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THE NELSON PHILOSOPHIC L TEXTS
General Edi tor
R a y m o n d K l i b a n s k y
Fro th ingham
Professor o f Logic a nd Me taphys ics
M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y
Honor a r y Fe l l ow o f
the
Warburg Ins t i t u te
Univers i ty of London
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N i h i l
o b s t a t :
R o y E f f l e r , o . f . m .
Censor
Depu tatus
I m p r i m i p o t e s t :
E l i g i u s W e i r , o . f . m .
Min is te r Prov inc ia l i s
N i h i l o b s t a t :
P h i l o t h e u s B o e h n e r ,
o . f . m .
Censor Deputatus
Imp r i ma tu r :
'
4
J o s e p h u s A l o i s i u s
Episcopus Bujfalensis
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F rom M S
l a t .
3114 o f the B ibliothequ e N a t iona le ,
Par i s ,
f o l . 1 ' - .
(Pho to B .N .)
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D U N S S C O T U S
P H I L O S O P H I C A L W R I T I N G S
A se lec tion
e d ite d a n d tra n s la te d
by
A L L A N W O L T E R , O .F .M .
P r o fe s s o r o f P h i lo s o p h y a t th e F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e
S t B o n a v e n t u re , N . T .
N E L S O N
1963
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T H O M A S N E L S ON A N D SON S L T D
Parkside
W o r k s E d in b u rg h 9
36 Park Street London
W l
117
La t robe Stree t M e lbou rne C r
Th o m a s N e l s o n a n d So ns ( A f r i c a ) ( P ty ) L t d
P .O. Box
9881
Johannesburg
T h o m a s N e l s o n a n d S o n s ( C a n a d a ) L t d
91-93 "Wel l ington Stree t W est Tor o n to 1
T h o m a s N e l s o n a n d S o n s
18
East
41st
Stre e t N e w Y o r k 17, N . Y .
Societe
F r a n c a i s e
d ' £ d i t i o n s
N e l s o n
97 rue M on ge Pa ris
5
© A l la n W o l te r
1962
Reprinted ig6$
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P R E F A C E
I n a v o l u m e o f t h e p r e s e n t s i z e , a c o m p i l e r c a n g i v e a
b r o a d e r i f s o m e w h a t p i e c e m e a l v i e w o f a m a n ' s p h i l o
s op h y b y l i m i t in g th e le n g t h o f th e s e le c tio n s , o r h e m a y
s a c r ific e c o m p re h e n s iv e n e ss o f s u b je c t m a t te r i n th e
in te r e s ts o f r e v e a lin g h is th i n k e r a t w o r k . I h a v e c ho se n
t h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e , b u i l d i n g t h e p r e s e n t s e l e c t i o n
a r o u n d
five
k e y q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n e d w i t h G o d a n d t h e
h u m a n
s o u l ,
t h e t w o p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o p i c s o f g r e a t e s t
i n t e r e s t t o a n
ex
professo
t h e o lo g ia n l ik e D u n s Sc o tu s .
F o l lo w in g th e A v ic e n n ia n in t e r p r e t a t io n o f A r is t o t e l ia n
m e t a p h y s i c s , l i k e A l b e r t u s M a g n u s , S i g e r o f B r a b a n t ,
A q u i n a s a n d m o s t s ch o la s tic s o f h is d a y , Sc o tu s e n v is io n e d
G o d as t h e g o a l o f a ny r a t i o n a l m e ta p h y s ic w h o se s u b je c t
is b e i n g qua b e in g . T h e tw o s e le c tio n s d e a lin g w i t h th e
e x i s t e n c e a n d u n i c i t y o f G o d ,
t h e n ,
fo r m th e c o re o f h is
"f i r s t p h i lo s o p h y ". Th e y a re in t ro d u c e d b y a fe w sh o r t
se c t i o n s i n w h i c h S c o tu s d e sc r i b e s t h i s " t r a n sc e n d e n ta l
s c i e n c e " a n d t h e t y p e o f c o n c l u s i o n i t p u r p o r t s t o
e s t a b l i s h , f o l l o w e d b y a q u e s t i o n w h e r e i n t h e S u b t l e
D o c t o r a n a l y z e s h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t o f G o d i n
t e r m s o f h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h e s i s r e g a r d i n g t h e u n i v o c i t y
o f b e in g . O f th e tw o q u e stio n s a b o u t th e h u m a n sou l ,
o ne to u ch e s o n its s p ir i t u a l i t y a n d i m m o r t a l i t y , t h e o th e r
c o nc e rn s its a b i li ty to a t ta in c e r ta i n k n o w le d g e .
T a k e n f ro m Sc otu s's m o st im p o r t a n t w o r k , h is
Ordinatio
( c a l l e d m o r e f r e q u e n t l y , i f l e s s a c c u r a t e l y , h i s O x f o r d
C o m m e n t a r y
o n th e
Sentences
o f
P e te r L o m b a r d ) ,
t h e k e y
q u e s t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , e x c e p t f o r
c e r ta i n m in o r m a r g in a l n ote s in th e m a n u s c rip t t e x t a n d
—where Sc o tu s h a s c o m b i n e d s e v e ra l q u e s tio n s i n t o o n e
—those
p o r tio n s n o t g e r m a n e to th e q u e s tio n se le c te d .
T h e m a n u s c r ip t (C o d e x A s s i s ii, b i b l io t h e c a
c o m m u n -
alis 137)
f ro m w h i c h th e L a t i n te x t is t a k e n , re p r e -
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VI
P R E F A C E
s e nts a n e a r ly f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a t t e m p t a t a c r i t i c a l
e d i t i o n o f t h is w o r k a n d is th e b a s is o f t h e V a t i c a n e d i t i o n
n o w i n p r o g r e s s . W h e r e th e te x t is o b v i o u s l y a t f a u l t ,
h o w e v e r , I h a v e n o t h e s i t a t e d t o a d o p t a b e t t e r m a n u
s c r i p t r e a d i n g f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n .
T h e s h o r t b i b l io g r a p h y m a ke s n o a t t e m p t t o d o ju s t ic e
t o t h e flood o f r e c e n t S c o t is t ic l i t e r a t u r e , e s p e c i a l ly i n
f o r e i g n la n g u a g e s , b u t is l i m i t e d t o l a r g e r E n g l i s h m o n o
g r a p h s o n s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s o f S c o t u s ' s p h i l o s o p h y o r t o
w o r k s l i k e t h o s e o f F a t h e r C o p le s t o n o r M is s S h a r p ,
w h e r e i n a f a i r l y b r i e f b u t c o m p r e h e n s i v e a c c o u n t o f
Sc o tu s 's g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t io n s c a n b e f o u n d .
M a y I ta k e th i s o c c a s io n t o e x p re s s m y in d e b te d n e s s
t o t h e l a t e F a t h e r P h i l o t h e u s
Boehner,
o . f . m . , a n d t o
F a t h e r G a u d e n s M o h a n , o . f . m . , o f t h e F r a n c is c a n
I n s t i t u t e , f o r h e l p i n p r e p a r i n g a n d c h e c k i n g th e L a t i n
t e x t . I a m d e e p ly g r a t e f u l a ls o t o P r o fe s so r R a y m o n d
K l i b a n s k y f o r h is p a r t i n b r i n g i n g t h i s v o l u m e t o f r u i t i o n ,
t h o u g h I h a v e n o t b e e n a b le t o a c c e p t a l l h is s u g g e s t io n s .
I ta k e f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b o t h f o r t h e c o n s t i tu t io n o f t h e
t e x t a n d f o r t h e t r a n s l a t i o n .
A l l a n B . W o l t e r
The Franc iscan Ins t i tu te ,
St Bon aven tu re , N .V.
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C O N T E N T S
I n t r o d u c t i o n i x
i
C o n c e r n in g M e ta p h y s ic s
i
ii
M a n 's N a t u r a l K n o w le d g e o f G o d
13
in
T h e E x is te n c e o f G o d 34
iv
Th e U n ic i ty o f G o d 82
v C o n c e rn in g H u m a n K n o w le d g e 96
vi Th e S p i r i t u a l i t y a n d I m m o r t a l i t y o f th e
H u m a n So u l 133
N o t e s 1 6 3
I n d e x e s 1 8 9
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
D o c u m e n t a r y d a ta o n th e l i f e o f J o h n D u n s Sco tus a re
s c a n ty . Sc a rc e ly m o r e t h a n h a l f
a
d o ze n d e f in i te c h r o n o
lo g ic a l re c o r d s a r e a v a ila b l e . T h e e a r lie s t d a te m e n
t io n e d i n c o n n e x io n w i t h Sc otu s is f o u n d i n th e C h ro nicle
o f the Sco t t i sh F ranc iscans , t ransc r ibed in the s ix teen th
c e n tu ry b y W . Tw e e d y , a n o t a ry p u b l ic o f H a d d i n g t o n .
A s p re se rv e d i n th e e ig h te e n th -c e n tu r y M o n a stic o n Sc o ti-
canum
o f M a r ia n u s
B r o c k i e ,
o .s . b ., th e c h ro n ic l e s ta te s :
I n th e y e a r
1278
F r ia r
Elias
D u n s ,
gua rd ian o f Dum fries , came
to H a d d in g to n a n d i n th e prese nce o f
the
o the r gua rd ians in a
chapter o f
the
Orde r received the
office
o f v icar genera l o f the
K in g d o m o f Sc o tla n d a n d to o k b ack w it h h i m to D u m frie s
tha t ce lebra ted the o log ian , Jo hn Du ns, ca lled Scotus by
reason o f his c o u n tr y , a n d g ave h im th e h a b it o f
re l ig ion .
F o r
he [Jo hn ] was h is nephew by h is b ro the r N in ia n Duns o f
L i tt le d e an and had a ttended the low er schools
of
H a d d in g t o n ,
where he had g i ven remarkab le i nd i ca t ions o f h i s fu tu re
l ea rn ing.
T h o u g h L . M e ie r , o . f .m . has re c e n tly a t te m p t e d t o d is
c r e d it th e v a l u e o f th i s e n t ry , h is re aso ns d o n o t a p p e a r
to o c o n v in c i n g . U n t i l fu r t h e r p r o o f is fo r th c o m in g , w e
c a n h a r d l y ig n o r e o r re je c t th e te s t im o n y o f this c h r o n ic le
e n t i r e l y .
M o r e c e r ta in , h o w e v e r , is th e n e x t r e c o r d , th a t o f
S c o t u s ' s o r d i n a t i o n t o t h e p r i e s t h o o d b y O l i v e r S u t t o n ,
B i s h o p o f L i n c o l n , o n
17
M a r c h
1291 .
O f th e f o r ty -
e ig h t p r ie s ts o r d a in e d t h a t d a y i n th e p r io r y o f St A n d r e w ,
N o r t h a m p t o n , f iv e w e re F r a nc is ca n s , in c lu d i n g " F r .
Jo h a nn e s D o n s " .
O n 26 J u ly 1300 Sc o tu s w a s a t O x f o r d , fo r w e f in d h is
n a m e a m o n g th e tw e n ty -tw o f r ia r s o f
the
O x f o r d c o n v e n t
w h ose n am e s th e E n g l is h p r o v in c i a l , H u g h o f H a r t le p o o l ,
s u b m itte d to J o h n D a l d e r b y , B is h o p o f L in c o ln , fo r
facu l t i es to hea r con fess ions .
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X DU NS SCOTUS
T h e c o l o p h o n o f C o d e x 66 o f M e r t o n C o l le g e , O x f o r d ,
c o n t a in s t h i s n o t e b y a n e a r ly f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y h a n d :
" T h i s is f r o m t h e O rd in a tio o f t h e Ve n e r a b l e F r i a r J o h n
D u n s o f t h e O r d e r o f F r i a r s M i n o r w h o f lo u r is h e d a t
C a m b r id g e , O x f o r d a n d P a r is , a n d d i e d i n C o l o g n e " .
A t t h e e n d o f t h e W o r c e s te r m a n u s c r i p t ( f 6 9 ), o n e o f
t h e e a r l i e s t o f S c o tu s 's P a r i s i a n le c t u r e s o n t h e Se nte nce s,
is t h e r e m a r k t h a t Sc o tu s b e g a n c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e f ir s t
b o o k "a t P a r is i n t h e y e a r o f t h e L o r d 1 3 0 2 , t h e t h i r d
h a v i n g s t a r t e d " , a n d t h a t h e c o m m e n t e d o n t h e f o u r t h
b o o k " i n t h e s tu d y a t P a r is i n t h e y e a r
1 3 0 3 " .
T h e
p h r a s e " t h e t h i r d h a v i n g s t a r t e d " se em s to b e a r e f e r e n c e
to th e a u t u m n t e r m ( f r o m a b o u t 9 O c t o b e r 1302 u n t i l
A p r i l
1 3 0 3 ) .
A c c o r d i n g t o " G a l l i c a n c u s t o m " t h e n e w
y e a r b e g a n o n 2 5 M a r c h , t h e fe a s t o f t h e A n n u n c i a t i o n .
Sc o tu s 's p r e s e n c e i n P a r is a t t h i s t im e is c o n f i r m e d b y
t h e f a c t t h a t w e f in d h is n a m e l i s t e d a m o n g th o s e f r ia r s
w h o o n 2 5 J u n e
1303
r e fu s e d t o s u p p o r t K i n g P h i l i p I V
i n h is a p p e a l t o a g e n e r a l c o u n c i l a g a i n s t P o p e B o n i
f a c e
V I I I .
T h e p e n a l t y f o r s u c h o p p o s i t i o n w a s e x i l e
f r o m F r a n c e w i t h i n t h r e e d a y s .
Sc o tu s w a s e v i d e n t l y b a c k i n P a r is a g a i n b y t h e e n d
o f 1 3 0 4 , f o r t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s ,
G o n s a lv u s o f S p a i n , s e n t a le t t e r f r o m A s c o l i i n t h e
M a r c h o f A n c o n a o n
18
N o v e m b e r
1304
t o W i l l i a m ,
g u a r d i a n o f t h e F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t a t P a r is . I t re a d s a s
f o l l o w s :
I n re fe re n c e to t h e p r o m o t io n o f F r ia r G ile s o f L i g n y , a b o u t
w h o m I h a ve b e e n in f o r m e d b y y o u r l e tte r s , w e o u g h t , as th e
c u s to m is , to m a k e p r o v i s io n fo r a n o t h e r s i m i la r p r e s e n t a t io n .
Since,
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a t u t e s o f t h e O r d e r a n d t h e s t a t u t e s
o f y o u r c o n v e n t, th e b a c h e lo r to b e p r e se n te d a t th is t im e s h o u l d
b e lo n g to s om e p r o v in c e o th e r t h a n th e p r o v i n c e o f F r a n c e , I
a ss ig n to y o u F r ia r J o h n Sc o tu s , o f w h o se la u d a b l e l if e , e x c e l le n t
k n o w le d g e , a n d m o st s u b tle a b i li ty , a s w e l l as h is o t h e r r e m a r k
a b le q u a l it ie s , I a m f u l l y i n fo r m e d , p a r t ly f r o m lo n g e x p e r ie n c e
a n d p a r t l y f r o m r e p o r t w h i c h h a s b e e n s p r e a d e v e r y w h e r e —
t o be p re s e n te d p r i m a r i ly a n d i n t h e r e g u l a r c o u rs e a fte r t h e
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INTRODUCTION XI
s a id F r i a r G ile s . I e n jo i n y o u n ev e rth e le s s t h a t y o u m a k e s u c h
p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h d u e s o l e m n i t y w i t h o u t much expense . I f ,
h o w e v e r, y o u s h o u ld b e c e r ta i n t h a t th e C h a n c e l lo r b e w i l l in g
to lic e n s e tw o o f o u r f r ia r s a t t h e sa m e t im e , I d e s ire t h a t F r ia r
A l b e r t o f M e t z, i f he s h a ll b e a b le to r e t u r n to th e c o n v e n t , b ep r o m o t e d to g e th e r w i t h t h e sa id F r ia r J o h n . I n w h i c h c ase , I
r u le th a t F r i a r A lb e r t o n a c c o u nt o f his s e n io r ity s h o u ld i n c e p t
f ir s t , F r ia r J o h n i n c e p t in g a fte rw a r d s u n d e r h i m . F a r e w e l l i n
th e L o r d a n d p r a y fo r m e . G iv e n i n th e p la c e o f Ascoli o f th e
p r o v in c e o f th e M a r c h o f A n c o n a , x i v K a l . D e c . 1304.
A f i n a l m e n t io n o f Sc o tu s is f o u n d i n t h e r e c o r d s o f a
p r o v i n c i a l c h a p t e r a t C o lo g n e w h e r e h e s ig n e d as " F r .
J o h a n n e s , le c t o r C o l o n i a e " . T h e d o c u m e n t g iv e s p e r
m is s io n f o r t h e e r e c t io n o f a c o n v e n t a n d is d a t e d m ore
G a llic o ru m 2 0 F e b .
1307
( a c t u a l l y 1 3 0 8 ) .
Th e s e d o c u m e n t s , w h e n v i e w e d a g a in s t th e g e n e r a l
h i s t o r i c a l b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e t im e s , m a k e i t p o s s ib le to
c o n s t r u c t th e f o l l o w i n g m o r e o r le ss p r o b a b l e s k e tc h o f
S c o t u s ' s l i f e .
H i s f a m i ly n a m e w a s D u n s . A t t h e t im e Sc o tu s w a s
i n P a r is th e r e w e r e m o r e t h a n fo r t y o t h e r f r ia r s i n t h e
F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t b y t h e n a m e o f J o h n . H e r e h e
r e c e i v e d t h e a d d i t i o n a l t i t l e o f " S c o t u s " b y r e a s o n o f h is
n a t io n a l i t y . A t t h e t i m e w h e n J o h n D u n s s t u d i e d a t
P a r is " S c o t u s " a p p a r e n t ly w a s u s e d e x c l u s i v e ly i n t h e
sense o f " a n a t iv e o f S c o t l a n d " , a n d n o t , as i n e a r l ie r
t im e s , t o d e s ig n a t e i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y I r i s h o r S c o t t is h
a n c e s t ry . T h i s is c o n f ir m e d i f w e a c c e p t t h e te s t im o n y o f
t h e C h r o n i c l e o f t h e S c o t t i s h F r a n c i s c a n s a s r e c o r d e d b y
B r o c k i e .
T h e r e a r e t w o m a i n b ra n c h e s o f t h e D u n s f a m i l y , t h e
D u n s o f D u n s i n B e r w ic k s h i r e , w h o b e lo n g e d t o t h e
n o b i l i t y , a n d t h e D u n s o f M a x t o n -o n - t h e -T w e e d , w h o
i f n o t o f t h e n o b i l i t y o w n e d ra t h e r e x te n s iv e f a r m i n g
l a n d s .
A c c o r d i n g t o E . L o n g p r e , o . f . m . , t h e e s ta te o f
N i n i a n D u n s , t h e f a t h e r o f Sc o tu s , w a s k n o w n a s L i t t l e -
d e a n , a n d is s i t u a t e d o n t h e s o u t h e r n b a n k o f t h e R i v e r
T w e e d a b o u t t w o m i le s d o w n s t re a m f r o m t h e v i l l a g e o f
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Xll DUNS SCOTUS
M a x t o n , R o x b u r g h s h i r e . A p o p u l a r t r a d i t i o n , h o w e v e r ,
w h i c h go e s b a c k fo r c e n t u r ie s c l a im s t h a t J o h n b e l o n g e d
t o t h e B e r w i c k s h i r e b r a n c h . H i s f a t h e r w a s t h e y o u n g e r
s o n o f t h e D u n s o f G r u e ld y k e s a n d l i v e d o n a n e s ta te
a d j o i n i n g th e p r e s e n t t o w n o f D u n s . T h e h o u s e w h e r e
t r a d i t i o n m a i n t a in s J o h n w a s b o r n s to o d n e a r t h e m o r e
w e s t e r l y l o d g e , n o w c a l l e d P a v i l i o n L o d g e , o f D u n s
C a s t le . I n t h e c o u rs e o f i m p r o v e m e n t s m a d e i n 1 7 9 0 ,
t h e l a r g e s to n e m a r k i n g t h e s i te o f t h e h o u s e w a s b u i l t
i n t o t h e n e a r b y d y k e a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o lo c a l h i s to r i a n s ,
w a s p o i n t e d o u t f o r g e n e r a t io n s , b u t is n o w a p p a r e n t ly
f o r g o t t e n .
Sc o tu s w a s p r o b a b l y b o r n e a r ly i n
1 2 6 6 .
S in c e B is h o p
S u t to n o r d a i n e d a t N o r t h a m p t o n o n b o t h 2 3 D e c e m b e r
1290 a n d 17 M a r c h
1 2 9 1 ,
A . G a l l e b a u t , o . f . m . a rg u e s th a t
Sc o tu s m u s t h a v e c o m e o f c a n o n i c a l a g e s o m e w h e r e
b e t w e e n th e s e t w o d a te s . T h i s w o u l d p l a c e h is b i r t h
s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n 2 3 D e c e m b e r
1265
a n d
17
M a r c h
1266.
C o n f l i c t i n g w i t h t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is
t h e s t a t e m e n t o f t h e C h r o n i c l e , a b o v e , t h a t S c o t u s ' s u n c l e ,
F r i a r Elias D u n s , t o o k h is n e p h e w w i t h h i m t o D u m f r ie s
a n d "g a v e h i m t h e h a b i t o f r e l i g i o n " . N o w t h e e a r l ie s t
a ge a t w h i c h Sc o tu s c o u l d c a n o n i c a l l y h a v e e n t e r e d t h e
n o v i t ia t e o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s w a s f if te e n . H o w e v e r , i t is
n o t u n l ik e l y , i n v i e w o f t h e c u s to m o f t h e t im e s , t h a t
Sc o tu s w o u l d h a v e s ta y e d a t t h e c o n v e n t a s a p u er ob la tu s
o r p o s t u l a n t , c o n t in u i n g h i s s tu d ie s u n d e r s o m e o f t h e
f r i a r s ,
u n t i l h e w a s o l d e n o u g h t o e n te r t h e O r d e r . O n
t h is s c o re , C a l l e b a u t p la c e s h is e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e n o v i t ia t e
la t e i n
1279
o r e a r ly i n
1280
a n d h is s o le m n p r o f e s s io n o f
v o w s a y e a r l a t e r .
I f Sc o tu s e n t e r e d t h e S c o t t is h b r a n c h o f t h e f r i a r s , i t
m a y s ee m s t r a n g e t h a t h e is r e f e r r e d t o i n s o m e m a n u
s c r ip t s as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e E n g l is h p r o v i n c e , u n le s s w e
r e c a l l t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e G r e y f r i a r s i n Sc o t la n d . I n 1231
t h e F r a n c is c a n f r ia r s , w h o h a d c o m e t o E n g l a n d s o m e
s e ve n y e a r s e a r l i e r , e s t a b l is h e d f r i a r ie s i n S c o t la n d . I n
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INTRODUCTION
Xlll
1235
th e se f r i a r i e s w e r e g i v e n th e s ta tu s o f a n in d e
p e n d e n t v i c a r i a t e , b u t s o o n a f te r w e r e re t u r n e d t o t h e
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e E n g l i s h C u s to d y o f N e w c a s t le . I n
1260 t h e y o u n g K i n g o f Sc o ts , A l e x a n d e r I I I , p e t i t i o n e d
P o p e A l e x a n d e r I V t o r e s to r e t h e in d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e
S c o t t is h f r i a r s . T h e m a t te r w a s r e f e r re d to t h e G e n e r a l
C h a p t e r o f t h e F r a n c is c a n s , w h i c h r e fu s e d t h e r e q u e s t ,
o w i n g i n p a r t t o p re s s u re b r o u g h t to b e a r o n t h e O r d e r
b y th e K i n g o f E n g l a n d . B u t i n 1278 A l e x a n d e r , K i n g
o f Sc o ts , w e n t t o t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e f r i a r s ,
J e r o m e o f A s c o l i ( la t e r P o p e N ic h o l a s I V ) , w h o g r a n t e d
t h e Sc o ts a n in d e p e n d e n t v i c a r i a t e .
Elias
D u n s , Sc o tu s 's
u n c l e ,
b e c a m e t h e f i r s t V i c a r G e n e r a l , d i r e c t ly r e s p o n s ib le
t o t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r a n c i s c a n o r d e r . I n
1 2 9 6 , h o w e v e r , t h e v i c a r i a t e w a s o n c e m o r e s u b je c te d
t o th e E n g l i s h p r o v i n c e , b u t th e Sc ots w e r e p e r m i t t e d t o
r e t a i n t h e i r V i c a r G e n e r a l a n d w e r e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e
C u s t o d y o f N e w c a s t le .
W h a t h a p p e n e d b e tw e e n Sc o tu s 's
entry
i n t o t h e
O r d e r a n d h is o r d i n a t io n i n 1291 is a m a t t e r o f c o n
j e c t u r e , as is a ls o t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1291 a n d 1300
w h e n h e w a s a g a i n a t O x f o r d . L . M e i e r , b a s in g h is
s p e c u la t io n o n th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y ,
s u gg e sts t h a t Sc o tu s d e v o t e d s o m e e i g h t y e a r s t o t h e
s t u d y i n g a n d t e a c h i n g o f p h i lo s o p h y
(1283-91)
i n
E n g l a n d , a n d lo c a te s t h e C a m b r i d g e t e a c h i n g e p is o d e
d u r i n g th i s p e r i o d . T h e n i n e p r e s c r ib e d y e a rs d e v o t e d
t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e o lo g y a t O x f o r d , M e i e r p la c e s b e t w e e n
S c o t u s ' s o r d i n a t i o n a n d
1300.
C a l le b a u t , o n t h e o t h e r
h a n d , s tre sse s th e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r is .
Sc o t u s , a c c o r d i n g t o h is t h e o r y , m u s t h a v e s p e n t a t le a s t
f o u r y e a rs i n t h e s t u d y o f t h e o l o g y a t P a r is so m e t i m e
a f t e r 1 2 9 2 . T h e t e a c h i n g p e r io d a t C a m b r id g e c o u l d
h a v e f o l l o w e d t h i s . I f Sc o tu s d i d g o t o P a r is b e fo r e
1300
i t m i g h t e x p l a i n w h y th e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l , G o n -
s a lv u s o f
S p a i n ,
c o u l d s pe a k o f h a v i n g le a r n e d o f Sc o tu s 's
f itn e s s " p a r t l y f r o m lo n g e x p e r i e n c e ". W h e r e w o u l d t h e
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MV DUNS SCOTUS
S p a n i s h f r i a r h a v e m e t t h e y o u n g Sc o t i f n o t a t P a r is ,
w h e r e G o n s a lv u s h a d t a u g h t b o t h as a b a c h e l o r (c.1297)
a n d la t e r a s m a s t e r o f t h e o l o g y
(1302-3)?
A t a n y r a t e , b y 1300 Sc o tu s w a s b a c k a t t h e O x f o r d
c o n v e n t . I n a d d i t io n t o t h e t e s t im o n y o f t h e d o c u m e n t
o f t h e E n g l i s h P r o v i n c i a l m e n t io n e d a b o v e , Sc o tu s 's
p re s e n c e a t O x f o r d is c o n f i r m e d b y t h e f a c t th a t h e t o o k
p a r t as a b a c h e lo r i n t h e Ve spe ries o f F r i a r P h i l i p
B r i d l i n g t o n (o n e o f t h e p u b l i c d i s p u t a t io n s c o n n e c t e d w i t h
t h e l i c e n s in g o f a n e w m a s t e r ). P h i l i p , h o w e v e r , b e c a m e
a r e g e n t m a s te r a t O x f o r d a r o u n d
1300.
T h a t Sc o tu s
w a s c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e Sentences o f P e te r L o m b a r d a t
O x f o r d a r o u n d t h i s t i m e is a ls o a t te s t e d t o b y T h o m a s
S u t to n o . p . , a c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d h o s t i le c r i t ic o f Sc o tu s
w h o w a s a t t h e E n g l i s h u n i v e r s i t y b e t w e e n 1300 a n d
1 3 0 2 .
Sc o tu s n e v e r b e c a m e a m a s t e r a t O x f o r d , f o r h i s
s u p e r i o r s s e n t h i m o n t o P a r i s t o t a k e t h e d o c t o r a t e o r
m a s te rs h ip " o f t h e o lo g y th e r e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e W o r
c e s te r m a n u s c r i p t w e c a n i n f e r t h a t h e m u s t h a v e a r r i v e d
i n P a r is i n t i m e fo r t h e a u t u m n t e r m o f
1 3 0 2 .
A c c o r d
i n g t o P e l s t e r , s . j . , J o h n D u n s l e c t u r e d o n B o o k I o f t h e
Sentences f r o m 9 O c t o b e r
1302
to a b o u t A p r i l
1 3 0 3 .
H e
t h e n b e g a n i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h B o o k I V a n d f in is h e d h is
le c tu r e s o n i t i n J u n e o f t h a t y e a r . O r d i n a r i l y t h e
b a c h e l o r h a d t o b e g i n o n t h e d a y b e f o r e t h e f e a s t o f
S t D e n i s (10 O c t o b e r ) a n d e n d b y 2 9 J u n e , t h e fe a s t
o f St P e te r a n d St P a u l . I f h e h a d n o t f in i s h e d a l l h i s
l e c t u r e s o w i n g t o s i c k n e s s , a b s e n c e o r t h e l i k e , t h e
s e nte n tia riu s h a d t o m a k e u p d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r a s m a n y
le c tu r e s as h e h a d m is s e d . L e c t u re s o n B o o k s I I a n d I I I
( u p t o D i s t . xvn) m u s t h a v e o c c u r re d b e tw e e n 1303 a n d
1 3 0 4 , f o r o n 18 N o v e m b e r 1304 h e w a s r e c o m m e n d e d
b y t h e M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l , G o n s a lv u s , f o r t h e m a s t e r s h i p
a n d m u s t t h e r e f o r e h a v e c o m p l e te d t h e r e q u i s i t e le c t u r e s
o n t h e f o u r b o o k s o f th e Sen ten ce s.
A p p a r e n t l y Sc o tu s 's P a r is ia n l e c tu r e s w e r e i n t e r r u p t e d ,
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INTRODU CTION
b y t h e d e c re e o f K i n g P h i l i p t h e F a i r . T h e F r e n c h
m o n a r c h h a d q u a r r e l l e d w i t h P o p e B o n i f a c e V I I I o v e r
t h e t a x a t i o n o f c h u r c h p r o p e r t y t o s u p p o r t P h i l i p ' s
s t a n d i n g a r m ie s f o r h is w a r s w i t h E n g l a n d . W h e n th e
P o p e e x c o m m u n i c a t e d t h e K i n g , t h e l a t t e r a p p e a le d t o
a G e n e r a l C o u n c i l o f t h e C h u r c h t o d e p o se th e P o p e .
H e w o n o v e r t h e F r e n c h c l e r g y , t h e u n iv e r s it ie s a n d o th e rs
t o h is c a u s e . A g r e a t a n t i -p a p a l d e m o n s t r a t io n t o o k
p la c e o n 2 4 J u n e
1 3 0 3 .
M e n d i c a n t s o f P a r is m a r c h e d
i n t h e p r o c e s s io n . B e r t h o l d o f St D e n is , B i s h o p o f
O r le a n s a n d e x -C h a n c e l lo r o f t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f P a r is ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t w o D o m in i c a n s a n d t w o F r a n c is c a n s ,
a d d re s se d t h e m e e t in g . T h e f o l l o w i n g d a y r o y a l c o m
m is s io n e r s e x a m in e d e a c h f r i a r a t t h e F r a n c i s c a n c o n v e n t
t o f in d o u t w h e t h e r h e w a s w i t h o r a g a in s t t h e K i n g . So m e
s e v e n ty f r ia r s , m o s t ly F r e n c h , s id e d w i t h t h e K i n g , w h i l e
t h e re s t (s o m e e i g h t y o d d ) r e m a i n e d l o y a l t o th e P o p e .
A m o n g th e l a t t e r w e f in d t h e n a m e o f Sc o tu s . A c c o r d i n g
to r o y a l o r d e r s , t h e P o p e 's p a r t is a n s w e r e t o le a v e F r a n c e
w i t h i n th r e e d a y s . B o n i f a c e c o u n t e r e d w i t h t h e B u l l o f
15 A u g u s t
1 3 0 3 ,
i n w h i c h h e s u sp e n d e d t h e U n i v e r s i t y 's
r i g h t t o g iv e d e g re e s i n t h e o l o g y , c a n o n a n d c i v i l l a w .
T h is b a n w a s w i t h d r a w n b y P o p e B e n e d ic t X i n A p r i l
1 3 0 4 , a n d s h o r t l y a f te r w a r d s t h e K i n g f a c i l i t a t e d t h e
r e t u r n o f s tu d e n t s .
W h e r e Sc o tu s w e n t d u r i n g t h is e x i l e is u n k n o w n .
E n g l a n d ,
B o l o g n a a n d C o l o g n e h a v e a l l b e e n s u g g e s te d .
P e ls te r b e lie v e s t h a t th e e x i le m u s t h a v e b e e n s h o r t a n d
t h a t Sc o tu s w a s s o o n b a c k i n P a r is c o m m e n t i n g o n
B o o k s I I a n d I I I a t le a s t b y 1 3 0 4 . H e e i th e r f in i s h e d h is
le c tu r e s o n B o o k I I I b y J u n e o f t h a t y e a r , o r p e r h a p s
c o n t in u e d t o le c t u re d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r u n t i l t h e f o l lo w
i n g Se p t e m b e r . T h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t s o f B o o k I I I , P e ls te r
m a i n t a i n s , w e r e c o m p l e t e d a t a n o t h e r t i m e i n E n g l a n d .
B e th a t as i t m a y , b y N o v e m b e r 1304 Sc o tu s m u s t h a v e
c o m p l e t e d a l l o f h is r e q u i re m e n t s a s a bachelor f o r m a t us .
I n f a c t , h e w a s th e r e s p o n d e n t i n G i le s o f L i g n y 's d is pu ta tio
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XVI DU NS SCOTUS
i n a u l a ( w h i c h f o l l o w e d t h e
vesperies
as a p a r t o f t h e f o r
m a l i t ie s connected w i t h G i le s 's i n c e p t io n as m a s t e r
o f t h e o l o g y ) . T o p a r t i c i p a t e i n s u c h a d i s p u t a t i o n ,
h o w e v e r , S c o t u s h a d t o h a v e c o m p l e t e d h i s l e c t u r e s
o n t h e Sentences b e fo r e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e a u t u m n
t e r m .
P r o b a b l y S c o tu s 's o w n i n c e p t io n as m a s t e r t o o k p l a c e
e a r l y i n
1 3 0 5 .
T h a t t h e c u s t o m a r y i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n t h e
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e le c tu r e s o n t h e Sentences a n d b e i n g
l ic e n s e d as m a s te r ( fo u r y e a r s a c c o r d i n g t o u n i v e r s i t y
s ta tu te s ) d i d n o t in t e r v e n e w a s d u e p r o b a b l y t o o n e o f
t h e m a n y p r iv i le g e s g r a n t e d t o t h e f r i a r s .
T h e f a c t t h a t w e h a v e b u t o n e Q u o d l i b e t o f S c o t u s
a rg u e s t h a t h e m a y n o t h a v e t a u g h t as r e g e n t m a s t e r f o r
m o r e t h a n o n e y e a r . G l o r i e u x d a te s t h i s 1 3 0 6 - 7 , t h o u g h
i f Sc o tu s b e g a n t e a c h in g i n t h e a u t u m n o f 1305 h i s
r e g e n c y c o u l d h a v e te r m i n a t e d i n
1 3 0 6 .
P e l s te r b e lie v e s
h e r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d i n t h a t y e a r a n d c o m p o s e d t h e
L e c tu ra c om p le ta , b u t th i s is l i t t l e m o r e t h a n a s u r m is e . H e
m a y h a v e g o n e d i r e c t l y f r o m P a r is t o C o l o g n e . A t a n y
r a t e ,
t h e la s t r e c o r d o f Sc o tu s 's l i f e i n d ic a t e s t h a t h e w a s
i n C o lo g n e i n F e b r u a r y 1 3 0 8 , a n d i f h e h a d b e e n t e a c h i n g
d u r i n g th e c u r r e n t s e m e s te r, as t h e t i t l e " l e c t o r C o l o n i a e "
in d i c a t e s , h e m u s t h a v e b e g u n a t le a s t b y t h e a u t u m n o f
1 3 0 7 .
V a r i o u s r e as on s h a v e b e e n a s s ig n e d f o r h is p re s e n c e i n
C o l o g n e . C a l le b a u t a n d o th e r s h a v e a r g u e d t h a t t h e
M i n i s t e r G e n e r a l o f t h e F r ia r s s e n t h i m t h e r e t o e s ca p e
th e c o n se q u e n ce s o f h is o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e K i n g 's a c t i o n
a g a i n s t t h e K n i g h t s T e m p l a r s o r t h a t Sc o tu s 's d e p a r t u r e
w a s c o n n e c t e d i n s o m e w a y w i t h h is d e f e n c e o f t h e -d o c
t r i n e o f t h e I m m a c u l a t e C o n c e p t io n a g a in s t i t s D o m i n i c a n
a d v e r s a r ie s . L o n g p r e su gg es ts a m o r e p r o s a ic r e a s o n ,
a n d o n e p e rh a p s n e a re r th e t r u t h , n a m e l y t h e c o m m o n
c u s t o m i n t h e O r d e r o f s e n d in g th e m o r e b r i l l i a n t l e c t o r s
f r o m o n e s t u d y h o u s e t o a n o t h e r i n r o t a t i o n . A t a n y
r a t e ,
Sc o tu s s e r v e d a b r i e f l e c t o r s h i p a t C o l o g n e . T h e
(2,322)
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I NTR O D U CTI O N XV11
t r a d i t i o n a l d a t e o f h i s d e a t h i s 8 N o v e m b e r
1 3 0 8 .
H i s
r e m a i n s a r e s t i l l v e n e r a t e d i n C o l o g n e .
I t is d e p l o r a b l e t h a t Sc o t u s 's e a r ly d e a t h le f t a l m o s t
e v e r y o n e o f h i s g r e a t w o r k s i n a n unfinished s t a te . B u t
so g r e a t w a s h is fa m e a n d f o l lo w i n g t h a t h is d is c ip le s
m a d e e v e r y e f f o r t to p u t h is w r i t in g s b e f o re th e p u b l ic .
W i t h a p p a r e n t ly m o r e h a s te t h a n p r u d e n c e , t h e y s h u f f le d
to g e t h e r e a r l i e r a n d la t e r r e d a c t io n s , in s e r t e d p a r ts t o b e
d e l e t e d a l o n g s i d e t h e i r c o r r e c t e d s u b s t i t u t e s a n d i n c o r
p o r a t e d n o t e s f o u n d i n t h e m a r g i n s o r o n s c a t t e r e d s l i p s
s a n d w ic h e d b e t w e e n t h e p a ge s o f t h e m a s t e r . I t is o n l y
a f te r s o m e t h i r t y o d d y e a rs o f in te n s e r e s e a rc h b y m e n
l i k e P e l s t e r , P e l z e r , L o n g p r e , Balic a n d o t h e r s t h a t s o m e
s e m b l a n c e o f o r d e r h a s b e g u n t o e m e r g e f r o m t h e c h a o s .
N o t o n l y h a v e m a n y t re a t is e s b e e n p r o v e d s p u r io u s , b u t
e v e n th e c e r t a i n l y a u t h e n t i c w r i t in g s a p p e a r i n a n e w
l ig h t . T o d a y t h e f o l l o w i n g w o r k s a r e a s c r ib e d to Sc o tu s .
THEOLOGICAL WORKS
I . C o m m e n t a r i e s o n the Sentences
S c o t u s
c o m m e n t e d
o n the Sentences o f P e t e r L o m b a r d a t
l e a s t t w i c e , o n c e a t O x f o r d a n d a g a i n a t P a r i s . F r o m
t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y d o w n t o o u r o w n , t h e s e t w o
c o m m e n t a r i e s w e r e r e f e r r e d t o r e s p e c t i v e l y a s t h e O p u s
oxon iense ( o r O rd i n a t io ) a n d t h e O p u s p a r is i e n s e ( o r R e p o r la t a
p a r is ie n s ia ). M o d e r n re s e a r c h h a s n o t o n l y r e v e a l e d th e
e x is te n c e o f o t h e r u n e d i te d r e p o r t s o f th e s e le c t u re s o n t h e
Sentences b u t h a s re d is c o v e r e d t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e te r m s
o rd in a tio a n d re p o rta tio . T h e o r i g i n a l le c t u r e o f a m a s te r
o r b a c h e l o r a s c o p i e d d o w n b y o n e o f h is s t u d e n ts , o r
s o m e s c r ib e , is k n o w n a s a re p o rta tio . I f s u c h a " r e p o r t e d
v e r s i o n " w a s la t e r c h e c k e d b y t h e t e a c h e r h i m s e l f , i t is
r e f e r r e d t o as a re p o rta tio e x a m in a ta . I n m a n y c ase s t h e
a u t h o r w o u l d re v is e h is o r i g i n a l le c t u r e s b e fo r e p r e
s e n t in g t h e m f o r f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n . T h i s la s t r e d a c t io n
(2,322)
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X V 1 1 1 D U N S S C O T U S
o r fin is h e d p r o d u c t is k n o w n as a n o rd in a tio , in a s m u c h as
i t r e p re s e n ts t h e f in a l d r a f t as o r d e r e d o r a r ra n g e d b y t h e
a u th o r h i m se lf. A s a p p l ie d t o S co tu s 's C om m entary on the
Sentences, the Ord ina tio , to w h ic h the re d a c to r o f the A ss is i
m a n u s c r i p t , u s e d b y u s
(Communalis
137) ,
h a d a c c e ss ,
is a r e v is io n o f th e O x f o r d le c tu r e s . I n t e r n a l e v id e n c e
s u g g e s t s t h a t s o m e p a r t s o f t h e r e d a c t i o n a n t e d a t e t h e
P a r i s l e c t u r e s , w h i l e f o r o t h e r p o r t i o n s S c o t u s m a d e u s e
o f a repo rta tio o f th e la t te r . Th e Opus oxoniense as w e
h av e i t i n t h e W a d d i n g a n d Vives e d i t i o n s i s n o t t h e
p u r e O r d i n a t i o , h o w e v e r , b u t c o n t a i n s o t h e r e l e m e n t s .
O n e o f t h e p r i n c i p a l t a s k s o f t h e S c o t i s t i c C o m m i s s i o n
u n d e r t h e d ir e c t io n o f C a r l B a l ic ,
o . f . m .
a t R o m e i s t o
re c o n s t ru c t t h e t e x t o f
th e
o r i g i n a l O rd in a tio a n d s e p a r a te
i t f r o m th e m a jo r a n d m in o r a d d it io n s ta k e n f ro m o th e r
w r it in g s o f D u n s Sc o tu s . T h e e n o r m it y o f th is ta s k c a n
b e r e a lis e d f ro m th e f a c t t h a t i t w a s o n ly a f te r t w e lv e
y e a r s t h a t B a l i c a n d h i s m a n y c o l l a b o r a t o r s p u b l i s h e d
t h e f i r s t s m a l l f r a c t i o n o f t h e m o n u m e n t a l O r d i n a t i o i n
th e t w o i n i t ia l vo lu m e s o f th e c r i t ic a l Va t ic a n e d i t io n o f
the Opera omn ia o f Sco tus (R om e 1950).
I n a d d it io n t o th e O rd in a tio , w h i c h c o n s t itu te s th e
p r in c ip a l p a r t o f the Opus oxoniense , the re is the Lec tu ra
oxoniensis [Opera om nia , V a t ic a n e d ., v o l . xvi) o n t h e
f i r s t a n d second books o f the Sentences. Som et im es re
f e r r e d t o as P r i m a
lec tura,
i t is b e lie v e d t o b e a re p o rta tio o f
Sc o tu s 's f ir s t le c tu re s a t Ox fo rd . S t i l l a n o th e r re p o rta tio is
t h e L e ctu ra in I I I Se nte ntia ru m ( s t i l l u n e d i te d ). I t is a lso
c a lle d th e L ec tu ra com p leta i n c o n t r a d i s t in c t io n t o t h e
P a r is ia n re po rta tio o f th e t h i r d b o o k w h i c h en ds a b r u p t ly
a f t e r D i s t .
x v n .
A n o th e r set o f q u e s tio n s o n th e f ir s t tw o b o o ks o f th e
Sentences goes by na m e o f Add itiones m agnae. U n l ik e the
"s m a l l a d d i t io n s " c o n s is tin g o f a p a r a g r a p h o r s o, th es e
a r e a s e r i e s o f c o m p l e t e q u e s t i o n s i n t e n d e d b y S c o t u s t o
s u p p l e m e n t h i s p r e v i o u s c o u r s e s o n t h e f i r s t a n d s e c o n d
b o ok s o f
th e
Sentences. Th e f i rs t b o o k o f
th e
Add itiones w as
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INTRODUCTION
XIX
e d i t e d b y W a d d i n g a n d Vives a s p a r t o f t h e R e p o r t a t a
p a r i s i e n s i a .
T h e d i f fe r e n t r e d a c t io n s o f t h e re p orta tio n es o f P a r is
l e c t u r e s a r e n o w g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i s e d t o b e d u e t o a
d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e s c r i b e s w h o r e p o r t e d t h e l e c t u r e s o r t o
c h a n g e s m a d e l a t e r , p e r h a p s e v e n a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f
Sc o tu s h im s e l f . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f th e s e re po rta tio ne s
is t h a t a u t h e n t i c a t e d b y Sc o tu s a n d k n o w n as t h e
R e p o r t a t i o m a g n a o r R e p o r t a t i o examinata ( u n e d i t e d ) . O n e
r e d a c t io n o f th e R e p o rta tio p a ris ie n s is w a s e d i t e d a t P a r is
(1517-18)
a n d d i f f e r s c o n s id e r a b ly f r o m t h e v e r s io n f o u n d
i n W a d d i n g a n d V i v e s . T h e l a t t e r is a m i x t u r e o f v a r io u s
e le m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e A d d itio n e s
magnae
a n d e v e n p a r ts
o f t h e O p u s oxoniense (e s p e c i a lly i n t h e t h i r d b o o k ) .
2 .
D i s p u t a t i o n s
S c o t u s h e l d s e v e r a l i s o l a t e d d i s p u t a t i o n s b o t h a s
b a c h e l o r a n d as m a s te r . H e f u n c t io n e d i n t h e f o r m e r
ro le a t t h e Vesperies of P h i l i p o f B r i d l i n g t o n , o . f . m . i n O x f o r d
a s w e l l a s i n t h e d is p u ta tio i n a u la o n t h e o c c a s io n o f G i le s
o f L i g n y ' s p r o m o t io n as m a s te r i n P a r is . T h e d i s p u t e
w i t h P e te r G o d i n , o . p . o n th e p r i n c i p l e o f i n d i v i d u a t i o n
a s w e l l a s t h e Qu a e stio d is p u t a ta
de
f o r m a l it a t e , r e f e r r e d t o
b y A d a m Wodam as L o g ic a Sc o ti, s ee m t o b e t h e w o r k o f
Sc o tu s as m a s t e r . M o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n th e s e is o l a te d ,
a n d fo r t h e m o s t p a r t u n e d i t e d , d i s p u t a t io n s a r e t h e
Quaestiones quod libe ta les a n d th e C o lla t ione s pa ris ienses e t
oxon ienses. T h e f o r m e r c o m p r i s e t w e n t y -o n e q u e s t io n s
( th o u g h t h e r e is so m e d o u b t as t o t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f t h e
t w e n t y - f i r s t ) d i s p u t e d b y Sc o tu s as r e g e n t m a s t e r i n
P a r i s , a n d r e p r e s e n t o n e o f t h e l a te s t a n d m o s t m a t u r e o f
Sc o tu s 's w o r k s . T h e C o lla tio n es a r e m u c h s h o r te r q u e s
t i o n s .
L i t t l e a n d P e l s te r c o n s id e r t h e m as "p r i v a t e
d is p u t a t i o n s o f t h e s tu d e n t s i n th e F r a n c i s c a n h o u s e . . .
i n w h i c h t h e b a c h e lo r D u n s S c o tu s , p r o b a b l y a s m a s te r
o f s tu d e n ts , t o o k a l e a d i n g p a r t " . A c c o r d i n g t o Balic
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XX DUNS SCOTUS
t h e y a r e f o r ty - s i x i n n u m b e r , n i n e t e e n o f w h i c h w e r e
h e l d i n P a r is a n d th e re s t i n O x f o r d . O n l y f o r t y a r e
f o u n d i n
Wadding-Vives
( o n e b e i n g p r i n t e d a m o n g t h e
i n a u t h e n t i c Q u a e s t i o n e s
miscellaneae de f o r m a l it a t ib u s ,
q . I
V i v e s ,
v . 5 , 3 3 8 - 5 3 ) . O f t h e r e m a i n i n g s i x , f iv e h a v e
b e e n e d i t e d b y H a r r i s {D u n s Sco tu s, v . 2 . , O x f o r d 1927)
a n d Balic l a t e r m a d e a n o t h e r e d i t i o n o f t h e f i r s t t h r e e
Collationes
f o u n d i n H a r r i s
(Bogoslovni
V e s t n i k r x ,
1 9 3 9 ,
1 8 5 - 2 1 9 ) .
P h i l o s o p h i c a l W o r k s
T h e T r a c t a t u s de primo p r in c ip io is a s h o r t b u t i m p o r t a n t
c o m p e n d i u m o f Sc o tu s 's n a t u r a l t h e o lo g y . I t se e m s t o b e
o n e o f h is la t e s t w o r k s a n d d r a w s h e a v i l y o n t h e O rd in a t io .
I t is a v a i l a b l e i n t w o m o d e r n e d i t i o n s , t h a t o f M . M u e l le r ,
o . f . m . ( F r e i b u r g im B r e i s g a u 1941) a n d E . R o c h e , o . f . m .
(St B o n a v e n t u r e , N . Y . , 1 9 4 9 ). A ls o a u t h e n t ic a r e t h e
Qu a estio n es su b t ilis s im a e i n M e t a p h y s ic a m A r i s t o t e l i s , a l t h o u g h
t h e la s t t w o b o o k s ( X a n d X I I ) f o u n d i n th e W a d d i n g
a n d Vives e d i t io n s a r e s p u r io u s . O n c e b e l i e v e d t o b e a n
e a r li e r w o r k o f Sc o tu s , i t se e m s t o h a v e b e e n c o m p o s e d
o r a t le a s t r e v is e d a b o u t th e t i m e S c o tu s w a s w o r k i n g o n
t h e O rd in a t io . L i k e th e la t t e r , t h e te x t o f th e s e q u e s t io n s
as f o u n d i n o u r e d i t io n s is i n a d e p l o r a b l e s t a t e .
S o m e w h a t le ss c e r t a i n is t h e q u e s t io n o f t h e a u t h e n t i
c i t y o f t h e Q u a e s t i o n e s i n l i b r o s A r i s t o t e l i s D e
a n i m a ,
w h i c h
i n a d d i t i o n t o d o c t r i n a l d is c re p a n c ie s w i t h t h e c e r t a i n l y
a u t h e n t ic w o r k s , c o n ta i n s p assa ge s t h a t a r e f o u n d l i t e r a l l y
i n G o n s a lv u s o f S p a i n .
O f t h e l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s f o u n d i n t h e W a d d i n g a n d
Vives e d i t i o n s , t h e f o l lo w i n g a r e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d as
g e n u i n e w o r k s o f S c o t u s : Qu ae stio ne s su pe r U n i v e r s a lia
P o r p h y r i i ,
Quaest iones in
librum
P raed icam en to rum , Quaes tiones
i n I e t I I l ib r u m
P e r i h e r m e n i a s ,
Opus secundum s ive oc to quaes
t i ones i n duos l i b ros Pe r ihe rmen ias , Quaes t i ones i n l i b ros E l e n -
c h o r u m .
T h e r e a r e s t i l l s o m e d i f f i c u l t ie s c o n n e c t e d w i t h
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INTRODUCTION
XXI
th es e w o r k s , h o w e v e r , so t h a t p e r h a p s th e
final
w o r d o n
t h e i r a u t h e n t i c i t y s t i l l r e m a i n s t o b e s a id .
E v e n m o r e d u b i o u s a re t h e Th e ore m a ta . I n t e r n a l
e v id e n c e m i l i t a t e s v e r y s t r o n g ly a g a i n s t th e i r a u t h e n t ic i t y ,
t h o u g h e x t e r n a l re a so n s f a v o u r i t . E v e n i f D u n s Sc o tu s
is d e f in i te l y e s ta b l is h e d as t h e i r a u t h o r , th e p r o b l e m o f
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t i l l r e m a i n s , f o r t h i s s m a l l t r a c t see m s t o
b e s im p l y n o te s o r o u t lin e s o f p r o b l e m s , r a t h e r t h a n a
f i n i s h e d c o m p o s i t i o n .
T h e f o l lo w i n g p h i l o s o p h ic a l w o r k s f o u n d i n t h e
W a d d i n g a n d Vives c o l l e c t i o n s , h o w e v e r , a r e d e f i n i t e l y
s p u r i o u s : Grammatica s pe cu la tiv a ( Th o m a s o f E r f u r t ) ,
Quaest iones in librum I e t I I p r io r u m Analyticorum Aristotelis
( u n k n o w n S c o t is t ) , Qu ae stio ne s i n lib r u m I et
IIposteriorum
A n a ly tic o r u m ( J o h n o f C o r n w a l l ) , E x p o s it io e t qu ae stio ne s i n
V I I I l i b r o s Physicorum A r is to te lis ( M a r s i l i u s o f I n g h e n ) ,
Meteorologicorum libri q ua tu o r ( a u t h o r u n k n o w n ) , E x p o s itio
i n X I I l ib ro s Metaphysicorum A r i s t o t e l i s s e u M e t a p h y s i c a
t e x t u a l i s ( A n t o n i u s A n d r e a s ) , C o n c l u s i o n e s
utilissimae
ex
l ib r i s M e ta p h y s ic o r u m A r is t o t e l is c o lle c ta e ( G o n s a l v u s o f
Spa in ) , Quaes t i ones d i spu ta tae de rerum p r in c ip i o (Vitalis d u
F o u r ) ,
Quaest iones miscel laneae de formalitatibus—except
t h e f i r s t question—(Nicholas o f L y r a a n d W i l l i a m o f
A l n w i c k ) , a n d D e c o g nitio n e D e i tra c ta tu s im p e rfe c tu s .
T h e e d i t io n s m o s t f re q u e n t ly u s e d a r e t h e s e . Ope ra
o m n ia , e d i te d b y L u k e W a d d i n g , o . f . m . ( L y o n s
1639)
i n
tw e l v e v o l u m e s . I n a d d i t io n to t h e t e x t , t h i s e d i t io n
c o n ta i n s n o t e s , s u m m a r ie s a n d c o m m e n t a r ie s b y fa m o u s
S c o t i s t s . T h e Vives e d i t i o n ( P a r i s 1891-5) i n t w e n t y -
f o u r v o lu m e s is p r a c t i c a l l y a r e p r i n t o f W a d d i n g w i t h o u t
t h e la t t e r 's in d ic e s . T h e n e w c r i t i c a l e d i t io n o f t h e
Op era o m n ia , p r e p a r e d b y t h e S c o t is t ic C o m m is s io n i n
R o m e a n d p u b l i s h e d b y th e V a t i c a n C i t y P r e ss , w a s
b e g u n i n 1950 a n d is s t i l l i n c o m p l e t e . O f t h e s in g le w o r k s
w e h a v e th e t w o m o d e r n e d i t io n s o f th e Tra c ta tu s de primo
p r in c ip io m e n t io n e d a b o v e . T h e e d i t i o n o f R o c h e is
a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t io n . T h e f i r s t t w o
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XX11 DU N S SCOTUS
b o o k s
o f t h e
Op u s
o x o n i e n s e
w e r e e d i t e d
b y M .
F e r n a n d e z
G a r c i a , o . f . m . u n d e r t h e t i t l e C o m m e n t a r i a o x o n i e n s i a
( Q u a r a c c h i ,
1 9 1 2 - 1 4 ) a n d t h e
Q u a e s t i o n e s q u o d l i b e t a l e s
o f
th e W a d d i n g e d i t io n are available i n a p h o to -o f fs e t r e p r i n t
b y th e F r a n c is c a n I n s t it u t e (St B o n a v e n tu r e , N . Y . , 1 9 5 0).
S E L E C T B I B L I O G R A P H Y
T h e b e s t b i b l i o g r a p h y t o d a t e i s t h a t p r e p a r e d f o r t h e
S c o t i s t i c C o m m i s s i o n b y O d u l f u s Schafer, o . f. m . , B ib l io -
g r a p h i a
d e
v i t a , o p e r ib u s
e t
d o c t r in a I o h a n n i s
D u n s
S c o l i
D o c t o r i s
S u b t i l i s
a c
M a r i a n i
sa e c u lo ru m X I X - X X , R o m a e :
O r b i s C a t h o l i c u s , H e r d e r , 1955. A ls o re c o m m e n d e d is
th e b ib l io g r a p h y o f C . R . S. H a r r i s , D un s Scotus, v o l . i ,
O x f o r d : C la r e n d o n P re ss, 1927, a n d t h a t o f M a u r ic e
G r a j e w s k i , o . f . m . , " S c o t i s t i c B i b l i o g r a p h y o f t h e L a s t
Decade (1929-39)" , F ranc iscan Stud ies,
v o l s ,
i a n d 11
( 1 94 1 - 2 ) .
B e t t o n i ,
E . , o . f .m . , Duns Scotus : The Bas ic P rinc ip les
of h is Phi losophy, t r a n s , a n d e d . B . B o n a n s e a, o . f .m . ,
W a s h in g to n , D.C. : C a t h o lic U n i v e r s i t y o f A m e r ic a ,
1961.
C a m p b e l l , B . J . , o . f. m . , Th e P ro ble m o f One o r P lu ra l
Substantial Forms
in M a n as
Found
in the W orks o f St Thom as
A qu in as a n d J o hn D u n s Scotus, P h ila d e lp h ia : U n i v e r s i ty
o f P e n n s y lv a n ia , 1940.
C o p le s to n , F . C ,
s . j . ,
A H is to ry o f P h ilo so p hy , v o l .
h
( M e d ie v a l P h ilo s o p h y f r o m A u g u s t in e t o Sc o tu s ),
L o n d o n : B u r n s , Oa te s a n d W a s h b o u rn e ,
1950.
D a y , S . J . , o . f . m . , I n t u i t iv e C o g n i t i o n : A K e y to t h e
S i g n i f i c a n c e
o f
th e L a t e r Sc h o l a s t ic s ,
S t
B o n a v e n t u r e ,
N . Y . :
F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e , 1947.
G i l s o n , £ . , T h e S p i r i t o f M e d i e v a l P h i l o s o p h y , t r a n s .
A . H . C . D o w n e s. L o n d o n : She ed a n d
W a r d , 1936.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Xxili
G r a je w s k i , M . J . ,
o . f .m . ,
Th e F o r m a l D is t in c t io n o f D u n s
Scotus, W a s h i n g t o n , D.C. : C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y o f
A m e r i c a ,
1 9 4 4 .
M i c k l e m ,
N . , R e a so n a n d R e v e la tio n : A Qu e stio n f r o m
D u n s Sco tu s, E d i n b u r g h : N e l s o n , 1953 ; se e a l s o A .
B.
W o l t e r , " D u n s Sc o tu s a n d t h e N e c e s s ity o f R e v e a le d
K n o w l e d g e . P r o lo g u e to th e O rd in a tio o f J o h n D u n s
S c o t u s " , F r a n c i s c a n S t u d i e s , x i , n . 3 - 4 ( S e p t . -D e c . 1951,)
2 3 1 - 7 2 .
S a i n t -M a u r i c e , B e r a u d d e , J o h n D u n s Sc o tu s : A
Te ache r f o r o ur Tim e s , t r a n s . C . D u f f y , o . f . m . , St B o n a -
v e n t u r e , N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n In s t i t u t e ,
1 9 5 5 .
S h a r p , D . E . , F ra n c is c a n P h ilo s o p hy a t O x f o r d i n th e
Th ir te e n th C e n tu ry , O x f o r d : U n i v e r s i t y P re s s , 1 9 3 0 .
S h i r c e l , C . L . , o . f . m . , Th e U n iv o c ity o f the C on ce pt o f
B e in g i n the P h ilo so p h y o f J o h n D u n s Sc otu s, W a s h i n g t o n ,
D . C . : C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y o f A m e r i c a , 1 9 4 2 .
V i e r , P . C , o . f . m . , E v id en ce a n d I t s F u n c t io n A c c o rd in g
to J o h n D u n s Sco tus, St B o n a v e n t u r e , N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n
I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 5 1 .
W o l t e r , A . B . , o . f . m . , Th e Tra n sc en d en ta ls a n d Th e i r
F u n c tio n i n the M e ta p h y sic s o f D u n s Sc otu s, S t B o n a v e n t u r e ,
N . Y . : F r a n c i s c a n I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 4 6 .
K l i b a n s k y , R . , C o m m e n ta riu m de E c k a r d i m a g is te rio
(Magistri E c k a rd i Op era L a t i n a , v o l .
x i i i ,
p p .
xxxf.,
L i p s i a e 1936) p r o v i d e s c o n f i r m a t io n o f Sc o tu s 's p re s e n ce
i n P a r is d u r i n g t h e s c h o la s t ic y e a r
1302-03
a n d s h o w s
t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y S c o t u s , as b ac ca la re us Se n te n tia ru m ,
t o o k p a r t i n t h e fa m o u s d i s p u t a t i o n b e tw e e n t h e
F r a n c is c a n M a s t e r G o n s a lv u s a n d t h e D o m i n i c a n
M a s t e r E c k h a r t .
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1
C O N C E R N I N G M E T A P H Y S I C S
Summary
i .
Metaphysics, the science of the transcendentals
2.
Concept and articulation of the transcendental
3. Primacy of be in g among the other transcendentals
4. On the deduction of the attributes of be in g
5. Being as the subject and God as the goal o f metaphysics
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DUNS SCOTUS
[ I .
DE m e t a p h y s i c a ]
[ i .
METAPHYSICA,
UT
SCIENTIA TRANSCENDENTIUM]
*
Necesse est esse
a l i q u a m
sc ien t iam un i ve rsa lem, quae
per
se
cons idere t i l ia t rans cend ent ia ,
et
han c sc ien t iam
vocamus metaphys icam, quae d ic i tu r a m e t a , q u o d est
t rans, et
physis scie ntia , q uas i transcenden s sc ient ia,
quia est
de
t ranscend ent ibus.
[ 2 .
DE
TRANSCENDENTIS NOTIONE EJUSQUE D IVISIONE] f
Sed tunc est dub ium, qua l ia sunt
i l i a
p raed i ca ta , quae
d i c u n t u r
de Deo
[ f o r m a l i t e r ] ,
ut
sapiens, bonus,
etc.
Respondeo
:
ens p r ius d i v id i t u r
in
i n f i n i t u m
et
finitum
q u a m
in decern p rae d ica me nta , q u ia
a l t e r u m
i s to rum,
sci l icet
[ens]
finitum,
est
c o m m u n e
ad
decern ge ner a.
Ergo
q u a e c u m q u e
conven iun t en t i ut
ind i f fe rens
ad
finitum et infinitum,
vel
ut est
proprium
enti infinito,
conveniunt sibi non ut
determinatur
ad genus sed ut
prius, et per consequens, ut est transcendens et est extra
omne
genus. Quaecumque sunt
communia Deo
et
creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indif
ferens ad finitum et infinitum ; ut enim conveniunt Deo
sunt infinita, ut creaturae sunt finita. Ergo [ilia] per
prius conveniunt enti quam ens dividatur in decern
genera, et per consequens quodcumque tale est trans
cendens.
Sed tunc est aliud dubium, quomodo ponitur sa-
* Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, prol., n. 5
(Vives,
v o l .
v i i ,
5a).
t Opus oxoniense,
1
dist.
v m, q. iii
(Assisi 137,
f.
50va
;
cf. Vives,
v o l .
ix, 597('-598<<).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 2
[ I . CONCERNING METAPHYSICS]
[ i . METAPHYSICS, THE SCIENCE OF THE
TRANSCENDENTALS]
There must necessarily exist some universal science
w h ich considers the transcendentals as such. This
science we call m eta ph ys ics , from m e t a , wh ich
means b e y o n d , an d th e science of na tur e .1 I t is, as
it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned
with the transcendentals.
[ 2 .
CONCEPT AND ARTICULATION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL]
Now a doubt arises as to what kind of predicates are
those wh ich are predicated form al ly of
Go d ,
for instance,
w i s e ,
g o o d , an d the l ike. I answer tha t before
b e i n g
is divided into the ten categories, it is divided
in to in fin ite an d finite. Fo r the latte r, na m ely finite
being, is com m on to the ten genera. W hatev er pertains
to b e i n g ,
then,
in so far as it remains indifferent to
finite an d in fin ite , or as pro per to the In fin ite B eing , does
not belong to i t as determined to a genus, but prior to
any such determination, and therefore as transcendental
an d outside any genus. W hatev er [predicates] are
common to God and creatures are of such
k i n d ,
perta in
ing as they do to being in its indifference to what is
inf init e an d f inite. Fo r in so far as they pe rta in to Go d
they are infinite, whereas in so far as they belong to
creatures they are finite. T he y belong to b e in g ,
then,
prior to the div is ion into the ten genera. A ny th in g of
this
k i n d ,
consequently, is transcendental.
B ut then another dou bt arises. H o w can wisd om be
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3 DUNS SCOTUS
pientia transcendens, cum non sit communis omnibus
entibus, [e t transcendentia v iden tur com m unia o m nibu s] .
Respondeo, sicut de rat ione [generis] generalissimi non
est habere sub se plures species, sed non habere aliud
supraveniens genus sicut hoc
praedicamentum
Qu a n d o ,
quia non habet supraveniens genus, est general issimum,
licet paucas habeat species aut nullas, ita transcendens
quodcumque nul lum habet genus sub quo cont ineatur.
Unde de rat ione transcendentis est non habere praedica-
tum
supraveniens nis i ens. Sed q u o d
ipsum
s it com m une
ad multa inferio ra, hoc acc idi t . H oc p atet ex al io :
quia ens non tantum habet passiones simplices converti-
biles,
sicut
u n u m , v e r u m ,
et
b o n u m ,
sed habet al iquas
passiones ubi opposita dist inguuntur contra se, sicut
necesse esse
vel
poss ibile, actus
vel
poten t ia , et
hu jusm odi .
Sicut
autem
passiones conv ertibiles sunt transcendentes
q uia consequuntur ens inq ua ntu m non de term ina tur ad
aliquod genus, ita passiones disjunctae sunt transcen
dentes ; et utrumque m em br um i l lius d is junc t i est t rans
cendens, qu ia neutrum determinat suum determinabile
ad
certum
genus ; et
tamen
u n u m me mb ru m i l l i u s
d is junct i formaliter est speciale non conveniens nisi uni
ent i ,
sicut necesse esse in ista divisione necesse esse vel
possibi le esse, et inf initum in ista divisione f initum vel
i n f i n i t um , et sic de ali is.
I t a etiam potest sapientia esse transcendens et quod
cumque al iud quod est commune Deo et creaturae, l icet
a l iquod ta le d icatur de so lo Deo, a l iquod autem de Deo
et a l iq ua crea tura. N o n opo rtet au tem transcendens ut
transcendens dici de quocumque ente, nisi sit con-
vert ib i le cum
primo
transcendente, scil icet ente.
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 3
considered a transcendental i f i t is not common to al l
beings, for transcendentals seem to be common to all?
I answer th at ju st as it is no t o f the natu re o f a supreme
genus to have ma ny species con tained und er i t, b u t it is of
its nature not to have any genus over and above it (the
category o f w h e n , for instance, is a supreme genus
since it has no genus over and above it, although it has
few, if any, species contained under it), so also whatever
is not contained under any genus is transcendental.
Hen ce, not to have any predicate above i t except b e in g
pertains to the v ery no tio n of a transcendental. T h a t i t
be common to many inferior not ions, however, is purely
i nc identa l .
T his is ev ident too fro m the fact that b e in g
possesses not only attributes which are coextensive with
i t ,
such as o n e , t r u e and g o o d , bu t a lso at tr ibutes
which are opposed to one another such as
possible-or-
necessary , ac t-o r- po ten cy , and suchlike.
But if the coextensive attributes are transcendental
because they pe rtain to b e in g as no t determ ined to a
definite genus, then the disjunctive attributes are trans
cenden tal too. A n d bo th mem bers of the disjun ction are
transcendental since neither determines its determinable
eleme nt to a de finite genus. Nev ertheless, one mem ber
of the disjunction is proper and pertains formally to
one be ing alone , for instance, nece ssary in the dis
jun ct i on necessary-or-possible , or in f i n i t e in the
d isjunct ion f in i te - o r - in f in i te ,and so also w it h the others.
A n d so w is d o m , or an yth ing else, for that m atter,
which is common to God and creatures, can be trans
cendental .
A transcendental, howev er, m ay also be
predicated of God alone, or again i t may be predicated
ab ou t G o d an d some crea ture. I t is no t necessary,
then,
that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated
of every being, unless it be coextensive with the first of
the transcendentals, nam ely b e in g .
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4 DUNS SCOTUS
[ 3 . DE
PRIMITATE
ENTIS
RESPECTU CAETERORUM
TRANSCEXDENTIUM] *
Dico quod ex is t is quatuor ra t ion ibus sequi tur , cum
nihil possit esse communius
ente,
et ens non possit esse
commune un ivocum d ic tum in qu id de omnibus per se
in te l l ig ib i l ibus, qu ia non de differentiis u l t im i s , nee de
passionibus
suis,
sequ i tu r qu od n ih i l est p r i m u m ob jec tum
intel lectus nostr i propter communitatem ipsius in quid
ad
omne
per se inte l l ig ib i le.
E t tamen hoc non obstante, d ico quod pr imum objec
tum intel lectus nostri est ens, quia in ipso concurri t
duplex pr imi tas, sc i l icet communi ta t is e t v i r tua l i ta t is .
N a m om ne per se inte l l ig ib i le aut in cl ud i t essential iter
rat ionem ent is, vel con t ine tu r v i r tua l i te r , vel essentialiter
in includen te essentia li ter ra t ion em ent is. O m n ia
enim
genera et species et individua et omnes partes essentiales
generum et ens increatum includunt ens
qu idd i ta t i ve .
Omnes autem
passiones entis includuntur in ente et in
suis inferior ibus v ir tual i ter.
I g i t u r
i l ia ,
qu ibus ens non est un ivocum d ic tum in
q u i d , inc luduntur in illis quibus ens est s ic univocum.
E t i ta patet q uo d ens habet
primitatem
communi ta t is ad
prima intel l ig ib i l ia, hoc est , ad conceptus quiddi tat ivos
generum e t spec ie rum e t ind iv iduorum e t par t ium
essentialium omnium is torum et ent is increat i , e t habet
pr imi ta tem v i r tua l i ta t is ad omnia in te l l ig ib i l ia inc lusa
in
primis
inte l l ig ib i l ibus, hoc est , ad conceptus qual i ta-
tivos
difTerentiarum
e t pass ionum propr iarum.
Q uo d autem supposui, com m un i ta tem entis
dicti
in
quid ad omnes conceptus quiddi tat ivos praedictos, hoc
* Opus oxonwue, ', dist. m, q. iii (Assisi 137, f. 280-291-4 ; cf.
