc ture
of
the
world is finished and rational
r
the contemporary viewhat the wo rld
s
to its
core, and eternally, absurd.
JUSTICE
AND
COMPENSATION
One
o f the earliest spu rs to belief in persona l imm ortality was
the
evident
fact of injustice in the w or ld.
I f
death ends
a l l ,
then th ere can be no question
of
“justice” in
thc
very
basic
sense
of
each individual’s receiving his
or
her
due. As no ted in Ecclesiastes, “This is th e evil that inheres
in
all that is done
under the
sun:
that one fate com es
to all.”
Yet one of the long-standin g
contentions of
much
of philosophy and rcligion is that “one fate” does no t
await us all. l 2 It is a dcep-scated, almo st instinctive repugn ance for such a
view that has led philosophers in the nam e
of
rationality, m oralists in the
name
of morality,
and
theologians in
thc
n a m e of
God
to argue for
the
reality of a life in which
a
m or e equitable participation in the goods
of
real-
ity would bc reahzed.
I t
is not being sug gested, of
course,
that belief
in
personal immortality
“proves” that w e live in a m ora l universe. I t is suggested that belief in per-
sonal immortality is b o u n d u p with belief in
a
m ora l universe. Surely, the
over w he lm ing num ber o f
h u m a n
beings now living and the biliions w h o
have lived can hardly be said to reflect in their allotted lives an yth ing
ap-
proaching justice.Even if those of us w h o have been mo re for tunate an
say
that in spite of everything we have been treated justly, it wo uld sure ly
be
rash
i f not ar rogant
for
us
to
suggest
that the same holds
for
others. In the
absence of personal mm ortali ty, hen, here is noavoiding theexisten-
tialist’s co nte ntio n that the w orl d is
absurd
and that morality is
a
charac-
teristic-and a most tenuous one-of a small part of reality.
Now
whether
o r not we live in a moral universe,
one in
wh ich justice will ultimately
prevail, th e desire for such
a
wo rld is a wo rrhy one and-absent com pell ing
evidence
that
such
a w orld is impossible-a reasonable on e. Thus , if person-
al immortality is necessary to
a
mora l universe, then it too is a wor thy and
reasonable belief.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 255/323
228 Cortcludirrg RefIpctiorls
H av ing said this, and believing it to
be
true in some sense, I remain un-
easy-it
scerns
too imple , too neat, too reasona ble”when reflected
against thc dark unde rside of human experience.
I f
there is a deep repug-
nance to the notion that there
is
no u ltimate justice, there has also em erge d,
particularly in the modern era,
a
repugnance to the notion that the poo r and
oppressed
will
be “com pensa ted” for their sufferings
in
ano ther l ife. H ere
again w e are co nfro nted with an instance of that existential dialectic de-
scribed earlier. Immortality bclicf should not eradicate those experiential
absurdities that i ts adherents share with theerminality-believers, in spite
of
theconflictingconcep ts, nterpretations,and beliefs thatarise fro m this
shared experience.
There is
a
serrse
in wh ich there are sufferingsand evils that ca nn ot
be
compensated for, here or hereafter. Consider the
suffering
of inn oc ent chil-
dren-what “divine plan” could ever justify such suftering?
W h y
d o we feel
offended,
w h y
d o
w e feel that their sufferings
have
been trivialized, w he n
we hear som eo ne glibIy say, “It’s all right; they are
in
heaven n o w ” ? Yet are
we any less ogen ded ,
do
their sufferings seem an y less trivialized, w he n w e
hear it said that “thin gs will be better for
future
hum an i ty”? As noted ear-
lier, there is
a
sense in wh ich silerlce seems to be the only appropr iate re-
sponse
to
so m e deeds, but neither the terminality-believer
nor
the irnrnor-
tality-believer can rest con tent perm anen tly with s ilence. We
must
respond,
undoubtedly i n “ fear and t r e r n b h g , ”
but we
must
respon d, a nd the diver-
sity of responses gives rise to our divergent concepts and eliefs. i 4
Let me hin t at the direction I th ink
a
response consistent with the assump-
tions and concerns
of
this essay mig ht take. Ho w might
we
acknowledge
that
some
sufferings defy “compensat ion” and at the same t im e avoid ren-
dering them completely meaningless? Suppose we are involved
and
incor-
porated within
a
gr ow th process along the ines
I
have described. Th e strug -
gles and sugering s o f everyone involved help to move the process to an even
higher and richer process;
as
we are all contr ibutors to the growth
of
this
process, we
share
in bo th its sufFerings and its joys-thoug h not all equally
nor s imultaneously, s ince w e en ter in
an
indefini te number of different mo-
ments and develop
a t
widely varying rates. Suffering an d loss, then, are the
prices all participants pay, including God, for the creating
of
the wo r ld . l 5
How, then, is th is not “compensat ion”
or
our sufferings? Well, of course, in
a
sense it is , but we m igh t call i t “creative com pe nsa tion ”
to
distinguish it
from “extr insic com pensation.’’
What might his mean ? I am, needless to say, reachinghere, but I am
at tempt ing to extrapolate a possible mode of l ife, however transformed,
from available experience. For exam ple, supposing somc young man’s legs
are horr ibly burne d in
a
thcater
fire
for wh ich the building’s own er
was
responsible. T he o w ne r pays this you ng man
a
large sum
of
money, corn-
pensates h im . Th e young m an or someone close to him m igh t say, “No
am oun t
of
money
can
ever com pensate for the pain and suffering he has
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 256/323
undergone.” Let
us
call this “extr insic comp ensation.” N ow im ag in e that
the you ng ma n is deterrnincd to ovc rcom e his hand icap, and throug h per-
sistent effort he is no t on ly able to regain the
usc
o f his legs
but
in s o do ing
develops into
a
world-class runncr.
I b
I
w ou ld call this “creativc compensa-
tion” and view it as the cxpc riential gro und for the extrapo lation f the way
in
which su fferings, irrcducibly
absurd
and rneaninglcss in the n~ selv cs, m ay
possibly acquire meaning by their role in th e crcative process. l 7
N o w one might objcct a t this point that if this is the best ar gu m en t that
can
be
constructed for “creat ivc com pensation,” i t highlights thc poverty
of
argum ents or personal im m orta l i tyw he n faccd with heenormity of
human suffering.
I
would not for
a
m o m e n t
deny
this, but what arc our
alternatives? Sup pose thc totality o f th e lives o f th o se
who
have undergone
profoundandundescrvcd suffering areabsolutely erminatedwith heir
deaths. Is this any m or e palatable, any m ore “just ,” than if somehow thcrc
were
a
Go d able to “save” thcir pcrsonal centers
so
that their ho rrible suffer-
ing wou ld no t have been the whole of thcir life?
I
have already cxprcsscd my
view that what would be scanda lous would bc
a
G od w ho had the power
to
savc them withou t thcir having und ergon e such suffering but for whatever
reasons failed to allcviatc their pain. B u t a suffering God who is intimately
bo un d up w ith the suffering
of
hum ans ,
who
is
“saving ” them in thc
ordy
way possible, is another matter. Of course, n o such G o d may exist , and our
faith may be a dec cptive illusion-this possibility has been repeatedly con-
ceded. I f such a God did exist, however, hc wo uld hardly be reprehensible;
hence, one’s fai th would no t be mo rally repug nan t, n or wo uld the hop ehat
those w h o havc endurcd such ntense and “senseless” suffering m igh t in
some mysterious way be “com pcnsatcd” through
a
t ransformed mod e of
existence within
t h c
div ine life.
Allied
to
thc com pensation o bjection
to
belief in pcrsonal im m or tali ty
is
the con tentio n that suc h belief oEers an unacceptable consolation
for
the
pain and suffering that inevitably accompanies hu m an life.
I
earlier
dodged
this objection
by
rejecting any faith thatserves as a “means to strperjcinl
consolation.” I t seems foolish, however, and p atently untrue to experience,
to de ny that even the kind of rig or ou s faith for which
I
am calling may give
rise to some m o d c of consolation. T h c only poin t would insist upon is that
consolation may ncvcr be dircctly sought, thatfaith m us t never be
a
deliber-
ate o r conscious mea ns to achieve the
end
of
consolation.
If
consolation docs
accompanyfaith, it mu st com e as a grace. As such, of course, t is
not
inevitablc,
a n d one
ma y indced believe yet rcceivc little or no conso lation.
Indeed, I wou ld sugges t that nothing
should
m akc th c believcr more wary
of
the authenticity
of
his or her faith than an excess of conso lation.
Another charge against thc propriety of im m ort ali ty bclief m ust be ac-
knowledged-a charge prevalent a t least since thc Enlightenm ent-that to
believe in pcrsonal immortality
is to be
mired in an ou tmoded, primit ive
rewards-and-punishments version
of
morali ty that is demeaning to and un-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 257/323
w or thy of ma ture hum an being s. This charge has bo th sccular and religious
expressions: the first is encapsulated in the m ax im “V irtu e is its o w n re-
ward,” and the second in “God must be loved for his own sake.” In both
perspectives the implication is that
to
low
G o d
o r
serve
our
fellow bcings
became
such actions will red ou nd to ou r cred it manifests a crass and super-
ficial egotism. Since
a
crucial claim of th e later p art of this essay has been
that immortal i ty belief is pragmatically eficacious, I m us t again takc refugc
in paradox-a pa rad ox , however, w hic h is at thehear t of all religious
expenencc.
Prescinding from hepsychologicalcornplcxity,perhaps mpo ssibil i ty,
involved,
I
w ou ld insist that believers in persona l imm ortality should not
love and serve G o d o r heir fcllow beings
became
they will be rewarded, here
or hereafter, for such love and service. l 8 This would secm to
bc
the insight
a t the heart of “lo singone’s sou l in ord cr to find i t .” A simplistic m eans-end
relation appears inadequate to w ha t is being coun seled. If we
seem corn-
pelled to recognize a dimens ion of unwor th inessattached to serving others
in
order
that
we be person ally rewarded-secularly or religiously-we also
seem compelled to recognizc that an enh anced quality of life oftcn does
result from disinterested service to others.
The
lesson the imm ortality-bc-
liever m ust dra w is that thoug hts
of
a
new
life ou gh t no t
to
be
the primary
focus o f and motivation for their actions.
9
G od an d ou r ellow beings otrghr
to be loved for their o w n sakes an d no t for any enefits that mig ht accrue to
us personally. T h e dedicated terminality-believer, therefore, will serve as a
challenge to the authen ticity o f th e mmortality-believer’s life an d in a sense
may even
be a
model for it. Immortality-belicvers must not makc theirdedi-
cation and co ntr ib utio n to
the
bct ter ing of t he hum an com m uni ty and t he
world dependen t upon their assurance of
imm ortal i ty. The ir t rust in the
divine benevolence m us t
be
such that if their
egos
are the price
to
be paid
for
the advancement of the S pirit, so be it. Th is, of course, does not exclude
their believing and ho pin g that the go od ne ss of G od is such that all will be
graciously enabled
to
share in the fruits of the Sp irit to whose lifc all have
contr ibuted.
An allied parad ox is that wh ile belief in personal im m ort ali ty gives mean-
ing
to ou r l ives, we shou ld not so believe in ord er to give m eanin g to a
meaningless life. Belief in personal immortal i ty should not be the sourceo r
cause
of a
me anin gful life; rather, heexperienced worthwhilcnessand
meaningfulness o f life itself should give rise to the hope for co ntinu ing life.
It is n o t because his life is so bad hat we mu st seek me aning for t in
an oth er life. It is because life is so good that we desire to extend, deepen, and
enrich it without limit.20
T h e
ambiguous,
cloud ed character of the hum an con dit iont the m om en t
is such that, a t bes t, bo th im m ortality elief and terminality belief are mo des
of
a
holding act ion unti l “the gods return.” Th e hum anist ic imm ortali ty-
beIievers cannot but acknowledge the poverty
of
their articulations, and the
elusiveness an d am big uity of the experiences from wh ich these articulations
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 258/323
emerge. T h e humanistic terminality-believers cann ot but ackn ow ledge the
gap betwcen the idealized hu m an ity
of
the Enlighten mcn t-whether in its
subseq uent Nietzsch ean, M arxian, o r Deweyan expressions-and the gen-
crality
of
hum an b eings. B oth m ust believe and hope that wc are in transi-
tion to
a
n e w m o d e of hum an consciousness . Thc former will believe that
this new mo de will make the divine dimensionof reality more evident and
vital. T h e latter will believe
a n d
ho pe that the
ncw
m o d e of consciousness
will achieve en o ugh self-sufficiency
to
effcctivcly o verco me the long-stand -
ing need for transcendcnce. Bo th m ust live to the f ~ ~ l l e s tn accordance with
their respective beliefs and interpretations of their necds. Neither, o f course,
will believe that thcsc
are
merely their individual or g r o u p
needs,
and they
will thereforc strive
to
persuad e the others hat the best
of
wh at these others
seek is found in the oppo sing bclief fram ew ork. Each g ro up l iving
s o
will
test out their bcliefs
s o
that, over the long run , wh at is w orth y
of
survival
will survive.
T h e
terrninality-believers m ig ht co m e
to
an awareness
of a
depthand reality accom pany ing heirexperience hat is no longer ade-
quatelyaccounted or
in
m er chum an e r m s .
T h e
immortality-believers
might come
to
realize tha t their bclief in an en con lpassin g perso nal rcality
with which their lives are continu ous was but
a
primitive projection of the
best in the hum an com mu nity and that the posi t ive possibil it ies o f such
belief can now
be
lived witho ut the early sym bols by wh ich i t was ex-
pressed.
REPRISE
We have seen that the classic criticism of bclief in im m o rta lity is its alleged
deen ergizing ch aracter, i ts turning individu als away f ro m th e difficult tasks
at handand ocusing heirattentionandenergies in an illusory“other
world.”21
I
believe that
a
pragm atic extrapo lation along the lines suggested
offers analternative to such
a
l ife-denying i~ n m o rt a li ty elief. I t does so
because, if con sisten tly acte d up on, it intensifies the prese nt efforts to trans-
form the world in wh ich we find ourselves. Furthcr, any future participation
in the “ new ” hum an com m uni ty will be significantly, though
not
neces-
sarily exclusively, de ter m ine d by theway we live and act in ou r presen t span
of
l ife. Hence, such belief in immortality does not divertour energies from
“this life”; rather, it intensifies th e m by aw akening us to the depth, scope,
and seriousness belon ging to “this
life.”
Since
a
n e w c o m m u n i t y o r n e w
world or new reality is “here and n o w ” in the
process
of being created,
and
since we are imp ortant- thou gh not necessari ly the only-participants in
this creative process, th e value
of
o u r present efforts
is
immeasurably in-
creased.
Inasmuch
as th e
sole
pathway to
any
ne w life is thro ug h “this li fe,”
any escapist beliefs o r activities that fantasize an already realized a nd corn-
pleted paradise
to
which
we
will leap are profoundly antithetical
to
authen-
tic belief in im m ortality .
In
the inal analysis,
of
course, hepragmaticperspective ssumed
throug hou t this
essay
insists that belief o r fai th is not knowledge, and there
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 259/323
232
C o n d r r d i q Reflec t iom
is n o guaran tee that imm ortality-bclicf, o r any other belief, is not illusory.
T he risk of bclief is inevitablc, and no reflective p erson can avoid it o r trans-
fer it to
a
surroga te, u-hcthcr that surrogate is called tradition, thc Chu rch,
the Biblc,
or
God. T h e
emphasis
upon persona l responsibility is
on ly
fit-
ting, given that what is a t stake
is
personal im m ortality . Bu t since thc person
is relational
o r
communal as well as individual, there is no suggestion here
of any isolated, self-enclosed, egotistic, and merely ‘m en ta l belief activity.
Indeed, unless belief in im m or tali ty gives
rise
to s om c evident existential
fruits for both he nd ividualand hccommunity,pragmatic evaluation
would
be
compelled to conclude that this belief is m erely notional-a hol-
low
relic left over from an earlier
age.
Inasmuch
as
l iving belief neve r occu rs within
a
historical and cultural
vacuum, we may not minim ize the formid able obstacles to belief in immor-
tality within our presen t context. But neither should wc s uccum b to t hem
because we are unable
to
fashion ar gu m en ts that will completely neutralize
theseobstacles. Fashion arg um en ts we must ,bu t they shouldreinforce,
deepe n, and enrich rather than substitute for othcr hum an activities. Para-
doxically, the best argum ents produ ced by any believing co m m un ity, in-
cluding perhaps thcscientific com m un ity, have always led to m yste ry rather
than dernystificat ion, ex panding
o u r
sense
of
awe
and won der instead
of
explaining
it
away. Eve n hebestarg um ents , however, never initiate o r
create life or belief.
0 x 1 1 ~
here there is
a
com mu nity already energized by
vital belief stcrnming from
a
mysterious and irreducible experiential dcpth
have there em erged those wh ose cflections have served
to
suppor t , to mod-
ify,
to
expand, and a t times to trivialize or destroy the originating belief or
faith . T ho se w ho choose the path of reflective believing cannot know,
a
priori,
which of these may
result from
their reflections.
All
we can kno w,
with some degree
of
confidence
is
that
a
belief in immortality which lacks
either personal and com mu nal frui ts or reflective support has already lost its
very reason
for
being-the deepe ning and expan sion o f life.
O n e last poin t . Belief in imm ortal i ty shou ld not isolate those w h o es-
pouse it from others who also believe in the need to wo rk towa rd
the
cre-
ation o f a richer andmore humane comm uni ty . These l a tt e r o d d inc lude
a
variety
of
Marxist and humanistic believers who
also
maintain that no sig-
nificant a n d desirable future is possible unless
a
con tinuing effort on the part
of
an increasing number
of
human
beings is made
to
“change the world”
as
it is pres en tly con stitute d. Th ou gh th e bclief structures that energize those
endeavoring to createabetter worldwill nv olv e m po rtan t differences,
which ought not be minimized, they should not be
in,
superficial cornpeti-
tion with each other. O n l y by a shared effort to realize c on ve rgen t goals and
values will an atmosphcre emerge for a more fruitful dialogue concerning
dive rgen t beliefs-beliefs o f such magn itude and scope that what is at stake
is literaliy a matter
of
death
and
life.22
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 260/323
Notes
and
Index
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 261/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 262/323
NOTES
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1. John Hcrm an Randall , Jr ., T h e
Role
ojK~nowledger l Westem Religiorr (Boston:
Starr King
Press, 1958), 140
ee also Randall’s
Nu t u r c u r d H i s t o r i d
Expcrierrce ( N e w
York:
ColumbiaUniversi ty
Press,
1958),
269-70
(hereafter,
N H E ) :
“Intellectual
cons istency betw cen ‘scientific’ and ‘religious ’ beliefs-if the latter are taken
as
giv-
ing
an
inteflectual explanationof anything-is a very greatvalue. B ut it s an intellec-
tual and philosophical valye, no t
a
‘religious’ value. ~ . . In any event, there
is
a basic
distinction between religious beliefs that are ‘fundamental,’ and perform a religious
function-that are religious symb ols-and those that give intellectual understand-
ing, that construe and interpret re l igious insight in termsf some particular philoso-
phy, and ad just it to the rest of man’s knowledge
and
experience. T h e latter beliefs
are the basis of a ‘rational’ o r ‘philosophical’ theology.”
2.
Cf.
SPP,
30:
“The ques t ion
of
being
is
the
darkest
in
all
philosophy.
A11
of us
are beggars here,
and
n o school can speak disdainfully
of
another or give itself supe-
rior
airs. For all of us alike, Fact forms
a
datum, gif t , or
vorge@ndener,
which w e
cannot burrow under, explain or
get
behind. I t makes itself somehow, and our busi-
ness
is far
more with i ts u h a t than with
i t s
w h c e
o r u,hy.”
3. John Dewey, “The Need for a Recovery in Philosophy,”
0 1 1
Experierrce, Na tu re ,
attd Freedom, ed. Richard]. Rernstein (N ew York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960),23.
4.
The hyphen ins t ead o f “and”s the connective heres deliberate and important,
since it emphasizes the distinctive versionof pragmatism’s “experience” as a transac-
tion between tw o poles of reality rather than
an
interaction betw een two essen tially
com plete and separate entities.
5. The Philosophy of -Al jed North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arth ur Sch ilpp (Ne w York:
Tudor,
1941),
645,
647-48.
6. A . N. Whitehead, Process arzd Reality NewYork: H umanit ies Press, 1955), 6.
7. A . N.Whitehead, Adventures ofldeas ( N e w York:Free Press/Macmillan,
1967),
8.
Cf . PU, 123: “All the wh ats as well as the thats of reality, relational as well as
228.
T h i s is
a
reissue of the
1933
edition.
terminal, are in the end c o n t e n t s o f i m m e d i a t e oncrete perception.’’
235
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 263/323
9. Ralph Barton Perry, The Thorcgkt nt ld Chnracteu
qf
WilliatnJmej, 2 vols.
(Boston:
Lit t le , Brown,
1935),
II:357 (hereafter TC).
10. See also V R E , 72-73: “If you have intuitions at all they come from a deeper
levcl of your naturc than the loquacious
evcl
which ra t ional isn~ inhabits .”
11. Cf. RichardStevens, J m t ~ c sm d Hlrsserl: The Fourrddiorzs of
M e m r i r ~ g
The
Hague: M artinus Nijhoff 1974),
37
(hereafter J H ) : “The task of achieving a fully
cohercnt network of Incarling is never finished, for w c n the most elaborate concep-
tual system always gives meaning only fro m a certain perspective, or from a limited
number of perspectives.”
12. Cf. Hans K iing, EtevtlaI L$e? trans. Edward Q u i n n (New York: D oubleday,
1984), 73-74: “A responsible decision of faith thus prcsupposes not a blind but a
justified belief in an eternal life; the per son
is
then not mentally ovcrpowcred but
convinced with the id
of
good reasons.” See also, the penultimate paragraph fJohn
Sm ith’s ine ntroduction to James’s Varieties of Religiorrs Experience: “Thebook
stands
as
a necessary co rrective to th e fideistic tendency manifested in the religious
thinking
of
recent decades, whichhas resulted in the encapsulation
f
religion within
the
walls
of sheer faith, w her e it s divorced f ro m any form of knowledge. James did
not accept that bifurcation” (p. li).
13.
Cf. Ian G. Barbour , A 4 p h ,
hfodels,
and Parcldignrs (New York:Harpe r Row,
1976), 123 (hereafter ALl4P): “ O n e cannot prove one’s most fundamental beliefs, b u t
one
can try to show how they funct ion in the interpreta t ion
f
expe rience.” Set: also
A r t h u r 0 Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dtrnlisrtl (La Salle, 111.: O pen C ou r t Publi sh -
ing ,
1960),398:
“Since ou r kn ow in g s characteristically concerned with beyonds, we
know by fa i th . Bu t no t all beyonds
of
wh ich we can frame ideas are the objects o f
faiths
for
which wc have motives equally persuasive, urgent,
r
irrepressible, equally
deeply rooted in our cognit ive const i tut ion, and equally reconcilable with one an-
other and with what-through our primary fa i ths in the real i ty
f
remembrance and
in the existence o f ot he r knowers-we believe to have been the constant and com-
mon
course
of
experience.” I t is worth noting that nei ther
f
these thinkers considers
himself
a
pragmatist .
14.
Ian G. Bar bou r, theolo gian and phys icist, has developed an exceptionally ac-
cessible viewpoint o n the re la t ion between science and re l igion. Thoug h
morc
con-
ceptually efinedanddeveloped,Barbour’sviews are str ikinglysimilar o hose
found within the pragmatic tradition. See in particular his hrihlP and
Zsscrcs
it/ Science
nrrd Religiatr
( N e w
York:
Harper Torchbooks,
1971).
15.
The impossibi l i ty of rationally grounding first principles is widely
held
by
twentieth-century thinkers. Godcl’s incom pletene ss theore m is often cited n
this
regard. Hans Jonas, no fr iend of irrationalism, has made the point in somewh at less
technical language: “If there
is
a
‘life
of
reason’
for man
(as distinct from the m ere
use o f reason), it can be chosen only nonrationaliy,as all ends m ust be chosen nonra-
tionally {if they can be chosen at all). Th is reason has no jurisdiction even ovcr t he
choice o f itself as a me ans. Bu t use of reason as
a
means, is com patible with any nd,
no
matter how irra t ional . This is
the
nihilistic implication in m an’s losing
a ‘being’
transcending the fluxof becoming”
(ThePhertomenon
ofLife [ N e w York: Dell, 19661,
47).
16. In “The Applicability of Logic to Existence,” Dewey m aintained that “exis-
tence apart
from
that of reflection is logicible, bu t no t logicired” Dewey a d His
Critics,
ed.
Sidney Morgenbesser [New
York:
The
Journa l of Philosophy,
19771,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 264/323
519). I t first appe ared in thejorrrrral o f P M o s u p h y
27,
no. 7 1930).For a similar point
made w ithin a vcry different philosophical context, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Tht
Will
to Power; trans.
W.
Kaufmann and
R .
j.
Hollingdale, ed. W. Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage
Books,
1967),
283:
“The
world scems logical to
us
because we have made
i t
logical.”
17. Cf. j o h n Dewey, The
i@ucrrce o jDu rwin ott
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press,
1965),
13 (hereafterID):Philosophy forswears inquiry after abso-
lute origins and absolute finalities n order to cx plore spec ific alues and thc specific
conditions that gcnerate them.”
18. Cf.Joh n Wild, The
Rndicnl Etrtpiricism of WiIliarrtJutnes
(New York: D oublcday,
Anchor Books, 1970),
388-89:
“Insuch facts therc is anelementofopacityand
‘m ystery ,’ as Jam es calls i t . No matter how fa r his know ledge of existencemay reach,
there will be furthcr dcyths beyond. Hence the radical em piricist should rccognizc
that in these concrete invcstigations, he is not conc erned with prob lem s that an ever
be
solved once and for all. H e is concerned ra thcr w ith mysteries into which he m ay
penetrate in various degrees, but which
he will
never
bc
ablc to exhaust. This mean s
that hc will put forth his ow n conc lusion s in tentative way, atte m ptin g a t
all
costs to
maintain that openness of mind which is o characteristic of Jam es.”
19.
For sim ilar notions by thinkers outside thc pragm atic tradition, cf. Joh n Hick ,
“Biology and hc Soul,” in Larpqge, Metuphysics, arid Death, ed.
John
Donne l ly
(New
York: Fordham Un iversity Press,
1978),
159: “We are no t here in the realm of
strict proof and disproof but
of a n
informal process of probing in
search
o f
a more
adequate conceptualization of the data.”See also Ralph Harper,
The
Existerrtial E x p -
rimce (Baltimore,
Md. :
Johns Hopkins’Universi ty Press, 1972),6: “ I t wou ld be wise
to think of existential thinking always as exploratory and provisional.”
20. Dewcy, ID,
194.
21. Cf.
James, cited in TC, I1:350: “T h e t ru th is what will survive the sifting-
sifting by successive generations and ‘on the whole.’ ”
22.
John Dewey, Experience u r d Nnfrrre (New York: Dovcr, lass),
7 .
Cf . WB, 12:
“The thinker starts
from
some experience of thepractical
world,
and
asks
its
mean-
ing. He launches himself upon the speculative
ea,
and
makes
a voyage long or short .
He ascends in to the empyrean , and com munes w i th the e te rna l essences . But what -
ever his achievements and discoveries be while gone, he utmost result they can issue
in
is
some new practical r n a s i m or resolve, or the denial of somc
old one,
wi th wh ich
inevitably he is soo ner o r later wa shed asho re on the
t e r m j r m a of
concrete life
again.”
23. Elizabeth Flower and Murray G. Murphey, A History ofPhilosoyIry
i n
Americn,
2 vols. (New York:
P u t n am, 1977),
II:682+
24.
Ralph
Barton Perry,
Itt
rhe
Spirit
o
Willinrn
Jntncs
(Ne w Ha ven, Co nn. : Yale
University Press,
1938),
203.
25.
In a letter
to
Arthur Lovejoy in 1907,Jamcs made thc following concession:
“Consequences of t rue ideas p e r
se ,
an d consequenccs of ideas
qlrn
believed b y
us,
are
logically different cons equc nces , and the whole ‘will to believe’ busincss has go t to
be re-edited w ith explicit uses made of the distinction” (cited in TC, 11:481).
26.
See also
P,
143:
“On
pragma tistic principles, if the hypothesis
of God
works
satisfactorily in thc wid est sens e
of
the wo rd, i t is true.
Now
whatever its residual
difficulties m ay be, experience
shows
that it certainly does
work, and
that the prob-
lem is to build i t out and de te rmine i t , so that i t wilI
cornbinc
satisfactorily
with
a11
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 265/323
238 No te s to Introdirctioti
the other working truths.” Cf. Morton White, Scierice G Sentiment in America (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 205: “A holistic . . . conception of sci-
ence . . . emerges in those parts of Pragmatism in which he Uames] describes the
establishment of belief as a process in which we do not test opinions in isolation but
rather as parts of a whole stock of opinions.”
27. Louis Duprk, Trartscendetit Seljhood (New York: Seabury Press, 1976), 80.
28. Cf. Randall,
NHE,
198: “We never encounter the Universe, we never act to-
ward experience or feel being o r existence as ‘a whole.’
”
See also Karl Jaspers, Wa y
to
Wisdom, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1960),
43: “The world as a whole is not an object, because we are always in it and we never
confront the world as a whole. Hence we can not, from the existence of the world as
a whole, infer the existence of something other than the world. But this notion takes
on a new meaning when it is no longer regarded as
a
proof. Then metaphorically, in
the form of an inference, it expresses awareness of the mystery inherent in the exis-
tence of the world and of ourselves in it.”
29. Eugene Fontinell, “John Hick’s ‘After-Life’: A Critical Comment,” Cross Cur-
rents, Fall 1978, pp. 315-16.
30. It is important to stress that pragmatic extrapolation is rational, and while any
extrapolation, such as the one relating to immortality, may be unsuccessful and fall as
a result of critical analysis, it cannot be dismissed out of hand simply because it
points us
beyond the bounds of present experience or strict inferential reasoning.
Pragmatic extrapolation does not have the dimension of irrationalism apparent in an
affirmation of immortality such as Miguel de Unamuno’s. The similarities and con-
trasts between the two approaches cannot here be delineated, but one crucial dif-
ference is that the faith-reason relation in pragmatism does not have the fierce op-
positional character that it has in Unamuno. See his Tragic Sense ofLlfe, trans. J. E.
Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954), 114: “To believe in the immortality of
the soul is to wish that the soul may be immortal, but to wish it with such force that
this volition shall trample reason underfoot and pass beyond it.”
31. Barbour makes one further point supportive of the kind of pluralism espoused
by pragmatism: “In place of the absolutism of exclusive claims of finality, an ec-
umenical spirit would acknowledge a plurality of significant religious models with-
out lapsing into a complete relativism which would undercut all concern for truth”
( M M P , 8).
32. Plato scholar Henry G. Wolz has given what
I
would call a near pragmatic
description of extrapolation: “The outcome of an extrapolation can, therefore, be
said to be empirical in its origilz, transempirical in its nature, and, in as much as it may
serve as a norm or means of elucidation, once more empirical, namely, in itsfunction”
(Pla to and Heideggev:
I tt
Search
of
Seljhood
[Lewisburg, Pa.
:
Bucknell University Press,
19811, 132).
33. Whether an extrapolation is so “beyond” experience as to be invalidly discon-
tinuous with it is one of the matters not able to be decided in isolation from a range
and diversity of factors. Nietzsche, for example, concedes that his notion of the
overman is as much a conjecture as is the notion of God, but he considers the former
a valid conjecture, the latter invalid: “God is a conjecture; but I desire that your
conjectures should not reach beyond your creative will. Could you create a god? Then
do not speak to me of any gods. But you could well create the overman” ( T h u s Spoke
Zarathustra,
in
T h e Portable Nie tzsc he,
ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York:
Viking, 19681, 197).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 266/323
Note s to Chapter 1 239
34. Throughout this essay, I will use the terms “immortali ty” and “resurrection”
interchangeably. In another context i t wou ld be im po rta nt to differentiate them, but
it is not crucial from m y perspective. I agree w ith Jo hn H ick that “if we posit the
reality of God, the difference between immortality and resurrection, as variations
within a theistic picture, becomes secondary” (Death arid Eterrzal LiJe [N ew York:
Ha rper Row, 19761, 181).
35. Th is classification is but a variation o f that given by Robe rt Jay L ifton in B o ~ t z d -
nries
(N ew Y ork: V intage Books , 1970), 21ff. , and
T h e LiJe o f t he
Self(New York:
Sim on Sch uste r, 1976), 32-34. For an earlier an d sim ilar version, see Co rliss La-
mont ,
T h e Illusiotz of lm mort al i t y
(N ew York: Frederick U ng ar, 1965), 22-23 (here-
after IZ).