Vives,
v o l . rx ioSfi-ma).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 4
[ 3 . PRIMACY OF BEING AMONG THE
OTHER TRANSCENDENTALS]
A n d I say tha t . . since no th in g can be mo re
common than b e in g , and tha t b e i n g cannot be
predicated univocally and in quid 2 o f a ll th at is o f itself
intel l igible (because it cannot be predicated in this way
of the ult imate dif ferences
3
or of its attributes) ,4 i t
fol lows that we have no object of the intel lect that is
p ri m a ry b y reason o f a commonness in quid i n re gard to
al l that is of i tself intel l igible.
A n d yet , notw i thstanding , I say that b e in g is the
first object o f the inte l lect, because in i t a tw o fo ld pr im ac y
concurs, namely, a primacy of commonness and of
v irtua l i ty.5 For whatev er is o f i tself inte l l igible either
includes essentially the no tion of b e in g or is contained
virtually or essentially in something else which does
inc lud e b e in g essentially. Fo r a ll genera, species,
individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the
U ncreated Being a l l inc lude
b e i n g
qu idd i ta t i ve ly . A l l
the ultimate differences are included essentially in some
of these. A l l the at t ributes of b e in g are v ir tu al ly
inc luded in b e in g and in those th ings w hich come
under be in g .
Hence, a l l to w hic h b e in g is no t univ ocal in quid are
inc luded in those to w hich b e in g is un ivo cal in th is
way. A n d so i t is c lear tha t b e in g has a prim acy o f
commonness in regard to the primary inte l l ig ib les, that
is , to the quidditative concepts of the genera, species,
individuals, and al l their essential parts, and to the
U ncreated Being. I t has a v i r tu a l pr im acy in regard to
the intell igible elements included in the first intell igibles,
tha t is, i n regar d to the q ua li fyin g concepts of the u lt im ate
differences and proper attributes.
M y supposit ion tha t b e in g is predicated com mo nly
in quid of al l the aforementioned quidditat ive concepts
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5 DUNS SCOTUS
probatur de omnibus i l l is, duabus rationibus positis in
pr ima quaest ione hu jus d is t inct ion is ad probandum
communitatem entis ad ens creatum et inc rea tum , q uo d
ut pateat, pertracto eas al iqual i ter.
Primam
sic : de
quocumque enim
p raed ic to rum con -
cep tuum qu idd i ta t i vo rum con t ing i t i n te l l ec tum
certum
esse ipsum esse ens, du bit an do de dif fere nti is co ntr a-
hentibus ens ad
talem
con cep tum . E t i ta conceptus
entis,
u t conveni t ill i conceptui, est alius a conceptibus
i l lis infer ioribu s de q uibus inte l lectus est du bius ; i ta
al ius quod inclusus in utroque inferior i conceptu, nam
differentiae illae contrahentes praesupponunt eumdem
conceptum ent is communem
quem
con t rahunt .
Secundam rat ionem pertracto s ic, s icut argutum est
quod Deus non est cognoscibi l is a nobis natural i ter nisi
ens sit
univocum
creato et increato, i ta potest argui de
substantia et accidente ; cu m e nim sub stantia no n
immute t immedia te in te l lec tum nost rum ad a l iquam
inte l lect io ne m s ui, sed tantum accidens sensibile, sequitur
q u o d n u l l u m co n cep tu m q u id d i t a t i v u m poterimus habere
de ea nisi al iquis tal is possit abstrahi a conceptu
acci-
dent is. Sed nul lus ta lis q uid di ta t iv us , abstrahibi l is a
conceptu accidentis est nisi conceptus entis.
Q u o a d autem est suppositum de substant ia, quod non
immuta t in te l lec tum nost rum immedia te ad ac tum c i rca
se,
hoc pro batu r : q u ia q u id q u i d praesens i m m ut at
intel lectum i l l ius absentia potest natural i ter cognosci ab
in te l lectu,
quando non immutatur, sicut apparet secundo
D e
anima,*
quod visus est tenebrae perceptivus, quando
scil icet lux non est praesens, et ideo tunc visus non
im m uta tu r . Ig i tu r si in te l lec tus na tura l i te r im m uta tur
a substant ia immediate ad actum circa ipsam, sequeretur
quod quando substantia non esset praesens, posset
*
i i ,
cap. x
(420 ,
23).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
5
is established by the two arguments used in the init ial
question to prove that being is predicated commonly
of created and uncreated be ing [C f . pp . 2 0 -3 ] . T h at
what I have supposed may be evident, I now explain
these reasons a little.
I ex pla in the first reason thus. O f each of the afore
m en tioned concepts, the intel lec t can be certain that i t is
a being and st i l l be in doubt about the dif ferences which
de l im it b e in g to the concept in q uest ion. A n d so the
concept of being, in so far as it agrees with the concept
in question, is other than the dubious concepts which
come under i t . Bu t i t is other i n such a wa y tha t i t is
included in both of the concepts which come under i t ,
for these li m it in g differences presuppose the same concep t
of be ing which they l imi t .
T h e second reason I e x pla in as follows : W e arg ued
that God cannot be known natural ly unless being is
un iv oc al to the created an d uncreated. W e can argue
in the same way of substance and accident, for substance
does not immediately move our intel lect to know the
substance itself, b u t o n ly the sensible accident does so.
From this i t fo l lows that we can have no quiddi tat ive
concept of substance except such as could be abstracted
fro m the concept of an accident. Bu t the only q uid dit a
t ive concept of this kind that can be abstracted from
that of an accident is the concept of being.
Our assumption that substance does not immediately
move our intellect to know the substance itself, we prove
thus : I f som ething moves the intellec t w he n it is present,
then whenever the intel lect is not so moved, i t wi l l be
able to kn ow n atur al ly tha t this object is absent. Th is is
clear from the De anima, bk . i i , * according to which the
sense of sight can perceive darkness when, presumably,
light is not present, and the sense, in consequence, is not
m oved .
Th erefore , i f substance imm ed iately m ov ed the
intellect naturally to know the substance itself, it would
follow that when a substance was absent, the intellect
C i ? . 2 X 3
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O DUNS SCOTUS
cognosci non esse praesens, et ita naturaliter posset cog-
nosci in hostia altaris consecrata non esse substantiam
panis,
quod est manifeste fa lsum. Nu l lus ig i tu r con-
ceptus quiddi tat ivus habetur natural i ter de substant ia
immediate causatus a substantia, sed
tantum
causatus
vel abstractus primo ab accident e, et illud non est nisi
conceptus entis.
Per idem conclud i tur
etiam propositum
de part ibus
essentialibus sub stan tiae. Si enim ma te r ia non immutat
in te l lectum ad actu m c i rca
ipsam , nee
form a substant ia l is,
quaero quis conceptus simplex in intellectu habeb i tu r
de mater ia ve l forma ? Si dicas q uo d al iq uis conceptus
relat ivus, puta part is, vel conceptus per accidens, puta
al icujus proprietat is materiae vel
f o rmae,
quaero quis
est conceptus quidditat ivus, cui iste per accidens vel
re la t ivus at t r ibu i tur
?
E t s i nu l lus q u idd i ta t iv us [h abe tur,
n ih i l er i t , cui at t r ibuatur iste conceptus per accidens,
nullus
autem
qu idd i ta t ivus] potest haber i n is i
impressus
vel abstractus ab illo q u o d movet in te l lec tum, pu ta ab
accidente, et ille erit conceptus entis. E t i t a n ih i l
cognoscetur de partibus essentialibus substantiae, nisi
ens sit commune univocum eis et accidentibus.
Istae
rat iones non includunt univocat ionem ent is in
quid ad differentias ultimas et passiones.
De prima, ostenditur quia aut inte l lectus est certus de
al iquo ta l i quod si t ens, dubitando utrum sit hoc vel
i l l ud ,
tamen non est certus quod si t ens quiddi tat ive sed
quasi predicatione per accidens.
V e l al i ter, et me lius : q ui l ib et tal is conceptus est
simpliciter s implex, et ideo non potest secundum al iquid
concipi et secundum al iquid ignorari , s icut patet per
Philosophum nono Metaphysicae, in fine,* de conceptibus
* ix , cap. ix
(1051'',
25).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
D
could kn ow tha t i t was not present. He nce, i t cou ld
know naturally that the substance of bread does not
exist in the Consecrated V ic t i m of the A lta r, w hic h is
clearly false.6 N a tu ra lly ,
then,
we have no qu idd i ta t ive
concept of substance caused immediately by substance
itself . O u r only q uid dita t iv e concept thereof is tha t
caused by , or f irst abstracted fro m , an acciden t, and this
is none other than the concept of being.
By the same token, our conclusion holds for the
essential parts o f substance. Fo r if neithe r matte r n or
form move the intel lect to an act of knowledge about
themselves, I ask W h a t simple concept shall we have o f
m atter or fo rm ? I f you say tha t i t is some relat iv e
concept, for instance, of some part, or that it is an
incidental concept, for instance, of some property of
m atter or for m , then I ask W h a t is the qu iddi tat iv e
concept to which this incidental or relat ive concept is
at t r ibu ted ? A n d i f there is no q u idd i ta t ive concept,
there wi l l be nothing to which th is incidental concept
m ay be at tr ib ute d. Bu t the only q uidd i tat iv e concept
possible is caused by , or a bstracted fr o m , th at w h ic h does
mov e the intel lect, v iz. an accident. A n d this w il l be
the concept of being . Conseq uently, no thin g is kn ow n
o f the essential pa rts o f substance unless b e in g is
un ivoca l ,
common to them and to the accidents.
These reasons do no t im p ly tha t b e in g is pred icated
in quid o f the u lt im ate differences an d attribu tes.
The f irst does not, for the intel lect [according to the
argument] is certain that some such thing is a being
w hile i t doubts wh ether i t is this being or that. T h e
intel lect , however, is certa in that i t [v iz. an ul t imate
di f ference or at t r ibute] is not being quiddi tat ively, but
i t is as i t were b e in g by wa y of accidental pred icat ion.
O r another and better wa y. Ev ery such concept is
i rreducibly s imple 7 an d therefore one pa rt of i t cannot
be conceived while another part remains unknown, as
is evident from the statement of the Philosopher ( in
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7
DUNS SCOTUS
simpl ic i ter s impl ic ibus, quod
non
est circa eos deceptio,
sicut est circa quidditatem complexorum ; q uod non
est
intelligendum
quasi inte l lectus simplex decipiatur
formal i ter c irca intellectionem qu idd i ta t is , qu ia in
intel lect ione simplici non est verum vel fa lsum, sed circa
quiddi tatem compositam potest inte l lectus simplex
v i r tua l i ter dec ip i . S i enim ista ratio est in se falsa, tunc
inc lud i t v i r tua l i te r propositionem falsam ; q uod autem
est s impl ic iter s imp lex, no n inc lud i t v i r tu a l i te r pro x im o
nee formal i ter proposi t ionem falsam, et ideo circa ipsam
non est deceptio. V e l en im to ta l i ter a t t ing i tur v e l non
at t ing i tur , e t tunc omnino igno ra tu r. D e nullo ig i tu r
simpliciter simplici conceptu potest esse cert i tudo secun
dum a l iqu id e jus et dubi ta t io secundum
a l iud .
Per hoc etiam patet ad secundam rationem supra
posi tam, q u ia ta le s imp l ic iter s implex o m nino est igno tum
nisi secundum se
totum
concip ia tur .
Ter t io e t iam
modo
potest responderi ad
primam
ra t i onem,
q u o d ille conceptus de quo est certitudo, est
alius ab illis de quibus est dubitatio, et si i l le certus
idem salvatur cum a l terut ro i l lo ru m du bio ru m , vere est
un ivocus, u t cu m a l terut ro i l lo ru m accip i tur . Sed non
oporte t quod ins i t u t r ique i l lo rum in q u i d , sed ut sic,
vel est univocus eis ut determinabil is ad determinantes,
vel ut denominabi l is ad denominantes. Unde brev i ter ,
ens est univocum in omnibus, sed conceptibus non
simpliciter simplicibus est univocus in quid dictus de eis ;
simpliciter simplicibus est univocus ut determinabil is
vel ut denominabi l is , non autem ut d ictum de eis in
qu i d ,
qu ia hoc inc lud i t contrad ic t ionem.
Ex his apparet quomodo in ente concurrat duplex
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 7
Metaphysics, b k . i x , nea r the end) th a t there is no decep
t ion regarding irreducibly simple concepts as there is re
ga rding the q uid di t y of w ha t is complex. Th is is not to
be unde rstood as thou gh the simple intel lect
8
is formally
deceived regarding the knowledge of quiddit ies, for in
simple inte l lec t ion there is neither tru th nor falsity. I n
regard to a quiddi ty that is composed, however, the
simple intel lect can be v irt ua l ly deceived. Fo r i f such
a notion is false in itself, then it includes virtually a false
prop osi t ion. Bu t w ha t is i rre du cib ly simple includes a
false proposi t ion nei ther v i r tual ly nor formal ly, and
therefore there is no deception i n its reg ard . E ith er it is
grasped total ly or not at al l , in which case it remains
com pletely un kn ow n. O f no i rred uc ibly s imple concept,
therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful
about another.
F ro m th is , it is clear also as far as the second reason
stated above is concerned, that what is so irreducibly
simple remains completely unknown unless i t is grasped
fully as it is in itself.
A third reply is possible regarding the first reason.
This concept of which we are certain is other than those
of w h ic h we are in dou bt. N ow if this same element of
w hi ch we are certain is preserved w it h bo th of the dou bt
ful concepts, it is truly univocal in the sense that it is
grasped w ith bo th of them. I t is no t necessary, how ev er,
that i t be contained in both of them in
quid,
but i t may
either be co ntained in quid or be univ oca l to the m as
determ inable is univ oca l to determ inant, or as wh at can
be deno m inated to w ha t denominates. T o put i t br ief ly,
then ,
b e in g is univ oca l for a l l . B ut for concepts that
are not i rreducibly s imple, i t is predicated of them uni-
v oc ally in quid ; for concepts irre du cib ly s imp le, i t is
univ oca l as som ething determ inable or d enom inable,
but it is not univocal in the sense that it is predicated
of the m in
quid,
for tha t wo uld be a contrad ic t ion.
A n d so i t is c lear how in b e in g there concurs a two -
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H DUNS SCOTUS
primi tas, v ide l icet pr imi tas communicabilitatis in qu id
ad
omnes
conceptus
non
s im pl ic i ter s impl ices, et p r im itas
virtual i tat is in se vel in suis inferioribus ad omnes con
ceptus simpliciter simplices.
[ 4 . DE ENTIS PASSIONUM DEDUCTIONE] *
Q u a n t u m a d primum d ico quod is tud d is junc tum
necessarium vel possibile est passio entis circumloquens
passionem convert ibi lem, sicut sunt
talia multa
i l l im i ta ta
entibus. Passiones autem ent is convert ib i les, ut
com-
munius, immediate dicuntur de ente, quia ens habet
conceptum simpliciter simplicem, et ideo non potest esse
med ium in te r ipsum et suam passionem, quia neutr ius
est
definitio
q uae possit esse m e d iu m . Si
etiam
est
al iqua passio ent is non prima, difficile est videre per
quam priorem, ut per medium, possi t concludi de ente,
qu ia
nee
faci le est v idere ordinem passionum entis.
Nee
si ille ordo cognosceretur, v iderentur proposit iones
sumptae ab eis pro praemissis esse
multum
ev ident iores
conclusionibus. I n passionibus au tem disjun ctis, l icet
illud totum dis junctum non possi t demonstrari de ente,
tamen
com m uniter supposito
illo
extremo quod est minus
nobile de al iquo ente, potest concludi i l lud extremum
q uo d est nob il ius de al iq uo ente. Sicut seq uitur : si
a l iquod ens est f in i tum, ergo al iquod ens est inf in i tum ;
et si aliquod est contingens, ergo aliquod ens est neces
sar ium,
quia in ta l ibus non posset ent i part iculari ter
inesse imperfectius extremum nis i a l icui ent i inesset
perfectius ex t remum a quo dependeret .
Sed nee isto modo v idetur posse ostendi extremum
* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxix, q. i (Assisi 137, f . gir^-giv ;
cf.
Viv£s,
v o l . x , 625°-626a).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 8
fold primacy, namely, a primacy of commonness in quid
in regard to al l concepts that are not irreducibly simple
and a primacy of v irtual i ty in i tself or in i ts inferiors
regarding al l concepts which are irreducibly simple.
[ 4 . ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING ]
I say th at this disju nc tion nece ssary-or-po ssible , l ike
the countless other such found among beings, is an a t t r i
bute of b e in g tha t is eq uivalent to a coextensive
att rib ute . Bu t the coextensive attributes , as som ething
more common, are affirmed immedia te ly o f b e in g ,
because b e i n g is an irre du cib ly simple concept an d
consequently no m iddle term can exist between b e in g
and i ts at t r ibute, for nei ther has a def in i t ion that might
serve as a m idd le te rm . Also , i f there is some a ttrib ute
of b e in g that is not im m ediate, i t is d i f f icul t to see w ha t
prior at t r ibute could be used as a middle term to l ink
it w it h b e in g , for i t is not easy to discern any order
am ong the at t ributes of b e in g . A n d even i f we knew
of such an order among them, any proposit ions about
them we might use as premises seem scarcely more
ev ident th a n the conclusions. I n the disjunctiv e
a t t r i
butes,
however, while the entire disjunction cannot be
dem onstrated fro m b e in g , nevertheless as a unive rsal
rule by positing the less perfect extreme of some being
we can conclude that the more perfect extreme is realised
in some other be ing. Th us it fol lows tha t i f some being
is f in ite , then some being is inf ini te. A n d if some being
is co ntin ge nt, th en some bein g is necessary. Fo r in such
cases it is not possible for the more imperfect extreme of
the dis jun ct ion to be ex istent ia lly predicated of b e in g ,
part icularly taken, unless the more perfect extreme be
existent ia l ly veri f ied of some other being upon which i t
depends.
But we see that the less perfect member of such a
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9 DUNS SCOTUS
imperfectius talis disjunctionis ; non enim si perfectius
est in aliquo ente, ex hoc necesse est imperfectius esse in
alio ente ; et hoc nisi ilia extrema disjuncta essent corre-
l a t i va , sicut causa et causatum. Ideo ig i tur non potest
ostendi de ente per a l iquod prius medium hoc dis-
j u n c t u m ,
necessarium vel contingens. Nee etiam ista
pars disjuncti quae est contingens posset ostendi de
aliquo, supposito necessario de al iquo, et ideo videtur
ista : A l i q u o d ens est contingens , esse v era p ri m a et n on
dem onstrabil is prop ter
q u id .
U n d e Philosophus * arguens
contra necessitatem fu tu ro ru m , non deduc it ad a l iq u id
impossibilius hypothesi , sed ad al iquod impossibi le nobis
manifestius, scil icet q uo d no n op ortet con si l iar i . E t ideo
negantes talia manifesta indigent poena vel scient ia vel
sensu, qu ia secundum Av icennam primo Metaphysicae f :
Negantes
primum
p r inc ip ium sunt vapu land i ve l expo-
nend i ign i , quousque concedant quod non est idem
comburi e t non
com bur i ,
vapu la r i e t non vapu la r i .
Ita
et iam is t i , qui negant a l iquod ens cont ingens, exponendi
sunt tormentis, quousque concedant quod possibi le est
eos non torqueri .
[ 5 . ENS UT SUBJECTUM ET DEUS UT FINIS METAPHYSICAE] 1
Hie
sunt t r ia v idenda : P r im o, si pr im us habi tus
natural i ter acquisitus et supremus perficiens in te l lec tum
viator is ,
cujusmodi
est habitus metaphysicae, habeat
Deum pro primo objecto ?.. .
De primo est controversia inter Avicennam et
* De interpretations, cap. ix (18s, 26-35).
t Aristotle, Topica, 1, cap. x i
(105s,
4-5).
Reportata parisiensia,
prol.
q .
ii i,
art. i
(Vives,
v o l .
x x i i,
^ - t f l i ) .
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS 9
dis jun ctio n canno t be established in this fashion, for if
the m ore perfec t exists i n some be ing , there is no necessity
on this score that the less perfect should exist in some
other being, unless, of course, the two extremes of the
disjunction should happen to be correlatives, such as
cause
and ca us ed . Consequent ly, this d is junct ion
nec essa ry-or- continge nt , cannot be established of
b e i n g
thro ug h some prio r m ed ium . Ne ither could the
contingent part of the disjunction be established of any
thing on the supposition that something necessary exists.
T he proposi t ion : Som e being is co nt ing en t , therefore,
seems to be a primary truth and is not demonstrable by
an a prior i dem ons trat ion, w h ic h gives the reason for the
fact.9 T h a t is w h y the Philosopher, i n arg uing against
the theory that future events are necessary, makes no
attempt to deduce from it som ething even m ore impossible
than the hypothesis, but he deduces from it an impossi
bi l i ty that is more apparent to us, namely, that there
w ou ld be no need to del iberate [abo ut the fu tu re ]. A n d
therefore, those who deny such manifest things need
punishment or knowledge or sense, for as Avicenna puts
it {Metaphysics 1) f : Th ose wh o deny a f irst pr inc ip le
should be beaten or exposed to fire until they concede
that to burn and not to burn, or to be beaten and not
to be beaten, are not id en t ic al . A n d so too, those wh o
deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to
torments until they concede that it is possible for them
not to be tormented.
[ 5. BEING AS THE SUBJECT AND GOD AS THE GOAL
OF METAPHYSICS]
W e m ust first see wh ethe r m etaphysics, the first an d
highest of the natural ly acquired habits perfecting man's
inte llec t i n the present life , has G od as its first ob ject.
On this point there is a controversy between Avicenna
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IO DUNS SCOTUS
Averroem. Pon i t
enim
Av icenna q uod D eus
non
est sub-
jectum in metaphysica, qu ia nu l la sc ient ia probat suum
subjectum ; metaphysicus autem p roba t Deum esse ;
ig i tu r, etc. Av erroes repre hen dit
Avicennam
i n u l t im o
Commento primi Physicorum, quia sumpta eadem majori
cont ra Av icennam cup i t p robare quod Deus e t sub-
stantiae separatae sunt subjectum in metaphysica, et
q uod D eu m esse no n pro ba tur in metaphys ica, qu ia
nul lum genus
substantiarum
separatarum potest probar i
esse nisi per m o t u m , quod per t ine t ad
physicam.
Sed v ide tur
mihi
Av icennam mel ius d ix isse
quam
Averroem ; unde arguo sic contra eum : haec proposit io,
Nul la scient ia probat suum subjectum esse, quae com
munis est utr ique, vera est propter primitatem subjecti
ad scientiam, quia si posterius esset, probaret ipsum esse
in
ilia
scient ia, in qua habet rat ionem posterior is, et non
tantum ra t ion em object i adae q uat i . Sed subjectum
magis habet ra t ionem primitatis respectu posterioris
scientiae q ua m respectu prio ris ; ergo si p r im a scientia
non potest probare suum subjectum esse, multo minus
nee
scientia posterior potest.
Vel
sub al ia form a ar g ui tu r sic : Si physicus p otest
pro ba re D e u m esse, ergo D e u m esse est con clusio i n
physica. Sed si m etaphys ica no n potest sic pro ba re
D eu m esse, ergo D eu m esse prae sup pon itur in m eta
physica tamquam
p r i n c i p iu m .
Erg o conclusio in physica
est pr inc ip i um in metaphysica ; ergo physica est pr io r
metaphysica.
I t e m ,
ex
omni
proprietate manifesta in effectu potest
conclud i
causam
esse, si non inest nisi
ration
e talis
causae ; sed no n solum huju sm od i propr ietates effectus
considerantur in phys ica, quae so lum conveniunt Deo,
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
10
and Av erroes. Av icenn a claims tha t G od is not the
subject of metaphysics, because no science proves [the
existence o f] i ts ow n subject. T h e m etaphy sician, how
ever, proves th at Go d exists. Av erroes reproves A v i
cenna in his final comment on the Physics,
b k . i ,
because
he wishes, by using the same major premise against A v i
cenna, to prove that God and the pure spiri ts are the
subject of metaphysics, and that God's existence is not
pro v ed i n m etaphysics, since it is only b y means of mo t ion,
which pertains to the science of natural phi losophy, that
any kind of pure spiri t can be proved to exist.
I t seems to me , howev er, that of the tw o, Av icenn a has
spoken better . W here fore I argue against Av erroes as
follows. T he prop osit ion they b ot h ho ld , v iz. N o science
proves the existence of its sub jec t is tru e, because of the
priority the subject holds in regard to the science. For if
the sub ject were posterior to the science, th en its existence
would have to be established in some lower science,
where it would be conceived under some inferior aspect
which is inadequate for its role as the object [of the
hig he r science]. N o w a subject enjoys a greater p ri o ri ty
over the lower tha n ov er the high er science. I f the
highest science, there fore, can not pro v e tha t its subject
exists, it is even less possible for a lower science to do so.
Or to put the argument in another way, i f the phi lo
sopher o f natu re can prov e th a t G od exists, the n G od's
existence is a conclusion of na tur al phi losoph y. N o w if
metaphysics cannot prove the existence of God in this
way, then God's existence is presupposed as a principle
in metaphysics. Conseq uently, a conclusion o f na tur al
philosophy is a principle of metaphysics, and therefore
the philosophy of nature is prior to metaphysics.
Aga i n , i f a certain property can exist only in virtue of
such an d such a cause, fro m every such prop erty tha t
appears in the effect, we can infer the existence of the
cause. N o w it is no t ju st such properties o f the effect as
are treated in the philosophy of nature that are possible
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DUNS SCOTUS
sed etiam
in metaphysica, quia
non
solum
mo tum
prae-
supponit movens, sed ens posterius praesupponit prius ;
igitur ex prioritate in entibus potest concludi primum
ens esse, et hoc perfectius q u a m ex mo t u concluditur in
physica p ri m um movens esse. U nd e ex ac tu et po ten tia ,
f initate et infinitate, multi tudine et unitate, et ex multis
talibus, quae sunt proprietates et passiones metaphysicae
potest conclud i in me taphysica D eum esse sive p r im u m
ens esse.
Ideo dico quantum ad istum
ar t icu lum,
quod Deus
non est subjectum in metaphysica, quia sicut probatum
est supra quaestione prima,* de Deo tamquam ut primo
subjecto
tan tum
est una scientia, quae non est meta
physica. E t hoc pr ob atur sic : D e
omn i
subjecto etiam
scientiae subalternatae statim ex sensibus cognoscitur
quod est sic quod sibi non repugnat esse, ut patet de
subjecto perspectivae ; statim
enim
ex sensibus appre-
hend itur l inea m v isib ilem esse ; sicut en im pr in cip ia
statim apprehenduntur apprehensis terminis ex sensibus,
ita tamen quod subjectum non sit posterius suo principio,
nee
ignotius, oportet subjectum in scientia apprehendi
statim ex sensibus ; sed nu lla ra tio pr op ria D ei con -
ceptibil is a nobis, statim apprehenditur ab intellectu
viatoris ; igitur nulla scientia naturaliter acquisita potest
esse
de D eo sub aliq ua ratione pro pria . Proba tio
minor is
:
Prima ratio Dei quam concipimus de ipso est quod sit
p ri m um ens ; sed haec ra tio non app reh enditu r a
nobis ex sensibus, sed prius oportet a nobis concipi com-
possibilitatem unionis
l s io rum duorum
term inor um ;
unde antequam
sciamus
hanc compossibilitatem, oportet
q uod demonstretur a liq uod ens esse p r im u m ; ig itu r, etc.
Unde concedo cum Avicenna, quod Deus non sit sub
jectum in metaphysica.
Nee
obviat dictum Philosophi
* q. i, art. iv .
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
11
only on condition that God exists, for the same is true
of the propert ies treated of in metaphysics. N o t only
does motion presuppose a mover, but a being that is pos
ter ior presupposes one th at is p ri o r. Con seq uently, fr o m
the priority that exists among beings the existence of the
First B eing can be infe rre d, and this can be done i n a m ore
perfect way than the existence of a Prime Mover can be
established i n na tu ra l phi losop hy. W e can infer,
then,
in metaphysics from act and potency, finiteness and
inf in i ty , mu l t i tude and un i ty , an d m any other such meta
physical properties, that God or the First Being exists.
So far as this article is concerned,
then,
I say that God
is not the subject of metaphysics, because, as has been
pro v ed abov e in the first q uestion, there is bu t one science
that has God as its f irst subject, and this is not meta
physics.10 A n d this is pro v ed in the fol low ing m ann er.
O f every sub ject, also of a subordina te science, it is
known through the senses that it is of such a nature that
to exist is not repugnant to it, as is evident of the subject
of optics, for the existence of a visible line is grasped
im m ed iate ly fro m the senses. J ust as princip les are
grasped immediately once the terms are apprehended
th ro ug h the m e d iu m of the senses, so likewise i f a subject
is not to be posterior to, or
less
kn o wn
than ,
its principle,11
it mu st needs be grasped th ro ug h the senses. B u t no
proper not ion that we can form of God is apprehended
im m edia tely by man's inte l lect in th is l i fe. Therefore,
we can have no natural ly acquired science about God
und er some no tion prope r to Him self. Pro of of the
m inor : Th e
first
[proper] concept we have of God is
tha t H e is the First Being . B ut this notion is not grasped
th ro ug h the senses, b u t w e mus t first ascertain tha t the
un ion o f these tw o terms is com patible. Before we can
know this compatibi l i ty, however, i t is necessary that we
dem onstrate th at some be ing is f irst. Th ere fore , etc.
Hence, I concede with Avicenna that God is not the
subject of me taphysics. T h e Philosopher's statement
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12 DUNS SCOTUS
primo Metaphysicae* dicentis quod Metaphysica est circa
causas alt issimas, quia loquitur sicut locutus est primo
Priorum,\ cum d ic i t : Primum oportet d icere circa quid
et de q uo ; quoniam c i rca demonstrat ionem, et de
discip l ina demonstrat iva, id est , de universal i scient ia
dem onstrandi s ive sy l log izandi . U nd e c i rca pro pr ie
notat c ircumstant iam causae f inal is, sicut et causae
m ate rialis ; un de meta phy sica est cir ca altissimas causas
finaliter, ad
quarum
cogni t ionem terminatur sc ient ia
metaphysical is.
*
i,
cap.
ii ,
passim.
t Analytica
priora, i,
cap. i
(24a,
10 ff.).
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CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
12
{Metaphysics, bk.
i)
* that metaphysics is concerned with
the highest causes, presents no dif fic u lty . For he speaks
here as he d id in the P rior Analytics, bk . i , j whe re he says :
First i t is necessary to determine with what [Prior
An alyt ic s] is concerned an d w ha t i t has to do . I t is
concerned with demonstrat ion and has to do with the
demonstrat ive branch of learning, that is with the
general science o f dem ons trat ing or syl log ising . Henc e,
concerned w i t h denotes properly the circumstance of
the fin a l cause ju s t as m u ch as i t does tha t o f the m ater ial
cause.
W here fore, metaphysics is concerned w it h the
highest causes as its en d. I n k no w in g th e m , m eta
physical science attains its
goal.
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I I
M A N 'S N A T U R A L K N O W L E D G E
O F G O D
S um m a r y o f th e A rgu m en t
Q u e s t i o n : I s t h e i n t e l l e c t o f m a n i n th i s l i f e ab le t o k n o w
G od n a t u r a l l y ?
P r o
e t
C o n t r a
B o d y
o f t h e
Q u e s t i o n
P r e l im i n a r y ob se r v a t i o n s
T h e o p i n i o n o f H e n r y o f Ghen t
Sco tus ' s own op in ion
First statement
: I t is
possib le
t o
h a v e
a
q u i d d i t a t i v e
con cep t o f God
Second s ta tem ent : Go d is conc e iv ed n ot on ly an a logou s ly ,
bu t a l so un i voca l l y
Th i r d s ta temen t : God ' s essence is no t k n ow n i n t u i t i v e l y
b y m a n
i n
th i s l i f e
Fourth
s ta temen t :
M a n can h a ve m an y p r ope r con cep ts
of God
F i ft h s ta temen t : We kn ow God t h rou g h the i n t e l l i g i b l e
species
o f
c r ea tu r e s
R e p l y
t o t h e
A rg u m e n t s
a t t h e
b e g i n n i n g
R e p l y
t o
H e n r y ' s a r g u m e n t s
(2,32'J)
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14 DUNS SCOTUS
[ I I .
COGNITIO
NATURALIS
DE DEO] *
C i r c a tertiam distinctionem quaero primo de cognos -
c i b i l i ta t e D e i . E t q u a e r o p r i m o : Utrum Deus s i t n a tu ra-
liter cognoscibilis
ab in te l lec tu v ia tor is .
[ P r o e t C o n t r a ]
A r g u o q u o d
non
:
P h i l o so phu s in De anima | d i c i t : Phantasmata se
h a b e n t a d
intellectum
s i c u t s e n s i b i l i a a d
s e n s u m .
Sed
se nsu s n o n s e n t i t n i s i s e n s ib i le , e rg o in t e l le c t u s n i h i l
i n t e l l i g i t n i s i c u j u s phantasma p o t e s t p e r s e n s u s a p p r e -
h e n d e r e . D e u s
autem
n on h a b e t p h a n t a s m a
nee
es t
a l i q u i d p h a n t a s m a nee e st a l i q u i d p h a n t a s i b i le ; e r g o ,
e t c .
I t e m
ii Metaphysicae
: s i c u t o c u l u s n o c t u a e a d
lucem
sol is ,
s i c e t i n t e l l e c t u s n o s t e r a d e a q u a e s u n t
m a n i -
festissima n a t u r a e ; s e d i b i es t i m p o s s i b i li ta s ; e r g o e t
h i e .
I t e m i Physicorum * * : I n f i n i t u m i n q u a n t u m i n f i n i t u m
est i g n o t u m .
E t n
Metaphysicae
f j
: I n f i n i t a n o n
contingit
cognosce re ; e rg o nee i n f i n i t u m , q u i a eadem v i d e t u r
esse i m p r o p o r t i o in t e l l e c t u s fin it i a d i n f i n i t u m e t a d
i n f i n i t a , q u i a a e q u a l i s e x c e s s u s vel n o n m i n o r .
I t e m Gre g or iu s Super Ezechie lem | J : Quantumcumque
* Opus oxoniense,
i ,
dist. i n , q . i (Assisi 137, f. 2 5 ^ -2 7 ^ ; cf.
Vive s,
vo l . ix, 8a-38<<).
t
in ,
cap v i i (431", 14).
11, cap . i (9936, 9).
* * 1, cap. iv
(1876,
8). tf
u ,
cap. i i (994*, 22).
J} Sermons on
Ezechiel,
i ,
horn, v i i i ,
n . 30 (Mign e, P .L.,
l x x v i ,
868).
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 14
[ I I .
man's n a t u r a l knowledge of god]
C o n c e r n i n g th e t h i r d d i s t i n c t i on I a sk firs t w h e t h e r
i t is poss ib le to k n ow God . A n d I ask f ir s t : whether the
intel lect of man in th is l i fe is ab le to know God natura l ly .
[ P r o e t C o n t r a ]
I a r g u e th a t i t c a n n o t
x
:
[ A r g .
1].
T h e P h ilos o p h e r i n De
an ima ,
b k .
i n ,
f says :
"Se n s e im a g e s a r e re l a t e d t o t h e i n t e l le c t i n t h e sa m e w a y
as sense ob jec ts a re re la te d to th e sense s ". B u t t he senses
pe r c e i v e o n l y w h a t is s e n s i b le . The r e f o re t h e i n t e l le c t
is u n a b l e t o g r a s p a n y t h i n g w h o se sense i m a g e c a n n o t b e
k n o w n b y t h e se nse s. O f G o d t h e r e is no sen se im a g e .
N e i t h e r i s H e s u c h t h a t H e c o u l d b e p e r c e i v e d b y s u c h
a sense fa c u l t y . Th e re fo re , e t c .
[ A r g .
n ] . Ag a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o Me ta phy sic s, b k . ii :
"A s t he e yes o f ba t s a r e to t he b l aze o f d a y , so is ou r
i n t e l le c t to th e t h in g s w h i c h a r e b y n a t u r e m os t
e v i d e n t "
B u t i f i t is im po s s i b le t o k n o w s u c h t h i n g s , i t is im po s s i b le
t o k n o w G o d .
[ A r g .
i n ] . A l so , a c co rd i ng to Phys ic s, b k . i * * : " T h e
i n f in i t e as i n f in i t e is u n k n o w a b l e " . A n d a c c o r d in g to
the Me taphys ics , b k , i i
f
f : " I t is n o t pos s ib le t o k n o w a n
i n f i n i t e [ n u m b e r ] o f t h i n g s " . T h e r e fo re , n e i th e r c a n
th e In f i n i t e B e i n g be k n o w n , s in ce a n in f in i te n u m b e r
a n d a n In f i n i t e B e i n g w o u l d s eem t o b e e q u a l ly d is
p r o p o r t io n a t e t o o u r i n t e l l e c t ; for a n I n f i n i t e B e i n g
exceed s t h e po we r s o f o u r in t e l l e c t i n t h e s ame m easu r e
as,
o r c e r t a i n l y to n o less a deg ree
t h a n ,
doe s th e i n f i n i t e
i n n u m b e r .
[ A r g .
i v ] . G r e g o ry , a ls o, i n h i s c o m m e n t a r y o n
Ezech ie l says : " N o m a t t e r h o w fa r our m i n d m a y h a v e
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15
DUNS SCOTUS
mens nos t r a i n c o n t e m p l a t i on e p r o fe c e r i t D e i , n o n a d
i l l u d q u od ipse es t, sed a d i l l u d q u od s ub ip so e st a t t i n g i t .
C o n t r a
:
v Metaphysicae * : M e t a p h y s i c a e s t t h e o log i a d e De o
e t c i r c a d i v i n a p r i n c i p a l i t e r , e r g o e t c . E t i n a c t u e jus , f
sc i l i ce t i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n e a c t u a l i
s u b s t a n t i a r u m
s epa r a -
t a r u m p o n i t f e l i c i t a t e m h u m a n a m .
[ C o r p u s Q u a e s t i o n i s ]
[Notiones Praeviae]
I n p r im a quaes tione n on est distinguendum qu od Deus
possit cognosci ne g at ive
vel
a f firm a t iv e , q u i a n ega tio non
cognosc i tur n is i pre affirmationem : n Perihermenias, in
f ine , j
et N
Metaphys i cae . ** Pa te t e t i a m q u o d n u l l a s
nega t iones cognosc imus d e Deo n i s i p e r a f fi rm a t i one s p e r
q u a s r e m o v e m u s a l i a i n co m p o ss i b i l i a a b i l l i s a f f i r m a -
t i o n i b u s .
Ne g a t ion e s e t i a m n o n
s u m m e
a m a m u s .
S i m i l i t e r e t i a m a u t n e g a t io c o n c i p i t u r p r a e c is e a u t u t
d i c t a d e a l i q u o . S i p r a e c is e c o n c i p i t u r n e g a t i o, u t n o n
l a p i s , h oc
a e q u e c o n v e n i t n i h i l o s ic u t
D e o ,
q u i a p u r a
n e g a t i o d i c i t u r d e e n t e e t d e n o n e n t e . I g i t u r i n h o c
n on
m a g i s
i n t e l l i g i t u r D e u s
q u a m
n i h i l v e l c h i m e r a . S i
i n t e l l i g i t u r u t n e g a t io d i c t a d e a l i q u o , t u n c q u a e r o i l i u m
c o n c e p t u m
s u b t r a c t u m
d e q u o
i n t e l l i g i t u r is t a n e g a t io
esse v e ra . A u t e r i t concep t u s
a f f i rm a t i v u s
a u t n e g a t i v u s .
Si e s t a f fi rm a t i v u s , h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m . S i n e g a t i v u s ,
q u a e r o u t p r i u s . A u t n e g a t io c o n c i p i t u r p r a e cis e a u t u t
* v , cap . v ii (io64a, 36).
t Ethica
Nicomachea,
x, cap.
v i i i .
X
De interpretations, ca p. xi i i
(22a, 3 3 );
cf. also cap. xiv
in
f ine.
**
iv, cap.
i i
(1004", 10-16).
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MAN
S
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
15
p rog re s s e d i n th e c o n t e m p l a t io n o f
G o d ,
i t doe s n o t a t t a i n
to w h a t H e is , b u t t o w h a t is b e n e a t h H i m " .
T o t h e c o n t r a r y :
Ac c o r d i n g t o Meta ph ys ic s, b k . v * : "Me t a p h y s i c s is a
th e o log y o f G o d a n d is p r i m a r i l y c on c e r n e d w i t h th e
d i v i n e " .
A n d [ A r i s t o t le ] p la c e s m a n 's h a p p in e s s i n th e
a c t u a l po s se s s i o n o f s u c h k no w l e dge , t h a t i s t o s a y , i n
t h e a c t u a l s p e c u l a t ion a b o u t t h e p u r e s p i r i t s .
[ B o d y o f th e Q u e s t io n ]
[P re l im i na r y Observations']
I n t h i s first q u e s t i o n t h e r e i s n o n e e d t o m a k e t h e
d i s t i n c t i on t h a t w e c a n n ot k n o w w h a t G o d is : w e c a n
o n l y k n o w w h a t H e is n ot.2 F o r e v e r y d e n i a l is i n t e l l ig i b l e
o n l y i n t e rm s o f som e a f fi r m a t i o n .
* * I t is a lso c lea r t h a t
w e c a n k n o w n e g a t ion s o f G o d o n l y b y m e a n s o f a ff i r m a
t ion s ; fo r i f w e d en y a n y t h i n g o f G o d , i t is b e c au se w e
w is h t o d o a w a y w i t h s o m e t h in g in c on s is te n t w i t h w h a t
w e h a v e a l re a d y a f fi r m e d .
Ne i t h e r a r e n ega t i o n s t h e o b j e c t o f o u r g r e a t e s t l o v e .
F u r t h e r m o r e , i f s o m e t h i n g is n e g a t e d , e i th e r t h e n e g a
t i o n is co n s id e r e d s im p l y i n i t s e l f o r as p r e d i c a t e d o f
s o m e t h i n g . I f a n e g a t io n , s u c h as " n o t - s t o n e " , is c o n
s i d e r e d s im p l y i n i ts e lf, i t is as c h a r a c t e r i s t ic o f n o t h i n g
as i t i s o f G o d , fo r a p u r e n e g a t i o n is p r e d i c a t e d o f b o t h
w h a t is a n d w h a t is n o t a b e in g . C on s e q u e n t ly , w h a t w e
k n o w t h r o u g h s u c h a n e g a t ion is n o m or e G o d t h a n i t is
a c h i m e r a o r n o t h i n g a t a l l . I f t h e n e g a t io n is u n d e r s t oo d
as m o d i f y i n g s o m e t h i n g , t h e n I i n q u i r e a fte r t h e u n d e r
l y i n g n o t io n o f w h i c h th e n e g a t io n is u n d e r s tood t o b e
t r u e . I t w i l l b e e i th e r a n a f fi rm a t i v e or a n e g a t iv e n o t i o n .
I f i t is a ff i r m a t i v e , w e h a v e w h a t w e s ee k. I f i t is n e g a
t i v e ,
I in q u i r e as I d i d b e fo re . E i t h e r th e n e g a t io n is
c on c e i v e d s i m p l y i n i ts e l f o r as p r e d i c a t e d o f s o m e t h i n g .
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16
DUNS SCOTUS
d i c t a d e
a l i q u o .
S i
primo m o d o ,
h oc a e q u e c o n v e n i t
n i h i l o s i c u t D e o . S i u t d i c t a d e a l i q u o , s i c u t p r i u s ; e t
quantumcumque p r o c e d e r e t u r in n e g a t i o n i b u s , vel non
i n t e l l i g e r e t u r D e u s magis quam n i h i l v e l s t a b i tu r i n
a l iq u o a f f i r m a t i v o c on c e p t u q u i e st p r i m u s .
Nee s e cu n d o est d i s t i n g u e n d u m d e c o g n i t io n e q u i a
[re a d q u i d ] e s t e t s i e s t , q u i a i n p r o p o s i t o q u a e r o c o n -
ceptum
s im p l ic e m d e q u o c og n o s c a t u r esse p e r a c t u m
i n t e l l e c t u s c o m p o n e n t i s e t d i v i d e n t i s . Numquam enim
co gno s co d e a l i q uo s i e s t , n i s i
habeam
a l i q u e m c o n -
ceptum i l l i u s extremi de q u o cognosco esse ; e t de illo
c o n c e p t u q u a e r i t u r
h i e .
Nee t e r t i o o p o r t e t d i s t i n g u e r e s i e s t , u t e s t q u a e s t i o
d e v e r i t a t e p r o p o s i t io n i s v e l u t e st q u a e s t io d e e sse D e i ,
q u i a s i p o te s t e sse , q u a e r o d e v e r i t a t e p r o p o s i t io n i s i n
qua es t esse tamquam p r a e d i c a t u m d e s u b j e c t o ; a d
concipiendum veritatem
i l l i u s q u a e s t i o n i s v e l p r o p o s i
t i o n i s ,
o p o r t e t p r a e c o n c i p e r e t e r m i n o s i l l i u s q u a e s t i o n i s ,
e t d e c o n c e p t u s i m p l i c i i l l i u s s u b je c t i s i e st p os s i b il is e st
n u n c q u a e s t i o .
Nee q u a r t o v a le t d is t in g u e r e de c o n c e p t u n a t u r a l i e t
s u p e r n a t u r a l i , q u ia q u a e r i t u r d e n a t u r a l i .
Nee q u i n t o v a le t d i s t in g u e r e d e n a t u r a l i t e r l oq u e n d o
d e n a t u r a a b s o lu t e v e l d e n a t u r a p r o s t a t u i s t o, q u i a
q u a e r i t u r p r a e c i s e d e c o g n i t i o n e p r o s t a t u i s t o .
Nee
se xto v a l e t d i s t in g u e r e d e c o g n i t i on e D e i i n
c r e a t u r a v e l i n s e, q u i a s i c o g n i t i o h a b e a t u r p e r c r e a t u r a m
i t a q u o d c o g n i t i o discursiva i n c i p i a t a c r e a t u r a , q u a e r o
i n q u o
termino
s i s t i t u r is t a c o g n i t i o . S i i n De o i n s e ,
h a b e o p r o p o s i t u m , q u i a i l i u m con cepturn D e i i n s e
q u a e r o. S i n o n s i s t i t u r i n D e o i n se , s ed i n c r e a t u r a ,
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m an's n a t u r a l k n o w le d g e o f g od
i 6
I f t he fi rs t be t ru e , the n the neg a t ion app lies to n o th ing
as w e l l as to God. I f i t is conceived as pre d ica ted of
som eth ing , the n I a rgue as be fore . An d no m a t te r how
fa r w e p roceed w i t h nega t ions , e it he r w ha t we know is
no m ore God tha n n o th ing is , or w e w i l l a r r i ve a t some
a ffi rm at ive concep t w h ich is the fi rs t concep t o f a l l .
In the second p lac e , there is no p o in t in d is t ing u ish ing
be tw een a knowledge of H is essence a nd a knowledge of
H is exis tence,3 for I in te n d to seek a s im ple conce pt of
wh ich ex is tence may be a f f i rmed o r den ied by a ju d g
m en t of the in te l le c t . For I never kn ow a n y th ing to exis t
un less I f i rs t have some concep t of tha t of w h ich exis tence
is a ffi rm e d . An d th is is w h at w e seek here .
Th i rd ly , in reg ard to God's exis tence there is no need
to d is t ingu ish be tween the ques t ion of the t ru th o f the
p ropos ition a n d the q ue st ion of H is exis tence.4 For
before the re can be any q ues tion of the t ru th o f a p ro
pos i tion w he re in exis tence is p red ica ted of a su bjec t , i t is
necessary f i rs t of a l l to conceive the terms of th is pro
posit ion.
Now the qu es tion
is
this
:
" Is i t poss ib le to have
a c once pt of the s ub ject [of th is p roposit ion : 'God
exis ts '] b y n a tu ra l m eans? "
Fou r th l y , t he d i s ti nc t ion be tw een a na tu ra l and supe r
n a tu ra l concep t is ou t o f p lace , because we are in te res ted
here on ly in the form er.5
Fi fth ly , in rega rd to the n a tu ra l , the re is no necessity
fo r a d i s t i nc t ion be tween "na tu re , abso lu te l y speak ing "
an d "n a tu re , i n ou r p resen t s ta te " , for we a re in te res ted
on ly in the la t te r .6
S ix th l y , t he d i s t i nc t ion be tween know ing God in
H im se lf and kn ow ing H im i n a c rea tu re is not to the
poin t .7 For i f our kn ow ledg e comes throug h a c rea ture
in the sense tha t the reason ing p rocess beg ins w i th w h at
can be know n f rom a c rea tu re , then I ask "Wh a t do we
kn ow a t the conc lus ion of th is process?" I f i t is God
H im se lf, the n I have w h a t I seek , fo r I a m look ing fo r
a concep t o f God H im se lf. I f i t
is
n ot
God,
b u t
a
c rea tu re ,
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17
DUNS SCOTUS
t u n c i d e m e r i t t e r m i n u s e t principium d i s c u r s u s , e t i t a
n u l l a n o t i t ia h a b e b i t u r d e D e o ; s a l te r n n o n e st in t e l le c t u s
i n u l t i m o d is c u rs u s te r m i n o
quam
d i u s i s t i t i n a l i q u o
ob je c t o q u o d est p r i n c i p i u m d i s c u r r e n d i .. .
Es t e r go m ens q u ae s t io n is i s ta : Utrum a l i q u e m
c o n c e p t u m s i m p l i c e m p o s s i t i n t e l l e c t u s v i a t o r i s h a b e r e
i n q u o c o n c e p t u s i m p l ic i c o n c i p i a t u r D e u s .
[Opin io
Henrici]
A d h oc d i c i t quidam do c to r s ic l o q u e n d o : De co g n i t i on e
a c t u s d i s t i n g u i p o t e s t e x p a r t e o b j e c t i e t p o t e s t c o g n o s c i
pe r se
vel
p e r a c c id e n s , i n p a r t i c u l a r i
vel
i n u n i v e r s a l i .
R e a l it e r p e r a c c id e n s n o n c o g n o s c i tu r D e u s , q u i a
q u i d -
q u i d d e i p s o c o g n o s c i t u r e s t i p s e , tamen cognoscendo
a l i q u o d
attributum
e j u s co gno s c imus q ua s i p e r a c c i d e n s
q u i d e st. U n d e d e a t t r ib u t i s d i c i t Damascenus libro
p r i m o ,
c a p i tu l o 4 * : N o n n a t u r a m
dicunt
D e i , s ed q u a e
c ir c a n a t u r a m .
I n u n i v e r s a l i
e t i a m ,
p u t a i n g e n e r a l i a t t r i b u t o ,
c o g
n o s c i t u r
;
n on
quidem
i n u n iv e r s a l i s e c u n d u m p r a e d ic a -
tionem q u o d d i c a t u r d e ip s o i n q u o n u l l u m est velle [s ic
u n i v e r s a l e ], q u i a q u id d i t a s
ilia
e st d e se s i n g u l a r i s , s e d i n
u n i v e r s a l i q u o d tantum a n a l o g i c e c o m m u n e e s t s i b i e t
c r e a tu r a e , ta m e n q u a s i unum a n o b is c o n c i p i t u r p r o p t e r
p r o x im i t a t e m c o n c e p t u u m , l ic e t s in t d i v e r s i c on c e p t u s .
* Mign e , P .G., xc iv , 800.
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MANS NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 17
th e n t h e b e g i n n i n g a n d c o n c l u s ion o f t h e r e a s on in g p r o
cess a r e i d e n t i c a l , a n d t h e r e for e I h a v e n o k n o w l e d g e o f
G o d a t
all—or
a t l e a s t G o d i s no t g r a s ped a t t h e e nd o f
t h e r e a s o n in g p roce ss so l o ng as t h e m i n d doe s no t g e t
b e y o n d t h e ob je c t t h a t s e rv e d as t h e i n i t i a l p o i n t of t h e
a r g u m e n t .
T h e m e a n i n g o f t h e q u e s t i o n ,
t h e n ,
is t h i s : " I s i t
p o s s i b l e b y n a t u r a l m e a n s f o r m a n ' s i n t e l l e c t i n t h e
p r e s e n t l ife t o h a v e a s i m p l e c o n c e p t i n w h i c h c on c e p t
G o d is g r a s p e d ? "
[ The Opin ion of H en ry of Ghent]
A c e r t a i n t e a c h e r
8
a n s w e rs t h e q u e s t i on i n t h is w a y :
A n a c t o f k n ow l e d g e c a n b e d i s t in g u i s h e d i n t e rm s o f it s
o b je c t , a n d o n t h i s s core we c a n d i s t i n g u i s h : (a ) a
k n ow le d g e o f a t h i n g t h r o u g h th e t h i n g itself; (b ) a
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e t h i n g t h r o u g h s o m e t h in g i n c i d e n t a l t o
i t ; (c) a k n o w le d g e of t h e t h i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r ; a n d ( d ) a
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e t h i n g i n g e n e r a l.
I n r e a l i t y t h e r e is n o kn ow led g e o f God th rough some
th ing in c iden ta l to H im , fo r w ha te v e r i s k n ow n o f God is
G o d H i m s e l f. N e v e rth e l e s s , w e d o k n o w w h a t G o d is
i n a q u a s i - i n c i d e n t a l manne r when we k no w so me o ne o f
H i s a t t r ib u t e s . H e n c e , Da m a s c e n e says * t h a t t h e
a t t r i
b u t e s " d o n o t b es p ea k th e n a t u r e o f
G o d ,
b u t s o m e t h i n g
a b o u t th e n a t u r e " .
G o d is a lso k n o w n in a general w a y , t h a t is , t h r o u g h s om e
u n i v e r s a l a t t r ib u t e . N o t in d e e d t h a t a n y a t t r i b u t e ,
u n i v e r s a l b y w a y o f p r e d i c a t i o n , i s affirmed o f H i m i n
who m no t h i n g i s u n i v e r s a l , f o r H i s e s s en ce i s s i n g u l a r o f
its v e r y n a t u r e . H e is k n o w n , h ow e v e r , i n a " u n i v e r s a l "
t h a t is o n l y a n a l og i c a l ly c o m m o n to H i m s e l f a n d t o a
c r e a t u r e . T h i s u n i v e r s a l is c o n c e i v e d b y us as t h o u g h i t
w e r e one n o t i o n , be c au se o f t h e c los e re s e m b l a n c e o f t h e
c o n c e p t s i t c o n t a i n s , a l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r i n r e a l i t y a r e
d i v e r s e .
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10
DUNS SCOTUS
I n
particular^ non
c o g n o s c i t u r e x c r e a t u r i s , q u i a
c r e a t u r a e st p e r e g r in a s i m i l i t u d o e ju s , s ic q u i a tantum
c o n for m is e i q u o a d a l ia a t t r i b u t a q u a e n o n s u n t
ilia
n a t u r a i n particular^. E rg o c u m n i h i l d u c a t i n c o g n i t i on e
a l t e r i u s n i s i s u b r a t i o n e s i m i l i s , s e q u i t u r , e t c .
I t e m i n u n i v e r s a l i t r i p l i c i t e r c o g n o s c it u r : g e n e r a l is -
s i m e , g e n e r a l iu s , g e n e r a l i t e r .
Generalissime tr e s h a b e t g r a d u s : c og n o s c e n d o enim
q u o d c u m q u e e n s, u t h oc e ns e s t,
indistinctissime
c o n c i p i -
t u r [D e u s q u i a c o n c i p i t u r ] e ns q u a s i p a r s c on c e p t u s , e t
e st p r i m u s g r a d u s ; e t a m ov e n d o h oc e t c o n c i p i e n d o en s
est s e cu n d us g r a d u s . J a m e n i m u t
c o n c e p t u m ,
n o n u t
p a r s , c o n c i p i t u r c o m m u n e a n a l o g u m D e o e t c r e a t u r a e .
Q u o d si d i s t in g u a t u r c on c e p t u s e n t is q u i D e o c o n v e n i t ,
p u t a c o n c i p i e n d o e n s indeterminatum n e g a t i v e , i d e s t
n o n d e t e r m i n a b i le , a c o n c e p t u e n t is q u i c o n v e n i t
a n a l og ic e , q u o d est ens i n d e t e r m i n a t u m p r i v a t i v e , j a m
e s t t e r t i u s g r a d u s . Primo modo i n d e t e r m i n a t u m a b s tr a -
h i t u r , u t f o r m a a b
omni
m a t e r i a u t i n s e s u b s is te n s e t
[ im jp a r t i c i p a b i l i s . Se c u n d o m o d o i n d e t e r m i n a t u m e st
velle [s ic / ] vel u n i v e r s a l e abstractum a p a r t i c u l a r i b u s
q u o d e st a c t u
participatum
i n
i l l i s .
P o s t i s t o s t r e s g r a d u s g e n e r a l i s s i m e c o n c i p i e n d i
c o n
c i p i t u r De u s g e n e r a l iu s c on c i p ie n d o q u o d c u m q u e
a t t r i -
butum n o n s i m p l ic i te r u t p r i u s , se d c u m p r a e e m in e n t ia
s u m m a .
G e n e r a l i t e r autem c o n c i p i tu r c o n c ip i e n d o q u o d c u m q u e
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man's natural knowledge of GOD 18
God is n ot k n ow n in par ticu lar from creatures , because
a c rea tu re bears on ly an exte rn a l likeness to H im , s ince
i t resemb les H im on ly i n those a t tr ibu tes w h ich do no t
cons t itu te H im as th is p a r t i cu la r na tu re . Now s ince one
th ing can be known th rough ano the r on ly by reason o f
the s im i la r i ty ex is t ing be tw een the tw o, i t follow s tha t
God is no t kn own in p a r ti cu la r t h roug h c rea tu res .
Fu r t he rmo re , t he re a re t h ree ways i n wh i ch we may
have a gen era l know led ge of God : (a) i n a most ge ne ra l
w ay , (b ) i n a
less
gen era l w ay , an d (c ) in the least gen era l
manne r .
(a) The most genera l knowledge we have of God
com prises three s tages. To kn ow an y be ing as " th is
b e i n g " i s a l ready to conce ive God in a very ind is t inc t
w ay ; for "b e in g " is i nc lude d , as i t w e re , as pa r t o f the
conce pt . This is the
first
step. Th e second step consists
i n r em ov in g th e " t h i s " a n d conce iv in g s im p ly " b e i n g " .
For " b e i n g " , i n
so
fa r as i t is a concep t a nd no t s im p ly a
par t o f a concep t , i s a l ready conce ived as ana log ica l l y
com m on to God and c rea tu re . We a re in the th i rd stage,
i f the concep t o f "b e in g " w h ich pe r ta ins to God is d is
tingu is hed from the concept o f " b e i n g " w h i ch pe rta in s
analogical ly to creatures, i f , for instance, God is
con
ce ived as a be ing that is negat ive ly undetermined, that
is ,
i ncapab le o f be ing de te rm ined , wh i l e a c rea tu re i s
conceived as a be ing that is pr iva t ive ly undetermined.9
In the fi rs t ins tance , "un d e te rm ine d " is conce ived
abs t rac t ly as someth ing
self-subsistent
and incapab le o f
be i ng p a r t ic i pa t ed
i n ,
l ik e
a
fo rm tha t lacks a l l m a t te r . I n
the second , "unde te rm ined" i s a un ive rsa l abs t rac ted
from pa r ticu la rs an d n ot ac tua lly shared by them.10
(b) In add i t ion to these three s tages of most genera l
kn ow led ge , God is grasped in a less genera l an d m ore
spec ific w ay , w hen any g iven a t tr ib u te is conce ived n ot
i n a n unq ua lifie d m anne r
as
b efore, b u t
as
ex is t ing in the
h ighest degree of
perfection
poss ib le to such an a t t r ib u te .
(c)
God is k n ow n in the least general manner, how ev er,
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19
DUNS
SGOTUS
a t t r i b u t u m esse i d e m c u m s uo primo a t t r i b u t o , s c i l i c e t
esse,
p r o p t e r s i m p l i c i t a t e m .
Nee p e r s p e c i e m propriam c o g n o s c i t u r , q u i a n i h i l e s t
e o s i m p l i c i u s , sed a d modum a e s t i m a t i v a e p e r s p e c i e m
aliquam alienam e x c r e a t u r is . E t h oc o m n i b u s t r ib u s
modis
p r a e d i c t i s . . .
[Opin io Scoti]
R e s p on d e o a l i t e r a d primam quaestionem e t i n q u ib u s -
d a m ,
s c i l ic e t i n q u i n q u e , contradicam p o s i t i on i p r a e -
d i c t a e .
R a t i o n e s meae p o s i t i on i s os t e n d e n t o p p o s i t u m
hu j u s pos i t i o n i s . . .
[ P r i m a Sentent id] . D i c o e rg o p r i m o q u o d n o n tantum
h a b e r i p o t e s t c o n c e p t u s n a t u r a l i t e r i n q u o q u a s i p e r
a c c id e n s c o n c i p i t u r D e u s , p u t a i n a l iq u o d a t t r i b u t o , s ed
etiam
a l iq u is c o n c e p tu s i n q u o p e r se e t q u i d d i t a t i v e
c o n c i p i a t u r D e u s .
P r ob o : q u i a c o n c ip i e n d o s a p i e n te m c o n c i p i tu r p r o -
p r i e t a s , s e c u n d u m
e u m , vel
q u a s i p r o p r ie t a s i n a c t u
s e c u n d o perficiens
n a t u r a m .
E rg o i n t e l l ig e n d o s a p ie n t e m
o p o r t e t p r i u s i n t e l l i g e r e a l i q u o d q u i d , q u i a c u m i n t e l l i g o
i s tu d q u a s i p r o p r i e t a t e m in e ss e , e t i t a a n t e c on c e p tu s
o m n i u m passionum v e l q u a s i p a s s i o n u m , o p o r t e t q u a e -
re re c on c e p t u m q u i d d i t a t i v u m c u i i n t e l l i g a n t u r is ta
a t t r i b u i ; e t is te c on c e p tu s a l iu s e r a t quidditativus d e
D e o , q u ia i n nullo a l io po tes t esse s ta tus .
[Secunda Sente nt id]. Se c u nd o d ic o q u o d n o n t a n t u m i n
c o n c e p t u a n a l o g o c o n c e p t u i c r e a t u r a e c o n c i p i t u r D e u s ,
s c i lic e t q u i omnino s i t a l i u s a b illo q u i d e c r e a t u r a d i c i t u r ,
s ed i n c o n c e p t u a l i q u o u n i v o c o s i b i e t c r e a t u r a e .
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M NS N TUR L KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ig
when the m in d , on the basis o f God's s im p l ic i t y , ide n t ifies
any o f H i s o t he r a t t r i bu t es w i t h H i s p r ima ry a t t r i bu t e ,
n a m e ly, being itse lf.
S ince no th ing i s s imp le r t han God , He i s known no t
t h roug h a species p rope r to H im , bu t , i n a m anne r
remin iscen t o f the opera t ion of the es t imat ive power
th roug h a species, a l ien to H im , de r ived from c rea tu res .
An d th is ho lds fo r a l l th ree of the a forem ent ioned ways
o f kn ow in g God.
[Scotus's own op in ion]
M y answer to the fi rs t qu es tion is d i ffe re n t . I sha ll
con t rad ic t the p reced ing v iew on five po in t s . The
reasons I g ive for m y p os i tion w i l l refu te the othe r .
[First Statem ent]. In the firs t p lace , th en , I say th a t i t is
na tu ra l l y poss ib le to have no t on ly a concep t i n wh ich
God i s k nown i n c i den t a l l y , a s i t
were—for
ins tance,
under the aspect of some
attribute—but
also one in
w h i c h H e is conceiv ed b y H im se lf and qu i dd i t a t i v e l y .
Th is I p rove as follow s . Acc ord ing to [H e n ry o f
Ghen t ] , b y conce i v i ng "w i se " we g rasp a p rope r t y o r
quas i -p roper ty wh ich per fec ts the na tu re a f te r the
m anne r of
a
secondary ac t. In order to conce ive "w is e " ,
the refore, i t is necessary to have a conc ep t ion of som e
pr io r sub jec t , because I unders tand th is p roper ty to be
verified ex is ten t ia l ly . An d so w e m us t look b eyond a l l
our ideas of a t t r ibutes or quas i-a t t r ibutes , in order to
fi nd a qu i dd i t a t iv e concep t to w h i ch the form e r m ay be
a t t r i b u t e d .
Th is othe r concep t w i l l be a q u id d i ta t ive
n ot ion of
God,
for our quest for a quas i-sub jec t w i l l n ot
cease w i th any othe r k in d of concep t.
[Second Statem ent]. Second ly, I say th a t God is con
ce ived not on ly in a concept ana logous to the concept
of
a
c rea tu re , tha t i s , one w h ich is w h o ll y othe r tha n tha t
wh ich i s p red ica ted o f c rea tu res , bu t even in some
concep t un ivoca l to H im se lf an d to a c rea tu re .
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2 0 DUNS SCOTUS
E t n e fia t c o n t e n t i o
de
n o m in e u n i v oc a t io n is ,
univocum
c o n c e p t u m d i c o q u i i t a e s t u n u s q u o d e j u s u n i t a s sufficit
a d c o n t r a d i c t i o n e m
afErmando
e t n e g a n d o
ipsum
d e
e o d e m ,
s u f f i c i t etiam p r o m e d i o s y l l o g i s t i c o , u t e x t r e m a
u n i t a i n m e d i o s i c u n o s i n e f a l l a c i a
aequivocationis
c o n -
c l u d a n t u r i n t e r se u n i r i e t u n i v o c a t i o n e m s ic intellectam
p r o b o q u a d r u p l i c i t e r .
[ A r g . i ] . Primo
s ic :
omnis
i n t e l l e c t u s c e r t u s d e u n o
c o n c e p t u e t d u b i u s d e d i v e r s i s h a b e t c o n c e p t u m d e q u o
es t c e r t u s alium a c on c e p t ib u s d e q u i b u s e s t d u b i u s , s u b -
jectum i n c l u d i t p r a e d i c a t u m . Se d in t e l le c t u s v i a t or is
p o te s t esse c e r t u s d e D e o q u o d s i t e ns d u b i t a n d o d e e n t e
f in i to
vel
i n f i n i t o , c r e a t o
vel
i n c r e a to ; e r go con ce p t u s
en t is d e Deo e s t a l iu s a co n ce p t u is t o e t
i l l o ,
e t i t a n e u t e r
e x s e, e t i n u t r o q u e
illorum
i n c l u d i t u r , i g i t u r u n i v oc u s .
P r o b a t i o
majoris
: q u i a n u l lu s i d e m c on c e p tu s est
c e r tu s e t d u b i u s ; e r g o v e l a l i u s , q u o d e st p r o p o s i t u m ,
v e l n u l lu s , e t n u n c n o n e r i t c e r t i t u d o d e a l i q u o c o n c e p t u .
P r o b a t i o
minoris
: Q u i l i b e t
Philosophus
f u i t c e r t u s
i l lud q u o d p os u i t primum p r i n c i p i u m esse e n s, p u t a u n u s
d e i g n e e t a l i u s d e a q u a , c e r t u s e r a t q u o d e r a t e n s .
N o n autem f u i t c e r t u s quod esse t ens creatum v e l in c r e a -
t u m , p r i m u m v e l n o n p r i m u m . N o n enim e r a t c e r t u s
q u o d e r a t p r i m u m , q u i a tu n c fu is s e t c e r tu s d e
f a l so ,
e t
falsum no n e s t s c i b i l e ; nee q u o d e ra t ens n o n p r i m u m ,
q u i a t u n c n o n p o s u i s s e n t o p p o s i t u m .
C o n f i rm a t u r e t ia m : n a m a l iq u i s v id e n s
Philosophos
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MAN
S
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 20
A n d le s t t h e r e be a d i s p u t e a b o u t th e n a m e " u n i v o c a -
t i o n " , I d e s ig n a t e t h a t con ce p t u n i vo c a l w h i c h possesses
s u ffic i e n t u n i t y i n i ts e lf, so t h a t t o a f fi rm a n d d en y i t o f
on e a n d th e s am e t h i n g w o u l d b e a c o n t r a d i c t i on . I t
a ls o h a s s u ffi c ie n t u n i t y t o s e rv e as t h e m i d d l e t e rm o f a
s y l l o g i s m ,
so t h a t w h e r e v e r t w o e xtre m e s a r e u n i te d b y a
m i d d l e t e r m t h a t is on e i n t h i s w a y , w e m a y c on c lu d e to
th e u n i o n o f t h e tw o e xtre m e s a m o n g th e m s e lv e s . U n i v o -
c a t i o n i n t h i s s e n s e I p ro v e b y t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r
a r g u
m e n t s .
[ A r g . i ] .
Th e fi r s t is t h i s . Eve r y i n t e l le c t t h a t is
c e r t a i n a b o u t on e c on c e p t , b u t d u b i ou s a b o u t oth e r s h a s ,
i n a d d i t io n t o t h e c on c e p ts a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n d o u b t ,
a n o th e r c on c e p t o f w h i c h i t is c e r t a i n . ( T h e s u b je c t
in c l u d e s t h e p r e d i c a t e . ) N o w , i n th i s l ife a l r e a d y , a m a n
c a n b e c e r t a i n i n h is m i n d t h a t G o d is a b e i n g a n d s t i l l
b e i n d o u b t w h e t h e r H e is a f i n i t e o r a n i n f in i te b e i n g , a
c r e a t e d o r a n u n c r e a t e d b e i n g . C on s e q u e n t ly , th e
c o n
c e p t o f " b e i n g " as a ff i r m e d o f G o d is d i ffe r e n t f r o m t h e
ot h e r t w o c on c e p ts b u t is i n c l u d e d i n b o t h o f t h e m a n d
t h e r e fo re is u n i v o c a l .
P r oo f o f t h e m a jo r . O n e a n d th e sa m e c on c e p t c a n n o t
b e b o t h c e r t a i n a n d d u b io u s . T h e r e f or e , e i th e r t h e r e is
a n o th e r c on c e p t ( w h i c h is o u r c o n t e n t i on ) , or th e r e is
n o c o n c e p t a t a l l , a n d c on s e q u e n t ly n o c e r t it u d e a b o u t
a n y c o n c e p t .
I p r o v e t h e m i n o r . E v e r y p h i los o p h e r w a s c e r t a i n t h a t
w h a t h e p os t u l a t e d as a fi rs t p r i n c i p l e w a s a b e in g ; fo r
i n s t a n c e , o n e w a s c e r t a i n t h a t f i r e w a s a b e i n g , a n o t h e r
t h a t w a t e r w a s a b e i n g . Y e t h e w a s n o t c e r t a in w h e t h e r
i t w a s a c r e a t e d or a n u n c r e a t e d b e i n g , w h e t h e r i t w a s
first o r n o t fir s t. H e co u l d n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t i t w a s
t h e f i rs t b e i n g , for t h e n h e w o u l d h a v e b e e n c e r t a in
a bo u t so me t h i n g f a l s e , a n d wha t i s f a l s e i s no t s t r i c t l y
k n o w a b l e .1 1 N e i t h e r w a s h e c e r t a i n th a t i t w a s n o t
fi r s t ; fo r t h e n h e w o u l d n o t h a v e c l a i m e d t h e o p p o s it e .
Th i s r eason is c on f i rm e d as fol low s : Som eone
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21
DUNS SCOTUS
d i s co rda re , po te s t e s se
certus
d e
quocumque
q u o d D e u s
[read q u i l i b e t ] posui tpr imum principium esse e n s , e t tamen
p r o p t e r contrarietatem opinionum e o ru m , p o t u i t d u b i t a r e
u t r u m s it h oc ens vel
i l l u d .