36. For a biting dismissal o f wh at he calls “tho se shab by pseudo imm ortalities that
atheists and pantheis ts are forever proffering as substitutes for the real thin g,” w hich
is “personal imm ortal i ty ,” see Mart in Gardner, “Imm ortal i ty: W hy I A m N o t Re-
signed,” in T h e W h y s < fa Philosophical Scriuerzev (N ew York: Q uill, 3983), 280.
37. Cf. Lamont, I l , 251. After describing a nu m be r of such “ sym bolic interpreta-
t i on [~ ]” f imm ortal i ty and resurrect ion and conceding that for him they contain “ the
only tru th that imm ortali ty ideas ever had,” L am on t adds that these “abstruse redefini-
t ions o f imm ortali ty and the resurrection c annot be expected to have muc h emotional
efficacy or religious value. T he y w ill appeal he re and there
to
certain esoteric religious,
philosoph ic and esthetic group s, bu t for the great m asses of me n they will have little
significance.”
38. Be rtran d Russell, Mysticism and Logic
(London: Longmans, Green, 1921), 47-
48.
39. W. B. Yeats, “T he Song o f the H app y Sh epherd,” in T h e Collected Poems
o f
W.
B . Yeats (N ew York: Macm illan, 1956), 7.
40. Fyodor Dostoevsky, T h e Brothers Karamazov, t rans. Constance Garnet t (New
York: Modern Library, n.d.), 253.
41. C ited by Jacques C ho ro n in Death arzd Moderrz Mart (N ew York: Col l ier Books,
1972), 15.
42. Ralph Harper, The Existeirtial Experience (Bal t imore, Md. : Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1972), 69.
C H A P T E R
1
1.
John J. McDermot t , ed . , The Writirzgs
of
WilliarnJatnes (Chicago: University of
Ch ica go Press, 1977), xlv (hereafter WWJ.
2. These notes are reproduce d in Ralph B arton Perry,
T h e Th oug ht arid Character rf
Will iamJames, 2 vols. (Bo ston : Little, B ro w n, 1935),
11:365ff.
(hereafter TC).Need-
less to say, there is n o sug gestion here that James originated the notion o f “fields.”
Mary Hesse locates one source of field theory in physics in the work of the eigh-
teenth-century cosm ologist Ru ggie ro Bosco vich:
For Boscovich, “m atte r” is reduced to point particles having inertia but interacting
by distance forces of attraction and repulsion, whose magnitude depends on the
distance between the particles. . . . If attention is concentrated on the forces that
are exerted in space between the point masses, it is possible to regard these as in
some way constituting
a
med ium , thus “substantializing” the force field itself and
reducing the point masses
to
mere singularities in this field. This
was
essentially
the step taken by Michael Faraday in transforming Boscovich’s theory
into
field
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 267/323
theory
as
i t is unders tood in both classical and modcrn
physics.
(“Action
at
a
Distance
and
Field Theory,” in
The
E nqdoped i a o PPltilosoyhy, 8 vols . , cd. Paul
Edwards, [New York:Frce Press/M acmillan, 19671, I:11-12).
Since its origination in physics, the “field” co ncept has been employ ed
n
a variety
of
disciplines.
T h e
most notable and dcvcloped instancc, perhaps, is found in the w o r k
of Kurt
Lewin,
w ho p roduced a highly technical socid-psychological field theory.
For an insigh tful and sugg cstive use
of a field
metaphor , d rawn f rom physics ,
to
illuminate
the
nature
of
poetic and religious ecstasy, see Justus George Lawlcr, “Ec-
stasy: Towards a General Field Theory,” ] o c r n d q f f h f AJlJerirntJ
Acndemy
tIfRrligior~,
Dec.
1974, 605-1 3 .
3. Cf. Richard Stevens, J n r ~ e s
t d
Htrsserl: The Fotr~zdutiollsojMenrLirrg (Thc Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974),
129
(hereaf ter,JH ): “James discovered that the most primi-
tive data of the streamof consciousness are ‘sensible totals,’ i .e . , ensembles of sense
data which always present themselves in a focus-fringc pattern.” Stcvens
is
herc dis-
cussing James’s de scription of experience as it is presented i n The Prirlciyles qfPjycltol-
og y . I think i t evident that these “sensible tota ls” aren early version of “f ie lds .” T he
following text f r o m Stevens suggests a sim ilar cong eniality bctw ecn James’s field
language and his doctr ine of pu re exp erience:“The primordial field of pure experi-
ence
is a vagucly pre-structured flow
of
loosely-linked ‘sensible totals.’
No
totaiity is
ever complete
o r
sct f-enclosed. O n th is fundamen ta l l e d , the re
is
n o precise line of
demarcation w hich separates one sensible totality from ano ther”
JH,
4).
4. For an allied no ti on , cf. A .
N .
Whitehead
Aherlt lrres
ofIdeas
New
York: Frce
PresslMacrnillan, 1967),206: “ T h e univcrsc achieves its values by reaso n o f its
coot“
dination in to societies of societies, and into societies of societies of societies.:
5. John He rm an Randa ll , Jr . Nutwe n r d
His tor id
Expcriewe
(Ncw York:
Colum-
bia University Press, 195&),
133,
14611.(hereafter N H E ) .
6. Robert Pollock, “James:Pragma t i sm,” i n The
Greur
Books,
4
vols., ed. Harold
Gard inc r (N ew York:Devon-Adair, 1953), IV:197, 191.
7.
A . N. Whitehead,
Process and
Redi ty (New York: Hum ani ties Press ,
1955), 53
(hereafter
PR) .
8.
A . N. Whitehead,
Modes
of
Tllought (New York: Capr ico rn Books, 1958>,221.
Whitehead later adds : “We have to con st rue
he
world in te rm s of the bod i ly oc ie ty ,
and the bodily society in tcrms of thc gencral functionings of the world.
Thus,
as
disclosed in the fundamental essence
of
ou r experience, the
togetherness
of things
involves
some
doctrine of mutua l imm anence .
111
some sense or o ther , th is com mu-
nity of the actualities
of
the world mean s that each happening is a factor in the nature
of
every
other happening.
.
. .
We
are in the world and the world is in us” (pp. 225,
227).
9. John
Dewey,
Experieuce mrd Nutwe
(New
York:
Dover,
1958),
208 (hereafter
EN). Cf. Randall, N H E , 245: “ I t is not me rely organ ism s that can be said
to
‘re-
spond to st imuli ,’ that is , to respond
o
particulars
as
instances of ways rather than as
m ere particulars.’’
10.
jo hn Dewey, “Experiencc, Knowledge
and
Value,” in T h e
Philosophy ofjohn
Dewey,
cd.
PauI Arthur SchiIpp (New York:Tudor, 1951)’544.
11. j o h n Dewey, “In Defense
of
the T h e o r y o f Inquiry,” in On Experiencc, Ndtwe,
a d Freedofir, ed. Richard Bernstcin (New
York:
Liberal
Arts
Press, 1960),
135
(here-
after ENF).
12. john
Dewey,
Logic
(New
York: H e n r y Holt, 1938), 66-67 (hereafter L ) .
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 268/323
Notes t o C h a p t u 1
24 1
13. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley. Kmwing n r d t l w Ktrn~vt~ (Boston: eacon
Press,
1960),
e .g . , 67-69 (hereafter KK) .
14. Bernste in, Introduction, E N F , xl. Sec also Bernstein’sJohn D e w e y ( N e w York:
W ashington Square Press,
1967),
83:
“ F r o m
a
transactional perspectivc, an ‘elcment’
is a function al unit that gains its specific charac ter from the role that it plays in the
transaction. . . . A transaction does no t occ ur wi th an aggregate or combination of
elements that have independ ent existence.
On
the contrary, what counts
as
an ‘ele-
ment’ is depend ent
on
i ts func tion w ithin a tra nsactio n.” T hat this radical character
of
“interna l” chan ge is no t restricted t o macrosco pic rcalities
is
suggested by the
following:
“Thus
twentieth-century science has revolutionized many fundam ental
ideas of the nineteenth century; the a tom is not on ly much
more
complex than
Dalton [ the founder
of
chemical a tomic theory] thought; it is a lso much mo re
dy-
namic. . .
.
The m a in mis t ake of DaIton and other advocates o f essentially mecha-
nistic theories lay in the conviction that atoms did n ot un dergo any internalchange’’
(Andrew G.
M.
van Melsen, “Atomism,”
E t q ~ l o p e d i a
fPhilosophy, 1:197).
15.George R . Geiger,]ohn
Dewey
( N e w York: Oxford Univctsi ty Press,
1958),
17.
16.
Sec aIso Joh n Dewey, Expevierrce
n d
Educntiojr ( N e w York: Macmillan, 1956),
41 (hereafter EE): “Thestatem ent hat ndivid uals live n a
world
means, in the
concrete, that they live in a
series
of si tuat ions. And when it is said that they live
i n
these situations, the meaningof thc wo rd ‘in’
is
different
from
i ts meaning when i ts
said that pennics
are
‘in’
a
or
paint
is
‘in’
a
can.’’
For
a
useful com parison
of
Dewey’s “environment” and Alfred Schutz’s version
of
the Lebenstvelt, see Rodman
B. Webb, The Prese~tceOfthe Past (Gainesville: Univcrsity Presses o f Florid a, 1975),
40K
17.
John Dewey, Den to mcy a ~ dducation (N ew York: Macmillan,
1961),
47.
18. john Dewey, Hrrntan Natrrre m i o ~ d t r c t New York: M odern Library, 1930),
14,
16. For what can properlybe considered a field view related toJam es and particu-
larly Dewey, see Randali’s “Su bstan ce as a Coope ra t ion of Processes,” in N H E ,
142-
94.
Randal1 notes that w hat h e calls “Substance” can be called “the Field” (p.
14911).
He
later states: “Substa nce
is
wh at we today call ‘process.’
.
. .
M o r e
precisely,
Sub-
stance is encoun tered and kno wn as a complex of interacting and coo perating pro-
cesses, each exhibiting its o w n determ inate ways of cooperat ing, o r Struc ture” p.
152).
Given the rather broad sense in which
I
am understanding “field metaphysics,”
one could maintain that W hitehead has constructed the most systematic field rneta-
physics to date. His Process a d Reality is, needless to say,
a
thoroughly processive-
relational view o f reality. T w o texts
from
his more accessible Modes qf Tltolrght in&-
cate the deep congeniaIity between W hitehead and James and Dew ey o n the central
theme of reality as “fields”: “ T h e whole spatial universe s a field
of
force, or in other
words, a ficld of incessant activity” (p. 186). “ T h e n o t i o n
of
self-sufficient isolation is
no t exemplified in modern physics. T he re are n o essentially self-contained activities
with in limited region s. Th ese passive geometrical relationships between substrata
passively occupying regions have passed o u t of the pic ture . Nature s a theatre for the
inter-relations
of
activities” p.191).
19. C f. Elizabeth Flower and Murray
G.
Murphey,
A
History
ofPhilosoplty
in Amer -
ica,
2 vols. ( N e w York: Capricorn Books, 1977)’ II:666: “Alternately it [pure experi-
ence]canbe
read
asan ontological ormulation
of
what here
is,
or
as
a
phe-
nom enological field where ontological interpretation is suspen ded. Ag ain, i t could
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 269/323
242 Notes to C h q r e r
1
sim ply be used, in
a
tcchnical way, as thc experience-matrix o u t o f which objects of
know ledge are constructed.
I t
even has afinities with Dewey’s ‘experience’ and it
gaveJames as much trouble
as
it afterward made forDewey.” As Perry shows, James
had no illusions that he had realized
a
definitive and finished theory. WhatJames aid
concerning the mind-bo dy quest ion is applicable t o his m o re general theory: “The
only surely false the ory would bc a perfectly clear and final o n e ”
(TC, I:386).
While
James did not deny the importance and ut i l i ty of c lari ty and consistency,n the final
analysis, as Perry n otes, “hc was m uc h m or eafraid
of
thinness than hewas
of
incon-
sistency”
TC,
I:668).
20. Cf. TC, II:367: “ In the ma in
. . .
he was preoccupied with the ‘pure experi-
ence hypothesis’-in a detcrm ined effort t o resolve certain e h f n f i v e differences
of
t radi t ional thought into relational
o r
jlnctionnl differences.” See
also
Stevens, J H , 15:
“Thus, the t radi t ional problemof an unbridgeable chasm between adically different
entities, thoughts and things, is seen as
a
false question, w hen entitativ e differences
are replaced by relationa l o r jurrctional differences within a c o m m o n sp h e r e of pure
experiences.”
21.
Cf. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Cltaos
nr ld
Context (Athens: O hi o Univers ity
Press, 1978), 43-44 (hereafter,
CC).
Seigfried convincingly shows the inadequacy
of
this passage: “A11 the criteria for physical things beg the question,” since
as criteriafor the ph ysical he gives physical descriptions w hichwould themselves
have to have other criteria
for
being physical.
For
instance, he says that the physical
can be distinguished from the
nlental if
it is recognized
as
entering into “relations
of
physical influence.” But it
is
precisely the problem f
providing a
ruIe to identify
the physical that is at
issue.
T he recognition of a relation
as
physical
does
not
tell
us
why it is physical and not mental. Furthermore, the criteria for thc mental
world
are no t exclusive and would apply equally
well
to the physicalworld.
The
physical
world is as transitory as themental field, chan ging all the while we ourselves
change. and the appeal to its “ph ysical inertness” again
begs
the question.
Of course , the di&culty
of
finding definitive, clear-cut characteristics to distinguish
the physical
from
the psychical is what
leads
both m aterialists and idealists to deny
that there are any. For an example from the side of idealism, see Josiah Royce, The
Spirit o fMo d e r n Philosophy (Bo ston and Ne w York: Hou gh ton , Miffl in , 1892), 350ff.
22.
Bruce Wilshire correctly, I believe,
notes
tha tJam es places an excessive bu rde n
o n
a “pure experience” when he “conceives f
a
single pure experience s being both
the knower and th e kn ow n. T hi s is exceedingly spare substantively, and it puts a
great theoretical load
on
pu re experience; a single pure experiencemust
be
perceiver,
perception,andperceived”
(Will iam Jnrnes
arld Pher lornemlogy
[New
York: AMS
Press, 19791, 170; hereafter WJP).
23. A .
J.
Ayer,
TheOrigirts of
Prugtnatisnt
(San
Francisco:
Freeman,
Coope r ,
1968),
292.
24. This sentence concludes: “ the philosophy of
pure
experience being on ly a
morecomminu ted Zderrtitutsykilosophie.” Wilshire,concerned to expose hephe-
nom enological tendencies of James’s th ou gh t, relates this text to James’s effort
to
overcome dualism
by
coming
“to
the poin t
of
saying that thought and thought’s
object are in
some
fundam enta1 way identical” (tt’JP, 14- 15).Cf. E R E , 263: “Can we
say, then, that the psychical and the ph ysical are absolutely heterogeneous? O n the
contrary, they are so i t t le heterogeneous that i f we adop t the commonsense
point of
view, if we disregard all explanatory nventions-m olecules and ether waves, for
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 270/323
Notes to Chapter
1
243
example, which at b o tt o m are metaphys ical entities-if, n short, we take reality
naively, as it is given, an imm ediate, then this sensible reality o n w h ic h ou r vital
interests rest and from w hich
all
o u r actions proceed, this sensible reality and the
sensation which we
have
of
it
are
absolutely identical one with the other
a t
the t ime
the sensation occurs. R eality is apperccption itself.”
25.
John Wild, The
R a d i d
Empiricism
OJ
Williarn James ( N e w York: Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1970), 361 (hereafter
REW’
W ilshire expresses
a
similar view in
describing why he finds a certain richness in PI,which is lacking in ERE. In the
fo rmer work , James “does not confront us nb
ovu
wi th a set of discrete pure experi-
ences, but rather with a whole lived-world of experience which is experienced by a
person
RS
lived by himself. H e takes the first steps toward
a
direct l inking
of
modes
of experiencing and m odes of the experienced, and so conceives experience that it
never takes
place
outs ide a contest. Indeed, the founding level of meaning is a con-
text’,
(WJP,
171). I t is ju st this fund amental contextual ch aractero f experience that is
acknowledged and safeguarded by the use o f “field” or “fields”
as
the
primary
meta-
physical metaphor.
26. Flower and M urphey, History
ofPhilosophy, lI:666.
27. Actually, the am biguity to w hich Stev ens efers
is
already present in PP; a few
lines before James d escribes the personal character of t hough t o r consciousness, he
says: “T l t e j r s t f a c t @ r HS, t h m ,
as
psychologists, is that thirzkiq ofsorne sort goes OH. . . .
If
we
could
say in English ‘it thinks,’
as
we
say ‘it rains’
or
‘it blows,’ we sho uld be
stat ing the fac t mo st s imply and w i th the m inimum of assumpt ion . As we canno t ,
we must simply say that rhoughrgues ou” (PP, 139-20).
28.
Wild
contends
that James’s desire to make room i n experience
for
both the
subjective and he objective gives
rise
to tw o qu i te d i ffe rent n terpre ta t ions . T h e
first, and acceptable, one holds that “experience may have an ov erarching structure
that is neither purely subject ive nor purely object ive but with a place
for
bo th of
these phenom ena .” O n the o ther hand, s ince ure experience “has room for both the
subjec tive and the objec tive, it is easy t o infer that in itself, as pure experience, it
must be nei ther the one nor the other, and
n
i tself neutral.” Th is in tu rn leads
to
the
view that “pure experience itself
s
composed of units which arc themseives neither
one nor the other, but neutra l to the whole dist inct ion.” Wild co m m ent s that “ the
dualism o f m ind and body needs
to be
overcome but this is coo
high
a price to pay”
29.
Cf. Wilshire,
WJP, 200:
“ I t is in this sense of an overabounding world, too rich
and fluid to be contained by any set of concepts-as truthfu l as that set m ig h t be-
which sets James off from
Husserl
and which places him nearer t o Heidegger and
Merleau-Ponty.”
30.
See also Stevens, J H , 177: “T he givenness of the perceptual field is absolute in
two senses: t is the absolute source
from
which consciousness derives the entire
fabric of reality and the absolute standardof t ru th for all mean ing.”
31. Both Stevens and Seigfried stress the fact that,for James, we never encounter
chaotic fluxof pure heterogeneity.
See
Stevens, j H , 20: “James insistson th e fact that
the origina l flow of experience is no t a manifold of totally heterogeneous im pres-
sions without s t ruc ture or continuity. But i t is, nonetheless, relatively unstructured
by com parison with the ul terior pat terns of organization imposed by intellectual
activity. T hu s th e ret ur n to pu re experience refers simply
to
the uncovering
of
a
world
of primary perceptions, considered in abstrac tion from theselective organiza-
(REW’, 355-54).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 271/323
244
Notes t o C h p t e r
2
t ion of conception.”
See
also Seigfried, CC, 53: “Relations in pure experience are
quasi-chaotic in that they have no t ye t been hardened into specific identifiable rela-
tions which are attributable to a chosen context .”
32.
Cf . James ,
TC,
I:381:
“All that is is experiences, possible o r actual. Im me diate
experience carries a seme ofntore. .
. .
the ‘more’ develops, harmon iously or inhar-
mo nious ly; and term inates in fu’ulfillmento r check. .
.
. T h e p r o b l e m is to describc
the universe
in
these terms.”
33.
The following James text could, I believe, be accom mod ated within this k ind
of
field perspective: “The paper seen and the seeing of i t are only two nam es for one
indivisible fact which, properly named, s
the d z r r r m
tllephenometzott, OY the exyerielice.
The paper is in
the
mind and the m i n d is around the pape r, because paper and mind
are only two names that are givenater to the on e xperience, when, taken ina larger
world of which i t
forms
a part, its conn ections are traced in different directions. To
know
immediatdy,
rken, or intuirively,
isfor
tnet1tol rotllejtr n t ld o6ject
ro be idettrical”
( M T ,
36).
34.
Perry includes a selection from these notes as an appe ndix unde r the heading
“T he M iller-Bode Objections” (TC, II:750-65).
35. Cf.
the frequently cited text ofJarnes: “Life is in the transitions as m uc h as in
the terms connected; often, indeed,
it
seems to
be
there
more
emphatically” ( E R E ,
36.
‘ B r u ce
Kuklick,
The
Rise
of
Anrericntr Philosophy
(New Haven, Conn. : Yale
University
Press,
1977)’ 333 (hereafter R A P ) . Kuklick cites James’s reference
to
“a
pluralistic panpsychic view of the universe”
( P U ,
141). WhileJames
does
say that this
view is the “great empirical movem ent . . i n to
which our
generationhasbeen
drawn” ( P U , 141-42), he does not unequivocal ly make i t his own, herer elsewhere
in h is wri t ings . Thus the com menta tors
are
divided on w heth er Jam es wa s a pan-
psychist, w ith the ma jority in clining tow ard the n egativ e. or a subtle and insightful
argum ent that
James’s
later metaphy sics was a m o d e of process panpsychism , see
Marcus Peter Ford, kVilliatn ]rimes's Philosophy (Am herst: University of Massachu-
settsPress, 1982)’
esp.
75-89,
thechapterenti t led“PureExperienceand Pan-
psychism.”
42).
CHAPTER
2
1. Ralph H arper,
T h e
Existerrtial Experietlce (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity
Press, 1972),
87.
2.
Cf. J o h n
Wild, The
Rndiml
Empiricism oj”fil l iarnJnmes (Ne w York: Doubleday
Anchor Books , 1970), 27: “T hu s before 1890and probably before 1885,James clear-
ly
recognized hat hum an consciousness is no t enclosed within
a
subjective con-
tainer, but is ra ther stre tched out towards objects of various
kinds
in the
manner
called intentioml by la ter phenomenologists .” Cf. a lso, Bruce Wilshire ,WilliarnJotnes
and Phmomenology ( N e w
York:
AMS Press, 1979),
125:
“The self is no t
a
sealed
container full of intrinsically private thoughts. I t is as if the sclf were blasted open
and distribu ted across the face of
the
l ivcd-world.”
3. john He rm an Randa ll , Jr., Nature
and
Historical
Expeuietzce
(New York: Co lum -
bia University Press, 1958), 173 (hereafter NNE). In a sense the characteristic of not
being enclosed within the envelope
of
the skin is not peculiar
to
h u m a n
selves
as the
following text from Dewey indicates: “T he th in g essential to bear in mind is that
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 272/323
l iv ing as an e m p i r i d a ffa ir is no t som cth ingwhich goes
on
below thc skin-surfaceof
an organism: it is always an inclusiveaffair invo lving conn ection, interactio n f wha t
is within the organic body and what lics outside in space and time, an d w ith higher
organisms far outside”
(Experience
m i
ature
[ N e w
York:
Dover,
19581,
282
(hcre-
after E N ) . See also John Dewey,
Art
as
Experiencf
(New York: Capr ico rn
Books,
1958),
58-59: “The
epidermis is only in the most superficial way an indication of
where an organism ends and i ts environnlent begins. . . the need that is man ifest in
the urgent impulsions that demand conlpletion through what the mvironm ent-
and it alone-can supply, is a dy nam ic ack no wl edg m en t
of
this dependence o f the
self for who leness upon i ts surroundings.” Cf. A .
E .
Bentley,
“The
Hum an Sk in :
Philosophy’s Last
Line
of Defense,” Pldosophy of‘ Scierlre 8 (1941): 1-19.
See
also
Whitehead’s
Adverztures
of ldeas ( N e w
York:
Free Press/Macmilian, 1967), 325, and
his
Modes
o j
Thought
(N ew York : Capr ico rn Books,
1958),
222.
For
a
somewha t
similar view f r o m within a different perspective, see Ralph Wendell Bu rho e, “Re-
ligion’s Role in Hum a n Evolut ion: The
Missing
Link B etw een Apc-Man’s SeIfish
Genes
and Civilized Altruism,” in Zygotr 14, no. 2: “Biological patterns and behav-
iors are not l imited to determination by g enes a lone. . .
.
organic s t ruc ture and
be-
havior are productsof the in te rac t ion of the gene t ic informat ion wi thparticular
set
of environing circumstances, .including culture and other non-random and enduring
factors, which properly haw been caned ‘paragenetic’ information by sucha veteran
biological
and
evolutionary theorist as
C.
H. Waddington.”
4.Terence Penelhu m in his essay on “Personal Identity” (TheEnq.dopedio qf Phi-
loroplry,
8 vols., ed. Paul Ed wa rds
(New
York:
Free
Press/Macmillan,
19671, VI:96.)
states: “T h e use
of
the wo rd ‘self,’ howev er, has
the
effect
of
confining thc question
t o
the
unity of the
mind
and
of
preventing the answer rom relying
o n
the temporal
persistence
of
the body.” Quite obviously, I intend n o such rcstrictive use
of
the
term. On the contrary, i t is the neutra l i ty of the term “self’ in relation to mind ard
body tha t comm ends i t .
5. O n e might note increasing evidence that some religious thinkers reject tradi-
t ional dual ism. SeeJohn
Shea,
W h r
Modern
Cutholic
BeIieves
nbo r r t
Heaven
m d
Hell
( Ch i c a g o : T h o m a s M o r e Press, 1972), 47:
“This
dualistic vicw
of
man, so long the
ally ofChrist ian a i th ,doesnot correspond withei thermodernor biblicalan-
thropology. Modern science envisions man as a psychosomatic unity.
.
.
.
T h e bibli-
cal view of ma n closely parallels th e m od er n. For both
O l d
and New Testament man
is a n indivisible whole. In biblical l i terature there are abund ant refcrcnces to
body,
soul, spirit , and heart but these are not parts into which man may be divided. E ach
of
these words refers fundam ental ly to thc who le man, a l though each does so in a
special m anne r.” E.
J.
Fortman n, after acknow ledging thc nondualistic views of Karl
Rahner and
John
Shea, proceeds
to
argue in favor
of a
m o d e
of
dua l i sm, d rawing
uponscience,psychology, and parap sych ology as well as scripture and the mag-
isterium. See his
Eueflastirrg
Life
ufiu
Denrh (N ew York: Abba
House,
1976),41-68,
ch. 2, “Is Man Natura l Iy Imm orta I?”
6. James, w h o struggled long and hard to f ind viable a lternative to dual ism , was
not unaware of the possibility that it was
a
fruitless endeavor. In one of his notes he
was led
to
ask: “Doesn’t i t seem like thc wrigglings of a worm on the hook, his
attempt to escape thc dualism of co m m o n sense?’’ (cited in Ralph Barton Perry,
T h e
Thought arld
Clzarncter of
Will inrnJmws, 2
vols.
[Boston: Little,
Brown,
19351, II:369;
hereafter TC).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 273/323
246 Notes to C h p t e r 2
7.
While
some
f o r m of materialism is the dom inant intcllcctual perspective in a
variety
of
disciplincs, including thc social sciences, Harold j M oro w itz has called
at tent ion to an interest ing anomaly: “Whatas happened is that biologists, w h o once
postulated
a
privileged
role
for the hum an mind in nature’s hierarchy, havebeen
moving relentlessly toward the hard-core materialism that characterized nineteenth-
century physics. At the samc time, physicists, faced with compelling experimental
evidence, have been moving way from strictly mechanical modelsof the n iverse to
a view that sees the mind as playing an integral role in all physical events” (“Re-
discovering the Mind,” in The M i n d ’ s I , ed . Doug la s
R .
Hofstadter and Daniel C.
Dennet t [New York: B asic Books, 19811, 34; reprintcd
from
Psyd~olog,gy oday, Aug.
1980).
8. It is the James
of
the PrirzcipIrs ofPsycllology, prim arily thou gh not exclusively,
w h o
is
often described
as
a
ma terialist. Ch arles Sand ers Pcirce’s review
of
this work
calls James “m ater ialis tic to the core-that is to say, in a method ical sense, but not
religiously, since he does not
deny
a separable soul n o r a fu tu rc life” (cited in
TC,
11:lOs). Se e also , Ge org e Santayana’s review in
Atltrrttic Morztlzly
67 (1891):
555:
“Pro-
fessor James.
.
.
.
has here outdone the m aterialists themselves. H e has applied the
principle
of
the tota l and immediate dependenceof m ind on m atter to several fields
in which we are
al l
accustomed only to metaphysical or psychological hypotheses”
(cited by Gerald E. M yers , In t roduc t ion ,
PP,
1:xxxvii-xxxviii).
9.
A s
an example
of
how fluid and controversial the claims
of
materialism can
be,
the essays n
The
Mind’s I and the comments of i ts editors are most instructive.
Ho fstadter and De nnett them selves abel their perspective as materialism bu t, signif-
icantly, describe m ind s as kin ds of patterns or “sophisticated representational sys-
tems.”
They go
on to say: “Minds exist in brains and may com c to cxist
i n
pro-
grammed machines . I fand when such machines
ome
ab ou t, their causal powe rs will
derive not from he substances hey are made of, but from heir design and the
program s that run in t h e m ” p*
382).
in his cssay “M inds, Brains, and Program s,”
reprinted in the same volume,ohn R. Searle calls
such
a doct r ine “s t rong AI” [artif-
icial intelligence]-that is, “th e co m pu ter is no t m erel y
a
tool in the study
of
the
mind; ra ther the appropria te ly program med com puter really
is
a mind” (p . 353)-
and maintains that i t is a “residual form
of
dualism”
(p.
371):
Unless youaccept some form
of
dualism, hestrong A I project hasn’t got a
chance.
The
project
is
to reproduce and explain the mental
by
designing programs,
but unless the mind
is
not only conceptuatiy but emp irically independent of the
brain you couldn’t carry out the project, for the program is completely
indepen-
dent of any realization.
. .
. If mental operations consist in comp utational opera-
tions on formal symbols, then i t follows that they have no interesting connection
with the brain; the
only
connection would be that the brain
ust
happens to
be
o n e
of the indefinitely many types
of
machines capable of instantiating the program .
This form of dualism is not the traditional Cartesian variety that claims that there
are two sorts of subsrnrrces, but it
is
Cartesian in the
sense
that
what
is specifically
mental about the mind as
no
ntrinsic connection
with
the actual prope rties of the
brain.”
(pp. 371-72)
10. Stanislaw Lem, “The Seventh SaIly,” in The Cyberiad, trans. MichaeI
Kandel,
in T h e Mind’s
I ,
291.
11.
Two
t hinke rs wh o m igh t
be
mentioned are Michael Polanyi
and
Ervin Lazlo.
For
an
expression
of
the fundamental
shortcomings
o f
a n y
reductionism,
see
Thom-
as
Nagel’sessay “What Is I t
Like to
Be a Bat?” In The Mi r i d ’ s I , 392-93: “Any
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 274/323
reductionist program has to be bascd
on
at1 analysis of w hat is to be rcduced. If the
analysis leaves so m eth in g ou t, the
problem
will be falscly posed.
I t
is useless t o base
the dcfense of m aterialism on any analysis of mental phenom ena that fails to
deal
explicitly with their subjective character.”
12. Cf.
also
Randall,
N H E , 224:
“But the activities of th e so-called ‘subject’ are
clearly as ‘real,’ as ‘objective,’ as any othct processes invo lved in the total coopcra-
t ion. They have ju st
as
valid a claim to a legitimate ontological
status
in Substance.”
Remember we previously noted that for Randall, that “Substance”
can
also be called
“the Field.”
13. Cf. Gabriel Marcel, A4etuyltysictrl~o~rrnn/.rans. Bcrnard Wall (Chicago:
H cn r y
Regnery, 1952), 241: “C an w e bclicve that death is th e real cessation o f personal life
without implicitly recognizing the truth of materialism?”
14.
John Dewey, “Experience, Know ledge and Value,” in
The
Philosoplty qjJolr tr
Dewey,
ed. Paul Arth ur Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1951), 604 (hereafter M I / ) .
15. It would be more accurate,perhaps, to say hat his ext“clearlyexpresses
Dewey’s desire to reject reductionism,” for other tcxts raise some d u u b t
as
to whe the r
he succeeded. See, c . g . , E N , 253-54: “T h e differrncc betwcen he animate plants
and thc inanimate iron rnoleculc is no t that the former has someth ing in addit ion to
physico-chem ical energy; i t lies in th e
way
in which the physico-chemical energies
arc interconnccted and operate, whence different c o tm q 1 m c c s mark inanimate and
animate activity respectively.” Dewey’s awareness of a
kind
of inconclusiveness and
ambiguity accompanying this quest ion
s
indicated, I believe, in EN,
262:
“While the
theory that l ife, feeling and thoug ht are neve r indep ende ntof physical events may be
deemed matcrialism, it may
also
be considered just the opposi te .
For
it is reasonable
to believe that the most adequate definition
of
th e basic traits of natural existence
can
be
had only when i ts propert ies are most fully displayed-a condition which is m et
in the degree of the
cope
and int imacy
of
interactions realized.”
See
also EN,
255.
I t is clear that Dewey, along with many other twentie th-century thinkcrs, wishes
to present a doct r ine of mind and matter that avoids both ontological dualism and
reductionism. it
can
sa f d y
be
said,
I
believe, that to
this
day there remains
a
formida-
ble
gap between the wish and the realization. I n
a
no te appended to “Wha t
s
I t Like
to Be a Bat?”
(TheMind’s I , 403n.),
Nagel touches upon one reason for this
gap:
I have not dcfined
the
term “physical.” Obviously, it does not apply
just
to what
can
be
described by the concepts
of
contemporary physics, sincewe expect further
developments.
Some
may think here
is
nothing to prevent mental phenomena
from eventually being recognized
s
physical in their own righ t. B ut whatever else
may be said
of
the physical,
i t has
to
be
objective.
S o
if
our
idea of the physical ever
expands
to include mental phenomena, i t will
have to
assign them a n objective
character-whether o r not this
is
done by analyzing them in terms of other phc-
nornena alrcady regarded
as
physical. it seems
to
me more
likely,
howev er, that
mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed i n a theory whose funda-
mental terms cannot be placed
in
either category.
See also p. 392: “Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be m u c h
less interesting. With consciousness it eems hopeless . Th e m ost imp or tan t andhar-
actcristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most
reductionist heories
d o
no t even tr y to explain t .Andcarefulexaminationwill
show that
no
currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a
new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose,
but such
a solution, if i t exists,
lies in the distant intellectual future.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 275/323
I believe hat i t can
be
said of bo th James’s doctrinc of “pure experience” and
Dewey’s metaphysics
of
“natural cvcnts” that they were attempting to construct “a
theory whose fun damen tal terms cann ot be placed in either category.”
16.
E.W
is
“metaphysical”
in
thc descriptive rather than specu lativc
sense
of
the
term;
t h a t
is, Dewey’s aim was to describe the “univcrsal generic traits of cxistcnce”
rather than arrive at the "ultimate" principles of reality. This distinc tion shou ld be
kept in mind in what
follows.
17. Cf. Dewey, EN, xi i : “The
irrfrirzsil
naturc of events is revealed in experience as
thc immediately felt qualities
of
things.”
All
events have “qualities” that charactcrize
them, and it is the quality of an event that is im mediately experienccd.
For
a clear,
concisc exposition of “qualities” a5 u n d e r s t o o d b y I k w e y ,
sce
Richard Bernstein,
Jokn
D e w e y New
York: W ashington Square
Press,
1969),
89-101,
ch. 7, “Qualita-
tive Immediacy.” What
we
“know,“ accord ing toDewey, are “objects” not “events.“
Cf. E N ,
328: “W hen it is d enied that we are conscious of
w m t s
as such it does not
mean that we are not awareof aejccts. Objects are
preciseiy
what
we
arc awarc
of.
For
objcctsareevcnts w i t h meanings; ables, hemilky way,chairs,stars,cats, dogs,
electrons, ghosts, centaurs, historic epochs and all t hc n~u l t i f a r iousubject-matter of
discourse designable by com m on n ou ns , verbs and their
qualificrs.”
18. T h e event character
of
reality
a s
Dewey understands it presents a formidable
obstacle
to
belief in the kind of enduring selfI
will
pose. O n e text expresses Dewey’s
view
in
a
ra ther touching manner:
A thing may endure secrrla
S C C I I / U Y I I I I I
and yet not bc everlasting; it will crumble
before the gnawing tooth of
time,
as it exceeds a certain measure. Every existence
is an evcnt.
The fact is nothing a t which to repine and nothing to
gloat over.
I t is something
to be noted and used. I f it is discom forting when applied to good things. to o u r
friends, possessions and precious selves, ~t is consoling also to k n o w that n o evil
endu rcs foreve r; thdt thc longcst fane turns som etime , and that the nmnory
and
loss ofne arcst and dearest grows dim in time. ( E N , 71)
19. T h e slow rate of change, mp erceptible o he ancients, was probab ly one
reason why
they
were
led
to posit
a n
unchatlging reality.
20. Cf. James, E R E , 39: “On the principles w h i c h I a m defending a ‘mind’ or
‘personal consciousness’ is the
n a m e
for a series of experienccs run together
by
cer-
tain definite transitions, and an objective reality is a series
of
simiIar experiences knit
together by different transitions.”
21. See also E N , xiii: “M ind is seen to be a function of social interaction s, and to
be a genuine characterof natural events w he n these attain the stageof the widcst and
most complex interact ion with one another.” Sec also
E N ,
267-68, where Dewey,
speaking of the correspondence of the “physical” and “psyc hical,” contends that
“the one- to-on e agree me nt is intelligible oniy as a correspondence of properties and
relations in one and the sam e world whic h is first taken up on a narrower and more
external level of interaction, and then upon a m or e inclusive and intimate level.” See
also E N , 285: “in he hyphena ted phrase body-m ind, ‘body’ designates he con-
tinued and conserved, the registered and cumulative operation of factors continuous
with
the
rest of nature, inanimate as well as animate; while ‘mind’ designates
the
charactersandconsequenceswhicharedifferential, ndicative of featureswhich
emergew h e n ‘body’ is
engaged
in a widermore complex and nterdependent
situation.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 276/323
22. See
also
E N , 284: “To
explain
is
t o
employ
on e thi ng to elucidate, clear,
shed
l ight upon, put in a better order, because in a wider context, another thing. I t
is
thus
subordinate to mo re adeq uate discou rse, wh ich, applie d o spac e-time affairs, as-
sumes
thc
style
of
narration and description. Speaking
in
terms
of captions famiIiar
in rhetoric , exposi t ior~ and argum ent are a lways subordinatc to a descriptive narra-
tion, and exist
for
the sakc of n u k i n g
the
latter clcarer. mo rc cohe rent and mo re
significant.”
23. This
“integration
of
organic-environmen tal connections” is,
of
course, pre-
eminently present in that organic activity designatcd mind. Cf. Randa l l ,
N H E ,
220-
23, for an explicit expression of this Deweyan point:
Mind
as
we
encounter i t
in
“the mental situation” s rather
a
complex set
of
powers
of cooperating in t ha t mental functioning. . . . Strictly speaking, M ind
in
this per-
sonal
sense
is
a
power,
not
of
operating, but of cooperating wi th other
powcrs.
Mind
is
thus, l ikc
all
powers,
a
relational po wer.
.
. . Hence, if we take Mind a s a
power
to
act in certain
ways,
we must not forget that his power belongs to what is
encountered as well as to the encounterer, the so-called h u m a n “agent” in think-
ing.
. .
. Mind as
a power
belongs to the process of encountering.
. . .
conse-
quently, the question, “What
is
it that think s?” beco me s the question, “What are
the
different powers
that coop erate in
the
process of thinking?”
24.
Cf.
PP)
1:277:
“ T h e m i n d is a t everystage a theatre of simultaneous pos-
sibilit ies. Co nscio usne ss cons ists in the com pariso n of these with each o ther, the
selection
of
some,
and the
suppression
of
the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting
agcncy of attention.”
25. Dewey’s debt toJam es concer ning such no tions as “ the vague,” “focus,” and
“fringe” is obviou s.
26. John Dewey, HwnatJ
Nutuw
arrd C o m h t (New York: Modern Library,
1930),
61
-62.
CHAPTER
3
1. This , at least is the basically persuasive picture presented byMilic Capek’s “The
Reappearance of the Self i n the Last PhiIosophy
of
W illiam James,”
Philosophical
Review 62 (1953): 526-44. Capek is here rejecting
Dewey’s
claim hat James was
m oving in the direction
of
a behavioraI account of the “self.” Cf. “The Vanish ing
Subject in the Psychology of
James,”
Jorrrnal o j
Philsopplty, Psychology and
SEient$c
Merhod
37
(1940):
589-99,
reprinted in John Dewey, P r o b l e m ofMer1 (New York:
Philosophical Library,
1946)’
396-4139 (hereafter PM).
2. Cf. James
M.
Edie, “The Philosophical Anthropologyof W illiam Jam es,” in
An
h i t d o n o Phenomerrolugy, ed. James
M.
Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1965),
128:
“James is clearest ab ou t what he rejects: the theory of the substant ia l soul , the
associationistic theory o f Hume, the Transcendental Ego
of
Kant-all of which are
rejected o n ‘pheno meno logical’ grounds, e . , as unsatisfactory accounts of o u r expe-
rience of self-identity. B ut on th e relationship of the bodily processes
to
the ‘self
wh ich is ‘never an object to i tse lf James gives, in The Principles,
no
clear answer and
seems to hesitate between parallelism, epiphenom enalism,
and
interactionism, de-
pending on his polemical concerns of t h e m o m e n t . He
was
content to leave the
problem
open and unsolved.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 277/323
250 Notes t o
Chapter 3
3 . T h e polemical th rust ofmuch ofJarncs’s w ritin g
on the
self mu st always be kept
in mind. In a particular instance he
is
first
of
all concerned to expose he inadequacies
ofone or another “es tab l i shed” posi t ion . s Gerald E. Myers says: ‘yarnes alternated
between placing the burden
of
d o u b t , n o w u p o n t h ematerialist, then upon the spir-
itualist. In his discussion of emotion and the consciousness of self
h e
placed that
burden upon the latter. In his theoriz ing about a t tent ion andwill,
on
the o ther hand,
it is placed upon the m aterialist” (PPJ1:xxxiv).
4. Cf. Edie, Invitation,
128:
“But here again, he does not overcom e the original
am biguity ; he can be read as an ‘egologist’
or
as a ‘non-ego logist’ ( though I believe
the egological interpretation is
more
consonant wi th the tenor ofis philosophy as a
whole particularly since he continues to speak of he experietrcirrg ego
as
a
unified
‘self
u p
to
the end
of
his life).”
5.
Ralph Barton Perry,
The Thorlght
n t ~ d
harclcter
qf WilliatnJurnes,
2
vols.
(Boston:
Little, Brown, 1935),
II:668
(hereafter
TC).
6.
T h e r e is a
sense
in
which
“feeling” is wider than “perceptual experience” and
can be applied
also
to “conceptual expericnce.” I t canbesaid
tha t
for
James,
all
concepts are “feelings” but not all “feelings” arc concepts. James was concerned to
avoid assigning “feelings” and “concepts” to diftkrent orders of being. Something of
this is reflected in an early article (“Some Omiss ions of introspective Psychology,”
Mind, Jan.
1884)
a large excerpt from
which
is reproduced by James in a long foot-
note in
PP,
I:451-52.
A
few
lincs
wiIl indicate the direction
of
his thought .
The contrast is really between tw o a s p c m , in which
all
mental facts witho ut excep-
tion may be taken; their structural aspect, as being subjective, and their functional
aspect, as being cognitions. . .
.
F r o m the cognitive point of view, all mental facts
are intellections.
From
the subjective point of view a11
are
feelings. .
.
.
The current opposition of Feeling to knowlcdge is quite a false issue. If
every
feeling is
a t
the same time bit of know ledge, we ou ght no longer to talk of mental
states differing
by
having more o r less, in having much fact o r little fact for their
object. The feeling of a broad scheme
of
relations is
a
feeling that knows much: thc
feeling
of a simple
quality
is
a
‘feeling that
knows
little.
7.
Ra lph Ba rton Ycrry, III T h e
Spirit
of
William
Junes
(Ne w Ha ven, Co nn. : Yale
University
Press, 1938), 82-83
(hereafter, SW’.
8.
See
also
PP,
:165: “Fix the essence of feeling is
to
be felt, and
as a
psychic
existentfeelr, so
i t must
be.”
I d o n o twish to suggest that this c la im s unp roblem cd.
As w e shall see when we discuss the self-cornpoundingof consciousness, some hold
that James finally surrendered it. While he modified particular interpretation of it, I
do not think he ever denied
the
irreducible character of experience that it expresses;
in
fact, h e repeated i t in
a
work
he
was wri t ing a t
the
t ime
of his
death (Cf. SPP, 8).
9.
See also PP,
1:591:
“ A
succession
o
/eelirgs,
it1 arld o itselJ
is
not
n
feelirrg
of
successiotl.
”
10. Bruce Wilshire co m m en ts on this tcxt: ‘lJarnes is thus sha rply critical of what
we
know
today as behaviorism which misses thesebasic tendencies and is, therefore,
a psychology which dispenses with the psyche; i t
s
a self-satirizing science” (Wi/ l im
Jarnes and Phertonrerrology [New York:
AMS
Press, 19791, 99; hereafter NYP). Wilshire
goes on t o
argue
that James’s
“remaining
dualist ic structure” landshim in d i6cu l t ies
from
the perspective of phenomeno logy (WJP, 100). These “d ifficulties” are not of
concern here. since what
is
being stressed is the irreducible and distinctive character
of “feelings of tendency.” Con cerning the distinctive characterf these feelings , Vic-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 278/323
Nofes
to Chapter 3
25 1
tor Lowe makes an eminently helpful comp arison:
‘I
Wt i f e h end ’ s “ J ~ ~ - S P ~ I S ~ I O U Sercep-
tiorl’
is
wh at James
.
.
. d l e d
‘the plairl corljlrrzcliue
experierm’; i t ha s no name in the
P5yctdogy, bu t is described undcr
a
number of headings suchas ‘feelings o f relation’
and‘feelings o f tendency’
”
(Urlderstartdirtg
Whitehead
[Ba l t imore : Johns Hopk ins
University Press,
19661,
343).
11. Robert R. Ehman, “Will iam James and the Structure f the Self’ inNew Essays
in
Phenornertology, ed. James
M.
Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,
1969),258
(here-
after
N E P )
12. Recall the previously cited text from Dew ey i n which he describes “ a first-rate
test o f the value of any philos ophy wh ich is offered us: D oes i t end in conclusions
which, when they are referred back to ordin ary life-experiences and their predica-
ments, render them more significant,
more
l u m i n o u s t o us,
and
make
our
dealings
with them m ore frui tful?”
(Experience
and
Nnttrre
[Ne w York: Dover ,
19581,
7).
See
also Jam es, SPP, 33-34: “ T h e w o r l d of common-sense ‘things’; the world of mate-
ria1 tasks to be don e; thc m athem atical wo rld of pure forms; the wor ld
of
cthical
propositions; heworlds of logic,
of
m usic , etc.-all abstrac ted an d gene ralized
from long-forgotten perceptual instances, from wh ich they have as it were flowered
out-return and
merge themselves again in the particulars of ou r pre sen t a nd futu re
perception.”
13. Cf.
Wilshire,
WJP,
126:
“Th e
general point is that he
does
not consider the self
to be
a
stable, isolable,
and
self-identical particular in the sen se that
a
diamond is
such a particular.”
14. “ T h e S t r e a mof T h o u g h t , ” PP, 219-78. In PBC, his chapter is given the title
by
which i t is most widely known, “ T he Stream
of
Consciousness.”
15.
Cf.
Dewey,
P M , 397: “The
material of the important chapteron the ‘Streamo f
Consciousness’
.
. . verbally is probably the most subjectivist ic part of th e book.”
Dewey imm ediately adds:
“I
say ‘verbally’ because it is quite poss ible to translate
‘stream
of
consciousness’ into ‘cours e
of
experience’ and retain the substance of the
chapter.”
16.
Cf.
Wilshirc,
WJP, 125:
“T he upsh ot of C hap ter Ten is that the self is not
a
sealed contain er full o f intrinsica lly private tho ugh ts.
I t
is as if the self were blasted
open and distributed across the face
of
the lived-world.”
17.
Cf. E h m a n , N E P , 264: “ In maintaining that our present pulse of cons cious life
might be selfless,
James
opens h imse lf to the criticism that his interpretation
of
the
central self as fclt bod ily rn ovcm ents is ind eed reduc tive.”
18.James concedes at icast the possibility f
the
“feeling” that Ehman insists upon.
Cf. PP,
I:323: “The p rc scn t moment of consciousness is thus, as
Mr.
Hodgson
says,
the darkest in th e wh ole series. I t may feel its own existence-we have
all
a long
admitted the possibility
of
this,
hard
as it
is by
direct introspection to ascertain the
fact-but no th in g can
be
k n o w n
nbout
it
till
i t be dead and gone.”
19.
T h e previously cited text
from Jamcs, W h z e u P r my i n t~ospecr iveg lnr l cestrccecds
in
tunritlg rotrnd
quickly-dl
it cnw
e v e r j e l
distincrly
is sortre bodily process,”
is similar to
David Hurne’s w ell-known passage in his
Trentise o
Humat1 Na t u r e : “For my part,
when 1 enter most int imately ntowhat
I
call
myself ;
I a lwaysstumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, l ight or shade , love or hatred, pain or
pleasure. I never catch rnyselfatany t ime witho ut perception, a nd never can observe
anything but the perception” (David Hume, A Treatise ofHutmr l
Nuure,
2d ed., ed.
L. A . Selby-Bigge [Ox ford: Clare ndo n Press , 19781, bk. I , pt. 4, sec. 6, p.
252).
I
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 279/323
252
Notes t o Choprev 3
believe that Roderick Chisholm’s cri tique o f Hurne is equally applicable to James:
“If
H u m e finds what
hc
says
he
finds, that is to say, if he finds not only pcrccptions, but
also that
he
f inds them and hence that there
s sorneorw
w h o finds t hem , how can h is
premisses
be
used
to
establish the conclusion that he never observcs anything b ut
perceptions?” (“On theObscrvability
of
theSelf,”
in
Larrgrqe ,
A4elaphysicss,
atld
Death,
ed. John Donnel ly [ N e w York: ordham Universi ty Press,
19781,
139). See
also 144, 146: “‘Could i t be that a man might be aware of himself as experiencing
without thereby being aware of himself?’ I f what
I
have suggested is true, then the
answer should
be
negative. For in being
aware
of ourselves as experiencing, w c are,
ipso)cto, aware of the self
or
person-of the
self or
person being affected ina certain
way.
. .
. From the fact that
we
are acqua in ted with t he seIf
as
it manifests itself as
having certain qualities, i t
follows
tha t
we
are acqua in ted wi th the self as it is in
itself.”
I
have previously noted that field view
of
the self rejects a n y “self as it is in itself”
insofar as this suggests that theelf has
a n
essential reality independent o f its relations
and activities. Since there isn o
“self’
independent of the rda t ions r fields (including
its activity
fields)
that constitute i t , there
is
n o “self in itself’ t o be know n. Nev-
ertheless,despite erminolocjcaldifferences,
my
poin t is not verydifferent from
Chisholm’s, since
I am
affirming an awareness
of
the self in , through, and with those
activities and relations whereby
i t
is a self.
20.
1
Corin th ians
15:35-40.
21. C f. Maurice Canez, “With W hat Body Do the Dead
Rise
Again?’’ in
I r w m r -
tal iry
m d
RewrreCtiott, ed .Pie rreBeno i tandRolandM u r p h y(Herder
ei
Herder ,
1970), 93: “For Paul the body cannot be reduced simply
to
the materia l comp onent
of
the animated being which is man. . . . The word ‘body’ ra ther describes man in
a
definite situation, in relationto others, than reduced to himself a lone.
.
. . T h e b o d y
is man responsible for what he does, for how he lives; i t
is
his entire situation , his
totality, his p ersonality.” See also Joachim Gnilka; “C on tem po rary Exegetical Un-
derstanding of ‘The Resurrection of the Body,’ ” in ibid., 129- 141. For
a
brief de-
scription
of
a
n u m b e r o f iew s o n t h e“risen body,” see
Everlasting
Life
u j e r
Death,
E.
J. Fortrnann, S. j. (New York: Alba House , 1976),240-50.
To
say
that there is no simple and u nequivocal identity between the “resurrection
body” and the present body s not to den y ha t they must
i n
5ome way be the “same.”
Cf. Thomas A quinas , Summa
Theolugica,
I i I (suppl.) , Q. 79, Art .
1,
trans. Fathers
of
t he Eng l i sh Domin ican Prov ince (New York: BenzigerBrothers, 1948),
III:2890:
“We cannot call it resurrection unless the soul re turn to the sam e b ody, since resur-
rection is a second rising. . .
.
And conseq uently i f it be not the same
body
which
the soul resumes, i t will no t be a resurrection, but ra ther the assuming of a new
body.”
The
difference in language and nletaphysicai assumptions precludes any un-
qualified incorporation of Aquinas’s view within the pragmatic perspectivc of this
essay. Nev ertheles s, there is a crucial and significant insight here that must be ac-
counted
for,
as will
bc
evident when
I
later speculate on the kin d f transformation of
the
self
that is neces sary f hebelief n mm ortality o r resurrection is to have
plausibility.
22. Cf. Max Sche le r, “Lived Body, E nvironment , and Ego,” in T h e Philosophy o
the Body, ed.Stuart F. Spicket
( N ew
York: Quadrangle /TheN e w
York Times
Books,
1970),
159-86, a translation by Manfred S. Frings
of
an excerpt from Sche-
Ier’s D e r Formalismus i n der Etlzik und die materiais LVerte Ethik, first published in 1916.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 280/323
253
A s
the translator notes, “Schcler makes a phenomenological distinction betwcen the
lived body
[Leib]
and thing-body [Korperj. This dist inct ion, important for thc ent irc
phcnornenologicalmov ement, can eraced ack to his essay, ‘Die Id o k der
Sebsterkcnntnis,’
191
1. ”
(Incidentally, he Spicker volume is an eminently useful
collection of essays and excer pts f rom a v ariety of thinkers, centering on the thcme
of the “b od y” in antidualistic l i terature.)
23. Jean-Paul Sartre, BeitIg u r d N o t l r i q p s s , trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1956), 305 (hereafter BN).
24. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pltetrow~mologyoJPerreptiorr, t r ans. Co l in Smi th (New
York: Hum anities Press,
1962),
98, 100. See also p. 139: “We must therefo re avoid
saying that our bo dy is i r t space,
or
ir-1 t ime. I t irdzubits space and time .”
25. Gabriel Marcel, Mystery ofBt’ittg,
2
vols., trans.
G.
S. Fraser (Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 19SO), I:100 (hereafter M B ) .
26.
GabriclMarcel, Metayhysiral Jortrr~ol, trans.Bernard Wall (Ch icago :Henry
Regnery, 1952; hereafter, M J .
27.SeealsoWilshire, WJP, 137: 3am es’s alk of movem ents n hehead is an
attempt to describe his o w n b o d y as a phcn onlenal presentation; i t is no t an attem pt
to discover th e causal bases o f consciousness. . . I t is true that there is a pervasive
physiological aura about i t aII. But perhaps this is the
w a y
a physiologist and doctor
of medicine som etimcs experiences his ow n bod y.”
28.
Richard Stevens,
James
and
Hrrsser l :
The
Forrfrdutious
ofMeatlirlg
(The Hague:
M artinus Nijho K 1974), 72 (hereafterJH).
29. See
also
]H,
42-43: after critically analyzing those texts that describe “t he
interpretation of bodilyreaction as autom atism ,unrelated o heperformance of
consciousness,” Stevens calls atten tion to ot he r passages in which ‘yanles rejccts the
view
of the bod y as a psychophysical thing whose transformations arc automatically
provoked by stimuli resulting
from
physical impressions.”
30.
John
Wild,
The Radicnl
Empiricism
of William
]awes
( N e w
York:
Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1970), 87,
379-80.
31.
For
a
free but accurate expression
of
lames’s notion, see Charlene Hadd ock
Seigfried, Chaos and Corttext (Athens: Ohio University
Press, 1979),
94: “Some t imes
the body is looked upon as a physical object amon g others, since it can be cou nted,
its m etabolic functions tabulated, alld its reactions to certain stimuli ccurately co m -
puted. At other times the body is cons idered as peculiarly personal, as a center
of
decisionandaction and asanarena
for
spiritual, i e . , private, operations such as
memory , desire, dreaming, and thinking.”
32.
I do not w ish to suggest that W ilshire and are using the “fie ld” m etaphor o r
the same purpose or wi th the same mean ing . He is us ing i t to su pp ort his phe-
nomenological reading of the
Principles,
while I am employ ing i t
s
the metaphysical
metaphor that most adequately expresses the metaphysical assumptions ofjames as
well
as
some otherpragmatists .B ydis ting uis hin g “field-like” and“stream-like”
characteristics, W ilshire seems to m ean som eth ing ess intrinsically processive than I
do.While
I
would not insist hat all fieldsareproce ssive as wellasrelational-
mathem atical ieldsperhaps
are
exceptions--I a m ma intaining hat all
exister~tial
fields are processive-relational.
33. Merleau-Ponty, Plterzomeftology
of
Perception, 98.
34.
First pub lished in the
Psychology
Review
12,
no.
1
ran.
1905);
reprinted
with
“slight verbal revision” in E R E , 79-95.
All
References are
to
t he no te
on
p. 86.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 281/323
254 Notes to Chapter 3
35. Stevensadds:“Husserl remarks that hebody, ‘reviewed
from
the nside,’
reveals itself as an organism which moves freely andby means of which the subject
experiences the external wo rld. From this point of iew,
it
would seem tha t the body
cannot
be
spatially located alongsidc
of
other objects. Rather, the body is experi-
enced as a zero-point, ‘.
. .
as a centre around which the rest of the spatial worid is
oriented.’ O n the other hand, ‘viewed from outside,’ the body appears as
a
thing
amo ng others and subject to ausal re la tionships with surrounding objects” ( I H ,
88).
36. T h e notion of the body as a “cente r” of relations is not confined to Husserl
and James. Cf., for example, Same,
BN,
320, who
speaks
of “ m y
b o d y
inasmuch
as
it
is the total center of reference which things indicate.” ee also Marcel, M
334-35,
who no te s tha t when he a l lows “my body” to becomen object,
“ I
cease to
look
o n
it as
my
body,
I
deprive i t of that absolute priori ty in vir tue of which
m y body is
posited as thecentre n e la t ion owhichm yexperienceandm yuniverseare
ordered. ”
37. Cf.
W illiam Ernest Hocking , who, though
more
sympathetic
to
philosophical
idealism than James, still m aintained that “w ith ou t bodiliness o f some sort there can
be no personal l iving. E xistence, for a person, implies awareness o f events in time-
a continuity of par t icu la rs , no t an absorp t ion in universa ls or The One”
T h e M e m -
i q
f h m o r t a l i f y
in
Hlrmarl
Experience
[ N e w
York:
Harper, 19571, 188).
38. Cf. Edie ,
Zrtvitntion,
122: “By the ‘world of sense’ James does
rtof
mean the
chaotic
mass
of
d u m b ‘st imuli’ o f physiological
or
‘sensationalistic’ psychology, but
the concretely experienced ‘life-world’ to which Merleau-Ponty,
or
his part,
accords
‘the primacy o f perception.’
”
39. This would have to be greatly q ualified as regards science in general but partic-
ularly as regards contemp orary physics: paradoxically, as its language has becom e
more “exact,” the reality of “m atter” has seemed to dissolve. T his has been app arent
for some t ime as the fol lowing text wri t ten over f if ty years ago indicates: “B ut the
physicists themselves have, if the phrase m a y be allowed , dissolved the m ateriality f
matter,
A
bo dy is in th e last resort, I suppose , now regarded as
a
complex sys tem o f
energy”
(W,
R. M a t th e w s , “ T h e D e s t i n y
of
the Soul ,”
Hibber t ]o t rmal28 ,
no .
2
uan.
19301:
200, ci ted by Corl iss Lamont in
The
Illusiotl ofIntrrrorfuality [ N e w York: Freder-
ick Ungar, 19651, 53 . ) M or e recently
R.
Mattuck in comment ingon n te rac t ing
particles said:
“So,
if we are after exact solutions, no bodies a t all is already too
m any ” (ci ted by DougIas R. Hofstader in T h e Mind’s
I ,
ed. Doug las R. Hofstader
and Daniel
C.
Dennet t [New York:Basic Bo ok s, 19811,
145).
40.Cf. Ignace Lepp, Death a d ts
Mysteries,
t r ans . Be rna rd Murch land (New ork:
Macmillan, 1968),
158: “ I
assert unequivocally that
a
ma n is truly his body. . . ~ But a
basic intuition, anterio r to all rational cons tructs, teaches us that we are some thing
other, and more than
ur
bodies.” There
s,
for
example,
a
belief present fr om earliest
times and within a variety o f culture s and still prevalent today to the effect that wh at
really const i tutes us cannot be touchedy punishment of our bod ies. Th at the efusal
to m a k e a simple identification between ou rselves and our bodies is not merely a
sentimental residue of mo re primit ive experiences evidenced in the following claim
by contemporary ana ly t ic phi losopher Sydney Shoemaker : “Recent work
o n
the
problem ofpersonal identi ty strongly indicates that the identi ty condit ions forersons
are different
from
those for bodies,n such away as to mak e i t possible
or
a person to
have different bodies at different times; that persons cannot, therefore be identical wit
their bodies; and that at any given time inperson’s
life
it is a contin gent fact that hehas
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 282/323
Notes to Chapter 4
255
the body
he
has instead of some other one” (“E mbo dimen t and Beh avior ,” in Tile
Identities
ofPersons,
ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty [Berkeley: Universi tyof California
Press,
19761,
13511.).
41. The Social
I sycholo<qy
of
George
Herbert Mead,
ed.
Anselm
St raws (C h icago ;
University of Chicago Press, 1956),213, 212. See also p. 217: “Persons who believe
in im m orta lity, or believe in
ghosts,
or
in the possibilityd t h c self leaving thc body,
assume a self which is quite dist inguishable from the body.
How
successfully they
can hold these conceptions is an open quest ion, but we do, as a fact, s epa rate the self
and the organism.’’
42. Hans Linschoten,
ON
he Way toumds a
Ptrertomenologid A y d r o l q y : Tltr Psy-
chology
of W i l l i n r n fumes, ed.ArnadeoGiorgi Pi t tsburgh:DuquesneUniversi ty
Press,
1968),
65.
43. We shall
see
that in James’s
later
writ ings he will speak of the self in te rms of
fields of
consciousness rather than the body. T h u s
the
“central self” which, as
we
have seen, is described in bodily terms in the Principles is described in term s of con-
sciousness in A Pluralistic Universe. Cf
PU,
31n.:
“ The
conscious self of the mo-
ment ,
the
central self,
is
probabIy determined to this privi leged
position
by its func-
tional connexion with the
body’s
imminen t o r present acts.”
C HA P T E R 4
I.. T he lack
of
a consensus concerning personal identity-whether it is, and if
s o
in
what it consists-has not chan ged mu ch since James’s t ime . “ T h e Identity
of
the
Self’ is the title of the opening chapter of Robert Nozick’s widely discussed Philo-
sophical Explanntions (Cambridge :HarvardUniversi tyPress,
1981;
hereafter PE).
Th is chapter focuses on the “metaphysical question” of “personal identi ty through
time,” that is, “how , given changes,
man
there be identity
of
some th ing from o n e
time to another, and in what does this identity consist?” N ozick no tes that“so m a n y
puzzling examples have been put forth in recent discussionso f personal identity that
it
is
di&cult
to
formulate,
much
less defend, any consistent view
of
identi ty and
n o t k d e n t i t y ” (p. 29). W hatever the diftlculties, personal identity has no t ceased t o be
a problem of concern to philosophers. Analytic philosophers in particular have con-
tributed
to
the store of technical arguments in supp ort of the various op tions-n o
identity, dentity hroughbodilycontinuity, dentity hroughpsychologicalcon-
tinuity, identity throug h some combinat ion of bodily and psychological continuity,
identity hrough some substantial o r transce nden tal principle-but theoptions
themselves have no t significantly increased or decreased though there are continuing
shif ts n he nu m ber of suppor te rs for a part icular opt ion. The l i tera ture on the
question o f personal identity is rapidly approaching
the
category of “vast ,” but
two
collections of essays can serve as usefu l in t roduc t ions to the“state of the question”:
Personal
Identity, ed.
John
Perry (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press,
1975); The
Iderrtitier
ofPersons,
ed . Arne l ie Oksenberg Ror ty (Berke ley: U niversi ty f Califorrlia
Press,
1976).
2. Cf. R a lph Bar ton Perry ,
Thc
Thought u r d Character o WilliumJames Boston:
Little, Brown,
1935),
II:72-73 (hereafter TC): “Thus dua l i sm’ was a provisional
doctrine by which
James
the psychologist
hoped
to e l iminate
and
pos tpone
a ques-
tion
on
whichJames the philosopher
had
no t
made
up
his
mind .