E t t a l id u b i t a n t i , s i f i e r e t d e m o n -
s t r a t i o c o n c l u d e n s v e l d e s t r u e n s aliquem conceptum i n -
f e r i o r e m , p u t a q u o d i g n i s n o n e r i t e n s p r i m u m , s e d
aliquid
ens pos te r i u s
primo
e n t e , n o n d e s t r u e r e t u r
ille
c on c e p t u s p r i m u s s i b i c e r tu s q u e r n h a b u i t d e e n t e , s ed
s a l v a r e t u r i n
illo
c o n c e p t u p a r t i c u l a r i p r o b a t o d e ig n e ;
e t p e r h o c p r o b a t u r p r op o s i t io s u p p o s it a i n u l t i m a
c on s e q u e n t ia r a t io n i s , q u a e f u i t q u o d i l le c on c e p tu s c e r tu s
q u a e est e x se n e u t e r d u b i o r u m i n u t r oq u e i s t or u m
s a l v a t u r .
Q u o d s i n o n c u re s d e a u c t o r i t a t e ilia a c c e p t a d e
d i v e r s ita t e o p i n i o n u m p h i lo s o p h a n t iu m , se d d ic a s q u o d
q u i l i b e t h a b e t d u o s c o n c e p t u s i n i n t e l l e c t u s u o p r o -
p in q u o s , q u i p r o p t e r p r o p i n q u i t a t e m a n a l og ia e v i d e n t u r
esse u n u s c on c e p t u s . C o n t r a h oc v i d e t u r esse q u o d t u n c
e x i s t a e v a s i o n e v i d e r e t u r d e s t r u c t a
omnis
v i a p r o b a n d i
u n i t a t e m a l i c u j u s c o n c e p t u s
u n i v o c a m .
S i enim d i c i s
hominem
h a b e r e
unum
c o n c e p t u m a d S o c r a t e m e t
P la t on e m , n e g a b i tu r t i b i e t d i c e t u r q u o d s u n t d u o , se d
v i d e n t u r u n u s p r op t e r magnam s i m i l i t u d i n e m .
P r a e t e r e a , ill i d u o c on c e p t u s s u n t s i m p l ic i t e r s i m p l ic e s ,
e r g o n o n i n t e l l i g i b i l e s n i s i d i s t i n c t e e t t o t a l i t e r , e r g o s i
n u n c n o n v i d e n t u r d u o , nee pos t .
I t e m ,
a u t c o n c i p i u n t u r u t
omnino
d i s p a r a t i e t
mirum
quomodo v i d e n t u r u n u s , a u t u t c o m p a r a t i s e c u n d u m
a n a log i a m a u t s e c u n d u m s i m i l i t u d i n e m v e l d i s t i n c t i on e m ,
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MAN
S
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
21
p e r c e i v in g t h e d i s a g re e m e n t a m on g p h i los op h e r s c a n s t i l l
b e c e r t a i n t h a t a n y o f t h e th i n g s t h a t th e y h a v e a c c la i m e d
as t h e fir s t p r i n c i p l e is a b e i n g . Neve r t h e le s s , i n v i ew o f
t h e c o n t r a r i e t y o f o p in i on s , h e c o u l d b e i n d o u b t w h e t h e r
th is o r t h a t b e in g is p r i m a r y . N o w i f w e c o u ld d e m on
s t r a t e f o r s u c h a n i n d i v i d u a l t h e t r u t h o r f a l s i t y o f o n e
o f these a l t e r n a t i v e s , fo r exam p le t h a t fir e is n o t th e fir s t
b e i n g , b u t is p os t e r ior t o t h e f ir s t b e i n g , w e w o u l d n o t
des t ro y h i s first c e r t a i n n o t io n o f i t as a b e i n g , b u t t h i s
n o t io n w o u l d s u r v iv e i n th e p a r t i c u l a r c on c e p t ion w h i c h
w e h a d p r o v e n a b o u t fir e . A n d t h i s a ls o p r ov e s t h e p r o p o
s i t i on s t a t e d a s t h e fin a l co n c l u s i on o f t h e a r g u m e n t ,
n a m e l y t h a t t h is c e r t a i n c on c e p t , s in c e as s u c h i t is
n e i t h e r o f t h e do ub t f u l no t i o n s , i s p r e s e r v e d i n bo t h o f
t h e m .
Y o u m a y n o t r e c o g n i s e t h e f o r c e o f t h i s a r g u m e n t
b a s e d o n t h e d i v e r s i t y o f o p i n i o n a m o n g t h e p h i l o s o -
p h i s e rs , b u t in s is t t h a t e a c h ha s i n h is m i n d t w o c on c e p ts
c los e ly r e s em b l i n g e a c h o th e r . Ye t be c au se o f t h e v e r y
c loseness o f t he a n a log y , t h e y seem to be one conce p t .
T h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h o w e v e r , m a y b e u r g e d
ag a i n s t t h i s . B y s u c h a n e v a s i on a l l po s s i b i li ty o f p ro v i n g
t h e u n i t y o f a n y u n i v o c a l c o n c e p t w o u l d b e d e s t r o y e d .
F or i f y o u sa y th a t " m a n " is on e c on c e p t a p p l ic a b l e t o
b o t h Soc ra te s a n d P l a t o , som e one w i l l d e n y i t , a s s e r tin g
t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o c o n c e p t s , b u t t h e y s e e m t o b e o n e
b e ca u se o f t h e i r g r e a t s i m i la r i t y .
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s e t w o c o n c e p t s a r e i r r e d u c i b l y
s i m p l e . U n le s s , t h e r e for e , t h e y a r e k n o w n d i s t in c t l y
a n d in
toto,
t h e y c a n n o t b e k n o w n a t a l l . C on s e q u e n t ly ,
i f th e s e con cep t s a r e n o t p e r c e i v e d as tw o con cep t s n o w ,
t h e y w i l l n o t b e p e r c e i v e d a s t w o l a t e r on .
A g a i n , e i t h e r th e se tw o con cep t s a r e co n ce iv e d as
o p p o s e d t o e a c h o t h e r , a n d t h e n i t i s s t r a n g e h o w t h e y
a r e p e r c e iv e d as on e . O r t h e y a r e c o m p a r e d a c c o r d i n g
t o a n a l og y , or a c c o r d i n g t o s i m i l a r i t y o r d i s t i n c t io n , i n
w h i c h ca se t h e y a r e c on c e iv e d a s d i s t i n c t e i t h e r p r i o r to
2 , 3 2 2 ) 5
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22 DUNS SGOTUS
e t t u n c simul vel p r i u s concipiuntur u t d i s t i n c t i , e r g o n o n
v i d e n t u r
u n u s .
I t e m ,
p o n e n d o d u o s c o n c e p t u s , ponis d u o o b j e c t a
fo r m a l ia c o g n i ta , q u o m o d o s u n t d u o c o g n i ta fo r m a l ia
e t n o n u t d i s t i n c t a .
P r a e te r e a , s i i n t e l l i g e r e t s i n g u l a r ia s u b p r o p r i i s
r a t i o n i b u s q u a m v i s c o n c e p t u s duorum e j u s d e m s p e c i e i
e sse nt s i m i l i m i , n o n e st dubium t a m e n , q u i n multo
s im i l i o r e s
quam
i s t i d u o i n p r o p o s i t o , q u i a i s t i d u o
d i ffe r u n t s p e c ie , a d h u c in t e l le c t u s b e n e d i s t in g u e r e t i n t e r
ta le s c on c e p t u s s i n g u l a r i u m . . .
[ A r g .
n ] . Se c u n d o p r i n c i p a l i t e r a r g u o s ic : N u l l u s
c on c e p t u s r e a l is c a u s a t u r i n i n t e l l e c t u v i a t or i s n a t u r a l i te r
n i s i a b
his.quae
s un t n a t u r a l i te r
motiva
i n t e l le c t u s n o s t r i .
Sed ilia s u n t phantasma v e l ob j e c t u m re lu c e n s i n p h a n -
t a s m a t e e t i n t e l l e c t u s a g e n s , e r g o n u l l u s c o n c e p t u s
s i m
p l e x n a t u r a l i t e r f i t i n i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o modo n i s i q u i
po t e s t f i e r i v i r t u t e i s t o r u m , s e d co n cep t u s q u i no n e s s e t
u n i v o c u s o b j e c t o r e l u c e n t i i n p h a n t a s m a t e , s e d
omnino
a l i u s p r i o r a d q u e r n ille habeat a n a l o g i a m , n o n p o t e s t
f i e r i v i r t u t e i n t e l l e c t u s a g e n t i s e t p h a n t a s m a t i s , e r g o t a l i s
c o n c e p t u s a l i u s a n a l o g u s q u i p o n i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r i n
i n t e l
l e c t u v i a t o r i s numquam e r i t e t i t a n o n p o t e r i t h a b e r i
n a t u r a l i t e r a l i q u i s c o n c e p t u s d e D e o , q u o d e s t
f a l s u m .
P r ob a t io a s s u m p t i : O b je c t u m quodcumque s i v e r e
lu c e n s i n p h a n t a s m a t e s iv e i n s p ec ie in t e l l ig i b i l i c u m
i n t e l l e c t u a g e n t e v e l p o s s i b i l i c o o p e r a n t e s e c u n d u m
u l t i m u m s ua e v i r t u t i s fa c i t s ic u t effectum s i b i a d a e q u a t u m
c o n c e p t u m
suum
p r o p r i u m e t c on c e p t u m o m n i u m
e s s e n t ia l i te r v e l v i r t u a l i t e r in c l u s o r u m i n e o. Se d i l l e
a l iu s c o n c e p t u s , q u i p o n i t u r a n a l og u s , n o n e st e s se n -
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23
DUNS SCOTUS
t i a l i t e r
nee
v i r t u a l i t e r
inclusus
i n i s t o ,
nee etiam
es t i s te ,
e r g o i s t e n o n f i e t a b a l i q u o t a l i m o v e n t e .
E t
confirmatur
r a t i o , q u i a o b j e c t u m p r a e t e r
c o n -
ceptum s u u m p r o p r i u m adaequatum e t inclusum i n i p so
a l t e r o
duorum
m o d o r u m
praedictorum
n i h i l p o t e s t
cognosci ex is to objecto n i s i p e r d i s c u r s u m , se d discursus
p r a e s u p p o n i t c o g n i t i o n e m i s t i u s simplicitatis a d q u o d
discurritur.
Formetur i g i t u r r a t i o s ic : q u i a n u l l u m o b je c t u m fa c i t
conceptum simplicem
p r o p r i u m i n i s t o i n t e l l e c t u c o n -
ceptum s i m p l ic e m p r o p r i u m a l te r iu s o b je c t i n i s i c on -
t i n e a t illud aliud o b j e c t u m e s s e n t i a l i t e r vel v i r t u a l i t e r ,
o b j e c t u m
autem
c r e a t u m n o n c o n t i n e t i n c r e a t u m
e s s e n t ia l it e r v e l v i r t u a l i t e r , e t h oc s u b e a r a t i on e s u b q u a
s i b i a t t r i b u u n t u r , u t p os te r iu s e s s e n t ia l i te r a t t r i b u i t u r
p r i o r i e s s e n t i a l i t e r , q u i a c o n t r a r a t i o n e m p o s t e r i o r i s
e s s e n t i a l i t e r e s t i n c l u d e r e v i r t u a l i t e r s u u m p r i u s e t p a t e t
q u o d o b j e c t u m c r e a t u m n o n e s s e n t i a l i t e r c o n t i n e t i n
c r e a t u m s e c u n d u m a l i q u i d omnino s i b i p r o p r i u m e t n on
c om m u n e , e rg o n o n fa c i t c on c e p t u m s i m p l ic e m e t p r o
p r i u m e n t i in c r e a t o. . .
[ A r g .
i n ] . T e r t i o a r g u i t u r s ic : C on c e p t u s p r o p r i u s
alicujus s u b j e c t i e s t sufheiens r a t i o c o n c l u d e n d i de illo
s u b j e c t o o m n i a c o n c e p t i b i l i a q u a e s i b i n e c e s s a r i o i n s u n t .
N u l l u m a u t e m c on c e p t u m h a b e m u s d e D e o p e r q u e rn
sufficienter p os s u m u s c o g n os c e re o m n i a c o n c e p t a a
n ob is q u a e ne c e ss a rio s i b i i n s u n t . P a t e t d e T r i n i t a t e , e t
aliis c r e d i t is necessa r iis ; e r g o , e t c .
M a j o r p r o b a t u r , q u i a i m m e d i a t a m q u a m l i b e t c o g n o s -
c i m u s ,
i n q u a n t u m t e rm in o s c og n os c im u s . I g i t u r p a t e t
m a j o r d e
omni
i l l o c o n c e p t i b i l i q u o d i m m e d i a t e
in
es t
c o n c e p t u i s u b j e c t i , q u o d s i i n s i t m e d i a t e , fie t i d e m
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 23
i nc lud e d in it.13 C onse que nt ly , i t cann ot a rise by any
such m ov ing fac tor .
An d th i s a rgum en t is con firm ed by the fac t t h a t excep t
th rou gh a reason ing p rocess the m ind can know n o th in g
from th is ob jec t bes ides the p roper an d adequ ate concep t
o f t he ob jec t i t se l f and wha teve r i s i nc luded the re in in
one of
the
tw o aforem en tione d w ays . B u t such a reason
ing process presupposes a know led ge of the s im ple th in g
tow ards w h ich one reasons .
Consequen t l y , t he a rgumen t may be fo rmu la ted as
follow s : No ob jec t w i l l p roduc e a s im p le a nd p rope r
concep t o f i t se l f and a s imp le and p roper concep t o f
another object , unless i t contains th is second object
essen tia lly or v i r tu a l ly . No created objec t , howe ver ,
con ta ins the "Uncrea ted" essen t ia l l y o r virtually—at
least i n the w ay tha t the tw o a re a c tua lly
r e la ted ,
n am e ly
as w ha t is by na tu re seconda ry is re la ted to w ha t is by
na tu re p r ior . For i t is con t ra ry to the very n o tion of
what is essen t ia l l y secondary to inc lude v i r tua l l y what
is p r ior to i t . I t is a lso obvious th a t the crea ted does n ot
conta in , as par t of i ts essence, someth ing that is not
mere ly common, bu t i s exc lus i ve l y p rope r to the 'Un
c rea t ed " .
There fore , i t p roduces no s im p le an d p rope r
concep t o f the "Un c re a te d " a t a l l .
[A rg . i n ] .
The t h i r d a rgum en t is th is . The p rope r
concept of any subjec t prov ides suf f ic ient ground for
conc lud ing to every th ing conce ivab le wh ich necessar i l y
inheres in tha t sub jec t . We have no concep t o f God,
however , that enables us to know every necessary
a t t r i
bu te w h ich w e conce ive o f H im , as is ev iden t from the
fac t o f the Tr in i t y , and the o ther necessary a t t r ibu tes
th a t w e k n ow of H im b y fa i th . The refore, e tc .
P roof o f the m a jor. We know an y im m ed ia te p ropos i
t ion in so fa r as w e kn ow its te rm s . C onseq uen tly , the
m ajor c lea r ly holds fo r every concep t tha t is im m ed ia te ly
ve r i fied e xis te nt ia l ly of the sub jec t-conce pt . I f i t is a
ques t ion of a n o tion tha t is on ly m ed ia te ly ve r ified , our
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24 DUNS SCOTUS
argumentum de m e d i o c om p a r a t o a d id e m s u b je c t u m ,
e t
ubicumque
s t a b i t u r , h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m d e i m -
m e d ia t is , e t u l t r a p e r illas s c i e n t u r m e d i a t a e .
[ A r g .
i v ] .
I t e m , q u a r t o p o te s t s ic a r g u i . A u t a l i q u a
p e r fe c t io s i m p l i c i t e r h a b e t r a t i on e m
communem
Deo e t
c r e a t u r a e , e t h a b e t u r p r o p o s i t u m , a u t
n o n ,
se d tantum
propriam c r e a t u r a e , e t t u n c r a t i o e j u s n o n c o n v e n i e t
formaliter
D e o , q u o d e st in c o n v e n i e n s . A u t h a b e t
r a t i o n e m omnino p r o p r i a m D e o , e t t u n c s e q u i tu r q u o d
n i h i l a t t r i b u e n d u m e st D e o , q u i a es t p e r fe c t i o s i m p l ic i t e r .
N a m h o c n i h i l e s t aliud d i c e r e , n i s i q u o d q u i a r a t i o e j u s
u t c o n v e n i t D e o , d i c i t perfectionem s i m p l ic i t e r , . id e o
ipsum
p o n i t u r i n De o , e t i t a p e r i b i t d o c t r i n a
Anselmi
Monologion,*
u b i vult q u o d praetermissis r e l a t i on i b u s i n
o m n i b u s aliis q u i d q u i d es t s i m p l i c i t e r m e l iu s i p s u m quam
n o n i p s u m , a t t r i b u e n d u m est D e o, s ic u t q u o d c u m q u e
n o n t a l e , est a m o v e n d u m a b ip s o . Primo e rg o s e c u n d u m
i p s u m a l i q u i d c o g n o s c i tu r esse t a l e e t s e c u n d o a t t r i b u i t u r
D e o .
E r go n o n e st t a l e p r a e c i s e u t i n Deo .
H oc etiam c o n f i r m a t u r q u i a t u n c n u l l a p e r fe c t io
s i m p l i c i t e r esset i n c r e a t u r a . C o n s e q u e n t ia p a t e t , q u i a
n u l li u s t a l is p e r fe c t io n is e t ia m c on c e p tu s a l iq u i s c o n v e n i t
c r e a t u r a e n i s i c on c e p t u s a n a l og i c u s e x h y p o t h e s i . T a l i s
s e c u n d u m s e, q u i a a n a l og i c u s , e st im p e r fe c t u s e t i n nullo
es t e ju s r a t i o melior n o n ip s o , q u i a a l ia s s e c u n d u m illam
r a t i o n e m a n a l o g i c a m p o n e r e t u r i n D e o .
C o n f ir m a t u r e t ia m h a e c q u a r t o r a t i o s ic :
Omnis
Cap.
xv (Migne ,
P.L.
c l v i i i ,
162-3).
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 24
a r g u m e n t w i l l c o n t in u e to a p p l y to t h e m i d d l e te r m i n
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s u b j e c t - c o n c e p t u n t i l w e h a v e w h a t w e
a re seeking—some i m m e d i a t e p r op o s it ion s . T h r o u g h
th ese im m e d i a te t ru t h s ,
t h e n ,
t h e m e d i a te t r u th s w i l l be
k n o w n .
[ A r g .
i v ] . A fo u r t h a r g u m e n t c a n a ls o b e a d d u c e d .
E i t h e r s om e p u r e p e r fe c t io n
14
h as a c o m m on m e a n i n g as
a p p l i e d t o G o d a n d c re a t u re s ( w h i c h is o u r c o n t e n t io n ) ,
o r n o t . I f n o t , i t is e i t h e r because it s m e a n i ng does n o t
a p p l y f or m a l ly t o G od a t a l l ( w h i c h is in a d m is s i b l e ) , or
e lse i t h a s a m e a n i n g t h a t is w h o l l y p r o p e r t o G o d , i n
w h i c h case n o t h i n g n e e d b e a t t r ib u t e d t o Go d b e ca u se
i t is a p u r e p e r fe c t io n . Fo r s u c h a n a s s u m p t ion is
e q u i v a l e n t t o s a y in g t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h a p e r fe c t io n
i n so fa r as i t a p p l ie d t o G o d , is a p u r e p e r fe c t io n a n d
t h e r e f or e is a ff i rm e d o f G o d . B u t t h i s is t o b r i n g t o
n ou g h t w h a t Anselm t e a c he s i n t h e
Monologion,*
n a m e l y
t h a t , w i t h r e g a r d to e v e r y t h i n g e xc e p t re l a t ion s , w h a t e v e r
is u n c o n d i t i on a l ly b e t t e r th a n s om e t h in g w h i c h is n o t i t ,
m u s t b e a t t r i b u t e d t o G o d , e v e n as e v e r y t h i n g n o t o f t h is
k i n d [ i. e . e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is n o t b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g
p o s it iv e t h a t is i n c o m p a t ib l e w i t h i t ] m u s t b e d e n ie d o f
H i m .
A c c o r d i n g to A n s e lm ,
t h e n ,
w e f i r s t k n o w s o m e
t h i n g t o b e a p u r e p e r f e c t i o n a n d s e c o n d l y w e a t t r i b u t e
t h i s p e r fe c t i o n t o G o d . The r e fo r e , i t is n o t a p u r e p e r
fe c t ion p r e c i s e l y i n so fa r a s i t is i n God .
Th i s is a lso co n fi rm e d b y th e f a c t t h a t ot h e rw is e n o
p u r e p e r fe c t io n w o u l d e xis t i n c r e a t u re s . T h e con s e
q uen ce i s e v i d e n t , f o r i n t h i s h y po t h e s i s o n l y s u c h
c o n
cep ts a s exp re ss such p u re p e r fe c t ions an a logous l y ca n be
a p p l ie d t o a c r e a t u r e . B u t s u c h a n o t io n i n it s e l f is
im pe r fe c t s in c e i t is o n l y a n a logo us t o th e p u r e p e r fe c
t i o n . A n d th e r e for e , n o t h i n g is a n y b e t te r fo r h a v i n g
t h i s a n a l o g o u s p e r f e c t i o n t h a n i t w o u l d b e i f i t d i d n o t
h a v e i t , fo r ot h e r w i s e s u c h a p e r f e c t io n w o u l d b e a f fi r m e d
o f God .
Th i s fo u r t h r e a so n is a lso co n fi rm e d as fo ll ow s . Eve r y
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25
DUNS SCOTUS
inquisitio metaphysica d e D e o s ic p r o c e d i t , c o n s id e r a n d o
formalem r a t i on e m a l ic u j u s e t a u fe r e n d o a b ilia r a t i o n e
f o r m a l i i m p e r f e c t i o n e m
quam habet
i n c r e a t u r i s e t r e -
s e r v a n d o illam r a t i o n e m f or m a l e m e t a t t r i b u e n d o s i b i
omnino summam
p e r f e c t i o n e m e t s i c a t t r i b u e n d o
illud
Deo . Exemplum
d e f or m a l i r a t i on e s a p i e n t ia e
vel
i n t e l le c t u s v e l v o l u n t a t i s . C on s id e r a t u r enim i n s e e t
s e c u n d u m s e, e t e x h oc q u o d i s ta r a t i o n o n c o n c l u d i t
formaliter i m p e r f e c t i o n e m a l i q u a m nee l i m i t a t i o n e m ,
r e m ov e t u r a b ip s a im p e r fe c t ion e s q u a e c o n c o m i ta n t u r
e a r n i n c r e a t u r i s e t r e s e r v a t a
eadem
r a t i on e s a p ie n t ia e
e t v o l u n t a t i s a t t r i b u u n t u r is t a D e o p e r fe c t is s i m e , e rg o
omnis
i n q u i s i t i o d e D e o s u p p o n i t i n t e l l e c t u m h a b e r e
conceptum eundem
u n i v o c u m
quem
a c c e p i t e x c r e a t u r i s .
Q u o d s i d ic a s a l ia e st fo rm a l i s r a t i o eorum q u a e
c o n v e n i u n t D e o , e x h oc s e q u i tu r in c o n v e n i e n s , q u o d ex
n u l la r a t i on e p r o p r i a e o r u m p r o u t s u n t i n c r e a t u r is
p os s u n t c o n c l u d i d e D e o , q u i a o m n i n o a l ia e t a l ia r a t i o
i l lorum e st e t is t o r u m . Immo n on magis c o n c l u d e t u r
q u o d D e u s e st s a p ie n s f or m a l i t e r e x r a t i o n e s a p i e n t ia e
q u a m a p p r e h e n d i m u s e x c r e a t u r i s q u a m q u o d D e u s e s t
fo r m a l i t e r l a p i s . P o te s t e n i m c o n c e p t u s a l iq u i s a l iu s
a c on c e p t u la p i d is c r e a t i fo r m a r i a d q u e m c o n c e p t u m
l a p i d i s u t est id e a i n D e o h a b e t is te la p is a t t r i b u t i o n e m ,
e t i t a fo r m a l i t e r d i c e r e t u r De u s e st la p is s e c u n d u m istum
c o n c e p t u m a n a l o g i c u m v e l a n a l o g u m , s i c u t s a p i e n s
s e cu n d u m i l i u m c on c e p t u m a n a l og u m .
Q u a l i s autem s it u n i v oc a t io e n t is , a d q u a n t a e t a d
q u a e d i c e t u r m a g i s i n q u a e s t i o n e d e
primo
ob j e c to
i n t e l l e c t u s . *
\Tertia
Sen tent id\.
T e r t i o d ic o q u o d De u s n o n c og -
Opus oxoniense,
i ,
dist.
u i ,
q . i i i .
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 25
m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y a b o u t G o d p roc e e d s i n th i s fa s h ion :
t h e fo r m a l n o t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g is c on s i d e r e d ; t h e i m
p e r fe c t i o n a s soc ia te d w i t h t h i s n o t i o n i n c r e a t u r e s is
r e m o v e d ,
a n d
t h e n ,
r e t a i n i n g t h i s sa m e fo r m a l n o t io n ,
w e a s c r ib e t o i t t h e u l t im a t e d e g re e o f p e r fe c t io n a n d
t h e n a t t r i b u t e i t t o G o d . T a k e , for e x a m p l e , th e f or m a l
n o t i on of " w i s d o m " or " i n t e l l e c t " or " w i l l " . S u c h a
no t i o n i s co n s i d e r e d f i r s t o f a l l s imp l y i n i t s e l f a n d
ab so lu t e l y . B e cau se t h i s n o t i o n in c l u d e s f orm a l l y n o
i m p e r fe c t io n n o r l i m i t a t i o n , t h e i m p e r fe c t io n s a s s oc ia te d
w i t h i t i n c re a tu re s a r e r e m o v e d . R e t a i n i n g t h is s am e
n o t io n o f " w i s d o m " a n d " w i l l " , w e a t t r i b u t e th e se t o G od
—but i n a m os t p e r fe c t d e g r e e . C on s e q u e n t ly , e v e r y
i n q u i r y r e g a r d i n g G o d is b a se d u p o n th e s u p p os i tion t h a t
t h e i n t e l l e c t h a s t h e s a m e u n i v o c a l c o n c e p t w h i c h i t
o b t a i n e d f r o m c r e a t u r e s .
I f y o u m a i n t a i n t h a t t h is is n o t t r u e , b u t t h a t th e fo r m a l
c on c e p t o f w h a t p e r ta i n s t o G o d is a n o t h e r n o t i o n , a
d i s c o n c e r t in g c on s e q u en c e en su es ; n a m e l y t h a t f r o m t h e
p r o p e r n o t io n o f a n y t h i n g f ou n d i n c r e a tu r e s n o t h i n g a t
a l l c a n b e i n f e r r e d a b o u t G o d , fo r th e n o t io n o f w h a t is
i n e a c h is w h o l l y d i ffe r e n t . W e w o u l d h a v e n o m or e
r e a s on t o c o n c lu d e t h a t G o d is f or m a l l y w is e fr o m t h e
n o t io n o f w is d o m d e r iv e d f r om c re a tu re s t h a n w e w o u l d
ha ve r e a son t o con c l u d e t h a t G o d is f orm a l l y a s tone .
Fo r i t is poss ib l e to fo rm a n o th e r n o t ion o f a s tone to
w h i c h t h e n o t i on o f a c r e a t e d s ton e b e a rs som e r e l a t i o n ,
fo r in s t a n c e , ston e as a n id e a i n G o d . A n d so w e c o u l d
s ay f or m a l l y , " G o d is a s t o n e " , a c c o r d i n g t o th i s a n a l o
g ou s c o n c e p t , j u s t as w e s a y , " H e is w i s e " , a c c o r d i n g t o
a n o t h e r a n a l o g o u s c o n c e p t .
W h a t k i n d o f univocation is a s c r ib e d t o b e i n g a n d h o w
fa r a n d t o w h a t i t e x te n d s , w i l l a l l b e d is cu s se d m o r e a t
l e n g t h i n a s ub s e q u e n t q u e s t ion on t h e p r i m a r y ob je c t
o f t h e i n te l le c t .15
[ Th i r d
Statem en t].
T h i r d l y , I s ay t h a t G o d is n o t k n o w n
n a t u r a l ly b y a n y o n e i n t h e p re s e n t l ife i n a p r o p e r a n d
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2 6 DUNS SCOTUS
noscitur n a t u r a l i te r a v i a t o r e i n p a r t i c u l a r i e t p r o p r i e ,
ho c e s t , s u b r a t i o n e h u j u s e s s en t i a e u t h a e c e t i n s e .
Se d r a t i o ilia p o s i t a a d h oc i n p r a e c e d e n t i o p i n i o n e n o n
c o n c l u d i t . C u m enim a r g u i t u r q u o d n o n c o g n os c i tu r
a l i q u i d n i s i p e r s i m i l e , a u t i n t e l l i g i t p e r s i m i l e d e
s i m i l i -
t u d i n e u n i v oc a t io n i s a u t i m i t a t i o n i s . S i primo
m o d o ,
i g i t u r n i h i l c og n o s c it u r d e D e o s e c u n d u m
illam
o p i n i o -
n e m ,
q u i a i n
nullo
h a b e t s i m i l i t u d i n e m u n iv o c a t ion i s
s e c u n d u m i l i u m m o d u m . S i s e c u ndo m od o , e t c r e a t u r a e
n on
tantum
i m i t a n t u r i l l a m e s s e n tia m s u b r a t ion e
g e n e r a lis a t t r i b u t i , se d etiam e s s e n t i a m h a n c u t e s t h a e c
e s s e n tia s iv e u t n u d a i n se e st e x is t e n s , s e c u n d u m eum ;
s i c e n i m
magis
e s t i d ea
vel
e xe m p la r q u o n i a m s ub
r a t i o n e g e n e r a l is a t t r i b u t i ; e r g o p r o p t e r talem s i m i l i
t u d i n e m p o s s e t c r e a t u r a e s s e
principium
c o g n o s c e n d i
e s se n tia m d i v i n a m i n se e t i n p a r t i c u l a r i .
E s t e r g o a l i a r a t i o h u j u s q u a e s t i o n i s , v i d e l i c e t q u o d
D e u s u t h a e c e s se n tia i n se n o n c o g n o s c i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r
a n o b i s , q u i a s u b r a t i o n e t a l i s c o g n o s c i b i l i s e s t o b j e c t u m
voluntarium n o n n a t u r a l e n i s i r e s p e c t u s u i i n t e l l e c t u s
t a n t u m ,
e t id e o a n u l l o i n t e l l e c t u c r e a t o p o te s t s u b
r a t i o n e h u j u s e s s e n t i a e u t h a e c e s t n a t u r a l i t e r c o g n o s c i .
Nee a l i q u a e s se n tia n a t u r a l i t e r c o g n o s c ib i lis a n o b is
s u f f i c i e n t e r o s t e n d i t h a n c e s s e n t i a m u t h a e c ,
nee
p e r
s i m i l i t u d i n e m u n i v o c a t i o n i s nee i m i t a t i o n i s . U n i v o c a t i o
e n i m n o n e st n i s i i n g e n e r a l ib u s r a t i o n i b u s , i m i t a t i o
e t i a m d e f i c i t , q u i a i m p e r f e c t a , q u i a c r e a t u r a i m p e r f e c t e
e u m imitatur.
Utrum autem s it a l ia r a t i o h u ju s i m p o s s i b i l i t a t i s ,
v i d e l ic e t p r o p t e r r a t i on e m
primi
o b j e c t i , s ic u t a l i i p o n u n t ,
d e h oc i n q u a e s t ion e d e p r i m o o b je c t o . *
[Quarta Sentent id] .
Q u a r t o d i c o q u o d a d
multos
c o n -
Opus oxoniense, I, dist.
i n ,
q .
i i i ,
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man's natural knowledge of god 26
pa r tic u la r m anne r ; t ha t is to say , we do no t k now H im
in H is essence itse lf pre cisely as this essence.
B u t the reason g iven fo r th is in the p reced ing op in ion
is no t conc lus ive . For , w he n [H e n ry ] a rgues th a t one
th in g can be know n from ano the r on ly b y reason o f w ha t
is s im i la r , w e can on ly und ers tand th is likeness to be one
of un ivoca t ion or o f im i ta t ion . I f the fi rs t is m ea nt , the n
noth ing is known about God, fo r accord ing to th is
opin ion the re is no likeness of u n ivoca t ion betw een God
and c rea tu re s w he reb y H e m igh t b e k now n b y us. I f the
second is m ea nt , then c rea tu res w ou ld no t im i ta te God's
essence m ere ly un de r the aspect of some g ene ra l a t t r ib u te ,
bu t a lso p rec ise ly as " th is essence" , unve i led and as i t
ex is ts in i tse l f , for in th is way i t is more an idea or
exempla r than i f i t were conce ived under some genera l
a t t r ib u te . By reason of th is s im i la r i t y , the re fore , a c rea
t u r e , a c cord ing to h im , cou ld be a p r in c ip l e of k now ing
the d iv ine essence in i tse l f and i n pa r tic u la r .
There is , however, another reason for th is conclus ion
t ha t God H im se l f
as
th is
essence is
n ot
an
objec t of n a tura l
kn ow led ge for us ; for i f
He
b e k nown i n th is w ay b y an y
in te l lec t othe r t han H is ow n , it is as a vo lun ta ry an d no t
as a na tu ra l objec t.16 Therefore H e c an not be kn ow n
na tu ra l l y by any c rea ted in te l l ec t p rec i se l y as " t h i s
essence". Ne i th e r is the re an y essence n a tu ra l ly kn ow -
able to us tha t w ou ld su ffice to reve a l " th is essence" as
" th is essence" w he the r by reason of a likeness of un ivoca
t ion or o f im i ta t ion . For there is u n ivoca t ion on ly w here
gene ra l no tions a re concerned . Im i ta t ion too is defic ien t
because i t is imperfec t , for c reatures only imperfec t ly
im ita te H i m .
Whether there is another reason for the imposs ib i l i ty
o f such know ledge based on the na tu re o f t he p r imary
ob jec t o f the in te l lec t , wh ich some c la im to be the
q u idd i t y o f a m a te r ia l t h ing , w i l l be dis cussed in the
que s tion on the p r im a ry ob jec t o f the in te l le c t .
[Fourth
Statement]. Fou r th ly , I say tha t we can a rr ive
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27
DUNS
SGOTUS
ceptus p r o p r i o s D e o possumus p e r v e n i re q u i n o n c on -
v e n i u n t c r e a t u r i s .
Gujusmodi
s u n t c on c e p tu s o m n i u m
p e r f e c t i o n u m s i m p l i c i t e r i n s u m m o , e t p e r f e c t i s s i m u s
c o n c e p t u s i n q u o q u a s i i n quadam d e s c r i p t i o n e p e r -
f e c t i s s ime co gno s c imus
Deum
e st c o n c i p i e n d o
omnes
p e r -
fe c t ion e s s i m p l ic i t e r e t i n s u m m o . Tamen c o n c e p t u s
p e r f e c t i o r simul e t s im p l i c i o r n o b i s po s s ib i lis e st co n cep t u s
en t i s i n f i n i t i .
Iste enim
e st s i m p l i c i o r
quam
c o n c e p t u s
en t i s
b o n i ,
e n t is v e r i , vel a l io r u m s i m i l i u m , q u i a i n f in i t u m
n o n est q u a s i a t t r i b u t u m v e l p a ss io
e n t is ,
s iv e e ju s d e q u o
d i c i t u r , s e d d i c i t modum i n t r i n s e c u m i l l i u s e n t i t a t i s , i t a
q u o d c u m d ic o i n f i n i t u m e ns , n o n h a b e o conceptum
q u a s i p e r a c c i d e n s e x s u b je c t o e t p a s s i on e , s e d c o n c e p t u m
p e r se s u b j e c t i i n c e r to g r a d u p e r fe c t io n i s , s c i lic e t i n f i n i -
t a t i s , s i c u t a l b e d o i n t e n s a n o n d i c i t c o n c e p t u m p e r a c c i
d e n s s i c u t a l b e d o v i s i b i l i s ;
immo
i n t e n s i o d i c i t
gradum
i n t r i n s e c u m albedinis i n se e t i t a p a t e t s i m p l i c i t a s h u ju s
c on c e p tu s en s i n f i n i t u m .
P r o b a t u r p e r f e c t i o i s t i u s c o n c e p t u s , t u r n q u i a i s t e
c o n c e p t u s i n t e r o m n e s n o b i s c o n c e p t i b i l e s c o n c e p t u s
v i r t u a l i t e r plura i n c l u d i t , s ic u t e n i m ens i n c l u d i t v i r t u a -
liter verum
e t
bonum
i n s e, i t a e ns i n f i n i t u m i n c l u d i t
verum i n f i n i t u m e t b o n u m i n f i n i t u m e t omnem p e r -
fectionem
s i m p l i c i te r s u b r a t io n e i n f in i t i . T u r n q u i a
d e m on s t ra t ion e q u i a u l t i m o c o n c l u d i tu r esse d e e n te
i n f in i t e , s i c u t a p p a r e t e x q u a e s t ion e p r i m a s e cu n d ae
d i s t i n c t i o n i s . Il ia autem s u n t p e r fe c t i or a q u a e u l t i m o
c o g n o s c u n t u r d e m o n s t r a t io n e q u i a ex e is , q u i a p r o p t e r
eorum remotionem a c r e a t u r i s difficilimum es t ea ex
c r e a t u r i s c o n c l u d e r e .
S i d ic is d e s u m m o b o n o v e l s u m m o e n t e q u o d is t u d
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 27
a t m a n y c on c e p ts p r o p e r t o G od i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y
do n o t a p p l y t o c r e a t u r e s . Su ch a r e t h e con cep t s o f a l l
t h e p u r e p e r f e c t i o n s w h e n t a k e n i n t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e .
A n d t h e m o s t p e r fe c t c on c e p t o f a l l , b y w h i c h w e k n o w
G o d m o s t p e r fe c t l y , as i t w e r e , i n a d e s c r i p t i v e so rt o f
w a y , i s o b t a i n e d b y c o n c e i v i n g a l l t h e p u r e p e r f e c t i o n s
a n d e a c h i n t h e h ig h e s t d e g r e e . N o w a less p e r fe c t b u t
s im p l e r co n ce p t is pos s ib le t o u s , n a m e l y t h e co n ce p t o f
a n in f in i t e b e i n g . F or th i s is s i m p l e r t h a n th e c on c e p t o f
" g o o d b e i n g " o r " t r u e b e i n g " o r o t h e r s i m i l a r c o n c e p t s ,
s in c e i n f in i t e is n o t a q u a s i -a t tr i b u t e o r p r o p e r t y o f
" b e i n g "
o r o f t h a t o f w h i c h i t is p r e d i c a t e d . R a t h e r i t
s ig n ifie s a n in t r i n s i c m od e o f t h a t e n t i t y , so t h a t w h e n I
sa y " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " , I d o n o t h a v e a c on c e p t c om p os e d
a c c i d e n t a l ly , as i t w e r e , of a s u b je c t a n d it s a t t r i b u t e .
W h a t I d o h a ve is a co n cep t o f w h a t is e s s en t ia l ly one ,
n a m e l y o f a s u b je c t w i t h a c e r t a i n g r a d e o f p e r fe c t io n —
i n f in i t y . I t is l ik e " in t e n s e w h i t e n e s s " , w h i c h is n o t a
n o t i o n t h a t i s a c c i d e n t a l l y c o m p o s e d , s u c h a s " v i s i b l e
w h i t e n e s s " w o u l d b e , f o r t h e i n t e n s i t y i s a n i n t r i n s i c
g r a d e o f w h ite n e s s it s e l f. Thu s t h e s im p l i c i t y o f t h i s
c o n c e p t " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " i s e v i d e n t .
No w t h e p e r f e c t io n o f t h i s con ce p t is p ro v e d fi r s t f r o m
t h e f a c t t h a t i t v i r t u a l l y i n c l u d e s m o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r
c on c e p t w e c a n c on c e iv e . As " b e i n g " v i r t u a l l y in c lu d e s
th e " g o o d " a n d th e " t r u e " , so " I n f i n i t e B e i n g " in c lu d e s
th e " i n f i n i t e l y g o o d " , th e " i n f i n i t e l y t r u e " , a n d a l l p u r e
pe r fe c t i on s u n de r th e a s pe c t o f i n f i n i t y . I t is a lso p ro ve d
from t h i s fa c t . W i t h a d e m ons t r a t i on o f fa c t,17 t he
e xis te n c e o f a n I n f i n i t e B e i n g , o r th e fa c t t h a t s o m e t h i n g
ha s i n f i n i t e b e i n g , is t h e l a s t co n c l u s i on t o b e e s t a b lis h e d .
Th i s i s c l e a r f r o m D i s t . n , q . i.18 T h e m o re p e r fe c t ,
h o w e v e r , a re t h e l a s t to b e e s ta b l is h e d b y a d e m o n s t r a t io n
o f fa c t w h i c h b e g in s w i t h c r e a tu r e s . F or t h e i r v e r y
r e m o t e n e s s f r o m c r e a t u r e s m a k e s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m
f r o m c r e a t u r e s m o s t difficult o f a t t a i n m e n t .
B u t i f y o u sa y t h a t "h i g h e s t g o o d " o r "H i g h e s t B e i n g "
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28 DUNS SCOTUS
d i c i t
modum intrinsecum
e n t is e t
includit virtualiter
a l ios
conceptus : r e s p on d e o , q u o d s i summum i n t e l l i g a t u r
c o m p a r a t i v e , s i c d i c i t
respectum
a d e x t r a , s e d
infinitum
d i c i t c o n c e p t u m a d se. Si autem i n t e l l i g a s a b s o l u t e
s u m m u m , ho c e s t , q uo d ex n a t u r a r e i no n po s se t e x c ed i ,
p e r f e c t i o
ilia
e x p r e s s i u s c o n c i p i t u r i n r a t i o n e
infiniti
e n t i s .
N o n enim s u m m u m bonum i n d i c a t i n s e utrum
s i t i n f i n i t u m vel f i n i t um.
E x h oc a p p a r e t i m p r o b a t i o i l l iu s q u o d d i c i t u r i n
p r a e c e d e n t i o p i n i o n e , q u o d
perfectissimum
es t cognos-
c ere a t t r i b u t a r e d u c e n d o
ilia
in esse
divinum
p r o p t e r
simplicitatem
d i v i n a m .
C o g n i t io e n i m esse d i v i n i s u b
r a t i o n e i n f i n i t i e st p e r fe c t io r c o g n i t i on e e ju s s u b r a t i on e
s i m p l i c i t a t i s , q u i a s i m p l i c i t a s communicatur c r e a t u r i s ,
in f in i ta s a u t e m n on s e c u n d u m m o d u m q u o c on v e n i t D e o.
[Qu i n t a
Sentent ia] , Quinto
d i c o q u o d i s ta q u a e c og -
n o s c u n t u r d e D e o c o g n o s c u n t u r p e r sp e cie s c r e a t u r a r u m ,
q u i a s i v e u n i v e r s a l i u s e t m i n u s u n i v e r s a l e c o g n o s c a n t u r
p e r eandem speciem m i n u s u n i v e r s a l i s s i v e utrumque
h a b e a t s p e c ie m s u i i n t e l l ig i b i l e m . Si propriam s a l t e r n
i l lud
q u o d p ote s t im p r i m e r e s p e c ie m m in u s u n i v e r s a l is
i n intellectu po t e s t etiam c a u s a r e s p e c i e m c u j u s c u m q u e
u n i v e r s a l io r is e t i t a c r e a t u r a e q u a e i m p r i m u n t p r o p r ia s
sp ecie s i n i n t e l le c t u p os s u n t e t i a m i m p r i m e r e s pe cie s
t r a n s c e n d e n t iu m q u a e c om m u n i te r c o n v e n iu n t e is e t
D e o .
E t t u n c in t e l le c t u s p r o p r i a v i r t u t e p ote s t u t i
multis
spec i ebus simul a d c o n c i p i e n d u m ilia simul q u o r u m
sun t i s t a e s p e c i e s , p u t a s p e c i e bo n i e t s p e c i e summi e t
sp ec ie a c tu s a d c o n c ip i e n d u m a l i q u i d s u m m u m b o n u m
e t a c t u a l is s i m u m , q u o d a p p a r e t p e r lo c u m a m i n o r i .
Im a g i n a t iv a e n i m p ote s t u t i sp e c ie b u s d i v e r s o r u m
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man's natural knowledge of god
28
expresses an in t r ins ic mode of be ing and inc ludes other
concep ts v i r t ua l ly , I rep l y t ha t i f "h ig h e s t " be taken in a
com pa rat ive sense, the n i t inc ludes a re la t ion to som eth ing
ext r ins ic to the be ing, whereas " i n f in i te " is an absolu te
concep t. B u t i f "h igh e s t " is und ers tood in an absolu te
sense , i.e . as m ea n ing tha t the very na tu re o f the th ing is
such tha t i t can not be exceeded, then th is pe r fec t ion is
conce ived even m ore express ly in the n o tion of an in f in i te
be i ng ,
because "h igh es t g ood" does n o t ind ica te as such
w he the r i t is in fin i te o r fin i te .
This obv ious ly refu tes the asser t ion made in the
p rev ious op in ion [of H e n ry ] , nam e ly t ha t the m os t pe r
fec t knowledg e we have of
God
is to know H is a t t r ibu tes
as i de n t ified w i t h t he d iv i ne be ing i n v ir tue of His s im p l i
c i ty . A know ledge of the d iv ine be ing as in fin i te is ,
how eve r , m ore pe r fec t t han a know ledge of H im as
s im p le , fo r s im p l ic i ty is shared w i th c rea tu res , whereas
in f in ity , as God possesses i t , is n ot.
[Fifth Statement]. In the f i fth p lac e, I say th a t w h a t w e
know of God is known th rough in te l l ig ib le spec ies o f
c rea tu res . Wh ethe r the m ore un iversa l an d less un ive rsa l
have each the i r own proper in te l l ig ib le spec ies , o r
whe the r bo th a re known t h rough one and t he same
spec ies , namely tha t wh ich is less un ive rsa l , th is in any
case is t rue . Wha teve r ca n im p r in t or cause a species of
w h a t is less un ive rsa l, can a lso cause a ny spec ies of tha t
w h ich is m ore un ive rsa l . Thus i t is t ha t crea tu res w h ich
im press th e i r ow n proper species on the in te l le c t can a lso
impress the spec ies of the t ranscendenta ls which are
com m on to them selves an d to God.19 Th e n , the in te l lec t
i n v i r tu e of its ow n pow er can m ake use of m any such
species s im ul tan eous ly , in orde r to conceive a t one t im e
those th ing s of w h ich these are the
species.
For ins tan ce,
i t can use the species o f "g ood " , the species of "h ig h e s t " ,
the species o f "a c t " , to conce ive the "h igh es t good w h ich
is pu re ac t " . Th is is c lear from an ins tance of the d ia
lec t ica l ru le a
minori,20
for the im a g ina t ion is ab le to use
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29 DUNS SCOTUS
s e n s ib i l iu m a d im a g i n a n d u m c om p o s it u m e x illis d i v e r s i s ,
s i c u t a p p a r e t i m a g i n a n d o
montem a u r e u m .
E x h o c a p p a r e t improbatio i l l i u s q u o d d i c i t u r i n
p r a e c e d e n t i o p in i on e d e ilia s u f f o s i o ne , q u i a s u f f o d i e n do
numquam illud q u o d non s ubes t suffosioni i n v e n i t u r
p e r s u ffo s io nem . No n
autem
s u be s t c o n c e p t u i c r e a t u r a e
a l i q u i s c o n c e p t u s
vel
s pe cie s r e p r a e s e n t a n s a l i q u i d
proprium D e o q u o d s i t omnino a l t e r i u s r a t i o n i s a b e o
q u o d c o n v e n i t c r e a t u r a e , u t
probatum
e st p e r s e c u n d a m
rationem i n s e c u n d o a r t i c u l o . E r g o p e r s u f fo s ion e m
n u l l u s t a l i s c o n c e p t u s i n v e n i t u r .
E t q u o d a d d u c i tu r s im i le d e a e s t im a t i v a , d i c o q u o d
v i d e t u r a d d u c i falsum a d confirmationem a l t e r i u s f a l s i ,
q u i a s i
maneat
ov i s i n
eadem
n a t u r a e t i n
eodem
a f f e c t u
n a t u r a l i a d a g n u m , imitaretur [ read mutaretur] tamen u t
esse t s im i l i s lupo p e r m i r a c u l u m i n om n i b u s a c c id e n t ib u s
s e n s ib i li b u s , p u t a c o lo r e , fig u r a e t s on o e t c a e t e r is h u ju s -
m o d i ,
a g n u s f u g e r e t ovem s ic mutatam s i c u t f u g e r e t
l u p u m .
E t t a m e n i n ov e s ic
mutata
n o n e s s e t i n t e n t i o
n o c i v i , se d c o n v e n i e n t is . E r g o a e s t im a t iv a a g n i n o n
suffoderet a d i n v e n ie n d u m i n t e n t i on e m c on v e n i e n t is s ub
s p ec ie b u s s e n s i b i l ib u s , s i p r a e c is e i t a m o v e r e t u r s e c u n d u m
appetitum s e n s i t i v u m s ic u t a c c i d e n t ia s e n s i b i l ia m o v e -
r e n t .
S i d ic a s q u o d i b i i n t e n t i o c on v e n i e n t is n o n multiplicat
se q u i a n o n s u n t talia a c c i d e n t i a c o n v e n i e n t i a t a l i
i n t e n t i o n i ,
e t i n t e n t i o c on v e n ie n t is n o n m u l t i p l i c a t u r
s in e a c c id e n t ib u s c o n v e n i e n t ib u s , h oc n i h i l e s t, q u i a s i
a g nu s fu g e r e t l u p u m p r o p t e r p e r c e p t ion e m n o c i v i c on -
ceptam
a b a e s t im a t iv a e t
ilia
n o n m u l t i p l i c a t u r c u m
a c c i d e n t i b u s i s t i s s e n s i b i l i b u s q u i a n o n e s t c u m e i s
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 20,
t h e s p ec ie s o f d i ffe r e n t t h i n g s p e r c e p t i b l e t o th e senses a n d
t h u s im a g i n e a co m po s it e o f th e s e d i ffe r e n t e l em en t s , as is
a p p a r e n t , fo r in s ta n c e , w h e n w e i m a g i n e a g o ld m o u n t a i n .
Th i s o b v i o u s l y r e f u t e s t h e a s s e r t i o n made i n t h e
p r e v i o u s o p i n i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o c e s s w h e r e b y t h e
i n t e l le c t b u r r o w s b e n e a t h t h e c on c e p t o f c r e a t u re s . F or
b y s u c h a p roc e ss , w e c a n u n e a r t h o n l y w h a t lie s b e n e a t h
t h e s u rfa c e . I n t h e c on c e p t of a c r e a t u r e , h o w e v e r , n o
n o t i o n o r s pe cie s w i l l b e fo u n d t o re p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g
p r o p e r t o G o d w h i c h is w h o l l y d i ffe r e n t i n n a t u r e f r om
a n y t h i n g p e r t a i n i n g t o a c r e a t u r e , as w e h a v e p r ov e d i n
t h e s e cond r e a son f or t h e s e cond s t a t e m en t . C onse
q u e n t l y , w e s h a l l n e v e r d i s c o v e r s u c h a c o n c e p t b y t h i s
b u r r o w i n g p r o c e s s .
A n d as t o t h e a n a l og y o f t h e e s t im a t iv e p o w e r , I w o u l d
s ay t h a t h e se ems t o a d du ce one fa ls e in s t a n c e t o c o n f irm
a n o th e r . F or i f a s he e p w e r e to r e m a i n t h e s a m e i n
n a t u r e a n d t o r e t a i n its n a t u r a l a f fe c t io n tow a r d s a la m b ,
a n d y e t b y s om e m i ra c l e w e r e to b e c h a n g e d a c c i d e n t a l ly
so as to re se m b le a w o l f i n a l l it s s ens ib le m an i fe s t a t ions ,
fo r i n s t ance i n i t s co lou r , i t s s hape , i t s c r i e s , and a l l t h e
re s t of i t , a l a m b w o u l d fle e f r o m s u c h a s he e p j u s t a s i t
w o u l d fle e fr o m a w o lf. A n d s t i l l s u c h a s he e p h a s on l y
fr ie n d l y , a n d n o t h a r m fu l , in t e n t ion s tow a r d s th e l a m b .
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e e s t i m a t i v e p o w e r w o u l d n o t d i g
b e ne a t h t h e s ense im age s t o d i s cove r t h e f rie n d l in e s s , i f
i t w e r e m o v e d a c c o rd i n g t o th e sense a p p e t it e i n t h e
p re c is e w a y t h a t t h e s e n s ib le a p p e a r a n c e s m ov e i t .
I t does no t he l p a t a l l t o say t ha t t h i s f r i e nd l i n e ss i s
n o t con v e ye d s e n s ib l y i n s u c h a ca s e, s in c e t h e e x t e r n a l
m a n i fe s t a t ion s d o n o t ag re e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i n q u e s t io n ,
a n d t h a t i t is o n l y w h e n t h e t w o a g re e th a t t h e fr i e n d l y
i n t e n t w i l l b e c on v e y e d i n a p e r c e p t ib l e m a n n e r . F or i f
t h e l a m b fle e s fr o m t h e w o l f o n l y b e c a u s e , b y i t s e s t im a
t iv e p ow e r , i t pe rc e iv e s s o m e t h i n g i n i m i c a l , a n d i n t h e
p r e s en t c a s e t h e i n t e n t i o n [ o f f r i e n d l i n e s s ] i s no t t r a n s
m i t t e d p e r c e p t ib l y w h e r e t h e s e ns ib le m a n ife s t a t ion s a re
2 , 3 2 2 ) 6
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30 DUNS SCOTUS
[injtentio c a s u , e r go h ae c e s t suffosio agni a d intentionem
n o c i v i , q u a e n u l l a e s t , a u t s i hie n o n fu g i t p r o p t e r s u f-
f o s s ionem ,
e r g o
nee
a l ia s .
[ A d
Argumenta
P r i n c i p a l i a ]
A d a r g u m e n t a i s t i u s
quaestionis
:
A d
primum
d i c o q u o d
ilia comparatio
d e b e t i n t e l l i g i
q u a n t u m a d primam m o t io n e m i n t e l le c t u s a b ob j e c t o,
i b i
enim
p h a n ta s m a c u m i n t e l l e c t u a g en te h a b e n t
vicem
o b j e c t i primi m ov e n t is , sed n o n d e b e t i n t e l l i g i q u a n t u m
a d omnem a c t u m sequentem p r i m a m m o t i on e m . P ote s t
e n i m i n t e l l e c t u s a b s t r a h e r e
omne
ob j e c t u m i n c l u s u m i n
o b j e c to primo m o v e n t e , e t c o n s i d e r a r e illud a b s t r a c t u m
n o n c on s i d e r a n d o i l l u d a q u o a b s t r a h i t e t c o n s id e r a n d o
i s tu d a b s t ra c t u m s ic c on s id e r a t c o m m u n e s e n s ib i li e t in s e n -
s i b i l i ,
q u i a i n illo c o n s i d e r a t u r in s e n s i b i le i n u n i v e r s a l i s ic u t
e t s e n s i b ile , e t p o te s t c on s i d e r a re i l l u d a b s t r a c t u m e t
aliud
a b s t r a c t u m i n q u o s it p r o p r i u m a l t e r i , s c i l ic e t in s e n s i b i li ;
s e d s en su s n o n e s t a b s t r a c t i v u s , e t id e o i n omni a c t u t a r n
p r i m o
quam
se cu nd o r e q u i r i t ob je c t u m a l i q u o d p r o p r i u m
movens quomodo n o n se h a b e t p h a n t a s m a a d
in t e l le c t u m .
A d s e c u n d u m d i c o q u o d C o m m e n t a to r e xp o n i t i l l u d
s i m i l e P h i l o s o p h i d e
difficili
e t n o n d e i m p o s s i b i l i , e t
r a t i o s u a e s t q u i a t u n c n a t u r a f e c i s s e t o t i o s e illas s u b
s t a n t ia s a b s t ra c t a s i n t e l l ig i b i l e s , e t n o n p os s ib i le s i n t e l l i g i
a b a l i q u o i n t e l le c t u . Se d is ta r a t i o e ju s n o n v a l e t ; t u r n
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m an's n a t u r a l k n ow le d g e o f g od
30
those [o f a w o l f ] , i t follow s tha t the lam b une ar ths a
non-ex is ten t in ten t ion of enmi ty ; o r i f the lamb does
no t fl ee in v i r t ue o f w ha t i t d is cove rs by such a b u r row
ing p rocess in the p resen t ins tan ce , the n n e i the r does i t
do so in oth e r cases.
[Rep ly to the Argum en ts a t the B eg inn ing ]
As to the a rgum en ts a t the be g inn ing o f this qu es tion :
To the irs t ,21 rep ly th a t the P hi losopher 's c om pa r ison
app l ies to the in i t ia l movement o f the in te l lec t by the
obje ct , for in th is case the sense im ages toge the r w it h the
ac t i ve in te l l ec t f unc t ion in t he ro le o f p r ima ry mov ing
objec t . I t m ust n ot be un de rs tood, howe ver , of a l l the
ac tions w h ich follow th is in i t ia l m ovem ent . For the
in te l lec t can abs trac t any ob jec t w h ich is inc lud ed in t ha t
w h ich p roduces the in i t i a l m ovem en t. I t is ab le to
con
s ide r the form er w i th ou t cons ide r ing tha t from w h ich i t
was ab s t rac ted . Now w he n the in te l lec t cons iders som e
th in g tha t has been abs trac ted in th is w ay , i t g rasps wh a t
is com m on to b oth sensib le an d inse ns ib le . In its con
s ide ra t ion the in te l lec t ca n u n i te a second abs t rac t n o tion
w i th the fi rs t so tha t the la t ter becom es prope r to som e
th ing e lse , nam ely to the insen s ib le , fo r in the ab s trac ted
are cons idered both the insens ib le ( in the un iversa l ) as
w e l l as the sens ib le . The sense fa c u l ty , how ev er , is
inca pa b le of m a k ing abs trac t ions . There fore , in a l l its
ac ts , w he the r they be p r im a ry or seconda ry , it r equ ires
som e ob jec t to fi rs t p u t i t in m ot ion . B u t th is is no t
the w ay tha t the sense im age is re la ted to the in te l le c t .
To the second,22, I re p ly th a t the C om m en tator re s tric ts
th is compar ison of the Phi losopher to what is d i f f icu l t ,
b u t no t im poss ib le , to kn ow . An d h is reason is tha t
o therw ise na tu re wou ld have made these separa te sub
s tances in te l l ig ib le in v a i n , fo r no in te l lec t w ou ld be ab le
to know them . B u t t h is reason is i nv a l i d , fir s t o f a l l ,
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31
DUNS SCOTUS
q u i a
non
e s t f i n i s i s t a r um
substantiarum inquantum
i n t e l l i g i b i l e s s u n t u t intelligantur a b i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o ,
e t ideo s i ho c no n co n ven i r e t e i s , no n p ro p t e r ho c e s s en t
fr u s t r a i n t e l l ig i b i le s ; t u r n q u i a n o n s e q u i tu r : n o n s u n t
i n t e l l i g i b i l e s a b i n t e l l e c t u n o s t r o , e r g o a
n u l l o ,
possen t
enim i n t e l l i g i a s e ip s is , e t id e o e st i b i fa l l a c i a co n seq ue n t is .
U n d e l ic e t m u l t i p l i c i t e r p os se t e x p o n i a u c t o r i ta s
P h i l o -
s o p h i , d i c o q u o d oc u lu s n o c tu a e n o n h a b e t c o g n i t i on e m
n i s i i n t u i t i v a m e t n a t u r a l e m , e t q u a n t u m a d i s t a s d u a s
c o n d i t i o n e s p o t e s t e x p o n i a u c t o r i t a s P h i l o s o p h i d e
i m p o s s i b i l i t a t e , q u i a s i c u t e s t impossibile illi oculo i n t u i
t i v e co n s i d e r a r e objectum i s t u d , s i c i n t e l l e c t u i n o s t r o e s t
i m p o s s i b i l e n a t u r a l i t e r e t etiam i n t u i t i v e c o g n o s c e r e
D e u m .
A d
t e r t i u m ,
d i c o q u o d in f i n i t u m p o t e n t i a l e est
ignotum
q u ia u n u m q u o d q u e est c og n os c ib i le i n q u a n t u m est i n
a c t u .
N o n
tamen
es t i g n o t u m s e q u i tu r [re a d s ic ] q u o d
r e p u g n e t s i b i i n t e l l i g i a b i n t e l l e c t u i n f i n i t o , s e d n o n
p o t e s t i n f i n i t u m c o g n o s c i a b a l i q u o i n t e l l e c t u
c o g
noscen te
ipsum
s e c u n d u m
modum
s u a e i n f i n i t a t i s .
M o d u s e n i m s u a e i n f i n i t a t i s e s t a c c i p i e n d o alterum
p os t a l t e r u m , e t i n t e l le c t u s q u i c og n o s ce r e t h oc modo
a l t e r u m p o s t a l t e r u m , c og n os c e re t s e m p e r fin itu m e t
n u m q u a m i n f i n i t u m , in t e l le c t u s t a m e n in f in i t u s p o te s t
cognosce re
totum il lud s i m u l ,
n o n p a r t e m p o s t p a r t e m .
C u m e t ia m a r g u i t u r d e s e c u n d o Me ta ph ysica e d e i n f i n i t i s
e t i n f i n i t o , d i c o q u o d n o n e st s i m i le q u i a c o g n i t io o b je c -
torum
i n f i n i t o r u m n u m e r a l i t e r c on c lu d e r e t
infinitatem
p o t e n t i a e c og n o s c e n t is , s ic u t p a t u i t i n q u a e s t ion e p r i m a
se cundae distinctionis a r g u m e n t o s e cu n d o a d i n f i n i
t a t e m ,
q u i a v i d e l ic e t i b i p l u r a l i t a s e x p a r t e ob j e c t i c o n -
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m a n's n a t u r a l k n ow le d g e o f g od 31
because we cannot say that the so le purpose or reason
for the in te l l ig ib i l i t y o f these subs tances is th a t we m ay
know the m . C onsequen tly , even i f w e cou ld know
no th ing abou t t hem, we s t i l l cou ld no t say they a re
in te l l ig ib le to no pu rpose. Second ly , i t does n ot fo llow
that jus t because these substances are un in te l l ig ib le to
our m ind s , they a re u n in te l li g ib le to a l l m ind s , for t hey
cou ld be in te l lig ib le to them se lves . There fore , we have
the fa l la cy of a ffi rm in g the consequent.23 Whe refore I
say t ha t e ven though the re a re m any ways i n w h i ch th i s
c i ta t ion of the Ph i losopher cou ld be exp la ined , s t i l l the
eye o f t he ba t has on l y a na t u ra l and i n t u i t i v e know
ledge. An d on the bas is of these tw o cha rac ter is t ics the
Ph i losopher ' s words can be exp la ined even in te rms of
im p oss ib i l ity . For ju s t as i t is im poss ib le for the eye of
the ba t to cons ide r such an ob jec t na tu ra l l y and in
tu i t ive ly , so i t is a lso imposs ib le for our in te l lec t to
possess a n a tu ra l a nd in tu i t ive know led ge of God.24
To the th ird,25 I reply that the potent ia l ly inf in i te is
unknown, because on ly to the exten t tha t someth ing is
in ac t i t is know ab le . B u t i t is no t so un kn own th a t i t
w ou ld be im poss ib le for a n in f in i te in te l lec t to know i t .
Never the less the [po ten t ia l l y ] in f in i te cannot be known
by an i n te l le c t w h i ch p roceeds to know i t i n the w ay t ha t
i t is in fin i te . For i t is in fin i te on ly in so fa r as the m in d
in cons ide r ing on ly one th in g a fte r an othe r never comes
to a n e nd . Now the m ind w h i ch cons ide rs on ly one t h i n g
af ter another in th is way a lways cons iders someth ing
fin i te a nd never som eth ing in fi n i t e . An in f in i te i n te llec t ,
howeve r , can know the who le t h ing a t once , and no t
s im p ly one p a r t a fte r anothe r . An d to the a rgum en t
from Metaphysics, b k . i i , conce rn ing in f i n i t e numbers
and the " I n f i n i t e " , I r ep ly t ha t the re is no p a r it y be tween
the tw o, for a kn ow ledg e of
an
in fin i te nu m be r o f ob jec ts
w ou ld im p ly t ha t the fac u l ty o f know ledge itse lf is
in f in i te (as is c lea r from q . i of d is t .
11
r ega rd i ng t he
in f in i ty of God),26 s ince one can infe r a greater powe r of
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32 DUNS SCOTUS
c l u d i t majoritatem v i r t u t i s i n i n t e l l e c t u , s ed intel l e c t i o
a l i c u j u s i n f i n i t i
non
c o n c l u d i t
i n f i n i t a t e m ,
q u i a
non
o p o r t e t a c t u m h a b e r e talem modum r e a l e m , qualem
h a b e t
o b j e c t u m ,
q u i a a c t u s s u b r a t i o n e fin i ti po t e s t esse
a d o b j e c t u m s u b r a t i o n e i n f i n i t i n i s i e s s e t a c t u s c o m p r e -
h e n s i v u s , e t c on c e d o q u o d ta l e m a c t u m c i rc a o b je c t u m
i n f i n i t u m n o n h ab e m u s
nee
p o s s i b i le e st h a b e r e .
A d Gregorium d i c o q u o d n o n d e b e t i n t e l l i g i q u o d
c o n t e m p l a t i o s i s t a t s u b D e o i n a l i q u a c r e a t u r a , q u i a h o c
e sse t f r u i u t e n d i s , q u o d e sse t
summa
p e rv e rs ita s s e c u n d u m
Augustinum LXXX1II Quaes t ionum, quaes t ione xxx . *
Sed con c ep t u s i l l i u s e s s en tia e s u b r a t i on e e n t is e s t
imper-
f e c t i o r co n cep t u i l l i u s e s s en t i a e u t h a e c e s s en t i a e s t , e t
q u i a e s t imperfectior i d e o i n f e r i o r i n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t e ,
c o n t e m p l a t i o
autem
d e le g e c o m m u n i s ta t i n t a l i
c o n
c e p t u c o m m u n i , e t id e o s ta t i n a l i q u o c o n c e p t u q u i e st
m i n o r i s i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t i s quam Deu s i n s e , u t e s t h a e c
e s s e n tia . E t id e o d e b e t i n t e l l i g i a d a l i q u i d q u o d e st s u b
D e o , h o c e st a d a l i q u i d s u b r a t i on e i n t e l l ig i b i l i s c u ju s
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a s e st i n fe r i or i n t e l l i g i b i l i t a t e D e i i n s e, u t
h a e c e s s en tia s i n g u l a r i s .
[Ad Argumenta pro Opinione
Henrici]
A d a r g u m e n t a p ro p r i m a op i n ion e , c u m a r g u i t u r q u od
De u s n o n p ote s t i n t e l l ig i i n a l i q u o c o n c e p t u c o m m u n i
s i b i e t c r e a t u r is u n i v o c e , q u i a e st s i n g u l a r i t a s q u a e d a m :
c o n s e q u e n t ia n o n v a l e t . Soc ra te s
enim inquantum
Soc ra t e s e s t s i n gu l a r i s e t tamen a So c r a t e plura possun t
a b s t r a h i p r a e d i c a t a , e t i d e o s i n g u l a r i t a s a l i c u j u s n o n
*
M igne,
P. L.,
x l ,
20.
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MAN
S
NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
32
i n t e l l e c t fr om a g r e a t e r n u m b e r of ob je c ts k n o w n . B u t
a k n ow le d g e o f s o m e t h i n g i n f in i t e d oe s n o t i m p l y t h a t
t h e a c t o f k no w l e dge i t s e l f i s i n f i n i t e u n l e s s i t b e a n a c t
w h i c h f u l l y co m p r e h en d s t h e ob j e c t , fo r i t is no t n ec e ss a ry
t h a t t h e a c t a n d o b j e c t s h o u l d h a v e t h e s a m e m o d e o f
r e a l i t y , s in c e a n a c t w h i c h b y n a t u r e is fin i te c a n b e
r e la t e d t o a n ob je c t w h i c h b y n a t u r e is i n f in i t e . I a d m i t ,
h o w e v e r , t h a t w e n e i t h e r h a v e , n o r c a n h a v e , s u c h a
c om p r e h e n s iv e a c t o f k n o w l e d g e i n r e g a r d t o a n i n f i n i t e
ob jec t .
To the \Jourth~\ a rg um en t ,27 [ t h a t ] o f G r eg o r y , I r e p l y
t h a t w e s h o u ld n ot t h i n k t h a t c o n t e m p l a t i on t e rm in a t e s
i n s om e c re a t u r e b e n e a t h G o d , fo r th i s w o u l d b e t o e n joy
as a n e n d w h a t is to b e u s e d as a m e a n s . A c c o r d i n g t o
A u g u s t i n e , * t h is w o u l d b e t h e g re a te s t p e r v e r s ion . B u t
t h e c on c e p t o f G od 's e sse nce u n d e r t h e a s p e c t o f " b e i n g "
is le ss pe r fe c t t h a n t he conc ep t o f t h e sam e essence a s
" t h i s e s senc e " . Because i t is le ss p e r f e c t , i t fa l l s be low
th e l a t t e r c on c e p t i n i n t e l l ig i b i l i t y . B u t th e c on t e m p l a
t i o n t h a t is c h a r a c t e r is t ic o f t h e o r d i n a r y d i s p e n s a t ion
re s ts w i t h ju s t s u c h a n [ im p e r fe c t o r ] c o m m o n c o n c e p t ,
a n d h e n c e w i t h on e of i n fe r i o r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y t o G o d
H i m
s e l f co n s i d e r e d as t h i s e ss en ce . C o nse qu en t ly " t o w h a t is
b e n e a t h G o d " m u s t b e u n d e r s t ood i n te r m s o f b e i n g
i n t e l l i g i b l e , [ t h a t is t o s ay i t re fe r s t o a co n ce p t ] w hose
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y is le ss t h a n t h a t o f G o d c on s i d e r e d i n H i m
s e l f as t h i s s i ngu l a r e s sence .
[A Reply to the Argum ents in Support of H e n ry]
To t h e a r g umen t s f o r t h e f i r s t o p i n i o n
28
I r e p l y t h a t
w h e n i t is a r g u e d t h a t G o d b y re a s on of H i s u n iq u e
s i n g u l a r i t y c a n n o t b e k n o w n t h r o u g h s om e c on c e p t
u n i v oc a l ly c o m m o n t o H i m s e l f a n d c r e a tu r e s , th e con se
qu en ce is i n v a l i d . Fo r Soc ra te s , i n so fa r as h e is Socra tes ,
is s i n g u l a r . Neve rth e l e s s s e v e r a l p r e d i c a t e s c a n b e a b
s t r a c t e d f r o m Soc r a te s . C o nseq ue n t l y , t h e s i n g u l a r i t y
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33
DUNS SCOTUS
i m p e d i t , q u i n a b e o q u o d s i n g u la r e e s t, p os s it a b s t r a h i
a l iq u is c on c e p t u s c o m m u n i s . E t l ic e t q u i d q u i d i b i i n r e s it
s i n g u l a r e e x se i n e x is t e n d o i t a q u o d n i h i l c o n t r a h i t
aliud
i b i a d s i n g u l a r i t a t e m , tamen illud i d e m p o t e s t c o n c i p i
u t h o c i n r e ,
vel quodammodo
i n d i s t i n c t e , e t i t a u t
s i n g u l a r e v e l c o m m u n e .