But
this
question-
namely, of the
relation
between ‘the state of mind’ an d its ‘object’-refirsed to be
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 283/323
eliminated,
as Jam es him self realized immediately after the publication of the
P r i t r c i -
ples , and more and mo re strong ly as the years passed. . . . Jam es was perpetually
being led, desp ite his profession of dualism and of metaphysical abstinence, to the
disclosure
of
a
homogeneous and continuous world.”
3 .
Cf. Robert R . Ehnlan, “W illiam Jam es and the Structure of the Self ,” i n New
Essays i n
Phenomerrology,
ed . James
M.
Edie (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1969),
257: “The impor tan t po in t to ec is that identity for James is no t to be regarded as
a
postulated condition of the flux above
o r
behind it but rather found
in d n
immediate
felt contin uity an d rese mb lance o f the hases of the
flux
themselves.”
4.
Roderick Chisholm is a formidable defender
of
the reality of the Ego -subjec t.A
central notion
of
his
defense
involves what he calls “self-presenting” propositions,
which
I
interpret as som ething akin to fecl ing. Sce
Persort u r d Object
(La Salle,
I l l . :
Open C o u r t ,
1976), 112:
What is
a
rritpvion of personal identity?
I t is
a statement telling what constitutes
evidence of personal identity-what constitutes a good reason for saying of a per-
son x
that
he is. or t ha t
he
is
not, identical with a person
y o
Now therc
is.
after all,
a
fundamental distinction between the trrrrh-~orrdilio,lsof a proposition and the
m i
dence w c
an
have for
deciding whether or not
the
proposition is true. The
f r r r th-
conditions for
the proposition that Caesarcrossed the Rubicon
consist
o ft h e fact,
if
i t
is a fact, that
C aesa r
did cross the Rubicon. The
o n ly
eviderrt-e you and I c a n have
of this fact will consist of certain orher propositions-propositions about records,
memories, and traces.
It
is
o n ly
i n
the case
of
what
is
self-presenting
( that
I
hope
for
rain o r that i seem to me to have a headache) t ha t
t he
evidence for
a
proposition
conicides w ith its truth-conditions. In all other cases,
thc
two arc logically inde-
pendent; the one could
be
true while the other
is
false.
5. Cf.
Gerald
E.
Myers,
PP,
1:xxxvi: “Wh at makes the ideqtity
of
a given state
of
consciousness? Neither James the psychologist nor J a m e s the metaphysician could
provide the answer.
Th e
peculiar identity o r unity of a state o f consciousness
consists
of
a ‘diversity
in
continuity,’ and that can only
be j d t .
Such was the verdict ofJames
the mystic.”
It
is true, as w e shaIi see, that
James
does no t c la im to “explain”
just
wh y experie nce is as
it
is.
Myers’s
com m ent mi ght be misleading, however, i f i t is
understood
as
suggest ing that ‘ .James the mystic” emerged after
7atnes
the psychol-
ogist” and ‘ljarnes the metaphysician” had failed. As already noted and as will be
developed more fully later, James nsists o n taking my sticism serious ly precisely
because its experientiai claims are consistent with his metaphysics
f
experience.
6. Ralp h Bar ton Perry, I r l The Spirit o Willinm
Jn r ne s
(New Haven.
Conn.:
Yale
University Press,
1938), 86
(hereafter S W m .
7.
“Person
and
Personality,”
inJokrtsorr3
Uttiverstrl
Cyclopaedin (189 5), VI:539,
cited
inPerry, SWJ, 86. Cf. SPP, 5: “Expevientinlly, o u r personal dentityconsists,he
[Locke]
said,
in nothing m ore than the functional and perceptib le fact that o u r later
states
of mind cont inue
and
remember
o u r
earlier ones.”
8. T h o u g h articulated explicitly in E R E and PU, the seeds of this distinction be-
tween perceptual experience of the flux character of reality and conceptualization are
already presen t in PP. HereJam es in t roduces the metaphor “s t ream” to denote the
changing character of thought while a lso aff irming the unchanging character f o u r
concepts. Th e issue
of
the samenessof meanin‘g that can
be
“intended” by constant ly
changing mind is too complex t o be described in
a
few sentences.
I n
the chapters
“Conception” and “Necessary
Truths,”James
seems to unde rmine
is
reputation
as
a
philosopher of process and experience. In the former
he
states: “Each conception thus
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 284/323
eternally remains what t is, and never can beco me anoth er. .
.
.T h u s , a m i d t h elux of
opinions
and
of physical things, the world of conceptions,
o r
things intended
to
be
thou ght abo ut, stand s stil l and imm utable, l ike Plato’s Realm of Ideas” (PP, I:437).
Conce rn ing
the
dispute between cvolutionary empiricists and apriorists over the ori-
gin of “nec essary truths,” Jam es ells us that “on the whole . .
.
the account which the
apriorists give of the&cts is that wh ich I defend; a l though I should contend . .
.
for a
naturalistic viewof their
”
PP,
II:1216).
am es wo uld insist that in both instances
he is concerned anly with the m eanin g structu res of
the
mind and is not positin g
concepts or necessary truths
as
ontological realities. That the onlya priori acceptable
to him would have to be a kind of processive a priori
is
hinted at in the following:
“W hat similarity can there possibly be between human laws impo sed a p r i o r i
on
all
experience
a5
‘Iegislative,’ an d hu m an
ways
of thinking that
row
up piecemeal
a m o n g
the
details of experience because on the whole they w ork best?” ( le t ter
to
Hugo
Miinsterberg,
1905,
cited in TC, II:469).
9. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch , “Wil l iam James’ Theory of the ‘Transitive PJrts’ of the
Strcam
of
Consciousness,” in
Studies
itt
Plwnonzenology u r d Psychology
(Evanston, I l l . :
Northw estern Universi ty Press, 1966),
305n.:
“T her e is another mo dificat ion
ern-
phasized by Jam es himsdf y h ic h takes place when the stream of consciousness is
grasped and objectivated instead o f being simply experienced. W hereas the stream
itself is co ntin uo us
and
is experienced as su ch, the acts o f reflection by which certain
m o m e n t s o r
phases
are grasped
are
discrete. Bchind these discrete markings,howev-
er, the stream of
experience
goes
on continuously.”
Cf. PU, 106:
“T he s tages in to
which you analyze a change arestates’, the change itselfgoes on be tween them. I t lies
along their intervals, inhabits w hat your definition fails to gather up, and thus eludcs
conceptual explanation altogether.”
10. Thomas Reid ,
Essnys
on the
I n t e l I e c f d
Powers of M a n ,
1785;
cited n Perry,
Personal Zdctrtity, 107.
11.
A .
N.
Whitchcad,
Adverltures
c f I d e a s (New York: Free Prcss/Macmillan,
1967),
186.
12. For a fine exposition of the various expressions of wha t
they
call the “de-
ontological, or ‘no-self,’ parad igm ,” set:David D i lworth and HughJ. S i lverman, “A
Cross-Cultural Approach to the Dc-Ontological Paradigm,” in
ortisr 61, no.
(lan.
13.
Cf. James
M .
Edie, “Th c
Philosophical
Anthropo logy
of William James,”in
An I t w i r a r i o n t o
P h e r t o m e d o g y , ed . James M . Edie (Chicago: Quad rangle Books,
1965),
128:
“He can be read
as
an ‘egologist’ or
as
a ‘non-egologist’ ( though
1
believe
the
egological intcrpretation is more consonant wi th the tenor ofis philosophy as
a
whole, particularly since he continues t o speak elsewhere
of
the
exper i emi tg
ego
as
a
unified ‘self up to the endof his life).”
14. Cf. ibid., 127: “ T h e more fundanlcntal question involves asking who i t is
who
identifieshimself i n varyingdegreeswith hesedivers emp irical’ or ‘objective’
selves.AndJames heremeetsone of his most undamental phenomenological’
problems: the problem which Sartreaccs in ‘The Transcenden ce
of
the Ego,’ which
Merleau-Yonty discusses under the ‘lived Body,’ which Gilbert Ryle puzzles over in
his
chaytcr
on thc ‘Systematic elusiveness of the I,’ and which divides phenomeno-
logists into ‘egologists’ l ike Hu sserl and ‘non-egolog ists’ l ike Gu rwitsch.”
15.
James’s statem ent here cannot be accepted w ith ou t qualification.
T h e
signifi-
cant difference between
his
understanding of xperience and feeling and that of ear-
1978): 82-95.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 285/323
258 Notes
to
Chapter 4
lier empiricists prohibits any identification of his philosophy with classical em-
piricism. Th is poin t has already been stressed and will become evident again w hen
we consider James’s rejection o f the associationist’s accou nt o f the self.
16. Cf. Milic Capek, “The Reappearance of the Self in the Last Philosophy of
William Jam es,” Philosophical Review 62 (1953): 536: “It wo uld be difficult to co ntra-
dict oneself m or e often with in a single sentence. D oes the ‘identifying section’ of the
stream no t belong to the s tream itself, that is to ‘the totality o f things collected’? In
what sense is it superior to them ? H ow can it collect, survey, own , o r disown the past
facts, as James claims in th e sub seq uent sentence, while it rem ains present, that is,
external
to th e past already gone ?”
17. Robert Nozick attempts to account for identity over time by his “closest con-
tinuer theo ry” w hich , th ou gh less metaphorical, is suggestive of James’s hypothesis:
“T he closest contin uer view holds that y at
t,
is the same person as
x
at
tl
only if,
first, y’s properties at
t2
s tem from, grow out of, are causally dependent on x’s
properties at
t ,
and, second, there is n o other z a t t, that stands in a closer (or as close)
relationship to x at t, than y at t, does” ( P E , 36-37).
18.
Cf.
A .
N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (N ew York: Cap ricorn Books, 1958),
146: “C om pl et e self-identity can never be preserved in any advance to novelty.”
19. Cf. R ichard Stevens,
James and Husserl: The Fourtdafion
o
Meaning
(The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974),
83:
“In their attempts to describe the peculiar identity of
the pure ego, b oth Husserl and James reject the model of objective iden tity w ithin a
succession of perceptual perspectives. Bo th maintain that the permanence o f the pur e
ego m ust be interpreted in terms o f function rather than of con tent.”
20. David Hume,
A
Treatise
o
Hutnuti Nature, 2d. ed., ed. L.
A .
Selby-Bigge
(O xfo rd: Clare ndo n Press, 1978), A ppe ndix , p. 636 (cited by James, b ut w ith ou t the
original italics, PP, 1:334).
21. Cf. C ape k, “Reappearance,” 536, w her e he com m ents o n this passage: “James
did not seem to realize that this criticism applied almost verbatim to his ow n notion of
‘the core
of
sameness running thr ou gh the ingredients o f the Self.’” Indebted as I am
to C apek’s article, I believe that h e has missed Jam es here. For James, the “tie” is not
“inexplicable” insofar as it is verified in experience. B y the sam e toke n, inasm uch as
experience an d /o r reality is constituted of “ties” or “connections,” there is no need
to go
behind
the phenomena to find the substance which does the tying or con-
necting.
22.
Cf. PP, I:268:
“
The re is
t i0
man$old ofcoexist ing ideas; the notion o f such a thing
is
a
chimera. Whatever thitigs are thought in relation are thoughtjom the outset in
a
unity,
in
a
sifiglepulse
of
subjectivity,
a
sittgle psychosis, feeli ng, or state ofmind.”
23. Capek, “Reappearance,” 541.
24. Ibid., 532-33; “T he true meaning of the article ‘Does Consciousness
Ex-
ist?’ . . . is a denial of the artificial separation of the act of consciousness from its
content. What James denies is a timeless, ghostly, and diaphanous entity, c om m on to
all individuals and consequently impersonal .”
25. Cf. the previously cited text, P B C , 175: “The I, or ‘pure ego’ .
.
. is that
which at any given moment is consciousness, whereas the Me is only one of the
things which it is conscious
of:”
This does not, I believe, conflict w ith m y claim that
the
“I”
and the “m e” are correlative and that it is not possible to have one w ith ou t
the other. The very possibility of distinguishing me-objects from non-me-objects
presupposes, of course, the reality of the “m e.”
26. Cf. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, 227-28: “Descartes’ ‘Co gito erg o sum ’ is
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 286/323
Notes to Chapter 5 259
w ron gly translated, ‘I thin k, therefore I am.’ It is never bare tho ug ht o r bare exis-
tence that we are aware of.
I find myself as essentially a unity o f em otions, enjoy-
ments, hopes, fears, regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions-all of the m sub-
jective reactions to the env ironm ent as active in m y nature. M y unity-which is
Descartes’ ‘I am’-is m y process of shaping this welter o f material in to
a
consistent
pattern of feeling.”
27. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Notebooks,
1914-1916, trans.
G.
E. M . Anscombe
(N ew York: Harpe r T orchbo oks, 1961), 80e:
Th e I, the I is wh at is deeply mysterious
T he I is no t an object.
I objectively con fron t every object. B ut n ot th e I.
So there really is a way in w hich there can and m ust be me ntion o f the
I
in
a non-
psychological sense
in philosophy.
28. A simpler example: If it is correct t o say that Joh nn y th row s the ball wit h his
arm , it is also correct to say simp ly that Joh nny thro ws the ball.
29. John Dewey,
Experience arid Nature
(New York: Dover, 1958),
208.
Cf. TC,
II:527: Perry cites Dewey’s letter to James in w hich he w rites positively of “th e wh ole
conception o f evolution as .
.
. reality which changes through centres of behavior
which are intrinsic and no t m erely incident.”
30. Cf . A . N . Whitehead, Process and R eal ity (N ew York: Hum anities Press, 1955),
254: “Apart from the experiences of subjects, there is nothing, nothing, nothing,
bare nothingness.”
31. Cf. E die,
Invitation,
130, wh ere he focuses on
“action
as the central category o f
James’ thou ght .”
32. Cf. Ian Barbour, Myths, Models, and Paradigms (N ew York: Harper Row,
1976), 158, wh ere h e describes th e “agent m ode l” developed un der the influence of
the “action” theorists: “An
actioti
is a succession of activities ord ere d towards an en d.
Its unity consists in an in ten tion t o realize a goal.
.
.
.
an action ca nn ot be specified,
then, by any set o f bodily mo vem ents, but o nly by its purpose o r intent.” Cf. also p.
139: “A person is an age nt as well as an activity,
a
centre of thought, intentionality
and decision, w h o can reveal himself to us in deliberate communication.”
33.
M i nd
4 (1879): 1-22.
34. Cf. TC, II:760, w here Perry cites the following no te w ritten by James in 1906:
“Since wo rk gets undeniably don e, a nd ‘we’ feel as if ‘we’ were do ing bits o f it, w hy,
for Heaven’s sake, th ro w aw ay the ria$impression.”
35. See also SPP, 109: “Meanwhile the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it
comes, offers in our own activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of
causal agency. The ‘transitive’ causation in them does not, it is true, stick out as a
separate piece of fact for conception to fix upon. Rather does a whole subsequent
field gr ow continuou sly ou t o f a w hole antecedent field because it seems
to
yield new
being of the nature called for, wh ile the feeling of causality-at-work flavors the
entire concrete sequen ce as salt flavors the water in w hic h it is dissolved.”
36. Edie,
Invitation,
131.
C H A P T E R 5
1 .
To
get som e idea o f how thorny, obscure, and frustratingly elusive so m e o f
these questions were for James, see “ T he Miller-Bode O bjec tions ,” repr odu ced in
part in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of Willi am James (Boston:
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 287/323
260 Notes t o Clrapter
5
Little, Brown,
193.9,
II:750-65, Appendix X (hereafter TC). This is a selection
made by Perry f rom notes tha t James kept be tween
1905 and
1908,
dealing with
object ions tohis doctr ine of “pure experience.” will draw liberally upon these notes
insofar as I think they support the processive-rela t ional
r
field metaphysics, implicit
inJames’s earl iest wri t ing, that becomes m ost unequivocal ly evident in A P l t rva l i s t i c
Utriverse.
2.
Cf.
ilic Capek, “The Reappearance of the Self
in
the Last Philosophy of
Will iamJamcs,” Philosophicarrl
Review
62 (1953):532: “James thus became
a
consistent
tempordist wi th all the consequen ces implied in this atti tude; temporality does be-
long, not only to the psychological world of thc ‘stream of thought ,’ but a lso to the
wh ole of reality.”
3 .
Cf. a lso
PU,
112:
“B ut i f, as metaphy sicians, we are more curious about the
inner nature o f reality or ab ou t wh at eally
rnnkes
if go,
we must
t u r n o u rbacks upon
our winged concepts a l together, and bury ourselvcs in the thickness of those passing
mo ments over the surface of wh ich thcy fly, an d on particular points of which they
occasionally test and perch.”
4.Cf. Gabriel Marcel, The
M y s r e v y
q f B e i t g ,
2
vols., trans. G.
S .
Fraser (Chicago:
Henry Regnery,
1950, 1951), I: 127:
“ Bu t i t is prccisely to the de gre e in w hich the
spectator is mo re than sim ply pectnrrs, it is to the degree to which he is also
particeps,
that the spectacle
s more
than a mere spectacle, that i t as some inner meaning--and
it is,
I
repeat , to the degree to which i t s more than a mere spectacle that
i t
can
give
rise to conte mp lation. And
o u r
term ‘participation’, even tho ug h it is so far for
us
no t much m ore than a makeshift , a bridge hastily th ro w n across certain gaps in o u r
argum ent, indicates precisely this ‘som ething m ore’ that has to b c added to th e sim-
ple recording o f inlpressions before contemp lation can arise.”
5. Cf.
V R E ,
341:
“I
d o believe that feeling is the deeper source o f religion , and that
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like translations o f a
t ex t in to another tongue . .
.
In
a world
in which n o religious feeling had ver existed,
I
doubt whether any phiIosophic theology could ever have been framed.
.
.
.
These
speculations must, i t seems to me,e classed as over-beIiefs, buildings-out per for m ed
by the intellect into direction s of which feeling originally supplied
the
hin t .”
6.
Cf.
Elizabeth Flower and Murray
G.
Murphey,
,4
History ofPhilosophy i r t 14mer-
ica, 2
vols. (N ew York : Capr ico rn
Books, 1977),
471: “If as we expe ct him /James] to
do by this t ime, o ne su bst i tutes a continuity over t ime for an identi ty o f substance,
then the conditionsof contin uity wo uld be atisfied if the experienceof the present n
some cum ulative sense captured past experience. Just as the present state o f a plant
incorporates i ts past growth,
so
the present thought owns o r represents all that
has
gone before.”
7. The com plex ques t ionof continuity-discontinuity cannot be entered into here.
W hile it was a relatively unfinished ques tion in Jam es, Perry sugg ests that he was
working toward a more adequa te express ion of
the
senses in which the temporal
world
is
bothcontinuousanddiscontinuous:“Thathewouldno t have efthis
‘abrupt increments of novelty’ unrelieved
is clear.
O n e m ay surmise that he
would
have described
a sequence of
happenings in which events occur like strokesr pulses,
with a th rust
of
their own ; but in w hich they wou ld at t he same t ime be continu-
ous-in the sense of conjunction or nextness, rather than in the senseof connection.
Their continuity wou ld not consist in the l ink between them , but in the
absence
of
any such interm ediary. Being thus in direct contact, they would be subject to ‘os-
mosis’” (TC,11566).
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 288/323
Notes
to
Chapter 5
261
It should be noted that t ime is not a mathem atical continuum for Jam es; rather, i t
comes in d iscont inuous “drops” or “pulses .”
Cf. SPP, 80:
“On the theory
of
discon-
t inui ty, t ime, change, e tc . , would grow by f ini te buds or drops, e i ther nothingorn-
ing
at all, o r certain units
of
amoun t bu rs t ing in tobeing ‘at
a
stroke.’
”
But “d iscon-
t inui ty”
is
no t thc wh ole sto ry, f or all experiences also have
a
dinlcnsion of contin-
uity, as is eviden ced in James’s d oc trin e
of
the specious present
in
which we grasp
imm ediately he eceding past andemerg ingfu ture . “ T h e tiniest eeling w e can
possibly have comcs with an earlier anda later part and wit h a sense
of
their continu-
ous procession” ( P U , 128). Tim c, th en, is continuous insofar as cach m om ent gro ws
immedia te ly (wi th out g ap) o ut of the last m o m e n t and will grow imm edia te ly in to
the next. T im e is discontinuous insofar as it corncs in d r o p s or strokes or pulses-in
h i t c bits.
8. Cf.
P U ,
87n.:
“ I
hold
it still as the best description
of
an
e n o r m o u s
number
of
our highe r ields o f consciousness. The y dem onstrab ly
d o
not
iontaitl
the lower
tares
that k n o w thesameobjects. Of other fields,however, his is n o t so t rue , . . . I
frankly withdrew, n principle, my former object ion
to
talking
of
f ie lds of con-
sciousness being made of sim pler ‘pa rts,’ leaving the facts t o decide the que stio n in
each specia1 case.”
9. Brucc Kuklick, The Rise
ojAmcricat l
Philosophy ( N e w Haven,
Conn.:
Yak
Uni-
versity Press, 1977), 331.
10.
I t
has
been
frequently noted that the str ic turesJames a t t r ibutes to the
logic
of
identity do no t ho ld gainst the logic of relations developed in the twentieth century.
Cf. Marcus PeterFord, William
j a m ~ s ’ s lzilosoplry
(Amherst : Universi ty
of
Mas-
sachusetts Prcss,
1982),
106-7:
T he logic of identity p resupp oses that concre te actualities can
be
dcfincd solely in
terms o f changeless universals. Consequ ently, concre te actualitics are themselves
considered to be changeless.
A
thing is forever
just
what it is. Moreover, because
concrete things can be defined solely
in
terms of universals, the rclation between
on e concrete hing and anothe r is not esscntial to either actuality. Relations arc
purely accidental.
.
.
.
The logic
of‘
elations, which includes the logic of identity.
affrrrns what the logic of identity denies,
L e . ,
that a subject may enter into and
affect ano ther sub ject. Because certain kind s of relations are internal to one term
and external to the other, subjects may include other subjects.
T h e
relations of
knowing, loving, or hating include what is known, loved, or hated-knowing x,
loving
y, hating
z .
The
eRect ncludes t he causc or , m or e generally stated, the
feeling-of-x must include
x
otherwise i t is merely the feeling-of-.
11. T h e relevance of all this to th e earlier field model of the self
as
a complex o f
conscious and nonconscious fields shifting and overlapping is ob vio us.
12. The se passages lend supp ort to interpret ing
James
as a panpsychist . 1 have
already “dodged” this quest ion
y
suggest ing that “panact ivism”
s
a
less
problenled
term for describing James’s metaph ysics than “pan psyc hism .”
13.
Cf.
Ford,
Jarnes’s
Philosophy,
87: “ T h e p a r a d o x
of
something be ing both
ex
and
LO
another actuality is no paradox a t all when seen from a process perspective. What
was
once ex may be co in a subsequen t mom ent .” Cf. also Perry, TC,
I:664:
“ Bu t
once the logic of identi ty is abandoned, it is permissible to say that tw o successive
events bo th are and are no t identical : the f i rst develops into the second, the s econd
emerges from the fi rst . There is novelty, bu t i t is a novelty which, when i t comes,
seems m utual and reasonable, l ike the fulfil lment of a tendency. This notion
of
a
‘really gro win g wo rld’ is the gene ral heme of the atter part of the Problems sf
Philosophy.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 289/323
262 Notes
t o Chapter
5
14. Cf. James in TC, 11:757:
“ 1
find that I involuntarily think
of
lo-ness under the
physical im ag e of sort
of
lateral suffusion fro m on e thin g into an oth cr,ike a gas or
warmth , o r l i gh t . The l n c e s involved are fixed, but what fills one place radiates and
suffuses into the other by
.
.
‘endosmosis .’ This seems
to
ally itself w ith th e fact
that all consciousness
is positional,
is
a
‘point of view,’ measures things for a
here,
etc. .
.
.”
15. C f , P U ,
121:
“The absolu tc is said t o pe rfo rm i ts feats by taking up i ts othcr
into tself. Bu t hat is exactly what is done when every ndividual
morsel of
the
sensational stream takes
up
the adjacent morscls by coalescing w ith the m . T his is
just what we mean by the stream’s set lsibk continuity.o element
thew
cuts itselfoff
f rom any other e lement ,
as
concepts cut chemselvcs from concepts. N o a r t
there
is
so small as not to be a place of conflux. No part there is no t really
r1e.uf
its neighbors;
which
means
that there
is
l itera lly nothing b ctween; w hich m eans that
no
part goes
exactly so far and
no
farther; that
n o
part absolutely cxcludes another, but that they
com penetrate and are cohesive; if you tear out one, i ts roots bring out m ore with
them; that whatever
is
real is telescoped and diffused into other rcals.”
16. Cf. also P U ,
104:
“All-felt times coexist and overlap or com pen etra te each ot he r
thus vaguely; but the artificcof plo t t ing them on a co m m on scale helps us to reduce
their aboriginal confusion.’’
17. Cf . L e w i s T h o m a s , The Mcd~rsa
rld
t h e
Stmil
(New York :Bantam Books,
1980),
10-12:
“If there
is
life there, you will find co nsor tia, colIab orating grou ps,
working part ies,
all
over the place. . .
.
I t is beyond our im aginat ion to conceive o f a
single form of
life that exists alone and independent, unattached to ot he r
forms.
. . .
Everything herc is alive thanks to the living of everything else. All the forms of life
are connected. .
. .
Wc a r e c o m p o n e n t s i n a dense, fantastically com plicated systcnl
o f life, w e are enmeshed in the interl iving, and
we
really don’t k n o w what wc’re
u p
to .”
18. Cf. Gerald E . Myers ,
PP,
1:xxxv-xxxvi: “He confcsscd hat neither he nor
anyone else could explain how the peculiar identity and unity o f a state
of
con-
sciousness can result fro m
a
combina t ion
of
elements.
I n
ou r experience we
do
find
the concept ‘diversity and m ultiplicity
in
unity’ fulfil led, but w e cannot explain it .
T hi s is becausc, i n the very effort to conceptual ize those mom ents wherein w e find
unity composed of diversity, we break
up
the unity; our concepts keep things sepa-
rated, whereas o u r experience f inds them ogether in a unity and continuity that can-
not
be
conceptual ized. Thus, the sort of continuity that pervades
a
pure experience,
that characterizes the diversityof a state of consciousncss, that connects hum an xpe-
riences t o God’s, cannot be described.”
I have cited Myers’s
fine
i n t roduc t ion to the PrirzripIes scveral times,
for,
a s the
citations indicatc, he locates thePrinciples within the larger context ofJames’s philos-
ophy wi th which I am concerned. I regret that his ful l- length study ofJames,
William
James:
His Life
atrd
Thought ( N e w
Haven, Conn., 1986),
was not available du ring the
period in w hich m y essay was co m po sed . Myers’s impressive w o r k is thc most com-
prehensive treatment ofjames’s life
and
tho ug ht yet wri t ten, and it is likely to rem ain
so for some t ime .
19. Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, The
Spiri t of
WillinrnJnrnes (Ne w Havcn. Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1938), 115-16:
Perry
points out that James escaped the paradox of
one ent i ty being “in
ome
sense
both identical
and
non-identical with another
.
.
by
taking the concrete en tity
as
an integrated complex which by overlapping another
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 290/323
could be both identica l with that other as regards their comm unity, and also non-
identical as regards their individualities and private remainders.”
20.
See above, page
104.
21.
Cf.
Y R E ,
191:
“In
the wonderful explorat ions by Binet , Janet , Breuer, Freud,
Mason, Prince, and others, of the subliminal consciousnessf patients with hysteria,
we have revcaled to us whole system s of underground life, in the shape of memor ie s
o f a painfu l s ort wh ich lead a parasitic existence, buried outside the p rimary fieldsof
consciousness.”
22.
I t
is doubtful whether a lmost thrce-quarters
f
a cen tury later w e can
be
said to
be mu ch “ fu r ther” thanJam es.For a more recent consideration of parapsychological
claimsby on e wh o l ikeJames
is
symp athet ic but a lsoreaches a “very open and
uncertain” conclusion, see Jo h n H i c k , “ T h e Co n t r ib u t i o n of Parapsycholog y,” in
Death u r d E t e r r d
Life
(New
York: H arp er Row,
1976), 129-46.
23. Cf. the
T.
H. Huxley ,“LifeandLetters,” I,
240,
cited
by
James in“Final
Impressions
of
a PsychicalResearcher,”
M S ,
185-86: “But supposing hese phe-
nomena to begenuine-they do no t n terest me . I f anybod y would endow m e wi th
the faculty oflisten ing to the chatterof old women and curates in the nearest provin-
cial town, I should decline the privilege, having better things to do. An d if the folk
of the spiritual world d o n o t alk m or e wisely and sensibly than their friends report
them to
do,
I put then1
in
the same ca tegory . Th e on ly
good
that 1 can see in th e
demonstration
of
the
‘Tru th
of
spiritualism’
is
to
furnish an addit ional argum ent
again st s uicidc. Be tter livc a crossing-sweeper, than die and bc m ad e to talk twaddle
by a ‘medium’ h i red a t a guinea a
S e a f m . ”
In fairness, such parapsychologica claims
as those of extrasensory perception and clairvoyance should be d istinguished from
“spir i tual ism” and “mediumship.” But apart
rom
the question of their authenticity,
there stiI1 seems to be a significant qualitative difference in t he lives of t hose who
appa rently possess such powers and those recognized as “m ystics.”
24. W illiam Jam es,
Z l k s
to Tearhers ( N e w Yo rk : N o r t o n ,
1958),
34.
25.
T ha t this is not merely an anti- or nonintelIectual emotive expression on
the
part
ofJames
is
well
noted
by
Marian
C.
M a d d e n
a n d
Edward
€3.
Madden
in
their
c o m m e n t on t h s text:
“It was
not only the
will
to believ e w h c h heIped mbrace
the free-will view bu t also the
rcmoval
of th e belief, on good evidence, in the autom-
aton theory. Indeed, the
w i l l
to believe that on e is free was not eno ug h for James by
any means. Th at opt ion had to
be
made a live
one
for h i m
by
honestly eliminating
the automaton theory, done
by
hard intellectual labor.
His
respect for scientific evi-
dence had to be
met,
and it was” (“The Psychosomatic IlInesses
of
William J am es,”
Thought, Dec. 1979, p.
392).
26. Cf. also P, 60: “Free will pragmatically means novelties in t he
worid,
the r ight to
expect that in its deep est elem ents as w ell as in ts surface phenomena, the future may
not identically repeat and imitate the past.”
27. T h r e e of the four experiences were sim ilar in character, the fourth being a
disturb ing dream that recurre d ove r several nights. T h e waking experiences are the
focus of my conc ern, but James’s conclusion regarding the dreams is well wor th
noting: “The distressing confusion
f
mind in this experience was the exact opposite
of my stical i l lumination, and equally unrnystical was the definiteness of what was
perceived. B u t the exaltation of the sense of relation was mystical (rhe perplexity
al l
revolved abo ut the fact that the three dreams
6 0 t h
did
a d
did
riot
belor1g
in
thc
most
intimate
way together);
and the sense that eality
was beirtg
uncovered was mystical in the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 291/323
264
Nota
fo Clrapter 5
highest degree. Tu this day
I
feel that those extra dream s w erc dream edn reality, but
when, whcre , and by whom, I cannot guess” ( C E R , 511).
28.
D.
C. Mathur, Nurrrvtrlistic Philosophies of Expcrierlce (St. Louis, Mo.: Warren
H.
Green,
1971),
62.
29.
Cf.
V R E ,
157-58.
Though James here a t t r ibutes an experience ofmetaphysical
terror t o an anonymous F renchman ,
he
later a dm itted it
was
his own.
30. Cf. TC,
II:346: “I have n o mystical experience of m y ow n, bu t
us t
enough
of
the germ of mysticism in me to recognize the region from which their [ s i c ] voice
comes when
I
hear it.” See also, TC, I1:350: “ I have no l iving sense of commerce
wi th a G o d . . . . Al though I a m so devoid of
Gortesbewusstsein
in the directer
a n d
stronger sense, yet there is
sonrething
i n me which
makes rexpome
w h e n I hear utter-
ances from that quarter made by others.” John Sm ith considers this last sta tement
“the key to the resolut ion of whatever paradox is involved” in James being “con-
vinced
at
second-hand that only first-hand experience in religion represents the gen-
uine article” ( V R E , xvi) .
31. Cf. W B , 223: “No part of the unclassified residuum has usuaily been treated
wi th
a more contemptuous scient if ic disregard than the mass of phenomena gener-
allycalled mysfical.
.
.
.
All thewhile ,however, hephenomenaare here , ying
broadcast over the surface
of
history.”
32. Cf.
V R E , 58-59:
“Such
cases, taken alo ng wi th
others
which would be too
tedious for quotation, seem suffkiently to prove the existence in o u r mental
ma-
chinery of a sense of present reality m or e diffused and general than that which our
special senses yield.”
33. James will later suggest that f the wo rd “sublim inal” s offensive “smclling too
much o fpsychical rcsearch or other aberrat ions,” then one might speakf the A- and
the B-region o f personality. T h e A-region is “t he level o f full sunlit consciousness.”
T he larger
B-region “is the abode of everyth ing that is latent
and
the reservoir of
everything that passes unrecorded and unobserved. I t contains, for example, such
thin gs as all our momentari ly inact ivememories, and it harbors the springsof a11 o u r
obscurely
motivedpassio ns, mp ulses, likes, dislikes,andprejudices.
O u r
intui-
tions, hypotheses, fancies, superstit ions, persuasions, convictions, and in gen eral all
our non-rational operations, co m e fro m it”
( V R E ,
381).
34.
Cf. Perry, TC, 11:273: “Again he discovered that men find within themselves
unexpected resources upon which to draw in times
of
danger
or
privation. There is
thus acom m on thread unning hrough James’ observat ions on religion,neu-
rasthenia,war,earthquakes,fasting, ynching,patriotism-an nterest,namely, n
hum an behavior under high pressure , and the conclusion that exceptional c ircum-
stances generate ex ceptional inner power. These phenom ena have a bearing on rneta-
physics because such ex ceptional power suggests the sudden removalof a barrier and
the tappings
of
a greater reservoir
of
consciousness.”
35. Cf. WB, 237:
“ T h e
result is to m ak e m e feel that we all have a potentially
‘subliminal’ self, wh ich m ay m ake a t any t ime irruption into o ur o rdinary lives. A t
its lowest,
it
is
only the deposi tory of
o u r
forgotten memories; a t i ts highest, we do
no t kn ow what it is
at
all.”
36.
Cf. Patrick Kiaran Dooley,
Pragmatism
as
Htrrnanism
(Totowa, N.1.: Littlefield,
Adams,
1975), 159:
“Even t hough
he
felt that the existence
of
the self was required
by
man’s ethical religious experiences, he maintained
that
the
self
was
only experi-
enced
as cephaiic movementsof adjustment . Jamesnow proposed that this self, expe-
rienced as
muscular
adjustment , was only a por t ion
of
a wider
self.
Mo reover, the
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 292/323
Notes
to Chapter
5 265
wider self was experienced in ethical and religious experiences wherein the widerelf
moves fromhe eripherysubconsciou s wareness)
to
the enterconscious
awareness).”
37.
From
an
essay
on
subliminal consciousness written by Frederick M yers
in
1892
and published in Proceedir-rgs
o f f h e S a c i e t y f o v
Aychicnl Restwrh
7:305.
T h e c on -
geniality of this text to the kind of field-self suggested in this essay is quite evident.
38. lames
was quite aware that in encouraging speculations such as Fechner’s, on e
was opening a Pandora’s b ox . Cf. P U , 142: “ I t
is
true that superstit ions and w ild
gro w ing over-beliefs of all sorts w il l undoubtedly beg in to abound
if
the not ion of
higherconsciousnessesenvelopingours, of fechnerianearth-soulsand he like,
grows
orthodox and fashionable . .
.
But ough t one se r iously to a llow such a t imid
consideration as that to de ter one
from
following the evident path of greatest re-
l igious promise? Since when, in this mixed world, was any go od given us in purest
outline and isolation? One of the characteristics of life is redundancy, . . + Every-
thing is sm othere d in the li t ter that is fated to accom pany it . W ithout too m u c h you
cannot have ctzough
of
anyth ing .”
39. Someth ing similar is suggested by Charles Sanders Peirce:
A friend of
mine,
in consequence of
a
fever, totally
lost
his sense of
hearing.
He
had been v e r y fond of music before his calamity; and, strange to say, even after-
wards would love to stand by the piano when
a good
perform er played.
So
then,
I
said to him, after all you can hear a little. A bsolutely no t, h e replied; but
I
canfEd
the
music all
over m y body. Why,
I
exclaimed, how
is it
possibie fora new sense
to
be
developed in a few months
I t
is not a new
sense,
he answered. Now that my
hearing is gone I can recognize that alway s possessed this mode
of
consciousness,
which I formerly, with oth er people, mistook for hearing.
In
the same m anner,
when the carnal consciousness passes away
in
death, we shall a t
once
perceive that
we have had all
along
a lively spiritual consciousn ess which
we have
been confus-
ing with something different.The Collected P u p s of
Chmles
Sanders
Peircc,
8 vols.,
ed.CharlesHartshorne, PaulWeiss,
and
Arthur
W. Burks
[Cambridge,Mass.:
Harvard U niversity Press,
1931-35,
19581, VU,
par.
577)
40.
In
a
le t ter wri t ten short ly after the publicat ion
of
V R E ,
James
stated:
“ l
think
that the fixed pointw i t h m e s the conviction that
our
‘rational’ consciousness touch-
es but a portion
of
the real universe and that
our
life is fed by the ‘mystical’ region
s
well” (cited in TC, Il:346).
41.
Cf.
the British analytic philosopher,
H .
H. Price’s ‘*Survival and the Idea of
‘Another World,’” in Lariguuge, Metaphysics, nrtd D e d z , e d . j o h n D o n n e l l y ( N e w
York: Fordham U niversity Press, 1978),
194:
“ l f th ere a re o ther wor lds han h is
(again I emphasize the ‘ i f ) ,who knows whe the r w i th
some
s t ra tum
of
o u r person-
alities we are not l iving in them now , as well as in this present
one
which conscious
sense-perception discloses?’’
42.
Cf.
Perry, TC, 11576-77: “Th is bel ief was to som e extent founded on norma l
observation, o n the reports of others , and on the theory
of
the subliminal con-
sciousness which he adopted from M yers. But the impression is irresistible that it
was his
own
unusual experiences hat put he seal of convic t ion on what wou ld
otherwise have been an alluring but open hypothesis.”
43. If we read so m e of the more arcane Jamesian texts within such a field meta-
physics, I believe we rend er them a bit
more
plausible. Try it, for examp le, singly
and together, with
two
just-cited texts-“millions
of
years later,
a
similarly retro-
spective experience, should any com e to birth . . I ’ and “a con t inuum of cosmic
consciousness.
.
.
.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 293/323
266 Notes fo Chpter 6
44.
In a
text written more than twenty years earlier, there is an anticipation f this
“collectivism of personal lives,” though with a more abstract and less dynamic
fla-
vor:
“If idealism be true, the great question that presents itself is whether its tru th
involve henecessity of an nfinite,unitary,andomniscientconsciousness,
o r
whether a republic of semi-detachedconsciousnesseswilldo,-consciousnesses
united by a certain common fund of representations, but each possessing a private
store which the others do not share” (“ O n Som e Hegelisms,” W B , 215).
45.
Cf.
also TC, I:526:“Nihilismdeniescontinuity. Of the woelementsof
change it says one does not exist
a t all till
the o ther has ceased etltirely. Com m on
sense lets one thing run into another and exist potentially or in substance whcre its
antecedent
is, alIows
continuity.” Cf. also
p. 527:
“Substance metaphysicalIy consid-
ered
denotes no thing more than this: ‘it
is
nrecrrrt,’
apllrs ul tm the phenomenon. What
this
plus
may be
is
lefr undecided;
i t
may be a noumenal world,
i t
may only be other
phenomena with which the present real one is related,-it may, in
a
word, denote
merely the ~onti t trr i ty
of
the real world.”
46.
In
positing a substantive sameness as characterizing the self, we must keep in
mind the distinctive features ofJames’sdoctrine of personal identity described in the
last chapter, in particular, the mode
of
“sameness” that is experientially warranted.
Cf.
PP,
:318: “The past and present selves compared are the sameust so far forth
as
they are the same, and no farther.”
CHAPTER
6
I .
C. Stephen Evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief(Washington, D. C.: Univer-
sity Press of America, 1982),
142.
The most dramatic expression
of
the metaphysical
and ethical implications attached to the God-question is Nietzsche’s famous parable
of the “Death of God.” What Nietzsche so brilliantly and terrifyingly illustrates is
that the loss of belief in the traditional
God
is
not
restricted in its implications o the
undermining
of
the classical arguments for the existence of God, nor even to the
denial of the existence of some transcendent Being. Rather, the “death of God”
involves the dissolution
of
that view of reality upon which the most important and
central institu tions and values
of
Western civilization were grounded.
2. Paul Tillich, The
Dynamics
ofFaith (New York:Harper Torchbooks, 1958),45:
“Whatever we say about that which concerns us ultimately, whether or not we call it
God, has a symbolic meaning. It points beyond itself while participating in that to
which it points. In
n o
oth er way can faith express itselfadequately. The language of
faith is the language
of
symbols.”
I
wish to add that the symbolic character of Gad-language applies particularly to
the use of the masculinepronouns
“he”
and “him.” I have followed customary West-
ern usage throughout simply because I could think
of no
alternative that would not
be cumbersome and distracting.Needless to say, God is no more nor less “he” than
“she”;
nor,
perhaps, than “it.”
3. It is not only those working explicitly ou t of the pragmatic tradition who reject
this simplistic dichotomy.
Cf.
the sociologist of religion Robert Bellah’s “Religion in
the University: Changing Consciousness, Changing Structures,”
in
Claude Welch,
ed . ,
Religion in the Ude r g r u d u n t e Curricrrfum (Washington,
D.C.:
Association of
American Colleges, 1973,
14:
For
the
religiously
orthodox
reiigious
belief
systems were
felt
to
represent
“objec-
tive” reality
as
i t really is, and thus
if
one of them is true
the
others must be false,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 294/323
Notes
to
Chapter
6
267
either absolutely or in some degree. For the secular orthod ox all religion is merely
“subjective,”based on emotion, wish o r faulty inference, and therefore
false.
For
the third group,
who take
symbolism seriously, religion is seen as a system of
symbols which is neither simply objective nor simply subjective but
which
links
subject and object in
a
way that transfigu res reality o r even, in a sense, creates
reality. For people
with
this point
of
view the idea of finding more than one re-
ligion valid, even in a deeply personal sense, is not only possible but normal. This
means n either syncretism nor relativism, since
i t is
possibIe within any
social or
personal context t o develop criteria for the evaluation
of
religious phenomena and
consequent hierarchy
of
choices.
4. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, trans.
Erazim
V. Kohik
(Evanston, Ill.:
Northw estern Universi ty Press, 1966),
476:
“At th is poin t Orphic Poe t ry [Goethe ,
Rilke, Nietzsche] leaves us unsatisfied. I t conceals a great temptat ion, the temptat ion
t o
lose
ourselves as subjectivity
and
to sink in the great metam orphosis.
.
.
.
I t
is
no
accident that Orp hism tends to a naturef worship in which the unique sta tus f the
C og ito evaporates in the cycleof the mineral and the animal.’’
5.
Ralph Barton Perry, T h e Thought
u r d
CItaracfPrc j WilliamJurnes,
2
vols. (Boston:
Little, Brown,
1935). II:358-59
(hereafter Tc).
6 .
See
also
P,
40-41: “iftheolog ical ideas prove
to
have valuefor concrete life, they will be
true, for pragmatism , n the sense o f b e k g
good fo r
so
much. For how much more they are true,
will depend entirely or1 thcir relations to the other truths that also have
t o
be acknowledged.”
7.
Cf.
TC,
1~273:
Again he discovered that men find within themselves unex-
pected resources upon which to draw
in
t imes of dange r or privation. . .
.
These
phen om ena have a bearing’on m etaphy sics because such exceptional power suggests
the sudden removal of a barrier and he appings
of
a greater reservoir of con-
sciousness; and they have bearing on ethics, since this power differs in degree rather
than
in
kind fro m that mo ral power-that f ight ing and adventurous spir i t , that hero-
ic quality-which gives to life the color and radianc e o f value.”
8. T h e passage elided reads, “So a ‘god o fbattles’ must be allowed for one kind of
person,
a
g o d
of
peace and heaven a nd home, t he god for another.” I have dro pp ed it
because it distracts fr om th e richness ofJames’s pluralistic perspective
by
giv ing the
impression
that all gods m u s t be al lowed. This
is
in sharp opposi t ion
o
his view that
we m ust evaluate all claims, including religious on es, on the basis of their experien-
tial fruits. I submit that whatever limited fruits belief in a
“ g ~ d
f bat tles” bro ug ht
forth a t an earl ier t ime, the overwhelm ing historical evidence pointso i ts now being
an unacceptable belief.
9.
For
a recognition
of God’s
pluralistic relationship to t he human communi ty
from a biblical perspective, cf. Clark M. WilIiarnson, Has God Rejected
His
People?
Anti-Judaism in
the
Chr is t ian
Church
(Nashvil le , Tenn.: Abingdon, 1982),
64:
“If
o n e
assumes hat G o d affects the
world
by
offeringditferentpossibilit ies to di ge re nt
peoples in different times and places, then we mayf i r m t ha t God wills diversity and
pluralism.” W hile not in conflict with a plu ralism such
s
that suggested by William-
son the pluralism presented by James is m o re personalistic than cultural. It is the
diversity of personal needs present evena t the same t ime and in
he same
culture that
James refers to several times in the
h r i e t i e s
(in addition to V R E , 384, ju st c i ted, see
also pp. 115, 136,
127).
Further, James do es not restrict pluralism
to
that of “re-
ligious” types. In a passage left o u t of earlier published versions of the
Varieties,
James
states: “The first thing that str ikes
us
is that the reIigious m an in the sense used
in
these lectures is only one type of man. Round about him are o ther men who say
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 295/323
they canno t realize this exper imen tal com me rce with the divine ; and taken collec-
tively there is no flagrant difference of w or th in the tw o classes of persons. . . . No
one type of man whatsoever
is
the total fullness
of
truth imm ediately revealed. Each
of us ha s o bo r ro w
rom
the other parts
f
tru th seen better from the other’s point of
view”
( V R E ,
383).
10.
This is
a
variation on th e fo llo w ing : “B ut rationality has at least four dimen-
sions, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and practical; and to find a wo rld ratio nal to
the m a x i m a l d e g r e e it1 all these respects simwltnneously is no easy matter” (PU, 55).
1 1 . “T he best fruits of religious experience are the best thin gs,t hat h isto ry has to
show” ( V R E , 210). “Religious rapture , moral enthusiasm, ontological wonder,
cos-
mic emot io n , a re
a l l
unifying states
of
mind, in which thc sand and gr i t o f
elfhood
incline to disappear, and tenderness to rule” (C’RE, 225). Hans Kiing takes a position
similar to that ofjarnes w hen he p oints out that the existence of needs, desires, and
wishes
do
no t prove hat here is a fulfillingrealitycorresponding o hem, bu t
neither does their existence exclude such a possibility:
“To
be more precise, could
not the s e t w e ofdependerlce and the itzstinct ofse lfpreservnt ion have a very r e n l ground ,
could no t our
strivirzgfor
hnpyirlesr have a very
real
goal?”
Kung
the n cites a text from
Edw ard von Hartmann w hich denies that the psychological dimension of
a
belief
renders
it
untrue :
“ I t
is quite true that nothing exists merely ecause we wish i t , bu t
it is not t rue that something cannot exist f
we
wish it . Feuerbach’s wh ole critique
of
reIigion and the whole proof
of
his atheism, however, rest o n this single argu me nt;
that is, o n a logical faIlacy” (Han s Kiing , Efernnl L$ t r ans. Edward Qu inn [New
York: Doubleday, 19841, 30-31).
12.
For a contra ry
view
presented within a semi-playful context ,
see
Stanislaw
Lem, “Non Serviam,” n
The h4ind’s
1, ed. Dougla s R. Hofstadter and Daniel C.
D e n n e t t ( N e wYork: Basic Books, 1981),313: “Living , we p lay the gam eof life, and
in
it
weare a llies, every one. The rew ith, he
game
between us isperfectly sym-
metrical.
in
postula t ing God, we postulate a continuat ion of the game beyond the
world.
1
believe hat on e sho uld be allowed to postulate his continuation of the
game,
so
lon g as it does not in any way nfluence he course
of
the game here .
Otherw ise , for the sake of someo ne who perhaps does not exist we may well be
sacrificing that which exists here, and exists for certain.”
13. For a strikingly similar image constructed by a thinker who is at the opposite
pole
fiomJames
concerning the value
of religion,
see Friedrich Nietzsche,
Tlte
Will
to
Power, trans. Walter K a u h a n n and
R.
J. H o h g d a l e , ed. Walter K a h a n n ( N e w
York: Vintage Books,
1967),
40: “Disintegrationcharacterizes his ime,and hus
uncerta inty: nothing stands f i rmly
on its feet o r
on
a hard faith in itself; o ne lives
for
t o m o r r o w as the day a fter to m or ro w is dubio us. Eve rything on our way is slippery
and
dang erous , and the ice that st il l supports
us
has become thin:
all
of
us
feel
the
warm , uncanny breath of the thawing wind; where we walk, soon no on e will be
able
to
walk .”
14. Cf. V R E , 367: “The genuineness of religion is thus indissolubly bound up
with the quest ion whether the prayerful consciousness be or be not decei tful. T h e
con victi on tha t som eth ing is genuinely transacted in this consciousness is the very
core of living religion.”
15.j o h n Smith c la ims that “ the importance toJarnes’s argument
of
his extension
of
faith to include God and the ideal
order has
n o t been_ sufficiently appreciated.”
According to
Smi th ,
“James
was calling attention to the pervasive religious belief
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 296/323
Notes tu Chapter
6 269
that the ‘More,’ however conceived, s never tho ug ht
of as
present only n the experi-
ence
of the individual but is cnvisaged
as
at work in the cosmos in t h c f o r m
of
a
divine order” ( V R E , xlvii-xlix).
16.
Paul Ed wa rds, “A theism ,” in
The
Elrcyclopedin ofPhilusoplry,
8
vols.,
ed. Paul
Edw ards (New Yotk: Free Press/Macrnil lan,
1967), I:187.
17, Henry Sam uel Levinson, T h e Religiolrr Irlvestirgatiorrs uf WilliamJames (Chapel
Hill : Un iversi ty of North C arol ina Press,
1981),
192 (hereafter
RIWJ).
18. In a let ter toJ am es c om m ent ing on re ligion in
A
Plrrrolisfir Ut t iuerse, Bertrand
Russellnoticed “one purcly emp eramental difference: hat the first dem and you
make of your God
is
that you should
be
able to love
h im,
whereas m y f irs t demand s
that I should be able to worship h im” ( InJarnes ,
M T ,
Append ix
IV. 303).
19.
C f . P U ,
28: “Th e
doctrine on which heabsolutists lay m ost stress is the
absolute’s ‘timeless’ character.
For
pluralists , o n the other hand,
t irnc
remains
as
real
as anything, and nothing in the universe is great o r
static
or e ternal enough n o t t o
have som e history.”
20.
W illiam James, “R eason and Faith,”
Jounrnl ufPhilosophy
24
(1924):197.
21. As early 3s 1882,James quest ioncd theneed for an all-inclusive God. In
a
Ietter
to Thomas Dav idson , he wro te : “ I t is a curious thing this matter
of
God
.
.
I
find
myself less and
less
able
to
d o w i t h o u t h i m . He need not be an all-including ‘subjec-
tive unity of the universe.’
. .
.
All I
mean is that there must be
sowe
subjective unity
in the universe which has purposes comm ensurable with my
own,
and which
is
at
the same ime a rge enough
to
be, among al l the pow ers hat may be
there,
the
strongest. I simplyrefuse to accept the no tion of there being no purpose n he
objective world.
. . .
In say ing ‘G od exists’ all
I
imp ly is that m y
purposcs
are cared
for by a mind so pow er fd as on the wh o leo contro l the dr i f tof the universe” (TC,
11737).
22. Cf. Marcus Peter Ford,
Willinm Janres’s
Philosophy (Amherst :Universi ty
of
M assachusetts Press, 1982), 100: “This process view of the relations between God
and a given individual,
o r
God and the W orld , which both James and W hi tehead
ascribe to , necessariIy implies that God has an environ m ent and that Go d s in so me
respects imited n pow er and kno wled ge.
Both
James and W hitehead accept his
view o f
God,
bu t
for
different reasons. Whitehead’s understanding of God’s lirnita-
tions follows fro m metaphysical principles whereas James’s understandingof
God
(at
least as deve loped in A Plrrrnlislic Universe) is merely an
ad
hoc so lu t ion to theprob-
lem of evil.” I would strongly disagree with
Ford
on
this . Granted that James does
not present his case with the system atic m etaphy sicaligor of Whitehead, I th ink it is
clear that even in PU the metaphysical pluralism advanced by James eads to
a
finite
God. Even apartfrom the problem
of
evil, a n in f in i te God would seem to undermine
the au tonomy and f reedom
of
hum an ac tivity, crea tivity, an d novelty.
poor over-beliefs rnay not actually help God
in
tu rn to be m o re effectively fruitfuI to
his ow n greater tasks” (VRE, 08).
“I
confess that I do no t ee why thevery existence
of an invisible worldm a y not in partdepend on the personal response which any one
of us rnay mak e to the religious appeal”
WB,
5).
24.
Cf. Levinson, RIWJ,
205: “Jameswanted t o articulate
a
pantheism that
adrnit-
ted real
c h a o s on
the one hand bu t real
reparation
o f chaos on the o ther .”
25.
Joseph Heller puts thesewords i n t o t h e m o u t h f his pro tag on ist, Yossarian, in
Cutch-22 (N ew York: Dell, 1961), 184. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans.
R.
23. “Whoknowswhether he a i thfulnessof ndividualshere below to their o w n
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 297/323
270
Notes to Chapter
6
J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 52-53:
“God’s hon-
esty.-A
god w h o is all-knowing and all-powerful and w h o does not even make sure
that his creatures understan d his intention-could that be a go d
of
goodness? W ho
allows countless doubts and dubieties to persist, for thousands of years, as though
the salvation o f mank ind were unaffected by them , and w h o on the othe r hand holds
ou t the prospect o f frightful consequences if any m istake is m ade as to the nature of
truth? Would he n ot be a cruel god if he possessed the tru th a nd could behold man-
kind miserably tormenting itself over the truth?”
26. Bonnell Spencer,
0 H .
C.,
G o d
Who
Dares to Be M an : Th eol ogy for Prayer and
SuJering (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), 4. It is significant,
I
believe, as David
Griffith notes in his review of this work, that Spencer balks at positing a finite Go d.
Instead he justifies God’s actions o n t he basis of divine self-limitation and respect fo r
the integrity of human self-determination
(Process Stud ies,
Fall 1983, 238).
I
suspect
that this is an example of an unresolved conflict between an existential insight and a
desire to m aintain the traditional understanding of G od .
27. H. D. Lewis,
T h e S e l f an d Imm or ta li ty
(N ew Y ork: Seabury Press, 1973), 196.
28. Williamson,
Ha s Go d Rejected
His
People
150.
29. John K. Roth,
Process Studies,
Fall 1983, 236-37.
30. Cf.
Lem, “N on Serviam,” 316. “H e wh o is almighty could have provided
certainty. Since H e did no t provide it, if H e exists, H e mu st have deemed it unncess-
ary. W hy unnecessary? One begins to suspect that ma ybe H e is not almighty. A God
not a lmigh ty would be deserving
of
feelings akin t o pity, and ind eed t o love as well;
but this, I think , n on e of our Theodicies allow.” If Lem gives us a playful version o f
the situation, Th om as Ha rdy gives us a m ore cynical one:
He did sometimes think that he had been ill-used by fortune.
. . . But that he and
his had been sarcastically and piteously handled in having such irons thrust into
their souls he did not maintain long. It is usually so, except with the sternest of
men. Human beings, in their generous endeavor
to
construct a hypothesis that
shall not degrade a First Cause, have always hesitated to conceive a dominant
power of lower moral quality than their own; and, even while they sit down and
weep by the w aters of Babylon , invent excuses for the oppression which pro mpts
their tears. ( T h e Return of the Native [New York: Harper Row, n.d.1, 455)
“God” to me, is riot the only spiritual reality to believe in. Religion mearis primarily a
universe
of
spiritual relations surrounding t he earthly practical ones, not merely relations
zf
“value,” but agencies and their activities.
I
suppose the chief premise fo r my hospitality
towards the religious testimony of others is my convictiori that “normal” or “sane” con-
sciousness is
so
small a part
o
actual experience. Wha t e’er be true, it is not true exclusively ,
as a philistine scientijic opinion assumes. The other kinds ofconsciousness bear witness to a
much wider universe
of
experienccs,Jiom which
o u r
beliefselects and em phasizes such parts
as best satisfy our needs.
(LW’,
11213)
31. Cf. James’s reply to a questionnaire concerning his views of God and religion:
32, Ian Barbo ur, Myths, Models, arid Paradigms (N ew York: Ha rper Row, 1976),
161.
33. Cf. O w en Barfield, Savi ng the Appearances (N ew York: A Harvest/HBJ B ook,
H arc our t Brace World, n. d. , f.p. 1956), 160. Barfield contends that histo ry has no
significance “unless, in the course o f it, the relation between creature and C rea tor is
being changed.”
34.
God as a presupposition for personal immortality is, of course, the view of
almo st all w h o have in any way affirmed the latter doctrine. “A lm os t” bu t no t all-a
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 298/323
Notes to Chapter 7 271
notable exception is the late nineteenth-cen tury Hegelian philosopher, J. M . E.
McTaggart; see his Humari Immortality and Pre-existence (London: E. Arnold, 1916).
35. Cf. also WB, 111: “In every being that is real there is som ething external to,
and sacred from, the grasp of every other. God’s being is sacred from ours. To co-
operate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us.
In such co-operation w ith his purposes, no t in any speculative conquest o f him , n ot
in any theoretic drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny.”
Levinson expresses James’s view he re as follows: “W he n they [Theists] characterized
the world as ‘thou,’ they pictured its deepest power as formally personal, individu-
ated, and caring, fighting for righteousness as men understood it and recognizing
each individual for the person he is. God was a ‘power not ourselves’ who helped
people realize their best inten tions because he me ant t o” (RIW’, 41).
36. Cited by Ronald W. Clark,
Einstein: T h e Life arid
Times (New York: World,
1971), 19.
37. For a distinguished, if unheralded, expression of a relational personalism, see
the Gifford Lectures of Jo hn M acm urray, published in 2 vols., Sel f as Agent and
Persorzs
in
Relation (L on do n: Faber Faber, 1957, 1961).
38. Ralph Harper,
The
Existerrtiul Experience (Baltimore, Md.
:
Johns Hopkins
Unive rsity P ress, 1972), 122, 123. H ar pe r sees the threat, if no t the already realized
reality, of th e loss of transcenden ce and presence as placing t he very life of the self in
jeopardy. Thus he states: “Proust meant to be shocking when he said, ‘We exist
alone. M an is the creature that ca nno t em erge fr om himself, that know s his fellows
only in hims elc w hen he asserts the con trary he is lying’ (Rernernbrance
o
Thitigs Past,
2:698).” Ha rper maintains that- “n o m ore frightening jud gm en t has ever been ma de
of human existence, not even the announcement that God is dead, for it is tanta-
mount to saying that man is dead also” (p. 82).
39. John Dewey, Experience and Nature (N ew York: Dover, 1958), 244.
40. R. H. Charles, Eschatology (N ew York: Schocken Boo ks, 1963), 61.
41. Th e possibility of a contin ued existence apart fr om the bod y is acknowledged
by Whitehead: “ H ow far this soul finds
a
su pp ort for its existence beyond the bo dy
is:-another que stion. T h e everlasting nature o f G od , which in a sense is non-tem-
poral and in anoth er sense tem pora l, may establish w ith the soul
a
peculiarly inten se
relationship o f mutua l immanence. Th us in som e im por tant sense the existence of
the soul may be freed fro m its com plete dependence upon the bodily organization”
(Adverztures o Ideas [N ew York: Free Press/M acm illan, 19671, 208).
42. Luke 20:38.
C H A P T E R 7
1. Joseph Butler, T h e A n a l o gy o
Religion
(Lond on: H enry G . Bo hn, 1860, f.p.
1736), 328.
2. Cf. John H erm an Randall, Jr., Philosophy a je r Darwin , ed. Beth J. Singer (Ne w
York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 18 (hereafter P A D ) : “Science had already
destroyed th e faith in personal imm ortality .
I t
could o f course no t disprove the belief,
but it could and did make it seem irrelevant to the kind o f being m an
is.”
See also,
Louis Du pr i , Transcendent SelJhood (N ew York: Seabury Press, 1976),
80:
“Indeed,
even to religious believers today the thought of
a
future life remains far from the
center of their faith, if they do not reject it outright.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 299/323
272 Notes to Chnpter 7
3.
Hans Jonas, T h e
Phewonremn
ofl-ife ( N ew
York: Dell, 1966),262
(hereafter PL).
4.
Hans Kiing,
Eternnl
Life,
trans. Edward Q uinn (New York: Doubleday,
1984),
...
x111.
5.
Joseph Blenkinsopp, “Theological Synthesis
and
Hermeneutical Conclusions,”
in
Immortality and Resrsrrectior~,
ed. PierreBenoitandRoland Murphy (Herder
Herder,
1970),
115 (hereafter
IR) .
6 .
Schubert
M .
Ogden,
T h e Reality ofGod arzd O t h e r Essays
(New
York:
Harper
7.
William Ernest Hocking,
The Meurlirlg o fIm mo rfa lit y n Huntan Experiertce
(New
York:
Harper, 1957), xvii-xviii (hereafter
MI).
8. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-philosophicus,
trans.
D.
E. McGuinness
and
B . F. McGuinness (New York: Humanities Press,
1941).
151.
Cf.
also Wittgen-
stein’s
The
Blue and Brown Books
(New
York:
Harper Row,
1965),
45:
“The diai-
culty in philosophy is
o say
no m ore than
we
know.” Perhaps
at
least one benefit and
one
liabilitywouldresultfrom iteraladherence to this njunction: Th e benefit
would be that most of us, in particular philosophy professors, would be rendered
almost
mute; the liability might be that unless we continually strive
o
say
more
than
we know, we will
never
kttow more than we now say.
9. P e k e has expressed hisperhapsassuccinctly as anyone:“There
are
three
things we can never hope to attain
.
.
.
absolute certainty, absolute exactitude, abso-
lute uncertainty”
(The
Collected
Papers
of Charles Smders Peir te, 8 vols., ed. Charles
Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur
W.
Burks [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1931-35, 19581,
I , par. 141. The Kant text
is
found in the “Preface to the
Second Edition”
of
he
Critiqrre ofPtsre Reason,
trans.
Norman
Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan, 1953),
29.
10.
Cf.
Ian Barbour,
M y t h s , Models, and
Paradigms (New
York:
Harper Row,
1976), 180 (hereafter M M P ) : “There is a ‘holy insecurity,’ as Buber calls it, in our
lack
of
certainty about the finality
of
our formuIations. There
is
a risk in acting
on
the basis
of
any interpretative framework which
is
not
subject
to
conclusive proof.
Faith, then, does not mean intellectual certainty
o r
the absence
of
doubt, but rather
a
trust and commitment even when there are
no
guaranteed beliefs or infallible dog-
mas. Faith takes us beyond a detached and speculative outlook into the sphere of
personal involvement.”
11. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr,
T h e
Se l f a rd Its
Dramas
(N ew York: Scribner. 1955),94:
“T he elaboration
of
the meaning of he Christian revelation demanded from the very
beginning that the tru th about life and
God
apprehended in an historical revelation
be brought into conformity with the truth which may be known by analyzing the
structures and essences
of
reality on all levels.”
12.
Cf. RichardNeuhaus’sdescription of WolfhartPannenberg’s heology:
“ A
critical faith is not a compromise with modernity. It is, rather, a more radical com-
mitment which takes the risk
of
making
one’s
faith vulnerable to refutation by
fur-
ther evidence” (“H isto ry as Sacred
Drama,” Worldview,
April, 1979, p.
23).
The risk accompanying critical thinking is not restricted to Christians or even to
“religious” believers.
Cf.
John Dewey, Experience
attd
Nulure (New York:Dover,
1958),
222:
“Let us adm it the case of the conservative; if we once start thinking no
one can guarantee where we shall corne ou t, except that many objects, ends and
institutions are surely doom ed. Every thinker puts some portion
of
an apparently
stabIe world in peril and
no
one can wholly predict what
will
emerge
in
its place.”
ROW,
1966), 229-30.
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 300/323
Notes fo Chapter 7 273
13.Jonathan Swift,
GdIiver’S
Travels, ed. Robert A . Greenbcrg ( N e w
York:
Nor-
14.