Q u o d d i c i t p r o ilia o p i n i o n e d e c o g n i t i on e p e r a c c id e n s ,
n o n op o r t e t i m p r o b a r e , q u i a q u a s i p e r a c c id e n s c og n os -
c i t u r i n a t t r i b u t o , s ed n o n p ra e c is e s ic u t p r o b a t u m e s t.
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MAN S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 33
o f a t h i n g i s n o i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e a b s t r a c t i o n o f a
c o m m on c on c e p t. T h o u g h i n r e a l it y e v e r y t h in g in G o d ,
s ince i t ex i s t s o f i t se l f , i s s ingu la r , so tha t one th ing does
n o t c o n t r a c t a n o t h e r t o s i n g u l a r i t y , n e v e r t h e l e s s o n e a n d
t h e s a m e t h i n g c a n b e c o n c e i v e d i n d i s t i n c t l y o r a s " t h i s
t h i n g e xis t in g i n r e a l i t y " , a n d th u s i t c a n b e c on c e i v e d
e i t h e r as c o m m o n o r as s i n g u l a r .
T h e r e i s n o n e e d t o r e f u t e w h a t h e s a y s r e g a r d i n g a n
i n c i d e n t a l k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , b e c a u s e G o d i s k n o w n i n
a q u a s i -in c i d e n t a l m a n n e r i n a n a t t r i b u t e . H ow e v e r ,
t h is is n o t t h e s ole w a y H e c a n b e k n o w n , as h a s b e e n
p r o v e d a b o v e .
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I l l
T H E E X I S T E N C E O F G O D
Summary of
the
Argument
Question : Among beings does one exist which is actually
infinite ?
Pro e t Cont ra
Body of the Question
Article I. Relative properties of God
Part I. The triple primacy
u.
Primacy o f efficient causality
b.
Primacy
of finality
c. Primacy of pre-eminence
Part II . Inte rre lation of the three primacies
Part
in.
Uni ty of the divine nature
Ar ticle I I . Absolute properties of God
Part I. Intellect and w ill
Part
i i .
The infin ity of the First Being
a. First proof
b. Second proof
c. Third proof
d. Fourth proof
e. An ineffective proof
Solution of the Question
Reply to the Arguments at the beginning
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35
DUNS SCOTUS
f i l l . DE ESSE DEl] *
Circa secundam d is t inct ionem quaero primo de his
quae pert inent ad
unitatem
De i , e t p r imo,
utrum
in
entibus sit aliquid existens actu infinitum.
[Pro et Contra]
Quod non, s ic argu i tur :
Si
unum contrariorum
esset actu inf in i tum, nih i l s ib i
co ntr ariu m esset in n atu ra ; ergo si a l iq uo d bonum sit
ac tu in f i n i tum , n ih i l
mali
esset i n un iverso . Resp on de tur
qu od ma jor est vera de con trari is form al i te r ; sed n ih i l
m alu m con trar ia tur Deo form al i ter . Co ntra : sive
formal i ter s ive v i r tua l i ter contrar ie tur , s i est in f in i tum,
n ih i l pat i tur contrar ium su i e f fectus, qu ia propter in f in i -
tam v i r tu tem destruet omne incompossibi le suo effectui ;
ergo est m ajor vera de con trario v ir tu a l i te r, s icut for
m al i ter. E xe m plu m : s i sol esset inf in i t e cal idus v ir
tua l i ter , n ih i l re l inqueret f r ig idum in un iverso s icut
nee
si esset inf inite cal idus formaliter.
I t e m ,
corpus in f in i tum nu l lu m
aliud secum
com pat i tu r ;
sicut nee ens in f in i tu m a l iqu od a l iu d ens cu m eo. Pro-
batio consequentiae : turn quia sicut repugnat dimensio
d imension i , i ta v idetur actua l i tas actua l i ta t i repugnare ;
turn quia s icut corpus al iud ab
i n f i n i t o ,
faceret cum illo
a l iqu id
majus
in f in i to , i ta ens a l iud ab in f in i to v idetur
facere al iquid majus inf in i to.
Praeterea, quod ita est
h ie,
quod non
a l ib i ,
est
* Opus oxoniense, I, dist.
n,
q. i (Assisi
137,
f.
I4r*- i8r6;
cf.
Vives,
vo l . vii i,
393&-486a).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 35
[ I I I . THE EXISTENCE OF GOD]
First I inquire about those things which pertain to the
unici ty of God, and
/
ask firs t whether in the realm o f
beings
something exists which is actually infinite ?
[Pro et Contra]
To prove that no such thing exists the fol lowing
argu
ments are cited 1 :
[A rg .
1]. I f one o f tw o contraries were ac tually
inf in i te, then no thing co ntrary to i t wo uld exist in nature ;
therefore i f some good were actually inf inite, nothing
ev il w o u ld exist in the universe. On e answer given to
this objection is that the major is true only of formal
contraries, and evi l is not formally contrary to God.2
T o the co ntrar y : I t makes no difference whe ther
con
t rar ie ty be vir tu al or form al. I f something is inf in i te, i t
wil l not tolerate anything contrary to its effect, since by
reason of i ts inf inite power, i t wi l l destroy anything
inco m patib le w it h i ts effect. The refore, the m ajor is just
as true of virtual contraries as it is of formal contraries.
Fo r examp le : i f the sun were inf inite ly hot either
v irt u a l ly or form ally , in either case it w ou ld leave
nothing cold in the universe.
[A rg .
11]. A ga in, just as an inf in i te body w ou ld not
permit the coexistence of another body, even so an
infinite being would not tolerate the coexistence of any
othe r be ing . Proo f of the consequence : A c tu a li ty seems
to be opposed to actuality in the same way as dimension
is opposed to dime nsion. Fu rthe rm ore , i f a being other
th a n the infi ni te co uld exist, it w o u ld seem to increase the
inf inite just as to add another body to an inf inite body
would produce something greater than the inf inite.
[Arg. 111].
Fu rtherm ore, anyth ing present in th is
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36 DUNS SCOTUS
in f in i tu m respectu ub i ; et qu od nunc est i ta , qu od non
alias, est finitum respectu qua ndo , et sic de singu lis.
Quod i ta ag i t hoc, quod non
a l i ud ,
est f initum qu a nt u m
ad act ionem ; ergo qu od est i ta hoc al iq u id , qu od non
a l iud , est finitum secund um en tita te m . Deus est summe
hoc, qu ia ex se sing ular itas ; ergo non est infin itu s.
I t e m ,
vn i Physicorum,* virtus infinita, si esset, moveret
in non-tem pore ; nu l la v ir tus potest movere in non-
tempore
; qu ia si sic,
motus
esset in in st a n ti ; ergo nu lla
est inf inita.
Contra :
Ib idem Phi losophus
vm
Physicorum
f
p roba t
primum
movens
esse potentiae inf initae, quia
movet motu
in f in ito ; sed haec conclusio no n potest in te l l ig i tantum
de inf in i ta te dur at ionis, quia prop ter
infinitatem
p otent iae
pro ba t qu od no n possit esse in m ag nitu din e ; no n
repugnat autem magn i tud in i , secundum
e u m ,
q uo d in eo
si t potent ia inf in i ta secundum durat ionem, sicut poneret
de
caelo.
I t e m ,
in
Psalmo
| : Ma gnus Dom inus et laudab i lis
nimis.
I t e m ,
Damascenus, l ib. 1, ca p. iv * * : Est pelagus, etc.
[Corpus
Quaestionis]
A d
primam
quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente
infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione
propter qu id qu an tum ad nos, l icet ex na tura terminorum
* vm, cap. x (266 ,
24-266*,
6). f loc. cit. (266*, 6).
% Ps. xlvii.
2 ;
cxliv.
3.
* * Defide orthodoxa,
1,
cap. ix (Migne, P.G., xciv , 835).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 36
place in such a wa y tha t i t is nowh ere else, is l im ite d w it h
rega rd to i ts whereabo uts. W h a t exists at jus t this m om ent
and no other, is f in i te with regard to temporal durat ion.
A n d so on w it h the single categories. W ha tever does
just th is and no thin g else, is finite in its ac tion . Th ere fore,
wh atever is jus t this th in g and no othe r, is l im ite d in i ts
en t i ty. N ow G od above al l is a th is , for H e is s ingu
la r i ty o f H is very nature. Therefore, G od is not inf in i te.
[A rg .
i v ] .
A g a in , acc ord ing to Physics, bk . v i i i , *
i f an inf inite force existed i t would move or act instan
taneously ; b u t no force can move things instantaneous ly,
for i f i t could movement would take place in an instant.
Consequently, nothing is inf inite.
To the contrary :
[A rg .
1]. I n the same place in Physics, bk .
vin,f
the
Philosopher proves that the First Mover is inf inite in
power because He moves with an inf inite movement.
But this conclusion cannot be understood of power that
is inf init e only in du ra tio n. T h e reason w hy it cannot is
this. A ris totle proves tha t because this pow er [ o f the First
Mover] is inf in i te, i t cannot reside in a [ f in i te] magni
tude.
Bu t i t is not contrad ictory, according to h im , that
a power inf inite merely in duration should reside in a
[finite] magnitude, for he assumes this to be the case
with the heavens.3
[Arg. 11].
Als o, in the Book of Psalms
j
: Grea t
is
the
Lord and exceedingly to be praised .
[ A r g .
i n ] . A lso, in the fo u rt h chap ter of the first
book of Damascene * * : H e is a sea [of inf in ite per
fect ions] .
[Body of the Question]
M y reason for proceed ing as I do in this first ques tion
is th is. A l th ou gh the prop osi t ion A n inf in i te being
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37
DUNS SCOTUS
pro po sit io est demonstrabilis p rop ter q u i d . Sed qu antu m
ad
nos
bene proposit io est demonstrabil is quia ex crea-
tur is. Proprietates autem infiniti entis relat ivae ad
creaturas immediatius se hab ent ad ilia quae sunt media
i n
demonstratione
qu ia
quam
proprietates absolutae, i ta
quod de illis proprietat ibus relat iv is concludi potest
immediatius esse per ista quae sunt media in tal i de
m onstrat ione qu am de pro prie tat ibu s absolut is ; na m
immediate ex esse unius relativi sequitur esse sui corre-
l a t i v i . I deo , primo
d eclarabo esse de pr op rie tat ib us
relat iv is ent is inf in i t i , quae sunt primitas et causalitas.
Et secundo declarabo esse de infinito ente, quia illae
re lativae proprietates sol i en t i in f in i to conve niunt. E t
i ta erunt duo art icul i pr incipales.
[Articulus
Primus. De Proprietatibus Relativis ]
Q u a n t u m a d p r i m u m , dico : prop rietates relat ivae
entis inf init i ad creaturas aut sunt proprietates causali-
tat is aut eminentiae. Gausalitatis dupl ic is, aut efRcientis
aut f inis. Q u o d ad di tu r de causa exemplari no n est aliud
genus causae ab efficiente, quia tunc essent quinque
genera causarum ; und e causa exem plaris est qu od da m
efficiens, quia est agens per
intellectum distinctum
contra
agens per
naturam
; de qu o alias.
In p r imo ar t icu lo p r inc ipa l i , t r ia p r inc ipa l i te r os ten-
dam : pr im o ergo ostendam quod a l iqu id est in efFectu
in ter ent ia quod est s impl ic i ter pr imum omni p r im i ta te
quae no n inc lud i t a l iqu am imp erfect ionem . Pars enim
est imperfectior toto et
tamen
pr ior ; pars en im part i -
c ipat entitatem totius et non est ipsum t o t u m . Aliae
autem sunt pr imi ta tes quae non inc ludunt a l iquam
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
37
exists can , by the ver y na tur e of i ts terms, be de m on
strated by a demonstrat ion of the reasoned fact,4 we are
no t able to dem ons trate i t in this w ay . Nevertheless, we
can demonstra te the propos i t ion by a demonstra t ion o f
fact be gi nn in g w i t h creatures. Ho we ve r, those propert ies
of the in f in i te being which refer to creatures are re lated
more c losely than the absolute propert ies to what we
mu st use as m id d le terms in a de m on stra t ion of fact , so
that in v i r tue o f such a demonstra t ion the re la t ive
propert ies are establ ished pr ior to the absolute propert ies,
for the existence of one term of the relat ion impl ies
im m ed ia t e ly tha t o f i ts cor re la t ive . Conseq uent ly , I sha l l
show first the existence of such relative properties of the
in f in i t e be in g as pr im ac y an d causa l ity . Second ly , f r om
these I shall show that an infinite being exists, because
these re lat ive propert ies per ta in exclusive ly to a being
tha t is in f in i t e . A n d so there w i l l be tw o p r in c ip a l
art icles.
[A rt ic le I . Relative Properties o f God]
As to the first article, I say that the properties of the
inf in i te being which refer to creatures are e i ther of
causa l i ty or of pre-e min enc e. Tho se of causal i ty in t u rn
are twofold, the propert ies of eff ic ient and f inal causal i ty.
What is added about the exemplar does not involve
another cause d i f ferent in k ind from the ef f ic ient, for
the n there w o u ld be five kind s o f causes. W he ref ore , the
exemplar cause is a certain kind of eff ic ient cause, namely
an in te l l igent agent in contrad is t inc t ion to a natura l
a g e n t ; bu t m ore of th is e lsewhere.6
I n the first ma in ar t i c le , I shal l set fo r t h three pr in ci pa l
poin ts : first, in the rea lm of beings so m eth ing ac tu al l y
exists w h ic h is sim ply first b y every pr im a cy th at inc ludes
no im pe rfe ct io n. Fo r a pa r t , th ou gh pr io r to , is less
perfect than, the whole, since the part shares in the unity
o f the w ho le a nd yet is no t the w ho le i tself . O th e r
(2,322;
7
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38
DUNS SCOTUS
imperfect ionem; ut pr imi tas eminent iae et t r ip l ic is
causalis inde pen den tiae ; scilicet efficientis, form alis vel
exe m plaris, et f inalis. P rim itas autem eminent iae non
est primitas causalitatis ; non enim ex hoc quod unum
ens praeeminet alteri est causa i l l ius, nam pr imum et
summum
in quol ibet genere praeeminet a l ter i posterior i
in
illo
genere, et
tamen
no n est causa i l l iu s. P rim itas
etiam exemplaris non dist ingui tur a primitate ef f ic ient iae,
qu ia
principium
exemplans al ia in esse in te l l i g ib i l i no n
est nisi principium eff iciens per intel lectum ; sicut enim
naturale eff iciens non dist inguit eff iciens sed continetur
sub eo, sic nee exemplaris d is t ing ui tu r ab ef f ic iente. Sunt
ergo duae causalitates c on tra se dis tinc tae , scil icet causae
efficientis et f ina lis. E t
omnes illae
primitates quas
attribuimus
D e o ,
nullam
imper fec t ionem inc ludunt .
U n d e primo ostendam quod est a l iquid in ef fectu inter
ent ia s impl ic i ter pr imum secundum ef f ic ient iam et
a l iqu id est quod et iam est s impl ic i ter pr imum secundum
rationem f in is , e t a l iqu id quod est s impl ic i ter pr imum
secundum em inen t iam . Secundo ostendo quod
illud
quod es t p r imum secundum unam ra t ionem p r im i ta t i s ,
idem est p r i m u m secundum alias prim itate s. E t tert io
ostendo quod
ilia
t r ip lex pr imi tas un i so l i naturae con-
venit , i ta quod non pluribus naturis d i f ferent ibus specie
ve l qu idd i ta t ive. Et i ta in pr im o art icu lo pr inc ipa l i erunt
tres art icul i part iales.
[Pars Prima. De Tr ipl ici Primitate]. Prim us art ic ulu s
i l lo ru m inc lud i t t res conclusiones
principales
per
triplicem
pr im i ta tem. Quae l ibe t au tem i l l a ru m tr ium conc lu -
sionum habe t tres ex qu ibus depend et. P rim a est qu od
al iq uid s it p r i m u m . Secunda est qu od i l lu d est incausa-
bi le. T e rt ia est qu od i l lu d actu exist i t in ent ibus. I ta q ue
in pr imo art icu lo sunt novem conclusiones, sed tres
principales.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 38
primacies, howe ver, includ e no im pe rfection . Such is
the primacy of pre-eminence and of independence in
regard to the three kinds of causes, viz. efficient, formal
or exemplar, and
final.
Th e prim acy of pre-eminence,
how ever, is no t a pr im ac y of cau sality. For ju s t because
one thing is more perfect than another, it does not follow
th at the form er is the cause of the latter ; for the first
and most perfect in any given genus is more perfect than
any othe r o f its k in d an d yet is not th e cause of the others.6
Ne ither is the prima cy of exemplarity to be dif ferentiated
fro m th at o f efficiency, for the prin cip le w hic h copies wh at
exists in thought is nothing else than an intell igent
efficient
cause. Fo r ju st as a n a tu ra l efficient cause
7
is
not considered as distinct from efficient cause but rather
as a subdivision thereof, so also the exemplar cause.
Consequently, we have but two causalit ies distinct from
one another, that of the efficient cause and that of the
fin al cause. A n d none of these primacies wh ich we
a t t r i
bute to G od include any imp erfect ion. W herefore, I
shall show that in the realm of beings something indeed
exists which is simply first according to efficiency, and
also tha t s om ething exists wh ich is sim ply first i n the
order of ends, and that something exists which is simply
first by reason o f pre-em inence . Second ly, I shall show
that what is f irst in virtue of one kind of primacy is
also f irst in virtu e of the others. A n d th ir d ly , I shall
show that this tr iple primacy pertains to but one nature,
so as not to be found in several specifically or essentially
differe nt natures. Thi s first ar ticle ,
then,
wi l l conta in
three subordinate parts.
[Part I. The Triple
Primacy],
Th is f irst pa rt com
prises three principal conclusions corresponding respec
tive ly to the three fold pr im ac y. Ea ch of these three
conclusions in tu rn depends u po n three others : (i)
Something is f irst, (2) It cannot be caused, (3) It actually
exists i n the re alm o f beings. A n d so the first pa rt
con
tains nine conclusions, three of which are
p r inc ipa l .
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39
DUNS SCOTUS
{a.
De
Primitate
Efficientis]. Prima
autem
conclusio
istarum
novem
est ista, quod aliquod
effectivum
sit
simpliciter primum, ita quod nee sit effectibile nee
virtu te alterius a se effectivum. Probatio : quia aliquod
ens est effectibile ; aut ergo a se aut a nih ilo vel ab
aliquo alio. Non a n ih ilo , quia nu llius est causa illud
quod nihil est.
Nee
a
se,
quia nulla res est quae
seipsam
faciat vel gignat, I De Trinitate.* Ergo ab alio. Il lu d
aliud
sit A . Si est A p rim um hoc
modo
exposito, pro-
positum habeo. Si non est prim um , ergo est posterius
effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio vel a virtute alterius
effec[ti]vum, quia si negetur negatio, ponitur afnrmatio.
Detur illud alteram et sit B de quo arguitur sicut de A
argutum est. Et ita aut proceditur in in fin itum quorum
quodlibet respectu prioris e rit secundum ; aut statur ir
aliquo non habente prius. Infinitas autem impossibilii
est in ascendendo. Ergo,
primitas
necessaria, quia non
habens
prius, nullo
priore se est posterius, nam circulum
in causis esse est inconveniens.
Contra istam rationem sic instatur primo quod petat
stare in causis ; secundo quod procedit ex contingentibus
et ita non fit demonstratio. Secundum probatur, quia
praemissae
accipiunt esse de aliquo causato et
omne
causatum
contingenter est. S im iliter , procedit ex
contingentibus quia ex rationibus productis et producti
qu i
tantum
sunt te rm ini contingentes. Primum con-
firmatur
per hoc quod secundum philosophantes
infinitas
est ascendendo, sicut ponunt exemplum de generationi-
bus infinitis, quorum nullum est primum sed quodlibet
De Trinitate, i,
cap.
i (Migne,
P.L.,
xl i i ,
820).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 39
[a . The Primacy o f Efficient Causality]. N o w the first
of these n ine conclusions is th is : Among beings which can
produce an effect one is simply first, i n the sense tha t i t neith er
can be produced by an efficient cause nor does it exercise
its eff icient causali ty in virtue of anything other than
itself. P roo f : Some being can be prod uce d. Th erefore ,
i t is either produced by i tself or by nothing or by some
th in g other tha n itself. N ow it cannot be produ ced by
noth ing,
for wh at is no thin g causes no thin g. Ne ither
can it be prod uce d by itself, for as Au gus tine p oints o ut
in his work De Trinitate, bk.
i , *
nothing ever makes itself
or begets itself. Th erefore i t can on ly be prod uce d by
another. N ow let this other be cal led A . I f 4̂ is first
in the way we have described, then I have what I seek
to prove . But if it is no t f irst, then it is some posterior
agent—either because it can be produced by something
else or because it is able to produce its effect only in
vir tue of som ething other than itself. T o deny the
negation is to assert the
af f i rmat ion.
Le t us assume th at
this being is no t f irst and cal l i t B. T h en we can argue
o f B as we d id o f A. A n d so we shall either go on ad
infinitum so th at each th in g i n reference to w hat precedes it
i n the series w i l l be second ; or we sha ll reach som ething
tha t has no thing prio r to i t . How ever, an inf in i ty i n the
ascending orde r
8
is impossible ; hence a pr im ac y is neces
sary because whatever has nothing prior to itself is pos
terior
to no thi ng pr io r, for a circle in causes is inadm issible.
Against this argument, it is objected, f irst, that the
argu m en t assumes an end in the series o f causes ;
secondly, that it begins with contingent propositions and
hence is no t a de m on stratio n. This second ob jection is
arg ued in this way . T h e premises assume the existence
of som ething th at has been caused, an d ev ery thing caused
exists con tingen tly. T he f irst objection is confirm ed fr om
the admission of those who philosophise that an infinity
is possible in an ascending order, as for instance, when
they assume infinite generations, where no single one is
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40
DUNS SCOTUS
secu ndum , qu ia secundu m eos, no n est inconveniens
procedere in in f in i tu m in prod uct ion ibu s e jusdem rat ion is
ub i nu l lum es t primum sed quodl ibet secundum, et
tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo ponitur.
A d
primam instantiam primo
exc ludendam dico quod
phi losophi non posuerunt inf in i tatem possibi lem in causis
essentialiter ordinatis, sed
tantum
in accidental i ter
ordinatis, sicut patet per Avicennam sexto Aletaphysicae,
cap. v , ub i loqui tur de in f in i ta te ind iv iduorum in specie .
Et ad proposi tum mel ius ostendendum sciendum quae
sunt causae essential i ter et accidental i ter ordinatae, ubi
no tandum quod aliud est loqui de causis per se et per
accidens ; et a li u d est lo q u i de causis per se sive essen
t ia l i ter et accident ia l i ter ordinat is, nam in prima est
tantum operat io unius ad
u n u m ,
scilicet causae ad causa-
t u m ,
et est causa per se quae secundum naturam p ro -
p r i am , et non secundum aliquid sibi accidens, causat ut
subjectu m est causa per
se
respectu suae pr op ria e passionis
et in aliis ut a lbu m disgregat et aed if icator aed if icat ;
sed causa per accidens econverso ut Polycletus aedificat.
In secundo est
comparatio
d u a r u m
causarum
inter se in
quantum ab eis est causatum.
E t differunt causae per se sive essentialiter ordin ata e
a causis per accidens sive accidentaliter ordinatis in
t r ibus.
P rim a dif fe re ntia est, qu od in per se ord inatis
secunda in q u a nt um causa dependet a p rim a ; in per
accidens no n , lice t i n esse vel a l iquo modo al io de pendeat.
Filius enim
l icet secundum esse dependeat a patre, non
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
40
first b u t each is second to some othe r. Fo r they find
nothing inconvenient about proceeding to inf in i ty with
productions of the same
k i n d ,
where nothing is first and
every member [of the series] is second [to some other
m em ber ] .
A n d st ill they assume no circle i n causes.
To exclude this first objection, I say that the philos
ophers do not assume the possibil ity of an infinity in
causes essentially ordered, but only in causes accidentally
ordered,
as is evident from Avicenna's Metaphysics,
bk .
v i , c. v, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals
in a species. T o u nders tand better wh at we have in
m i n d ,
one should know that some causes are essentially
ordered and others acciden tal ly ordered. He re i t should
be noted that it is one thing to speak of incidental causes
(causae per accidens) as contras ted w i th those w h ic h are
intended by their nature to produce a given effect (causae
per se). I t is qu ite anoth er to speak o f causes w h ic h are
orde red to one ano the r essentially o r o f themselves (per se)
and those which are ordered only accidentally (per
accidens). For i n the first instance we have m erely a
comparison one-to-one, namely of the cause to that
which is caused. A per se cause is one which causes
a given effect by reason of its very nature and not by
reason o f som ething inc ide nta l to it. Fo r instance, the sub
jec t is a per se cause of its pro pe r attr ibu tes . O th e r such
instance's are w h ite d i l a t i n g 9 or a bui lder bui l d
i n g . O n the contrary, Polyc le tus b u i ld in g wo uld be an
in c id enta l cause.10 I n the second instance, tw o causes are
compared with each other in so far as they are causes of
the same thing.
Per se or essentially ordered causes differ from acciden
ta lly ord ere d causes in three respects. T h e first difference
is that in essentially ordered causes, the second depends
up on the first precisely i n its act of
causation.
I n acciden
tally ordered causes this is not the case, although the
second may depend upon the first for its existence or in
some other w ay . Thu s a son depends upo n his father for
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41 DUNS SCOTUS
tamen in causando, quia patre mortuo potest agere sicut
ipso viv o. D iffe re nt ia secunda est, qu od in per se
ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et alterius
ord inis, qu ia superior est per fectior ; in ac cide nta l i ter
autem
ordina t is no n. E t d i f fer en t ia haec su m itur ex
pr im a ; na m n ul l a causa a causa ejusdem rat ionis de-
pendet essentiali ter i n causando, qu ia i n causatione
a l icu-
ju s sufRcit unum unius rat ion is. T e rt ia est, q uo d omnes
causae essentialiter et per se ordinatae simul necessario
requi runtur ad causandum, a l ioquin a l iqua causal i tas
essentialis et per se deesset effec tui ; in ac cid en ta lite r
autem ordinat is non est s ic, quia non requir i tur simultas
eorum
in causando, qu ia qu ael ibet ha bet
suam
perfectam
cau salitatem sine alia respectu sui effectus. SufRcit enim
quod successive causet una post
a l iam.
Ex his ostenditur
p ropos i tum,
sci l icet quod infinitas
essentialiter
ordinatorum
est imp oss ibi l is. S im il i te r
secunda inf in i tas accidental i ter ordinatorum est im
possibil is, nisi ponatur status in ordinatis essentialiter.
Ergo
omni modo
est impossibil is infinitas in essentialiter
ordinat is. Si etiam negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc
inf initas est imp ossibi l is. Erg o o m n i m od o est al iq uo d
primum necessario et simpliciter e f fec t ivum . Is ta ru m
trium propositionum assumptarum, p rop ter b rev i t a tem,
prima dicatur A, secunda B, tert ia C.
Probat io
i l l a rum ,
primo A, sci l icet quod essential i ter
or din ato ru m inf in i tas est impos sibi lis . Probo turn quia
in causis essential i ter ordinatis ubi ponit adversarius
in f in i ta tem secunda in quantum causat , dependet a
p r i m a ,
ex p ri m a dif fer en tia. Si ig it u r essent causae
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 41
existence but is not dependent upon him in exercising
his own causality, since he can act just as well whether
his fathe r be liv in g or dea d. T h e second difference is
that in essentially ordered causes the causality is of
another nature and order, inasmuch as the higher cause
is m ore perfect. Such is no t the case, however, w i t h
accid en tally o rde red causes. T h is second difference is a
consequence of the first, since no cause in the exercise of
its causality is essentially dependent upon a cause of the
same nature as itself, for to produce anything one cause
of a give n k in d suffices. T h e th ir d difference is tha t a ll
per se and essentially ord ered causes are simultaneou sly
required to cause the effect, for otherwise some causality
essential to the effect w o u ld be w a nt in g. I n acc identa lly
ordered causes this is not so, because there is no need of
simultaneity in causing inasmuch as each possesses
independently of the others the perfection of causality
w i t h rega rd to its ow n effect. Fo r it is enough tha t one
cause after the other exercises causality successively.
From all this we propose to show that an inf inity of
essentially ord ered causes is impossible ; second ly, th at
an in fi n it y o f accide nta lly ordered causes is also impossible
unless we admit a terminus in an essentially ordered
series ; there fore an in fi n it y i n essentially o rde red causes
is impo ssible in a ny case ; th ir d ly , even i f we deny the
existence o f an essential order, an in fin ity of causes is s til l
impossible . Co nse que ntly, in every instance, o f necessity
some first be ing able to cause exists. For the sake o f
brevity, let us call the first of these three assumptions A,
the second B and the third C.
Proof of the first of these propositions, A (namely that
an in fi n it y of essentially ordered causes is impossible) : I
prove this first, because in essentially ordered causes
where our opponent assumes an infinity, the second of
the series depends upon the firs t. Th is is a consequence
of the first difference between essentially and accidentally
ord ere d causes. N o w i f these causes were in fin ite so
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42 DUNS SCOTUS
inf in i tae i ta quod non solum quaelibet posterior sed
quaelibet al ia dependet a sua causa proxima prior, ergo
universitas
causatorum
est ab al iqu a causa p ri o ri . N o n
ab al iqua causa quae est al iquid tot ius universitat is,
qu ia tun c esset causa su i. T o ta
enim
universitas depen
det et a
nullo
i l l ius universitat is et hoc voco
primum
eff iciens. Si ig itu r sunt in f in ita e , adh uc depen dent ab
aliqua quae non est i l l ius universitat is.
Turn quia si causae inf initae ordinatae essential i ter
co nc urra nt ad pr od uc tio ne m alicujus effectus ; et ex
tert ia d i f ferent ia omnes causae essentialiter ordinatae
sunt
s imul ,
sequi tur quod infinita sunt simul ad causan-
dum hunc
ef fectum,
quod nu l lus philosophus poni t .
Turn ter t io , qu ia pr ius est pr inc ip io prop inquius,
qu into Metaphysicae.* Erg o u b i n u l l u m [ M S unum]
principium
nihi l essential i ter prius.
Turn quarto, quia superior causa est perfect ior in
causando ex secunda dif fer en tia ; ergo i n in f in it u m
superior est in in f i n it u m perfectior ; ergo
[.MS1
in ] inf in i ta e
perfectionis. E t n u lla talis est causans de v ir tu te alterius
quia quaelibet talis est imperfecte causans, quia est
dependens incausando ab alia.
Turn qu in to , qu ia e f fec t ivum
nullam
imper fec t ionem
po n it necessario ; ergo potest esse i n a liq uo sine imper-
fectione, qu ia quo d nih i l im perfect ionis in clu di t potest
po ni inte r e ntia sine imp erfec tione ; sed si n ul la causa
est sine dependentia ad prius, in nul lo est sine imper
fectione ; ergo ef fectibili tas inde pen den s potest inesse
al icui naturae, et ilia simpliciter est pr im a . Ergo
effectibi l itas sim plic iter p ri m a est possibil is. H oc
* v, cap. xi
(10186,
9-11
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
42
that not only would each single cause be posterior to
som ething b ut every other cause w h ich precedes it w o u ld
be dependent in turn upon the cause that goes before it,
then whole series of effects would be dependent upon
some p rio r cause. N ow the la tte r can not be a cause tha t
is part of the series, for then it would be its own cause.
The series as a whole, then, is dependent on something
which does not pertain to the group that is caused, and
this I ca ll the first efficient cause. Even i f the grou p of
beings caused were infinite, they would sti l l depend upon
something outside the group.
T h e n ,
too, i f an inf inite number of essential ly ordered
causes concurred to produce some effect, it would follow
that an inf inite number would simultaneously cause this
effect, for it follows from the third difference that
essentially ordered causes must exist simultaneously.
Now no philosopher assumes this.
T h e n ,
thirdly, to be prior, a thing must be nearer to
the beginning.11 * Co nsequ ently, whe re there is no be gin
n ing ,
nothing can be essentially prior to anything else.
T h e n ,
fourthly, by reason of the second difference, the
higher cause is more perfect in its causality, therefore
what is inf initely higher is inf initely more perfect, and
hence of inf in i te perfection. N ow noth ing inf in i te ly
perfect can cause something only in virtue of another,
because eve ryth ing o f this k in d is im perfec t i n its causality
since it depends on another in order to cause its effect.
T h e n ,
fifthly, inasm uch as to be able to produ ce some
thing does not imply any imperfection, i t fol lows that
th is abi l i ty can exist in something without imperfect ion,
because that which implies no imperfection can be
asserted of beings w ith o u t im pe rfec tion . Bu t i f every
cause depends upon some prior cause, then efficiency is
never foun d w ith ou t impe rfect ion. Hence an indepen
dent power to produce something can exist in some
na tur e, an d this na ture is simply first. Th ere fore , such
an efficient power is possible, and this suffices, for later
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43
DUNS SCOTUS
suff ici t , quia inferius ex hoc concluditur quia tale efficiens
p r i m u m ,
si est pos sibile, est i n re . E t sic q uinq ue
rat ionibus patet A.
B probatur, sci l icet quod inf in i tas in accidental i ter
ordinatis sit impossibil is, nisi ponatur status essentialiter
ord inatorum, qu ia in f in i tas acc identa l is , s i poni tur , hoc
non est s imul , patet, sed successive t a n t u m , u t a l te rum
post a l terum, i ta quod secundum al iquo
modo
fluit a
pr io re ,
non tamen dep end et ab ipso in causan do. Potest
enim causare, illo non existente, sicut illo existente ;
sicut
Alius
generat, patre
mortuo
sicut ipso vi vo . Ta lis
infinitas successionis est impossibil is, nisi ab aliqua
natura inf in i te durante, a qua tota successio et quidl ibet
ejus dependeat ; nul la enim
difibrmitas
perpetuatur, n is i
in v ir tute al icujus permanent is quod nih i l est i l l ius
successionis, quia omnia successiva illius successionis sunt
ejusdem rationis, et quia nulla pars successionis potest
permanere cum tota successione eo quod tunc non
esset pars ejus. Sed est a li q u id prius essentialiter, qu ia
quidlibet successionis dependet ab ipso, et hoc in alia
ord inat ione
quam
a causa proxima, quia est a l iquid
illius successionis.
Omne
ig i tur quod dependet a causa
accidental i ter ordinata, dependet essential ius a causa
per se et essentialiter o rd in a ta .
Imo
negato ordine
essential i negabitur ordo accidental is quia accidentia
non habent ord inem n is i mediante f ixo et permanente,
nee
per consequens habet
multitudinem
in i n f i n i tum.
Patet ergo B.
Proba tu r etiam C, quod sci l icet si negetur ordo
essentialis, adh uc infin itas est impo ssib il is. Pro bo :
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 43
we sha ll prove th at i f such a first efficient cause is poss ible,
then it exists in re ali ty. A n d so
A
becomes evident from
these five arguments.
N ow B (namely, that an in f in i ty of accidental ly ordered
causes is impossible unless we admit that the essentially
orde red series has an end) is pro ve d in this way . I f we
assume an infinity of accidentally ordered causes, it is
clear that these causes do not exist simultaneously but
only successively, one after the other, so that what
follows flows in some way fro m w h at precedes. S til l the
succeeding cause does not depend upon the preceding
for the exercise of its causality, for it is equally effective
wh ethe r the prec eding cause exists or not. A son in tu rn
m ay beget a ch i ld jus t
as
w ell whe ther his father be dead or
alive.
Bu t an in fin ite succession o f
such
causes is impos
sible unless it exists in virtue of some nature of infinite
d ur a tio n fro m w hic h the who le succession and every p art
thereo f depends. Fo r no change of form is perpetuated
save in virtue of something permanent which is not a
par t of the succession. A n d the reason for this is tha t
everything of this succession which is in flux, is of the
same nature and no part thereof can be coexistent with
the entire series for the simple reason that it would no
longer be a pa rt of the latte r. So m ething essentially p rio r
to the series then exists, for everything that is part of the
succession depends upon it, and this dependence is of a
different order from that by which i t depends upon the
im m ed iate ly preceding cause where the latter is a pa rt of
the succession. Th ere fore , wh atever depends up on an
acc iden tally orde red cause depends mo re essentially up on
an essentially ord ere d cause. In dee d , to deny the essen
tial order is to deny the accidental order also, since
accidents do not have any order save in virtue of what
is f ixed an d perm anen t. Consequ ently, neither w il l an
inf in i te m ult i t ud e exist. B,
then,
is evident.
Proposition C (namely that if an essential order is
denied,
an infinity is sti l l impossible), also is proved.
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44
DUNS SCOTUS
quia cum ex pr ima rat ione hie adducta, sci l icet quod a
nullo n ih i l potest esse, sequatur q uo d a l iqu a na tu ra sit
effectiva . Si ne ga tur or do essentialis
ac t ivo rum ,
ergo
ilia
in nul l ius alterius virtute causat, et l icet ipsa in al iquo
singulari
ponatur causata,
tamen
in al iquo est non
causata, qu od est propo si tum de natu ra vel s i in quo l ibet
ponatur causata,
statim
impl icatur contrad ic t io negando
ordinem essent ia lem, quia nul la natura potest poni in
quolibet causata, i ta quod sit ordo accidental is sub ipsa
sine or din e essentiali ad
aliam
na tura m [s icut patet ex B ] .
Ad secundam instant iam supra posi tam, quae dic i t
quod rat io procedit ex cont ingent ibus et i ta non est
demonstrat io, cum dico al iqua natura vere est
effecta,
ergo al iq u id est efficiens, respondeo q u o d posset sic ar g ui :
a l iqua natura est ef fecta quod al iquod
subjectum m u t a -
lur,
et i ta terminus mutationis incipit esse in subjecto, et
ita ille terminus ve l com posi tum pro du ci tu r s ive efficitur ;
ergo est aliquod efficiens, per naturam correlativorum ;
et tunc potest esse secundum v er ita te m p ri m a contingens,
sed m anifesta. Potest tam en sic ar gu i pr ob an do
primam
conclusionem sic. Hae c est vera : al iq ua na tu ra est
effectibilis ; ergo al iq ua est effect iva. Antecedens pr o -
batu r : qu ia al iqu od subjectum est m uta bi le , qu ia a l iquo d
entium est possibile, definiendo possibile contra neces-
sarium ; et sic pro cede ndo ex necessariis. E t tu nc
probat io primae conclusionis est de esse q u id d ita tiv e sive,
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
44
Proof:
F ro m the first reason addu ced here, viz . that
nothing can come from nothing, i t fo l lows that some
na ture is capable of causing effectively. N ow , i f an
essential order of agents be denied, then this nature
capable o f causing does no t cause in vir tu e of some other
cause,
and even if we assume that in one individual i t is
caused,
nevertheless in some other it will not be caused,
and this is what we propose to prove to be true of this
na ture . Fo r i f we assume tha t in every in d iv id u al this
natu re is caused, then a con tradict ion fo l lows imm ediately
if we deny the existence of an essential order, since no
nature that is caused can be assumed to exist in each
indiv idual in such a way that i t is included in an
acci
dental order of causes without being at the same time
essentially ordere d to some other natu re. This follows
from proposi t ion B.
Then we come to the second objection cited above,12
nam ely tha t wh en I argue : So m e nature is capable of
producing an effect, therefore something is an efficient
cause ,
the argument is not a demonstration, since it
proceeds fro m con tingen t propo sitions. I rep ly tha t I
co uld inde ed argue th at some nature is prod uce d because
some subject undergoes a change and therefore the term
of the change comes into existence in the subject, and
consequently this term or the composite [i.e. the subject
an d ter m ] are produced or effected. Hence by the
nature of the correlatives, some efficient cause exists.
Formulated in this fashion, this f irst argument would be
based upon a contingent but manifest proposit ion.
However, to prove our conclusion the argument can be
refo rm ula ted i n such a wa y tha t it proceeds fro m necessary
premises. Th us i t is tru e tha t some na ture is able to be
produced, therefore something is able to produce an
effect. T h e antecedent is pro ved fr o m the fact th at
something can be changed, for something is possible
( pos sible being defined as con trary to nece ssary ).
In this case, the proof for the first conclusion proceeds
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45
DUNS SCOTUS
de esse possibili,
non autem de
existentia ac tu ali . Sed
de quo nunc ostenditur possibi l i tas ultra in conclusione
tert ia ostendetur actualis existentia.
Secunda
conclusio
de
primo effectivo
est
ilia
quod
simpl ic i ter
primum
ef fect ivu m est incausa bi le. H oc
probatur, quia est inef fect ib i le independens ef fect ivum.
Hoc patet pr ius, quia s i s i t v i r tute al ter ius causat ivum,
vel ab al io effect ibi le, ergo vel processus in
i n f i n i t um ,
vel c irculus, vel status in a l iquo [ in]ef fect ib i l i indepen-
dente effective ;
i l lud
d i co p r imum, e t
aliud
patet quod
no n est p r im u m ex dat is tu is. Ergo ul ter ius
concluditur,
si i l lud primum est inef fect ib i le, ergo incausabi le, quia
no n est f in ib i le,
nee
ma ter iab i le ,
nee
fo rma b i le . Pro batur
consequentia prima, sci l icet quod si est ineffectibi le, ergo
est infinibile quia causa finalis non causat nisi quia
causa movet m etaphor ice ipsum efEciens ad efRciendum ;
nam a l io modo non dependet entitas finit i ab ipso ut a
pr io r i .
N ih i l a ute m est causa per se nis i u t ab ipso
tamquam a priore essent ia l i ter dependet causatum.
Duae autem
aliae
consequentiae, scil icet quod si est
ineffectibi le, ergo est
immateriabile
e t in fo rmab i le ,
p roban tu r simul ; q ui a cujus n o n est causa extrinse ca,
nee
intrins eca ; qu ia causalitas causae extrinsecae d ic it
per fectione m sine im pe rfection e. Causali tas vero causae
intrinsecae necessario dicit imperfectionem annexam,
quia causa intrinseca est pars causati. Igitur ratio causae
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 45
from what the thing is or from its possible existence, but
no t fr o m its ac tua l existence. T h e actua l existence of
this being which up to now we have shown to be merely
possible, however, wil l be established in the third
con
clusion.
T h e second conclusion about the first possible effic ien t
cause is th is . Among those things which can produce an effect
that which is simply first is itself incapable of being caused.
Proof:
Such a being cannot be produc ed an d is inde
pe nd ently able to produce an effect. Th is was prove d
above, for i f such a being could cause only in virtue of
something else or i f i t could be produced, then either a
process ad infinitum or a circle in causes would result, or
else the series would terminate in some being which
cannot be produced and yet independently is able to
produce an effect. Th is being I cal l f i r s t , and fro m
what you grant, i t is clear that anything other than this
is no t f irst. Th ere fore , the fur the r conclusion follows
th at i f such a be ing ca nno t be pro du ce d, it has no causes
whatsoever, for it cannot be the result of a
final,
mater ia l
or fo rm a l cause. P ro of o f the first consequence, viz . tha t
i f such a being cannot be produced, neither can it have
an y fina l cause. A final cause does not cause at a ll unless
in a metaphorical sense it moves the efficient cause to
prod uce the effect. O n ly in this wa y does the en tity o f
what exists for the sake of an end depend on the end as
p rio r. N o th in g , however, is a per se cause unless the
thing caused depends upon it essentially as upon some
th in g pr ior . N o w the other two consequences are proved
simultaneous ly. I f som ething cannot be prod uced , then
it can be the result neither of a material nor of a formal
cause.
T h e reason is this. I f som ething has no extrinsic
cause,
neither does it have an intrinsic cause, for while
to be an extrinsic cause does not imply imperfection but
perfect ion,
to be an intrinsic cause necessarily includes
some imperfection since the intrinsic cause is a part of
the th in g it causes. Fo r this reason, the very n ot io n o f
2 , 3 2 2
8
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46 DUNS SCOTUS
extrinsecae est natural i ter prior rat ione causae
i n t r i n -
secae ; negato ig i tur pr ior i , et negatur et posterius.
Probantur
etiam eaedem
consequentiae, quia causae
intrinsecae sunt causatae ab extrinsecis vel secundum
esse earum ve l in quantum causant composi tum ve l
u t roque
m odo ,
quia causae intrinsecae non seipsis sine
agente co ns tituu nt com po situm . Ex ist is dict is satis
patet conclusio secunda.
Tert ia conclusio de primo effectivo est ista : primum
effectivum est in actu existens, et al iqua natura vere
existens ac tu al ite r sic est effec tiva. P ro b at io istius :
Cujus rat ioni repugnat esse ab al io, i l lud si potest esse,
potest esse a se ; sed ra ti o n i primi effectivi s impl ic i ter
repugnat esse ab alio, sicut patet ex secunda conclusione.
Simi l i ter e t iam ipsum potest esse, sicut pa tet ex p ri m a
ubi pos i ta est qu in ta probat io ad A, quae minus v idetur
concludere et
tamen
hoc conclud i t .
Aliae autem
p ro -
bationes ipsius A possunt tractari de existentia quam
propon i t
haec
tert ia conclusio, et sunt de cont ingent i -
bus, tam en manifest is : ve l ac cip i tu r A de na tur a et
qu id di ta te et po ssib i l i tate, et sunt ex necessariis. Erg o
effec tivum s im plicite r p r im u m potest esse ex se ; qu od
non est a se, non potest esse a se quia tunc non ens pro-
duceret al iquid ad esse, quod est impossibi le, et
adhuc
tun c i l l u d causaret se, et it a n o n esset inca usa bile
omn ino .
I l lud u l t imum, sc i l icet de ex is tent ia pr imi e f fect iv i
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 46
an extrinsic cause has a natural priority over that of
intrin sic cause ; to de ny wha t is pr io r is to deny also
what is posterior.
Another way of proving these same consequences is
this.
In tr in s ic causes are caused by ex trins ic causes
either in their very being or in so far as they cause the
com posite, or in bo th o f these ways, for the intr insic causes
of themselves and without the intervention of some agent
can not constitute the composite. Thi s suffices to make
the second conclusion evident.
The third conclusion about this being capable of exercis
in g eff icien t cau sa lity is th is. Such a being actually exists
and some nature actually existing is capable of such causality.
Proof:
A n y th in g to whose nature i t is repug nant to
receive existence from something else, exists of itself if it
is able to exist at al l. T o receive existence fr o m some
thing else, however, is repugnant to the very notion of a
being which is first in the order of efficiency, as is clear
fro m the second conclusion. T h a t it can exist, is also
clear from the f irst conclusion [namely A ] , where the
fifth argument, which seems to be less conclusive than
the othe rs, establishes this m uc h at least.13 How ever ,
the other proofs of proposition A can also be used to
establish the existence of this being as proposed by this
third conclusion, but in this case they are based on con
t ingen t tho ug h manifest propos itions. I f A, however, is
understood o f the nature, the qu id dit y a nd the po ssibi l i ty,
then the conclusions proceed from necessary premises.
From all this it follows that an efficient cause which is
first in the un qu alif ie d sense of the ter m can exist o f itself.
Consequently, it does exist of itself, for what does not
actually exist of itself, is incapable of existing of itself.
Otherwise a non-existent being would cause something
to exist ; bu t this is impossible, even apa rt fro m the fact
that in such a case the thing would be its own cause and
hence could not be entirely uncaused.
Another way to establish this last conclusion, viz. the
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47
DUNS SCOTUS
ali ter declaratur, quia inconveniens est universo
deesse
supremum gradum possibilem in essendo.
Juxta tres conclusiones ostensas de effectivo
p r imo ,
nota coro l lar ium quoddam quod quasi cont inet t res
conclusiones probatas, quod, scil icet
primum effectivum
non tantum est prius ali is, sed eo prius aliud esse includit
con t rad ic tionem. S ic in qu an tum pr im u m , ex is ti t, p ro -
batur ut praecedens ; nam in rat ione tal is
primi maxime
inc lud i tu r incausabi le, pro ba tur ex secunda ; ergo si
potest esse, qu ia no n contra dic i t en t i ta t i , u t pro ba tur
ex prima, sequitur quod potest esse a
se,
et ita est a se.
\b. De Primitate
Final i tat is] .
J u x ta tres conclusiones
primas
de causa effectiva, propono tres conclusiones
similes de causa finali. A li q u o d
finitivum
est simpliciter
p r i m u m , hoc est nee ad a l iud ord inabi le nee in v i r tu te
alterius
natum finire
a l ia . E t p rob atur qu inque proba-
t ionibus simi l ibus illis quae ponebantur ad pr imum
conclusionem de primo effect ivo.
Secunda est qu od p r im u m finit ivum est incausa bile.
Probatur, qu ia in f in ib i le , a l ias non pr imum, et u l t ra ,
ergo ineffect ib i le. Haec consequentia pr ob atu r, qu ia
omne
per se agens agit p ro pt er f inem, ex secundo
Physicorum,* ubi etiam hoc vult Phi losophus de natura,
de qua minus v idetur
quam
de agente a pro po sito. Sed
cujus non est aliquod per se efneiens, i l lud non est
ef fect ib i le, quia in nullo genere potest per accidens esse
p r i m u m ,
sicut patet in proposito specialiter de causis
II,
cap. v
(196 ,
17-212).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
47
existence of this first efficient cause, would be to argue
from the impropriety of a universe that would lack the
highest possible degree of being.
A k in d of co rolla ry co nta ine d, as it w ere, in these three
conclusions concerning the first being able to exercise
efficient cau sality, is the fo llo w ing . N o t only is such a
cause p rio r to al l the others, bu t i t w ou ld be co ntra dicto ry
to say tha t anothe r is p ri o r to it. A n d , in so far as such
a cause is first, it exists. Th is is prov ed in the same wa y
as the preced ing. T he very notion o f such a being imp lies
its ina b il i ty to be caused (w hic h is pro ved fr om the second
con clusion ). Th ere fore , i f it can exist, ow in g to the fact
tha t to be is no t co ntr ad icto ry to i t (as the first con clusion
proves), then it follows that it can exist of itself, and
consequently that it does exist of itself.
\b. The Primacy of Fin ality ]. Co nce rning the fina l
cause,
I propose three conclusions similar to the first
three conclusions about the being which is able to
prod uce som eth ing. T h e first conclusion is th a t some end is
simply ultimate, tha t is, it can ne ithe r be orda ine d to some
thing else nor exercise i ts f inal i ty in virtue of something
else. T his is pro ve d by five argum ents sim ilar to those
advanced for the first conclusion concerning the possi
bil ity of a first efficient cause.
T h e second conclusion is tha t the ultimate end cannot be
caused in any way. Th is is prove d fr o m the fact th a t it
cannot be ordained for another end ; otherwise i t would
no t be ult im ate . I t fol lows in ad dit io n that i t cannot be
caused by a n efficient cause. T h is lat te r consequence is
prov ed f ro m the fact th at every agent per se acts for the
sake of an end as is said in Physics, bk.
i i , *
where the
Philosopher understands this proposition to hold also of
n a tu r e wh ere it seems to ap ply less th an i n the case
o f an agent who acts acc ording to purpose.14 N o w a
th in g ca nn ot be prod uced i f no per se efficient cause of i t
exists, for the first of any given kind of cause is never an
in c id enta l cause {causa per accidens). T h is is clear fr o m
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48
DUNS SCOTUS
agentibus per accidens, quae sunt casus et fortuna quae
secundum Aristotelem, secundo Physicorum* reducuntur
necessario ad causas per se agentes ut priores, scilicet
ad naturam et intellectum u t propositum ; cujus igi tu r
non est aliquid per se agens ejus nullum erit agens,
sed cujus n o n est finis, ejus n on est ali qu od p er se
agens ; ergo ipsum erit ineffectibile ; n am finibile ex-
cell itur a fine in bonitate et per consequens in perfectione.
Et ultra, ut supra ostensum est de causa efTectiva
pr ima.
Tert ia conclusio est, quod primum finitivum est ac tu
existens, et alicui naturae actu existent i convenit ilia
pr im i tas. Prob atur u t pr im a v ia de ef f ic ient ia .
Sequ i tu r quod pr imum est i ta p r imum, quod
impossi-
bile est aliud prius esse. E t pr ob at ur u t corollarium in
via priori.
[c. De
Primitate
Eminentiae]. Conc lusion ibus tribu s de
utroque ordine causali tat is extrinsecae ja m posit is , pro-
pono tres simi les de ordine em inent iae. A l iq u a na tur a
eminens est s im pl ic i ter p r im a secundum perfec t ionem .
H oc pa tet qu ia in te r essentias ordo essentialis, qu ia secun
dum Ar i s to te lem,
formae
se
habent
sicut
n u m e r i ,
octavo
Metaphysicae.] I n hoc ord ine sta tur. Q u od p rob atur
illis qu inque rationibus quae de statu in effectivis sunt
superius.
Secunda conclusio est quod suprema natura est in-
causabilis. P rob atu r, qu ia est in f in ib i l is , ex praece-
dentibus [nam finibi le excell i tur a f ine in bonitate et per
consequens in perfe ct ione ]. Ergo ineffec t ib i l is . E t u l t r a ,
* n, cap. vi
(198 ,
5-13 .
t
vm,
cap. ii i
(1043*,
33).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 48
what is said
in
part icular of incidental causes, which are
chance and fortun e. These, according to Ar istot le in
Physics, bk . 11,* must be reduced respectively to the prior
causes of n a tu r e and in te l le c t as purpose, nei ther
o f w h ich are inc ide nta l causes. He nce, wha tever has no
per se efficien t cause has no efficien t cause w hatsoever.
But whatever has no end, also has no per se efficient
cause. Therefore, i t w i l l not be something that co uld
be produced, for whatever could be the result of a f inal
cause will be surpassed in goodness, and consequently
in perfec tion, by the end. Fu rthe r, as has been shown
above of the first potential
efficient
cause [such a being
wi l l have no materia l or formal cause ei ther] .
The third
conclusion
is tha t the being which
can be
an ultimate
end actually exists and that this primacy pertains to some actually
existing nature. T h e p ro o f for th is is like th a t used in th e
first way from efficiency.15
It follows that such a being is first in the sense that it is
impossible tha t any thin g should be pr ior to i t . Th is is
proved in the same fashion as the preceding corollary
about the efficient cause.
[c. The Primacy o f Pre-eminence]. H a v in g alread y
established three conclusions of each of the two orders
of extrinsic causality, I submit three similar conclusions
con cerning the order o f pre-em inence . T h e first conclusion
is that some eminent nature is simply first
in perfection.
Thi s is
evident because an essential order exists among essences,
for as Aristotle puts i t , f forms are l ike num bers. A n d in
such an order an ult ima te natu re is to be fou nd . T his is
proved by the five reasons given above for a first being in
the order of efficient causality.
T h e second conclusion is tha t the supreme nature cannot be
caused. T his is prove d fro m the fact tha t i t cannot be
ordained to an end, for whatever is ordained to an end
is surpassed in goodness, and therefore also in perfection,
by the end. Bu t i f i t is no t orda ined to an end ,
then,
i t
cannot be caused by an efficient cause, and consequently
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49
DUNS SCOTUS
ergo incausabil is. Il lae duae consequentiae sunt pro-
batae ex secunda conclusione de
effectivis.
I t e m ,
quod suprema natura si t inef fect ib i l is probatur.
N a m
omne
ef fect ib i le habet a l iquam
causam
essentialiter
ord ina tam,
sicut patet ex probatione ipsius B in con
clusione prima de
primo
effect ivo. Causa
autem
essential iter or din at a exc ell i t effectu m . [I g it u r , si esset
effectibil is, non esset suprema.]
Tert ia conclusio est quod suprema natura est a l i -
quod actu existens et probatur ex praecedentibus.
Corollarium : al iq ua m esse n at u ra m eminentiorem vel
superiorem ipsa inc lud i t con trad ic t ione m . Pro batu r u t
coro l la r ium de efficiente et fine.
[Pars Secunda. De primitatibus ad invicem comparatis].
Quantum ad secundum articulum d ico quod primum
efficiens
est u l t im us f in is. Pr ob at io, qu ia om ne
efficiens
per se agit pr op ter f ine m et prius eff iciens p ro pt er finem
pr io rem.
Ergo p rim u m effic iens pro pte r ult imum finem.
Sed propter n ih i l
aliud
a se pr inc ipa l i ter et u l t im a te agi t .
Ergo ,
prop ter se sicut pro pte r finem. Erg o p r im u m
efficiens est pr im us finis. Si enim ageret per se propter
finem
alium
a se, tunc al iquod esset nobil ius primo
eff iciente, quia f inis qui est al iquid remotum ab agente
intendente f inem nobil ius eo.
Simi l i ter, pr imum eff ic iens est pr imum eminens.
Probatur, quia primum eff ic iens non est univocum res-
pectu al iarum naturarum efFect ivarum, sed aequivocum.
Ergo
eminentius
et nob il ius eis. Er go p r im u m efficiens
est eminentissimum.
[Pars Tertia . De divinae naturae
unitate].
Q u a n t u m a d
tert ium art icu lum d ico quod cum s i t idem cui inest
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 49
i t can no t be caused in any way . These last tw o
con
sequences are proved from the second conclusion about
the efficient cause.
Another consideration proves that this supreme nature
cannot be an effect. E ve ryth ing wh ich can be produce d
has some essentially ordered cause, as is evident from
the proof of the proposit ion B in support of the f irst
conclusion about the possibil ity of a first efficient cause.
N o w a n essentially ordered cause excels its effect ; the re
fore, i f i t could be produced, i t would not be supreme.
The third conclusion is tha t the supreme nature actually exists,
and this is proved from what we have said above.16
C oro llary : I t is con trad ictory that any natu re should
be m ore excellent or higher th an this natu re. T his is
proved in the same way as were the corollaries about the
efficient and final cause.17
[Pa rt I I . Interrelation o f the Three Primacies]. R egard
in g the second pa rt, I say th a t the first cause is the ultimate
end.
P ro of : Eve ry per se efficien t cause acts fo r the sake
of an end , an d a p rio r cause acts for a p ri o r end ; there
fore,
the first cause acts for the sake of the ultimate end.
Now the first efficient cause does not act primarily or
ult imately for the sake of anything dist inct from
itself;
hence,
it must act for itself as an end ; therefore, the first
efficient cause is the ult im a te e nd . I f it were to act per
se
for the sake of any end other than itself, then something
would be more noble than the first efficient cause, for if
the end were anyth ing a part f ro m the agent inten ding the
end,
i t would be more noble than the agent.
N o w the firs t efficient cause is also the supreme
nature. Proof:
The first efficient cause is not a univocal cause with
reference to the other efficient causes but rather an
equi
vo ca l cause. Such a cause, there fore, is m ore excellent
an d noble th a n they. Consequently, the first efficient
cause is the most excellent.18
[Part I I I . Unity o f the Divine Nature]. Regard ing
the third part, I say that since this tr iple primacy is
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50
DUNS SCOTUS
trip lex primitas, quia cui inest una, insunt et
aliae
; et
etiam est ibi tr iplex identitas, i ta quod primum efficiens
est tantum unum secundum quidditatem et na t u ram .
Ad q u o d ostendendum ostendo primo q u a md a m co n -
clusionem praeambulam et secundo principalem con -
clusionem. Praeambula autem est quod efficiens quod
est p r im u m hac t ri p li c i p ri m it a te , est necesse esse ex se.
P rob at io, qu ia est penitus incausabile ; na m con tra-
dict ionem includit al iquod esse prius eo in genere causae
efficientis vel finis, et per consequens in genere cujus-
cumque causae ; ergo est omnino incaus abile. Ex hoc
arguo : n ih i l potest no n esse, nisi cui a l i q u id
i ncom-
possibile pos itive ve l p riv a tiv e potest esse. E i aute m
quod est a se et penitus incausabile, non potest al iquid
esse quod ei sit incompossibile
-
posi t ive ve l pr iva t ive ;
ergo etc. M ajo r patet qu ia n u l lu m ens potest de strui ,
nisi per incompossibi le sibi vel posit ive vel privative.
Mino r p roba tu r , qu ia i l lud incompossibi le aut potest
esse a se au t ab a lio . Si a se et e rit a se. E r it i g it u r du o
incompossibi l ia
s imul ,
ve l neutrum est , qu ia u t rumque
de struit esse alte rius . Si ab a lio , co ntr a : n u lla causa
potest destruere al iquod ens propter repugnant iam sui
effectus
ad
i l l ud ,
nisi suo
effectui
perfectius et intensius
esse det quam sit esse il l ius alter ius de struc tibil is :
null ius entis ab alio est nobil ius esse a causa sua quam
sit esse necessarium a se, qu ia omne causatum habet esse
dependens, sed quod est ex se habet esse independens.
Ex hoc u l t r a ad prop osi tum , pro ba tur un i tas [M S
Veritas] naturae
p r imae ,
quae est pr incipale intentum in
hoc tert io art iculo, quod ostenditur t r ibus rat ionibus.
P rim o sic : q u ia si dua e n atur ae sunt necesse esse,
al iquibus rat ionibus propri is real ibus dist inguuntur ; et
d icantur A et B.
Ulae
rat iones aut sunt formaliter neces-
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 50
fou nd together (fo r where one is, there also are the o the rs),
i t fol lows further that this tr iple identity is such that
there is but one irst efficient cause according to essence and nature.19
To show this, I wi l l f i rst establish a prel iminary
con
clusion and only afterwards the principal conclusion.
N o w the p re lim in a ry conclusion is this . The efficient cause
which is first by this triple primacy is of itself necessarily existent.
Proof:
I t is com pletely incapa ble of be ing caused, for
i t is co ntra dicto ry tha t i t should have an yth ing prio r to i t
in the order of efficiency or f inality, and consequently in
any causal orde r. He nce, it is w h ol ly incap able of be ing
caused.
F ro m this I argue, no thin g can be non-existent
unless something either positively or privatively incom
patible w it h i t can exist. N ow n oth ing can be posit ively
or pr ivat ively incompat ib le with a being which exists of
itself an d is tota lly uncaused ; therefore, etc. T h e m ajo r
is clear, inasmuch as no being can be destroyed except
by something posi t ively or pr ivat ively incompat ib le with
i t .
T he m ino r is prove d as follows. W h a t is inco m pa tible
cou ld exist either o f itself or in vir tu e o f some other b eing .
If it can exist of itself, then it will exist of itself.
Con
sequently, two incompatible entit ies will coexist or rather
neither will exist because each will destroy the other.
But can this incompatible enti ty exist in virtue of another
being? N o , for no cause is able to destroy som ething b y
reason o f
an
effect inco m pa tible w it h the thin g to be de
stroyed unless it is able to give a mo re perfect an d intense
existence to its effect than that which the thing to be de
stroyed possesses.
Now
the existence w h ic h a cause im pa rts
to a being is never as perfect as that of a self-existent
being,
lor
the existence of what is caused is dependent
whereas that of the self-existent being is independent.
N ow to proceed to what we pr im ar i ly intended to prove
in this third part, the unity of this f irst nature.
Three reasons are adduced by way of proof, the first
o f w h ic h is this . I f tw o necessary natures existed, some
reali ty proper to each would dist inguish one from the
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51
DUNS SCOTUS
sariae,
aut
non .
Si sic, ig itu r
utrumque
duabus ra t ion i -
bus formalibus erit necesse esse, quod est impossible,
qu ia cum n eut ra i l la r um ra t io nu m per se inc ludat
a l iam,
utr aq ue is ta ru m c irc um sc rip ta, esset necesse esse [ M S
om.
per alteram, et ita esset aliquid necesse esse per i l l ud ,
quo
c i rcumscr ip to ,
non m in us esset necesse esse]. S i
vero per illas ra t iones qu ibus d is t inguuntur neutrum
sit formaliter necesse esse, igitur illae rat iones non sunt
rat iones necessario essendi, et i ta neutrum includitur in
necesse esse, quia quaecumque entitas non est necesse
esse est de se poss ibilis ; sed n ih il poss ibile in c lu d it u r in
necesse esse.
Secundo probatur, quia duae naturae eminent issimae
n o n possunt esse in u nive rso ; ergo nee duo pr ima
effectiva. P rob atio anteced entis, q u ia species se ha be nt
sicut
num er i ,
ex octa vo Metaphysicae* et per consequens
duae non possunt esse in eodem ord ine . Ergo multo
minus
nee
duae
primae vel
duae eminentissimae.
H o c etiam patet tert io per rat ionem de rat ione f inis,
quia duo f ines
ult imi
si essent haberent duas coordina-
tiones entium ad se, i ta quod ista entia ad ilia n u l l u m
ord inem haberent , qu ia nee ad finem i l lo ru m ; na m quae
ord inantur ad
unum
f inem u l t imum non possunt ord inar i
ad a l i um , quia ejusdem causati duas esse causas totales
et perfectas in eodem ordine est impossibile ; tunc enim
aliquid esset in al iquo ordine per se causa, quo non
posito, nihi lominus causatum i l lud [aeque perfecte esset].
*
vm,
cap. ii i
(10436,
33).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 51
other. L e t us ca ll these rea l differences A and B . N o w
either A and B are formally necessary or they are not.
If we assume them to be necessary, then each necessarily
existing nature will possess two formal reasons for its
necessary existence, for in addition to A or B, each is
formally necessary by reason of that part of its nature in
w h ic h it is l ike the other. N o w this is impo ssible, for
since ne ithe r o f the tw o reasons o f itse lf includes the oth er ,
if either be excluded, the being would sti l l exist neces
sarily in v irt u e of the other. I n such a case the be ing
would exist necessari ly in virtue of something which, i f
e l im inated,
would sti l l leave the nature existing as
necessarily as before. O n the other ha nd , i f ne ither
nature is formally necessary in virtue of these real differ
ences, then the latter are not of the essence of necessary
existence and consequently neither is included in a
necessary be ing. Fo r any en tity w h ich is no t of itse lf
necessary be ing is on ly possible being.20 N o th in g m ere ly
possible, however, is included in what exists necessarily^
Second proof: T w o pre-eminent natures canno t exist
i n one universe ; therefore neither can tw o beings firs t
i n the order of
efficient
causali ty. Proo f of the antec ed en t:
Species are li ke numbers (Metaphysics, bk.
vni)
* an d hence
no two occu r i n the same orde r. S til l less co uld two be
first or pre-eminent.
This is also evident in the third place from the fact
th at this Be ing has the character o f an end. N o w if there
were tw o u ltim ate ends, the n we should have tw o separate
series of co-ordinated beings where the members of one
group would have no relat ion to the other inasmuch as
they are no t orde red to the same end . Fo r w ha t is
ordered to one ult im ate end cannot be ordered to an other,
as it is impossible to have two total and perfect causes of
the same ord er causing one an d the same th in g . I n such
a case, som ething co uld be
a
per
se
cause i n a given ord er,
although its effect would exist no less perfectly even
sho uld this cause never have existed. Th ere fore , things
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52 DUNS SCOTUS
Ord ina ta e rgo ad unum
finem nullo modo
o rd inan tu r
ad a l i um , nee per consequents ad ilia quae ord inantur
ad alium, et ita ex eis non fieret
un ivcrsum.
Hoc etiam confirmatur in
c o m m u n i ,
qu ia nu l la duo
possunt esse terminantia to ta l i ter dependentiam alicujus
ejusdem, quia tunc illud terminaret dependent iam, quo
subtracto, non minus
terminaretur ilia
dependentia, et
ita no n esset dep end entia ad i l l u d ; sed ad efHciens et
eminens
et ad finem depen dent al iq ua [ M S al ia] essen-
t ial i te r. Erg o nu llae duae natu rae possunt esse primo
terminant ia a l iqua [MS a l ia ] ent ia secundum illam
triplicem de pe nd en tiam . Praecise ig itu r est al iq ua una
natura terminans ent ia secundum i l lam t r ip l icem depen
den t iam, et ita habens istam t r ip l i ce m p r im i t a te m .
\_Articulus
Secundus. De Proprietatibus Dei
Absolutist
Ostenso esse de proprietatibus relativis primi entis,
u l ter ius ad ostendendum i l l ius primi
i n f i n i t a t em ,
et per
consequens esse de ente in fi n it o , procedo sic : P rim o
ostendo quod
primum efficiens
est intelligens et volens,
i ta quo d sua inte l l ige nt ia est in f in i to ru m d ist incte, et quo d
sua essentia est repraesen tativa i n f in it o ru m , quae quidem
essentia est sua in te ll ig e n tia . E t ex hoc secundo conc lud e-
tu r sua inf inita s. E t sic cu m tr ip l ic i p rim ita te ostensa,
er i t quadruplex medium ad ostendendum ejus in f in i
t a tem. . . .
[Pars Pr ima. De Intellectu et Voluntate P rim i Entis ].
[Conc lus io P r im a] . Q uo d
autem
sit intelligens et volens
arguo sic : A l i q u o d agens est per se p r im u m agens, qu ia
omni causa per accidens prior est aliqua causa per se,
secundo Physicorum,* ubi hoc
vult
de natura de qua
* II, cap. vi
(ig8a,
8-9).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 52
orde red to one end cannot be ordered to another. N eith er
then ,
can they be ordered to things which in turn are
orde red to som ething else. Con sequently, they w ou ld
not form one universe [with the lat ter] .
This is also
confirmed
in general because one and the
same thing cannot be total ly dependent upon two things.
For then i t would be dependent upon something which,
i f removed, would st i l l leave the thing in question as
dependent as before. He nce, the th in g w ou ld not real ly
be dependent up on it at al l . N ow some things depend
essentially upon an efficient cause which is also
pre
em inent and they depend essentially upon an end . Th ey
cannot,
then,
be dependent upon two natures in this
tr ip le way . Co nsequ ently, some one natu re is the term
of this triple dependence, and thus enjoys this triple
pr imacy.
[Article I I . Absolute Properties o f God]
Having shown the existence of the relative properties
of the First Being, we go on to prove that this Being pos
sesses in fin ity a nd , consequen tly, tha t an In fin ite Be ing
exists. I proceed as follow s : First I show that the first
efficient cause is endowed with will and possesses such
intell igence that this cause understands an infinity of
distinct things and that its essence, which indeed is its
intell igen ce, represents an in fin ity of things. Secondly,
I go on fro m this to infer the in f in ity o f this Being. T his
approach coupled with the tr ip le primacy which we have
established provides four ways of showing the infinity of
this Being. . . .
[Part I. Intellect and W il l] . [F irs t Con clus ion ]. I
argue th a t this being is intelligent and endowed with w i l l as
follows :
Some agent is per se and first, for ac co rd ing to Physics,
bk . 11,* every incidental cause is preceded by one that is
not incidental but per
se.
I n this passage the Ph ilosopher
applies this to nature where it would seem to hold sti l l
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53 DUNS SCOTUS
minus v ide tur. Sed omne agens per se agit propter
f inem. Et ex hoc arg u i tur du pl ic i te r : Primo sic :
Omne agens naturale, praecise
consideratum
ex neces
sitate et aeque ageret si ad nullum f inem alium ageret,
sed sit inde pe nd en ter agens ; ergo si no n a git nis i
propter f inem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente
amante
finem ; ta le est primum efficiens ; ergo etc.
I t e m ,
s i pr imum agens agi t propter f inem, aut ergo
finis ille movet p r i m u m efficiens u t amatus ac tu vo lun
tat is, aut u t tantum na tura l i ter am atus. Si ut amatus
actu vo lun tat is , habe tur prop osi tum . Si ta nt um amatus
natural i ter, hoc est
falsum,
qu ia non na tura l i te r amat
al ium f inem a se, u t grave centrum, e t mater ia
f o rmam.