In Bernard WiIliams, Problems ofthe S s [ f ( N e w York:Cam bridge Universi ty
15. Corliss Lamont , T h e Illttsiorl cflrnmovtality, i n t roduc t ion byJohn Dewey (New
16. The following tex t of Wittgenstein’s is, I believe, a response to a situation
ton ,
1970), 177ff.
Press,
19761,
82ff.
(hereafter
PS) .
York: Frederick Ungar,
1965),
13 (hereaftcr,
IT).
similar to the
one
under consideration:
There are, for instance , these entirely different ways
of
thinking first of
all-
which needn’t be expressed
by
one person
saying
one thing, another person
an-
other thing.
What we call believing
in
a Judgement Day or not believing in
a
Judgement
Day-the expression
of
belief may play
an
absolutely minor role.
If you ask me whether or not
I
betieve in a Judgem ent Day, in the sense n which
religious peop le have belief in it ,
I
wouldn’t
say: “No. I
don’t believe there will be
such a thing.” It
would
seem to be utterly crazy
to say
this.
And
then I give an exp lanation: “I don’t believe in . . .”, but then the religious
person nevcr believes what 1 describe.
1 can’t
say.
I can’t contradict thatperson. (Lertrrres nnd Conversations on Aesth~rics ,
Psychology and Religimrs
Belief,
ed.
Cyril
Barrett [Berkeley: University
of
California
Press, n.d.3, 55)
17,
W hile no t asserting that Paul Ricoe ur is adva ncing
a
position identical in
all
respects
to
the one here presented,
do
believe that his com m enta ry on the fol lowing
Goethe c i ta t ion points in the
ame
direction:
If you have not understood
The command,
“Die
and become ”
You are
but
an obscure transient
O n
a shadow of an earth.
“Highly coded language” says Ricoeur. “The incantat ion suggests that we dare no t
translate: The 110 and
ycs
are bound in all things according toa dialectic law which is
not
at all one
of
arithernetical composition but one
of
metamorphosis and transcen-
dence. T h e universe travails und er th e
hard
law of ‘Die and become’ ” (Freedom atld
Natu re , trans.Erazim V. K oh ik E va ns ton , 111.: N orth we ster nUniversi ty
Press,
1966 , 473).
18.
Andrew
Grecley,
Death
u r d Beyortd
(Ch icago : Thom as M ore Pre ss , 1976),
37.
19. Is this somcthing of what Nietzsche is calling for in the following? “ T h e
need-
I sacr$m.”These serious, excellent, upright, deeply sensitive people
who
are still
Christ ians from the very heart : theyowe i t t o themselves
to
try for oncc the experi-
ment
of
living
for some
length
of
t ime without Christ iani ty, they
we
it to theirfoith
in this way
for once to so journ ‘in th e wilderness’-if on ly to
win
for themselves the
right to a voice o n the quest ion whether Christ iani ty is necessary’’
( D a y b r e d ,
trans.
R. J.
Holl ingda le [New
York:
Cambridge Universi ty
Press,
19821,
37).
20.
O f course ,
I
am em ployin g paradoxical mo de , nonovelty in questions
of
this
sort. O n e m i g h t argue that in such questions as God and immortal i ty , anything
less
than paradox is trivial; an ything
more
is impossible.
21.
Julius Seelye Bixler, I r m o r fa l i t y and
the Presertt
(Cam bridge, M ass. : Harvard
University Press, 1931), 35 (hereafter IPW.
22.
Cf.
Miguel
de
U n a m u n o ,
T h e
Tragic
Sense
OfLfe,
trans.
J.
E.
Cr aw for d Flitch
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 301/323
274 Notes t o C h u p t e r
7
( N e w
York:
Dover,
1954)
(hereafter TSL) . U n a r n u n ono ton ly refuses to accept
im m orta lity belief and tragedy as mutually exclusive but goes a
long
way toward
making tragedy the essen tial character of such belief . Unam uno’s style is mu ch too
florid and superheated
to
suit the laid-back contempo rary ph ilosopher; nevertheless,
I
mu st admit that
I
find myself engaged
by
his metaphysical wail. Indeed, without
sugges t ing any compar i son be tween my ha l t ing ,ll to o tentative words and those of
U n a m u n o , m y
effort
might be ent i t led: “Unamuno without Tears.” I am s t rugg ling
to s ing
the
same song, t hough in a much lower key and wi th imm easurably more
prosaic music.
23.
Lael Wertenbaker,
Death
O J U Marl (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1974), 70.
24. For a strong cond crnn ation
of
belief in imm ortal i ty as unwo rthy of hum an
beings, cf. Leslie Dew art, “ T h e Fcar of Death and Its Basis in the Na tur e of
Con-
sciousness,”
in
Pltilosophical
Aspects
o j
Thmn olog):
2
vols.,
ed.
Florcnce
M.
Hetzler
and Austin H. Kutsche r (Ncw York: MS S In fo rma t ion C orpora tion ,
1978),
161,
63
(hereafter PAT): “ T h u s our comm on th ink ing today beg ins w i th the p remise tha t
immortaIity is desirable. .
. .
Critical reflection should reveaI n ot only its invalid ity
but also itsdisvalue
for
human development.
. . .
Man may
well
die,needlcssly,
from his self-imposed, mo rtal fear of death.”
25. Will iam Ernest Hocking and Ralph BartonPerry, bo th sym pat het ic to elief in
imm ortality, assert that such beIief does not rem ove thepain of death.
“No
doctrine
o f
survival
i n any case escapes the act of dea th ,” Ho ckingells us, “nor the suffering
that goes w ith it; these remain the data of every argument” ( M I , 9). According to
Perry, “ T h e belief in a futu re life mitigates but does not destroy the menacc of death,
and w hile it provides reserves of hope i t lcaves abundant room for fort i tude’’ (The
Hope oflrrrrtrortality [ N e w York:Vanguard Press, 194.51, 26; hereafter HFI).
26.
C f. Friedrich Nietzsche, Ec c e
Honro,
t rans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann
(New
York: Vin tage Books, 1969),261: “Ultimately, nobody can get
more
o u t of things,
including books, t h a n h ealready
knows.
For w ha t on e lacks access
to
from experi-
ence one willhave
no
ear. N o w let
us
imagine
an
ext rem e case: that a book speaks of
nothing but events that l ie a l together beyond the possibi l i ty of any frequent or rare
experience-that it is the first langu age for a new series of experiences. In that case,
simply nothing wil l be heard, .but thereill be the aco ustic il lusion that w here n oth-
ing is heard, noth ing is there .”
27. The
Antichrist, in
The
Portable
Nietzsche, trans. and ed.
Walter
Kaufmann
(New
Yotk: Viking Press, 1954), 618 (hereafter PN) .
28. Cf. Walter Kaufmann,
Nietzsche,
3rd ed . (New York: Vintage Books, 1968),
102: “To escape nihi l ism which seems involved both
in
asserting the existence of
God and thus robbing this
world
o f ultimate significance, and also in denying God
and thus robbing
evevythit lg
of
meaning and value-that
is
Nietzsche’s greatest an d
most persistent problem.”
29. Friedrich Nietzsche, The tVi l l
to
Power, trans. WaIter Kaufm ann and R. J. Hol-
lingdale,ed.Walter Kaufmann (N ew
York:
Vintage
Books,
1967), 17 (hereafter
W P )
30. C f .
WP,
3: “What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe
what is coming, what can no longer
come
differently:
the
adveut oftlihilisrn.”
31. Tlms Spoke
Zarufht.rstvn,
in
PN,
125. See also theNietzscheno te cited by
G e o r g e M o r g a n , Nietzsche
Ncw
York:Harpe r
Torchbooks,
1965), 313:
“We
must
take
up on us and affirm
ulI
suffering that has been suffered, by
men
and animals,
and
huve a
g o d
in which it gets r e u m t .”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 302/323
Notes
t o
Clrclpter-
7 275
“We
ust i fy all the dead subsequcntly and give their l ife me aning , when w e form
t h e su p e r m a n o u tof
this
material and give the entire past a g o a l . ” See also texts cited
by Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche, t rans . Char les F. Wallroff- and Frederick
J.
Schmitz (Chi-
cago:
Henry
Regnery,
1965), 167:
“In
spite
of
d l ,
he
must come
to
us
sometime, this
redeemitrg man .
. .
who gives the-ear th i t s purpose
.
. . this victor over God and
nothingness. . .
.
God has died, ‘our desire is now tha t the superman live.”
32. Cf. Joan Starnbaugh, Nietrsche’s Tholrght of Etcrt~alRvtcrnl (Ba l t imore , Md . :
Johns H opkins U nivers i tyPress, 1972),
88:
“ T h e su p e r m a n
s
the man who
is
able to
a f ir m eternal recurrence, the man w h o experiences eternal recurrence 2s h i s own
inner being. Th e su per m an is
a possibility which appears with the death o f God.”
33. For an insightful development of eternal return as the affirmation
of
the depth
of t he moment , see Stambaugh , N i c t r s c I ~ e ~ sh r g h t .
34.
I
think that
Bernd
M agnus is r igh t when
he
claims that Nietzsche does not
escape a version o f eternalism in his effort
o
overcome that kronoyhobia that appears
to be an inescapable feature
f
thc human condit ion; ee Magnus , Ni(’tzsche’sExisrerj-
rial
I tnpevdve (Bloom ington: Indiana Universi ty Press,
I978),
195-96.
35. Rainer Maria Rilkc, himself touched by N ietzsche, wrote
of
his own
Dtrino
Elegies and Sowlets
to
Orpherts:
“To
presuppose the omvtes5 of life an d death .
.
. to
know the identity of terror and bliss .
.
. is th e essential meaning and idea
of
my t w o
books” ( B r i e j , Wiesbaden,
1950,
11, 382,
407;
cited in Erich Heller, T h e Disinlterifed
Mind [ N e w York: Farrar, Straus Br Cudahy , 19571, 148).
36. John J . McDermot t , “The Amer ican Ang leof Vision,” Cross Currents, Winter
1965, p. 86.
37. Th es e essays have been collected in
John
J. M c D e r m o t t ,
The
Cdturc o fExpev i -
ence
( N e w Y ork: N e w York University Press,
1976;
hereafter
CE);
and Streams .f
Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986; hereafter SE).
38.
“Time
and Individuality,” in On Experience,
Na t u r e , and
Freedom, ed. Richard
Bernstein (N ew York: Library o f Liberal Arts, 1960),225.
39. See also S E , 98: “Yct this
was
preciseIy what American classical philosophical
tradition was proposing, namely that the very transient character
of
our
hu m an Iives
enhanced, rather than denigrated, the profoun d inferential character
of
our values,
decisions, and disabilities.”
40. N o r m a n 0 Brown, LifE
agnitrst
Death (New York: Ra n d o m House,
1959);
Lave’s
Body New York: Random House ,
1966);
Closing Tirm New York: Random
House,
1973).
41. Unpu blished note , c ited
by
Eric Heller, “ T h e I m p o r t a n c e of Nietzsche,” in
The
Artist’s Journey info the
Interior
(N ew York: H arcou rt Brace jovanovich, 1976),
193.
42.
That “all shall
be
well”
is,
of
cour se, the essence
of
eligious
hope.
T h e
fif-
teenth-century mystic jul ian of Norwich expresses this as
a
divine revelation: “At
One
t ime ourLord said: ‘All things
shall
be well’; and a t another she said: ‘Thou shall
see thyself that a l l m a n n e r of things
shall
be well’ ” ( 7 k e Rwelntions
qfDivir7e
Love
c$]diayl $Norwich, trans. James Walsh, S. j. [New
York:
Harper,
19611,
98).
43. Rajner M aria Rilke, “ T h e N i n t h Elegy,” in Dtrino Elegies, t rans. , with intro-
duction and commentary , J. B. Leishman and Stephen Spender (New York:Nor to l l ,
1939),
73,
44.
Charles Hartshorne,
“A
Philosophy
of
Death,” in
PAT, Ik83.
45.
Cf .
Yeager
Hudson , “Dea th and the M ean ing
of
Life,”
in
PAT,
II:98:
“A
play
o r novel which did no t end would
be
comp letely unsatisfactory.” Hartshorne and
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 303/323
276
Notes
t o
Chapter
7
Hudson might f ind suppor t for thc i r posi t ionn esthetic grou nds in the examples
of
“endless” soap operas. For many, however, the lack of a final endin g do es no t seem
to diminish the interest .
46.
Charles Hartshorne, “The Acceptance
of
Death,” in
PAT,
1234-86.
47. For a diametrical ly opposed view, see Ho cking ,
M I ,
150: “The t rue meaning
of the deed is wh at i t m eans to theclf which performs i t ; wi thout his self the deed
has no meaning
a t
all.
. .
. A nd if this self vanishes, and all like it, me aning vanishes
out of the wor ld .
No
achievement can keep the person alive, but the continuance o f
the person is
a
guaranty that such values as that shall n ot reduce to no thi ng . I t
is
the
person who perpetuates the achievement, not the achievcmcnt the person.”
48. A . N. Whitehead,
Process
arrd Reality (N ew York: Hum ani t ies Press, 1955), ix
(hereafter
PR) .
49.
A .
N.
Whitehead,
Sciwce
ar~d
he
M o d e m World
( N e w
York:Free
Press/Mac-
millan,1969), 192.
50. T h e
locus
classicrrs for this view of im m orta lity is in Pericles’ Funeral Or atio n,
Thucydides 2.43-44. An dy Warhol som ewh ere said someth ing to the effect that “ in
the future everyone will be famous for fifteen minutes.” This would hardly have
satisfied the Gre eks and is not l ikely to satisfy any present or future fam e seeke rs.
The
essence
of
belief in fam e-im mo rtality is that one will achieve or create somc-
thing that will: continu e to endu re after
one’s
death. The radical discrepancy between
the living experience and what remainss poignantly captured in the opening ines o f
James’s “Address at the Emerson Cen tenary in Conco rd” : “The pa thos of death is
this, that when thedays of one’s life are ended , those days that wereo crowded with
business and felt
so
heavy in their passing, what remains
of
o n e in m e m o r y
should
usually be so slight a t h i n g . T h e p h a n t o m
of
an attitude, the echo of a certa in mode
of thought , a
few
pages of pr in t , some invention, or some victory we gained in a
brief critical hour, are all that can s urvive the b est
of
us” ( M S , 19).
51. George Santayana, Life ofRenson,
5
vols. (N e w York: Scribner, 1913),
I11:272.
52. I t must be conceded that James comes verylose to agreeing with the view that
survival
of
values
or
ideals
is
more important than survival
of
individuals. In
V R E ,
he
tells us that he did no t discuss imm ortality because it see m ed to him a secondary
point. . . . I f o u r ideals are only cared for in ‘eternity,’ I d o n o t s ee w h y w e m i g h t
no t be willing to resign their care o other hands than ours” V R E , 412). In a letter to
James, C arl Stumpf, after declaring that “personal imm ortality stands for m e
in
the
foreground,’’ c i tes he foregoing passage and comm ents hat it “seems to me to
contain a sortof inner contradiction. T h e realization of ideals is only possible
on
the
presupposition
of
individual immortality.” James responds:
I
agree that
a
God ofthe
totality must be an unacceptablc re l igious object. But do no tsee why there m ay n ot
be superhuman consciousness
of ideals
of
ours, and
thnt
would be
o u r
G o d .
I t
is
all
very dark. I have never felt the rut iord
need of
inuno rta l i ty as you seem to eel i t ; but
as I g r o w older I confess that I feel the practical need of it m u c h more than I ever did
before; and that comb ines with reasons, not exactIy the sam e as your own, to give
me
a
gro wi ng faith in its reality” (cited in Raip b Ba rton Perry, The Tlrolcghr urd
Character
ofWill iam]ames,
2
vols. [Boston: Little, Brown, 19351, II:343,
345).
James
here converges with and diverges from the iews of Hartshorne and Jonas. He con-
verges insofar as he makes survival
of
ideals the important matter; he diverges inso-
far
as
he
does
not exclude the possibility of personal survival,
53.
John Hick ,
Death
and
Eternal Life
(New
York: Harper
Row,
1976),
73,
63-64
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 304/323
Notes to Chapter 7 277
(hereafter
D E L) .
See also R.
H.
Char les , Eschatology ( N ew York: Schocken Books,
54. ThomasAquinas , Srrm~nnTheologim, I , Q. 29, Art. 3 , t rans.Anton Pegis
( N e w
York:
Rand om Hou se , 1945) ,
1:295.
55. For
an apparentcounterchoice,seeMaryMcCarthy’snovel, C y n i b u l s
u r d
Missiorraries ( N e w
York:
Harcourt Brace jovanovich, 1979), 293-94. A grou p o f h i-
jackers are in process f exchanging hostages
for
som e g rea t works o f a r t . O ne
f
the
hostages, sym pathetically portrayed, reflects upon the “stragetic genius” of this un-
dertaking: “If a hostage or t w o g o t killed, it had to be seen in the perspective
of
the
greater good of the greater number. But works of art were a different typeof non-
combatant , not
to
be touched wi th
a
ten-foot pole by any government respectful of
‘values.’ I t was in the nature of civilians to die soo ner or a ter
.
. . while works of a r t
by their nature and in principle were imperishable, In addition, they were irreplacea-
ble, which could no t be said o f their owners . . .
.
T h e lesson to be derived
.
. . was
that paintings were m o re sacrosanct than persons.”
1963), 51-81.
56. Romans
9:20-21.
57. Perh aps th e m ost laid-back response
to
“ the absurd” is that of Thomas Nage l
in “Th e Ab surd ,” in
Larprage ,
Metuphysi ls , and
Death ,
e d . o h n D o n n c l i y ( N e w
York: Fordham University Press, 1978), 114:
“I
would a rgue tha t absurd ity s on e of
the
most hum an th ings about us . .
.
. I t need not
be
a matter of agony unless we
make it so. Nor need i t evoke a def ian t contempt ofate that allows us to feel brave or
proud. Suc h dram atics, even if carried on
in
private, betray a failure to appreciate the
cosmic impor tance of the situation.
tf,
sub specie aetenlitalis, there is no reason to
believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, andwe can approach
our absurd l ives with i rony instead of heroism or despair.”
58. Cf.
Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery ofBeing, 2
vols.,
trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago:
H en ry Regnery, 1950-51), 11:155: “W hat we have t o find o u t is whether one can
radicallyseparate aith n a God conceived n His sanct i tyf romanyanlrmation
which bears on the destin y of the intersubjective unity which is form ed by being s
wh o love one ano the r and whoive in and by one another . Whats really im po rtan t,
in fact, is the de stin y of the l iving
ink,
and not thatof an entity which is isolated and
closed in
on
i tsel f. Th a t i s what we more
o r
less explicitly m ean when
we
assert our
faith in personal immortality.”
59. Even bracketing the quest ionof God, the cessation of human persons must be
lamented. “I t is absu rd for
us
to insist ,” Bixler points out , “ in
line
with the present
mood, OR an educational process n which personality shall be developed and an
economic order n which it can be maintained, and o profess a t the sam e ime
indifference t o its extinction” (IF“, 35).Cf. Perry, HFI, 11: “Whatever philosophy
praises the creation
of
man must deplore his annihi la t ion.”
60. Cf. William Styron’s novel. Sophie’s ChoiLe ( N e w York: Ra n d o mHouse ,
1979),218-19.Styron’s protag onist, viden tly peak ing for the uthor, rgues
against George Steiner’s sugg estion that confr onted with an
vil on
t he magn i tudeof
the Holocaust, “s i l tme is the answer”; he adds that “Steiner has not remained si lent”
bu t has stated that “the next best
is
‘ to t ry and understand.’
I
61.
Cf.
ZPM,
63, where B ixler cites the British idealist Bernard B osanquet
to
the
effect that
“we
shall never get
a
popular conception of religion that is clear and sane
until rhis perpetual hankering after a future life as a means of recompense is laid to
rest.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 305/323
278
Notes to Chapter 8
62. For an interpretation of resurrection that does not separate individual and com-
munity, cf. Charles,
Eschnrology,
164: “ N o t to a utureof nd ivid ual bliss, even
tho ug h in the divine presence, but to
a
resurrect ion to a new life
(is.
xxvi.
19)
as
mem bers of the holy people and ci t izens of the Messianic kingdom , did the right-
eous
aspire.
T h e id iv idr ra l thus looked forward to his highcst consummation in the
life
of the r ighteous comm unity” ( i ta l ics added). For a more recent perso nalist ver-
sion of resurrect ion,
cf.
Rosemary Haugh ton , The
Pussiomte
God (New York: Paulist
Press, 1981), 196: ‘yesus talked t o people about eternal life, o r l ife in the kingdom
of
God, in ways which m ake
i t
clear that
he
t hough t of th em as being still and always
‘themselves.’ They would not ‘merge’ into the kingdom, theywould ‘inherit’ it, live
in it, have ‘mansions’ in it.”
63. Cf. Hans Kiing, Dm5 G o d
Exist?
t rans. Edw ard Q u i m (New York: Double-
day,
1980),
659:
“Th ere can be
a
t rue consummat ion and
a
t rue happiness of mankind
only wh en n ot m erely th e last generation , but all m en, even those who suffered and
bled in the past , come to share in i t .”
64.
I
a m n o t ,
of
course, suggesting that this
cotzstancy
of belief in eternal life has
been an
i d e t r t i f y of
belief in all ages of h e Ch r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t y . T h eifferent modcs
in which hisbeliefhasbeenexpressed hroughart, iterature,reliquaries, altar-
pieces, death rites, and funerary practices
is
brilliantly detailed by Ph ilippe Aries in
The
H o w
OfOw Death, trans. Helen Weaver (N e w York:Knopf , 1981).
65. Cf. James B. Pratt , The Religious Consciuustress (New
York:
Macmillan, 1928),
253: “As the belief in miracles
and
special answers to prayerand in the interference o f
the supernatural within the natural
has gradually disappeared, almost the only
mg -
mafic
value of the supernatural left to religion is the belief in a personal future life”
(cited in La m on t,
11
6). See also Lam ont,
11 5:
“But in this fundam ental identi ty
between
God
and immortal i ty priori ty stil l belongs to imm ortal i ty . God wou ld be
dead
if
there were no immorta l i ty .”
CHAPTER 8
1 .
j o h n
Hick,
Death
a d
E f e r r d
LIfi
(Ne w York: Harper
81
Row,
1976),
24
(here-
after D E L ) .
2. H. D. Lewis, T h e
S e l J o r d Zmnrorlaliry
(N ew York: Seabury Press , 1973), 196
(hereafter
S I ) . See
also William Ernest
Hocking, T h e
1Mentlit lg qf I t w m t d i r y itt
HI JWU I ~Jxperience (New
York:
Harper,
1957),
xi-xii (hereafter hdl): “ U d e s sm Idea
has or car1 have an
inrelligibk
basis irr the cotzsritdotl 0Jthitlg.s i t is i l legitimate, w hether
for postulate
or
for fai th : we mus t be ab le tosay what
i t
is we postulate
or
believe.”
3. Cf. David L . Nor ton ,
Personal Destinies
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1976), 358: “He w ho a f firms the wor th of l ife does not embrace the dea of
a n
afterlife that is the ant ithe sis
of
the life he and all human beings live.”
4. John Dewey, Experience
u r d
Edumtion (N ew York: Macmil lan , 1956), 51.
5.
Alber t Camus, The Rebel, t r ans . An thony Bow er (New York: Vintage Books,
1956), 304.
6 . Chris topher Mooney, “Dea th
and
Human Expectat ion,” in Philosophicnl Aspects
~JThanntu logy, vols., ed. Florence
M .
Hetzler and Austin
H.
Kutscher ( N e w York:
MSS Information Corporat ion, 1978), II:f51 (hereafter PA7).
7. For a suggestion of
some
convergences as well as divergences between prag-
mat ism and the thought of Au robin do, see Eugene Fontinel l , “A Pragmatic
Ap-
proach
to
The
HWJOU
ycle,”
in
Six
Pillnrs,
ed.Robert
A .
M c D e r m o t t ( Ch a m -
bersbutg,
Pa.:
Wilson Books, 1974),
131-59,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 306/323
Notes to Chapter 8
279
8. Such a view is antithetical to any interpretation of le s us ’ teaching that sees n o
comparison possible betw een prese nt and future lifc. For a representative example,
see Franz Mussner , “The Synopt ic Account ofJesus’ Teaching
n
the Future Life,” i n
Immarraliry
u r d
Rcswrecfiotz,
ed.PierreBenoi tandRolandMurphy Herder
8:
Herder,
1970), 53: “ I t
is Jesus ’ teaching that the cornin g life bears no cornparison
with the present life. To make Jesus a witness to a poin t of v icw tha t saw th is l i fes
one. evolving towards the coming life, wo uld be to nlisrep resen t the syno ptic ac-
cou nt of his teaching.’’
9. Cf. Denis Goule t ,
“Is
Economic Just ice Possible?”
Cross
Currents,
Spring 1981,
47: “C an any re ligionoffer a convinc ing ra t ionale why m en and wom en should
build history even as they strive to bear witn ess to transce nden ce? . . . One vitaj
arena is how any religion values tim e itself: is ea rth ly life sim pl y a means to some
paradise beyond his world,
o r
is it rather
some
end having ts
own
dignity and
wor th?”
10. Cf.
James,
S P P , 116: “ ‘ I f w e d o
ur
best, a d he other powersd o heir best , the
worldwillbeperfected’-this propositionexpresses n o actual fact, but only he
complexion of a fact tho ug ht of
as
eventually’possible.’’
11.
For
a critique
of
Tei lhard de Chardin on jus t th is poin t , see , George Maloney,
“Death and O meg a: An Ev olving Eschaton ,” in PAT, I:143: “ T h u s tw o great wcak-
nesses of Teilhard’s syst em (he never co m es to serious grips with the problems) are
(I)
he fa ils to continue the evolut ionary proces s beyon d the O mega Point and 2) he
does not answer how the major i ty of the hu m an race, all those billions w h o have
lived in the past , our present majori ty and a good deal of the fu tu re to come, how
will
they reach the Omega Point?”
12. Cf. Aldous H uxley,
Thc
Doors
ofPerceptiorz
( N e w York:
Harper
81 Row, 1963).
23-24:
“Tha t w h ich , in the language of religion, is called ‘this world ’
is
the universe
of reduced awareness, expressed, and, as it were, petrified by language. Th e various
‘other worlds,’ with which hum an beings erratically make contact are so m any ele-
ments in the totality of the awareness belonging to Mind
a t
Large.”
13.
See
also
W B ,
51:
“But the inner need
of
believing that this world
of
nature is
a
sign of something more spir i tual and erernal than i tse lf
is
jus t as strong and au-
thoritative
i n
those who feel i t , as the inner need
of
uniform laws
of
causation ever
can be in
a
professionally scientific head.”
14.
Though he wou ld be outraged by the use James and I m a k e
of
it, a somewha t
similar phenom enon is suggested
by
Nietzsche: “We discover an activity that would
have to be ascribed to a far higher and more comprehensive inte l lect than we know
of.
. .
.
Of the numerous influences operat ingat every m om en t, e,g ., air, electricity,
we sense almost
nothing: there could well
be
forces that, although we never sense
them, continually influence
us”
( T h e
Will
to
Power,
trans. Walter
Kaufrnann
and
R.
J .
HoIlingdale , ed. W alter Kaufmann [N e w York: Vintage
Books,
19671, 357).
15. T he re is a highly technical question attached to the notion of a plurality of
worlds: namely, the possibility
or
conceivability
of
plural times, o r plural spaces,
or
plural space-times. Speculation on this question is not confined to “tender-minded”
o r “roman tic” thinkers. See, for examp le, Hocking ’s reference MI,
10)
to “Min-
kowski’s M em oir of 1908,
in
which he vigorously assaulted the doctr ine f m o n i sm
(though chiefly
for
the purposes of calculation), mak ing the radical assertion that
‘from
henceforth we shall speak no m or e
of
Space and Tim e, bu t of spaces and
times.’”
John Hick
( D E L ,
279-95) speculates on the plurality of spaces as a prerequisite for
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 307/323
280 Notes to Chapter 8
a doctrine of bodily resurrect ion. The dist inguished psychologist Gardner Murphy
asks, “Is the re a possibility that general psyc holog y wou ld say, ‘We don’t yet have a
time-space reference for th e stu dy of death any more than we have a t ime-space
reference for the study of pe rsonali ty?’
”
(T he Menning
of
Death ,
ed. Herman Feifel
[ N e w
York:
McGraw-Hill , 19651,
339).
The conceivability
of
plural spaces is defende d by An thon y Qu inton in “Spaces
and Times,” Philosophy, April
1962.
And work ing f rom a radically differen t philo-
sophical and cultural context, P. T. Raju states: “ I think that the Upanishads are r ight
in saying that there are different levels f space and time .
There
is space between one
book and another; but what
s
th e space that separates ideasof cause and effect when
think o f the law of causation? W hat
is
th e space that separates m e and
m y
mental
images? Certainly, I am not m y mental images . And w hat is the time that separates
me as
observing the first instant o f
a
duration
of
f ive seconds and m e as observ ing
the last i n s t an t? How man y p rob iem srise
here?
(“Self and Body: H o w K n o w n a n d
Differentiated,” Monis t 61,
no.
1 Dan. 19781,
153-54).
16. Cf. John Shea , What a Modertr Cntholic BeIieves about Heaver1
a t ~ d
ell (Chicago:
T h o m a s M o r e Press, 1972),
21
(hereafter
H H ) :
“H op e is rooted in the actual i ty
of
things. . . . If personal immortality is a t rue hope and nota mere wish, in som e way
it must be intimated in the experienceof men.”
17.
Extrapolation is an act o f imagination that should be sharply differentiated
from
idle fantasy.
Cf.
WilIiam L ynch,
S .
J.,
Images qfHope
(N ew York : New Am er i -
can Library, 1965),
27, 209:
“Fbr o n e of the permanent meanings of imagination has
been that it is the gift that envisions what cannot yet be seen , the gift that con stantly
proposes to itself that the boundaries of the possible are wider than they seem.
. .
.
Th ej vs t task ofsuch atr imqin ntio n,
; f i t is
to be healing,
is
to-finda
~ u a y
hvotrghfantnsy arid
lies into fact
u r d
ex i s te~ce .”Lynch also develops this them e, that the imagination is
essentially reality-oriented, in Christ urd Apol lo ( N e w York: Sheed Ward,
1961).
18.
Recall the previously cited statement ofjarnes: “I have no mystical experience
of
my
own,
bu t ju s t enough f t h e g e r mof mystic ism in me to recognize the region
from which their [sic] voice comes when
I
hear it” (cited in Ralp h Ba rton Perry,
T h e
Thought and Character
o
WilliamJames, 2 vols, [Boston: Lit t le , Brown, 19351, II:346;
hereafter TC).
I
have made no reference to a large body of claims which are often cited as sup-
port ing imm ortal i ty-those of spir i tual ism and other paranorm al psychic experi-
ences. T h e evaluation
of
these claims is an undertaking in itself and one that I make
no
pretense o f doing in
a
footnote . Let me
simply
say that
I
share with many who
have sym pathetically investigated these claims the conclusion, “no t proved.” That is
not heirgreatestweakness,however,
for
pragmatismneither asks norexpects
“pro of’ in such nstances . What
i t does
seek
are
fruits in the
form
of
the deepening,
illumination, and expansionof hu m an life. S uch fruits can reasonably
be
said to issue
fro m the ives of m an y f no t al l myst ics but are decidedlyless evident in thecase of
“spiritualists,” particularly in their c laims of comm unica tion wi th the dead . Jam es ,
himself deeply sympathetic with and professionally supportive
of
such efforts, con-
cluded, as we
saw
earlier, that “the spirit-hypothesis exhibits
a
vacancy, triviality and
incoherence
of
mind painful
to
think
of
as the state o f the departed”
(CER,
438-39).
A figure w h o m i g h t b e an exception here, and who com mand s the respect o f a
num ber of serious thinkers, s Rudolph Steiner. While I
find
the details of
his
other-
world descript ions bordering o n th e fantastic, there is an e lement
of
nsight in his
wri t ings that
I
think should not be dismissed. Tw o passages from his autob iograp hy
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 308/323
Notes
to Chapter
8
281
m igh t be cited as most congenial t o the kind o f extrapolation or mo del herein of-
fered:
“‘I
have tried t o sh o w n
my
book that nothing
utrknowdde
lies behind the sense-
world,but hat w i t h i n i t is the spiritual world. . .
.
i insisted hat a pe rson who
deepens his view
of
the world
as
m u c h
as
l ies within the
scope
of
his powers, will
discover
a universal process
which
encom passes the true reality of nature as well as
morality”
(Rtrdolph Steirter,
An Autobiography [Blauvclt,
N , Y.
: Rudolph Steiner Pub-
lications,
19771,
215, 213). T he re
is
one o the r g roup o f phenom ena tha t
I
can only
mention in passing-‘“clinical death” expe riences such as those described by R. A .