T u n c
enim
esset aliquo
modo
ad f inem, qu ia inc l inatus
ad i l i um . S i autem tan tum natura l i te r amat f inem qu i
est ipse, hoc nihil est nisi
ipsum
esse
ipsum.
Ho c en im
non est salvare duplicem rationem in ipso.
I tem argu i tu r quas i confirmando [ M S conferendo]
ra t ionem jam
factam
s ic. Ips um p r im u m effic iens
di r ig i t e f fectum suum ad f inem ; ergo vel na tura l i te r
dirigit , vel cognoscendo et amando ilium f inem . N on
natural i ter, quia non cognoscens nih i l d ir ig i t n is i in
v ir tu te cognoscentis : sapientis en im est p ri m a o rd in a tio ,
p rim o Metaphysicae* Sed p ri m u m eff iciens nu ll ius
al ter ius v ir tute dir ig i t , s icut
nee
causat ; tunc e nim no n
esset p r im u m ; ergo, etc.
I t e m ,
a l iq uid causatur cont ingenter ; ergo p ri m a
causa co ntin ge nte r causat ; ergo volens causat. P ro ba tio
*
i,
cap. ii
(982°,
17-16
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
53
less [t h a n of a de libe rat e cause ]. N o w every per se
agen t
acts for the sake o f an end. F r o m this I d ra w a do ub le
argument : F i rst , that every natura l agent, considered
precisely as natural, acts of necessity
21
and w ou ld act
just as i t does now even i f i t had no other end but was
a n ind epe nde nt agent. Th ere for e, i f i t acts on ly because
of an end, this is so only because it depends upon an
agen t w h i c h loves the en d. B ut the f i rst eff ic ient cause
is such an agent, therefore, etc.
[Secondly,] i f the first agent acts for the sake of an end,
then this end moves the first efficient cause inasmuch as
it is loved ei ther natural ly or by an act of the
w i l l .
I f
the la tte r be the case, y ou gr an t wh a t I seek to pr ov e.
I f you assume that the end is loved natura l ly , the assump
tion is false, for the f i rst agent loves natural ly no end other
th an i tse lf , as m at te r , for instance, na tu ra l ly loves f o rm
or the heavy object the centre [of the ea r t h] . I f i t d id ,
th e first ag ent w o u l d be or ie nt ed t o i t as a n en d, since i t
is in cl ine d to i t by i ts very na ture . B ut i f th is end w h ic h
i t loves natura l ly is noth ing other than i tse l f , then we
assert n o th in g m or e th a n th at the th in g is itself .22 I n
such a case, how ev er, th e tw of ol d [ca usal] aspect w o u ld
not be saved.
I n co nf i rm at i on o f the argu me nt jus t g iven we c ou ld
argue that the first efficient cause directs its effect to some
end . N o w , i t d i rects i t e i ther na tu ra l ly or by consciously
lo v in g th is end . T h e first a l te rna t ive is un ten abl e, inas
m u c h as wh ate ve r lacks know led ge c an d i rec t its ef fect to
some end only in vir tue of something which does possess
know ledge , fo r t o o rde r u l t i m a t e l y pe r ta ins to w isd om
ac co rd in g to Metaphysics, bk . i . * N o w ju s t as the f i rst
efficient cause does not cause in virtue of something else,
neither does this cause direct i ts effect to an end by reason
of something other than i tse l f , for otherwise i t would not
be first; th er ef or e, etc .
A no th er pro of is th is. So me thin g causes co nt in
ge n tl y. T he re fo re , the first cause causes
c o n t i n g e n t l y ;
(2,322)
9
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54
DUNS SCOTUS
primae consequentiae : quaelibet causa secunda causat
in quantum movetur a prim a ; ergo si prim a necessario
movet, quaelibet alia necessario movetur et quidlibet
necessario causatur. Ig itu r, si aliqua causa secunda
contingenter movet, et prima contingenter
movebit,
quia non causat causa secunda nisi in virtute primae
causae, in quantum movetur ab ipsa. Probatio secundae
consequentiae : nullum est principium contingenter
operandi nisi voluntas, vel aliquid concomitans volun-
tatem, quia quodlibet
aliud
agit ex necessitate naturae,
ita et non contingenter ; ergo etc.
Contra
istam
rationem instatur, et
primo
contra
primam
consequentiam arguitur sic : qu ia nostrum
velle
posset adhuc aliquid contingenter causare, et ita
non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter
causet. Ite m , Philosophus antecedens concessit, scilicet
quod aliquid contingenter causatur, et negavit conse-
quens, intelligendo de velle scilicet quod prima causa
contingenter causet ; ponendo
contingentiam
in in-
ferioribus, non propter contingenter Deum velle , sed ex
motu
qui necessario causatur in quantum uniformis,
sed
difformitas
sequitur ex partibus ejus, et ita con-
tingentia.
Contra secundam consequentiam : si causat contin
genter, ergo volens, non videtur tenere, quia aliqua
naturaliter
mota
possunt impediri, et ita
oppositum con
tingenter et violenter potest evenire.
A d primum dicendum, quod si Deus est primum
movens
vel
efficiens
respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem
sequitur de ipsa quod de
aliis,
quia sive immediate
necessario movet earn, sive aliud immediate, et illud
necessario
motum
necessario
moveat
earn, quia movet
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 54
conseque ntly, it causes vo lu n ta ril y. Proo f of the first
consequence : Eve ry secondary cause causes in so far as
i t is m ov ed by the first cause. I f the first cause moves
necessarily,
then,
every other cause will be moved
necessarily and everything will be caused necessarily.
Co nsequ ently, if any secondary cause moves co ntin ge ntly,
the first cause also moves contingently, since the
secondary cause can cause only in so far as it is moved
by the first. P roof o f the second consequence : T he on ly
source of contingent action is either the will or something
accompanied by the w i l l . E ve ryth ing else acts w it h a
natural necessity and, consequently, not contingently ;
therefore, etc.
One objection to this argument is directed against the
first consequence, namely that our vol i t ion would st i l l be
able to cause something contingently and therefore it is
unnecessary t h a t the first cause sho uld cause co ntin ge ntly .
Fu rtherm ore, the Phi losopher
23
concedes the antecedent
(that something is caused contingently), yet denies the
consequent (that the first cause causes contingently).
He places contingency in the lower beings and not in the
fact tha t G od wil ls things con tingen tly. Con tingenc y
arises fro m m o tio n , w h ic h , tho ug h it is caused necessarily
in so far as it is uniform, gives rise to
difformity
owing to
its parts.
The other objection is to the second consequence.
Just because something causes contingently, it does not
seem to follow that therefore this cause is endowed with
a
w i l l ,
for even what is moved natural ly can be impeded.
Hence, the opposite can happen either contingently or
vio lent ly.
To the f irst objection we must reply that i f God is the
first mover or efficient cause with regard to our w i l l ,
then the same holds of our wil l as of other things.
Whether God moves our wil l immediately with necessity
or whether He first moves something else necessarily
and this latter in turn moves our wil l with necessity,
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55 DUNS SCOTUS
non n is i ex hoc qu od m ovetur, sequitur tand em quo d
pr ox im um vo lun ta t i necessario moveat vo lu n ta te m , etiam
s i prox imum voluntat i s i t ipsamet vo luntas, e t i ta
necessario vo le t, et e ri t volens necessario. E t seq uitu r
ulterius
impossibi le,
quod necessario causat quodlibet
causatum
[ , et non est a l iquid cont ingens].
Ad secundum dico, quod non voco hie contingens
quodcumque non necessarium,
vel
no n sem pi ternum , sed
cujus oppositum posset f ieri quando i l lud f i t . Ideo
d ix i : a l iquod
contingenter
causatum, et non a l iquod
est contingens. N un c dico , qu o d Philosophus n o n potest
consequens negare salvando antecedens per motum ;
quia s i
ille
totus
motus
necessario est a causa sua, quaeli-
bet pars ejus necessario causatur quando causatur, id
est, inevi tabi l i ter, i ta quod oppositum non potest tunc
causari.
E t u l ter ius , qu od causatur per
quamcumque
pa rte m m otus, necessario causatur et in ev ita bi l i te r. V e l
ig i tu r n ih i l fit cont ingenter, id est , evi tabi l i ter, vel
primum
sic causat immediate, quod posset et iam non
causare.
A d
tertium
dico, quod si al iqua causa potest impedire
istam, hoc non est nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic
usque ad
primam causam
quae si
immediatam causam
sibi necessario movet, usque ad
ult imam
erit necessitas ;
ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens, non potest
al ia causa natural i ter causare.
Sic ergo v idetur t r ip l ic i v ia ostensum quod pr imum
agens est intelligens et volens.
Quarum
prima est quod
natura agi t propter f inem, et non nis i quia dependens
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 55
in any case the wil l would be necessari ly moved by
whatever is pro xim ate to i t . T his wo uld be true even
if this proximate cause were i tself
w i l l .
T h e
w i l l ,
there
fore,
would wil l necessari ly and would be a necessary
vo lun tary agent. A n d there is st i l l another absurdi ty
that would fol low, viz. that i t would cause necessari ly
anything that is caused, and there would be nothing
cont ingent.
As to the second objection, let me say that by c o n
t in g e n t I do no t m ean som ething tha t is no t necessary
or which was not always in existence, but something
whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this
actu ally di d . T h a t is w hy I do not say tha t something
is contin gent, b u t th a t som eth ing is caused contingently.
Now I maintain that the Philosopher cannot deny the
consequent and sti l l save the antecedent through the
expedient of motion, because if the motion as a whole
proceeds from its cause in a necessary manner, every
single part of it is caused necessarily at the time it occurs.
In other words, it is inevitable, so that the opposite effect
cou ld no t possibly be caused at ju st this m om ent.
Furthermore, whatever is caused by any part of this
m o tio n is caused necessarily an d ine vita bly . Th erefo re,
either noth ing ever happens unav oida bly or con tingen tly,
or the first cause im m ed iately causes w hat i t was also able
not to cause.
To the third objection, I say that if any cause can
imped e a na tur al cause, i t can do so only in virt ue of a
higher cause, and so we are forced back again to the first
cause.
I f this firs t cause necessarily moves the cause
immediately below it , this necessity wil l continue down
to the last cause, which will consequently be necessarily
im pe de d in its ac tion . As a result, this last cause co uld
not cause anything natural ly.
There appears to be three ways,
then,
of proving that
the f irst agent is intel l igent and endowed with w i l l . The
first of these is that nature acts on account of an end,
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56 DUNS SCOTUS
et directa a cognoscente finem ; secunda est q u o d ipsum
primum agens ag it pro pte r f inem; et ter t ia qu od
aliquis effectus contingenter f i t quando causatur.
[Conclusio Secu nda]. U l ter iu s quo ad quaestionem
praeambulam ad in f in i ta tem, probo secundo quod e jus
intellectio et vo lit io est id em q u o d ejus essentia. E t
primo
de vol i t ione sui ipsius ut objecti , i ta quod
primam
causam amare est idem essentialter cum natura causae
et
omnis
actus vo lun ta tis ejus. P ro ba tio : causalitas et
causatio causae finalis est simpliciter prima, secundum
Avicennam sexto Metaphysicae [cap. v], dicentem quod si
de qualibet causa esset scientia, ilia quae esset de causa
finali esset no bilis sim a ; ipsa enim quantum ad causal i -
tatem praecedit causam ef f ic ientem, qu ia movet eum ad
agendum,
et ideo causalitas
pr imi
finis et ejus causatio
est penitus incausabilis secundum quamcumque causa-
tionem
in qu olib et genere causae. Ca usalitas
autem
finis
primi est efficiens p r i m u m movere sicut
a m a t u m .
I d e m
autem est pr imum f inem movere primum eff ic iens ut
am atu m ab ipso et p r i m u m effic iens amare pro pte r finem,
qu ia n ih i l aliud est objectum amari a vo lun ta te quam
voluntatem amare objec tum ; ergo pr im u m effic iens
amare primum finem est penitus incausabile, et i ta per
se necesse esse, et i ta eri t idem naturae
p r i m a e .
E t quasi
co nv er t i tur ra t io ex opposito conclusionis ; qu ia si
pr imum amare est a l iud a natura prima, ergo est
causabile, et per consequens effe ctib ile. I g it u r ab
aliquo per se efficiente
amante
finem ; ig i tu r p r im u m
am are se esset causa tum ex a liq uo amore finis priore isto
causato ; quod est impossible.
Hoc ostendit Aristoteles, duodecimo Metaphysicae*
de in te l l igere qu ia a l i ter pr imum non er i t opt ima
*
xii,
cap. ix (1074&, 28-29).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 56
and it does this, only because it is dependent upon and
dire cte d by someone who knows the en d. T h e second is
th at this first agent acts for the sake o f an end. T h e t h ir d
is th a t some effects are caused co nt in ge n tly . But let us
proceed with the prel iminaries to the proof for inf in i ty.
[Second Co nclu sion ]. T he second conclusion I establish
is th is : the knowledge and volition of this First Being is the
same as its essence. T h is is true , fir s t, o f its vo li ti o n of
itself as object, so that to love the first cause is something
essentially identif ied with the nature of this cause, and
the same holds for every act of its
w i l l . Proof:
The
causality and causation of the final cause is simply first
acco rdin g to A vice nna's Metaphysics,
b k . v i ,
where he says :
I f we had scientific know ledge o f any cause,
that of
the
fin a l cause w o u ld be the most exce llent . T h e reason is
this.
T h e f ina l cause fro m the standp oint of causality
precedes the efficient cause inasmuch as it moves it to
act. The refore, the causality of the ult im ate end an d
its causation is completely incapable of being caused in
any wa y. N o w the causality of the ult im ate en d consists
in this. By be ing loved it m oves the first efficient cause.
But it is one and the same thing whether the ultimate end
moves the first efficient cause by being loved by this
cause or whether the first efficient cause loves for the sake
o f an en d. Fo r an object being loved by the w il l means
the same as a w i l l lov ing an object. Henc e, the love by
which the first efficient cause loves the ultimate end is
com pletely incap able of being caused. Th ere fore, it
exists necessarily and consequently is the same as the
first natur e. O r to use the argu m ent in reverse, i f this
first love is directed towards anything other than the first
nature itself, it can be caused and therefore produced,
and this by some per
se
efficient cause which in turn loves
some end . Con sequen tly, this first love of itse lf w o u ld be
caused by some pr io r love of an e nd, wh ich is impossible.
Aristotle in his Metaphysics, bk. x i i , * proves that the
knowledge which the First Being possesses is the same as
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57
DUNS SCOTUS
substantia, quia per intel l igere est honorabile ; secundo
qu ia alias laboriosa erit ejus co nt inu at io . I t e m si no n
sit
i l l ud ,
er i t in potent ia contrad ic t ion is ad
i l l ud .
A d
illam naturam sequitur labor, secundum ipsum.
Istae
rat iones possunt ra t ion e de cla ra ri. P rim a sic :
cu m
omnis
entis in actu
primo
perfectio ejus ult ima sit
in actu secundo quo conjungi tur opt imo, maxime si sit
act ivum et non
tantum
fac t i vum.
Omne autem
in te l l i -
g ib i le est act ivum, et pr ima natura est inte l l ig ib i l is ex
praemissa, sequitur ergo quod ult ima ejus perfectio eri t
in actu secundo. Ig i t u r si ille non sit ejus substantia,
substantia ejus non est optima, quia aliud est suum
o p t i m u m .
Secunda ra t io potest de clar ari sic : po ten tia
so lum-
modo rece ptiva est po ten tia contra dict ion is ; ergo cum
hoc non sit h u j u s m o d i ; ergo etc. Sed qu ia secundum
Ar is to te lem,
nee
ista est rat io demonstrat iva, sed tantum
probabi l is, a l i ter proposi tum ostendatur ex ident i tate
po ten tiae et ob jec ti in se ; ergo actus er it eis id e m . Sed
consequentia no n va let. Patet ins tan tia : qu ia angelus
intel l igit se et amat se, et tamen actus angel i amandi et
intel l igendi non sunt idem substantiae ejus.
Haec conclusio, videl icet, quod essentia divina sit
eadem quod vol i t io sui ipsius, foecunda [A1S ve ra ] est
ex coro l lar i is . N a m sequi tur pr im o quo d vo luntas est
idem
primae
naturae ; qu ia
velle
non est n is i vo lun
tatis ; ergo ilia voluntas cujus velle est incausabile, est
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
57
its essence, first, because it would not be the best
substance, were such not the case, since this is the most
excellent of substances precisely because of the knowledge
it possesses. A n d secondly, because otherw ise the F irs t
Being would grow weary i f i t cont inued to th ink, for i f
its thought were not its substance, the latter would be in
potency of contradict ion 24 to th in k ing , and th is w ou ld
produce weariness according to Aristotle.
These argum ents fro m au tho rity can be established by
reason. As to the first, every bein g w h ich is in first act
f inds i ts ult imate perfection in i ts second act, through
w hi ch it is un ite d to tha t w h ic h is best for it.25 This
is true especially if this being is capable of acting in the
proper sense of the term and not merely in the sense of
pr od uc ing or fashion ing some exte rna l object.26 N o w
wh ateve r is int el l ig ible is active in the prop er sense o f the
t e rm,
an d the first nature is inte l l igible fr om w ha t we said
above.
The refore, i t follows that the ult im ate perfection of
this Be ing w i l l be i n its second act. But if this act is not the
substance itself, the latter wil l not be the best inasmuch
as its ult im ate p erfec tion is som ething other th an itself.
[Aristotle's] second reason can be put in this way.
Only a receptive potency is in potency of contradict ion.
But this Be ing has no receptive potencies ; there fore, etc.
Since Aristot le, however, did not consider his proof
demonstrat ive but merely probable, some27 wou ld
prove the thesis in another way, viz. since the faculty
and the object are identical, therefore the act is identif ied
w it h them . Th is inference, however, is in va l id as is clear
from the case of an angel, which knows and loves itself
and nevertheless, its acts of loving and knowing are not
identical with i ts substance.
T h is conclusion, viz. th at the div ine essence is id en tical
w it h its vo l i t io n, is fr u it f u l because of i ts corol laries. First
o f a l l , i t follows tha t the w i l l is the same as the first n atu re ,
because w il l in g is a fun ctio n on ly of the w il l ; wherefore,
if the volit ion itself is uncausable, the same is true of the
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58
DUNS SCOTUS
etiam incausabilis ; ergo, etc. E t s im i l i ter velle in te l l i -
g i tur quasi posterius voluntate ;
tamen
velle est idem
i l l i naturae ; ergo magis vo luntas.
I t e m ,
secundo sequ itur q uo d inte l l igere se est idem
i l l i na tu rae , qu ia n ih i l
amatur
nisi co gn itu m ; sicut si
amare se ex se est necesse esse, sequitur quod intelligere
se est necesse esse ex se.
E t si est inte l ligere p ro pin qu ior i l l i n atura e quam ve l le,
ideo sequitur ulterius quod intel lectus sit idem i l l i
naturae, sicut prius de voluntate ex vel le argutum est.
Seq uitur qua rto et ia m qu od rat io in te l l ig en di se sit
idem sibi quia necesse esse est ex se, si intelligere sit ex
se necesse esse, et ratio intell igendi se quasi praeintell i-
g i tur ips i in te l lectu i .
[Conclusio T e r t i a ]. Ostenso de inte l l igere se et vel le
se quod sint idem essentiae
p r i m i ,
ostendo propositum
ex
ali is,
scil icet de om n i inte ll ige re et velle ; et sit
con
clusio te rti a ista : n u ll u m in tell ig ere potest esse accidens
primae naturae . Pro bat io, qu ia de ilia na tu ra p r ima
ostensum est esse in se primum effe ct ivu m . Erg o ex se
habet unde posset quodcumque causabile causare cir
cumscripta al io quocumque, sal tern ut pr ima causa
il l ius causabilis ; sed circu m scr ipta cog nit ione ejus, no n
habet unde possit i l lud causabile causare ; ergo co gn itio
cujuscumque al ter ius
non
est
aliud
a na tura sua. Pro
batio assumpti, quia nihi l potest causare nisi ex amore
f inis volendo
i l l ud ,
quia non potest aliter esse per se
agens, quia nee agere pro pter f inem ; nun c autem ipsi
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 58
w il l to w hi ch i t belongs ; consequently [ the w il l is id en ti
fied w it h the na tur e] . Fu rthe rm ore , since the act of the
will is conceived as though it were posterior to the
w i l l ,
i f the former is identical with that nature, then the latter
wil l be al l the more so.
Secondly, it follows that this self-knowledge is identical
with that nature, for nothing is loved unless i t is known.
He nce it follows th at jus t as this self-love exists necessarily
in virtue of itself, so also this self-knowledge.
Then too, knowledge, as it were, is more closely
con
nected w it h that nature than is vo l i t i on . Therefore, it
follows in the third place that the intellect is the same
th in g as th at na ture . W e prove this in the same wa y as
we previously established the identity of the wil l from
the act of wi l l ing.
Fourthly, i t fol lows that whatever is required for this
nature to know itself is also identical with the nature,28
for i f the knowled ge exists in vi rtu e of itself, the n the same
is true of the reason for knowing, because the latter, as
it were, must f irst be known to the intel lect.
[T h ir d Conclusion]. H av ing proved that th is self-
knowledge and self-love of the first being are the same as
its essence, I go on to show the same to be true of other
acts, namely of all its knowledge and all its acts of
vo l i t ion . L e t the th ird conclusion be th a t no knowledge can
be an accident of
the
first nature. P ro of : T h e first na tu re
has been shown to be first in the order of efficiency, and
therefore has of itself and apart from anything else, the
abil i ty to produce whatever can be produced, at least
in so far as it is the first cause of that which can be
produced.
Bu t w ith ou t a knowledge of the lat ter, the
first nature would be unable to produce what can be
produced.
Hence, the knowledge
of
any of these other
beings is not something dist inct from its own nature.
Pr oo f o f the last assum ption : N o th in g can cause an
effect except by w il l i n g i t for the sake o f an end . O the r
wise it w o u ld no t be a per se age nt, since it w o u ld n ot
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59 DUNS SCOTUS
velle alicujus propter f inem praeintelligitur intel l igere
ipsum.
An te ig i tu r
pr imum s ignum,
in quo in te l l ig i tur
causans sive volens A, necessario praeintel l igitur intel l i -
gens A, ita sine hoc non potest per se
e fficere,
et i ta de
aliis.
I t e m proba tur idem : qu ia omnes intellectiones ejus-
dem
inte l lectus habent s imi lem
habitudinem
ad
in te l -
lectum secundum identitatem essentialem vel acciden-
ta lem,
sicut patet de omni intel lectu creato et ejus
in te l -
lect ionibu s, qu ia v id en tu r perfectiones ejusdem generis.
Ergo si a l iquae habent
recep t i vum,
et omnes ; et si
aliq ua est accidens, et qu ae libe t, Sed aliq ua n o n potest
esse accidens in
p r i m o ,
ex praecedenti quaestione, quia
no n inte l lec t io sui ipsius ; ergo nu lla e ri t ib i accidens.
I t e m ,
intell igere si quod potest esse accidens recipietur
in inte l lec tu ut in subjecto ; ergo et in illo inte l l igere
quod est idem intel lectui , et i ta perfect ius inte l l igere eri t
in potent ia recept iva respectu imperfect ions [quod est
absurdum] .
I t e m ,
idem intell igere potest esse
plurium objectorum
ordinandorum ; ergo qu anto perfectius tan to pl u r iu m ;
ergo perfectissimum, quo incompossibi le est perfectius
i n te l l ig i ,
e r it idem om niu m in te l l ig ib i l ium . In te l ligere
primi sic est perfectissim um ; ergo id em est o m n iu m
in te l l ig ib i l ium, e t
i l lud
quod est sui est idem
s ib i ,
ex
prox ima praecedente ; ergo inte l l igere om ni um est
idem. E t eandem conclusionem volo inte l l ig i de vel le.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 59
be act ing for an end . B ut before an yth ing can be w i l le d
for the sake of an end , i t must be kn o w n. He nce, before
we can even conceive of the First Being as wil l ing or
causing A, we must conceive i t as kn ow ing A , for w ith o ut
such knowledge the f irst cause would not be properly a
cause. A n d the same holds true of eve rythin g else i t
could produce.
Another proof of the same is that al l the acts of know
ledge of any given intellect are related in the same way
to that intellect, so that either all are accidents or all are
o f the essence o f tha t intelle ct. Th is is clear in reg ard to
all created intellects and their respective acts of know
ledge,
all of which seem to be of the same kind of perfec
t i on .
Th ere fore , i f some o f the acts are received by the
intelle ct, a ll the acts are, a nd i f one of the m is an accident,
the rem ainder are l ikewise. Bu t fro m the preceding
conclusion, the self-knowledge of the first being cannot
be an accident ; therefore none of its know ledge w i ll be
accidental to i t .
Furthermore, i f some act of knowledge can be an
accident, it wil l be received by the intellect as by its
subject. I n such a case, how ever, the act of know ledge
which is ident ical wi th the inte l lect and is the more
perfect of the two acts of knowledge, would itself be the
recipient of the less perfect, which is absurd.29
Furthermore, the same act of knowledge can embrace
several interrelated objects, and the more perfect this
act is, the greater can be the nu m be r o f objects. Conse
qu en tly, an act that is so com pletely perfect tha t i t w ou ld
be impossible to have an yth ing m ore perfect, w il l embrace
al l that can be kno wn . N ow the understanding of the
Firs t Being is o f such perfe ction ; therefore there is bu t
one act for al l that can be kn ow n. N ow , fro m the pre
ceding conclusion, self-knowledge is identical with its
very be ing ; consequently, a ll know ledge is iden tical
w i t h its bein g. Th is same conclusion I w ish to be unde r
stood of the act of vol i t ion.
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60 DUNS SCOTUS
I t e m ,
iste
intellectus
non est nisi
quoddam
intel l igere ;
sed iste intel lectus est ide m o m n iu m et i ta q uo d no n
potest esse alicujus alterius objecti ; ergo nee intel l igere
aliud ; ergo ide m intel l igere est o m n iu m . Fa l lacia est
accident is ex ident i tate al iquorum inter se concludere
identitatem respectu te r t i i , respectu cujus extraneantur,
et patet in
simili
: inte l l igere est ide m q uo d
velle
; si
ergo intel l igere ipsum est alicujus, ergo et velle est
ejusdem ; no n sequ itur, sed tan tum m od o seq uitur qu ia
est velle, quod quidem vel le est a l iquid ejusdem, quia
intel l iger e est ejusdem ; i t a qu o d di vis im inf e rr i potest,
n o n conjunctim propter accidens.
I t e m ,
intel lectus primi habet actum unum adaequa-
tum
sibi et coaeternum, quia intel l igere se est idem
sibi.
Ergo non potest a l iquem habere a l i um . Consequentia
non va le t. Ex em plum de beato, q u i
simul
v ide t
Deum
et a l iud et iamsi videat De um secundum u l t im um
capacitatis suae, ut de anima Chr is t i pon i tu r , e t adhuc
potest v idere al iud.
I t e m a rgu i tur : inte llectus iste habet i n se per ide nt i
ta tem perfectionem m ax im am in te l l igen di ; ergo et
omnem a l i am. Respondeo : non seq uitur, qu ia al ia
quae minor est, potest esse causabilis, et ideo
differre
ab
incausabi li ; m axim a autem non potest.
[Conclus io Q u a rt a ] . Q ua rta conclus io pr inc ipa l is de
intel lec tu et vo lunta te D e i est ista : inte l lectus p ri m i
intel l igit semper et dist incto et actu et necessario quod-
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
60
It is also said that this intellect is nothing more than
a certain ki n d of kn ow ing ; bu t this intel lect is the same
for al l things so tha t it cann ot differ for differe nt objects.
Therefore, neither is the act of understanding dif ferent.
Hence, one act of understanding suffices for all objects.
However, to argue in al l cases from the identity of two
things among themselves to their identity with relat ion
to a third object dist inct from
bo th ,
as this argument
does,
is to co m m it the fallacy of acciden t. Fo r instance,
just because an act of understanding is identified w i t h
the act of wil l ing, i t does not fol low that whatever is
known by the act of knowledge is also loved by the
w i l l .
All that fol lows is that an act of vol i t ion exists and that
this act of wil l is something which is related to object
known [not indeed by a relat ion of love] but in so far as
it is also an act o f know ledge. T h e inference can be
made only in d is junct ion, not in conjunct ion, for only
an incidental relation exists between the two.
Another argument advanced is that inasmuch as the
First Being's act of self-knowledge is identical with itself,
its intellect has one coeternal and completely adequate
act, an d therefore can have no othe r. T he inference is
i nva l i d . Ta ke the examp le o f one w ho is bea tif ied. H e
has an intel lectual vision of God and of other things as
wel l .
Ev en tho ug h he sees G od to the utm os t of his
abil ity, as we assume to be the case with the soul of
C hr ist, he can s ti l l see som ething else.
S til l ano ther arg um en t em ployed is this. Since this
intel lect is identif ied with the most perfect knowledge
possible [viz. knowledge of the supreme nature itself], it
also possesses a ll other know ledge . I reply tha t this does
not follow, for this other lesser knowledge could be
caused,
and therefore i t could be dif ferent from the most
perfect self-knowledge, which is uncaused.
[F o u rt h C on clu sio n]. T h e fou rth principal conclusion
w hi ch concerns the intel lect a nd w il l o f G od is this :
the intellect of the First Being knows everything else that can be
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61 DUNS SCOTUS
cumque in te l l ig ib i le , pr ius naturaliter quam illud sit
in se.
Prima pars probatur, quia potest cognoscere quod-
cumque inte l l ig ib i l e, sic : hoc enim est perfectionis in
in te l lectu, posse distincte et actu cognoscere
quodcum -
que in te l l ig ib i le .
Imo
hoc ponere est
necessarium
ad
rationem
inte l lectus, quia
omnis
intelle ctus est totiu s entis
sumpti communiss ime, u t determinabi tur d is t inct ione
ter t ia . * Nullam autem intellectionem
potest habere
intellectus primi nisi eamdem sibi, ex proxima ; ig itu r
cujusl ibet inte l l ig ib i l is habet inte l l igere actuale et
d is t inctum, e t hoc idem
s ib i ,
et ita semper et necessario.
Secunda pars, de pr io r i ta te , pr ob atu r sic : quia
quidquid est idem
sibi ,
a se est necesse esse, sicut patuit
pr ius. Sed esse a li o ru m non a se est no n necesse esse ;
ergo necesse esse ex se est prius natura omnium non
necessario. A li te r p ro ba tu r, qu ia esse cu jus libe t alterius
dependet ab ipso ut a causa, et ut causa est alicujus
causabil is, necessario includitur cognit io ejus ex parte
causae ; ergo ilia cognit io eri t pr ior natural i ter ipso
esse cog n iti . Secunda pars
etiam
conclusionis probatur
al i ter, quia art i fex perfectus dist incte cognoscit
omne
agendum antequam fiat ; al ias non perfecte operaretur,
qu ia cognit io est mensura ju x ta qu am ope ratur ; ergo
Deus est om niu m pr od uc ib i l iu m a se habens n o t i t i a m
dist inctam et actua lem, vel sa l tern habi tua lem, priorem
eis. Cont ra
istam
instatur de arte, quia ars universal is
sufficit ad unive rsal ia ; ergo, etc. Responsionem
quaere.
* Opus oxoniense, I, dist.
in,
q . iii .
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
61
known with a knowledge that is eternal, is distinct, is actual, is
necessary and is prior by nature to the existence o f
these
things in
themselves.
Proof o f the
f i rs t
pa r t . T o be able to kn ow ac tua l ly
and d ist inct ly each and every other th ing that can be
k no w n is som ethin g tha t per ta ins to the per fec t ion of
know ledge. Ind ee d, the very no t ion o f an in te l lec t
makes it necessary to assume the possibi l i ty of such know
ledge, for every inte l lec t (as w i l l be de te rm ine d in dis
t in ct io n three) has to do w i t h a l l be in g in gene ral . Bu t
the in te l lect of the Fi rst Being can have no knowledge
that is not one wi th i tse l f ( f rom the preceding conclusion).
There fore , i t knows every th ing in te l l ig ib le actua l ly and
dist inct ly. Since th is kno wled ge is ide nt i f ie d w i t h the
First Being, i t is eternal and necessary.
T h e second pa rt abo ut the p r i or i t y of th is kno wledg e
is pr ov ed as fol low s. As we hav e m ad e clear above , wh a t
ever is id en tic al wi t h this Be ing , exists necessarily. B ut
the existence of other things which are not self-existent
is n ot necessary. Necessary be in g, ho we ve r, is p ri o r b y
nature to everything that does not necessari ly exist.—
A n ot h er pr oo f is th is. E ve ry be ing other th an the f i rst
depends u p o n the la tte r as u p o n a cause. N o w to be a
cause of something, i t must necessari ly possess a know
ledge of w h a t i t can cause. Con seq uen tly, this know ledg e
wi l l be natura l ly pr ior to the existence of the th ing known.
— S t i l l
another proof for the second part of this conclusion
is the fo l lo w in g. T h e perfect ar t isan has a d ist inct kn ow
ledge of ev er yt hi ng to be don e before he does i t . O th er
wise he would not act perfectly, for knowledge is the
n o r m w h ic h regulates h is w or k. G o d , therefore, has
some previous d ist inct knowledge, e i ther actual or at
least hab i tua l , o f every th ing tha t he can
m a k e . — A g a i n s t
this last argument, the objection is raised that the posses
sion of some univ ers al ar t suffices for the pr od uc ti o n of
b o th the unive rsal an d the s ingular . Fo r the solu t ion to
this o bj ec ti on , see w h a t I ha ve said elsewhere.30
(2,322) 10
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62 DUNS SCOTUS
[Pars Secunda. De Infinitate Primi Ends] . H is ostensis
praeambul is , arguo infinitatem
quatuor v i is :
primo
per
viam ef f ic ient iae ubi ostendetur proposi tum dupliciter:
pr imo qu ia ipsum est primum eff iciens o m n iu m ; secundo,
quia efficiens, puta distincte cognoscens omnia
fact i -
bilia
: te rt io ostendetur
infinitas
per v iam
finis
: et
quarto per v iam eminent iae.
[ V i a P r i m a ] .
Primam
viam ex parte causae tangit
Philosophus, octavo Physicorum * et duode cimo Meta-
physicae,\ quia movet motu infinito ; ergo habet po ten-
tiam
in f i n i tam.
Haec ra t io rob or atu r qu an tum ad antecedens sic :
aeque concludi tur proposi tum si possi t
movere
per
i n f i n i t u m ,
s icut s i moveret per inf in i tum, quia aeque
opor te t eum esse in actu ; sicu t i l lud posse patet de primo
q u a n tu m est ex se ; l icet ig itu r no n
moveat
m o tu in f i n i to
sicut inte l l ig i t Aristoteles, tamen si accipiatur antecedens
istud quod quantum est ex parte sua potest movere,
habetur antecedens
verum
et aeque
sufficiens
ad inferen-
dum p ropos i tum.
Con sequen tia pr ob at ur sic : qu ia si ex se no n vi rt u te
al ter ius movet motu inf in i to, ergo non ab al io accipi t
sic mo vere, sed in v ir tu te sua activa hab et totum effectum
suum s imul , qu ia indep ende nter ; sed qu od simul habet
in v i r tu te in f in i tum ef fectum est in f in i tum ; ergo, e tc .
A l i te r rob oratu r pr i m a consequent ia sic : p r i m u m
movens s im ul habet in v ir tu te sua omnes effectus
*
vin,
cap. x (266 ,
10-24).
T x , cap. vii
(1073 *,
3-13 .
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 62
[Part I I . The Infinity of the First Being]. Now that
these preliminary conclusions have been established, I
argue in four ways for the infinity | of the First Being].
The notion of efficiency really provides two of the
argu
ments, the first of which is drawn from the fact that this
Being is the first efficient cause of a ll other things ; the
second,
that as efficient cause, this Being has a distinct
knowledge o f a ll that can be made. The th ird way is
that of finality ; the fourth , that o f eminence.
[a.
First P roof]. The Philosopher treats of the first
way from efficient causality in Physics, bk. v i i i , * and his
Metaphysics, bk.
xn,f
where he argues that the First Being
has infinite power, because it moves with an endless
movement.
The antecedent can be reinforced inasmuch as the
desired conclusion follows equally well from the fact that
the First Being can cause such motion as it would if it
actua lly d id so ; for in either case, the actual existence
of such a being wou ld be necessarily required. Now it
is clear that, so far as the First Being exists in virtue of
itself, it has this ability to produce endless movement.
Therefore, even though such a being may not actually
cause an endless movement as Aristotle thought, still the
proposed conclusion can be inferred with equal validity
if the antecedent be understood of the ability of the first
cause to produce such movement.
The proo f of the consequence is this. I f the First
Being,
by itself and not in virtue of another, moves with
an infinite movement, then it has not received such
power of movement from another. Hence it has in its
power at one and the same time the totality of its effect,
because it has this power independently. But, whatever
has an infinite effect in its power at one and the same
moment is infin ite ; therefore, etc.
Another way to reinforce the first consequence is this.
A t one and the same moment, the First Mover has in its
power all the possible effects to be produced by motion.
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63 DUNS SCOTUS
possibiles produci per motum ; sed i l l i sunt i n f i n i t i , si
motus infinitus
; ergo, etc.
Contra istas declarationes Aristotelis : q u i dq u id s it
de antecedente, tamen consequent ia pr ima non v idetur
bene pro ba r i . N on primo
m o d o ,
qu ia dura t io ma jor
n ih i l perfect ionis ad dit ; na m albedo quae uno anno
manet
n on est perfectior
quam
si
tantum
uno d ie m an ere t ;
ergo motus quantaecumque durat ionis non est perfect ior
effectus quam motus unius
d ie i .
Erg o ex hoc, qu od
agens habet in virtute sua activa simul movere motu
i n f i n i t o , non conclud i tur major perfect io hie q u a m i b i ,
nisi quod agens diut ius movet et ex se ; et i ta esset
ostendendum quod aeternitas agentis concluderet ejus
infinitatem
; alias ex
infinitate
motus non posset con-
c lud i .
Tunc ad formam, u l t ima proposi t io i l l ius roborat ion is
negatur, n is i de inf i n i ta te du rat ion is. Secunda rob ora t io
etiam consequentiae improbatur qu ia non major per-
tect io intensiva concludi tur ex hoc quod agens quod-
cumque ejusdem speciei potest producere successive
quotcumque quamdiu manet , qu ia quod po tes t in
tempore uno in unum tale, potest eadem v i r tu te in mille
ta l ia , si m il le tem po ribus ma ne at. E t n o n est possibil is
apud phi losophos inf in i tas nis i numeral is ef fectuum pro-
duc i b i l i um ,
per motum sci l icet generabilium e t corrup-
t i b i l i u m ,
quia in speciebus finitatem po ne ba nt ; ergo
non magis sequitur inf initas intensiva in agente ex hoc
quod potest in inf in i ta numero successive, quam si posset
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 63
I f the motion is without end, however, these effects are
infinite ; therefore, etc.
Ag ains t these statements of A ris totle : W ha tever is to
be said of the antecedent, the first consequence still does
no t seem to be va l id ly established. C erta inly no t in the
first way fo r a pe rfectio n does no t increase sim ply because
i t endures for a greater len gth o f t im e. Whiteness w h ic h
exists for a year does not become any more perfect than
if i t existed ju st for a day. The refore, mo vem ent w h ic h
continues for howsoever long a time , is no t a more perfect
effect than the movement which lasts for a day.
Con
sequently, just because at one and the same moment an
agent virtually possesses infinite movement, we cannot
conclude to any greater perfection in this case than in
any other—except that here the agent moves by itself
an d for a longer t ime . A n d so we w ou ld have to prove
tha t the etern ity of the agent im pl ied i ts in f in ity ; other
wise,
the latter could not be inferred merely from the
endlessness of the movement.
As to the form of the argument, the last proposit ion
of the reinforced argument [viz. that whatever has an
endless effect virtually is infinite] may be denied if used
to prove anyth ing more than an in f in i ty o f durat ion.
Also the second reinforcement of the consequence breaks
down , inasm uch as we cann ot conclude to greater
intensive perfection merely from this that an agent, i f i t
remains in existence long enough, can produce succes
sively any nu m be r whatsoever of the same species. Fo r
what an agent can do in one moment to one thing, by
the very same pow er it can do to a thousa nd in a thousa nd
such mo m ents , if it exists for such a leng th o f t ime . H o w
ever, according to the philosophers, who assumed only a
finite number of species, the only infinity possible is the
numerical inf inity of effects that come into existence and
go ou t o f existence thr ou gh m ot io n . Hence , there is no
more reason for concluding that the agent is intensively
in f in i te 31 ju st because it can do an in f inite num ber of
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64 DUNS SCOTUS
in duo t a n t u m , tantum enim est possibilis infinitas
num eralis secund um philosophos. Si quis autem probet
in f in i ta tem
specierum
possibi lem, probando al iquos
motus coelestes esse incommensurabiles, et ita numquam
posse red i re ad un i formi ta tem,
etiam
s i per in f in i tum
durarent, et inf initae conjunctiones specie causarent
inf in i ta generabi l ia specie, de hoc, quidquid s i t in se,
n ih i l tamen ad in ten t ionem Ph i losoph i , qu i in f in i ta tem
specierum negaret.
Ul t ima probabi l i tas quae occurr i t pro consequent ia
Ph ilosophi declaran da est ista : q u id q ui d potest i n al iq ua
multa simul
quo rum quod l ibe t requ i r i t
aliquam
per-
fect ionem s ib i propr iam,
illud
concluditur esse perfectius
ex p lura l i ta te t a l i um , i ta v idetur de primo agente esse
concedendum , quo d si posset causare sim ul in f in i ta , qu od
esset ejus virtus infinita, et per consequens si primum
agens s imul habet v i r tu tem causandi in f in i ta , quantum
est ex se simul posset ea producere, l icet natura effectus
non pe rmi t ta t , adhuc sequitur inf in i tas v ir tut is e jus.
Haec consequent ia u l t i m a pro ba tur : qu ia potens causare
albedinem
e t n igred inem, non est minus perfectum quia
no n sunt s im ul causabi l ia. Haec en im no n simultas est
ex repugnan t ia
eorum
et non est ex defectu agentis.
E t ex isto probo in f in i ta te m sic : s i p r im u m haberet
omnem
causal i tatem
formaliter
simul, l icet non possent
causabi l ia s imul poni in esse, esset inf initum, quia simul,
quantum est ex se, posset inf inita producere, et posse
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 64
things successively (for only a numerical infinity is pos
sible according to the philosophers) than there would be
if i t cou ld do b ut tw o. Bu t suppose someone should
prove that an infinity of species is possible by proving
that some heavenly movements are incommensurable
and so the same arrangement would never recur even
tho ug h the m ovem ent should con tinue ad infinitum. T he
inf in i te variety of [p lanetary] conjunct ions, then, wou ld
cause an infinite variety in the effects that can be pro
duced. W hatev er is to be said of this view , however, it
is definitely not the posit ion of Aristot le, who denies the
infinity of the species.32
The f inal probable interpretat ion advanced to
re in
force the Philosopher's reasoning may be put in this way.
If an agent can do many things at once, where each of
the things in question needs some perfection proper to
itself, then the greater the number of such things, the
greater the perfection o f the agent. A n d so it seems tha t
we must concede that i f the power of the First Agent
could produce an infinity of effects at one and the same
t ime ,
i t must be inf in i te . Th is conclusion w ou ld fo l low
even where the nature of the effect was such as to make
its simultaneous existence in an inf inite number impos
sible,
provided that, so far as the causal power of the
agent was concerned, i t cou ld produce sim ultaneously an
in f in i te multitude.—This last inference is proved as
follow s. A n agent th at can cause b o th whiteness and
blackness is not less perfect because it cannot cause the
two simultaneously, for this inabil i ty to exist simultane
ously arises from the repugnance of the effects to each
other, and not from any defect in the agent.
F ro m this I prove in f in ity i n this wa y : I f the First
Be ing a t one a nd the same tim e formally possessed a ll
causal power, even though the things which i t could
cause could not be given simultaneous existence, it
would be in f in i te ,
because—as
far as it is
concerned— •
i t has power enough to produce an inf inite number al l
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65
DUNS SCOTUS
plura simul conc lud i t ma jorem potentiam intensive ;
ergo si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causali-
tatem
formal i ter ,
magis
sequitur
infinitas
inten siva . Sed
habet om nem causal i tatem cu jusl ibet re i secundum totum
quod est in re ipsa eminentius quam si esset formaliter.
L icet ergo omnipotent iam propr ie
dictam
secundum
intent ionem theologorum tantum creditam esse et non
natura l i ra t ione
credam
posse probari, sicut dicetur
dist inct ione x l i i et
Quodl.
q .
v n , *
tamen p roba tu r na tu ra l i -
ter inf in i ta p ote nt ia , quae sim ul, qu an tu m est ex se, habet
omnem causali tatem, quae simul posset in inf inita, si
essent simul fact ibi l ia.
Si obj icis,
primum
non potest ex se simul in inf inita,
quia non est probatum quod si t tota l is causa inf in i torum,
hoc nihi l obstat, quia si haberet simul unde esset total is
causa,
nihi l perfectius esset quam nunc sit , quando habet
unde sit p r im a causa : tu rn qu ia illae secundae causae
non requi runtur propter perfect ionem in causando, qu ia
tunc remotius a prima esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem
requireret causam, sed si requiruntur causae secundae
cum prima, secundum phi losophos, hoc est propter im -
perfectionem ef fectus, ut pr imum cum al ia causa imper
fecta posset causare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos,
no n posset im m ed iate causare : tu rn qu ia perfectiones
totae secundum Aristotelem eminent ius sunt in primo
quam si ipsae
formalitates earum
sibi inessent, si possent
inesse. Q u o d pr ob at ur , qu ia causa secunda proxima
Opus oxoniense,
1,
dist.
x l i i ,
q.
unica;
Quodlibet, q. v ii.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 65
at once, and the more one can produce simultaneously,
the greater the pow er in inten sity. B ut i f the First
Being possessed such power in an even more perfect
way than i f i t had i t formal ly [as Avicenna, for instance,
assumes],
i ts intensive inf inity fol lows a fort ior i . Bu t the
ful l causal power that each thing may have in i tself , the
First Being possesses even more perfectly than if it were
formal ly present.
Therefore, although I bel ieve that the omnipotence
in the proper sense of the word as the theologians under
stand it ,33 cannot be proven by natural reason, but is
on ly b el ieved (as w il l be show n in dist. x m and Quodlibet
q . vii),* nevertheless we can establish naturally the exis
tence of an infinite power which on its part possesses
simultaneously the fulness of causality and could produce
an inf inite number of things at once, i f only they were
capable of existing simultaneously.
It is objected that the First Cause on its part cannot
cause an infinite number of effects at one time, so long
as i t is no t prov ed t ha t i t is the to ta l cause o f these effects.
This objection, however, presents no obstacle, since the
requirements to be a total cause would not make it any
more perfect than it would have to be i f i t were the First
Cause. T h is is clear, first of a ll , because secondary
causes are not required simply to supply some addit ional
perfection to the causality, for if that were the case, the
more remote effect would be the more perfect inasmuch
as it w o u ld req uire a m ore perfect cause. B ut if secondary
causes are needed in addition to the First Cause, the
reason, according to the philosophers,34 lies in the fact
th a t the effect is im pe rfect. T h a t is to say, the F irst
Cause, which immediately would be unable to cause
an yth ing imp erfect , could do so in co njunc t ion w it h
ano ther im perfect cause. A lso , the First Be ing, acco rd
ing to Aristot le, contains al l the perfections in a more
perfect manner than if they were formally present, were
this latte r possible. T h e pr oo f of this lies in the fact tha t
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66
DUNS SCOTUS
primae totam
perfect ionem
suam causativam
habet a
sola prima ; ergo totam perfect ionem i l lam eminent ius
habet causa prima quam secunda causa habens ipsam
formaliter. Consequent ia pa tet , qu ia p rim a respectu
illius causae secundae est causa totalis et aequivoca.
Consimiliter
quaeratur de tertia causa respectu secundae
vel
respectu prim ae . Si respectu prim ae , hab etur p ro-
pos i tum. Si respectu secundae, se qu itur secundam
eminenter cont inere perfect ionem totalem quae est
form al i ter in ter t ia. Sed secunda habet a p ri m a qu od
sic co ntin et pe rfec tione m te rti ae , ex praeostensa ; ergo
prima eminent ius habet cont inere perfect ionem tert iae
q ua m secunda ; et sic de om nibu s aliis usque ad u l t i -
mam
; quare [c on clud i tur ]
primam causam
habere
eminenter to ta lem perfect ionem causat ivam omnium
et perfectius quam si haberet causalitatem o m n i u m
form al i ter, si esset possibile. V id e tu r ju d ic io
meo
posse
concludere rat io Aristotel is de substantia
i n f i n i t a ,
quae
accipitur ex octavo Physicorum * et duo decim o Meta-
physicae f superius posi ta .
Ju x ta istam viam efKcientiae argu i tur quod habeat
po ten t iam
i n f i n it am ,
na m virtu s quae potest super
extrema
distant ia in
i n f i n i t u m ,
est in f in ita . Sed virt us div ina est
hu jusm odi in creatione. In te r
enim
extrema creationis
est inf in i ta d istant ia, s icut inter a l iquid et
n ih i l .
Sed
hoc antecedens ponitur tantum c red i tum, e t verum est
de creatione in ordine
rea l i ,
ita scilicet quod non-esse
quasi du rativ e praecederet esse reale existentiae cre aturae .
N o n tamen est minor credi ta de creat ione qua ordine
naturae esse sequitur non-esse, quo
modo
loqu i tu r
Avice nn a de creatione q u in to [read sexto] Metaphysicae % ;
sed est suff icienter de m on stra ta qu ia saltern p r im a na tura
* vni, cap. x
(266a, 10-24).
t
xii)
cap. vii (1073s, 3-13 .
X Metaphysial,
vi,
cap. ii.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 66
the secondary cause closest to the first receives all of its
causal perfec tion exclusively fr o m the f irst. Con sequen tly,
the First Cause has the who le o f this perfection in a mo re
eminent way than the second cause, which possesses it
fo rm a lly . T h e consequence is ev ide nt, since the first
is the tot a l eq uivo cal cause of the second. W e can argue
the same way regarding the relat ion of the third cause
to the second or first cause. I f we take it i n rela tio n to the
first, we have the proposed conc lusion. I f we take it i n
relation to the second, then it follows that the second
cause contains the total perfection found formally in the
t h i rd .
B u t as we have sho wn, the second cause owes this
a ll to the Firs t Cause ; therefore , the Fir st Cause mu st
contain the perfect ion of the th ird in an even more
perfect w ay t ha n does the second. A n d the same is true
w it h al l the other causes do w n to the very last. Th ere
fore, we conclude tha t the First Cause contains em inently
the total causal perfection of all the other causes, and
this in a way tha t is even m ore perfect th an i f i t contained
this causali ty for m ally , were tha t possible. T o m y m in d ,
it seems th at A ristotle's arg um en t for an in fin ite substance
i n Physics, bk . v i i i , * and Metaphysics, bk .
x i i , |
can be m ade
to hold.
Using this way of efficiency, some 3B argue tha t the
First Cause has infinite power, because any power which
can bridge the distance between infinite extremes is
itself
in f in i te .
T he div ine power in creat ion, however,
is of such a nature, for between the extremes of creation
(i.e.
between nothing and something) an inf inite distance
intervenes. I f existence be unde rstood as true o f the real
order where non-existence precedes existence by a
pr io r i ty o f
du ra t i on ,
the n the antecedent is an assum ption
based on fa ith alone ; whereas if we take c rea tion as
Av icenna
does
in Metaphysics, bk.
v i , % in
the
sense
that
non
existence precedes existence merely by a priority of
nature, then the antecedent is no longer an assumption of
faith.36 Fo r it is sufficiently dem onstrated tha t the first
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67 DUNS
SCOTUS
post Deum est ab ipso et non a se, nee accip it esse aliq uo
praesupposito. Ergo
i l lud
crea tur. N a m si est
primum
e f fec t i vum,
quod l ibe t aliud ab eo totum esse suum capit
ab eo, quia al i ter secundum al iquid ejus non dependet
ab eo, nee i l lu d esset tunc p ri m u m effect ivum . Sed qu od
sic cap it tot u m esse suum ab al iq uo , i ta qu od per na tu ra m
suam ha be t esse post non-esse, crea tur ; erg o, etc. Sed
sic accipiendo prius natura
tam
esse
quam
non-esse,
non sunt ext rema mulat ion is [MS univocat ion is ] quam
causet ista virtus,
nee
i l l u d
effici
re q u i r it
m u t a r i .
Sed quidquid s i t de antecedente, consequent ia non
probatur ; quia quando inter extrema nul la est d istant ia
media ,
sicut est in continuo cujus extrema sunt duo
pu nc ta, ista dic un tur praecise distare rat ione extremorum
inte r se ; ta nt a ergo est dis tan tia q u a n tu m est
majus
ext remu m . Ex em plum : Deus d ista t in in f in i tu m a
creatura etiam suprema possibi l i , non quidem propter
aliquam
d is tant iam
mediam
inter extrema, sed propter
inf in i t at em unius extre m i ; s ic ergo co ntrad ictoria no n
dis tant per a l iqua media, qu ia contrad ic tor ia sunt
immed ia ta , i t a quod quan tumcumque
parum recedit
al iqu id ab uno ext remo, statim est sub a lte ro ; sed
dis tant [M S d i f fer un t ] propte r ext rema in se. T an ta
ergo est d is tant ia is ta quantum est i l lud ext remum quod
est pe rfectius : i l l u d est finitum ; ergo , etc. Gon-
firmatur,
qu ia posse to ta l i ter super terminum posi t ivum
hujus distantiae est posse super distantiam sive super
tra ns itu m ab extrem o in ex tre m um ; ergo ex posse super
istum
t ransi tum non sequitur inf in i tas, n is i sequatur ex
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
67
nature after God does not exist of itself but is dependent
upo n H i m ; nei ther is an yth ing [v iz. m atte r] presupposed
in ord er to give it existence. Co nsequ ently, it is created.
For i f a first efficien t cause exists, ev eryth ing else receives
its to ta l bein g fr o m it. Oth erw ise, these other beings
would not be dependent upon it , nor could i t real ly be
the first efficien t cause. B u t anyt h in g th a t receives its
total being from another so that by i ts nature i t has
existence after non-existence, is created ; there fore, etc.
I f we understand nature as being prior to both existence
and non-existence in this [viz. ontological] sense, then
existence and non-existence are not termini of a change ;
ne ither does t o be pro du ce d i n this w a y necessarily
im ply to be chan ged .
Whatever is to be said of the antecedent of this
argu
m en t, the consequence remains un pro ved . W he n there
is no interval between the extremes as is the case in a
continuum, whose extremes are two points, i t is how one
extreme compares with the other that determines how
d is ta n t i t is said to be. Consequ ently, i t w i l l be as
distant from, as it is greater
than ,
the other. G od , for
example, is inf initely distant from even the greatest
creature possible, not indeed because of any interval
between the two, but because of the inf inity of the one
extreme. A n d so I argue tha t contrad ictories are distant
from one another in virtue of the extremes themselves,
and not by reason of some interval between them, for
contradictories are imm ediate. N o m atter how l i t t le
something departs f rom one extreme, i t immediately
comes un de r the othe r. I n the present instance, then,
there w i l l be as m uc h dis tan ce as there is [en t i ty] in
the m ore perfect extrem e. But the latt er is f inite ;
therefo re, etc. Th is is co n firm ed, inasm uch as to possess
com plete powe r over the posit ive te rm of this dis tan ce
is to have power over the distance or the passage from
one extreme to the other. In f i n ity , therefore, cann ot be
inferred from the power of the agent to effect this transi-
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68
DUNS SCOTUS
posse to ta lit e r super
terminum
ejus
pos i ti vum .
Terminus
ille est finitus ; ergo posse super transitum ad istum ter
m inum non conc lud i t v i r tu tem
activam infinitam
demonstrat ive.
Q u o d autem d ic i tu r communiter, contrad ic tor ia d is-
tare in in f in i tu m , potest sic in te l l ig i , id est, indete rm inate ;
quia s icut nul la est i ta parva distant ia quae non
sufficiat
ad contradictoria, s ic nul la est i ta magna, etiam si
esset major maxima possibi l i , quin ad ilia contrad ic tor ia
se extende re. Est ig it u r
eorum
distant ia inf in i ta, id est ,
indeterminata ad quamcumque sc i l icet magnam vel par-
v a m .
E t ideo ex ta l i inf in i tate distant iae, id est, indeter
m ina ta , no n sequitur consequens de in f in i ta po tent ia
intensive, sicut nee sequitur ad minimam d i s tan t i am, in
qua salvatur s ic inf in i ta d istant ia, id est , indeterminata
;
et quod non sequitur ad antecedens, nee ad consequens.
Contradictoria ergo maxima distant ia est et opposi t io,
sed pr iva tive et ind ete rm ina te ; con trarietas vero est
maxima posi t ive, s icut patet decimo Metaphysicae*
[V ia Secun da]. Ostenso propo si to per
viam primae
eff icientiae, quia ilia p r i m a efficientia in fe r t in f in i ta tem,
sequitur secunda via ex hoc quod est intel l igens dist incte
om nia fact ib i l ia , ub i arguo sic : In te l l ig ib i l ia sunt
in f in i ta , e t hoc actu in in te l lectu omnia in te l l igente.
Ergo intel lectus ista
simul
actu intel l igens est inf initus.
Talis est intel lectus
p r i m i .
Hujus enthymematis probo antecedens et conse-
quen t i am .
Quaecunque sunt in f in i ta in po ten t ia , i ta
quod in acc ip iendo a l teram post a l terum nul lum possunt
habere finem,
ilia
omnia, s i s imul actu sunt, sunt actu
in f in i ta . In te l l ig ib i l ia sunt hu jus m odi respectu
in te l -
* x, cap. iv
(1055°,
9).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 68
t i on ,
unless it is already implied by its power to produce
the po sitive extre m e. B ut the latt er , in the present case,
is f inite ; consequently, it is not demonstratively estab
l ished that inf inite power is required to effect such a
t ransi t ion.
Sti l l ,
the com m on saying that con tradictories are
inf in ite ly d ista nt can be understood in the sense of
ind ete rm ina te ly . For just as no d is ta nce is too smal l
to prod uce a co ntr ad ict io n, so l ikewise, none is too great,
even i f it were greater th a n the greatest possible. The re
fore this d is ta n ce is in fin ite in the sense th at it is no t
determined to any definite interval, howsoever great or
smal l . Such an in f in i ty or indeterminateness, then, does
not imply the consequent about a power that is inten
sively inf in ite , jus t as the m in im u m distance characterised
by such an in f in ity does not im p ly i t . For wha t does no t
fol low from the antecedent, does not fol low from the
con
sequent. Con tra dic tor ies , therefore , are at the greatest
di st an ce an d in the greatest opp osit ion to each other,
bu t pr iva t ive ly and indeterm inate ly . Posi tive ly, how
ever, the greatest d is ta n ce is betwe en con traries, as is
clear from Metaphysics, bk. x.*
[b. Second P ro of ]. H a vi n g established the proposed
conclusion by the first way of efficiency inasmuch as the
first
efficient cause implies infinity, we proceed to the
second, where, from the fact that the First Being knows
dist inct ly everything that can be made, we argue as
follows : T h e things tha t can be kn ow n are inf in ite in
num ber. Bu t they are al l actua l ly kn ow n by an intellect
w hi ch knows a l l things . The refore, tha t intel lect is
infinite
w h ic h , at one an d the same mo m en t, has actua l
know ledge of a l l these things . N o w such is the intel lect
of the First Being.
I pro ve the antecedent an d consequence of this en thy-
meme.
Th ing s po ten tial ly inf in ite or endless in nu m be r,
i f taken one at a t im e, are ac tually
infinite
i f they actually
exist simultaneously. N o w wh at can be kn ow n is of such
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69 DUNS
SCOTUS
lectus creati. Satis pa tet. Et in inte llectu div ino sunt
simul omnia actu intellecta quae ab intellectu creato
successive sunt inte llec ta. Ergo ib i sunt
infinita
actu
intellec ta. Hu jus syllogismi probo majorem, licet satis
evidens videatur, quia omnia
talia
acceptibilia quando
sunt simul existentia, aut sunt actu finita aut sunt actu
in fin ita . Si actu finita, ergo accipiendo alteram post
alterum, tandem omnia possunt esse actu accepta.
Ergo si non possunt esse omnia actu accepta, si talia actu
simul sunt, sunt actu infinita.
Gonsequentiam primi
enthymematis sic probo : quia
ubi pluralitas requirit
vel
concludit majorem perfec-
tionem quam
paucitas, ibi infinitas numeralis concludit
infinitam perfectionem. Exemplum : posse ferre decern
majorem perfectionem requirit virtutis motivae quam
posse ferre quinque : ideo posse ferre in fin ita concludit
infinitam virtutem m otivam. Ergo in proposito, cum
intelligere A sit aliqua perfectio, et intelligere B sit
similiter alia perfectio, numquam intelligere idem est
ipsius A et B et aeque distincte, ut duo intelligere essent,
nisi perfectiones [MS perfectiores] duorum intelligere
includuntur in
illo
uno eminenter, et sic de tribus, et
ultra de infinitis.
Consimiliter
etiam
quia de ipsa ratione intelligendi
argueretur sicut de inte llec tu et actu argutum est : quia
major perfectio concluditur in actu intelligendi ex
pluralitate illorum quorum ratio intelligendi distincte,
quia oportet quod includant eminenter perfectiones
omnium
propriarum operationum
intell igendi,
quarum
quaelibet secundum propriam rationem aliquam per
fectionem ponit ; ergo infinitae concludunt inf in itam .
Secundo, juxta istam viam de intelligere primi pro-
positum sic ostendo ; causa p rim a, cui secundum
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
69
a nature so far as a created intellect is concerned, as is
suff iciently clear. N o w al l tha t the created intel lect
knows successively, the divine intellect knows actually
at one an d the same t im e. The refore, the div ine inte l lect
knows the actu ally inf ini te . I prove the m ajo r of this
syl logism,
alth ou gh it seems eviden t eno ugh . Consider
these po ten tial ly in f in ite things as a w hole . I f they exist
al l at once, they are either actually inf inite or actually
f in i te.
I f f inite, the n i f we take one after the other ,
eventual ly we shal l actua l ly kn ow the m a l l . Bu t i f we
cannot actual ly know them al l in th is way, they wi l l be
actual ly inf in i te i f known simultaneously.
The consequence of this first enthymeme, I prove as
fol low s. W hene ver a greater num ber implies or requires
greater perfection tha n does a smaller num ber , nu m eric al
in f in i ty im pl ies inf in i te perfection. For exam ple, greater
m ot ive pow er is requ ired to carry ten th ings th an to carry
f ive. Th erefore , an inf init e m otiv e powe r is needed to
carry an inf in i ty o f such th ings. N o w in the po int at
issue,
since to know A is one perfection and to know B
also is another perfection, it follows that A and B as two
equally dist inct objects wil l never be known by one and
the same act of knowledge unless the latter includes in a
m ore eminen t wa y these tw o perfections. T he same holds
for three objects, an d so ad infinitum.
A similar argument to that based on the intel lect and
the act of knowing could be constructed in regard to the
reason for knowing (ratio
intelligendi) .37
For the greater
the number of th ings known dist inct ly through th is
medium of knowledge, the more perfect is the act of
knowing since the act by which al l things are known
must include in a more eminent way the perfections of
each proper act of knowledge, where each of these in
cludes some perfe ction pro pe r to itself. W here the latter
are inf inite, therefore, inf inite perfection is required.
A second proof from the knowledge of the First Being
in su pp ort o f ou r thesis is this . Suppose a secondary
2 , 3 2 2 11
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70 DUNS SCOTUS
ult imum suae causali tat is causa secunda aliquid per-
fect ionis addit in causando,
non
videtur sola posse ita
perfectum
effectum
causare, sicut ipsa cum secunda, qu ia
causalitas sola primae diminuta est respectu causali tat is
am ba rum ; ergo s i
i l lud
q u o d
natum
est esse a causa
secunda et prima simul sit multo perfectius a sola prima,
secunda ni h i l perfectionis a dd it pr im ae ; sed omne
finitum
omni
finito addit
aliquam perfectionem
; ergo
talis causa prima est
i n f m i t a .
A d p ropos i tum, no t i t i a
cujuscum que n ata est gi gn i ab ipso sicut a causa pr ox im a,
et
maxime ilia
quae est visio sive intuit iva intel lect io
;
ergo si ilia al icui intel lectui inest sine actione quacumque
tal is objecti ,
tantummodo
ex vir tute al ter ius object i
pr ior is ,
quod natum est esse causa superior respectu talis
cognit ionis, sequitur quod i l lud objectum superius est
in f in i tum in cognoscib i l i ta te , qu ia
inferius
n ih i l s ib i addi t
in cog nosc ibi li tate : tale objec tum superius est na tur a
p r i m a , quia ex sola praesentia ejus apud intel lectum
p r i m i , nullo
al io objecto concomitante, est not i t ia
cujuscumque o bjec t i in in te l le ctu ejus ; ergo n u l lu m
aliud
inte l l ig ib i le a l iquid s ib i addit in cognoscibi l i tate ;
ergo est inf initum in cognoscibi l i tate sic, ergo est in
en titate , qu ia un um qu od qu e sicut se ha bet ad esse, sic
ad cognoscibil itatem, ex secundo Metaphysicae*
[V ia Te rt i a ] . I te m , ter t ia v ia , sc ilicet ex parte finis
arg ui tu r sic : voluntas nostra om ni fin ito a l iq uid al iu d
majus potest appetere et
amare,
s icut inte l lectus inte l l i -
gere ; et vid et ur qu od plus est in cl i na tio na tura l is ad
summe amandum bonum in f in i tum ; nam inde argu i tu r
incl inat io natural is ad al iquid in voluntate, quia ex se,
i i,
cap. i (9936, 30-31)
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
]0
cause can add some perfection to the causality of the
First Cause, even when the latter acts to the utmost of its
powe r. I n such a case, if the First Cause were to act
alone,
its effectiveness would seem to be less perfect
th an tha t of the tw o causes together. Th ere fore , if
something which a secondary cause can produce together
with the First Cause, can be done much more perfectly
by the First Cause alone, the secondary cause adds no
perfe ction to the first. But a finite th in g always adds
some pe rfec tion to w hat is finite. He nce, a first cause
whose causality can not be perfected is in fin ite . T o a pp ly
this to the que stion at issue. K no w led ge o f any object
is by its very nature apt to be engendered by that object
as its proximate cause, and this is especially true of in
tuit ive knowledg e or visio n. Th erefore , i f some intel lec t
possesses such knowledge without any action on the part
of the object known, but solely in virtue of some prior
object which by nature is a higher cause of such know
ledge,
i t fol lows that the higher object is inf initely intel l i
gib le, because the lower object adds nothing to it in the
w ay of cog no scibi l i ty. N ow , the supreme natu re is such
a superior object, since in the absence of all other objects
by the mere fact that it is present to the intellect of the
First Being, it gives to that intellect a knowledge of every
object w ith o u t exce ption. Th erefore , no th ing else tha t
can be known adds anything to this nature in the way of
cog nosc ibi l ity. Consequently, i t is inf in itely inte l l igible ;
therefore, its entity is also infinite, for a thing can only
be known to the extent that i t has entity, according to
Metaphysics, b k.
i i . *
[c. T h i r d P ro of] . T he fact that the First Being is also
the ul t imate end provides a th ird way of arguing to
in f in ity . O u r w il l can always love an d seek som ething
greater than any finite being, even as our intellect is
always able to kn ow m ore. A n d , wh at is m ore, there
seems to be a natural incl ination to love an inf inite good
to the greatest degree possible, because the free will of
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71
DUNS SCOTUS
sine habi tu , prompte et
delectabiliter vult illud
voluntas
l ibera : i ta v idetur quod exper imur actu amandi bonum
in f in i tum : imo non videtur voluntas in a l io perfecte quie-
t a r i .
E t quomodo n on i l l u d na tu ra l i te r od iret , s i esset
objectum sui objecti , sicut natural i ter odit non esse,
secundum
A u g u s t i n u m ,
De libero arbitrio, l ibri [ te r t i i ]
cap i tu lo [oc tavo ] * V ide tur
etiam
s i in f in i tum repug-
naret bono, quod nullo modo quietaretur in bono sub
rat ione
i n f i n i t i , nee
in i l lud fac i l i ter tenderet , s icut
nee
in repugnans suo ob jecto. C on f i rm ab i tur ilia ra t io in
sequent i v ia de intel lectu.
[V ia Q u a r t a ] . I t e m q u a r to propositum ostenditur
per
v iam eminentiae
et arguo sic :
eminentissimo i ncom-
possibile est aliquid esse perfectius, sicut prius patet.
F in i to autem non est incompossibile esse aliquid per
fectius ; q uare, e tc . M in o r pro batu r qu ia in f in i tu m non
repugn at en t i ; sed om ni f in i to magis est in f in i tum.
A d istud al i ter a rg ui tu r, et est idem : cu i no n repugn at
inf initum esse intensive, i l lud non est
summe
perfectum
nisi s i t inf in i tum, quia s i est f in i tum potest excedi vel
excel l i ,
qu ia in f i n i tu m esse sib i no n repugnat : en t i non
repugnat
infinitas
; ergo
perfectissimum
ens est infini
t u m . M in o r hu jus quae in praecedent i argum ento
ac cipi tu r, no n vid etu r a p rio r i ostendi ; qu ia s icut
contrad ic tor ia ex ra t ion ibus propr i is contrad icunt , nee
potest per a l iquid manifest ius hoc probari , i ta non
repugnant ia ex ra t ion ibus propr i is non repugnant ,
nee
videtur posse ostendi, nisi explicando rat iones ipsorum :
in ,
cap. v i, viii
(Migne,
P.L.,
xxxn,
1280, 1282).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 71
i tse l f and wi thout the a id o f any habi t prompt ly and
delightful ly loves this good, so that we seem to experi
ence an act of love for an
infinite
go od . Ind ee d it seems
that the wil l is not perfectly satisf ied with anything else.
And if such an inf inite good were really opposed to the
natural object of the w i l l , why is i t that the wil l does
not na tur al ly hate an inf in i te go od , jus t as i t na tur al ly
hates non-existence, according to Augustine in De libero
arbitrio, ru, vii i
?
* Fo r i t seems that i f in f i n i t e and
g o o d
were incompat ib le, then there would be no way
in which the wi l l could be sat isf ied in such a good, nor
cou ld i t re ad ily te nd tow ards such a go od ju s t as i t
cannot readi ly tend towards anything which is opposed
to i ts proper object . Th is argum ent w i l l be conf i rme d i n
the fo l lowing by a s imi lar argument f rom the intel lect .
\d.
F o u rt h P ro o f] . T h e thesis is shown also by the
wa y of eminence, an d here I argue tha t i t is inco m pa tible
w it h the idea of a most perfect being tha t an yth ing should
excel it in perfection, as has been previously explained.
Now there is nothing incompat ib le about a f in i te th ing
being excelled in perfection ; therefore, etc. T he m in o r
is prove d fro m this, tha t to be inf in i te is not inc om pat ib le
w it h be ing ; bu t the in f in ite is greater tha n any f inite
being.