Moody in Life
n j e r
Life (St . Simons Island, Ga.: Mock ingbird Books, 1975). These
are instances in w hich persons judged clinically dead, ‘“return” o life and proceed to
describe “out of body” experiences, usually as beautiful and reassuring. While these
exper iences mig ht supp or t a v iew of theelf that avoids identifying it withthe body
narrowly understood,
I
f ind no thin g in them that
can be
cited as evidence for im-
mortality. Since the d efinition of “death” presupposed is suspect, there is no
d i 6 -
culty naccounting or hesephenomena in“materialistic” erms. 1 shareHans
Kiing’s conclusion concerning such cases: “What then d o these experiences of dy ing
imply for life after death? To put it briefly, noth ing .
.
.
Experiences of this
kind
prove nothing about a possible life after death: it is a question here of the last five
minutes bejore death and not of an eternal life u j e r death” (Eternal Life?, trans. Ed-
w a r d Q u i n n [ N e w
York:
Doubleday, 19841, 20).
19. Cf. Gottfricd
Leibniz,
Discourse on M e t a p h y s i c s , t r ans . George R. Montgomery
(La Salle, I l l : O pe n C ou r t , 1947). 58: “Suppose that
some
individual could suddenly
become King of China
o n
condi t ion ,
however,
of forget t ing what he had been, as
though being born again, would t n o t a m o u n t to the samepractically,
or
as far as the
effects could be perceived, as if the individual were annihilated, and a king of China
were the same instant created in his place? T h e individual would have n o reason t o
desire this.” A similar insight is found
in
Aristotle:
“No
o n e c h o o se s t opossess the
whole wo rld if
he
has f irst to beco me som eone else . . * he wishes for this only
o n
conditionofbeingwhateverhe is”
(Nichonracheurr
Ethics 9.4.1166a, ed. Richard
McKeon
[New
York:
Random House , 19411,
1081).
20.
BernardWilliams, Problems of the Self ( N e w York: Cambridge Univers i ty
Press, 1976), 91 ( hereafter P S ) .
21. Fried rich Nietz sche, Thus
Spoke
Z a r d r l u t r a , in The Porkd.de Nietrrche, trans.
and ed. Walter Ka ufm ann New
York:
Viking Press,
1968), 339-40.
22.
Friedrich
D .
E. Schleiermacher, On Rdigion, t rans. by John
Oman
( N e w York:
Harper To rchbooks. 1958), 101.
Cf. A .
Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Zdea of
Immortality
(Oxford:
Cla rendon Press, 1922), 136,
155-56:
But eternity and immortality are by
n o
means necessarily exclusive terms : o n the
contrary, our experience here and now may carry in it “the power of an endless
life”, and be in truth
the
only earnest or guarantee
of
such a life.
.
. .
I t
does not
follow
that the attainment of religious insight in the present life involves the
sur-
render
of
any hope
of a
personal life beyond. W hy should not the app rehensionof
the eternal rather carry with i t the gift of further
life
and a fuller fruition? . .
.
Th roug hou t the Ne w Testament, accordingly, even
in
the passages which most
de ar ly treat “eternal life” as realized here
and now,
he present experience
is
never
taken
as
foreclosing the possibility of future
life,
but always ratheras a foretaste,
as an assurance, indeed,
of a
fuller realization hereafter.
23.
Soren
Kierkegaard,
Purify
of
Hear t ,
trans.Douglas
V.
Steere
New
York:
Harper T orchbooks, 1956), 35. Cf. J. H e y w o o d Thomas, ‘“Kierkegaard‘s View of
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 309/323
282
Notes
to Chapter 8
Time,” in PAT, 1233: “The point Kierkegaard wants tomake is that the eternal is the
present o r better that the present is the etcrnal.”
24.
George Santayana, S o l d o p i e s
IrI
Er1&zrtd
(Ann A rbor : Univers ity of M ichigan
Prcss,
1967),
1
16.
25. See also
M I ,
71: “ Bu t if lastingness isa
mark
o f value, is i t no t an absu rd i ty o fa
universe in which the everlast ing things are things which do no t know and cannot
become aware of their post of hon or?” For a diametrically opposed interprctation of
the endurance of inorganic entities, see Hans Jonas , Thc P h e m t n e t m
o f *
Life ( N e w
York: Dell, 1966),
276:
“If permanen ce were the point, l ife sho uld not have started
ou t in the first place, for in
no
possible form can it match the duration of inorganic
bod ie s.” Th oug h C am us doe s n o t clieve in its reality, he does recog nize theefficacy
of a life th at endu res: “I t appears that great minds are som etimes less horrificd by
suffering than
by
the fact that i t do es no t en du rc. In default
of
inexhaustible hap-
piness, eternal suffering would at least give us
a
destiny”
(TheRebel,
t rans . Anthony
Bo wer [Ne w York: Vintage B o o k s ,
19561, 261).
26.
Henri Bergson, Creative
Etdl4t io t1 ,
t rans. Ar thur Mitche l l (New York: M odern
Library, 1944), 7.
27. StewartSutherland, Imm ortal i ty ndResurrect ion,” in L n r p a g e , Meta-
physics,
alrd
De a tk , ed. Jo h n D o n n e l l y ( N e wYork: Fordham University Press, 1978),
206.
28. John Sm i th , “Dying ,
Death
and Their Significance,”
in
P A T ,
I x i i .
29. John B aillie, Ami the
L
Evev las t iq (N ew York : Oxfo rd Un ive rs i ty
Press,
1934), 204. Cited in Louis Dupri, Trmsrerlderlt Se l f l ~ ood , N ew York: Seabury Press,
1976), 81. Cf. O w c n Barfield, “Matter, Imagination, and Spirit,”Jonnzal o j R e l i g i w ,
Dec.
1974,
627:
“I would wish
to
emphasize hat I mean impor tan t
.
. . for he
whole fu turc of humani ty . The issuc of survival after death today has, I believe. that
kind
of
imp ortan ce as well as the p ersonal o ne. B ut I am not very fond
of
the word
‘survival’ in this context.t
has
too s t rong a suggest ion of a mere pro longa t ion of the
life we a re so familiar with. I prefer ‘im mo rtality’ as suggesting transition to a new
and very different kind
of
life.”
30. E.
J.
For tmann , Everlnstirtg
Life <Fer
Death (N ew York: Alba House, 1976),
301
(hereafter E L D ) .
31.
William Frost,“Religious magination,” Ecumerrist, March-Apri l 1980, 44.
Also relevant is Frost’s description (p. 43) o f the interpretation that the M arxist Ernst
Bloch givcs
to
“Christ’s saying that hew h o loses his ife will find
i t
and he w ho seeks
his
life will lose it. O nl y tho se who are willing to follow the life of the soul w hich
vibrates beyond the body and the mundane are mad e free
for
an immortal i ty which
is mo re than the existing form of reality. I t is the trans-cosmo logical.’’
32.
This ,
I
believe, is the fund am ental thrus t o fhis
The
PImtornettorl
q f M m ,
trans.
Bernard Wall (N ew York: Harper, 1959). Teilhard also implies that human beings
wou ld not participate in a
process
that they knew was a dead-end
one:
“M an wi l l
never rake a step in a direct ion he know s to be blocked. T he re lies precisely the ill
that causes o u r disquiet’’ (p. 229). See also p.
231:
“Witltorrt the
taste-for
lue, mankind
wou ld soon stop inventing and construct ing for a work i t knew to be doo m ed in
advance.”
33. Cf. Gabriel Marcel,
The
Mystery ofBPiug, 2 vols. , trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago:
Henry R egnery, 1950,
1951),
II:157-58 (hereafter M B ) : “What we loosely call ‘be-
yond’ consists
af
unknown dimensions
o r
perspectives within
a
universe
of
which
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 310/323
we apprehend only the
one
aspect which is in tune with our ow n orga no-p sych ic
structure.’’
34. F. X . 13urrwel1, The Resurrcctiou (N ew York: Sheed Ward , 19601, 126.
35.
Piet Schoonenbe rg ,
“I
Believe in Eternal Life,” in The Probletr1 o fEs ~h u tu 1 1 ? ~y ,
ed. Edward Schillebeeckx,
0
P., and B oniface W illcms,
0
P. (N ew York: Paulist
Press,
1969),
110.
36. Ignacc
Lepp,
Denth
a d Its
MyrteriPZ, t r ans . Be rna rd M urch land (New York:
Macmillan, 1968), 188.
37, See also, Fortman,
E L D , 135,
where he describes K arl Rahner’s and Ladislaus
BoroGs process views o f purgatory. W hile Fortman himself is not comp letely antag-
onistic to a processive purgatory or heaven, he balks a t the notion of a processive
G o d .
38.
Henri B ergson,
Tuto
Sources
d R e l i g i o t t and
Morality ,
trans.
R.
Ashley Audra
and Cloudesley Brcre ton (New York: H c n r y H o l t , 1935), 124.
39. j.P. Ecke rmann , Gesprmche rnit C oe t he (Stu t tgar t : Co t ta , n .d . ) , c i ted in Rose
Pfeffer, Nietzsche, Disciple
of Diorlyslls
(Lewisburg,
Pa.
: Buck nell University Press,
1972), 267.
40.
See a lso N or to n , Persorlal Destirlies,
237:
“Go ethe said to Eckerm ann that he
would not know what todo with an afterlife if t did not provide new tasks and new
opportunities. This extrapolative propensity is supported by certain distinctive theo-
ries of imn lorta l i ty as exemp lif ied in the thought of
I n ~ m a n u e l
Kant and Josiah
Royce.
”
41. Ralph Barton Perry, The Ho p e f o r Inlrtmrality ( N e w York: Vangu ard Press,
1945),
8,
24.
42. I t should be noted, how ever, that the relation between “fitness” and immor-
tality was n ot a late-Iifc af ter th ou gh t fo r James. See
PP,
I:330: “The demand fo r
immorta l i ty is nowad ays essentially teleological. We bclieve ou rse lve s imm orta l
be-
cause we believe ourselves-fit
for
immortality. A ‘substance’ ou gh t surely
to
perish,
we think, i f not worthy to surv ive ; and
an
insubstantial
‘stream’
to prolong itself
provided it be worthy, if the nature of Things is organ ized in the rationa l way in
which
we
trus t it is.”
43.
Cf.
James
L.
Muyskens ,
The
Strjicierlcy
OfHope
(Philadelphia: Temple Univer-
sity Press, 1979), 72: “Unless one’s sense o f self and one’s potential are very limitcd
or one is un com m on ly blessed with favorable condit ions and knows i t , death blocks
one’s path to genu ine fulfillm ent. . .
.
A t th e tim e of one’s death, self-fulfil lment
nornlally has not been attained. Much of one’s potential remains untapped. lf, then ,
death is the
final
curtain, i t destroys the possibility of a truly mean ingful Iife to a
great many. For them , it wo uld be reason able to desire a life after death in the form
of personal survival.”
44.Cf. Marcel, MB, I: 153-55: “First I k t m e q u o t e again what one of m y charac-
ters says, ‘to love a being is t o
say,
“T h o u , thou shal t not die.”
’
. . .
[This]
prophetic
assurance . . . m igh t be expressed fa ir ly enough
as
follows: whatever changes may
intervene in what I see before
me,
you and I will persist as one: the event that has
occurred and which belongs to the order of accident, cannot nullify the promise of
eternity wh ich is enclosed in our love, in ou r m utu al pledge.’’
45.
Thomas Hardy ,
Tess
ojrhe D’Urbervi l les (N ew York: Signe t, 1964),
416.
Prince
Andrew in Tolstoy’s
f i r
atrd Peoce responds differently to the separation consequent
upon
the death
of
a
loved
one:
“All
I
say
is
that
it
is no t arg um ent that convinces
me
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 311/323
284
Notes to Chapter 8
of
the necessity of a future life, but this: when you go hand in hand wi th someone
and all a t once that person vanishes here,
into
tzoulhere, and you yourself are left facing
that abyss and look in, And have looked in .
.
.” ( t rans . Aylmer Maude [New
York:
Simon
gL
Schuster,
19421,
422).
46.
GabrielMarcel Creative Fidelity, t rans.Rober tRostha l New York: Farrar,
Straus Giroux, 1964), 152. For a fine cxposition
of
M arcel’s views on death, see
Barbara E. Wall , “The Doctrine of Death in the Philosophy of Gabriel M arcel,” in
PAT,
II:223-35. For a description
of
a “phenomenon” s imi lar to Marcel’s but in-
terpretedradicallydifferently,seeVivienneThaulWechter,
“ A
T im e to Live-A
Time to D ie?” inPAT,
11244-45:
“As an addendum m ust be added, tha t
though
my
own understanding-or wish-for death as ‘the end,’ has
I
suspect seeped thr ou gh ,
theremustbeanadmissionof heambivalencewh ich is acommonafliction.
T h o u g h
I
choose to th ink ,
to
intellectualize, to indeed wish for that kind
of
death as
in the words of Epicurus ‘when dea th is come we are not’-neverthcless
I
find my-
self relating
to
loved on es w ho have died as tho ug h they have migrated into sum e
kind of discarnate existence, which still is in som e m ys ter io us way related to
me
here. A nd m y drcanls indicate that I wish to encourage this relationship.”
47. See, e.g ., Karl Jaspers,
“On
M y Philosophy,” trans. F. Kaufrnann, in Exirterr-
t iu l isnrjom Dosruevsky t o
Sur t re ,
ed. W alter Kaufnlann ( N ew
York:
Meridian Books,
1968), 147:
“Th e individ ual cann ot becam e hum an by himself. Self-being is on ly
real n com mu nication with anoth er self-being. Alone, I sink into
gloomy
isola-
t ion-only in com m un ity wi th oth ers can
I
be revealed in the act
of
mutual discov-
ery.” For an impressive and intellectually demanding exposition and evaluation of
both transcendental and dialogical versions o f a transactional social self, see Michael
Theunissen, The Other: Studies in
the
Social Ontology ofhlwsserl, Heidegqer, Sartre a d
Buber, t rans. Christopher Macann (Cam bridge, Mass.: MiT Press,
1984).
Far a subtle and unset t l ing suggest ionof the way in which man-made mass death
impacts upon the social o r transactional self, cf. Edith W ysch ogro d,
Spirit
i n Arhes:
Hegel, H e id e a e r ,
artd
Man-Made Muss Death (N ew Haven, C on n. : Yale Universi ty
Press,
1985),
21
1:
“The concept ion
of
a linguistic and co rporeal transactional
self
holds in equipoise the individuating aspect f self, the I pole, and the objectified me.
With the advent of man-made mass death this more
or less
ha rmonious un i ty is
broken: the I pole is shattered resulting in a negative and apocalyptic s ubject. Each I
experiences the possibility not only of its own co m ing to an end but a lso of h u m a n
extinction in toto as a result of human acts.”
48. Josiah Royce’s ideal of the “Beloved C om m un ity,” developed in The Prob/em of
Christianity
1913;
Chicago: Universi ty
of
ChicagoPress,
1968)
wouldbe
a
rich
resource for an extrapolation along the lines of the one I am sugges t ing. One text
will
indicate the direction of Royce’s efforts:
Th e ideal Christian comm unity is to
be
the community ofall mankind,-as
com-
pletely united in its inner
life
as one conscious self
could
conceivably become, and
as destructive of the natural hostilities and of the narrow passions which estrange
individual men, as i t is skillful in winning from the infinitc realm of bare pos-
sibilities conc rete arts of contro l over nature and ofjoy in its own riches of grace.
This free and faithful community of
all
mankind, wherein
the
individuals should
indccd die to their own natural life,
but
should also enjoy
a
newness
of
positive
life,“this com m unity never became, so far as I can learn,
a
conscious ideal for
early Buddhism. (p. 195)
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 312/323
Notes to Concludirlg
Rt$ections
285
49. T h e metaphysical character of “struggle” is suggestedby James: “The facts o f
struggle seem
too
deeply characteristic of the whole frame o f things
for me
n o t t o
suspect that hindrance and experiment go
a11
the way through ” TC,I:379).
50 Cf. A n n e C a r r , “ T h e
God
W h o Is Involved,” Theology Today, (Oc t . 1981,
314:
“There is today theological insistence, rooted in interpretations of the Bib le and of
contemp orary experience, that the
God of
Christian faith, while remaining God,
is
intimate
to
the joy and the pain, the victory and the defeat, the struggle of human
existence, and comes to be kn ow n precisely there.” See also David Tracy, Blcssed
Ragejbr
Order
(N ew York: Seabury Press , 1975), 177: “Is no t the God
of
theJewish
and Ch ristian scriptures a G od pro fou nd ly involved in humanity’s struggle to the
poin t wh ere Go d not me rely ffects but is affected by the struggle?”
51.
“For i t is not against human enemies that we have to struggle, but against the
Sovereignties and the
Powers
w h o originate the darkness in this world, the spir i tual
a rmy of
evil
in the heavens” (Ephesians
6:12).
52. Cf Hans K iing, Does God
Exist?,
t r ans . Edward Q u inn (New York: Double-
day, 1980), 665:
“ T h e
biblical God is nota G od without feeling, ncupable cdstrgiring,
apathetic
i n
rtgard to the vast nrferingo tht. world and man, but a sym-pathetic com-passion-
ate
God.”
See
also,
Tracy, Blessed Rage,
177:
“Is Bonhoeffer’s famous cry that only a
suffering God can help rnereIy a rhetorical flourish of a t roubled m an? Can the G o d
of Jesus C hrist really be sirnply changeless, om nipotent, omn iscient, unaffected by
our angu i sh and
o u r achievements?”
53.
Eugen e Fontinell ,
“John
Hick’s ‘A fter-Life’:
A
Cr i t ic a l Co m m e n t , ” Cross
Cur-
r e m , Fall 1978.
54. See Hick, “Universal Salvation,” in DEL, 2428:
CONCLUDING R E F L E C T I O N S
1. For
a brief description of and the relevant sources relating
to
“ T h e O r i g in s
of
After-Life and Im mo rtality Beliefs,” see john Hick , Death and E t e r r d
Lifp
( N e w
York:
Harpe r
Br
Row,
1976), 54-77.
2. The Epic
of Gilgamesh it, the Ancierlt
Neur
Ens t , ed. James B. Prichard (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958).
I:64.
3.
Ecclesiastes 5:17, 9:lO.
4. Samuel Beckett , Wuitirlg&r Godot (N ew York: Grove
Press,
1954),
57.
5.
M arilyn French,
T h e
Women’s
Roorn
(New York : Summi t Books, 1977), 279.
6 . SigmundFreud, Beyord the Pleusure Principle, trans. anded. James Strachey
(New York:N o r t o n , 1961),
32.
7. Cf. V R E , 263: “We can never ho pe
for
clean-cut scholastic results. .
. .
Decide
that
orl
the
whole
one type
of
religion is
approved
by
its fruits,
and
another type
condemned. ‘ O n the
whole’-I
fear we shall never escape com plicity with that qual-
ification, so dear to
your
practical man, so repugnant to your ystematizer ”
8. Jeanne Hersch, “Jasper’s Conception of Tradition,” in T h e
Philosophy o
Karl
Jaspers, ed. Paul A . Schilpp (New York: Tudor , 1957),
603-4. Of
course, Mersch is
not sugg esting-n or am I-that
it
is either possible o r desirable to re tu rn to an
earlier mode of religion, whatever the richness of l ife that ensued fr om it.
9. C f. Gabrief Marcel, The Mystery
$Being,
2
vols.,
trans. G .
S.
Fraser
Chicago:
Henry Regnery,
1950,
1951),
II:146:
“The re
is
n o d o u b t but that the appalling er ro r
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 313/323
of which a certa in sort of spiritualism is guilty, l ics in deny ing to d eath this gravity ,
this a t
all
events apporettt final value, wh ich gives to hum an life
a
quality
of
tragedy
without which i t is no th ing m ore than a puppet-show.
There
is a mistake which
balances this one; i t is even more serious and mu ch weighter with consequences ; i t s
that which lies
in
a dogmatic affirmation of the final character of death.”
10. Cf. N o r m a n M a l c o l m , Llrdwi‘p W i t t p s t e i t r : A Merrloir (London : Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1958),
71:
“W ittgenste in once suggested that a ay in w hich the notion
of imm ortal i ty can acquire meaning is thro ug h one’s feeling that on e has duties from
which one cannot be released, even by death.”
I
I .
See James’s letter to Perry in Ralph Barton Perry,
The Thought u r d
Character
o
WiIliarrl
James, 2
vols. (Boston: Lit t le , Brow n, 1935), II:475: “Cer ta in ly a doct r ine
that encouraged immortal i ty would draw belief mo re than one that didn’t , f it were
exactly
as sntis4ctovy
in residual respects, Of
coursc
it could n’t prevail against kno ck-
knock-down evidence to the contrary ; but wh ere there is n o such evidence, i t will
incline belief. ’
12. Ecclesiastes
9:3.
Cf. Max Horkhe imer , D i e Seknsrrrht rrach
dern g u m
Arzderen,
an in te rv iew wi th commenta ry by
H.
G u r n n i o r ( H a m b u r g ,1970), 61-62; cited in H.
Kiing, Does G od E x i s t , t rans. Edw ard
Q u i n n
(N ew York: Doubleday , 1980),
491:
“Theo logy .
.
is the hope that this injustice which characterizes the world is not
permanen t, that injustice will not be the last word
.
.
.
that the murderer will not
tr iumph over his innocent vic t im.”
13.
For
a similar version
of
th is a rgument ,
see
James
L.
Muyskens ,
T h e
S t r _ B i c i e r q
ofHope (Philadelphia: Tcmple University
Press,
1979), 74-75.
14.
Cf.
T he Brothers K U ~ W J ~ Z O Vy Dostoevsky and The
P I a p e
b y Ca m u s for an
example
of
two person s perceiving with great insight , intensi ty , and sensi t ivi ty the
irreducible absurdi tyof the sufferings of innocent children b ut rcspo nding with dif-
ferent modes of hope .
15.
Cf. A . N. Whitehead, Adverttures of ldeas ( N e w York: Free Press/Macrnillan,
1967), 286:
“Decay,Transi t ion, Loss, Displacementbelon g o he essence of the
Creative Advance.’’
16. Glenn Cun ningham , the great miler , through persistent effort , overcam e se-
vere leg
burns
suffered as
a
youth .
17.
Cf. the reflections
o f
Hans Jonas ,
who,
th ou gh unable t o accept personal im-
mortality, nevertheless desired that the victims of Au schw itz achievc so m e m od e
of
imm orta l i ty through be ing a spur to an e f for t tha t wi l l t ransform huma n
life.
T h e
refusal to forget them serves as the
way
in which they
are
incorporated in the living
process.
18.
Som e years ago, I concluded an essay
on
“Faith and Metaphysics” with the
following:
The Christian of today, unlike his believing forerunners, will no longer expect o r
seek supe rficial aid or com fort from the Othe r. not cven the certain assurance of
His existence. it might be suggested that a distinct advantage of such an approach
would be the avoidance of the ch aracteristically Christianmode of self-deception,
i.e., the affknation of the nob lest values as a blind
for
a spiritual egotism, for a
selfish
individual obsession with personal immo rtality which the contemporary
world
has
quite properly designated as unw orthy of ma n. Th is ast will jar Chris-
tians, but if
we
were to
put
i t simply
we
might ask which
is
the more
noble,
a man
who loves his fellowman in order to avoid hell-fire
or
one wh o loves him because
he is his fellow-man. T his
is
by
no means
a
radically new insight,
for
it is already
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 314/323
contained 111
thc
stor y of the saint wh o encountered an angel walking down the
road
with a torch i n on e hand and
a
pail
of
water in the other. When asked what
they were
for
he replied, “ T h e torch is
to
burn down
the castles
of heaven and the
water to put out the flames
of hell
and then
we
shall see who really
loves
God.”
(Cross
Cwre l z t s ,
Winter
1966,
39-40>
19. Som ething along these ines seems to
be
suggested in the le t ter Peirce wr ote to
James’s son onlam cs’s dcath :I think we have
afirll
l o g i d r(ght to en te r ta in h igh opes
of
a future lifc, a life of wo rk , long
r
perhaps endless. But i t
s
clear to m e hat i t has
not been intended
(so
to speak) that we should C o m f
upott
i t too implicitly” (cited in
Thomas K n igh t , Chnrles S m d e r s Peirce [ N e w
York:
W ashington Square Press, 19651,
23).
20. T h e priori ty of life over meaning is expressed in the fol lowing exchange in
Dostoevsky’s
Brother5
Karatnarou:
“ I
understand too well, Ivan. O ne longs to
love
with
onc’s
inside, with one’s
stomach.
You
said that so well and I am awfully glad that you have such a longing
for l ife,” cried Alyosha. “ I think everyone should love lifc above everything in the
world.”
“Love life more
than
the meaning
of
it?’’
“Certainly, love it regardless of logic a5 you say, it must
bc
regardless of logic,
and it’s only then one
will
understand the meaning of it. I have thought
so a
long
time. Half your work
s
done, Ivan, you love
life,
now you’ve o n l y to try to do he
second half and you are saved.”
“You
are trying
to
save
me,
but perhaps
I
am not lost And what does
your
second
haIf mean?”
“Why, one has to raise up your dead, who perhaps have
not
dicd
after
all.”
(trans. Constance Garnett [New York:
Modern
Library, n.d.1, 239)
I t
is this passage that
Camus
probably had in mind wh en he remarked:
“One
m u s t
love life before loving its m eanin g, says Do stoev sky. . . .
Yes
and w h e n t h e love of
life disappea rs, n o me aning can console us*’ Notebooks
1949,
cited
in
Germa ine Brke,
Conrrrs [New Brunswick , N.J.: Rutgcrs Un iversity Press, 19591,
57).
21.
No on e has xpressed this charge m o re passionately nd ividlyhan
Nietzsche. See
The
Birth
.f
Tragedy,
t rans. W alter Kau fm ann, (Ne w
York:
Vintage
.Books, 1967),
23:
“Christ iani ty was from the beginning, essentia l ly and fundam en-
tally, life’s nausea an d di sg us t w ith life, mere ly conccakd beh ind , masked by, and
dressed up as, faith
in
‘another’ o r ‘better’ life.’’
22.
F o r
a
similar call from
one
located
at
t h e o t h e r po le o f the d ia logue ,ee Michael
Harr ington , The Politics at God’s Frtrleral New York:
Holt,
Rinehart 8= Winston ,
1983), 197, 202: “C an W estern-Society create transcendental
common
values in its
everyday experiencc?
Values which
arc not based upon-yet not coun terpos ed to-
the supernatural?
.
.
. M y ans w er is clear by now: there is no wayback-or for-
ward-to
a
re ligious integrat ion of socie ty on the m od el
of
Judco-Christ iani ty in
any of ts manifestations. B ut the re is a need for the transcendental. That is why the
conflict between religious and athcistic humanism must now bc ended.”
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 315/323
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 316/323
Index
Absolute, the,
91 107
43, 150,
207
262 n.
15;
and evil, 216; ames’s critique
of, 144-48
Action, in Barbour,
259
n.32
Activity: and action, 97; haracter of, in
Amphitryon 38, 173-74
Aquinas,St.Thornas,I90,252n.21,277n.54
Arendt, Hannah,
183
Aries, Philippe,
278n.64
Aristotle,
3, 281
n.19
Associationism, 86, 90-91
Atom istic individualism, xiii, 11, 17 27
Aurobindo, Sri , 203
Ayer, A . J., 35,
242 n.23
“Bad faith,” 48, 167, 175, 216. See also
Badhe,John, 09 282 .29
Barbour, Ian, 20, 154,
236
nn. 13-14,
Barfield,
Owen , 270n.33, 282 11.29
Beckett, Samuel, 222,
285
n . 4
Belief, 166, 172 177 223 238.26,
fields, 42
46,
157
Self-deception
238
n.31, 259
n.32 270 n.32 272
.10
263
n.25; and arguments, 232; in fame-
immortality,
276
n.50; in
God,
xi, 101,
134-35 137-3841, 152
156,
174
179-80 190, 197 200
26,
231
257n.58; in higher presences, 148; n
human annihilation, 173; and immor-
tality,
286
n.
1
I ; ofjames,
113;
and
needs, 270
n.31;
n
other worlds, 206;
psychological dimen sion
of,
268
n. t
1
;
religious,
214 17866
n.3,
268
n.15;
and resurrection, 195-97; n the resur-
rection,
167;
and
risk,
232;
and self-de-
ception,
223-24;
n superhuman life,
206; Wittgenstein on , 273 n.16
Belief in personal immortality, xi-xiv, 8
202 204 20510, 232;Bixler on, 194;
and Christianity,
196-98;
nd compen-
sation, 228-29; nd consolation,
224.
229; and its counterbelief,
189-90;
nd
death, 174, 274
nn.24,
25;
s demean-
ing, 229-30;Dewey
on,
172, 182; Dos-
toevsky on, 22;
s
energizing
or
deenergizing,
171-72 231;
s ex-
pression of expectancy, 130; ading of,
222; and field-self, 132; fruitfulness o f,
182 225-26;
nd
God,
101,
132 133.
156,
158, 159;
and a growing
worId,
99;
hope or hindrance, 199; and illusion,
173; and James’scritique
of
the Abso-
lute,
144;
nd justice,
227;
n Marcel,
277 11-58; McDerrnott on, 179-80, 184;
and meaning,
230;
nd metaphysical
dualism, 168; and model of the self, 45;
and a moral universe,
226-27;
nd
“new life,”
200;
Nietzsche’s critiquc of,
177-79;
nd personal identity, 81; and
pragmatic evaluation, 15, 19 232;s
“reasonable,” 169-70; nd science,
271
n.2; Smith
on,209;
nd tragedy,
173-75
274 n.22; and Western religion,
194; nd wider consciousness,
11
5
289
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 317/323
290 Irzdex
Bellah, Robert, 266 11 3
Bcntley, Arthur
F., 31,
241 n.
13,
245
11.3
Bergson. Henri. 27, 33, 41, 62. 102. 112.
Berkcley, Geo rge, 34
Bernstein, Richard, 144.
235
11.3,
Bixler, Julius Seclye, 172, 192, 194,
Blenkinsopp, Joseph,
165,
195-97,
Bloch, Ernst, 282
n.31
Bode, B. H . , 106
Body,
the, 7, 48, 69-80; am biguity
of,
88;
in Bloch, 282 n.31; and con sciousn ess,
78; in Dewey, 248 n.21;
in
Eastern
thoug ht, 70; eucharistic, 195; field. 78-
79; in H usscrl,
254
n.35; in fames, 6 6 ,
69, 74, 77-78, 93, 253 nn .29 , 31; in
Lepp, 254 n.40; “lived body ,” 70-71,
75-76, 78-79, 253 11.22, 57 n. 14; in
Marcel, 71-73, 254 n.36; in Merleau-
Ponty, 71, 76; in St . Paul,
252
n.21; and
personal identity,
88;
in physics,
254 n.39; and rcsurrcction, 195; in
Sartre, 71, 73, 254 n.36; and the self, 7,
80, 102, 122, 254 n.4, 255 n.41; in
Whitehead, 30, 274 n.41; and the
world, 78
203, 209, 213, 282 n.26 , 283 n.38
240
nn.11,
14;
238 n.17, 275 11.38
273 11.31, 277 1111.59,
61
272 n . 5
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich , 285 n. 52
Boros, Ladislaus, 283 n.37
Bosanquet, Bern ard , 277 11-61
Boscovich, Ruggiero, 239
n.2
Bradley, F. H.,7
Braudel, Fernand, 52
Brie,
Germaine, 287 n.20
Brown, Norman O., 182-83, 275 11.40
Buber, Martin,
183,
272 n.10
Burhoe, Ralph Wendell, 245 n . 3
Butler, Joseph, 165, 271 n.1
Camus.
Albert,
183.
201,
227,
278
n.5,
ca ne z, Maurice, 252
n .21
Capek, Karel, 170
Cap ek, Milic, 92, 249 n.
1 ,
258 nn . 16, 21,
Carr, Anne,
284
11.50
Centers
of
activity, 14, 30, 96, 103, 127,
Charles, R. H.,
59,
271 n.40, 277 n.53,
282 n.25, 286 n.14, 287 n.20
23;
260 11.2
154,187,213
278
n.62
Chisholm . Roderick, 8, 252 n.19, 256 17.4
Christ , 209-10, 213, 282 11.31,285 11.52
Christianity, 4. 167. 196-98, 287 11.21
Clement
of
Alexandria, 4
Concrete,
the
(Concreteness),
27,
28,
33,
Consciousness, 32, 69, 88,90, 96, 97,
37, 40-41 , 62, 79,
107,
1 1 1
153,
203,
231, 265 n.39, 270 n.31; and
body, 78; critical, and faith, 168; Dewcy
on,
56, 58; field(s) of, 58, 61, 63, 76-
122, 153, 243 n.30, 255 n.43 , 261 n.8,
263 n.2 1; greater reservoir of, 264 n.34,
267
n .7 ;
in Jam es, 34, 36, 67. 74, 92,
102-3, 111, 249 11.34, 253 nn.27, 29;
258 nn.24, 25; 262 n.14; many w orlds
of, 227, 206. 212; of mystics, 129; and
personal identity, 86, 256 11.5, 262 n.
18;
praycrful,
268 n. 14; as processive-rela-
tional function, 94; production theory
of,
116; and pure experience, 38-39; of
self, 93, 250 11.3;self-compounding of,
77, 106-7, 109-11, 122; stream
of,
41,
49, 65, 69, 79 , 102, 130,
240
n.3,
251 n.
15,
357 n.9; and “stream of
scioluness,” 68; sublim inal, 363 n.21,
264 n.33,
265
n.42; superhuman, 132,
153, 156; transm ission theory
of,
116,
127; wider,
42,
105, 112-13,
115-22,
125,131,148,154
260
nn.6,7;
262 nn.15,18; 266 11.45; in
Dewey, 55;
of
fields, 26-30, 46, 76,
105, 204; and personal identity, 83-84,
86, 256 nn.3,5; between present life and
new life, 207-12; and substance, 129,
266 n.45; with super hum an conscious-
ness,
116, 124
78,
96, 98,102-3,106,
111,
118-19,
Continuity, xiii, 25, 43, 85, 91, 105,
Contributionism, in Hartshorne, 186
Cosm ic consciousness, 126-27, 265 n.43
“Cosmic omnibus”:
in
James, 108
Co sm ic (creative) process, xiii, 19-20,
159-60, 187,
203,
216,
229,
231
;
model of, 200, 202-4, 207-8; an d per-
sons, 21,
191
Cunningham, Glenn, 286
n.
16
Davidson, Thom as, 269 n.21
Death, 160-61,165-66,169-70,174,177,
284 n.46; Hart sh orne o n, 185-86; and
imm ortaiity belief, 274 n.25;
215, 221-22, 224, 227, 276 n.SO,
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 318/323
Kierkegaard on , 208; and love, 193,
214-15; Marcel o n , 247 n.13, 285 n.9;
McDermott on, 180, 182-83; meaning
of,
193; M urph y
o n ,
280
n.15;
Muyskcns
on,
283 11.43; and nature, 21,
147; and new life, 202, 21 1, 213; and
“out of body” cxperiences, 281 n. 18;
pathos of, 276 n.50; and resurrection,
105-97;
Rilke
on , 275 n.35 ; Whitehead
011,
188
Dvurlz find Beyond, 172
“Death
of
G od ,” 1 74, 177-78, 266
1 1 . 1 ,
Democritus, 51
Dennett, Daniel C., 46 n.9
Descartes, Rend,
15,
70, 258-59 n.3 6
Dewart, Leslie, 274 11.24
Dcwey, John,
8,
27,
80, 93.
157, 158, 183,
235 n.3, 236 n.16, 237 nn.17,20;
240 nn.9-12, 241 nn.13,16-19; 245 n.3 ,
247 n.14, 249 nn.25,26; 249 n.l,
251
n.
15, 259 n.29, 271 n.39, 272 n. 12,
278 n.4 ;
on
belief in immortality, 172,
182; o n dua lism, 50-51; events in, 54-
55,
248 nn.17-18; experience i n , 11-13,
32, 99. 337 11.22,242 n.19; on mate-
rialism , 51-56. 247
n . 1 5 ;
metaphysics
of,
30-31, 54-59, 248 11.15; mind-body
in, 248 n.21; and panactivism, 30, 96;
and pragmatic evaluation, 15-17,
251 11.12; on present-future dialectic,
201; relational view of mind and matter
in, 53-59;
on
religious experience, 171,
179-80; “situation” in, 30-31; time in,
182
275 11.32
Diary ofa
Wrifcr,22
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 27
Dilw orth, Dav id, 257 n . 12
Dooley,
Patrick Kiaran, 264 n.36
Dostocvsky, F yodor, 21-23, 239 n . 4 0 ,
Dualism, 8 ,
33,
39, 65, 151, 204,
286 11.14, 287 n.2 0
243 t1.28, 245
n.5 ,
246 11.9; and the
body, 70, 75; Dewey
on,
50-51; and
field-self, xiii, 48, 79-80: in James, 60,
242 11.34, 245
n.6 ,
255 n .2; and immor-
tality, 7-8, 127; ontolog ical (me ta-
physical), 11, 32, 37, 40, 43, 47-48, 50,
65, 96, 115, 143, 168. 247 n.15; prag-
matic objections to, 48-51
282
11.29
65, 74-75, 78, 82, 84, 104, 106 ,
1
14-15,
DuprC, Louis, 19, 238 n.27, 271 n.2,
Ecclcsiastcs, 221-22, 227, 285 n.3 ,
Eckermann, j.P., 13, 283 n11.39-40
Edie, James
M.,
98,
249
n . i
,
250 n.4,
286 n. 12
251 n. 1 I , 254 n.38, 256 n.3,
257 nn.13,14; 259 11-31
scendental, 85, 87, 91. See also Pure
Ehman, R obert R., 4, 68-69, 73-75, 78,
251
n n .
11, 17 , 18, 256 11.3
Einstein, Albert, 157
Emerson, Ralph
Waldo,
150
Environmcnt:
in
Dewey,
31-32, 57,
Ego, the, 5,
44, 60; transactiona l,
94;
tran-
Ego
241 n.16, 245 n . 3 ; of G od , 149, 152; in
M cDe rmo tt, 180; in Whitehead, 30
Epicu rus, 193, 284 n.46
Essnys
in
Rddical
Empiricism,
34, 60, 84,
Eternal, th e, 143, 168, 189, 208,
281 nn.22.23
Eternal life, 209, 217, 236 n. 12, 281 n.22.
See nlso Belief in personal im mo rtality;
Resurrcction
275
nn.32,33
101-2,106, 115
Eternal recurrence, 177-79, 201,
Evans, C. Stephen, 266 n.
1
Events, in Dewey, 54-58, 248 nn . 17-18
Evil,
150-51, 153, 193, 216. 227, 269
11.22
Evolutionary proccss, 186-87, 193, 203,
205,
216,
279 n.11; and new life, 210-12
Experience, 12 , 27-28, 40, 62, 79, 84
103-5,107-11,
115,
150,206,234
nn.32,
33,
256
n.8, 257 n.8 ; arnbigu-
ity
of,
36-37, 108, 134, 243 n.2 8; and
concepts, 38, 62, 107-8, 110; in Dcwey,
12,
32, 237
n.22;
and extrapolation, 84,
206-7, 238 n.33; and fields, 26, 29,
104-6, 112, 243 n.25; and God, 134-
37, 140, 237
11.26;of
idcntity, 249 n.3,
256 n.5; injames, 13, 14,
17, 36,
77,
79,
83, 91, 258 n.21, 260
n.6;
mystical,
265 n.30; personal, 11, 13-1 4, 19, 99,
102; and pragm atic evaluation, 15, 19-
20,
169; in pragmatism , 11-12;
re-
ligious,
121,
123-24, 139, 143, 147,
24, 230, 268 n. 11;
stream of, 65,
77-79,
88, 90-91, 94, 96, 102, 257 n.9;
a s
transaction, 12, 1 4, 16, 31-32, 235 n.4;
in
Whitehead, 13, 29. See
n l s o
Feel-
ing(s); Pure experience; Reality
112-13, 116-17,
119,
135-36, 156, 207,
150, 155, 157,179-80, 183, 198, 223-
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 319/323
292
ltrdex
Experience a d N n h u e , 54
External relations, 147-48
Extrapolation,
10, 32,
42, 124, 134, 203,
206, 210, 224-25, 229, 238 nn.30 , 33,
33,
280 n.
17;
and experience, 84, 136,
155; of personal im m orta lity, 73, 130,
n.30; pragmatic, 19-20,169
206-7;
of
God, 103, 112-13,
119,
134,
143, 202, 210-13, 215-16, 231, 238
Faith, 10, 53, 114, 167, 184, 212, 231,
236
nn.
12,13; 278 n.2 ; Christian, 167,
173, 245
n.5,
273 n.19 , 285 11.50; an d
conso lation, 229; critical, 168,
272
nn. 10,12; and illusion, 229; and
pragm atism, 167-69, 176,
222;
and rea-
son, 4, 6, 15; religious,
139,
156, 194,
197-98; and rcsurrection, 195-97; and
salvation, 175-76; supcrnaturalistic.
112, 114; and sym bols, 266
n .2 .
See also
Belief; Belief in personal immortality
Fechner, Gustave, 125, 127, 265 n.38
Feehg s), 80,
95,
98,
102, 250
11.6, 250-
51 n.lO, 251 11.18, 261 n.7;
of
causal
efficacy,
97-98,
259
11.35; in
James, 62-
64, 74, 104, 250 nr1.6,8-9; in Marcel,
72; and personal identity, 82-86,
256 n.4; and religion, 13, 260 11.5;of
“som ething mo re,” 67-68, 102; in
Whitehead, 63,
259
n.26
Feurbach, Ludwig, 268 n.11
Field(s), 31, 57, 111, 127,
132,
155,
241 n.18, 243
n.30,
259 n.35;
and
body,
69, 76, 78; characteristics
of,
29-30; as
constituting reality (world), 128, 153;
divinc, 137, 142, 154-55; “ficIds within
fields,” 27, 30, 46-47, 57, 61, 76-77,
127, 202; in James, 26-27,
93,
105,
120;
metaphor, 25, 29, 45, 76, 79, 96,
240 11.2, 253
11.32;
model, 64, 89, 107,
122, 137, 261 n . 11; and substance, 27;
theory in physics, 239 n.2.
See
also
Consciousness,
field s)
of;
Experience,
and fields
Field metaphysics, xiii; in Dewey.
54-59;
in James, 25, 33, 39, 76, 82,
84,
95, 128,
260 n. 1 , 265 n.43; and materialism, 51-
53; in Whitehead, 241 n. 18
Field-self, 45, 47-48. 93, 95, 102, 130-31,
155, 252 n .19, 265 n.37;
and
the divine
field, 154; in Jam es, 68, 92, 122-23; and
materialism, 51-53; and personal im-
mortality, xiii; as su bstantive self, 128
Flower, El izabe th, 17, 36, 237 11.23,
Fontinell, Eugene, 238 n.29, 278 11.7,
Ford, M arcus Peter, 244 n.36,
Fortmann,
E.
J., 209, 245 n.5, 252 n.21,
Freedom , 98-99, 114-15, 153-54, 217;
French, Marilyn, 285 n.5
Freud, Sigmund, 128, 180, 207, 222-24,
Frost, William,
209-10,
282
n.32
Galifeo, 4
Gard ner, M art in , 239 11.36
Geach, Peter, 8
Gilgamesh, 221-22
Giraudoux, Jean, 173
Godel, Kurt, 236
11.15
Go ethc, Johann Wolfgang von,
213,
267,
273 n.17, 283 n.40
Goulet, Denis, 279
n .8
Greeley, Andrew, 172, 273 n. 1
Griffin, David, 270 11.26
Gurwitsch, Aron,
257
n11.9,14
Hardy, T ho m as , 214, 270 n.30, 283 11.45
Harp er, Ralph, 22, 44, 158, 237 n .19.
239 n.42, 244 n.
1,
271
11.38
Harr ing ton ,
Michael,
287 n.22
Hartmann, Edward von,
268
n.
11
Hartshorne, Charles, 185-89, 190, 191-
92,
265
n.39, 272 n,9, 275
nn.44,45;
276 nn. 46,52
241 11.19,243 n.26, 260 n.6
285 n.53
261 nn.10,13; 269 n.22
282 n.30, 283 n.37
and God, 142, 152. 269 n.22
263 11.21, 285 n.6
Ha ughto n, Rosemary, 278
n .62
Hegel, Georg, 27, 191
Heidegger, Martin, 8, 27, 33, 243 n.29
HcH, xi, 217
Hcller, Erich, 275
nn.35,41
Heller, Josep h, 269 11.25
Hersh, Jeanne,
258
n.8
Hesse, Mary, 239
11.2
Hick, Jo hn, 190-91, 200,
237
11.19,
239 n. 34, 263 n.22, 276 n.53, 278 n. 1 ,
279 n. 15,
285
nn.54,l ; on human suf-
fering, 191; on univcrsal salvation, 217
Hocking, William Ernest. 166. 208, 213,
254 n .37, 272 n . 7 , 274
n .
25, 276 n.47,
278 n.2, 279 n.15; meaning in, 201
Hodgson,
S. H . ,
251
n . 1 8
Hofstadter, Douglas R. , 246 n.9 , 254 n.39
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 320/323
Irrdex 293
Hope, 166, 195-96, 199, 202, 209, 221,
275 n.42;
in
McDermott, 184-85; in
Nietzsche, 178
Horkheimer, Max, 286 n.12
Hud so n, Yeager, 275-76 n.45
Human Ittrmorrality, 11 1, 11
5,
120, 127
Human
Nature
and
Conduct , 58
Hume, David, 11, 81, 90-91, 167,
249 n.2, 251 n.19,
258
11.20
Husserl, Edmund,
15,
27, 33, 78,
243 n.29, 254 nn.35,36; 257 n.14,
258 n.19
HuxIey, Aldous, 279 n. 12
Huxley,
T.
H., 263 11.23
Idealism, 33,
51,
56, 70, 136, 140, 144,
266 n.44; and evil, 151; and p ure expe-
rience, 39
Identity, 46, 95, 210-11, 256 nn.3,5 ,
258
R.
9, 262 n. 18; logic
of,
107,
261 nn. 10, 13. See also Personal identity
Individual, the, xiii, 4-5,
8,
19, 44,
I
19,
157, 217; ann ihilation
of,
215;
i n
Blenkinsopp, 195; destiny of, 196; in
Fechner,
125;
and
fieIds,
132, 154-55;
relationship to God, 156; in Harts horn e,
185-86; and im m orta lity (resurrection),
6, 21, 190 , 195, 278 11.62; in jaspers,
284 n.47; in Jonas, 187; and pragm atic
evaluation, 17-18; and religion, 157,
159, 269 n. 15.
See
also Person; Soul
Internal relations, 147
Jaspers, Karl, 27, 238 n.28, 275 n.31,
Jonas, Hans, 165, 166, 173, 186-93,
284 n.47
236 n.15, 272 n.3, 276 n.52, 282 n.25,
286 n.17
Julian of N orw ich , 275 n.42
Kant, Imm anuel, 74, 90, 91, 167, 191,
Kierkegaard, Soren,
27, 208, 281 t1.23
Kuklick, Bruce, 42, 107, 244 n.36,
Kiing, Hans, 165, 236 n.
12,
268 n.11,
249 n.2,
272
n.9, 283 n.40
261 n.9
272 n.4 . 278 11-63, 281 11.18, 285 n.52,
286 11.12
Lamont,
Corliss,
171, 192 , 239 1211.35~37;
254 n.39, 273 n.15, 278 n.65
Lawler, jus tus George, 240 n.2
Lazlo, Ervin, 246 n.11
Leibniz, Gottfried, 281 n.19
Lem, Stanislaw, 52, 246 n. 1 0, 268 n. 12,
Lepp, Ignace , 213, 254 11.40, 283 n .36
Levinson, Henry Samuel, 157, 269
nn.17,24, 271 11.35
Livi-Strauss, CIaude, 52
Lewin, Kurt,
240 n.2
Lewis,
H.
.
,
7-8, 152, 200, 202,
270 n.27, 278 n.2
Lifton, Robert Jay, 239 11-35
Linschoten, Hans, 80,
255
n.42
Locke, jo hn , 83, 256 n.7
Love,
287 n.20; and death , 214-15; di-
vine, 143, 193. 208, 217, 226; of God,
159-60, 230, 269 n.18; M arcel on,
277.n.58, 283 n.44
Lovejoy, Arthur, 7, 236 n.13, 237 n.25
Lowe, Victor, 250-51
h.10
Lucretius, 193, 208
Luke, S t., 159, 217 n.42
Lynch, William, 280 n. 17
270 n.30
Macrnurray,
John, 271 n.37
Madden, Edward H., 263, n.25
Madden, Marian C. ,263 n.25
Magnus, Bernd, 275 n.34
Malcolm, Norman, 286 n.10
Maloney,
George, 214,
279 n . 11
Marcel, Gabriel, 253 nn.25,26; 260 n.4,
277 n.88, 282 n.33, 283 n.46; the
body
in , 72-73, 254 11.36; on dea th, 215,
247 n.13, 285 n.9; on love, 215,
283 n.44
Marx, Karl, 157, 180, 201, 223, 224
Materialism, 33, 121, 145, 194,
246 nn.7,9; and
body,
70, 78; Dewey
on , 53-54, 247 n.
IS;
and field meta-
physics,
52-53;
and field-self, xiii,
51-
53; and imm ortality, 7; James on, 73-
74; Marcel on, 71, 247 n. 13; and p ure
experience, 39; Nagel on, 247
n.11;
Randall on , 52
Mathur,
D.
C . , 118-19, 264 n.28
Matthews,
W.
. , 254 n.39
Mattuck,
R . ,
254 11.39
McCarthy, Mary, 277 n.55
M cDerm ott, John J.
,
25, 33, 239 n.
1,
275 nn.36,37;
o n
salvation, 179-85;
ternporalized eschatology in, 179, I81
McTaggart, J.
M .
E.,
271
11.34
Mead, George Herbert,
80,
255 n.41
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 321/323
M eaning, 172, 186,
199;
in Hartshorne,
185-86; in H ockin g, 201, 276 n.47; and
immorta lity, xi-xiii, 221 , 230,
286 n.
IO;
in Jonas, 193;
loss
of,
222;
need for,
166; and new life, 214; in
Nietzsche, 177-78, 275 11.31; and o ther
wo rlds, 212
M eliorism, and salvation, 175
Melsen, Andrew G. M . van, 241 n.14
Merleau-Ponty. M auricc, 243 n.2 9,
253 11n.24,33; 254 n.38, 257
n.14;
body
in, 71,
76
Metaphysical atom ism , in W hitehead, 29
MetaphysiclllJotrmal,
72
Metaphysics, 9 , 105,
151,
168, 190,
264 n.34,
267 n.7 ; in Dewey,
248
nn.15,16;
in Jarncs, xii, 25, 39, 41-
129, 135, 157. 244 n.36. 256 n.5 ,
261 n.12; mechanistic, 55; in prag-
matism,
10, 12,
14, 213; Randall on, 27,
52; spiritualistic, 55; of Wcstern culturc,
xi-xii.
See
also
Field
metaphysics
Mill, John Stuart, 11, 28, 90-91, 130
Miller, Dickinson,
106
Mind, 51, 138, 148, 244 n .33 , 246 n n . 7 , 8 ;
in Dewey, 53-59,
248
n.21;
in
Hume,
90; in
James, 36,
248 n.20, 249 n.24,
257 n.8; in Randall, 47, 49-50,
249 n.23; Searle on, 246 n.9 ; and self,
245 n.4.
See
also Soul; Substance
42, 65, 83, 102, 105, 111, 114-16, 127,
Minkowski, Herrnann, 279 n .
15
M odel, 25, 45-46, 154, 210; in Barbour,
20;
of
the cosmic process,
20, 202-4,
207-8
Molikre, Jean Baptiste Poquelin, 50
M onism, 30, 43, 51, 99, 115, 146-47,
Moody,
R .
A. , 281 n.18
Mooney, Christopher, 202, 214, 278 n.6
Morality, 141, 226-27, 229
Morgan, George, 274 n.31
Morowitz, Harold
j., 46
n.
7
Miinsterberg, Hugo, 83, 257 n . 8
Murphey, Murray G . , 17,
36,
237 n.23,
241 n.19, 243 n.26, 260 n.6
Murphy, Gardner, 280 n. 15
Mussner, Franz, 279 n.8
M uyskens, James L., 83 n.43, 286 n.13
Myers, Frederick, 120, 124, 265 n.42
Myers, Gerald
E., 46 n.8 ,
250
11.3
Mysticism, 28, 62, 136, 256 n.5, 264 n.30
279 n.15
256 n.5, 262 n. 18
Nagel, Th om as, 246
n .
11 ,
247
n. 15,
Neuhaus,
Richard, 272
n.
12
Neutral
monism,
35-36,
42,
55
N ew life, 46, 161, 173, 196, 199-200, 203,
230; and con tinuity w ith present life,
207-12; and dea th, 212-13; duration
and transformation, 204, 209-12; ncga-
tive characteristics of, 216-17; positive
characteristics of, 212-16;
and
responsi-
bility, 225
277 n.57
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 272 n.11
Nietzsche, Fricdrich, 22, 27,
180-81,
207,
227,
237 n. 16, 238 n.33, 266 n.
I ,
267 n.4, 268 11.13, 269 11.25, 273 n.
19,
274 nn.26-31,
275
nn.34,35, 279
11.14,
281 n.21;
on
Christianity, 287 n.21;
concern for the futu re, 201; hymn to
“eternity,” 208; critique of immortality.
176-79; on philosophers, 9; o n salva-
tion, 183; and self-deception, 223-24;
on ‘‘socratic rationalism ,” 3
Nihilism, xi, 129, 266 n.45; in Nietzsche,
177-78, 274 nn . 28,30
Norton, David L., 78 n.3, 283
n.40
Novelty,
11,
98-99, 147, 209, 260 n.7,
261
n.13;
and free dom , 114-15; and a n
infinite God,
269
n.22; and tim e, 204;
in Whitehead,
188,
258 n.18
Nozick, Robert, 255 n. 1, 258 n.17
Objectivism: Dewey on, 50-51; and God,
Og den, Schubert
M.,
166,
272
n.6
Omnipotence, 150, 152, 160, 216,
Omniscience, 150, 216, 266
n.44,
O ptim ism , and salvation, 176
Overbelief.
See
Beiief; Extrapolation
Overman, 177-79, 201, 224, 238 n.33;
and “death of
God,”
375 nn.31,32
133
285
TI.
52
285 n.52
Panactivism, 30, 42, 96, 261 n.12
Pannenberg, Wolfhart, 272 n. 12
Panpsychism, 30, 42, 96, 244 n.36,
Pantheism: pluralistic, 143-48, 269 n.2 4
Parapsychological, 112-13, 263 nn .22,23
“Passing Tho ught.” 89. 91. 93. 111 129;
and full self, 94-95, 128; and irnmor-
tality, 68,
84;
and personal identity, 85-
89; and substantive self,
89,
91
261 n.12
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 322/323
h d e x 295
Paul, S t., 69, 191, 252 n.21
Peirce, C harles Sanders, 17, 153, 246 n.8,
Penelhum, Terence,
245 n . 4
Pericles, 276 n.50
Perry, John , 255 n. 1, 257 n. 10
Perry, Ralph Bar ton , 61, 112,
1
14,
236 n.9, 237 n.24, 239 n.2 , 242 n.19,
244 n.34 , 245 n.6, 250 nn.5,7,
256 nn .6,7, 359 nn.29,34 , 259-60 n. 1,
264
n.34,
67 n.5, 276 n.52 , 280 11.18,
283 11.41, 286
n. l
1; on consciousness in
James, 97, 1 16, 153, 265 n.42; on con-
tinuity inJam es, 105, 260 n.7; o n du-
alism in James, 255 n.2; o n experience
in James, 33, 28, 79; on feelings in
James, 63; tin God inJarnes, 134,
150;
on identity in James, 83, ,262 n. 19; o n
imm orrality, 213-14, 274 n.25,
277 n.59; on m ind inJam es, 42; on ni-
hilism in James, 129; on novelty in
James, 261
n.
13; o n pragm atic evalua-
tion i n James, 17-19; on radical em-
piricism in James,
102
276 n.47; in Aquinas, 190; in Barbour,
259 n.32; and body, 70, 254 n .40 ; in
Chisholm, 252 n.9; relation to God,
124, 225-26; in Harp er, 158; in Hock-
ing, 254 11.37; sup erhum an 151-52; val-
ue
of, 190-91.
See also
Individual, the
Personal identity, xiii, 85, 88, 255 n.
1,
266
n.46;
in Chisholm , 256 n.4; and
continuity, 83-87; and feelings, 82-86;
and imm ortality, 81;
and “passing
Th ou gh t,” 85-89; in Shoem aker,
254 n.39
265 n . 39, 272 n .9 , 287 n . 19
Person, 7, 109, 123, 192-93, 232,
Pessimism, and salvation, 175
Philosophical theology.
6,
13, 132, 217,
Physical, 47, 247 n . 15. See aIso Pure expe-
235 n.1
rience, and physical and psychica l
(mental)
Plato, 3, 70, 257
n.8;
Platonism, 41
Pluralism, 14, 146-47, 155, 174; and evil,
151;
and fields,
30;
and
God,
137, 149,
150, 269 11.22;
in
James, 267 n.9; and
novelty, 99, 115, 147
Pluralistic Universe, 41, 42, 60, 62, 92,
101-2, 106-7, 109, 113, 115, 121-23,
125, 127, 144,146
Polanyi, Michael, 246 n. 11
Pollock, Robert, 28, 240
n . 6
Pragmatic evaluation, 15-20,
169;
of
im-
mortality, 232
Pragnratis,n,
17
Pragmatism, 14-15, 70, 175, 203, 223-24,
267 n.6,
80
11.18;
nd A urobindo,
278 n.7; and the conc rete, 28-29, 62;
and evil, 216; and faith, 167-69, 176,
238 n.30; and
God,
133; in James, 18;
and materialism, 52-53; and new life,
200, 213; and the relational self, 158,
213, 215; and t he soul, 48-50.
See
also
Metaphysics, in pragmatism; Pragmatic
evaluation
Pratt, James
B.,
278
n.65
Prayer, 140, 268 n. 14
Price, H.H., 265 n.41
Principles of
Psychology,
xiii, 36,
39,
60, 68,
74,
SO,
81-82, 84,
90,
92, 94-95, 97,
102,106,111-12,114,122,129-30,
158
Pringle-Pattison, A . Seth, 281 n.22
Process, in Dewey, 56 ,
58
Process and Reality,
12,
188
Processive-relational: character
of
Dewey’s
metaphysics, 55-59; character
of
ields,
27, 29,
43,
142, 253 n.32; view of
G od,
xiii-xiv; character
of
“lived
body,”
71
;
character of the self, xiii-xiv,
65,
102;
character of he world (reality), 14-17,
45,
110,
127, 133, 174, 202, 241 n.18.
See
also
Experience, and fields; Field
metaphysics; Reality; World, the
Proust,
Marcel,
73,
271 n.38
Psychical, 47. See also Pure experience,
and physical and psychical (mental)
Psychology: Briefer C o t m e ,
86,
88
Pure Ego, 66,
81,
258 nn . 19, 25; in James,
27, 68, 86, 258 n. 19; in Kant, 91. See
nlso
Ego,
he
Pure experience, 55,
260
n.1 , 262 n.
18;
and the concrete, 33, 38; and con-
sciousness, 38-39, 112, 126; description
of,
34; and fields, 32, 37 , 39-40,
240 n.3, 241 n. 19; flux character of,
40-
41;
McD ermott on, 33; and physical
and psychical (mental), 34-35,
38-40,
42-43, 106,’ 126-27, 242 11.24,
248 n.15; Seigfried o n , 37-38, 243
n.31;
Stevens
on,
242 n.20; Wild on,
243 n.28; W ilshire on , 242 nn.22,24
Quinton, Anthony, 280
n . 1 5
8/20/2019 Eugene Fontinell - Self, God and Immortality
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/eugene-fontinell-self-god-and-immortality 323/323
296 Itrdex
Radical empiricism, 32, 36, 38, 39, 71,
90.
128; and causal effkacy, 98; Perry on,
102;
and pluralism, 147-48.
See
also Ex-
perience; Pure experience
Rahner, Karl, 245 n.5, 283 n.37
Raju, P. T., 280 n . 15
Randall, John Her ma n,
Jr.,
6, 27-28,
235 n. 1, 238 11.28, 240 nn ,5,9; 244 n.3 ,
247 n.12, 271 n.2; on immortality, 194;
on metaphysics, 52;
on
mind, 47-50,
249 n.23
Reality: as centers o f activity, 30 , 96; and
“death of God ,” 266 n. 1; in Dewey, 55,
248 nn.16,18; and faith in
God,
141;
flux character
of,
40-41, 85, 102, 143-
44, 203-4, 256 n.8, 259 n.29, 260 n.2;
o fG o d , 117, 119, 121, 134, 142, 148,
149, 155.
158,
168, 174, 177, 226,
231,
270 n.31; and immediate perception
(feeling), 62, 98, 235 n .8 , 243 n.24; in
James, 180, 260 11.3;
f
other worlds,
205-7; and pluralism, 146, 149; ra-
tionality o f , 148; in Whitehead, 187. See
also,
Experience; Field(s); Processive-
relational, character of the world; Pure
experience; World, the
Refirtation of D t d i s r n ,
T h e ,
7
Reid, Thomas, 85, 257 n.10
Religion. 13, 112,139-42, 157, 159, 224,
260 n .5, 268 n.11, 279 n.9; in Bellah,
266-67 n.3; and immo rtality, 172, 194;
in James, 99, 134, 137-40, 268 n. 14,
270 n.31, 285 n.7; and morality, 141;
and science (reason), 4-5,
15,
113-15,
135,147, 167, 236 n n. I2 ,1 4; and self-
deception, 223-25
Renan, Joseph E rnest, 186
Resurrection , 173 , 194-98, 202 , 278 n.62,
280 n.15;
n Aquinas, 252
n.21;
Blenkinsopp on, 195-97; o f body, 69,
252 n.21; of Christ,
210,
212; and field-
self, 46; and immortality,
239
n.34;
symbolic, 198, 239 n.37.
See
also
Belief
in personal im m orta lity; Death, and
resurrection
Ricoeur, Paul, 267 n.4, 273
n.
17
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 185, 267 n.4,
Rorty, Amelie O kse nb erg , 254-255 n.40,
Roth, John K.,
153,
270 n.29
Royce, Josiah, 242 11.21,283 11.40,
275 nn.35,43
255 n . 1
284 11.48
Russell, Bertrand, 21,
35,
239 n.38,
Ryle, Gilbert, 257 n.14
Salvation,
5,
143, 168, 202, 217,
225;
in
James, 145, 375-76; M cD erm ott on ,
179-85; Nietzsche
on,
183, 270 11.25
Santayana, Geo rge, 189, 208, 246 n.8,
276 11-57, 282 n.24
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 71, 73, 227, 253 n.23,
254 n.36, 257 n. 14
Scheler, Max, 5, 70, 252 n.22
Schiller, F. C.
S . ,
157
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, 235 n.5, 24011.10,
247 n.14 , 285 t1.8
Schleirmacher, Friedrich, 208, 281 n.22
Science, 16, 123, 137, 238 n.36; and faith
in personal immortality, 271 n.2; and
G od , 157; James on , 14, 138; and re-
ligion, 4-5, 15, 113-15, 119, 136,167,
236 n.14
269 n.18
Searle, Joh n R. , 246 n.9
Seigfried, Charlene, 37, 39, 41-42,
Self-deception, 181, 223-24, 286 n.18 .
Shea, Joh n, 213, 245
n.5,
280 n.16
Shoemaker, Sydney, 254 11-40
Shoonen berg, Piet, 213
Silverman, Hugh J., 257 n. 12
Smith, jo h n , 209, 236 n. 12, 264 11.30,
Some
Problenls
of
Philosophy,
62, 98-99,
“Something more,” 67-68, 80, 102-5,
242 n.21, 243 n.31, 253 11-31
See also “Bad faith”
268 n.15, 282 n.28
102, 115, 129
121-24,
129,
207, 269 n. 15;
in
Marcel,
260 n.4
Fechner’s earth soul,
325;
contrasted
with field-self, 131; in Goethe, 213;
and immortality, 49, 130-31
;
James o n ,
48-50, 67,
74,
79, 87, 130; contrasted
with “passing Thought,” 89; salvation
of, 168; n Un am un o, 194, 197, 238; in
Whitehead,
271
n.41. See also Indi-
vidual, the; M ind; Perso n; Substance
Soul, 22, 61, 70, 91, 129, 282 n.31;
Spencer, Herbert, 156, 170-71
Spinoza, Benedict, 157
Stambaugh, Joan, 275 nn.32-33
Steiner, George, 277 n.60
Steiner, Rudolph, 280 n. 18
Stevens, Richard, 35-36, 236 n .
1 1,
240 n.3, 242 n.20,
243
nn.27,30,31,