Another formulat ion given to the same argument is
this. T h a t to w hic h intensive in f in i ty is no t repugn ant
is not all perfect unless it be infinite, for to be infinite is
com pa tible w it h i t . A n d if i t is f inite , i t can be exceeded
or excelled. N o w in f in ity is no t repu gna nt to being ,
therefore the most perfect being is inf init e. T h e m ino r
of this proof, which was used in the preceding argument,
ca nn ot, i t seems, be prov en a prio ri. Fo r, ju st as co ntra
dictories by their very nature contradict each other and
their opposi t ion cannot be made manifest by anything
m ore eviden t, so also these terms [viz. b e in g an d
in f i n i t e ] by their very nature are not repugnant to
each othe r. Neith er does there seem to be any wa y o f
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72 DUNS SGOTUS
ens per nul l ius notius explicatur ; i n f i n i tum intelligimus
per f in i tu m , hoc vu lgar i te r s ic expono : in f in i tu m est
q u o d
aliquod
f initum d a tu m secundum
nullam hab i -
tudinem finitam praecise ex ce dit, sed u lt ra omnem talem
habitudinem
assignabilem adhuc excedit.
Sic tamen propositum suadetur : s icut qu idl ib et pone n-
dum est possibi le, cujus non apparet impossibi l i tas, i ta
et compossibi le cujus non apparet incompossibi l i tas.
Hie
incompossibi l i tas nul la apparet quia de rat ione ent is non
est finitas,
nee
apparet ex ratione entis quod sit passio
convert ib i lis cum ente ; a l te rum is to rum req ui r i tur ad
repugnant iam praedictam : passiones enim primae entis
et convertibiles satis videntur notae sibi inesse.
I t e m sic suadetur : in f in i tu m suo modo non repugnat
quan t i t a t i ,
id est, in accipiendo pa rte m post par tem ;
ergo nee in f in i tum suo modo repugnat ent i ta t i , id est in
perfectione simul essendo.
I t e m ,
si quantitas virtut is est simpliciter perfectior
quam quant i tas mol is , quare eri t inf in i tum possibi le in
m ole et no n in v ir tu te ? Q u o d si est possibi lis, est in
actu ,
s icut ex tert ia conclusione patet supra de primitate
effectiva et
etiam
in fer ius probabi tur .
I t e m ,
quare [MS quia] inte l lectus, cujus objectum est
ens,
nu l lam inven i t repugna nt iam in te l ligendo a l iquod
in f in i tum ; imo v i d e tu r perfect iss imum in te l l ig ib i le ?
Mirum
est
au tem,
si
null i
inte l lectui ta l is contradict io
patens fiat circa
pr imum
e jus ob jectum, cum
discordia
in sono fac i l i ter offendat a u d itu m ; s i en im disconveniens
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 72
proving th is except by explain ing the meaning of the
notions themselves. B e in g cannot be explained by
any th ing better kn ow n than itself. In f i n i t e we under
stand by means of fin ite. I exp lain in f i n i t e in a pop ular
de finit io n as follows : T h e inf init e is that w hi ch exceeds
the finite, not exactly by reason of any finite measure, but
in excess of any measure that could be assigned.
The fol lowing persuasive argument can be given for
w ha t we inten d to pro ve. Just as eve rything is assumed
to be possible, if its impossibil ity is not apparent, so also
all things are assumed to be compatible, i f their incom
pa t ib i l i ty is not manifest. N ow there is no inco m pa t i
bi l i ty apparent here, for i t is not of the nature of being
to be fin ite ; no r does finite appear to be an a ttri b ute
coextensive w it h being . Bu t i f they were m u tu a lly
rep ug na nt, it wo u ld be for one of these reasons. T h e
coextensive attributes which being possesses, seem to be
sufficiently evident.
A no the r persuasive argu m ent adduced is this. In f i n it y ,
in i ts ow n way , is no t opposed to q ua n tity (tha t is, where
pa rts are tak en successively) ; the refo re, ne ithe r is
inf in i ty, in i ts own way, opposed to ent i ty ( that is,
where perfection exists simultaneously).
Aga i n ,
i f the quantity characterist ic of power is simply
more perfect than that characteristic of mass, why is it
possible to have an infinity [of small parts] in an [ex
tended] mass and not an inf inite power ? A n d i f an
infinite power is possible, then it actually exists, as is
evident from the third conclusion about the first efficient
cause,
and will also be proved again later.38
Aga i n ,
w h y is it th a t the intellec t, whose object is be ing ,
does no t f ind the notio n of som ething inf in ite repug nant?
Instead of this, the infinite seems to be the most perfect
th in g we can kno w . N ow , i f tonal d iscord so read i ly
displeases the ear, it would be strange if some intellect
did not c learly perceive the contradict ion between
infinite and its f irst object [viz. being] if such existed.
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73 DUNS SGOTUS
statim
u t perc ip i tu r
o f fend i t ,
cur
nullus intellectus
ab
in te l l ig ib i l i infinito natural i ter refugi t s icut a non con-
veniente,
suum
i ta
primum
ob jec tum
destruentem
?
Per i l lud potest colorari ilia ra t io Anselmi de summo
bono cogitabil i, Proslogion,* et intell igenda est ejus
des cript io sic. Deus est qu o co gn ito sine con trad ict ion e
majus cog itar i non potest s ine co ntra dict io ne . E t quo d
add end um si t co ntra dict io ne , pate t : na m in cujus
cognit ione vel cog i ta t ione inc lu d i tu r co n t rad ic t io , i l lud
dic i tur non cogitabi le, quia sunt tunc duo cogitabi l ia
opposita
nullo modo
faciendo
unum
cogitabi le, quia
neutrum determinat a l te ram, u t quod homo s i t i r ra -
t ionalis est inc og itab i le. U nd e sicut in rebus n ih i l est
nis i s i t s implex vel compositum ex potent ia et
ac tu ,
i ta
in conceptibus. C on trad ic tor ia autem n ih i l f ac iun t u nu m
nee
s implex,
nee
compos i tum.
Summum cogi tab i le praedic tum, s ine contrad ic t ione
potest esse in re . H oc pro b a tu r primo de esse quiddita-
t ibo : quia in ta l i cogi tabi l i summo quiesci t inte l lectus ;
ergo in ipso est ratio primi objecti intel lectus sci l icet
entis,
et hoc in summo.
Et tunc argu i tur u l t ra , quod i l lud s i t loquendo de
esse existentiae.
Summe
cogitabi le non est
tantum
in
inte l lec tu co gitan te, qu ia tunc posset esse, q ui a cog itabi le
possibile, et non posset esse, quia repugnat rationi ejus
esse ab aliqua causa, sicut patet prius in secunda con-
clusione de vi a efficien tiae. M aju s ergo co gita bile est
Cap.
iii (Migne, P.L.,
c lv i i i ,
228).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 73
For if the disagreeable becomes offensive as soon as it
is perceived, why is i t that no intel lect natural ly shrinks
fro m the inf in i te ly in te l l ig ib le as i t wo uld f rom some thing
out o f harmony
w i t h ,
and even destructive of, its f irst
object ?
I n this same wa y Anselm's argument in the Proslogion *
about the highest conceivable good can be touched up.
H is des cript ion m ust be und erstood in this wa y. G od is
a being conceived w ith ou t c on trad ict ion , wh o is so great
that i t would be a contradict ion i f a greater being could
be conceived. T ha t the phrase w i th o u t co ntra d ic t ion
m ust be added is clear, for an yth ing , the very kn owledge
or thought of which includes a contradict ion, is cal led
inconceivable , for i t includes two conceivable notions
so opposed to each other that they cannot in any way
be fused into a single conceivable object, since neither
determines the other. Thu s m a n is i r ra t i o n a l cannot
be conceived. He nce, jus t as in the w o rl d o f rea l i ty
nothing exists that is not either simple or at least com
posed of act [ the determining element] and potency [the
dete rm inab le elem en t], so also w it h concepts. C on tra
dictories, however, do not form a unity, be i t simple or
composed.
I t fol lows
then,
that the greatest object conceivable
w itho ut contra dict ion can actual ly exist in real i ty. Th is
is proved first of its essential being, for in such an object
the inte llec t is fu lly satisfied ; therefore, in it the pr im a ry
object of the intel lect, viz. b e in g , is verif ied and this
in the highest degree.
I t is further argued,
then,
that this being actually
exists because the highest conceivable object is not one
which is merely in the intel lect of the thinker, for then
it both could exist, because as something possible it is
conceivable, and yet could not exist, because the idea of
existing in virtue of some cause is repugnant to its very
na ture. T his latte r was show n above in the second con
clusion o f the p ro of fr o m efficiency.39 Th erefore , wh at
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74 DUNS SCOTUS
quod est in re quam quod est tantum in in te l lec tu . No n
est
autem
hoc sic inte l l igendum, quod idem si cogi tetur
per hoc sit majus cogitabile si existat, sed omni quod est
in in te l lectu tantum est majus a l iquod quod ex is t i t .
Vel al i ter c olo ratu r sic : m ajus co gitab i le est qu od
existit, id est perfectius cognoscibile, quia visibile sive
in te l l ig ib i le in te llect ione in tu i t iv a. C u m [read Q uo d
autem] non ex is t i t ,
nee
in se,
nee
in nob i l io r i , cu i n ih i l
ad di t , no n est v is ib i le. V is i b i l e aut em est perfect ius
cognoscibi le non vis ib i l i , sed tantum modo in te l l ig ib i l i
abs tractive ; ergo
perfectissimum
cognoscibi le exist i t .
De di f ferent ia inte l lect ionis intu i t ivae et abstract ivae et
quo m odo in t u i t iv a est perfect ior , tange tur d is t inct ione
tert ia * et a l ias quando locum habebit .
[ V i a Ine f f i cax] . U l t i m o os tend i tu r propositum ex
neg atione causae extrinsecae [read intrinse ca e] ; qu ia
mater ia finitur per f o r m a m , s icut potent ia per actum et
perfectione m et esse form ae ejus. E t e converso fo rm a
f in i tur per materiam sicut actus per
po t en t i am .
Fo rma
ergo quae n o n est na ta esse in m a te ria est in fi n it a ;
cujusmodi est Deus.
Haec rat io non valet, quia secundum ipsos angelus
est im m ate rial is ; ergo in na tu ra est inf in itus . N o n pos-
sunt dicere, quod esse angeli f iniret essentiam ejus, quia
secundum eos est accidens essentiae et posterius natura-
liter ; et sic in primo signo na tura e essentia secu ndu m se
u t pr io r esse, vid et ur in f in ita intensive, et per consequent
in secundo signo naturae non erit f initabil is per esse.
* Opus oxoniense,
i,
dist.
m,
q. iii.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
74
exists in reality is conceivably greater than what exists
only in the inte l lect . Th is is not to be understood, how
ever, in the sense that something conceived if it actually
exists, is, by the fact of existing, conceivable to any
gjeater extent. T h e m ean ing is tha t wha tever exists is
greater than whatever is solely in the intel lect.
Or the argument could be retouched in th is way.
Whatever exists is conceivable to a greater extent [than
w ha t does n o t] ; th at is to say, i t can be kn ow n m ore
perfectly, because it is intuit ively intel l igible or visible.
What does not exist either in i tself or in something more
noble to which i t adds nothing, is not capable of being
i n tu i t ed .
N o w w ha t can be seen is able to be kn ow n
mo re perfectly than what can not be in tu i ted , but kn ow n
on ly abstrac tively. Th erefo re, the mo st perfect th in g
tha t can be kn o w n exists. T h e difference between in
tu i t iv e and abstractive know ledge, and the supe rior i ty of
the former over the lat ter, wi l l be treated in dist inct ion
three and elsewhere as occasion offers.40
[e.
A n Ineffect ive P ro of ] . Fin al ly, some
41
argue to
the proposed conclusion fro m the absence of any intrins ic
cause, for matter is determined by form as the potential
is determined by act, perfection, and the existence of
i ts fo rm . Conversely, the fo rm is l im ite d by m atter as
act is l im ite d by potency. A n y form incapable of
be ing in ma tter, therefore, is inf in ite. G od is of such
k ind .
T h is reason does not ho ld , fo r a ccord ing to these men,42
the angel is im m at er ia l ; therefore, i ts na ture is inf ini te.
They cannot avoid this conclusion by saying that the
existence of the angel l im its its essence, for they m a in ta in
that existence is accidental to the essence and naturally
pos terior to it . A n d so i n the first instance of nature,43
the essence, considered in its own right and as prior to
existence, seems to be intensive ly in fin ite . Co nsequ ently,
it cannot be limited by existence in the second instance
of nature.
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75
DUNS SCOTUS
Brevi ter respondeo ad argumentum : nam quael ibet
entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis,
i n quo est f initum, si est f initum, et in quo in fi n it u m , si
potest esse inf initum, et non per al iquid accidens
sibi.
A r g u i t u r etiam : si form a f initur ad m at e ria m , ergo
si non ad
i l l a m ,
no n finitur. Falla cia consequentis :
sicut corpus finitur ad corpus ; ig it u r si no n ad corpus,
er i t in f in i tum ; u l t imum ergo coelum e r i t ac tu in f in i tu m ;
sophisma est istud tertio
Physicorum,*
quia sicut prius
corpus in se prius f in itu r pro pri is
terminis
an tequam ad
a l iqu id aliud finiatur, ut de
coelo,
ergo i ta forma f in i ta
prius est in se finita quam f iniatur ad m a te ria m , qu ia est
tal is na tu ra in entibus qu od f initur, id est an teq ua m un ia-
tu r materiae ; nam secunda f initas praesupponit primam
et no n causat earn ; ergo in ali qu o signo na tur ae erit
essentia [an ge li] finita ; ergo non finitur pe r esse ; ergo
in secundo signo non finitur per esse. Bre vi ter d ico unam
proposit ionem, quod quaecumque essentia absoluta
finita i n se, est f inita u t p ra e in te ll ig itu r omni compara-
tione sui ad
aliam
essentiam.
[Solutio Quaestionis]
Ex dict is patet solut io quaestionis : n a m ex primo
art iculo habetur quod al iquod ens existens est simpliciter
primum t r ip l ic i pr imitate, v idel icet ef f ic ient iae, f in is et
eminent iae, et i ta s impl ic i ter quod incompossibile est
a li q u id esse priu s ; et in hoc p ro b a tu m est esse de De o
quantum ad proprietates respect ivas Dei ad creaturam,
vel
in quantum determinat dependent iam respectus
crea turarum ad ipsum. Ex secundo art ic ulo habe tur
in ,
cap. iv
(2036,
20-22).
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
75
Brief ly,
then,
I reply to the argu m ent. I f an en tity is
finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something
incidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic
degree of f inite or infinite perfection respectively.
I t is also argu ed that,44 if fo rm is l im ite d w it h reference
to matter, where there is no matter, there the form is
in fin ite . T h is is the fallac y o f asserting the consequent,
jus t as is the fo l lo w in g : a bod y is l im ite d w i th reference
to a bod y ; therefore, i f a bod y is no t l im ite d w it h refer
ence to an other bo dy , i t w i l l be inf init e ; hence, the
outermost heaven w i l l be actua l ly inf in i te. Th is is the
fallac y o f Physics, bk . h i . * Fo r, ju st as a bo dy is f irst
l imited in i tself by i ts own proper boundaries before i t is
l imited with respect to anything else (as is the case with
the heavens), so the finite form is first l imited in itself
before i t is l im ite d w it h respect to m atter. T h a t is to
say, i t is of such a nature that i t is l imited, and this,
prior to any union with matter ; for the second l imita
ti o n presupposes, an d does no t cause, the first. The
finite ch arac ter o f the ange lic essence, then, is something
th at is p ri o r by na ture to its existence. Co nseq uently,
it is not its subsequent existence that makes such an
essence l im ite d . T o pu t the argum ent brief ly in one
sentence, I say tha t every f in ite essence is such ab solu tely
an d pr io r t o a ny reference it m ay have to ano ther essence.
[Solution of the Question] 46
The solut ion to the question,
then,
is clear from the
foregoing,
for the first article establishes the existence
of some being that is simply f irst by the triple primacy of
efficiency, finality an d em inence, an d is first i n such an
un qu ali f ie d sense tha t i t w ou ld be impossible for an yth ing
to be p ri o r to it. T his is to establish the existence o f G od
so far as the divine properties that have reference to
creatures are concerned, or in so far as creatures are
dependent up on h im . T he second art icle shows in fou r
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76 DUNS SCOTUS
quadrup lex v ia quod i l lud primum est in f in i tum : primo
v ide l icet , qu ia pr im u m effic iens ; secundo, qu ia p r im u m
agens omnia fact ib i l ia, secunda via continet quatuor
conclusiones de intell igere primi ; te rt i o, qu ia f inis
ul t imus ; quarto, quia eminens.
Ju x ta primam exclusa est quaedam v ia inu t i l is de
creat ione. Ju xt a secundam tan gitu r a l ia v ia de
perfectione p r i m i ob ject i e t in te l lectua l i ta te . Ju xta
quartam exponitur rat io Anselmi, Proslogion, Deus est
quo
majus
cog i tar i no n potest. U l t im o exc lud i tur v ia
inut i l is ex immater ia l i ta te in ferens in f in i ta tem.
Ex praemissis conclusionibus probatis et ostensis,
arg ui tu r s ic ad quaest ionem : a l iq uo d ens tr ip l ic i te r
pr imum in ent ibus ex is t i t in actu et i l lud t r ip l ic i ter
p r im u m est in f in i t um ; e rgo a l iquod in f in i tu m ens
exist i t in
ac tu ,
et istud est perfectissimum conceptibi le et
conceptus perfectissimus absolutus quem possumus
habere de Deo natural i ter quod si t inf in i tus, s icut d ic i tur
dist inct ione te rt ia .* E t sic pr ob at um est Deum esse
quantum ad conceptum
vel
esse ejus perfectissimum
concept ib i lem vel possibi lem haberi a nobis de Deo.
[Ad Argumen ta Pr inc ipa l ia ]
A d argumen ta hu jus quaestion is : ad p r i m u m dico
quod causa inf inita activa ex necessitate naturae non
compatitur
a l iqu id s ib i co ntr ar ium , s ive s it e i c on trar ium
a l iqu id fo rma l i te r [ M S om. id est, secundum al iq uo d quo d
convenit sibi essential i ter] sive virtual i ter, id est, secun
du m ra t ione m effectus su i quem v i r tu a l i t er inc lud i t ;
u t roque enim modo impedire t quodl ibet incompossib i le
suo effectui, sicut argutum est
pr ius.
Co ntra : nu m qu id ph i losoph i ponentes D eu m agere
ex necessitate na tura e n on po neb ant esse a l iq u id m a lu m
* Opus oxoniense,
1,
dist.
in,
q . i.
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77
DUNS SCOTUS
in universo? Respondeo, sicut patuit probando Deum
esse agens per cognitionem,
non potuerunt
salvare
ali-
quod malum fieri posse contingenter in universo, sed
tantum
unus ordo causarum produceret aliquid quod
esset
receptivum
alicujus perfectionis ; alius
autem
ordo
de necessitate produceret oppositum illius perfectionis,
ita quod ista perfectio non posset tunc induci concur-
rentibus omnibus causis, licet absolute
productum
ab
aliquibus [M,S aliis qu ibus], consideretur secundum ratio-
nem
suae speciei, esset receptivum illius perfectionis,
cujus oppositum necessario evenit ; ergo secundum eos
sicut causae
efficientes
in una coordinatione necessario
agunt, ita causae efficientes
impedientes
in alia coordina
tione necessario agunt
impediendo.
Unde aequali neces
sitate qua sol agit ad dissolvendum, agit Saturnus ad
condensandum. Cum ergo
omnis
defectus materiae
reducatur ad causas efficientes quae sunt defectuosae in
virtute, si quaelibet causa efficiens agit necessario, tunc
nihil defectus
vel
monstruositatis
vel
malitiae erit in
universo quin necessario accidat. Q u id autem possunt
philosophi dicere de libero arbitrio nostro et
malitia
moris, dicendum est alias.
Ad secundum dico , quod consequentia non valet. Ad
probationem
ostendo quod non est consimilis incom-
possibilitas dimensionum in replendo locum et essen-
tiarum in simul essendo ; non enim una entitas ita replet
totam naturam
entis qu in cum ea posset stare a lia entitas.
Hoc autem non debet intelligi de repletione locali, sed
quasi commensuratione essentiali ; sed una dimensio
replet
eumdem
locum secundum
ultimum
capacitatis
suae, itaque una entitas simul potest esse cum cum
alia,
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 77
his na tur e, also ad m it the existence of ev il i n the universe?
As I have already made clear in proving that God acts
w it h knowledge,48 I rep ly th at they co uld not consistently
explain the contingent character of the evi l in the
un i
verse.
A l l they could m ain ta in w ou ld be that one order
of causes could produce something capable of receiving
a given perfection, whereas another order of necessity
w ou ld produ ce the opposite of this perfec tion. I n other
wo rds, i f we considered a ll the causes ac tua lly co nc ur rin g
at that t ime, this perfection could not be induced at this
pa rt icula r m om ent. Abso lutely speaking, however, i f we
consider not this part icular event, but one similar in
k ind ,
then a thing produced by some of these causes
could also be the recipient of a perfection which de facto
was necessarily absent at this pa rt icu lar t im e. A cc or din g
to th em , there fore, ju s t as the efficient causes in one gro up
act necessarily, so the impeding efficient causes of the
other grou p act necessarily. T h e sun dissolves som eth ing,
then,
with the same necessity with which Saturn
con
denses it . The re fore, since every defect o f m at te r
is due to a deficiency in the strength of the efficient
causes, if each efficient cause acts necessarily, then
every defect, monstrosity, or evil in the universe occurs
necessarily. W h a t the philosophers ca n say of ou r free
w i l l and mora l
evi l ,
however, wil l have to be treated
elsewhere.
To the second
argument,*9
I say that the consequence is
i nva l i d . As to the pr oo f addu ced i n its favo ur, I show that
there is no parity between the impossibi l i ty of several
extended things filling the same place and several
essences ex isting sim ultane ous ly. For no en tity so fills
the whole nature of being as to render impossible the
coexistence of ano ther. Coe xiste nce in this latte r case,
how eve r, should no t be und erstood i n the sense o f filling
a place, bu t rather as a kind of essential commensuration.60
T h e extension of one th in g , how ever, f i lls any place to the
utmo st of i ts capa city. M or e tha n one en tity, therefore,
2 , 3 2 2 12
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78 DUNS SCOTUS
sicut posset respectu loci cum corpore replente locum esse
aliud
corpus
non
replens loc um . S im i l i ter a l ia conse-
qu en t ia non vale t , quia corpus in f i n i t u m si esset cu m al io,
fieret totum majus u t roque rat ione d imensionum, qu ia
dimensiones alterius corporis essent
aliae
a
dimensionibus
corporis inf init i et ejusdem rationis cum eis, et ideo totum
esset majus propter d imensionum diversi tatem, et totum
non majus, quia dimensio inf in i ta non potest excedi.
Hie autem tota quant i tas infinitae perfectionis nullam
addit ionem recipi t in rat ione ta l is quant i tat is ex coexis-
tent i a l icujus
f init i
secundum
talem
qua l i t a tem.
Ad tert ium dico, quod consequent ia non valet , n is i
i l lud
quod demonstratur in antecedente, a quo al ia
sepa rantur, sit f i n i t um . E xe m plu m : s i esset a l iq uo d ub i
inf in i tum per impossibi le, et corpus infinitum rep le t i l lud
ub i , no n seque retur : hoc corpus est
h ie,
i ta quod non
a lib i ; ergo est f initum secundum ubi , qu ia ly hie non
demonstrat n is i in f in i tu m . I t e m , secundum Philoso-
p h u m ,
si motus esset infinitus et tempus in f i n i tum, non
seq uitur : iste m otus est in hoc tem po re et n o n in alio ;
ergo
est f in i tu m secundum tempus. I t a ad pro pos i tum ,
oporteret probare i l lu d qu od d em ons tratur per ly hoc esse
f i n i t um . Q uo d si assumatur, pe t i tu r conclusio in prae-
missa.
Ad u l t imum dico, quod Phi losophus in fer t moveri in
non-tempore ex hoc antecedente, quod potent ia inf in i ta
est in magnitudine, et inte l l ig i t in consequente moveri
propr ie , u t d is t ingui tur contra mutat ionem, et hoc modo
consequens includi t contradict ionem, et
etiam
antece-
dens, secundum
eum.
Q ua l i te r au tem teneat ilia conse
qu en tia, sic declaro : si po te ntia est in f i n it a et agit ex
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 78
can exist at once, even th ou gh one bod y c ann ot fil l a place
alrea dy occupied by ano ther. T h e other consequence is
also invalid, for i f an inf inite body were to coexist with
another body, the reason the combination of the two
would be greater than either taken singly l ies in the
nature of
extension,
for the dimensions of this other body
would be di f ferent f rom those of the inf in i te body and
sti l l they w o u ld be qu ali ta t ive ly the same. The refore,
the union of two extended bodies implies an increase in
extension because of the distinct dimensions and yet the
sum total could not represent an increase, because an
in fin ite extension can not be exceeded. I n ou r case,
however, the total amount of inf inite perfection is not
increased quantitatively by the coexistence of some
quali tat ively similar f inite enti ty.
To the third
51
argument, I say that the consequence does
not hold unless, in the antecedent, the thing singled out
fr o m all the others is som ething f inite . For exam ple,
to assume the imp ossible, i f an in fin ite place were o ccu pied
by an inf in i te bo dy, i t st i l l w ou ld not fo l low tha t this body
is h e r e i n such a w ay tha t it is now here else, because
the w o rd h e re , i n this case, on ly designates w ha t is
in fin ite . T h e n too, acc ord ing to the Philosopher,52 if
m ot io n and t ime were inf in i te, f ro m the propo si t ion th is
motion is at this t ime and not at another , i t does not
fol low that m otio n is finite in du ra tio n. Consequendy,
if the desired conclusion is to be established, it would be
necessary to prove that whatever is designated by the
w o rd t h i s is f init e. T o assume it sim ply begs the
quest ion.
To the last
53
argument, I say that the Philosopher argues
that i f the antecedent be true (viz. that some power is of
inf in i te m ag nitud e), i t w ou ld move instantaneously, where
he understands m o v e s in the prop er sense as dif ferent
fro m mu ta t io n . I n th is sense, according to h im , the
con
sequent as w e ll as the antecedent is se lf-con trad ictory . I
w il l show, however, ho w this consequence cou ld be made
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79
DUNS SCOTUS
necessitate na tur ae , ergo ag it in no n-te m po re. Q u ia si
agat in te m pore , s it
i l lud
A , et ac cip iatu r al ia vir tus finita
quae i n tem pore f inito ag it, sit i l lu d B ; et aug m ente tur
virtus f inita quae est B secun dum pr op or t io n em illam
quae est B ad A . P uta , si A [ M S B] est centuplum vel
milletuplum
ad B [ M S A ] , acc ip ia tur v i rtus centup la ad
i l lam v i r tu te m fin itam da t am , ve l m i l le tup la . Ig i tu r ilia
virtus sic
augmentata movebit
in A tempore, et i ta
virtus ilia e t in f in i ta in aequal i tempore movebunt ,
quod est impossibi le, s i v i r tus inf in i ta movet secundum
u lt im u m pote ntiae suae et necessario. Ex hoc ergo qu od
virtus est inf inita sequitur quod si agat ex necessitate,
agi t no n in tem pore. Ex hoc
autem
quod pon i tu r in
antecedente, quod est in magnitudine sequitur s i agi t
c i rca corpus quod proprie
moveat
i l lud corpus, quod
loq uitu r de vi r tu te extensa per accidens. Ta l is autem
virtu s si ageret circa corpus, habe ret partes hujus corporis
divers imo de distantes respectu ejus : p u ta unam pa r tem
corpor is prop inquiorem et aliam remot io rem ; habet
etiam
resistentiam
aliquam
in corpore, c irca quod agi t ,
quae duae causae, scil icet resistentia et diversa approxi
mate
pa r t i um mob i l i s ad
ipsum
movens, faciunt succes-
sionem esse in motu et corpus proprie m ove r i . E rgo ex
hoc quod in antecedente
illo
pon i tu r v i r tus in magn i
tud ine sequi tur quod propr ie movebi t , e t i ta jungendo
ilia
duo s imul , sci l icet quod est inf in i tum et quod est in
magn i tud ine , sequ i tu r quod [MS om. p ropr ie ] in non-
tempore m ove bi t , qu od est co ntra d ic t io . Sed is tud non
sequi tur de v i r tu te in f in i ta quae no n est in m ag ni tud ine ,
ipsa enim l icet in non-tempore agat , s i in non-tempore
agit , quia hoc sequitur
i n f i n i t a t em , tamen
non propr ie
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
79
to
h o l d .
I f a pow er is in fin ite an d acts by necessity of
na ture , the n it acts instantaneously. I f i t were to act in
t ime , let us ca l l this t im e A. N o w take another f in ite
powe r, w hic h acts in the f in i te t ime B. T he n let the
finite power, which acts in B t ime, be increased by the
amount that A exceeds B, e.g.
i f
A is one hu nd re d or one
thousand times as great as B, let the finite power be
increased a hundred—or a thousand fo ld . N ow , th is
increased pow er w ou ld act in A t im e. Cons equently,
this f inite power would act in the same t ime as the in
f in i te,
which is impossible i f the inf inite power moves
necessarily an d to the utm ost of i ts ab i l i ty . The refore,
if an infinite power acts necessarily, it follows that it
acts instantaneous ly. O n the other ha nd , however, i f
we assume, as the antecedent does, that this power has
magnitude, i .e. is extended accidental ly, then it fol lows
tha t i f i t acts on a bod y, i t moves this bod y i n the proper
sense o f m ov in g. B ut i f such a pow er acted up on a
body, i t would be at unequal distance from the dif ferent
parts of this body, that is, one part of the body would
be closer, whereas another would be farther away.
T h e n ,
too, this power would meet with some resistance
in the bo dy on w h ic h it acts. N o w these tw o causes
(viz. resistance and the difference in distance between
the mover and the various parts of the thing moved)
give rise to succession in motion and, therefore, cause
the body to be moved in the proper sense of that term.
From the fact ,
then ,
that we assume in the antecedent
a power with magnitude, i t fol lows that i t moves in the
proper sense, and thus by combining these two notions
simultaneously, namely that i t is inf inite and that i t has
magnitude,54 it follows that it moves in the strict sense
of the term and, nevertheless, does so instantaneously,
w hic h is a con tradict ion . Th is con tradict ion, however,
does not fo l low fro m the no t ion of an inf in i te power w hic h
has no m agn itude. For a l though i t wou ld act instan
taneously, were it infinite and necessarily acting, sti l l i t
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80 DUNS SCOTUS
moveb i t ,
quia non habebit in passo
illas duas
rationes
successionis. Non igitur vult Philosophus q u o d infinita
poten t ia p ropr ie
moveat
in
n o n - t e mp o re ,
sicut
argu-
mentum procedi t , sed quod in f in i ta potent ia in
magn i -
tud ine propr ie moveat e t non in tempore, quae sunt
co ntr ad icto ria. E t ex hoc sequ itur qu od ta l is antecedens
inc lud i t con t rad ic to r ia , sci l . quod v i r tus in f in i ta s i t in
magn i tud ine .
Sed tunc est du bi ta t io : cum po ten t iam m ot iva m
ponat in f in i tam et natura l i ter
agentem,
v idetur sequi
qu od necessario ageret in non -tem po re ; l icet no n m oveat
in non-tempore ;
imo
tunc n ih i l moveb i t
aliud
propr ie
loquendo. E t qu od hoc sequatur pate t : qu ia
illud
probatum fu i t pr ius per rationem potent iae inf in i tae
necessario agentis.
Respondet Averroes duodecimo Metaphysicae* quod
praeter primum
movens,
quod est inf in i tae potent iae,
requir i tur movens conjunctum potent iae f in i tae, i ta quod
ex primo movente sit inf initas motus et ex secundo sit
successio, quia aliter non posset esse successio nisi con-
curreret i l l u d fin itum, qu ia s i solum in f in i t u m ageret,
ageret in non-temp ore. I l lu d improbatur distinctione
octava quaestione
u l t i m a , |
ubi in hoc argui tur contra
philosophos, qui ponunt primum agere ex necessitate
quid l ibet quod immediate ag i t .
Sed Christ ianis non est argumentum di f f ic i le, qui
d icun t Deum contingenter agere. Ipsi enim possunt
faci l i ter respondere, quia l icet virtus inf inita necessario
agens agat secundum ul t imum sui, et i ta in non-tempore,
qu idqu id immedia te ag i t , non tamen v i r tus in f in i ta
con tinge nter et l ibere agens ; sicut en im est in potestate
ejus agere
vel
non agere, ita est in potestate ejus in
*
xn,
com.
41.
f Opus oxoniense,
1,
dist.
vm,
q. v, nn . 3, 8 ff.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 80
would not move, properly speaking, since the two reasons
for succession would be absent in that on which it acts.
T he Philosopher, therefore, does no t m ean tha t an in f in ite
pow er w ou ld move instantaneously as the argu m ent
assumes, but that a power inf in i te in magnitude, though
it is not in time, nevertheless moves in the proper sense,
w hic h is a co ntra dict io n. F ro m this i t fo llows that such
an antecedent includes contradictory notions, namely a
power in f in i te in magni tude.
Bu t a do ub t arises. Since an inf init e m otive pow er
acting of necessity is assumed, it would seem to follow
necessarily that this power acts instantaneously, even
tho ug h it m ay no t move instantaneously. Consequently,
i t fol lows further, that no agent wil l move another
pro per ly speaking. T h a t th is w ou ld fo l low is c lear f ro m
w ha t was jus t pro ved above regarding an inf in i te
necessarily acting power.
Averroes i n Metaphysics, bk. x i i , * replies that it is not
enough simply to have an inf in i te ly powerful First
M ov er. W ha t is furth er requ ired is tha t th is First
Mover and some addit ional f in i te power co-operate in
such a way that the inf inity of the motion is due to the
First Mover, whereas the succession is due to the other.
W it h o u t the co -op eration o f some finit e m ove r, succession
w o ul d be impossible ; for i f only the inf inite agent acted,
i i w ou ld act instantaneously. Th is solut ion w il l be dis
pro ve d i n the last question of dist inc t ion eight
f
where the
philosophers who assume that whatever the First Cause
does immediately, it does with necessity, are attacked.
B ut for Ch ristians, w ho say th at G od acts c onting ently,
the o bje ctio n presents no d iff icul ty, since they can answer
it w it h ease. Fo r, even if an inf in ite powe r w h ic h acts
necessarily and to the utmost of its power, does instan
taneously whatever it does immediately, this is not true
of an inf inite power which acts freely and contingently.
As it is in the power of such an agent either to act or not
to act, so it has the power either to act in time or to act
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OI DUNS SCOTUS
tempore agere vel i n no n-te m po re agere ; et i ta faci le
est salvare
primum movere
corpus in tempore, l icet sit
infinitae potentiae, quia non necessario agit nee secun
dum ul t imum potent iae quantum sci l icet posset agere,
neque in tarn brevi tempore in quam brevi posset agere.
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THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 81
instantan eou sly. Co nseq uen tly, it is easy to defend the
posit ion that the First Cause moves a body in t ime even
if it be of infinite power, for it does not act necessarily
neither to the ful l extent of i ts power nor in as short a
t ime as i t could.
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I V
T H E U N I C I T Y O F G O D
Summary of the Argument
Question : Is there but one God ?
Pro e t Cont ra
Body of the Question
First opinion : The unicity of God is known only by fa ith
Scotus's opin ion : Natural reason can prove the un icity of
God
First proof
:
From the infinite intellect
Second
proof:
From the infinite w ill
Third proof : From the infin ite goodness
Fourth proof
:
From the infinite power
Fifth proof : From absolute infinity
Sixth proof
:
From necessity of existence
Seventh proof : From the omnipotence
Reply to the arguments for the first opinion
Reply to the Arguments at the beginning
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83 DUNS SCOTUS
[ IV . DE UNIT ATE DEl] *
Quaero utrum sit tantum unus Deus ?
[Pro et Contra]
Et quod
non
argu i tur :
Q u o r u m dicuntur multi domini et d i i multi.f
I t e m ,
si Deus est, ergo d i i sunt. P ro ba tur conse quen tia,
qu ia singulare et p lurale idem sign i f icant , l icet d i f ferant
in modo significandi ; ergo idem in c lu d i t praed icat io
pr op ort io na l i ter accepta ; ergo sicut s ingulare inc lud i t
s ingulare, i ta p lur ale in clu di t p lu rale . Pr ob atu r secundo
[MS tert io] , quia s icut Deus est quo majus cogi tar i non
potest, i ta di i sunt quibus majores cogitari non possunt.
Ilia autem
quibus majora cogitar i non possunt sunt in
effectu.
Q uo d vid etu r, qu ia s i no n essent in
effectu,
possent cogitari majora eis ; ergo, etc.
Praeterea, omne ens per participationem reduci tur ad
al iq ui d ta le per essentiam. In d iv id u a in quac um que
specie creata sunt ent ia per part ic ipat ionem, al ioquin
non essent
multa
; ergo reducuntur ad al iquid ta le per
essentiam. E rgo est aliq uis h o m o, aliq uis bos per essen
t i a m ,
etc. Q u id q u id au tem est per essentiam, no n per
pa rt ic ipa tio ne m , est Deus ; ergo, etc.
I t e m ,
plura bona sunt paucioribus m el i or a. Sed quae-
cumque
m elior a sunt ponen da in universo ; ergo, etc.
I t e m ,
quidquid si est, est necesse esse, est simpliciter
* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. n, q. i i i (Assisi 137, f. i8r*-ig r& ; cf. Viv£s,
vo l . vm ,
487 -50ia). f I Cor.
vm.
5.
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UNICITY OF GOD
83
[ I V .
THE
UNICITY
OF GOD]
/ ask whether there is but one God ?
[Pro et Contra]
Some argue there is not merely one God 1 :
[Arg. 1 ]. For indeed there are many gods and many
lords .
[Arg.
n ]. Also, if
God
exists, then gods exist. Proof of
the consequence :
(1)
Singular and plural signify the
same, although they differ in the way in which they do
so. Therefore, the predication proportionately implies
the same. As the singular mode then implies a singular
thing, so the p lu ra l implies several things.2 (2) Just as
God is tha t greater than which nothing can be conceived,
so gods are those greater than which nothing can be
thought. Things that could not be conceivably greater,
however, actually exist. Th is is clear from the fact that
i f they d id not actua lly exist, we could think of something
greater than they. Therefore, etc.
[Arg.
in ] .
Furthermore, everything wh ich is a being
by participation can be traced back to something which
is such by its very essence.3 Now the individuals in any
created species are beings by partic ipat ion ; otherwise
more than one individual per species would not exist.
Therefore, they can be traced back to something wh ich is
such
by its very essence. Consequently, there is
some
man
who is by his essence, some ox which is by its essence, and
so on . Now whatever is by its essence and not by par
ticipa tion is God. Therefore, etc.
[Arg.
i v ] .
Likewise, a greater number of
good
things
is better than a lesser number.4 But we should assume
the best to exist in the universe. Therefore, etc.
[A n add itiona l argument].5 Also, whatever is a
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UNICITY OF GOD
84
necessary being, if it exist, is necessary being without
q u a lif ic a tio n . B ut i f ano ther G od exists, H e is a necessary
being.
Th erefo re, etc. Proo f of the m ajo r :
I f
you gran t
the opposite of the predica te (v iz. [ i t ] is no t necessary
being without qual i f icat ion ), the opposi te of the subject
follows ( viz . I t is no t necessary b u t on ly possible be ing,
i f i t exists ).—Reply : The opposite of the subject which
is to be inf er re d is this. I t is no t a necessary be ing , i f it
exists. Here, then , the re lat io n between antecedent an d
consequent may be denied.
To the contrary :
I n Deuteronomy * we rea d : H e a r
O Israel ,
the L o rd our
God is one L o r d , and in Isaiasj : T h e re is no Go d
besides m e .
[Body of the Question]
In this question, the conclusion is certain.
[First Opinion]
Some say,6 howe ver, th at the un icity of God c annot be
demonstrated but is accepted only on fa i th . A n d in th is
they fo l low the au tho ri ty of R a b bi Moses [Maimonides] J
who says that i t is known from the Law that God is one.
Reason supports this view, for i f the mind by i ts natural
powers could know that God is one, then it could also
kn ow na tur al ly tha t G od is s ingular. I n th is case, na tur al
reason could know the singularity of God and could also
know the essence of God as singular, which is false and
contradicts what was said in the question about the
subject of theology.7
[Scotus's
Opinion]
Nevertheless, it seems that natural reason could estab
l ish the unic i ty of God by arguing from (1) the inf inite
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85
DUNS SCOTUS
inte l lectu ;
secundo
ex
infinita
volun tate ; tert io ex
infinita bon itate ; qu ar to ex rat ion e infinitae potent iae ;
quinto
ex rat ione
infiniti
abso lute ; sexto ex ratio ne
necesse esse ; septimo ex ra t ione omnipotent iae.
[Prima Via] , Ex pa rte inte l lectus in f i n i t i ar gu i tu r sic
p r i m o .
Intel lectus inf in i tu s cognoscit in te l l ig ib i le qu od -
cumque perfectissime qu an tu m est in te l l ig ib i le in se ;
ergo si sunt d ii , sint A et B. A cogno scit B perfectissime ,
quantum scil icet B est cognoscibile : sed hoc est impos
s i b l e . P rob atio : qu ia au t cognoscit B per essentiam B,
au t no n . Si n o n , et B est cogno scibile per essentiam,
ergo non cognoscit B perfectissime et quantum scil icet
est cognoscibile. N ih i l
enim
cognoscibile per essentiam
perfectissime cognoscitur, nisi cognoscitur per essen
t iam suam, vel per al iquid perfectius includens essentiam
suam quam
ipsa sit i n se. Essentia
autem
B i n
nullo
perfectius includitur quam in B, quia tunc B non esset
Deus.
Si au te m cognoscit B per essentiam ipsius B, ergo
actus ipsius A est posterius naturaliter essentia ipsius B,
et i ta A no n erit Deus. Q u o d aut em actus ipsius A sit
posterior ipso B probat io, quia
omnis
actus cognoscendi
qui non est idem objecto est posterior objecto
;
neque
enim prior neque simul natura est actus cum aliquo al io
ab
actu ,
quia tunc actus posset intell igi sine objecto, sicut
econverso.
Si d icatur quod ilia intel l igit B per essentiam ipsius A,
quae simi l l ima est ipsi B, s ic v idel icet quod A intel l ig i t B
in rat ion e speciei com m unis ipsi A et ipsi B. C on tra :
neutra salvat responsio quod A intel l igat B perfectissime,
et per consequens non est Deus, quia cognitio al icujus in
simili t a n t u m , et in universal i non est cognit io per-
fectissima
et intuit iva ipsius rei, et i ta A non cognosceret
B in tu i t i ve nee perfect issime, quod est proposi tum.
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UNICITY
OF GOD 85
in te l lec t , (2 ) the in f in i te
w i l l ,
(3) the inf in i te goodness,
(4) the in f in i t e po we r, (5) the no t io n of in f i n i t y considered
absolutely, (6) the nature of necessary being, and (7)
omn ipo tence .
[Fi rst
Proof ] ,
T h e first argu m en t, based on the in f in i te
inte l lec t , is th is. Su ch an in te l le ct knows wh ate ver can
be known in the most per fect way tha t i t cou ld be known.
Suppose then that two gods existed, let us cal l them A
a n d B. A , therefore , w o u ld k n o w B as per fec t ly as B
co u ld be kn o w n . Th is , howeve r , is imposs ib le . P r o o f :
E ith er A know s B t h ro ug h the essence o f B or no t. I f not ,
and B can be known through i ts essence, then A knows B
nei ther in the most per fect manner nor to the extent that
B can be kn ow n. For no th in g tha t can be kn ow n th ro ug h
its essence is perfectly known unless it be known either
through i ts essence or through something which includes
the essence in a more perfect way than the latter exists
i n itself. B u t th e essence
o f
B is no t inc lud ed in an yt h in g
more perfect than B, for i t i t were, B would not be God.
But i f A knows B through the latter 's essence, then A's
act o f kn ow le dg e is po ste rior to th e essence o f B a n d
therefore
A
wo u ld no t be G od . I prove th at in such a
case A's act w o u l d be pos ter ior to B in this fash ion. E ve ry
act of knowing not ident ica l wi th i ts object is poster ior
to th at object . Fo r an act by na tur e is s imul taneous on ly
w i t h i tself . N ei th er is i t p r i o r to i ts obje ct, for the n the
act could be known wi thout the object and v ice versa.
But suppose we say that A through its own essence
knows B because of the great s imi lar i ty between the two,
so that A knows B through some nature common to
A a n d B . T o the co nt ra ry : T h is answer saves ne ith er
o f these tw o poin ts : viz . (1 ) th at A know s B most per
fec t ly , a nd therefore , (2) th at A is G od . F or an y such
knowledge that is merely general and in v i r tue of some
l ikeness is nei th er per fect no r in tu i t iv e. Cons equen t ly,
A wou ld not know B in tu i t i ve ly or most per fect ly , wh ich
is what we set out to prove.
(2,322j
13
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86 DUNS SCOTUS
Secundo ex parte intellectus arguitur sic, unica
inte l -
lect io
non
potest habere duo objecta adaequata, A est
ob jec tum adaequatum suae intel lect ioni , quia A habet
pro objecto adaequato essentiam suam ; ergo no n hab et
essentiam B pro obje cto ada eq ua to. Esset au tem B
objectum adaequatum intel lect ioni A, s i posset simul
in te l ligere perfecte A et B. M a jo r patet , qu ia al iter
actus adaequatur objecto, quo abstracto, non minus
quietaretur et adaequaretur, et i ta frustra esset tale
ob jec tum.
[Secunda Via ] . Q ua ntu m ad secundam viam a rgu i tu r
sic : V olu nta s
infinita
est recta ; ergo di l igit quodlibet
d i l ig ib i le quantum est d i l ig ib i le , e t quanto
amore
potest
si sit i n f i n i t um . B aute m est d i ligendus in in f in i tu m cum
p o n itu r esse alius De us. E t pe r consequens sit
bonum
in f in i tu m et inf in i te a vo lun tate sic poten ter d i l igere
dil ige nd um ; ergo voluntas A di l ig it B inf ini te : sed hoc
est impossible, quia A natural i ter di l igit plus se
quam
B.
Probat io : qu i l ibet enim na tu ra l i te r plus [ M S pr ius ] esse
suum
q u a m esse alter ius , cujus no n est pars
vel
effectus.
A autem nihil est ipsius B
nee
u t pars
nee
ut effectus ; ergo
plus d i l ig i t A se na tura l i ter qua m ipsum B. Sed volun tas
l i bera ,
quando est recta , conformatur vo luntat i natura l i ,
al io qu in volun tas na tur al is non esset semper recta ;
ergo A si habet istam voluntatem rec tam, actu el ic i to
plus di l ig i t se quam B, ergo non B inf in i te.
Secundo sic de vo lun tate : aut A fr u i tu r B aut u t i t u r.
Si u t i tu r eo, ergo habet A vo lu nta tem ino rd ina tam . Si
fruitur B et fruitur A, ergo A est beatus in duobus
object is, quorum neutrum dependet ab al io, quia s icut
A beatus est in se, sic et in B ; sed consequens est im -
possibile, quia nihil potest esse actu beatum in duobus
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UNICITY OF GOD 86
A second arg um en t based on the inte llect is this. O ne
and the same act of intel le ct ion cannot have tw o adequate
objects. N ow A is i ts ow n adequate object of intel lec t ion ,
for the essence of A is the adequate object of A's intellec
t ion. Co nse que ntly B's essence is no t its adequate ob ject.
But i f A could know perfectly both i tself and B at
one and the same t ime, then B would be an adequate
object of 4̂'s intel le ct ion . T he ma jor is evident, for
otherwise the intellect could be perfectly satisfied and
have all that it is capable of even though its adequate
object were non-e xistent. Such an objec t, consequently,
would be useless.
[Second P ro o f]. A second w ay is this. A n y w i l l tha t
is inf inite wil ls things the way they should be wil led.
Therefore, it loves whatever is lovable to the extent that
it is lova ble. I f the object is in fin ite ly lova ble, the n such
a w il l loves it to the utm ost of its a bi l ity . But since B
is assumed to be another God, it must be loved infinitely.
Consequently, B inasmuch as i t is inf initely good must
be loved inf initely by any power capable of inf inite love.
The wi l l o f A ,
then,
loves B in fin ite ly. N o w this is
impossible since A naturally loves itself more than
B.s
Proof: Ev ery thing na tura l ly loves its ow n being more
than any other if it is neither a part nor an effect of this
other. But A is neither a pa rt n or the effect of B ; there
fore A loves i tself na tur al ly m ore tha n B. Bu t a free w il l
that loves things as they should be loved conforms itself
to th is na tura l w i l l ; otherwise the na tura l w i l l w ou ld
no t always be as it sh ould be. Th ere fore, i f A w ills as it
should,
then it elicits a greater act of love for itself than
for B and hence does not love B infinitely.
A second argument based on the will runs as follows.
E ith er A finds its happiness in B or it sim ply uses B . I f
it me rely uses B , then A's love is inordina te.9 I f it finds
its happiness in B as well as in itself, then A is beatified
by two dist inct objects, neither of which depends upon
the othe r, fo r A is made ju s t as ha ppy by B as it is by itself.
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87 DUNS SCOTUS
objectis
beatificantibus
to ta l ibus. Pro bat io : qu ia
utroque destructo ,
nihilominus
esset bea tus ; ergo in
neutro est beatus.
[Tert ia Via]. De te rt i a vi a, sci licet de rat ion e infiniti
[ b o n i ] ,
arguitur sic : voluntas ordinate potest appetere
majus bonum et magis amare majus b o n u m . Sed plura
bona inf in i ta , s i s int possibi l ia , p lus inc lud un t bon itat is
quam unum in f in i tu m ; ergo vo luntas ord inate p lus
posset amare p lura in f in i ta quam unum, et per con-
sequens in nullo uno objecto in f in i to qu ietare tur. Sed
hoc est contra rat ionem boni quod si t inf in i tum et non
quietat ivum cujuscumque vo luntat is .
[Quarta Via ] . Q ua n tu m ad qu ar tam viam de potent ia
in fi n it a arguo sic : n o n possunt esse duae causae totales
ejusdem effectus in eodem ord ine causae ; sed inf i n ita
potentia est causa totalis respectu cujuscumque effectus
in rat ione primae causae ; ergo nu ll a a lia potest esse in
ratione causae primae respectu alicujus effectus, et ita
nul la a l ia causa inf in i ta in potent ia.
Primam
proposi-
tionem pro bo : q u ia tun c posset a li q u id esse causa
alicujus a quo i l lud no n dependeret. Pr ob at io : a nu l lo
al iquid dependet essential i ter, quo non existente,
n ih ilo m in us esset ; sed si C h ab et duas causas totales
A et B, et in eodem ord ine , utro qu e
eorum
non existente,
nihilominus esset ipsum C ab a l tero e orum , qu ia non
existente A, nihi l minus est ipsum C ab ipso B et non
existente B, nihi l minus est G ab A.
Juxta i l lud argu i tur de un i ta te cu juscumque primi
i n quacumque pr im i ta te p raed ic ta . N ih i l enim est
excessum a duobus
primo
excede ntibus ;
vel
finitum
essentia liter ord ina tur [M S or di na nt ur ] ad duos primos
f ines. Esset [ M S essent] e nim a liq u id a d finem, qu o non
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UNICITY
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8 ]
But the consequent is impossible, for nothing finds its
complete happiness in each of two objects.10
Proof:
Either object could be destroyed and nevertheless the
being wou ld still be happy. Therefore in neither object
is it completely happy.
[Th ird Proo f]. The th ird way, based on the notion of
the infin ite good, is this. I t is proper for a w il l to seek
the greater good and love it more ardently. But if more
than one thing could be infinitely good, then together
they would contain more goodness than a single infinite
good. An orderly
wil l ,
consequently, could not be
perfectly satisfied w ith but one inf inite good. Yet to be
unable to satisfy perfectly any w il l whatsoever contradicts
the very notion of an infinite good.
[Fourth Proof]. M y fourth argument, from infinite
power, is this. Two causes of the same order cannot each
be the total cause of the same effect. But an inf in ite
power is the total primary cause of every single effect
that exists. Therefore, no other power can be the total
prim ary cause of any effect. Consequently, no other
cause is inf inite in power. M y proof of the first proposi
tion : I f this proposition did not hold, then a thing
could be the cause of something which does not depend
upon it. Proof: Nothing depends essentially on any
thing i f i t could exist even when this other is non-existent.
But if C has two total causes, A and B, each of which is
in the same order, then either could be non-existent and
still C would continue to exist in virtue of the other.
For if A were non-existent, C would still exist by reason
of B and if B were non-existent, C would exist by reason
of A.
This argument can be used to establish the unicity
of any of the primacies mentioned above [viz. efficiency,
finality and eminence].11 W hat exists for the sake of an
end is never essentially ordered to two ultimate ends,
for then, as we argued above, it would exist for the sake
of something which, as non-existent, would still be the
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88
DUNS SCOTUS
existente, n ih il m inus esset f initum, u t prius a rg u tu m
est ; et excessum esset essentialiter ab a liq u o , quo non
existente, nihil minus haberet essentiale excedens, quo
mensuraretur essentialiter et a quo acciperet suam
pe rfection em essentialiter : q uo d est imp ossibile ; ergo
impossibile
est
aliquorum duorum infinitorum
duos esse
fines primos vel du or um excessorum duo pr im a e m inent ia .
[Quinta V ia ]. De qu in ta v ia d ico, quod in f in i tu m non
potest exced i, et arg uo sic ; qua ecu m qu e perfe ctio potest
numerari
in diversis plus perfectionis habet in pluribus
quam in uno, s icut d ic i tur vin De Trinila te, c. I * ; ergo
in f i n i t u m
omnino
in p lur ibus numerar i non potest .
[Sexta V ia]. De sexta v ia primo arg uo sic : species
pluri f icabi l is sci l icet in indiv iduis non determinatur ex
se ad
certum numerum
ind iv iduorum, sed quantum es t
ex se com pat i tur in f i n i ta te m in d i v id uo ru m , s icut patet
in speciebus om nibus co rru pt ib i l ib us ; ergo si ra t io
necesse esse sit plurif icabil is in individuis, non determi -
nat se ad cer tum n um eru m , sed co m pa t i tur in f in i ta tem
q u a n tu m est ex se. Sed si possent esse in fi n it a necesse
esse, sun t in fi n it a necesse esse ; ergo , etc . Consequens
est
falsum
; ergo et antecedens ex qu o se qu itur .
Ista rat io in a l ia forma f iat ex rat ione primitatis sic :
Unum
u nius ratio nis se habens a d
plura
un ius
rationis
non de termina tur ad illam plural i tatem sive ad deter-
mina t ionem certam i l lo ru m . N o n est instant ia in natu ra
respectu
suppositorum nee
in causa respectu causatorum,
nisi instes in propo sito. Sed deitas erit u n u m unius ra-
viii,
cap. i (Migne, P.L.,
x l i i ,
947-948).
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UNICITY OF GOD
OO
end for whose sake the oth er exists. N ei th er is an y th in g
excel led to the u l t imate degree by two most per fect
beings, for then something could be non-existent and
sti l l excel something ei ther as i ts essential measure of
pe rfe cti on or as th a t f r o m wh ic h i t receives i ts essential
per fe ct ion . T hi s, how ever, is imp oss ib le. I t is no t pos
sible,
then, tha t two in f in i te be ings shou ld be u l t imate
ends, or that of two more perfect beings, both should
be the most excel lent .
[F i f t h P ro o f] . As to the fifth w ay , I say th at w h a t is
absolute ly in f in i te , can not be excel led. A n d I argue thus.
Any per fect ion tha t can ex is t in numer ica l ly d i f fe rent
things is more perfect i f i t exist in several than if i t exist
merely in one, as [Augustine] points out in De Trini tate,
bk .
v i n ,
c. i . * Th ere for e, w h a t is absolute ly in f in i te
cannot be found in several numer ica l ly d i f ferent th ings.
[Sixth P r o o f ] . T h e si xt h w ay th at I argu e is this. A
species which can be mul t ip l ied in more than one
ind iv idua l , i s no t o f i tse l f de termined to any cer ta in
nu mb er o f i nd iv idua ls bu t is com pat ib le w i t h an in f in i ty
o f ind iv i du als . T hi s is evide nt in the case of a l l per is h
able species. Th er ef or e, i f th e per fec tion of necessary
ex is tence can be mul t ip l ied in more than one ind iv idua l ,
i t is not of i tse l f restr ic ted to any cer ta in number, but is
co mp at ib le w i t h in f in i ty . B ut i f an in f in i ty o f necessary
beings can exist, the y do exist. Th er efo re, etc. T h e
cons equence is false ; henc e the an tec eden t is also false.
This argument can be reformulated on the basis of
[Go d 's ] p r im ac y as fo l lows. O ne th in g o f a g iven k in d
is not related to others of i ts kind in such a way that
i t is l i m i t ed to ju st th is p l ur a l i t y or to a ce r ta in nu m be r
of such th in gs. Th ere is no th in g in the na ture i tse l f
w h i ch requ i res tha t there be ju st so m an y ind iv id ua ls ,
nor in a cause that says there must be only so many
things caused, unless you insist on what we seek to prove
[v iz. that the nature is such that i t be found in but one
ind iv i du a l ] . Bu t d e i t y is one g iven k in d o f th in g , an d
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89 DUNS SCOTUS
tionis et per te se habe t a d
plura
unius rationis, ergo ex
se non determinatur ad certain pluralitatem s ingu la r ium
nee
potest
determinari
al iunde, quia hoc repugnat
p r i m o ,
ergo deitas est in suppositis infinit is. Ista rat io
videtur quod fundatur super hoc quod primitas est de
se ind eterm inata.
Secundo arguo sic et juxta istam v i am . Si sint plu ra
necesse esse, aliquibus perfectionibus realibus
d ist in-
guuntur. Sin t illae A et B. T u n c sic : au t ilia duo
distincta per A et B sunt formaliter necesse esse per A et
per B, aut no n. Si no n, ergo A n on est ra t io
formalis
essendi necessario, nee B. Per consequens, nee ergo ea
includens est necessarium p r i m o , qu ia inc lud i t aliquam
entitatem quae non est formaliter necessitas essendi,
nee
necessaria ex se. Si autem ilia sint formaliter necesse
esse per A et B, et prae ter haec
utrumque
est necesse
esse per
illud
in quo convenit
unum
cum al io, ergo
utrumque habet in se duas rat iones, quarum u t rumque
fo rm a lite r est necesse esse. Sed hoc est im po ss ibile , qu ia
neutra i l la ru m inc lu d i t a l teram ; u t raq ue ergo illarum
circumscripta, esset tale necesse esse per reliquam, et ita
a liq u id esset fo rm al ite r necesse esse per ra tio n e m a liq u a m ,
qua circumscripta, nihilominus esset necesse esse, quod
est im po ssibile.
[Septima V ia ]. De septima v ia, sci l icet omnipotent ia,
v idetur quod non s i t per ra t ionem naturalem
demon-
strabi le, quia omnipotent ia, ut a l ias patebi t , non potest
conclud i ra t ione natura l i , u t catho l ic i in te l l igunt
o m n i -
po ten t iam,
nee
con clud i tur ex ra t ione
infmitae
potent iae.
Tamen ex omnipotent ia credita argu i tur s ic proposi tum.
Si A est omn ipotens, ergo potest facere circa qu o d-
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UNIGITY
OF GOD
89
according to you is found in more than one indiv idual of
its k i nd . Th ere fore , de ity as such is no t de term ined to
any certain number of individuals nor can it be so
dete rm ined by a ny thin g other tha n itself , for this w ou ld be
repu gna nt to w ha t is tr u ly f irst. Th erefore , deity exists
in an inf in i te num ber of indiv idu als. Th is argum ent, as
we see, is based up on the no tio n tha t pr im ac y of itself is
indetermined.
The second argument I give, based on this way, runs
as follow s. I f several necessary beings existed, they
would be dist inguished from one another by some real
perfections. Le t us ca ll these A an d B. T h e n I argue,
either these two necessary beings which differ by A and B
are necessary formally in virtue of A and B, or they are
no t. I f no t, then A is no t a fo rm al reason for necessary
existence, an d the same is true o f B. He nce , whateve r
includes A or B is not primarily a necessary being,
because it includes some entity which is neither its
necessity of existence nor is i t necessary of itself. If ,
however, these two beings are formally necessary in
virtue of A and B, in addit ion to being necessary by
reason of what they have in common, then each being
contains two reasons w h y it is fo rm a lly necessary. T hi s,
however, is impossible for neither of these two reasons
includes the other, and hence if either of the two were
absent, the being would sti l l exist necessarily in virtue
o f w ha t remains. I n such an impossible situa tion , some
thing would owe its formal necessity to what could be
removed and still leave the being a necessary being.
[Seventh P ro o f] . As regards the seventh way , fro m
omnipotence, it seems that the thesis cannot be demon
strated by na tur al reason, for omnipotence—as Catholics
understand the term—cannot be demonstrated from
natural reason, nor does it fol low from the notion of
inf inite power, as wil l be shown later.
St i l l ,
i f omn i
potence be accepted on
fa i th ,
then one can argue that if
A is omnipotent, i t can make everything other than itself
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go DUNS SCOTUS
cumque aliud ipsum esse vel non esse, et it a posset
destruere B, et i ta faceret B null ipotentem, et sic sequi-
tur quod B non est
Deus.
Ista rat io non valet , s icut quidam respondent ad earn,
qu ia B non est ob jectum omnipotent iae, qu ia
o m n i -
po ten tia pro objecto respicit possibile ; B autem pone-
ba tu r
necessarium
sicut A.
Ideo
argu i tur a l i ter dec larando s ic ra t ionem Richard i
secundo De Trinitate, cap. x v i i vel u lt im o ,* u b i dic it sic :
facile efficere poterit quisquis omnipotens fueri t i ta quod
omne
al iud nih i l possi t , s icut omnipotens per
suum velle
[ M S add ve l sicut om nipote ns suo ve lle] potest prod ucere
quodcumque
possibi le, i ta suo nolle potest impedire vel
destruere om ne possibile. Sed si A est om nipo tens ,
potest velle omnia alia a se esse et ita suo velle ipsa in
esse pro du ce re. N o n necesse est a u te m qu od B
velit
omnia ilia esse quae vult A , qu ia vo luntas B co nt in-
genter se habet ad
i l ia ,
sicut voluntas A ad ilia quae B
v u lt, si est Deus. Si au tem B
nolit ilia esse,
ergo nu l lu m
i l -
lorum est. Ergo si sint duo om nipoten tes, ute rqu e illorum
faceret
alium
nu l l ipotentem, non destruendo i l ium sed
prohibendo per suum nolle esse
volitorum
ab al io.
Quod si dicas quasi sophist icando quod concordent
in voluntate sua, quamvis nulla sit necessitas, sed quasi
fecer in t pactum,
adhuc
probo quod neuter
eorum
erit
om nipotens ; na m si A est om nipo tens, potest pro
ducere suo vel le quodcumque producibi le vol i tum a l iud
a se. Ex hoc sequitur quo d B nu l lu m p ote ri t producere
suo vel le, et i ta non est om nipo tens . Q uo d aute m hoc
sequitur, patet ex quarta via, quia impossibi le est duas
*
i,
cap. xxv (Migne,
P.L.,
cxcvi,
902),
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UNICITY OF GOD 9<D
come in to existence o r go out o f existence. Co ns eq uen t ly ,
it can destroy B and thus render B impo tent. From this
it follows that B is not God.
Some
12
object that this reason does not hold since B
is not an object of omnipotence, for omnipotence has as
its object only what can, yet need not, exist, whereas B
is assumed to
be
just as necessary as A.
Wherefore, we must reformulate the argument of
Richard [of
St
V ic to r] in his work De Trinitate* where he
says : Whoever w il l have been omnipotent, w il l easily
be able to make everything else impotent . Just as an
omnipotent being
can
produce whatever is possible simply
by willing that it should be, so also he can impede or
destroy everything that is possible by w ill ing that it should
not be. But if A is omnipotent, he can w il l everything
other than himself and so, by his
wil l ,
cause everything
to exist. I t is not necessary, however, that B w il l every
thing which A wills because the will of B is related only
contingently to what A wills, even as the will of A is
related contingently to what B wills, assuming here that
each is G od. But i f B wills tha t none of these things
should exist, then none w il l exist. Consequently, i f two
omnipotent beings exist, each w i ll make the other im
potent, not indeed by destroying the other, but because
one by his positive w il l could keep non-existent what the
other wills should exist.
And if you say, to argue sophistically, that they
voluntarily agree on a common way of acting through
some sort of
pact,
even though there is really no in trinsic
necessity that they do so, still I prove that neither will
be omnipotent. For
if
A is omnipotent, by w illin g he can
produce every possible thing that can be produced and
thus B can produce nothing by willing and hence will
not be omnipotent. That this follows is clear from what
was said in the fourth way. For it is impossible that two
total causes should produce one and the same effect,
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91
DUNS SCOTUS
causas esse totales unius effectus, quia ex quo total i ter
causatus est ab una, impossibile est quod sit ab alia.
[A d Argumenta Pro Prima Opinione]
Ad argumenta
primo enim
ad
ilia
quae sunt pro al ia
opinione respondeo ad auctoritatem Rabb i Moys i e t
dico quod
Deum
esse
unum
credi tur in Lege quia enim
populus fu i t rudis et pronus ad idolatr iam. Ideo
indigui t instru i per Legem de uni tate Dei, l icet per
naturalem
rationem posset
demonst rar i . I ta etiam
acceptum est a Lege qu od Deus s it : E xo d. in * : Ego
sum qui sum, et Apostolus ad Hebraeos,f dic i t quod
oportet accedentem ad Deum credere quia est, et
tamen
non negatur D eu m esse dem onstrab i le. Erg o pari
rat ione
nee negandum
est posse de m on stra ri per rat io ne m
D e um esse u n u m , l icet accepta sit a Lege. I l ia et iam
possunt demonstrari ut i le est communitat i t radi et iam
per
viam
auctori tat is et propter negl igent iam
com-
munitatis in inqui rendo veritatem e t e t iam propter
impotentiam inte l lectus, et propter errores inquiren
dum per demonstrat ionem, qu ia ver i ta t ibus su is
multa
falsa permiscent, ut dicit Augustinus xvm De Civitate
Dei,l et ideo quia simplices sequentes tales demonstra-
tores possent dubitare, cui esset asserendum vel assentien-
d u m .
Ideo tu ta est via et stabi l is et com m unis , au cto ri-
tas certa [ M S add. circa] quae no n potest fallere
nee fa l l i .
Ad secundam rat ionem de singulari dico q u o d aliud
est
singularitatem
esse conceptam vel ut objectum vel
ut partem objecti , al iud singularitatem esse praecise
modum
concipiendi s ive sub quo concipi tur objectum.
Exem plum cum d ico un ive rsa le [A/5 v e l l e ] , ob jectum
conceptum est plural i tas, sed modus concipiendi, id est
modus sub quo co nc ipitu r, est singu laritas. I t a in
* Exodus, in. 14. f Heb. x i. 6.
X
xvm,
cap. xli (Migne, P.L.,
x l i ,
601).
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UNICITY OF GOD
g l
for what is caused completely by one cannot be caused
by the other.
[Reply to the arguments fo r the First Opinion] 13
First I answer the arguments for the other opinion,
rep lying first to the au tho rity of R ab bi Moses. I say
that the reason God's un icity was a m atter of bel ief in
the Law is to be found in the fact that the people were
unedu cated an d prone to ido latr y. Consequen tly, they
needed the Law to tel l them that there is but one God
even thou gh th is t r u th c ould be demonstrated by na tura l
reason.
T h e fact tha t Go d exists is also kn ow n fro m the
L a w , for instance, Exodus, i n * : I am who a m , and the
Apostle to the Hebrews f : F o r he who comes to G od
must believe tha t G od exists . Nevertheless, we do no t
deny that G od's existence is dem onstrab le. O n the same
grounds,
then,
we must not deny that reason can dem on
strate tha t there is b u t one G od ju s t because this is
accepted from the La w . Indeed it is good tha t m an y
things demonstrable in themselves be transmitted to the
human race by way of authority also because of man's
weakness of intellect, his neglect to seek the truth and
because of the mistakes he makes when he tries to
dem onstrate some thing. As Au gus tine says in the City
ofGod,X m uc h fa ls i ty is m ixed w ith t r u th , and since simple
people fol lowing such demonstrators could st i l l be in
doubt about what they must assent to, the
f i rm ,
safe and
com m on w ay is by means of au tho rity so cer tain i t can
neither deceive nor be deceived.
As for the second reason about the singular, I say that
it is one thing to conceive singularity as an object or part
o f an object. I t is qu ite another thin g to have sing ularity
as a mode of con cep tion or as the aspect unde r w hi ch the
object is con ceived . Fo r exa m ple, whe n I say a un i
versa l , the object conceived is plural i ty, but singularity
is the mode of conception, that is, it is conceived as a
singular th in g. So also w it h logical intent ions. W hen
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g2
DUNS SCOTUS
intent ionibus logic is, cum dico s ing u la re , quod con-
cip itu r est singularitas, sed mo dus sub quo co nc ipitur
est universal i tas, quia quod concipi tur ut concipi tur
habet indifferentiam ad
p lu ra .
I ta dico in proposi to,
quod essentia divina potest concipi ut singularis, i ta quod
singularitas sit concepta vel u t ob jectum vel ut pars
object i .
N o n
tamen
sequitur quod essentia possit cog-
nosci ut est singularis, ita quod singularitas sit modus
concept i . Cognoscere enim sic aliquid ut singulare est
i l lud
cognoscere ut hoc sicut a lb u m vi de tu r ut hoc. E t
hoc modo praedictum est quod non cognoscitur essentia
div ina sub rat ione singulari tat is, et ideo in argumento
est fa l lacia figurae d ict ion is, com m utan do rem in
m od um .
[Ad Argumenta Pr inc ipa l ia ]
Ad rat iones principales, d ico quod Apostolus loquitur
de idol is et ideo de di is nu nc up ativ e, et sub dit i b i *
Nobis autem unus est Deus, quia omnes d i i gen t ium
daem onia. ]'
Ad secundam dico quod consequent ia non valet , quia
numerus non est talis modus cognoscendi grammaticus
sicut a l i i m od i gram m aticales, q u i praecise dic un t m od um
concipiendi rei absque al iqua reali tate correspondente
tal i modo concipiendi ; unde [nee] dicunt praecise a l i
quid in re, a quo moveri possit intellectus ad talem
modum conc ip iendum, quamvis i l lud mot ivum non s i t
a l iqu id in re (masculinitas en im non requ i r i t a l iqu id
masculinum
in re sed al iquid correspondens
mascul i -
n i t a t i ,
scilicet potentiam activam ve l a l iqu id hu jusmodi) .
Sed numerus vere includi t rem substratum [MS sub-
t r ac t am ] .
U nd e sequi tur H om ine s cu rru nt , ergo p lures
homines c u rr u n t . Sed no n sic de aliis consignificatis
* i Cor.
vii i.
6. f Ps. xcv. 5.
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UNICITY OF GOD Q2
I say s in g u la r , i t is sing ular ity th at is conceived, bu t
the mode of conception is that of a universal, for what
I conceive is ind if fere nt to being m ore than one. A n d so
m y answer to their assu m ption is this. T h e divin e essence
can be conce ived as singu lar in the sense tha t s ing ula rity is
conceived either as the object or pa rt of the object. F ro m
this, however, it does not follow that the divine essence
can be known as singular in such a way that singularity
is the mode of conception, for to know something as
singular in this w ay is to kno w it as a th is jus t as a w hite
ob jec t is seen as this w h ite object. As we said above,14
the divine essence is not known under the aspect of
s ingu lari ty in th is m anner. Therefore, the argum ent
involves a fallacy of speech by substituting the mode for
the th ing.
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]
To the in i t ia l arguments,15 I say that the Apostle is
speaking of idols a nd hence of so-called g o d s , for in
the same passage he adds : Y e t for us there is on ly one
G o d ,
fo r a ll the gods of the Gentiles are de vils .
T o the second argument,16 I declare the consequence to
be invalid inasmuch as number is not l ike some of the
other grammatical modes which express precisely a mode
of conception without any reali ty that corresponds to the
conceptual mode, and consequently do not express pre
cisely something in real i ty by which the intel lect could
be m ov ed to conceive a th in g the wa y it does, even where
tha t m otive be not something in the th in g as such. For
a noun to be masculine, for instance, it is not necessary
tha t the th in g designated by the no un be itself mascu line.
It suffices if it have something resembling masculinity,
nam ely some active powe r or some such th ing . N um be r,
on the contrary, includes the underly ing th ing.
Con
sequently , f rom the proposit ion M e n are ru n n in g i t
follows th at several m en are ru n n in g . Such is no t the
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93 DUNS SCOTUS
nomin is
vel
verb i , qu ia
non
[ M S bene] sequitur : De us
est, ig i tur Deus est mascul inus , quia ad mascul in i tatem
suff ic i t a l iquid in re a quo
ille
modus concipiendi possit
accipi ,
pu ta act iv i tas. D ico ergo quo d illud solum
D i i conceptum sub modo p lu ra l i inc lud i t con t ra -
dict ionem, quia modus concipiendi repugnat e i quod
con cip i tur sub m odo. C um ig i tu r pro ba tur consequentia ,
quia idem includi t s ingulare et p lurale, d ico quod
singulare includi t i l lud sub modo concipiendi convenient i
ipsi concepto sed plurale includi t i l lud sub modo im -
possibi l i
i l l i
concepto, et ideo singulare includi t rat ionem
quasi in se veram p rou t inc lud i t conceptum e t modum
con cipiend i ; p lur ale autem prout includi t is ta duo
includi t rat ionem quasi in se
falsam
; et ideo no n
sequitur quod plurale s i t verum de p lu ra l i , s icut s ingulare
de sin gu la ri, qu ia de eo cujus est ra tio in se falsa n ih il
est ve ru m . Per i l l u d patet ad
aliam
p robat ionem, quo
majus cogitari non potest, quia non sunt di i cogitabi les
sine contradict ione, quia modus repugnat re i conceptae,
et ideo major est glossanda sicut prius est dictum in
quaestione prae cede nti. A d sensum autem et veritatem
requi r i tur quod rat io subject i non inc lud i t contra-
dict ionem, sicut dictum est in quaestione secunda hujus
dist inct ionis.*
Ad te r t iam d ico quod ilia major proposi t io non est
p r i m a ,
sed reduci tur ad
is tam,
omne imper fec tum
redu ci tur ad pe rfec tum . Et qu ia omne ens per pa rt i -
c ipat ionem est imperfectum, et tantum illud ens est
perfectum quod est ens per essentiam, ideo sequitur
Opus oxoniense,
i,
dist. n, q. i i , n. 5.
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UNICITY OF GOD 93
case,
however, with the other co-significates of a noun
or verb, for f ro m the propo si t ion G o d is [where the
noun God or
Deus
is masculine gender] it does not follow
that God Himself is masculine, for it suffices for a noun
to be masculine if there is something about the reality
tha t w o u ld jus t i fy this gender, for instance, ac tivity . I
say, therefore, tha t the subject g o d s conceived in the
plural form includes a contradict ion since the mode of
conception is repugnant to what is conceived under this
mode. As for the proo f of the consequence, viz . tha t
the singular and plural include the same thing, I reply
that the singular includes it in a conceptual mode that
is in ha rm on y w it h the thin g conceived whereas the
plural includes it in a conceptual mode that is incom
pa tible w it h the th in g conceived. So far
as
the conceptual
mode and the thing conceived are concerned, then, the
singular includes a notion that is, as it were, true in itself,
whereas the p lu ra l includes a no tio n th at is, as it were,
false in itself. Co nse que ntly, it does no t fo llow th a t the
plural is true of several as the singular is true of one, for
no th in g is tru e that is false i n itself. A n d in this wa y
we can answer the other p ro o f fo r the consequence based
on the prop osi t ion : T h er e is som ething in comparison
w i t h w hich no th ing greater can be conceived. For
g o d s
is not something conceivable without contradic
t i on ,
since the mode of conception is repugnant to the
th in g conceived. Con sequen tly, the m ajo r m ust be
glossed the way it was in the previous ques tion. Fo r
if the proposition is to be true or to make any sense,
it is necessary that the notion of the subject includes no
inherent contradict ion, as has been pointed out in the
second question of this dist inct ion.*
To the third
argument17
I reply that its major premise is
no t a pr im ar y t ru th bu t is reduced to th is : E ve ry th in g
impe rfect is trace d back to something perfect .18 Since
every being by part ic ipat ion is imperfect and only that
be ing w h ic h is such b y its essence is perfec t, there fore this
2 , 3 2 2 ;
1 4
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94 DUNS SCOTUS
proposi t io
i l ia ,
sci l icet quod omne ens per part icipa-
tionem reducitur ad ens per essentiam quod est per-
f e c tu m .
U t ig itu r vere possit sequi conclusio, haec
autem
major de [imjperfecto sic habet d is t ing ui . A l i q u id est
imperfectum
secundum perfect ionem simpl ic i ter, quae
non necessario habet imperfect ionem concomitantem
quia non inc lu d i t in se l im i ta t io ne m , s icut ho c b o n u m ,
h o c
v e r u m ,
ho c ens , e t
hujusmodi
imperfect io re
duc i tu r ad perfectum ejusdem ra t ion is , sc ilicet b o n u m ,
e n s , e t v e r u m , quae im po rtan t perfectiones s impl i
c i ter . A l iq u id autem est imp erfectum secundum per
fect ionem non simpl ic i ter, quae de rat ione sui includi t
l imitat ionem et ideo necessario habet imperfect ionem
annexam,
u t
hie
h o m o ,
hie
asinus , et hujusm odi
imperfecta non reducuntur ad perfectum per essent iam
absolute ejusdem rationis sicut ad
rationem specificam
quia ipsa adhuc inc lud i t imperfect ionem, qu ia l imi ta
t ionem ; sed redu cun tur ad perfectum primum quod
continet ea
supereminenter
et aequ ivoce. Q u od ergo
imperfectum est primo
m o d o ,
reduci tur ad perfectum
simpl ic i ter secundum perfect ionem i l l ius rat ionis, quia
a l iqu id secundum
istam
rat ionem potest esse simpliciter
perfectum. Q uo d autem est imp erfec tum secundo m odo
non reduci tur ad a l iqu id perfectum secundum per
fect ionem ejusdem rat ionis, quia enim ilia imperfec
t ionem inc lu d i t . Ideo ilia non potest esse perfectum
simpl ic i ter propter
illam
l im i ta t ion em . Sed reduc i tu r
ad a l iqu id s impl ic i ter perfectum aequivocum, eminenter
inc ludens i l la m perfectionem. Et ideo bo nu m im per
fectum reduci tur ad perfectum bonum, sed lap is , qu i
est imperfectus, non reduci tur ad lapidem perfectum
simpliciter, sed ad
summum
ens et ad
summum
b o n u m ,
quae inc ludunt v i r tua l i ter i l lam perfect ionem.
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UNICITY OF GOD 94
prop osit ion follows : E ve ry being by pa rt icip atio n is
traced back to a perfect being that is such by its essence .
Hence in order that the conclusion fol low, the major
premise rega rding the im pe rfe ct must be dist inguished
as follows. So m ething is imp erfec t according to pure
perfect ion.
A p ure perfection inasm uch as it includes no
limitation in itself does not necessarily include some
con
com itant imp erfect ion. Som ething imperfect according
to pure perfection, for instance, w o ul d be th is go o d ,
th is t rue th in g , th is b ei n g . Such imperfect th ings
are reducible to something perfect of the same character,
namely to the G oo d , the Tr u e , B e in g , a l l o f
w hic h im ply pure perfect ion. O the r th ings, however, are
imperfect according to m ixed perfect ion. A m ixed per
fect ion is one which includes some l imitat ion and there
fore necessarily has some added im pe rfec tion . T h is
m a n ,
th is d on ke y , and such l ike, w ou ld be imperfect
in this w ay . Such things are no t reduce d specifically
to something which possesses the same perfection abso
lut ely by its essence, for the latte r w ou ld s ti l l be im pe rfect
because it is l im it e d . The y are redu ced , however, to a
perfect First Being which contains them in a more perfect
and equivocal m anner. W h a t is impe rfect in the f irst
way ,
then,
is reduced to a pure perfe ction of the same
for m al cha racter, for som ething of this kin d can be simp ly
perfect. W h a t is imp erfec t in the second way , however,
cannot be reduced to something perfect of the same
formal character, for the latter includes imperfection.
Such a th ing by reason of th is l imitat ion,
then,
cannot
be simply perfect, but i t is reduced to something which
is sim ply perfect an d w hic h is of
a
dif ferent cha racter, bu t
includes the perfection of the imperfect being in a more
excellent w ay . Con seque ntly, an imp erfec t good is
reduced to a perfect good, but an imperfect stone is not
reduced to a stone which is simply perfect, but to the
Highest Being and the Greatest Good which vir tual ly
include this perfection.
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95 DUNS SGOTUS
A d ult imum d ic i tu r quod plura bona f in i ta sunt
meliora
paucioribus bonis finit is, non
autem
p lura bona
inf in i ta . Sed hoc no n vid et ur respondere ad
argu-
m e n t u m ,
qu ia quaecumque si essent meliora essent,
videntur ponenda esse in entibus, et
maxime
in ente
supremo quod est necesse esse, quia ibi quidquid posset
esse bonum est, et necesse est i b i esse. Sed p lu ra b ona
inf in i ta
si
essent essent m eli or a. V id e tu r ig itu r qu od plu ra
bona in f in i ta sunt ponenda in natura summi
bon i .
A d i l lud respondeo, quod cum d ic i tur in majori il ia
quae si essent essent m e lio ra , sunt p one nda i b i , dico
quod aut per
ly
s i im pl ica tu r posi t io possibilis aut
posi t io incom pos sibi l ium. Si primo modo d ico quod
major est vera et minor falsa, quia
implicatio ilia
in
minori no n possibilis sed inco m po ssib i l ium. Si autem
ly s i imp l icet pos i tionem incom possib i l ium , tunc m inor
est vera et major falsa, quae
enim
non essent meliora
nisi ex posit ione incompossibi l ium, non essent meliora,
nee etiam sunt bona, sicut i l lud quod non est nisi ex
posi t ione incompossibi l ium,
omnino
non est, sicut
nee
i l lud posi tum a quo dependet.
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UN1GITY OF GOD 95
T o the last,19 some say 20 that a greater number of f inite
goods is better than a lesser number, but that the same
is n ot tru e o f in fin ite goods. T hi s, how ever, does no t
seem to answer the diff iculty, for it seems that whatever
is better, if it can exist, should be assumed to exist in
some being and in part icular in that being which is
suprem e an d exists necessarily, for wh ateve r can be a goo d
exists there an d it is necessary tha t it exist there. N o w i f
several infinite goods existed, this would be better.
Therefore in a nature of the highest good it seems that
more than one infinite good must be assumed to exist.
To this I reply that when the major premise declares
th at those things are to be assumed to exist w h ic h
w ou ld be better i f they d id exist , the term i f impl ies
the assum ption o f som ething possible or so m ething im
possible. I f the first, the n I say the m ajo r is true an d the
m in o r false, for wh at the m in or implies is no t possible bu t
includes inc om pa tible notions. Bu t i f the
term,
i f
implies the assumption of the impossible, then the minor
is tru e an d the m ajo r false. Fo r if some things are better
only inasmuch as they assume the coexistence of in
compatible notions, then they are not real ly better, nor
for tha t m atte r are they rea l ly goo d. I t is the same w it h
something that can exist only if we assume the coexistence
of inco m pa t ib le not ions. Such a th i ng is s imp ly non
existent, and the same is true of the impossible basis
postulated for i t .
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V
C O N C E R N I N G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E
Summary of the Argument
Qu estion : Can any certain and unadulterated tru th be known
naturally by the intellect of
a
person in this life without the
special illum ina tion of the Uncreated Ligh t ?
Pro e t Cont ra
Body of the Question
The opinion of Henry of Ghent
Scotus's critique of Henry (in six articles)
Artic le I . Henry's arguments lead to scepticism
Article I I . Rejection of scepticism
u. Certitude of first principles
b. Experimental knowledge
c. Knowledge of our own acts
d. Certitude of
sense
knowledge
Article I I I . Reply to Henry's arguments
Article IV . Concerning Henry's conclusion
Artic le V . Solution of the Question
Reply to the Arguments at the beginning
Ar ticle V I . To what extent Henry's arguments hold
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97 DUNS SCOTUS
[ V . DE COGNITIONE HUMANA ] *
U l t imo q u a n tu m a d ma te r i a m istam cognoscibi l i tat is,
quaero an aliqua Veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter
cognosci ab
intellectu
viatoris absque
lucis
increatae
special
illustratione.
[Pro et Contra]
Arguo quod non :
ix
De Trinitate, cap. ul t im o sexto
vel decimo
qu in to
f
:
I n t u e a m u r inviolabilem ver i ta tem ex qua definiamus
qualis esse mens hominis sempiternis rationibus debeat.
Et ib idem, cap. dec imo quinto :
Aliis
supra
nos
regulis
manentibus ve l approbare ve l improbare conv inc imur
quando al iquid recte vel non recte probamus ve l
im -
probam us. E t ib id em , cap. decimo sept imo :
Artem
ineffabiliter pu lchram super aciem ment is s impl ic i
inte l l ige ntia capientes. E t
eodem,
cap. octavo vel
undevigesimo
J : I n
ilia
veri tate ex qua
temporalia
sunt
facta omnia formam conspicimus, atque inde conceptam
no t i t i am
tamquam verbum
apud nos habemus.
I t e m ,
libro duod ecimo , cap. secundo * * : Su bl imioris
rat ionis est ju di ca re de istis corp ora l ibus secundum
rationes sempiternas.
I t e m ,
in eodem duodecimo, cap. decimo quarto vel
trigesimo secundo f f : Non so lum rerum sensibilium in
locis positarum
stant
incommutabiles
ration es, etc. E t
quod intel l igat ib i de rat ionibus aeternis vere in Deo,
probatur per hoc quod ib idem d ic i t quod paucorum est
* Opus oxoniense,
i,
dist.
in ,
q. iv (Assisi 137, f.
30vb-33il>;
cf.
ViveS, VOL.
IX, l§'2a-Q.O']b'.
f ix, cap. vi (Migne, P.L.,
x l i i ,
966).
X cap. vii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 967).
* * xi i, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 999).
f t x ii , cap. xiv (Migne, P.L.,
x l i i ,
ioio).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
97
[ V . CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE]
Finally, on the subject of what we can know, I ask
whether any certain and unadulterated truth can be known natur
ally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special
illumination of the Uncreated Light ?
[Pro et Contra]
I argue tha t no such tr u th can be kn ow n
x
:
[ A r g .
1].
F ro m [St Au gus tine] : De Trinitate, bk.
rxf :
"But we gaze upon the indestruct ib le t ruth by reason of
which we may def ine perfect ly what the mind of man
should be acc ordin g to the eternal reasons". A n d again :
" W h e n we accept or reject som ething corre ctly, our
incontestable convict ion arises from other immutable
rules above our m in d s" . A n d again : "G ras ping by
simple intel l igence the unspeakably beautiful art that
lies bey ond the eye of the m in d . . ." . A n d in the same
work %
: " I n the eterna l t ru th f rom w hich a l l tem pora l
things are made, we behold the form . . , and we have
with in us l ike a Word the knowledge of what we have
conceived".
[ A r g .
11]. Also in bk. x i i * * : "B u t i t pertains to higher
reason to judge of these corporeal things according to
eternal reasons".
[ A r g .
in .
A n d in the same bk. x n f f : " A n d n ot
only are there immutable reasons for sensible things
posited in place, etc. . ." . T h a t Au gus tine here is
speaking of the eternal reasons that are really in God is
proved by the fact that he says in the same passage that
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98
DUNS SCOTUS
ad
illas
perven ire. Si
autem intelligeret
de
primis
princip i is, non est paucorum pervenire ad ilia sed
m u l t o r u m ,
quia omnibus sunt communia et nota.
I t e m ,
libro decimo quarto , cap. decimo qu in to vel
tr igesimo quarto,* loquens de injusto qui
multa
recte
laudat et v i tuperat in moribus ho m inu m , a i t : Qu ibus
regulis jud ica t , e tc. Et in fine a i t : U b i sunt illae regulae
scriptae nisi in l ibro
illo lucis.
L i b e r
ille lucis
est
in te l
lec ts d ivinus . Ig i tu r vult ut in ilia luce injustus videt
quae sunt juste agenda et qu od in al iqu o impresso ve l per
a l iquod
impressum
ab i l lo videtur, u t ib ide m d ic i t : U nd e
omnis lex justa in cor hom inis no n m igra nd o, sed
t a m -
quam
im prim en do transfertur s icut imago ex an nu lo, etc.
in ceram transit et annulum [ M S . ceram] non re l inqui t .
Ig i tu r in ilia luce v idemus, a qua impr imi tur in cor
homin is just i t ia ;
ilia
autem est lux increata.
I t e m , x i i
Confessionum
f
: S i
ambo
v idemus
verum
nee tu in me nee ego in te, sed ambo in ea quae supra
mentem
est inco m m uta bi l i ver i ta te . M ul ta e autem sunt
auctori tates August in i in
multis locis
ad
probandum
hanc
conclusionem.
Ad opposi tum :
R o m . i I : Inv is ib i l ia D ei a creatura mundi per ea
quae facta sunt intel lecta conspiciuntur.
Istae
rationes
aeternae sunt invis ib i l ia D e i ; ergo cognos cuntur ex
creaturis ; ig itu r ante visionem ista rum h ab etu r certa
cogni t io creaturarum.
* xiv , cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xu i , 1052).
•f x ii , cap. xxv (Migne, P.L.,
xxxn,
840). % Rom.
1.
20,
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 98
i t is the privi lege o f the few to atta in them . Fo r he w ou ld
not say this if he were speaking of f irst principles, since
the latter are not the privi lege of the few but the many,
inasmuch as f irst principles are common and known to
all .
[ A r g .
i v ] . Also in Book xr v ,* speaking of the unjust
man who correctly praises and blames many things in
the mores of m en , he asks : "B y w h at norms do they
j udge,
etc. . ." . A n d at the en d, he adds
:
"Wh e re
are these rules w rit te n except in th at book o f l ig h t. . " .
That "book of l ight" , however, is the div ine inte l lect .
Therefore, he wishes to say that it is in this l ight that the
unjust man sees what justice demands must be done.
And he sees this in something or by something impressed
upon him by this l ight, for as Augustine says in the same
place : " . . . whence every ju st law is transferred to the
heart of man not by passing from one place to another,
but by being impressed, as it were, even as the image is
transferred from the r ing to the wax without leaving the
r i n g " .
Th erefo re, we see in that l igh t by w hic h just ice
is im p rin te d up on the heart of
m a n .
T his l ig ht, however,
is the Uncreated Light.
[ A r g .
v ] . Lik ew ise , i n the Confessions, bk .
x n f
: " I f
both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me, nor do
I see it in yo u, bu t bo th o f us see it i n th at im m uta ble
t r u th w hic h is above the m in d " . No w there are ma ny
other places where statements of Augustine could be
found to support this conclusion.
To the contrary :
Romans I
%
: "F o r since the creation of the w o rld , God's
invisible attributes are clearly seen . . . being under
stood th ro ug h the things that are m ade. . ." . N o w the
invisible things of God are these eternal reasons.
Con
sequently, they are kn ow n fro m creatures. Th erefore ,
even be fore these ete rn al reasons are
seen,
we have certain
knowledge of creatures.
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99
DUNS SCOTUS
[Corpus Quaest ionis]
[Opinio Henrici]
In ista quaestione est opinio una tal is quod intentiones
generales habent inter se
ordinem na t u ra l em .
D e duabus
quae sunt ad propositum, videl icet de intentione entis et
ve r i [MS ub i ] loquamur.
In tent io pr ima est ent is , quod probatur per i l lud De
causis* proposit ionis qua rtae : P rim a
rerum
creatu-
rarum est esse, et in com m ento primae propositionis : Esse
est
vehementioris
adbaeren tiae. E t ra t io est qu ia entitas
est abs oluta ; Veritas decit respectum ad exem plar. Ex
hoc sequitur quod ens possit cognosci sub ratione ent i -
tat is,
l icet non sub ratione veritatis, et per consequens
ipsum quod est verum potest cognosci antequam cogno-
scatur ipsa Veritas.
Haec etiam conclusio probatur ex parte intel lectus,
qu ia ens potest co ncip i sim plic i
intelligentia
et tunc co nci-
p i tu r i l lu d quo d ve ru m est ; sed rat io veri tat is non
concipi tur n is i inte l l igent ia componente et d ivide nte ;
composit ionem et d iv is ionem
praecedit
s implex inte l l i
gentia.
Si autein qua eratu r de no tit i a entis, sive ejus quo d
verum est, dicitur quod intel lectus ex puris natural ibus
potest sic inte l ligere ve rum . Q uo d pro ba tur, qu ia incon-
veniens
est naturam esse expertem propriae operationis
secundum Damascenum,| e t hoc magis inconveniens est
in natura perfect ior i secundum Phi losophum, n De
caelo
et mundo,
\
de stel l is, quia magnum inconveniens
esset Stellas habere virtutem progressivam et non habere
instrumenta ad progrediendum ; ig i tu r cum prop r ia
* Liber
de causis, prop,
i, iv.
t Defide orthodoxa, n, cap. xxiii (Migne, P.G., xciv, 949).
X n, cap. vi ii
(290*,
30).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
99
[Body of the Quest ion]
[The opinion o f Henry o f Ghent]
One op in ion 2 reg ard ing this question m aintains tha t
a na tu ra l order exists am on g general notions. Le t us
discuss two of these which are relevant here, viz. the
not ion o f "be ing" and the no t ion o f " t rue" ,
That "being"is the f irst of these notions is proved from
the fourth proposit ion of the Liber
de
Causis* : " T h e first
of created things is b e in g " ; an d in the com m entary on
the f irst pro po sit ion : "B e ing is of stronger adh eren ce".
The reason for this is that entity is something absolute,
whereas tr u th imp l ies a re lat ion to an exemplar. Fr om
this i t fol lows th at a th in g can be kn ow n as an e ntity even
tho ug h its tr u th value is as yet un kn ow n. Conseq uently,
the thing which is true can be known before i ts truth is
known.
T he w ay the m in d functions provides a fur the r proof.
A be ing can be grasped by a n act of simple un ders tanding ,
an d in such a case the thin g wh ic h is true is kn ow n. Bu t
the tr u th value i tsel f is kn ow n on ly by an act of jud gm en t.
Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of
judgment .
Now if we ask about our knowledge of a being or of
the thing which is true, they tel l us that the intel lect by
reason of i ts purely natural powers can know the " t rue"
i n this sense. T h e pr oo f is this. I t is h ar d ly fitting th at
any nature exist wi thout i ts proper act iv i ty, as Damas
cene
says.f
T he m ore perfect the na ture in question the
less fitt ing that it should lack such operation, as the
Philosopher points out in speaking of the stars in De caelo
et mundo, bk . n . % For i t w ou ld be hig hly imp rop er for the
stars to have the powe r o f progressive mov em ent an d s t i l l
lack the means necessary for loc om ot ion . I f the proper
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100 DUNS SCOTUS
opcratio intellectus sit intelligere ve rum , v idetur incon-
veniens
quod natura non concesseri t inte l lectui
ilia
quae
suff iciunt ad hanc operat ionem.
Sed si loquamur de cognit ione veritat is, respondetur
quod sicut est duplex exemplar, creatum et
increatum,
secundum Platonem in Ti tnaeo* v idel icet exemplar
factum et non factum, s ive creatum et non creatum
(exemplar creatum est species universalis causata a re,
exemplar increatum est idea in
mente
d iv ina), i ta duplex
est conformitas ad exemplar et duplex Veritas ; una est
conformitas ad exemplar creatum et isto
modo
posuit
Aristotel is, veritates rerum cognosci per conformitatem
earum ad speciem in te l l ig ib i lem ; e t i ta v ide tur Augus-
tinus ponere
vin°
De Trinitate, cap. vii \ ubi
vult
quod
re rum notitiam generalem et specialem ex sensibus collec-
tam h abem us, secundum quam de quocumque occurrent
veritatem
jud icamus, quod
ipsum
sit tale
vel
tale.
Sed quod per tale exemplar acquisitum in nobis
habeatur omnino certa et infa l l ib i l is not i t ia veri tat is de
re,
hoc vide tur o m nino impossibile et hoc p rob atur
tr i p l ic i rat ione secundum istos. P rim a sumitur ex parte
rei de qua exemplar est extractum, secunda ex parte
subjecti in quo est, et tertia ex parte exemplaris in se.
Prim a ra t io est ta lis : O bje ctu m i l lud a quo abstrah i tur
exemplar est
mu tab i le .
I g it u r no n potest esse causa
al icujus immutabi l is , sed certa not i t ia a l icujus de al iquo
sub rat ione veri tat is in eo habetur per rat ionem
im -
m uta bi lem ; ig i t ur non hab etur per ta le exem plar.
Haec d ic i tur ra t io August in i Octoginta Ires quaestionum,
quaestio ix , J u b i d ic it qu od a sensibus n o n est
* Timaeus, 28.
f vnI>
cap. vi (Migne,
P.L.,
x l i i , 966).
} q. ix (Migne, P.L.,
x l ,
13).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
100
operation of the intel lect, however, is to know the thing
which is true, i t seems hardly f i t t ing that nature should
not endow the intel lect with what is prerequisite for such
an operat ion.
But as for knowing the truth i tself , they tel l us that
there are two exemplars, one created, the other un
created.
Th is is in accord w it h Plato, who mentions in
the Timaeus* one exem plar tha t is m ade , i.e. created , an d
one th at is no t m ade , i.e. unc reate d. T h e created
exemplar is the species of the universal caused by the
th ing .
T he uncrea ted exem plar is the idea in the divine
m i n d .
Consequently, a two fold t r u th and twofold
co nfo rm ity to an exem plar exists. On e is the con form ity
to the created exemplar, and it was in this sense that
Aristot le maintained that the truths of things are known
through their conformity to the intell igible species.3
Augustine, also, seems to hold this view in his work
De Trinitate, bk.
vin,f
where he m aintains that the know
ledge of things gleaned fr o m the senses is bo th of a general
an d of a pa rt icula r na ture. I n v ir tue of such knowledge
we jud ge the tr u th of any occurrence to be such or
such.
But it seems wholly impossible that such an acquired
exem plar should give us infa l l ible and com pletely certain
knowledge of a th ing . T he advocates of this op inion
give three reasons for such a con clusion . T h e first is
based upon the thing from which the exemplar is
abstracted, the second upon the subject in which the
exemplar inheres and the third upon the exemplar itself.
T h e first reason runs som ething like this. T he object
from which the exemplar is abstracted is i tself mutable ;
therefore it cannot be the cause of something unchange
able. B ut i t is only in virtue of some im m uta ble reason
th at someone can be certain that something is true. A n
exe m plar such as this,
then,
provides no such knowledge.
They claim this to be Augustine's argument in his
Eighty-three Questions, q. ix,J where he tells us not to look
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101
DUNS SCOTUS
expectanda Veritas, quia sensibil ia sine intermissione
mu ta n tu r .
Secunda ratio talis est : Anima est ex se mutabilis et
passiva erroris ; ig itu r per n ih i l
mutabilius
ea potest
ratificari sive regulari ne erret. Sed tale exe m plar in ea
est mu tab i l ius quam ipsa an im a si t. Ig i t u r i l lud exemplar
non perfecte regulat
animam
ne erre t. R e qu ir i t ur ergo
specialis influentia superior . Haec d i c i t ur ra t io Augus-
tini De vera religione * : Lex om niu m a r t i u m , etc.
Tert io ra t io : notitiam veri tat is nul lus habet certam
et infal l ibi lem nisi habeat unde possit
verum
discernere
a
ver is im i l i ,
quia si non possit discernere verum a falso
[MS secundo] vel a veris imi l i , potest dubitare se fal l i .
Sed per exemplar
praedictum
creatum non potest d is-
cern i ve ru m a ve ris im i l i ; ergo, etc. Pro ba t io minoris :
Species talis potest representare se tamquam se vel alio
modo
se tamquam objectum, sicut est in somniis, si
repraesentet se ta m q u a m ob je ctu m , falsitas est, si se
tam qu am se, Veritas est. Ig it u r per
talem
speciem non
habetur sufficiens d ist inct ivum quando repraesentat se ut
se vel u t ob jec tum , et i ta nee suff iciens dist inct ivum veri
a falso.
Ex ist is concludi tur quod certam scientiam et infa l l i
b i lem veri tatem si cont ingat hominem cognoscere, hoc
non convenit ei aspiciendo ad exemplar a re per sensus
acceptum quantumcumque s i t depuratum et un iversa le
f ac tum,
sed re qu ir i t ur qu od respic iat ad exemplar
incre atu m . E t tunc modus pon end i est iste : Deus no n
ut cog nitum habet rat ion em exemplaris ad qu od
aspi
ciendo cogn oscitur sincera Veritas. Est
enim
cogni tum
* cap. xxx (Migne, P.L., xxxiv ,
147).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 101
for truth from the senses, for what the senses perceive
constant ly undergoes change.
T h e second reaso n goes l ik e this. O f i tsel f the soul is
chang eable an d sub jec t to er ror . N o w a th in g w h ic h is
even more changeable than the soul i tsel f cannot correct
th is co nd i t i on or pre ven t the sou l f r o m er r in g. Bu t the
exemplar which inheres in the sou l i s even more mutab le
th a n the soul i tself . Co nse que nt ly , such an exe mp lar
does not regulate the soul so perfect ly that i t makes no
mis take . Som e specia l h ig he r inf lu en ce, th en , is re qu i re d.
T h i s , t he y say, is the ar gu m en t Au gu st i ne uses i n h is w o rk
De vera rel igione* : "S in ce the la w o f al l a r ts " , etc.
The third reason is that no-one possesses certain and
in fa l l ib le knowledge of the t ru th un less he can d is t ingu ish
the t ru th f rom what has on ly the appearance o f t ru th ,
for i f he is unable to tel l the true from the false or from
w h a t ap pears to be t ru e, he can st i l l be i n d o u bt w he th er
he is be in g dece ived or no t . N o w tr u t h can no t be dis
t ingu ished f rom what mere ly appears to be t rue by means
o f the aforesaid exe mp lar . Th er efo re , etc . Pr oo f o f the
m i n o r : Su ch a species ca n ei th er represe nt i tsel f as
species or, as happens in dreams, present i tself as an
ob jec t. I n the la tt er case, w e hav e fals i ty ; i n the fo rm er ,
t r u t h . T h e re is n o th in g ab ou t such a species th en th at
suff ices to di f ferent iate the f i rst mode of representat ion
from the second and thus to d is t inguish the t rue f rom the
false.
F r o m a l l th is they conc lude tha t i f m a n can kn ow the
infa l l ib le t ruth and possess certa in knowledge i t is not
because he looks upon an exemplar der ived f rom the
thing by way of the senses, no matter how much such an
ex em pla r m a y be pu r i f i ed a nd universa l ised. I t is neces
sary th at he look u po n the un crea ted exem plar . A n d
th e w a y the y assume this to ta ke pla ce is this.4 G o d does
not funct ion as exemplar in the sense that He is the object
kn o w n so tha t un adu l te ra ted t r u th is kn o w n by look in g
at H i m . Fo r G o d is kn o w n on ly un de r some genera l
(2,322) 15
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102
DUNS SCOTUS
in genera l i at tr ibute Sed est ratio cognoscendi ut
nu du m exemplar e t pro pr ia ra t io cognoscendi u t nu du m
exemplar et propria rat io essentiae creatae.
Qua l i t e r autem possit esse ratio cognoscendi et non
cogni tum poni tur exemplum, qu ia s icut rad ius solis
qua ndo quo de riva tur quasi ob l iqu ato aspectu a suo fonte
quandoque d i recte. Q uo d v ide tur in rad io
primo modo
derivato, l icet sol s i t rat io v idendi, non tamen ut visus in
se.
Ejus au tem q uo d vid etu r secundo m odo in rad io, sol
est i ta ra t io cognoscendi qu od etiam est cogn itus. Q ua nd o
igi tur ista lux increata inte l lectum quasi d irecto aspectu
i l lustr at , tun c u t v isa est ra t io v id en di a l ia in ipsa.
I n te l
lec tum autem nostrum pro s ta tu v iae quasi ob l iquato
aspectu i l lustrat, et ideo est intel lectui nostro rat io
v ide nd i non v isa.
Poni tur autem qual i ter habeat triplicem ra t i onem
respectu actus videndi, sci l icet lucis actuantis, speciei
immutant is, et caracteris s ive
exemplaris
conf igurant is.
Et ex hoc concludi tur u l t ra quod requir i tur special is
inf luent ia, quia s icut
ilia
essent ia non videtur natural i ter
a nobis in se, ita ut
ilia
essentia est exemplar respectu
alicujus essentiae n at ur al i te r non vi de tu r. Secund um
Augustinum
De videndo D e u m * I n ejus
enim
potes-
tate est v id er i ; s i v u l t , v id etu r ; s i no n v u l t , no n vide
tur . U l t im o ad di tu r qu od perfecta no t i t ia ver i ta t is est
quando duae species
exemplares
concurrun t in
mente,
una inhaerens, scil icet creata, alia i l lapsa, scil icet non
creata ; et sic co nting im us
verbum
perfecte veritat is.
(Arguo contra
istam opinionem
i n se, secundo c on tra
rationes fundamentales adductas vel econverso. Primum
inc lud i t quartum art icu lum, qu i est quasi ad hominem
cap.
vi (Migne, P.L.,
xxxni,
603).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 102
attr ibu te. Bu t God is the reason w hy we kno w inasmuch
as He is the sole exemplar and the proper reason for the
created essence.
The fol lowing example is used to explain how God can
be the reason why we know and yet not be known in
Him self. Some su nlig ht is reflected w hil e other rays come
dire ctly fro m the ir source. A n d even tho ug h the sun is
the reason why we see something by reflected sunlight,
the sun itself is no t seen. But for an object i l l u m in e d by
direct l ight, the sun is a reason for knowing that is also
k n o w n . I n s imi lar fashion,
then,
when the Uncreated
Light as i t were i l lumines an intel lect by a direct glance,
then this Light as seen is the reason for seeing the other
things i n it. I n the present l ife, however, this Unc rea ted
L ig h t i l lum ines our inte l lect ind irec t ly as i t were.
Con
sequently, though unseen itself, it is the reason why our
intellect sees.
Now they claim that the uncreated exemplar is related
to the act of vision in three ways, viz. as a st imulating
light, as a transforming species, and as the character or
exemplar which produces a l ike form [ in the inte l lect ] .
From this they conclude further that a special inf luence
is re qu ire d. Fo r ju st as na tu ra lly we do not see this
essence in
itself,
neither do we see it naturally as the
exem plar o f any essence. As Aug us tine puts it in his
work De videndo
Deum
* : " I t is in H is power to be seen.
I f he wishes it , He is seen ; if He docs no t wish it , He is
no t seen ". F in al l y, they ad d that perfect knowledge of
truth results when the two exemplar species concur in
the mind, viz. the created exemplar which inheres in the
soul and the uncreated exemplar which enters from
w itho ut. A n d i t is in th is wa y that we have the w or d of
t ruth perfect ly.
(First
5
I argue against the opinion in
itself;
secondly
I refute the reasons adduced in its favour or turn them
to m y advantage. U nd er the f irst hea ding falls the fo ur th
art icle.
I t is an argumentum ad
hominem,
as it were , whereas
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103 DUNS SCOTUS
et ter t ium qui est ad rem, secundum inc lud i t primum
articulum hie
e t te r t ium e t
sextum.
Q uin tus ergo
articulus est solutio quaestionis.)
Cont ra istam op in ionem, primo ostendo quod istae
rationes non sunt rat iones fundamentales alicujus op i -
nionis verae,
nee
secundum in ten t ionem
Augus t i n i ,
sed
sunt pro opinion e A ca de m ico rum . Secundo ostendo
quomodo
ilia
op in io Academicorum, quae v ide tur con-
cludi per istas ratione s, falsa sit. E t te rti o respondeo ad
rationes istas quatenus m inus co nclu du nt. Q ua rto arguo
contra conclusionem ist ius opinion is. Q u in to
solvo
quaestionem . Sexto ostendo qu om od o rat iones istae
quatenus sunt August in i concludunt i l lam in ten t ionem
Augus t in i ,
non i l lam ad
quam hie
i nducun tu r .
[Articu lus Primus. Rationes Henrici sunt pro Opinione
Academicorum]. P rim o, istae ratione s v id e n tu r con cludere
imp ossibi l i tatem certae cogn it ionis natu ral is. P rim a,
quia s i ob jectum cont inue mutatur nee potest haberi
a l iqua cert i tudo de ipso sub rat ione immutabi l is . Immo
nee in quocumque lumine posset cert i tudo haberi, quia
non est cert i tudo quando objectum al io modo cognos-
c i tur qu am se habet . Ig i tu r
nee
est certitudo cognos-
cendo m utab i le u t im m uta bi le . Patet etiam quod ante-
cedens hujus rat ionis, videl icet quod sensibi l ia continue
mu ta n tu r ,
falsum
est. Ha ec
enim
est opinio quae
impon i tu r Herac l i to iv Metaphysicae*
Sim i l iter , s i propter m uta bi l i t a te m exemplaris, quo d est
in
anima
no stra, no n posset esse ce rt i t ud o, cu m q u id q u id
po nitu r in anim a subject ive sit m uta bi le , et iam ipse actus
in te l l igendi , sequi tur quod per n ih i l in an ima rectificatur
anim a ne erre t. [N on Dun s]
8
(Sequ itur et iam qu od ipse
actus in te l l igen di cum s it m uta bi l io r q ua m ipsa an im a in
qua est, numquam eri t verus
nee
ver i ta tem cont inebi t . )
*
iv ,
cap. v
(ioioa,
6).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
103
the t h ir d ar ticle is ad rem. T h e second hea ding includes
the m ate ria l in the th ir d an d sixth art icles. T he f if th
art ic le ,
therefore, is the solution to the question.)
Against this opinion, in the f irst [art icle] I show that
these arguments are not a basis for any true opinion.
Neither are they in accord with the mind of August ine.
Instead they lead to the view of the Academicians.6
In the second [art icle], I show how the view of the
Academicians, which seems to follow from these reasons,
is false. I n the t h i r d , I answer these arguments in so far
as they are inconc lusive. I n the fo u rt h , I argue against
the conclusion of th is op inion [of H e n ry ] . I n the
fifth,
I solve the ques tion. I n the six th, I show ho w these
reasons, in so far as they are Augustine's, prove what
Augustine intended to prove rather than what they are
here used to prove.
[Article I . Henry's Arguments lead to
Scepticism].
First,
these reasons seem to imply the impossibil ity of any
ce rtain na tu ra l knowledge. Consider the f irst.7 I f an
object is co ntin ua lly chan ging we can have no cert i tude
abo ut i t by any ki n d of l igh t, for there can be no cert i tude
w he n an object is kn ow n in some wa y other th an the w ay
in wh ic h i t is. Ne ither is there any cert i tude in k no w ing
a changeable thi n g as uncha ngea ble. I t is also clear tha t
the antecedent of this argument is false, viz. that what
the senses can perceive is co nt inua lly c ha ng ing . This is
the op inion at t r ib ute d to Hera cl itus
in
Metaphysics, bk.
i v . *
Likewise, i f the mutabil i ty of the exemplar in our soul
makes cert i tude impossible, then it fol lows that nothing
in the soul could prevent i t f rom err ing, for everything
inhering in such a subject is also mutable—even the act
o f und ersta ndin g itself.8 ( I t fol lows furthe r tha t, inas
much as the act of understanding is even more mutable
th an the soul in w hi ch i t resides, i t w i l l never be tru e
nor contain t ruth.)
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104 DUNS SCOTUS
Simi l i ter , secundum istam opinionem species creata
inhaerens concurri t cum specie i l labente,
sed
quando
al iqu id concurr i t quod repugnat cert i tud in i , non potest
cert i tudo haberi , s icut enim ex altera de necessario et
altera de contingenti non sequitur conclusio nisi de
cont ingent i , i ta ex certo et incerto concurrent ibus ad
al iquam cognit ionem, non sequitur cognit io certa.
Idem pate t etiam de tertia ratione, quia si species ipsa
abstracta a re concurrat ad
omnem
cognit ionem et non
potest ju d i ca r i quando ilia repraesentat se tanquam se et
quando se tam qua m objectum ; ergo quo dcu m que aliud
concurrat , non potest haberi cert i tudo per quam dis-
cernatur verum a ver is im i l i . Istae ig i t ur rat iones vid en tur
concludere omnem incert i tud inem et op in ionem Acade-
m i co rum .
Q u o d
autem
ista conclusio non sit secundum inten-
tionem
Au gus t in i probo. August inus n
Soliloquiorum
* :
Spectabil ia discipl inarum quisque verissima esse nulla
du bita t ion e conce dit. E t Boethius De
hebdomadibus f
:
Communis animi conceptio est quam quisque probat
aud i tam. E t Philosophus n Metaphysicae \ : P rim a
pr inc ip ia sunt omnibus nota. Ex h is t r ibus au cto r i ta t i -
bus, arguitur sic quod convenit omnibus al icujus speciei,
sequitur
naturam speci f icam.
Ig i tu r cu m quisque habet
cer t i tud inem in fa l l ib i lem de
primis
pr incip i is et u l t ra
cuilibet est natural i ter evidens forma syl logismi perfecti
i
Pr iorum,**
scient ia autem conclusionum non dependet
nis i ex evident ia princip i i et ex evident ia i l la t ionis
syl lo-
gisticae, ig itu r c ui l ib et na tu ra l i te r scita potest esse quae-
cumque
conclusio demonstrabil is ex principi is per se
notis.
*
i i,
cap. xi (Migne, P.L.,
xxxn,
893-894).
t (Migne, P.L., lx iv , 131
i).
t 11, cap. i
(9936,
4).
* * Analytica
priora,
1,
cap. i i
(24'',
22-26).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
I04
Likewise, according to this opinion, the created species
which inheres in the soul concurs with the species that
enters fr o m w ith o u t. But no ce rtitud e is possible whe re
something incom pat ib le w it h cert i tude concurs. For just
as we can infer only a contingent proposit ion from a
necessary and a contingent proposit ion combined, so
also a concurrence of what is certain and what is un
certain does not produce certain knowledge.
The same reasoning clearly applies to the third
arg um en t. Fo r i f the species abstracted fro m the thin g
is a concurrent factor in al l knowledge, and if we cannot
judge when such a species represents itself as such and
when it represents itself as object, then it makes no
difference w h at concurs w it h such a species. W e shall
never have a certain norm for dist inguishing the true
fr o m wh at me rely appears to be true . These arguments
then seem to lead to the conclusion that all is uncertain,
the opinion of the Academicians.
T h a t such a conclusion is no t w ha t Augustine intende d
I prove fro m the second book of his Soliloquies * : "E ve ry
one concedes without hesitation that the proofs of the
sciences are mos t tr u e " . A n d Boethius says in De hebdo-
madibus\ : A common concept ion of the mind is that
w hic h is conclusive for anyone w ho hears i t " . A n d
the Philosoph er i n Metaphysics, bk .
i i , J
says : "F ir s t
principles are kn ow n to a l l . . ." . O n the basis of
these three testimonies, the following argument is
con
structed. W hateve r pertains to al l the members o f a
given species, springs from the specific nature itself.
Now since the knowledge of conclusions depends solely
upon the evidence of f irst principles and of the syllo
gist ic inference, then if everyone has infal l ible cert i tude
abo ut f irst principles and furthe r, i f the fo rm of the perfect
sy llogism as de fined i n Prior Analytics, bk. i , * * is natural ly
evident to everyone, then anyone can know natural ly
any con clusion dem onstrable fro m self-evident principles.
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105
DUNS SCOTUS
Secundo apparet quod August inus concedit
cer t i -
tud inem
eorum
quae cognoscuntur per experient iam
sensuum. U nde d ic i t x v De
Trinitate,
cap. x i i i vel xx x i i * :
Absit ut ea quae didicimus per sensus corporis vera esse
dubitemus
per ea quippe did ic imus caelum et
terram
et
ma re et om nia quae in eis sunt. Si no n dubita m us de
veri tate eo rum et no n fa l l im ur , u t patet ; ergo cert i
sumus de cognit is p er viam sensus. N a m ce rt i tu do habe-
tur quando exc lud i tur dubi ta t io e t decept io .
Patet etiam ter t io quod August inus concedi t
cer t i -
tud in em de actibus nostr is , ib ide m x v , cap. x i i ve l xx x i
f
sive dormiat s ive vig i let v iv i t , quia et dormire et in
somniis videre viven tis est. Q u o d si dicas : vivere non
esse actum secundum sed
p r im u m ,
sequitur ib idem : Si
al iquis dicat, scio me scire, me vivere, falli non potest,
e t iam
quotiescumque reflectendo
super p r imum
scitum
;
et ib id em : Si quis d ica t, volo esse beatus, quomodo non
impudenter respondetur, forte fal leris, et ibi ref lectendo
in in f in i tum sc io me velle etc. Ib id e m : Si quispiam
dicat errare nolo, nonne
eum
errare nolle
verum
est.
Et a l ia , inqui t , reper iuntur quae contra Academicos
valent qui n ih i l scir i ab homine posse concedunt.
Sequitur ibidem De tribus contra Academicos libris
\
quos qu i in te l lexer i t , n ih i l eum contra perceptionem
veri tat is
argumenta
eorum
multum movebun t .
I t em
eodem xv , cap . v i i i ve l xxxv i i i * * : I l ia quae sciuntur ut
numquam excidere possint et ad naturam ipsius animae
pert inent cujusmodi est i l lud quod nos vivere scimus.
(Notandum quod quat tuor sunt cogni t iones in qu ibus
est nobis necessaria certitudo, scilicet de scibilibus
* xv , cap. xi i (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,
1075).
t loc. cit. (1074).
t Libri tres contra Academicos (Migne, P.L., xxxii, 905-958).
** xv , cap. xv (Migne,
P.L.,
x l i i ,
1078).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IO5
Secondly, it is clear that Augustine concedes the
cert i tude of those things kn o w n t hr ou gh sense experience.
Hence he says in De Trinitate, bk . x v * : "F a r be i t
that
w e
shou ld do ub t abo ut those things w hic h we learn to be true
th ro u g h o ur bo di ly senses, for t hr ou gh these we learn the
heavens, the earth, the sea and al l that are in them".
If then we are not deceived nor in doubt about the truth
of these things, as is clearly the case, we are certain of
things known through the senses, for where doubt and
deception are excluded, we have cert i tude.
Thirdly, i t is c lear that in the same work August ine
also concedes that we have certitude regarding our
actions, f " H e is alive whe the r he be asleep or awake,
for it is a pa rt of l iv in g also to sleep and to see in dre am s".
And if it be objected that to l ive is not a second act but
a first act,9 he adds in the same place : " I f anyone sh ould
say, ' I know tha t I kno w or tha t I l iv e' , he cannot be
deceived, no matter how often he reflect on this first
know ledge". A n d in the same p lace : " A n d i f one says,
' I am ha pp y' , how can one say w itho ut being imp ude nt,
'Perhaps yo u are deceived'? A n d i f I reflect ad infinitum,
I kno w that I w i l l , an d so o n " . A n d i n the same place :
" I f anyone says I do no t wish to err, w il l i t not be true
tha t he does no t wish to err. . ." . " A n d other arg um ents ",
he says, "can be found which hold against the Acade
mic ians, wh o m ainta in that noth ing can be kno wn by
m a n " .
A n d in the same w or k : " I f anyone has read our
Contra
Academicos,X
the arguments against the perception
of t ru th g iven by the Academic ians w i l l not move h i m " .
Likew ise, in the same book * * : "Th ose things w hi ch are
kn ow n in such a wa y tha t they can never sl ip fro m the
mind but pertain to the nature of the soul i tself , of such
k in d is the knowledge tha t we l ive. . . " .
(Note 10 tha t there are fou r kinds of knowledge of
w hic h we are necessarily ce rtain, viz.
( i )
things knowable
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106
DUNS
SGOTUS
simpliciter
; de
scibilibus
per
experientiam
;
de
act ibus
nos tris ; et de co gn itis a nob is u t n un c pe r sensus ;
exemplum tr iangulus habet t res, etc. ;
luna
eclipsatur ;
v ig i lo ; i l lud est a lbum. Primum et tertium tantum
egent sensu ut occasione, quia simpliciter est certitudo
si
omnes
sensus errarent, secundum et quartum tenent
per
i l l u d ,
sci l icet quod frequenter evenit a non l ibero
habet i l lud pro per se causa natural i , ex hoc sequitur
proposi tum tarn in secundo
quam
in quarto a l iquando
ad ditu r prop osi t io necessaria. I ta qu e auctori tates
Augus-
t i n i
dimittas
usque ad art iculum secundum, qui est ad
re m vel q u i est solut io). (P rim um est m anifes tum , ter
tium conceditur esse per se n o t u m , a l ias non jud icaretur
q u id esset per se n o tu m . Secun dum et q u a rt u m haben t
infinitas per se notas quibu s ju n g u n t al ias ex plurib us
sensibus).
Sic patet pr imum
quomadmodum
rat iones i l l ius non
concludunt et quod hoc falsum s it e t contra A ug us t inum .
[Articulus Secundus. Reprobatio Scepticisms]. Q u a n tu m
ad secundum art iculum ut in nul l is cognoscibi l ibus
locum habeat error Academicorum, v idendum est
qua l i -
ter de tribus cognoscibi l ibus praedict is
dicendum
est,
videl icet de prin cip i is per se notis et de conc lusionibus,
et secundo de cognit is per experientiam, et tert io de
actibus nostris,
utrum
possi t natural i ter haberi cert i tudo
infal l ib i l is .
[a.
De Notitia Princip iorum]. Q u a n tu m ergo ad
cert i tud inem de pr inc ip i is d ico s ic . T e rm in i p r i n
cipiorum per se
notorum talem
habent iden t i ta tem u t
alter evidenter necessario alteram includat, et ideo
intel lectus componens illos terminos, ex quo apprehendit
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE Io6
in an unquali f ied sense, (2) things knowable through
experience, (3) our actions, (4) things known at the
present tim e thro ug h the senses. A n exam ple [o f each] :
(1) A tria ng le has three [angles eq ual to tw o right ang les],
(2) The moon is eclipsed, (3) I am awake, (4) That is
whi te .
T h e first an d th ir d req uire the senses m ere ly as
an occasion, because even if all the senses erred, there
w ou ld st i l l be cert i tude purely and simply. Th e second
an d fo ur th hold in v ir tu e of th is proposi t ion : 'Whatever
happens frequently through something that is not free,
has this som ething as its n a tu ra l per se caus e". F ro m
this principle cert i tude fol lows in the second and fourth
cases w he n the other pr op os ition is necessary. Th ere fore
you can let the arguments f rom the au tho ri ty of Augus t ine
go u n ti l the second art icle , w h ic h is ad rem, or to the [f i f th
art ic le] w h ic h is the solut ion.) (Th e u first is manifest,
the t h ir d is conceded to be self-evident ; otherwise we
co uld no t jud ge wh at is self-evident. T h e second an d
fourth have an inf inity of self-evident truths to which
others are added which are based on the testimony of
several senses.)
And so the first article is clear, viz. that the reasons
[of Henry] are inconclusive, that his opinion is false and
not in accord with the mind of August ine.
[Ar ticle I I . The Rejection o f Scepticism]. As regards
the second article, lest the error of the Academicians be
repeated in regard to any of those things which can be
k n o w n , we must see what is to be said of the three types
of knowledge m ention ed above, viz. wh ether i t is possible
to have infal l ib le cert i tude natural ly :
(1)
of self-evident
principles and conclusions, (2) of things known by ex
perience, and (3) of our actions.
[a. Certitude of First Principles]. As to the cert i tude
o f prin cip les , I have this to say. T h e terms of self-
evide nt principles are so ide ntica l tha t i t is evident tha t
one necessarily includes the othe r. Con seque ntly, the
intel lect unit ing these terms in a proposit ion, from the
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107 DUNS SCOTUS
eos,
habet
apud
se necessariam
causam
conformitat is
i l l ius actus componendi ad ipsos terminos quorum est
composit io, et
etiam
causam evidentem tal is conformi
tat is,
et ideo necessario patet sibi ilia conformitas cujus
causam evidentem appre hend i t in term in is . Ig i tu r non
potest in
intellectu
apprehensio esse terminorum et
composit io eo rum, quin stet conformitas i l l ius
com-
posit ionis ad terminos, sicut stare non potest album et
a l b u m ,
qu in s te t s im i l i tudo. Haec
autem
conformitas
compositionis ad terminos est Veritas compositionis.
Ergo non potest stare composit io
talium
t e rm in o ru m
q u in sit vera . E t i ta no n potest stare perce ptio i ll ius
composit ionis et percept io terminorum, quin stet per
ceptio conformitat is composit ionis ad terminos, et i ta
percept io veri tat is quia prima percepta evidenter
inc ludunt perceptionem ist ius veritat is.
Confirmatur rat io ista per simile per Philosophum rv
Metaphysicae* ubi
vult
quod opposi tum pr inc ip i i non
potest in in te l lec tu al icujus ven ire, sci licet hujus m od i im -
possibile idem esse et non esse, quia tunc essent opiniones
contrariae
simul
i n
mente
; quo d ut iqu e
verum
est de
opinionibus contrari is, id est repugnant ibus formal i ter,
quia opinio opinans esse de aliquo et opinio opinans
non esse de
eodom,
sunt form al i te r repugnantes. I t a
arguam in proposi to , repugnant iam aliquam intel lec-
tionum
in m ente, l icet no n form alem ; s i
enim
stat in
intel lectu not i t ia tot ius et part is, et composit io eorum,
cum ista includant sicut causa necessaria conformitatem
composit ionis ad terminos, si stet in intel lectu haec
opinio, quod ipsa composit io sit falsa, stabunt noti t iae
repugnantes ; no n form al i te r, sed no t i t ia una stabi t cum
*
iv ,
cap. ii i
(1005', 23-24).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
107
very fact that it grasps these terms, has present to itself
the necessary cause, an d w ha t is
more—the
ev ident cause,
of the conformity of th is proposi t ion with the terms that
compose i t . Th is con form ity,
then,
the evident cause of
which the intellect perceives in the terms, cannot help
bu t be evident to the intel lect. T h a t is w hy the intel lect
could not apprehend these terms and unite them in a
proposi t ion without having th is re lat ionship of
con
formity arise between the proposit ion and the terms, any
m ore tha n tw o wh ite objects could exist w ith ou t a rela t ion
ship of sim ilar i ty arising between them . N o w it is pre
cisely this conformity of the proposition to the terms that
constitutes the tr u th of a jud gm en t. Such terms then
cannot be combined in a judg m en t w i tho ut be ing true,
an d so i t is th at one canno t perceive this prop os ition an d
its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the
proposit ion to the terms, and therefore, perceiving the
t r u th .
For w h at is f irst perceived evid en tly includes
the perception of the truth of the proposit ion.
I n Metaphysics,, bk.
r v , *
the Philosopher confirms this
reasoning by a simile. Th ere he points ou t tha t the
opposite o f a first pr in cip le such as " I t is impossible th at
the same th ing be and not b e ", cannot enter the m in d of
anyone because then the mind would possess contrary
opinions simultaneously. Th is is indeed true of co ntrar y
opinions, that is, propositions formally opposed to each
other. Fo r the opinions a ttr ib ut in g existence and
non
existence to one and the same th in g are fo rm all y opposed.
And so in the question at hand, I argue that there is
some kind of repugnance existing between intellections
in the mind, even though i t is not exact ly a formal
opposi t ion.
For i f the in te llect possesses the kno wledg e
of "who le" and o f "par t " and combines them in a p ro
posi t ion, since they include the necessary reason for the
conformity of the proposit ion to the terms, i f the intel lect
were to th ink th is proposi t ion fa lse, two mutual ly repug
nant acts of knowledge would coexist, even though the
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108
DUNS SCOTUS
al ia, et tamen erit causa necessaria oppositae notitiae
ad
i l l a m ,
qu od est impo ssibi le. Sicut enim impossibile
est a lbum et n igrum
simul
stare, quia sunt contraria
formaliter, i ta impossibi le est simul stare album et illud
quod est praecise causa
n i g r i ,
ita necessario quod non
potest esse sine eo absque contradictione.
Habi ta cert i tud ine de pr inc ip i is
primis
patet quomodo
habebitur de conclusionibus i l lat is ex eis propter evi-
dentiam
syl logismi perfecti , cum cert i tudo conclusionis
tantumodo dependeat ex cert i tudine
principiorum
et ex
evident ia i l la t ioais.
Sed numquid in is ta not i t ia pr inc ip iorum et con-
c lus ionum non errab i t intellectus si sensus omnes deci-
piantur c irca
terminos
? Respondeo qu an tum ad
istam
no t i t i am , quod intellectus non habet sensus pro causa,
sed
tantum
pro occasione, quia intel lectus non potest
habere not i t iam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus.
I l ia tamen accepta vir tute sua potest s imul componere
sim plicia , et si ex ra t ion e
talium
s im pl ic ium s it com plex io
evidenter vera, inte l lectus vir tute propria et terminorum
assentiet i l l i complexioni non virtute sensus a quo
accipi t terminos exterius. E xe m plu m : s i ra t io tot ius
et rat io majoritatis accipiatur a sensu et intellectus
componat istam :
Omne totum
est
majus
sua parte, in
tel lectus virtute sui et istorum terminorum assent iet
indubi tanter is t i complex ion i e t non tantum quia v id i t
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 108
opp osit ion is no t precisely fo rm al . T h e one act of kn ow
ledge would be co-present with the other even though
the first is the necessary cause of the very opposite of the
second,
w h ic h is impo ssible. For ju s t as it is impossible
for white to be at the same time black because the two
are formally contraries, so it is also impossible to have
the white where you have the precise cause of blackness.
The necessity in this case is of such a kind that i t would
be a contradict ion to have the one [viz. the knowledge of
the terms and the pro pos i t ion] w ith o ut the other [v iz. the
knowledge of the conformity between the two].
Once we have cert i tude of first principles, it is clear
how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from
such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident,12
and the certitude of the conclusion depends solely upon
the certitude of the principles and the evidence of the
inference.
But wil l the intel lect not err in i ts knowledge of
principles and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived
ab ou t the terms? I re ply th at so far as this k in d of kn ow
ledge goes, the senses are not a cause but merely an
occasion of the intellect's knowledge, for the intellect
cannot have any knowledge of the terms of a proposit ion
unless it has take n the m fr o m the senses. B u t once it
has them, the intel lect by i ts own power can form pro
posit ions w it h these terms. A n d if a prop osit ion be
evidently true by reason of the terms involved, the
intellect by its own power will assent to this proposition
in vi rtu e o f the terms an d no t b y reason of the senses fro m
w hi ch i t externally received the terms. T o give an
example : I f the not ion of "w h o le " and the not ion of
"greater
t h a n "
be take n fro m the senses an d the inte llect
form the proposi t ion "Every whole is greater than i ts
part" , the inte l lect by i ts own power and in v ir tue of the
terms wil l assent to this proposit ion without the shadow
of doub t. A n d i t does no t assent to this because i t sees
these terms verif ied in some thing, as it does when it
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log DUNS SCOTUS
term inos conjun ctos i n re, sicut assentit isti : Sortes
est a lbus, quia v idet terminos in re un i r i .
Immo d ico quod si omnes sensus essent falsi a quibus
accip iuntur ta les termin i vel quod plus est ad decep-
t ionem,
aliqui sensus falsi et aliqui sensus
ve r i ,
intel lectus
circa talia p r inc ip ia non deciperetur, qu ia semper hab eret
apud se terminos qui essent causa veritatis, utpote si
a lic u i caeco na to essent impressae [ M S om. miraculose in
somniis] species albedinis et nigredinis et illae remanerent
post in v ig i l ia, inte l lectus
abstrahens
ab eis componeret
is tam : a lb um n on est n ig ru m , et c i rca istam n o n
deci
peretur inte l lectus, l icet termini accip iantur a sensu
errante, quia rat io
formalis terminorum
a d
quam
deven-
tum est, est necessaria causa veritatis hujus negativae.
[b . De cognitis per experientiam]. D e secundis , sci
l icet de cognit is per experientiam, dico quod l icet expe-
rientia non habeatur de omnibus singularibus, sed de
pluribus, neque quod semper, sed quod pluries, tamen
expertus infal l ibi l i ter novit quia i ta est et semper et in
omnibus, et hoc per istam proposit ionem qui est quies-
centem in anima : Q ui dq ui d evenit u t in p lur ibu s ab
aliqua causa non libera, est effectus naturalis i l l ius
causae, quae propositio nota est intellectui l icet acce-
pisset term inos ejus a sensu er ran te. Q u ia causa no n
l ibera non potest producere ut in p lur ibus
effectum
non
libere ad cujus opposi tum ord inatur, ve l ad quem ex
sua form a no n or din at ur . Sed causa casualis or di na tu r
ad producendum oppositum effectus casual is, vel non
ad i l iu m pro duc en du m . Erg o, n ih i l est causa casualis
effectus frequenter producti ab eo, et i ta si non sit l ibera
erit causa natural is.
Iste autem
effectus evenit a tali
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
log
assents to the proposition "Socrates is white", because it
saw the terms united in real i ty.
I ndeed , if the senses from which these terms were
received were a ll false, or w ha t is m ore deceptive, if some
were false and others true, I st i l l maintain that the in te l
lect would not be deceived about such principles,
because the terms which are the cause of the truth would
always be present to the intellect. And so i t would be
if the species of whiteness and blackness were impressed
m iraculous ly in s leep up on one w ho was b l in d fro m b ir th
and they rem ained af ter he awoke. Th e intel lect cou ld
abstract f rom these and form the proposi t ion "White is
not b la ck " . A n d i t w ou ld not be deceived w i t h regard
to this proposit ion even if the terms were derived from
erring senses, because the formal meaning of the terms
at which the intellect has arrived is the necessary cause
of th is negat ive truth.
\b. Experimental
Knowledge].
As for w ha t is kn ow n
b y experience, I have this to say. Ev en th ou gh a person
does not experience every single individual, but only a
great many, nor does he experience them at all t imes,
but only frequently, st i l l he knows infal l ibly that i t is
always this way an d holds for all instances. H e knows
this in v irt u e of this pro po sition reposing i n his soul :
"Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause
th a t is no t free, is the n a tu ra l effect of th at cause ". This
pro po sit ion is kno w n to the intel lect even if the terms are
derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not
act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that
is the very opposite of what i t is ordained by i ts form to
pro du ce . T h e chance cause, however, is ord aine d either
to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance
effect. Con seque ntly, if the effect occurs freq ue ntly it
is not produced by chance and its cause therefore will be
a n a tu ra l cause i f it is no t a free agen t. But this effect
occurs th ro ug h such a cause. Th ere fore , since the latte r
2 , 3 2 2 ) 16
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110
DUNS SCOTUS
causa, ergo i l lud est causa naturalis effectus frequenter
product i ab eo, qu ia non est casualis.
Iste enim
effectus
evenit
a tal i causa ut in pluribus,
hoc acceptum est per experientiam, quia inveniendo
talem naturam
nunc cum ta l i acc idente nunc cum ta l i
inventum est quod quantacumque esset diversitas
accident ium, semper istam naturam sequebatur ta l is
effectus, igitur non per al iquod accidens ist i naturae
sed per naturam ipsam in se se qu itur talis effectus.
Sed ulterius
notandum
quod quandoque acc ip i tur
experientia de conclusione, puta quod luna frequenter
eclipsatur, et tunc supposita conclusione quia ita est,
inquiri tur causa tal is conclusionis per viam divisionis, et
quandoq ue deve nitur ex conclusione experta ad pr inc ip ia
nota ex terminis, et tunc ex ta l i pr incip io noto ex
terminis potest conclusio, priu s tantum secundum experi
entiam nota, certius cognosci, scil icet primo genere cogni-
t ionis,
qu ia u t deducta ex prin cip io per se no to, s icut
istud est per se n o t u m , q u o d opacum interpositum
in ter
perspicuum
e t lumen,
impedit
mu l t i p l i ca t ionem
lum inis ad ta le perspicuum ; et s i in ve nt um fueri t per
div is ionem quod terra ta le est corpus interposi tum
inter
solem
et
l u n a m ,
scietur cert issime demonstrat ione
prop te r
q u i d ,
qu ia per causam e t non tantum per ex
perientiam, sicut sciebatur ista conclusio ante inventio-
nem p r inc ip i i .
Quandoque autem est experientia de principio i ta
quod non cont ingi t per v iam div is ionis invenire ul ter ius
pr in c ip ium no tum ex term in is , sed sta tur in a l iquo uno
ut in pluribus cujus extrema per exper imentum scitum
est frequenter
u n i r i ,
pu ta quod
haec
herba talis speciei
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C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E
I 10
is not a chance cause, it is the natural cause of the effect
it frequently produces.
That such an effect occurs frequently through such a
cause is a fact gathered from experience. For once we
find such a nature associated at one time with this
accident and at another with that, we have discovered
that despite the accidental differences, such an effect
inva riably follows from this nature. Hence, such an
effect is not the result of what is merely incidental to
such a nature but is rather the effect of this nature as
such.
It should be noted further that at times we experience
[the tru th ] of a conclusion, such as : "T he moon is
frequently eclipsed". Th en , granting the va lidity o f this
conclusion because it is a fact, we proceed by the method
of divis ion to discover the reason for this. And sometimes,
beginning with a conclusion thus experienced, a person
arrives at self-evident princ iples. I n such a case, the
conclusion which at
first
was known only by experience
now is known by reason of such a principle with even
greater certainty, namely that characteristic of the first
kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a self-
evident princ iple . Thus for instance, i t is a self-evident
principle that when an opaque body is placed between
a visible object and the source of light, the transmission
of ligh t to such an object is prevented. Now, i f a person
discovers by way of division that the earth is such an
opaque body interposed between sun and moon, our
conclusion w il l no longer be known merely by experience
as was the case before we discovered this princip le. I t
will be now known most certainly by a demonstration
of th e reasoned fact,13 for i t is known through its cause.
Sometimes, however, we experience a princ iple in such
a way that it is impossible to discover by further division
any self-evident princ iple from wh ich i t could be derived.
Instead we must be satisfied w it h a pr inciple whose terms
are known by experience to be frequently united, for
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I l l
DUNS
SGOTUS
est calida
nee
i nven i tu r m ed ium
aliud
pr ius per quod
demonstretur passio de subjecto propter qu id , sed statur
in isto sicut
primo
noto propter experient ias, l icet tunc
ce rt i tud o et infa l l ib i l i ta s [read inc er t i tu do et fa l l ib i l i tas ]
removeantur per istam p ropos i t ionem : effectus ut in
plu rib us al icujus causae no n l iberae , est na tur al is effectus
ejus ; tamen iste est ult imus gradus cognitionis scienti-
f icae et forte ibi non
habetur
cognit io actual is unionis
ext re m oru m sed ap t i tud in a l is . Si enim passio est alia
res absoluta a subjecto, posset sine contradictione sepa-
ra ri a subjecto, et expertus no n haberet cog nit ion em qu ia
ita est, sed quia ita
aptum natum
est esse.
[c. De actibus nostris]. D e te rti is co gn itio nibus ,
scili
cet de actibus nostris, dico quod est cert i tudo de multis
eorum sicut de
primis
et per se notis, quod patet
rv
Meta-
physicae* ubi dicit Philosophus de rat ionibus dicentium
omnia apparentia esse vera, quod
illae
rat iones quaerunt
utrum nunc v ig i lemus an dormiamus, possunt autem
idem omnes dubi ta t iones ta les omnium enim rationum
h i i
dignificant
esse, et sub dit , ra t ion em qua eru nt qu oru m
no n est ra t io ; dem onstrat ionis en im p rin c ip i i non est
dem onstrat io. Ergo per ipsum ibi nos vigilare est per se
n o t u m ,
s icut pr inc ip ium demonstrat ion is .
Nee obstat quod est contingens, quia sicut dictum est
alias ; ordo est in con t inge nt ibu s, qu od al iq ua est p r im a
et immedia ta , vel esset processus in infinitum in con
t ingent ibus, vel al iquod contingens sequeretur ex causa
necessaria, quorum
utrumque
est impos sibile. E t sicut
IV, cap. vi
( i o n " ,
6-13 .
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I I I
example, tha t a certain species of herb is hot. Neither
do we find any other prior means of demonstrating just
why this attribute belongs to this particular subject, but
must content ourselves with this
as
a first principle known
from experience. Now even though the uncertainty and
fallibility in such a case may be removed by the pro
position "What occurs in most instances by means of a
cause tha t is not free is the natura l effect of such a cause",
still this is the very lowest degree of scientific knowledge
—and
perhaps we have here no
knowledge
of the actual
union of the terms but only a knowledge of what is apt
to be the case. For i f an attribute is an absolute entity
other than the subject, it could be separated from its
subject w ithout involving any con tradiction. Hence, the
person whose knowledge is based on experience would
not know whether such a thing is actually so or not, but
only that by its nature is it apt to be so.
[c. Knowledge o f Our Own Acts]. Regarding the th i rd
type o f knowledge, v iz . o f our acts, I say that we are
as certain o f many o f these as we are of the first and
self-evident propositions,
as is
clear from Metaphysics,
bk . i v . * There the Philosopher says
to the
arguments
o f
those who say that a l l that appears is true that they look
for proofs o f whether we are no w awake or asleep. " A l l
these doubts, however, amount to the same thing, for
they
a l l
th ink tha t there is
a
reason
fo r
everything."
A n d
he adds
:
"T h ey seek the reason
fo r
things of wh ich there
is
no
reason,
fo r
there
is no
demonstration
o f
a principle
of demo nstrat ion". Accord ing
t o h im ,
then,
the
fact
that we are awake is as self-evident as a pr inciple o f
demonstration.
That such a th ing is contingent matters not, fo r as we
have pointed
ou t
elsewhere, there
is an
order among
contingent propositions.14 Some proposition
is
first
and
immediate. Otherwise,
we
should have
an
infinite
regress i n contingent propositions o r something con
t ingent would fol low from
a
necessary cause, both
o f
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112
DUNS SCOTUS
est ce rt i tu do de vig i la re , sicut de per se no to , i ta
etiam
de
multis aliis act ibus qui sunt in potestae nostra, ut me
intel l igere, me audire, et de al i is, qui sunt actus perfecti .
L ice t enim non s it cer t i tudo quo d videam a lbum extra
pos i tum, vel in ta l i subjecto, vel in ta l i d istant ia, quia
potest f ieri i l lusio in medio vel organo, et mult is al i is vi is,
tamen ce rt i tu do est qu od video etiams i i l lusio f iat in
organo, quae maxime i l lusio v idetur, puta quando actus
fit in ipso organo non ab objecto praesente, qualis natus
est f ieri ab objecto praesente, et ita si potentia haberet
act ionem
suam
posita tali positione vere esset
i l lud
ib i
quod visio dicitur, sive sit actio sive sit passio sive
u t rumque . S i autem i l lusio f ieret non in organo proprio
sed in a l iquo p rox im o quo d v ide tur org an um , s icut s i non
fieret i l lusio in concursu nervorum, sed in ipso oculo
fieret impress io speciei qu alis n ata est fieri a b a lbo,
adhuc visus videret quia talis species, vel quod
natum
est
v ideri in ea, v ideretur quia habet sufncientem d is tant iam
respectu organi visus quod est in concursu nervorum
i s to rum,
sicut apparet per Augustinum xi De Trinitate,
cap. i i , * quod re l iqu iae visorum remanentes in oculo
oculis clausis vi d en tu r. E t per
Philosophum
De sensu el
sensato,\ quod ignis qui generatur ex elevatione oculi
violenta et multiplicatur usque ad palpebram clausam,
v idetur.
Istae
verae sunt visiones licet n o n perfectissimae,
quia hie sunt sufficientes d istant iae specierum ad org anu m
principale visus.
(Nota : no t i t ia pr inc ip i i est immutabilis a veri tate in
fa ls itatem, no n al i ter, quia s im pl ic i ter co rru pt ib i l is est ;
* xi, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 987).
t cap. i i
(437",
23-24).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I
12
w hic h are impossible. A n d ju st as ou r cert i tude o f being
awake is l ike that of self-evident propositions, the same
is true of m an y other acts i n ou r pow er such as " I und er
s t and " ,
or " I he ar ", a nd other such acts w hic h are being
performed.
For even though there is no cert i tude that I see white
located outside, either in such a subject or at such a
distance (for an i l lusion can be caused in the medium
or in the organ or in a number of other ways), st i l l for
a ll tha t there is ce rtitud e th at I see even w he n the il lu sio n
is in the organ itself, which seems to be the greatest of all
i l lusions (for instance, when the same kind of act takes
place in the organ w ith ou t a ny object present as nat ur al ly
should take place only when such an object is present).
In such a case, i f the faculty should act, that which is
cal led vision would truly be present whether vision be
action or passion or bo th . Bu t i f the i l lusion were no t
caused in the organ proper but in something near which
seems to be the organ, for instance, if the il lusion did not
take place i n th e b un dle o f nerves b u t i n the eye, a species
simi lar to that which natural ly resul ts f rom an object
w o u ld be impressed. I n such a case there w o ul d st i l l be
an act of v is ion, for we would see such a species or what
is to be seen therein because it is sufficiently distant from
the orga n of sight i n the bu nd le of those nerves. Thi s is
evident from Augustine in De Trinitate, bk. x i , c . i i , *
because after-images of vision are seen when the eye is
closed. I t is also evide nt fro m the Philosoph er in De
sensu et sensato,^ because the flash o f fire prod uc ed by vio
lently elevating the eye and transmitted as far as the
closed eyelid is seen. A lt h o u g h these are no t the most
perfect, they are true visions, for in this case a sufficient
distance intervenes between the species and the principal
organ of v is ion.
(Note 15 : Kno wledge of a pr inc ip le is im m utab le in
the sense th at i t cann ot change fro m tr u th to falsity. I t
is not unchangeable in the other sense, for it is simply
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I 13 DUNS SCOTUS
sic species intelligibilis, non phantasma, est debilis, sed
immutabi l is a vera
repraesentatione
in
falsem
; sed
objectum l icet corrupt ibi le tamen est immutab i le a vera
entita te in falsam, et ideo est co nfor mat ivum no tit iae
sibi
seu causativum
notitiae sive veritati in essendo, quia
enti tas vera immutabil is in falsam virtual i ter continet
not i t iam
veram
immutabi l i ter, id est , conformem ent i tat i
verae.) (N ota : secundum
Augus t inum verum
neces-
sarium sive im m ut ab ile est supra men te m, inte ll ige : in
ratio ne verit atis ev identis , qu ia hanc de se causat in
mente, non autem secundum ejus evidentiam subest
ment i
ut possit apparere vera
vel
falsa, sicut subest verum
probabile menti, ut ipsa possit facere
i l l ud
apparere
verum vel falsum, quaerendo rationes h inc inde per quas
prob etur et imp rob etu r. Sic
in te l l igendum
est quod
mens non judicat de vero
immutab i l i ,
sed de
aliis,
quia
dictatio quod hoc sit verum, quae est actus judicandi, est
in potestate mentis respectu probabil is, non autem
respectu necessarii, nee tam en minus perfecte asserit de
necessario quod
ipsum
sit ve rum ; et haec assertio apu d
Aristotelem potest dici judicium, sed Augustinus
vul t
judicium esse in potestate judicantis, non quod statim
necessario de te rm ine tu r ab ali o. Sic pa te t qu om od o de
conclusione necessaria mens ju d ic a t qu ia n on est stat im
ex se ; ideo no n de termina t ex se ad evi de nt ia m sui ipsi
menti.
Potest
et iam
mens rationes sophisticas adducere
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C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E II3
perishable. Thus the intellig ible species, not the image,
is weak. Nevertheless, i t is unable to change from a
true to a false representation. But the object, although
perishable, cannot change from something true to
something false. As a result, it is able to conform
knowledge to itself or to cause knowledge or tru th
by being what it is, for a true entity, unable to be
come something false, virtually contains true know
ledge immutably, that is, knowledge conformed to true
entity.) (Note 16 : Accord ing to Augustine, necessary
or immutable truth is "above the
mind —understand
"taken precisely as evident tr u th " . For what is neces
sarily and immutably true causes this evident knowledge
of itself in the mind, As evident, such a tru th is not
subject to the mind so that it could appear either true
or false in the way that a probable truth is subject to the
m ind inasmuch as it is in the power of the m ind to make
it appear true or false by looking here or there for reasons
that prove or disprove it . I n this way w e must understand
the statement that the mind judges about other things
and not about immutable tru th . For it is only in the case
of something probable and not in the case of something
necessary that the assertion of its
truth—an
act of
judg
ment—lies
w ith in the power of the m ind. Bu t this does
not mean that the mind asserts the truth of a necessary
proposition in a less perfect manner. According to
Aristotle , the latter can be called a "judgm ent", whereas
Augustine understands judgment as something that is in
the power of the
o n e
jud ging and not as something that
is immediately and necessarily determined by a factor
beyond one's control. And so it is patent how the m ind
"judges" about a necessary conclusion that is not im
mediately evident of itself and therefore does not force
itself upon the m ind as something evident. The m ind
can even bring up sophistical reasons against the
con
clusion in question and on the basis of
these
reasons refuse
its assent. But this i t cannot do w ith something that is
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I 14 DUNS SCOTUS
contra earn per quas dissentiat. N o n sic con tra p r imum
notum, i v
Metaphysicae * : I n
mentem
venire, etc.)
[d . De cognitis quae subsunt sensibus]. Sed quomodo
habetur
cert i tudo eorum
quae subsunt actibus sensus,
puta quod al iquid extra est album, vel cal idum, quale
appa ret? Respondeo : aut circa tale co gn itu m eadem
opposita apparent diversis sensibus aut non, sed
omnes
sensus cognoscentes i l l ud , habent ide m ju d ic iu m de eo.
Si secundo modo, tunc certitudo habetur de veritate talis
cogniti per sensus et per istam proposit ionem praece-
dentem : Quod evenit in plu ribu s ab aliq uo i l lu d est
causa na turalis ejus, si non sit causa libera. Ergo cu m
ab isto praesente ut in pluribus evenit talis immutat io
sensus sequitur quod immutatio vel species genita sit
effectus naturalis talis causae, et ita tale extra erit album,
vel cal idum, vel tale al iquid quale na tum est praesentari
per
speciem
genitam ab ipso ut in pluribus.
Si
autem
diversi sensus habeant diversa judicia de
aliquo viso extra, puta visus dicit bacu lum esse f ractum
cujus pars est in aqua et pars est in aere, visus semper
dici t
solem
esse
minoris quant i tat is quam
est, et
omne
visum a remotis esse minus quam sit, in talibus est certitu
do quid
ve rum
sit et quis sensus erret per propositionem
quiescentem in
an ima
ce r t i o ra r i
o mn i
judicio sensus, et
per actus p lu r i um sensuum
concurrentes,
ita quod semper
al iqua proposit io
recti f icat
mentem vel intel lectum de
actibus sensus quis sit verus et quis falsus, in qua pro-
positione intellectus non dependet a sensu, sicut a causa,
sed sicut ab occasione. Exemplu m : inte llec tus
habet
istam proposit ionem quiescentem : Nullum durius frangi-
tu r in ac tu alicujus moll is sibi cedentis. Haec est it a per
* iv, cap. ii i (10056,
15
ff.).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
114
f i rst known [v iz. a primary princip le] according to
Metaphysics, bk.
i v ) . *
[d.
Certitude o f Sense Knowledge]. Bu t how can a
person be certain of those things which fal l under the
acts of the senses, for instance, that something outside
is w hi te or h ot in the way tha t i t appears to be ? I reply :
Regarding such an object, either the same things appear
opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but
ra th er a ll the senses kn ow in g such an object ju dg e the
same ab ou t it . I f the latt er be the case, the n we have
certitude of this thing perceived by the senses in virtue
of the aforement ioned prin cip le, v iz. "W h a t occurs in
most instances by means of something that is not a free
cause is the na tu ra l effect of this th in g " . Th erefore , i f
the same change repeatedly occurs in the majority of
cases when such an object is presented, it follows that the
transformation or image produced is the natural effect
o f
such
a cause, and thus the external thing wil l be white
or hot or such as i t natural ly appears to be according to
the image so frequently produced.
B ut i f the ju d g m e n t of differe nt senses differs in rega rd
to w ha t is seen outside ; for instance , if sight says th at
the staff w hic h is pa rt ly i n the wa ter and p ar t ly in the air
is bro ke n, or i f sight says, as it in va ria bl y does, th a t the
sun is smaller in size than it really is, or in general, that
everything seen from a distance is smaller than it is in
reality, in all such instances we are sti l l certain of what
is true an d kn ow w h ic h sense is in e rror. Th is we kno w
by reason of some proposition in the soul more certain
th an a ny sense ju dg m en t together w it h the co ncurren t
tes timon y o f several o f the senses. Fo r the re is always
some pro po sit ion to set the m in d or intel lect ar igh t regard
ing which acts of the senses are true and which
false—a
proposition, note, which the senses do not cause but
m ere ly occasion i n the inte llec t. Fo r instance, the
intel lect has this pro pos it ion reposing in i t : " T h e harder
object is not bro ken b y the touch o f som ething soft w hic h
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115 DUNS SCOTUS
se nota ex term inis q uo d etiamsi essent accepti a sensibus
errant ibus, non potest intel lectus dubitare de
i l ia .
I m m o ,
opposi tum inc lu d i t con trad ic t ione m . Sed quo d baculus
sit durior aqua, et aqua sibi cedat, hoc dicit uterque
sensus tam visus quam tactus. Sequitur, ergo baculum
non est fractus sicut sensus judicat
ipsum f r ac t um ,
et ita
quis sensus erret et quis non circa fractionem bacu l i ,
inte l lectus judicat per cert ius
omni
ac tu sensus. S im i
l i ter , ex a l ia parte quod quantum applicatum quanto
omnino est aequale sibi , hoc est notum in te l lec tu i quan-
tum cum que n ot i t ia te rm ino ru m accip ia tur a sensu
errante. Sed qu od ide m qua nt um possit ap pl ica ri v iso
propinquo et
remoto ,
hoc dic i t tam visus quam tactus.
Ergo,
quantum visum sive a prope sive a remotis est
aequale ; ergo visus dicens hoc esse m inu s errat . Ha ec
conclusio con clu ditu r ex pr inc ipi is per se notis et ex
actibus
duorum
sensuum
cognoscentium
ut in p lur ibus
esse ita, et ita ubicumque ra t io jud ica t sensum errare,
hoc jud ica t non per a l iqua m no t i t ia m praecise acquis itam
a sensibus ut causa, sed per a liq u a m n o t it ia m occasio-
natam a sensu in qua non fal l i tur etiam si omnes sensus
fai iantur, et per a l iquam
aliam
no t i t iam acqu is i tam a
sensu vel a sensibus u t i n plu rib us quae s ciu ntu r esse vera
quae sciuntur esse vera per
propositionem
saepe allega-
t a m ,
sci l icet : Quod in pluribus evenit, etc.
[Tertius articulus. Solutio ipsius
Henrici ] .
Q u a n t u m a d
tert ium art iculum ex ist is est respondendum ad
illas
rationes tres.
A d
primam
: ad
i l lud
de mutat ione ob ject i , ante-
cedens est falsum ; no n enim sensibi l ia sunt in continuo
m o tu .
Im m o pe rmanen t
eadem
in a l iqua dura t ione ,
nee
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 115
gives w ay before i t " . So evident is this prop osit ion u po n
analysis of its terms that the intellect could not call it in
doubt, even if i ts terms were derived from erroneous
senses. In de ed , the opposite of this pro po sitio n includes
a con trad ict ion. N ow b oth sight and touch attest that
the st ick is harder than the water and that the water
gives way before the stick. I t follows therefore tha t the
stick is no t brok en as the sense o f sight judg es. Hen ce ,
in the case of the " br o ke n sta ff" the intel lect judges by
something more certain than any testimony of the sense.
A n d so too w it h the other cases. Even thou gh the terms
be de rive d fr o m e rrin g senses, the inte llec t knows t ha t the
measure used to m easure remains perfectly equ al to itself.
Now the sense of sight as well as that of touch tell us that
the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object
of vision an d to a distant object. The refore, the actual
size of the object is equal whether seen from near by
or fr o m afar. Sigh t errs, consequen tly, whe n it declares
the size to be less. Th is conc lusion is in fer re d fro m self-
evident principles and from the repeated testimony of i ts
tr u th by tw o senses. A n d so w he n reason judges tha t the
senses err, it does so in vi rt u e o f two kind s o f know ledg e.
The first is a knowledge for which the intellect requires
the sense on ly as an occasion and no t as a cause—a know
ledge in which i t would not be deceived even if al l the
senses were deceived. T h e othe r is a know ledge acqu ired
by the oft-repeated testimony of one or more senses
which are known to be true by reason of the proposit ion
so frequently quoted, viz. "Whatever occurs in most
instances, etc.".
[Article I I I . Reply to Henry's Arguments]. I n this
third art icle, we must answer the three arguments [of
H e n r y ]
17
in the l igh t of w ha t has been
said.
As fo r the first argument (viz . th a t based on the change i n
the object) the anteced ent is false. Fo r sensible things
are not in co nt inua l m ot io n ; indeed, they rem ain the
same for some tim e. N eith er is this the op ini on o f
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t 16 DUNS SCOTUS
est opinio Augus t i n i , sed error Heracl i t i et d iscipul i sui
Cra ty l i ,
qu i no lebant
loqui
sed
movere digitum
u t
d ic i tu r iv Metaphysicae* E t conseque ntia non valet,
dato quod antecedens esset verum quia adhuc secundum
Aristotelem, posset haberi certa cognito de hoc dato
quod omnia cont inue moverentur.
Non sequi tur etiam : s i objectum est mutabi le, ig i tur
quod gignitur ab eo non est repraesentativum alicujus
sub rat ione immutabi l is , qu ia mutabilitas in objecto non
est rat io gignendi, sed natura ipsius objecti , quod est
mu tab i le ,
vel
quae na tura est im m uta bi l is . Ge ni tum
ig itu r ab ipso repraesentat n a tu ra m per se. Ig it u r si
na tura, unde natu ra habeat a l iquam
immutabilem hab i -
tud inem ad a l iqu id , illud aliud per suum exemplar et
natura ipsa per suum exemplar repraesentatur ut i m m u -
tabi l i ter uni ta, et i ta per duo exemplaria generata a
duobus mutab i l ibus , non inquantum mutab i l ia , sed in
quantum naturae, potest haber i not i t ia immutabilitatis
unionis
eorum.
(Quamv is non in quan tum mutab i le
signif icat,
si
tamen est m uta bi le , quom odo ejus a d al i ud est hab itudo
immutab i l i s ?
Respond
eo : ha bit ud o est im m ut ab il is sic
quia inter
extrema
non potest esse opposita habitudo,
nee non esse ista positis extremis, sed per destructionem
extrem i ve l ext re m orum destru i tur . Co ntra : Quom odo
propositio necessaria affirmatur s i ident i tas extrem orum
potest destrui ? Respondeo : qu an do res n o n est, no n
est ide ntita s ejus realis ; sed tunc si est i n in te ll e c tu , est
identitas ut est objectum intel lectum, et necessaria
secundum
q u i d ,
quia in tali esse extrema non possunt
esse sine ta l i ide ntit ate . T a m e n
ilia
potest non esse sicut
*
iv ,
cap. vi
( iona,
4-13).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE I 16
Aug ustine. I t is rathe r the error of He racl i tus and his
disciple Cratylus, who did not even wish to speak but
only move his ringer, as Metaphysics, bk . i v , * relates. But
even if the antecedent were true, the consequence would
st i l l be in va l id , for as Aristot le pointed out, wc could st i l l
be certain of this truth, viz. that al l things are in
con
t inuous mot ion.
Likewise, it does not follow that just because an object
is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced does not
represent an yth ing unde r an im m uta ble aspect. For i t
is not precisely this mutability in the object that causes
the kno w ledg e ; it is the nature of this muta ble o bject th a t
does so, an d this natu re is im m ut ab le. Hen ce, the know
ledge pro du ce d by it represents the na ture itself. A n d if
i t is the nature, th is nature may have an immutable
relat ion to something, and then both this nature and the
other thing to which i t is related, each by i ts own
exem plar, are represented as im m ut ab ly un i ted. A n d
so by means of two terms produced by two mutable
things (though not in so far as they are changeable, but
in so far as the y are natures) it is possible to have a kn ow
ledge of their immutable union.
(Even 18 tho ug h som ething muta ble is not signified i n
so far as it is m uta ble , how is it th at its re latio n to anothe r
th ing is immutable
?
I reply that the relat ion is im
mutable in this sense, that the opposite relation could
no t exist betwee n the extremes ; neithe r co uld this
re lat ion be non-existent, given these extremes. By the
destruction of one or both extremes, however, this
re lat io n is also destroyed. T o the con trary : H o w can
we assert that the proposition is necessary if the identity
of the extremes co uld be destroyed? I rep ly : W h e n a
thing is non-existent, i t has no real identity, but in such
a case, if it is in the mind it has an identity inasmuch as
it is an object known, and this identity is necessary only
in a qualified sense inasmuch as the extremes cannot exist
in thou gh t w ith o u t possessing this ide ntity . Ne verthe-
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I I
7
DUNS SCOTUS
extremum potest esse no n in te lle ct um . Ergo , propos itio
necessaria in
intel lectu
nostro secundum quid, quia
im mu tabil is in falsam. Sed s impl ic i ter necessaria non
nisi in intel lectu divino, sicut
nee extrema
habent ident i -
tatem simpliciter necessario in aliquo esse, nisi in i l lo
esse intellecto.)
Patet
et iam
quod repraesentatum in se mutabi le,
potest repraesentare aliquid sub ratione immutabil is,
quia essentia Dei sub ratione immutabil is repraesenta-
bi tur intel lectui per al iquid
omnino
mutabi le sive
i l lud
sit species sive actus. Hoc pa te t per sim ile , qu ia per
f initum potest repraesentari al iquid sub rat ione
inf ini t i .
Ad secundum, dico quod in an ima potest intell igi
duplex mutabi l i tas, una ab
af f i rmatione
in negationem,
et econverso, puta ab ignorantia ad scientiam,
vel
a non
intel lect ione ad inte l lect ione m. A l i a quasi a contrario
in contrarium, puta a rect i tudine in decept ionem, vel
econverso. A d quaecumque au tem objecta est muta-
bilis
anima prima mutabi l i tate, et per nihi l formal i ter in
ea existens to ll i t u r ab ea talis im mut ab il i ta s. Sed no n
est mutabi l is secunda mutabi l i tate, nisi circa i l ia com-
plexa
quae non habent
ev ident iam
ex terminis . Circa
i l ia
vero quae sunt evidentia ex terminis,
mu t a r i
non
potest secunda mutabil itate, quia ipsi termini appre-
hensi sunt causa necessaria et evidens conformitatis
com-
positionis factae ad ipsos term inos . Ergo si an im a est
mutabi l is a recti tudine in
errorem
absolute, non sequitur
quod per nihi l
a l iud
a se potest
rect i f icari .
Saltern
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C O N C E R N I N G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E I
17
less,
this identity need not exist, even as the term need
not be known. Therefore, the proposition in the m ind is
necessary only in a qua lified sense inasmuch as it cannot
become false. But it w ou ld only be necessary in an
unqualified sense in the divine intellect, for the terms
have an ident ity tha t is simply necessary in no other fo rm
of existence save that which they possess by being known
by God.)
It is also evident that something can be represented
under an immutable aspect even if that which does the
representing is something mutable in itself. For the
essence of G o d is represented to the intellect as something
immutable by means of something that is radically
changeable, whether the la tter be the species or the act o f
knowing. This is evident from a similar case, for some
th ing can be represented
as
infinite through what
is
finite.
As to the second, this changeability of the soul can be
understood in a twofo ld sense : one from a ffirmation to
negation and vice
versa,
such as from a state of ignorance
to a state of knowledge or from a lack of understanding
to understanding ; the other from one contrary as it
were to another, such as from being right to being
deceived, or vice versa. The soul, however, is changeable
w ith regard to any object only in the first sense of muta
bility, and there is nothing which exists formally in the
soul that w il l remove this kin d of mutability. But the
soul is not mutable in the second sense except in regard
to such propositions as are not evident from their terms.
But with those propositions that are evident from their
terms,
the soul cannot be altered in the second way for
the terms which are apprehended are themselves the
necessary and evident cause of the conformity of the
judgment involv ing the aforesaid terms. Therefore, even
i f the soul is mutable in the sense tha t absolutely speaking
it can pass from the state of being correct to a state of
error, i t does not follow that it can be set arigh t on ly by
something other than itself. A t least i t can be set aright
2 > 2 2 ) 17
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l DUNS SCOTUS
rect i f icari
potest circa
i l ia
objecta circa quae
non
potest
intellectus errare apprehensis terminis.
Ad te r t ium, dico quod si a l iquam apparent iam
haberet,
magis
concluderet contra
opin ionem i l lam
quae
negat
speciem
intel l igibi lem, quae est opinio ponentis
istam op in ionem hie, qu ia i l ia species quae potest
repraesentare sensibile
tamquam objectum
i n
somniis
esset pha ntasma, non species in te ll ig ib il is . Ig i t u r si
intellectus solo phantasmate utatur per quod objectum
est sibi praesens et non aliqua specie intelligibili, non
videtur quod per al iquod in quo objectum sibi relucet
posset
discernere verum
a ve ris im ili ; sed ponendo
speciem in intellectu, non valet ratio, quia intellectus
non potest uti i l ia p ro se ut pro objec to, quia non
cont ingi t u t i
i l ia
in dormiendo.
Si objicis : si phantasma potest repraesentare se u t
objectum, igitur intel lectus per i l ium errorem virtutis
phantasticae potest errare
vel
saltern potest liga ri ne possit
operari ,
ut patet in somniis et phreneticis, potest
dici
quod etsi legetur quando est talis error virtute phan-
tastica, non tamen tunc errat intellectus, quia tunc non
habet al iquem actum.
Sed quomodo sciet vel erit tunc intellectus certus
quando non errat virtus phantastica
quam
tamen non
errare re qu ir it ur ad hoc quo d intellectus no n erret ?
Respondeo
: ista Veritas quiescit in in te lle ct u quod
potentia
non errat circa objectum
p ropor t iona tum
nisi
indisposita, et no tum est intellectui v i r t u tem phantasti-
cam
non esse
indispositam
in vigil ia tali indispositione
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C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E I 18
in regard to those objects about which the intellect cannot
err once the terms are grasped.
To the third argument, I say that if it held at all, it
would rather be valid against that opinion which denies
the intelligible
species—the
view of the man who has
advanced the opposing theory [viz. Henry of Ghent].19
For the species which is able to represent the sensible in
dreams as though it were an object would be the sense
image or phantasm and not the intelligible species.
Therefore, if the intellect were to use the sense image
alone so that the object would be present to the mind
through the sense image and not in virtue of any in
te llig ible species, there seems to be no way of distinguish
ing between what is true and what merely appears to be
true by means of something in which the object itself
appears. But i f w e assume the existence of a species in
the intellect, the argument does not hold, because the
intellect is unable to use such a species as though it were
an object in itself for the simple reason that i t is not able
to use such a species in sleep.
You may object that if the sense image can represent
itself as object, then it follows that the intellect could err
by reason of this error in the faculty of the imagination,
or at least, as is the case in dreams or w ith madmen, the
intellect could be so bound that it could not operate.
I t can be said in reply that i f
th e
intellect is bound when
there is such an error due to the imaginative faculty,
then the intellect does not err for the simple reason that
it does not act.
But how will one know or how will the intellect ever
be certain that the imagination does not err when the
latter faculty must be free of error if the intellect is not
to err? I reply that the follow ing tru th reposes in the
mind. " A faculty does not err in regard to an object that
is properly proportioned to it unless the said faculty is
indisposed". Now it is known to the intellect that the
imaginative faculty is not indisposed during a waking
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119
DUNS SCOTUS
quae faci t phantasma repraesentare se tamquam objec-
t u m , quia per se notum est intel lectui quod intel l igens
vig i la t , i ta quod v i r tus phantast ica
non
est l igata in
vigi l ia sicut in somniis.
Sed adhuc instatur contra certitudinem dictam de
actibus hoc
modo
: V i d e tu r
mihi
quod
videam vel
audiam u b i tamen nee v ideo nee audio. Ig i tu r , de
hoc no n est ce rt i tud o. Respondeo :
Al iud
est contra
negantem aliquam pr op os itio ne m ostendere earn esse
veram ; a l iu d est al ic ui admittenti earn ostendere
quomodo
s it vera. E xe m plu m :
iv
Metaphysicae*
contra negantem primum principium non induci t
Phi losophus istud inconveniens, quod opiniones con-
t rar iae
simul
essent in
an i m a .
H o c ipsi concederent
sicut praemissam, sed inducit eis al ia inconvenientia
manifestiora
eis, l ice t n o n i n se ; sed rec ipien tibu s
p r imum p r inc ip ium os tend i t quomodo s i t no tum, qu ia
i ta notum est quod oppositum ejus non possi t venire in
m e n t e m ,
quod probat quia tunc possent opiniones con-
trariae simul stare, tal is conclusio est ibi magis incon
veniens quam hypothesis.
I t a
h ie ,
si concedis nullam esse per se notam nolo
d isputare tecum quia constat quod protervus [MS pro-
tervis] et non es persuasus, sicut patet in actibus tuis,
quomodo objicit Philosophus rv Metaphysicae,^ som-
nians
enim
de a l iquo quasi in prox imo
consequendo
sive
obtinendo et postea evigilans non prosequeris illud
sicut prosequeris vel prosequereris, si ita esses
proximus
in v ig i lando ad i l lud consequendum.
Si
autem
admit t is a l iquam proposi t ionem esse per se
n o t a m , et c i rca quamcumque potest potent ia indisposi ta
errare, sicut patet in somniis, ergo ad hoc ut al iqua cog-
*
rv,
cap. iii (1005&, 25 ff.). f iv> cap. v (1010&, 10).
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C O N C E R N IN G H U M A N K N O W L E D G E Iig
state to such an extent that the sense image w ou ld repre
sent itse lf
as
an object, for it is self-evident to the inte llect
that when it knows, it is awake, and that, consequently,
the imagination is not bound in a waking state as it is in
sleep.
But there is still another objection to the aforemen
tioned certitude about our actions. I t runs as follows.
I seem to see and to hear, whereas in reality I neither
see nor hear ; consequently, I have no certainty on this
po int. I reply that i t is one th ing to show someone who
denies a given proposition that it is true and quite
another to indicate to someone who admits the given
proposition how i t is true. For example in Metaphysics,
bk. iv ,* the Philosopher does no t adduce the inconsistency
that "contrary opinions would be present in the soul at
one and the same time" against those who deny the first
principle [viz. of contradiction], for they indeed would
concede this as a premise. Instead he brings out other
inconsistencies which are more manifest to them though
they are not more evident in themselves. But he does
show those who grant this first principle how this princ iple
is known. For it is known in such a way that its opposite
could not even enter the mind. This he proves from the
fact that otherwise contrary opinions could exist simul
taneously in the m ind. Such a conclusion
i s ,
in this case,
even more inconsistent than the hypothesis.
So i t is in our case. I f you hold that nothing is self-
evident, I w il l not argue w ith you for i t is clear tha t you
are a quibb ler and are not to be convinced. This is
apparent from your actions, as the Philosopher indicates
in Metaphysics, bk. rv,f for if you dream of obtaining or
going after some nearby object, after you awake you no
longer seek i t as you would do, or w ould have done, had
you been that close to getting it while awake.
If, however̂ you admit that some proposition is self-
evident and that a power indisposed can err w ith regard
to anything, as is clear in the case of dreams, then from
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120
DUNS
SCOTUS
noscatur per se esse no t a , oportet quod possit cognosci
qua ndo po ten tia est disposita et qu an do n on . E t per
consequens potest haberi noti t ia de actibus nostris,
quod potent ia est i ta d isposi ta quod ilia est per se nota
quae apparet sibi per se nota.
Dico tunc ad
formam
hujus cavi l lat ionis, quod sicut
apparet somnianti se vid er e, it a posset sibi a ppa rere
oppos itum unius pr in c ip i i per se n o t i speculabi lis , et
tamen non sequ i tu r qu in i l lud principium sit per se
notum et ita non sequitur quin sit per se notum audient i
quod audiat , quia c irca
utrumque
potest potent ia indis-
posita errare ; no n autem disposita. E t qu an do sit
disposita et qu an do n o n , hoc est per se n o tu m ; alias
non posset cognosci
aliquam aliam
esse pe r
se n o t a m ,
qu ia
non posset cognosci quae foret per se nota, utrum ilia
cu i
intellectus
sit dispositus
vel cui
sic assentiret.
[Articulus Quartus. Contra conclusionem Henrici \ . Circa
q u a r t u m articulum contra conclusionem opinionis arguo
sic . Quaero qu id in t e l l ig i t per veritatem certam et
sinceram, aut ver i ta tem in fa l l ib i lem absque dubi ta t ione,
scil icet, et decep tione, et
probatum
est prius et de clara tum
in art iculo secundo et tert io, quod ilia potest haberi ex
puris natura l ibus. A u t in te l l ig i t de ve ri tate quae est
passio entis, et tunc cum ens possit natural i ter intel l igi,
ergo et verum ut est passio ejus, et si verum ig i tur e t
Veritas per abstractionem quasi, quia quaecumque
forma potest inte l l ig i ut in subjecto, potest inte l l ig i ut in
se et in abstracto a subjecto. A u t a l io modo in te l l ig i t
per veri tatem
conformitatem
ad exemplar, et si ad
creatum, patet prop osi tum . Si aute m ad exemplar
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
120
the fact that something can be recognised as self-evident
it follows that a person can tell when a faculty is disposed
an d w he n it is no t. Con sequently, in regard to our
actions it is possible to know that a faculty is so disposed
that what appears to be self-evident is actually so.
As to the form of this sophist ical argument,
then,
I say
this.
Ju st it appears to the drea m er tha t he sees, so also
the opposite of some self-evident speculative principle
m ig ht appear to h im . Bu t f ro m this i t st i l l does not
fol low th at such a pr inc iple is no t self-evident. Likewise
it does not follow that it is not self-evident to the hearer
th at he hears. Fo r i f a pow er th a t is indisposed can err
with regard to either truth, a power that is disposed
can no t. A n d it is self-evident w he n i t is disposed an d
w he n it is no t. Othe rwise, no thi ng else w ou ld be
recognised as self-evident, for one could never tell what
would be self-evident, or whether this is something to
w h ic h the inte l lect is disposed or to w h ic h i t w o ul d assent
in this way.
[Article I V . Concerning Henry's Conclusion]. I n the
fourth art icle I argue against the conclusion of [Henry's]
v iew 20 as fol low s : W h a t, I ask, is meant by certa in an d
una dultera ted tru th? Eithe r i t means infal l ib le t r u th ,
that is, a truth which excludes al l doubt and deception.
And in this case, we have proved and declared already
in the second and third articles that such truth is possible
on pure ly natu ra l grounds. O r by such tr u th he means
tr u th as an at tr ib ute of " b e in g " . I n w hic h case, s ince
we can know "being" we can also know i ts at t r ibute
" t r u e " . A n d i f we know " t r u e " we can also know t r u th
by a ki n d of abstract ion. For any for m that can be
recognised in a subject can also be known in itself and in
the abstract ap art fro m the subject. O r t r u th is to be
understood in st i l l another way, as t ruth of conformity
to an exem plar. I f the exem plar in question is taken to
be created , we have w ha t we seek to pro ve . I f
con
for m ity to an uncreated exem plar is mean t, wh y such .
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121 DUNS SCOTUS
i nc rea tum,
conformitas ad i l lud no n potest int e l l ig i n is i in
illo exemplari
cognito, quia relat io non est cognoscibi l is
nisi cognito extrem o ; ergo falsum est quod ponitur
exemplar aeternum esse rationem cognoscendi et non
cogn i tum.
Praeterea secundo sic : Int elle ctu s sim plex , omne
qu od in te l l ig it confuse, potest cognoscere definit ive ,
inqu i rendo definitionem i l l ius cognit i per viam divisionis.
Haec cognit io definitiva v ide tu r perfectissima pertinens
ad in te l lectum
s impl icem.
Ex ta l i
autem
cogni t ione
perfect issima terminorum, potest inte l lectus perfec-
t iss ime in te l l igere pr inc ip ium et ex pr inc ip io conclu-
sionem,
et in hoc compleri v idetur not i t ia inte l lectual is
ita quod non videtur cognit io veritat is necessaria ultra
veritates praedictas.
I t e m t e r t i o , aut lux aeterna quam dicis necessariam
ad habendum sinceram ve ri ta te m , causat a l iq ui d prius
na tura l i ter actu aut non . Si s ic, aut ig i tu r in objecto aut
in in te l lectu . N o n in ob jecto, qu ia objectum i n quan tum
habet esse in in te lle c tu , no n ha bet esse
reale,
sed
tantum
inte ntio na le. Ig it u r no n est capax al icujus accidentis
realis. Sed in in te l lec tu , ig i tu r lux increata no n imm uta t
ad cognoscendum sinceram veri tatem nis i mediante
effectu suo, et i ta aeque perfecte videtur opinio com
munis ponere not i t iam in lumine increato, sicut ista
posit io ; qu ia po nit esse v id e ri in int el lec tu agente qu i
est effectus luminis increatae et perfectior quam esset
i l l u d lum en accidentale crea tum . Si au tem n ih i l causat
ante actum, aut ergo sola lux causat actum, aut lux cum
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 121
conformity cannot be recognised unless the exemplar
itself is known, for unless the term of a relat ion is known
the rela t ion itself cann ot be kn ow n. Conseq uently, i t is
false to assume th at an e terna l exem plar is the reason w h y
we know something when this exemplar i tself remains
unknown.
Secondly, I argue further that simple intel l igence
21
can know by way of def in i t ion al l that i t knows in a
con
fused manner by the simple expedient of discovering the
de f in i t ion of the th ing kn ow n by wa y of d iv is ion. Th is
definit ive knowledge seems to be the most perfect kind
of know ledge th at pertains to simple intel ligence. F ro m
this most perfect knowledge of the terms, however, the
intel lect can unde rstand the pr inc iple most perfectly ;
and fro m the prin cip le, the conclusion. Inte l lec tual
knowledge seems to be complete with this, so that no
further knowledge of truth over and above the afore
mentioned truths seems necessary.
I n the th i r d p lace, e ither the Eterna l L ig ht , w hic h y ou
say is necessary in order to have unadulterated truth,
causes som ething na tu ra l ly p rio r to the act or no t. I f i t
does,
then this thing is produced either in the object or
in the intel lec t. Bu t i t cannot be prod uce d in the object,
because the object, in so far as it exists in the intellect,
has no real existence but only intentional existence.
Th ere fore, i t is incapa ble of any real accident. I f this
th ing is produ ced in the inte l lect , then the Ete rna l
Light t ransforms [ the mind] to know pure truth only
th ro u g h the m e diu m of its effect. I f this be the case,
then it seems that common opinion attributes knowledge
to the Uncreated Light to the same extent as does this,
for the common view assumes that knowledge is seen in
the active intel lect, which is the effect of the Uncreated
Light, and indeed is a more perfect effect than this
acci
den tal created L ig h t w o uld be.22 I f th is Un created Li gh t
does not cause anything prior to the act, then either the
Light alone causes the act [of knowledge], or the Light
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 122
w it h the intel le ct an d object do so. I f the L ig h t does so
alone, then the act ive inte l lect has no funct ion whatso
ever i n k no w in g pure tr u th . B ut this seems inconsistent
because the latter is the most noble function of our
intel lect . T he act ive inte l lec t ,
then ,
which is the most
noble [ facu l ty o f knowledge]
23
in our
soul,
must concur
in some way in this action.24
And
the inconsistency here inferred also follows from
the aforesaid op inion in another wa y. For acc ording
to the one who holds this opinion, any agent using an
instrument is incapable of performing an act ion which
exceeds the ac tion of the ins tru m en t. Th ere fore , since
the power of the active intel lect could not arrive at the
knowledge of pure truth, the Eternal L ight using the
active intel lect could not produce this knowledge or have
any th ing to do w i t h the act whereby pure t r u th is kno wn
and st i l l have the active intel lect function as an instru
m ent. A n d i f yo u say tha t the Un crea ted Lig h t causes
this unadulterated truth together with the inte l lect and
the object, this is the co m m on o pin ion w h ich assumes th at
the Uncreated Light acting as the remote cause produces
al l certa in t r u th . Consequent ly, e i ther th is op inion [of
Henry] is inconsistent or i t is not at variance with the
common v iew.
[Article V. Solution o f the
Question].25
As to the
quest ion, then , I say that because of what Augustine has
said, one should concede that infall ible truths are seen
in the eternal ru les, where the term " i n " can be taken in
the sense of " i n an ob jec t". Th ere are four ways i n
which this could be done :
( i )
either as in a p rox im ate
object, or (2) as in th at w h ic h contains the p ro x i
mate object, or (3) as that in virtue of which the
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123 DUNS SCOTUS
con t inen te ob jec tum p rox imum, vel sicut in eo virtute
cu jus ob jec tum prox imum
movet ,
vel sicut in objecto
remote
[P r im a V ia ] . A d i n te l le c tu a l
p r i m i ,
dico quod omnia
int el l i g ib i l ia a ctu inte l lectus d iv in i habent esse int el l i -
gib i le ,
et in eis
omnes
veritates de eis relucent, ita
qu od intel lectus inte ll igens ea, et v i r tu te eorum in te l l i -
gens necessaria veritates de eis, videt in eis sicut in
objectis istas veritates necessarias.
Il ia autem
i nquan -
tum sunt objecta secundaria intel lectus divini, sunt
veritates quia conformes suo exemplari, intel lectu sci l icet
div ino ; et sunt lu x qu ia man ifestae ; et sunt
i m m u t a -
biles i b i et necessariae. Sed aeternae sunt secundum
q u i d ,
quia aeternitas est condit io existentis, et
ilia
non
habent existent iam nis i secundum
q u i d .
Sic ig itu r
primo possumus dici videre in luce aeterna, hoc est in
objecto secundario intel lectus divini, quod est Veritas et
lux aeterna modo exposito.
[Secunda V i a ] . Secundus modus patet s imi l i ter, quia
intel lectus d ivinus co ntine t istas veritates quasi l ibe r,
sicut
ilia
auctori tas August in i d ic i t De
Trinitate
x iv ,
cap. xv * : quod istae regulae scriptae, scriptae sunt in
libro lucis
aeternae, id est, in in te l le ctu d iv ino inq ua ntu m
continet istas veritates et l icet
ille
l iber non videatur,
v iden tur tamen illae veritates quae sunt scriptae in l ibro
illo
primo, et eatenus posset dici intellectus noster videre
veritates in luce aeterna, hoc est, in l ibro i l lo sicut in
continente objectum26 (et hoc secundum secundum
modum
vel in
illis
veritat ibus quae sunt lux aeterna
secundum
q u i d ,
sicut in objectis videmus secundum
primum
mo d u m) .
E t a l ter isto rum m od or um vid etu r esse de intel le ctu
xiv , cap. xv
(Migne,
P.L.,
x l i i ,
1052).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
123
pro xim ate object moves [th e in te l le ct] , or (4) as in a
remote object.
[T he First W a y ]. I n explanat ion of the f i rst , I say that
al l the inte l l ig ib les have an intel l ig ib le being in v ir tue of
the act of the div ine intel lect. I n these intel l igibles a l l
the tru ths th a t can be aff irm ed abo ut the m are visible so
that the intel lect knowing these intel l igibles and in virtue
thereof understanding the necessary truths about them,
sees these tru ths in th em as i n an objec t. N o w these
intell igibles inasmuch as they are secondary objects of
the divine intel lect are "truths" because they are
con
form ed to their exemplar, v iz. the div ine inte l lect . L ik e
wise,
they are a " l i g h t " because they are m anifest. A n d
there they are im m uta ble a nd necessary. B ut they are
eternal only in a qualif ied sense, because eternity is
characteristic of something really existing, and these
intel l igibles " e x is t" on ly in a qu ali f ied sense. Th is then
is the first way in which we can be said to see in the
E ter na l Li g h t, i.e. as in the secondary object of the divin e
intel lect , which object is t ruth and eternal l ight in the
sense explained.
[T h e Second W a y ] . T h e second wa y is also clear,
because the divine intellect contains these truths like a
boo k, as Au gu stine testif ies in De Trinitate, bk . x iv , c. xv * :
"These ru les are wr i t ten in the book of Eterna l L ight" ,
that is, in the divine intel lect inasmuch as i t contains
these tru ths . A n d alth ou gh this book itself is no t seen,
nevertheless those tru ths are seen w h ich are w r it te n i n
this boo k. A n d to this extent, ou r intel lec t co uld be said
to see tru ths in the Et er na l L ig h t, i .e. to see things w hic h
are in that book as in something which contains the
object.26
And August ine's statement in De
Trinitate,
bk . xn ,
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124
DUNS SCOTUS
August in i
xn
De Trin i tate, cap. x iv,* quod rat io quadrat i
corporis manet incorrumptibil is e t im m uta bi l is , e tc . Non
autem
manet tal is nisi
ut
est ob jectum secundarium
inte l lectus d iv in i .
Sed co ntra
primum modum
est
d u b i u m .
Si
enim
non
videmus istas veritates ut sunt in intel lectu
d i v i no ,
qu ia
non v idemus d iv inum in te l lec tum, quomodo d icemur
videre in luce increata ex hoc quod videmus in ta l i luce
aeterna secundum q u i d , quae habet esse in luce increata
sicut in intel lectu cognoscente.
[T er t ia V ia ] . H uic respondet ter t ius mod us, q u i ta lis
est : ilia u t sunt ob jectum secundar ium in te l lectus d iv in i
no n habe nt esse nisi secu ndum q u id ; op era tio au tem
al iqua vera real is non compet i t a l icui praecise ent i
secundum quid v ir tute sui , sed si a l iquo modo compet i t
sibi ,
hoc oportet esse virtute alicujus cui competit esse
simpliciter. Ig it u r ist is objectis secundari is no n co m pe tit
movere
intel lectum praecise nisi virtute esse intel lectus
d iv in i qu od est esse sim plic iter, et per qu o d ista habe nt
esse secundu m q u i d . Sic ergo in luce aetern a secundum
q u i d ,
sicut in objec to pro xi m o videm us ; sed in luce
aeterna increata v idemus secundum tert ium modum
sicut in causa proxima cujus vir tute objectum proximum
movet .
Juxta hoc etiam po tes t d ic i quod quantum ad te r t ium
modum videmus in luce aeterna sicut in causa object i in
se.
N a m intel lectus div inus prod uc i t is ta ac tu suo in
esse in te ll ig ib il i, et ac tu suo da t h uic objec to esse tale et
i l l i
tale, et per consequens dat eis
talem rationem
objecti
per quas rationes post m ove nt inte l le ctu m ad cog nit ione m
xi i ,
cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,
i o i i ) .
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
124
c. x iv ,* that the me aning o f "square b o d y " remains in
co rrup t ib le a nd im m uta ble , and so on , can be understood
seem ingly in eithe r of these tw o ways. Fo r the me an ing
of a square body remains incorrupt ib le and immutable
only inasmuch as it is a secondary object of the divine
intel lect.
B ut there is a do ub t about this f irst wa y. W e do no t
see these truths as they are in the divine intellect, because
we do not see the div ine intelle ct itself. H o w th en can
we be said to see th ings i n the U ncrea ted Lig ht— thin gs ,
which exist indeed in the Uncreated Light as objects
kn ow n by tha t inte l lect , b ut w hic h we see on ly in some
thing which is the eternal l ight in a qualif ied sense.27
To this the third way gives the fol lowing answer.
[T he T h i r d W a y ]. These intell ig ib les in so far as they
are secondary objects o f the div ine inte llec t have existence
on ly in a qu alif ied sense. B ut som ething tha t exists on ly
in a qualif ied sense, to the precise extent that it "exists"
in this way, is incapable of any truly real operation.28
If such an operation pertains to it at all, it does so only
in v ir tue of something which exists in an unqual i f ied
sense. The re fore, these secondary objects do not enjoy
the pow er to move the inte llec t, to speak precisely, except
by virtue of the existence of the divine intel lect, which
exists in an unquali f ied sense and through which the
inte ll igible s ha ve existence in a qu alif ied sense. A n d
so we see in the e terna l l ig h t in a qu alif ied sense as i n the
pro xim ate object . Bu t according to this th ir d wa y we
see in the Unc rea ted L ig h t as in the imm edia te cause by
vir tue of w hi ch the proxim ate object moves [ the inte l lect ] .
We can also be said to see in the Eternal Light in this
th ir d w ay ina sm uch as this L ig h t is the cause of the object
i tself. Fo r the div ine intel lect produces this inte l l igible
in existence and by its act gives to this object one type
of being and to another a second type of being.
Con
sequently, the divine intel lect gives them such intel l igible
co nte nt as they possess as objects of know ledg e. N o w
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125 DUNS SGOTUS
certain, et quod proprie posset d ic i inte l lectum nostrum
videre in luce, qu ia lu x est causa ob jec ti . A pp ar et per
s imi le : qu ia pro pr ie d ic im ur in te l ligere in
lumine
intel lectus agentis, cum tamen illud lumen non sit nisi
causa activa, vel faciens objectum in actu suo, vel v i r tu te
cu jus ob jectum movet , ve l u t rumque.
Ista
ig i tur duplex causal i tas inte l lectus div in i , quod
est vera lux increata, v idel icet quae produci t objecta
secundaria i n esse in te l l i g ib i l i , et qu od est i l lu d vir tu te
cujus secundaria
etiam
ob jecta produc ta movent
actual i ter inte l lectum, potest quasi integrare unum
tertium modum ve l membrum p rop te r quod d icamur
vere videre in luce aeterna.
Et si obj iciatur contra istos duos modos integrantes
ter t ium m em bru m de causa, qu ia tun c
magis
v idetu r quod
diceremur v idere in Deo volente, vel in Deo ut voluntas
est , qu ia vo luntas d iv ina est immediatum pr inc ip ium
cujusl ibet actus ad extra, respondeo : intel lectus divinus
inquan tum a l iquo modo pr ior actu vo luntat is d iv inae
pr od uc it ista objecta i n esse in te l l i g ib i l i , et i ta respectu
istorum
vi de tu r esse causa m ere n atu ra l is, q u ia Deus non
est causa l ibera respectu al icujus nisi quod praesupponit
ante se al iquo m odo v olu nta tem sive actu m v olu n
tat is,
et s icut inte l lectus ut pr ior actu voluntat is produci t
objecta i n esse in te l l ig ib i l i , i ta ut p rio r causa vid etu r
cooperari
illis
in te l l ig ib i l ibus ad
effectum eorum
na tu ra -
lem,
scil icet ut apprehensa et composita causent appre-
hensionis
conformitatem
ad se. V id e tu r ergo quo d
contrad ic t ionem inc lud i t in te l lectum
aliquem talem
compositionem form are et com posit ionem n o n esse con -
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 125
i t is through their inte l l ig ib le content that they af terward
move the inte l lect to certa in knowledge. A n d , prop erly
speaking, it could be said that our intellect sees in the
L ig h t, because the Li g h t is the cause of the object. This
is clear fro m a sim ile : for we are said to un derstan d
properly in the l ight of the act ive inte l lect , a l though th is
l ight is nothing more than the active cause
(i.e.,
that
which makes the [potent ia l ] object actual , or that in
virtue of which the object moves, or both).
The fact then that the div ine inte l lect , the true Un
created Light, has a twofold causal i ty (v iz. that i t pro
duces objects in intell igible being and that it is also that
in v irtu e o f w h ic h the secondary objects produ ced actu ally
move the
intellect)—this
fact can supply as it were a
th ir d type or mo de of interp reta t ion as to how we can be
said to see tr u ly i n the Ete rn al L ig h t.
But suppose someone should object to these two ways
of supply ing a th i rd in terpretat ion on the fo l lowing
ground s. W e should rath er be said to see in G od w il l in g
or i n G od i n so far as H e is
w i l l ,
for the divine wil l is the
immediate principle of every act directed towards some
thing outside Himself.
I re ply th at th e div ine in telle ct, as far as i t is i n some
way prior to the act of the divine will,29 produces these
objects in intell igible being, and thus the intellect seems
to be a pu rely na tu ra l cause in their regard . Fo r G od
is not a free cause of an yt hi n g unless vo lit i o n as an elicited
act somehow precedes the th in g in question. N o w , inas
m uc h as the intel lec t produces objects in in tel l ig ible being
prior to the act of the w i l l , it would seem to co-operate
as a prior cause with these intel l igibles in the production
of the i r natura l
effect—which
effect consists in this
:
Once
these intel l igibles are grasped and formulated in a pro
posit ion they cause the conformity of what is grasped
[viz. the proposition] to themselves [as terms]. Con
sequently, i t seems to involve a contradict ion that an
intel lect should form such a proposit ion and st i l l not
2 , 3 2 2 ) 18
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126
DUNS SCOTUS
formem terminis, l icet possibi le s i t
illos
terminos non
componere vel no n concipere. Q u ia licet Deus vo l un -
tar ie coagat ad hoc quod intel lectus terminos componat
ve l non componat , tamen cu m composuer i t , u t ilia
composit io sit conformis terminis, hoc videtur necessario
sequi rat ionem terminorum quam habent ex inte l lectu
Deicausante
i llos terminos in esse in te l l ig ib i l i na tur al i te r.
Et ex isto apparet qualiter non est necessaria specialis
i l lust ra t io ad v ide nd um in regulis aetern is , qu ia A ugu st i -
nus non ponit in eis videri nisi vera quae sunt necessaria
ex v i ter m ino ru m , et in ta l ibus est m ax im a (natura li tas
vel) necessitas tarn causae remotae quam prox imae
respectu effectus, puta tarn intel lectus divini ad objecta
movent ia quam
illorum objectorum
a d
veritatem com-
plexionis de eis, et
etiam
l icet non tanta si t (natural i tas
vel) necessitas ad perceptionem (alius vel) alicujus ver i -
tat is quod
oppositum
con t rad ic t ionem inc ludat , tamen
(naturalitas vel) necessitas est a parte causae proximae
coassistente sibi causa
remota ,
qu ia termin i apprehensi
et composit i sunt nat i natural i ter causare
evidentiam
conformi ta t is compositionis ad term inos etsi po na tur qu od
Deus coagat terminis ad hunc ef fectum
influentia
general i ,
no n tam en necessitate n a tu r a l i . Sed sive sit
influentia generalis sive quod plus est necessitas naturalis
influendi
termin is ad hunc ef fectum, patet quod non
requir i tur i l lustrat io special is.
Assumptum de in ten t ione August in i pa te t per ipsum
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 126
have th is proposi t ion conform to the terms even though
it is possible that the intellect should not grasp the terms
or form ulate them in a prop osi t ion. For even thou gh G od
freely co-operates with the intel lect when it combines or
does not combine these terms, sti l l once the terms have
been formed into a proposi t ion, the conformity of the
latter with the terms seems to follow as a necessary con
sequence fr o m the ver y m ea ning of the terms—a meaning
which they have by reason of the fact that the intel lect
of G od has na tur al ly prod uced these terms i n inte l l ig ib le
being.
From al l th is, i t is c lear why a special i l luminat ion is
no t re qu ire d in ord er to see i n the etern al reasons, for
Augustine assumes that we see in them only such truths
as are necessary i n vir tu e o f the ir terms. N o w i t is in ju s t
such truths that we have the greatest necessity between
the effect and bo th i ts prox im ate an d rem ote causes (tha t
is ,
bo th on the part o f the div ine inte l lect in i ts re la t ion to
the objects wh ic h move [our inte l lect ] and on the pa rt of
the objects in relat ion to the truth of the proposit ions
ab ou t the m ). Ev en tho ug h the necessity of perce iving
such a truth is not so great that not to perceive i t would
include a contradiction, sti l l there is a necessity present
which arises from the proximate cause [viz. the intel l igi
bil ity of the terms] assisted by the remote cause [viz. the
divine intel lect which gives such ideas their intel l igi
b i l i t y ] . Fo r once the terms are grasped an d form ed in to
a proposi t ion, they are natural ly able to make evident
the co nfo rm ity tha t exists between the prop osit ion a nd its
terms even though it be granted that God co-operates
with these terms in producing their effect, not by a
natural necessity, but by a general [free] influence.
B ut wh ethe r i t be by a general inf luence, or wh at is m ore ,
by a natural necessity, that God co-operates with the
terms in producing their effect, i t is quite clear that no
special i l luminat ion is required.
The assumption as to what Augustine meant is clearly
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127
DUNS SCOTUS
iv De Trin itate, cap. xx xv ,* lo qu i tu r de philosophis dicens
n o n n u l l i eorum po te run t aciem ment is u l t ra omnem
creaturam
levare et
lucem incommutabilis
veritat is
quantulacumque ex parte at t ingere qui Christ ianos
m ultos ex sola fide viventes nondum posse de rid en t. Ergo
vult
quod Chr is t ian i c red i ta
non
v iderunt in regul is
aeternis, sed philosophi vident in illis necessaria mu l ta .
I d e m
etiam ix
De Trinitate, cap. vi
f
: N o n qualis unius-
cujusque hominis mens, etc., quasi diceret contingentia
non videntur ibi, sed necessaria et in eodem i v , capi tu lo
x x x v i | arg uit con tra istos philosophos,
numquid
quia
verissime disputant aeternis rat ionibus omnia tempora-
liter f ieri p ro pte r ea, po te ru nt i n ipsis ra t ion ibu s aspicere
quot sunt an imal ium genera, quot
semina
s ingulorum in
exordi is, etc. No nn e ista om nia no n per i l lam i n c om m u -
tab i lem sc ient iam, sed per locorum ac temporum inst i tu -
tionem
quaesierunt et ab
aliis
experta atque conscripta
cred iderun t. Ergo in te l l ig i t qu od per regulas aeternas
non cognoscuntur
ilia
cont ingent ia quae
tantum
per
sensus cognoscuntur, vel per historias creduntur, et
tamen special is i l lustrat io magis re q u ir i tu r in credendis
quam
in cognitis necessariis.
I m m o ,
i b i
maxime
remove-
tur i l lustrat io special is et sufficit sola generalis.
Co ntra : Q u id ig i tu r d ic i t August inus x i i De Tr in i
tate, cap. x iv * * : qu od paucorum est m en tis acie pe rven ire
ad rationes intelligibiles, et Octaginta tres quaestionum,
quaestio xlvi f f : non nisi purae animae ad illas pert ingu nt .
Respondeo : Ista pu ri tas no n debet in te l l ig i a v i t i is ,
quia xi v
De Trinitate, cap.
xv ,j +
vu l t quod
Justus
v idet in
regulis aeternis quid justum faciendum si t vel quid in h is
* rv,
cap.
xv (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902).
t
ix , cap. vi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 966).
X
iv ,
cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902).
* * x ii , cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,
ioio).
f t
q-
xlvi (Migne, P.L., x l , 30).
XX xiv , cap. xv (Migne, P.L., x l i i ,
1052).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
127
jus t i f ied b y w ha t he says o f the inf id el phi losophers in De
Trinitate, bk .
i v ,
c. xx xv * : "S om e o f the m have been able
to see thr ou gh an d beyond al l creat ion and w it h their
mind's eye to reach at least in some degree the light of
immutab le t ru th , a th ing wh ich they r id icu le many
Christ ians, who l ive meanwhi le by fa i th a lone, for not
being able to d o " . H e wishes to say, therefore, that
Christians do not see in the eternal rules the things they
believe and yet the philosophers see many necessary
truth s there in. A n d the same w it h De Trin itate, bk. i x ,
c. v i f : " N o t o f wh at sort the m ind o f one pa rt icu lar
m an happens to be, etc. —as i f he were to say : " I t is no t
contingent but necessary truths that are seen there".
And in the same work he argues against those philos
ophers : "Ju st because they argue most tr u ly th at al l
that happens in time takes place on account of eternal
reasons, are they therefore able to perceive therein how
many kinds of animals exist or how many seeds of each
there were in the be ginn ing, an d so on . . . . H ave they
not sought all these things not by that unchangeable
knowledge, but by the history of places and t imes, and
have they n ot bel ieved the w rit te n experience of othe rs? "
Consequently, he means that contingent truths known
by the senses alone or believed on the account of others
are no t kn ow n thr ou gh the eternal rules. A n d yet special
i l luminat ion is required even more for what must be
believed tha n for necessary tru ths . Ind ee d, this special
i l lumination is least needed in the case of the latter ;
general i l lumination alone suff ices.
On the contrary, Why then does August ine say in De
Trinitate, b k. x i i , c. xi v : " I t is on ly for the few to a tta in
the inte l l ig ib le reasons w it h the ir m ind's e ye", and in the
Eighty-three Questions, q.
xlvi
: " O n ly the pure of soul
reach
th e m " ? I rep ly
that
he does not mean by this
purity a freedom from vices, for in De Trinitate, bk. xiv,
c. xv, he holds that the unjust man sees in the eternal
rules wha t a jus t m an m ust do and how he must regard
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Iil8 DUNS SCOTUS
sentiendum sit. E t iv l ibro cap. praeallegato,* vu l t quod
plures non
v ident
veritatem in regulis aeternis sine fide.
Et quaestione eadem,
f
vult quod nullus potest esse
sapiens sine cognitione idearum, eo
modo
quo Platonem
concederent forsan
sapientem
esse. Sed ista pur itas
debet intel l igi elevando intel lectum ad considerandum
veritates ut relucent in se, non t a n tu m ut relucent in
phantasmate.
Ubi considerandum est quod res sensibilis extra causat
phantasma confusum et
u n u m
per accidens in virtute
phan tan tica , repraesentans scil icet rem secundum qua nti -
tatem, secundum figuram, et colorem, et alia accidentia
sensibilia. E t sicut phantasma repraesentat ta n tu m
con
fuse et per accidens, ita
m u l t i
percipiunt tantum ens per
accidens. Veritates
autem primae
sunt praecise tales ex
propria ratione te rminorum in quantum i l l i termin i
abstrahuntur ab omnibus per accidens conjunctis cum
eis. N o n
enim
haec propositio :
Omne to tum
est
majus
sua pa rte ,
p r imo
vera est ut totum est in lapide
ve l
l igno,
sed ut t ot u m abs trahitur ab omnibus quibus conjungitur
per accidens. E t ideo intellectus q u i nu m qu am intell igi t
totalitatem nisi in conceptu per accidens, puta in totali-
tate lapidis vel l ign i , numquam in te l l ig i t
sinceram
veri
tatem hujus pr in cip i i , quia nu m qu am in tel l i g i t praecisam
rat ionem termini per
quam
est Veritas. Pau co rum ergo
est pertingere ad rationes aeternas, quia paucorum est
habere intellectiones per se et multorum est habere con-
ceptus tales per accidens. Sed ist i pa uc i no n dicu nt ur
dist ingui ab aliis proter specialem i l lustrat ionem sed vel
propter mel iora natural ia, quia habent intel lectum
magis
abstrahentem et magis perspicacem, vel prop te r
majorem
* iv, cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., x l i i , 902). f loc. cit.
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
128
th ings in their l ig ht . A n d in the fo ur th boo k, in
the chapter c i ted above, he maintains that the phi lo
sophers saw truth in the eternal reasons even though
they lacked
fa i th .
A n d in the same que stion, he holds
that no one can be wise without a knowledge of the
ideas in the way, for instance, that they would concede
Plato to be wise. B ut this p u ri ty mu st be unde rstood of
the elevation of the intel lect to the co ntem plation of these
truths as they are in themselves and not as they appear
in the sense image.
He re we must rem em ber tha t the sensible thin g outside
causes a confused sense image, something with only an
inc identa l un i ty in the facu l ty o f imaginat ion, which
represents the thing according to i ts quantity, colour and
other sensible acciden ts. A n d ju s t as the sense imag e
represents things only confusedly and according to an
incid en tal u ni t y, so m an y perceive only such incide ntal
combinat ions. N ow , pr im ar y t ru ths are pr im ary pre
cisely because their terms are grasped in their proper
nature an d ap art f ro m al l tha t is me rely incide ntal to
t hem. N o w this prop osi t ion, " T h e who le is greater than
its part", is not primari ly true of the whole as real ised in
a stone or in wood, but of "whole" in the abstract , i .e.
apart f rom everything with which i t merely happens to
be jo ine d. Consequently, the m in d w hic h never
con
ceives totality except in an incidental concept such as the
total i ty of a stone or the total i ty of wood, never real ly
understands the pure truth of this principle, because it
never grasps the precise nature of the terms to which the
prin cip le owes its t r u th . I t is only w it h in the power of
the few to attain the eternal reasons, because it is only
the few that have an understanding of the essentials,
whereas the many grasp things merely in incidental
concepts such as those m en tione d above. But these few
are not said to be distinguished from the others by a
special i l luminat ion, but by better natural powers, s ince
they have a sharper and more abstractive mind, or be-
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129
DUNS SCOTUS
inquisitionem
per
quam
aeque ingeniosus pervenit ad
cognoscendum illas quidditates quae al ius non inquirens,
non cognoscit.
Et isto modo in te l l ig i tu r illud Augus t in i ix De Tr in i -
tate,
cap. v i , * de v idente in
monte
et vidente inferius
aerem nubilosum et superius lucem s inceram. Q u i enim
tantum
intel l igit semper conceptus per accidens eo modo
quo phantasma repraesentat objecta
talia
quasi entia per
accidens, ipse est quasi in valle circumdatus aere nebu-
loso.
Sed q u i separat qu iddita tes inte l l igen do praecise
eas conceptu per se quae tamen re lucent in phantasmate
cum multis aliis accidentibus adjunctis, ipse habet
phantasma inferius quasi aerem nebulosum, et ipse est
in monte inquantum cognosci t illam veritatem et videt
verum
supra u t i l lam ver i ta tem
superiorem
in v i r tu te
intel lectus increati, quae est lux aeterna.
[Q ua r ta V ia ] . U l t im o modo potest concedi quod
cognoscuntur veritates sincerae in luce aeterna sicut in
objecto remoto cognito, quia lux increata est primum
principium entium speculab i l ium et ultimus finis rerum
practicarum
et ideo ab ipso sumuntur pr incip ia prima
tam speculabil ia qu am pract ica. E t ideo cogn it io en t ium
tam
speculab i l ium quam
practicabilium
per pr inc ip ia
sumpta
a luce aeterna ut cognita est perfectior et prior
cognit ione sumpta per princip ia in gen ere p ro p rio sicut
d ict um est in quaestione
ilia
de subjecto th eo log iae , et est
em inent ior a l ia quacu m que. E t hoc mo do cogni t io
om niu m pert inet ad theolog um . Ho c m odo s incera
Veritas cognosci dicitur quia per i l lud cognoscitur quod
est tantum Veri tas non habens al iquid permixtum non
veri tat is quia per primum ens, a quo cognito sumuntur
principia sic cognoscendi ;
aliud autem
quodcumque a
* ix , cap. vi (Migne, P.L.,
x l i i ,
966).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 129
cause of greater research which enables one person to
know those essences which another equally talented
individual does not discover because he does not investi
gate them.
And in this way we can understand Augustine's state
m ent in De Trin itate, bk . ix , c. v i , * rega rding the in di v i
du al on the m ou n ta in w ho sees the pure l ight above an d
the m ist below. Fo r whoever grasps no thin g bu t
inci
dental notions in the way that the sense image represents
such objects, viz. as a kind of accidental aggregate, is
l ike one in a va l ley surro und ed by m ist. Bu t by grasping
just what things are of themselves, a person separates the
essences from the many addit ional incidental features
associated w i t h th e m in the sense ima ge. Such a one,
as it were, has the sense image in the mist beneath him,
but he himself is on the mountain to the extent that in
virtue of the uncreated intel lect , the Eternal L ight, he
knows this truth and sees what is true from above, as a
more un iversa l t ru th .
[T he F ou rth W a y ]. A n d finally, we can concede that
pur e truths are kn ow n in the Etern al L ig ht as in a re
m otely kn ow n object. For the Un created L ig ht is the
first source of speculat ive things and the ult imate end
of pra ctic al things. T he first speculat ive an d pra ctica l
princip les,
then,
are derived fro m i t . Henc e, the know
ledge of speculat ive and practical things by means
of
princip les derived from the Eternal L ight, where the
latter is known,30 is more perfect and prior to knowledge
derived from principles from the respective class of things
as such, as has been pointed out in the question on the
subject o f theology. Such knowledge is m ore em inent
th an any other. N o w it is in this w ay that the knowledge
o f al l things pertains to the theolog ian. I n this wa y pure
truth is said to be known, s ince truth alone without
admixture of anything else is known, for i t is known
thro ug h the First Being. A n d once th is Being is kn ow n,
the principles for kn ow ing in this perfect w ay are d erived
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130 DUNS SGOTUS
quo su m un tur p rin c ip ia cognoscendi in genere est
verum
defect ivum.
H oc modo solus Deus cognoscit omnia sincere quia ut
dictum est in quaestione de subjecto theologiae,* solus
ipse novit omnia praecise per
essentiam suam. Omnis
autem intel lectus moveri potest ab objecto alio ad cog-
noscendum veritatem aliquam v ir tu te ejus. E t hoc
modo
cognitio
omnium per t ine t ad
t heo logum,
sicut
dictum est in quaestione ilia de subjecto theologiae, et
est eminent ior a l ia quaecumque.
Gognoscere enim
triangulum habere tres ut est quaedam part ic ipat io Dei
et habens talem ord inem in un iverso quod quasi per-
fect ius exprimit
perfectionem
Dei, hoc est nobi l ior i
modo cognoscere tr iangulum habere tres quam per
rat ione m tr i an gu l i . E t i ta cognoscere qu od temperate
vivendum
est propter beat i tud inem u l t imam conse-
quendam quae est att ingendo essentiam Dei in se, per-
fect ius est cognoscere istud cognoscibi le practicum quam
per pr inc ip ium a l iquod in genere
mor i s ,
puta per hoc
quod honeste vivendum est.
Et isto modo loquitur August inus de luce increata ut
cogn ita x v De T rinitate, cap. x x v i i , f u b i seipsum alloquens
ait :
Multa
vera vidist i et ea quae discrevist i ab ista luce
qua t i b i lucente vi d i st i ; at to l le oculos ad
ipsam lucem
et eos in ea infige si potes ; s ic en im videbis quom odo
distat nat iv i tas V e rb i D e i a processione D o n i D ei . Et
paulo post : Ha ec et al ia oculis tuis inte rio rib us lux
ista (monstrabit vel) m on str av it . Q uae est ergo causa
cur acie f ixa ipsam videre non poteris n is i ut ique
inf i rmitas, etc.
* Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii.
t xv , cap. xxv ii
(Migne,
P.L., x l i i ,
1097).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
130
therefrom . Bu t any other th in g fro m w hi ch princip les
of knowing something in k ind are derived is defect ive
t ru th .
Only God knows al l things purely in this perfect way,
for as we have said in the question on the subject of
theology,* He alone knows al l things precisely through
H is essence. Nevertheless, every intelle ct can be m ov ed
by some object to know that something is true in virtue
of H i m , and in th is way the knowledge o f a l l th ings
pertains to the the olog ian, as has been said i n the ques tion
on the subject of theology. Fo r to kn ow th at a tr iang le
has three [angles equal to two right angles], in so far as
this is a kind of part icipation of God and that i t has such
an order in the universe that it expresses more perfectly
as it were the perfection of
God,31—this
is a nobler way
of knowing a triangle has three [angles, etc.] than to
know this t ruth f rom the not ion of a t r iangle i tsel f .
Simi lar ly, to know that one should l ive temperately in
order to attain the supreme happiness, which consists
in attaining the essence of God in Himself, is a more
perfect way of knowing th is pract ical t ruth than to be
aware of it through some principle in the class of mores,
for instance, through the principle that one is obl iged
to l ive upright ly.
And i n this ma nne r Au gustine speaks of the U ncre ated
Light as known in De Trinitate, bk. xv, c. xxvii,f where
addressing himse lf, he says : " Y o u have seen man y
things and these you have discerned through that Light
in w hic h yo u saw them shin ing fo r th to you . T u rn
your eyes to the Light i tself and fasten them upon it ,
i f yo u can, for in th is wa y you w i l l see how the na t iv i ty
of the Word of God dif fers from the procession of the
G i f t o f G o d ." A n d a l i t t le la ter : "T h is and other th ings
this L ig h t has revealed to yo ur inner eyes. W ha t then
is the reason with fixed glance you are unable to see the
L ig h t itself, if it is no t inde ed yo ur weakness ? . . . "
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131 DUNS SCOTUS
[Ad Argumenta Pr inc ipa l ia ]
Ex dict is patet ad omnes auctori tates August in i ad
oppositum ; et secundum a l iqu em dictorum mo d o ru m
" v ide nd i in " expon i possunt auctori tates Au gu st in i quae
occurrunt de ista materia.
[Articu lus Sextus. Quomodo rationes Henrici
concluduni].
De sexto art iculo v idendum est quomodo tres rat iones
factae pro pr ima opin ione a l iqu id
ver,um
conclud unt in
quantum accip iuntur ab August ino, l icet non concludant
i l lam
conclusionem
falsam
ad
quam
i nducun tu r .
U b i sciendum est [qu o d a sensibi libus, sicut a causa
per se et principali, non est expectanda sincera Veritas ;
quia noti t ia sensus est circa al iquid per accidens, ut
dictum fui t , l icet actus sensuum a l iqu i s in t cert i vel
ve ri ; sed vi rt u te intel lectu s agentis, q u i est pa rt ic ipa tio
lucis
increatae, i l lustrantis super phantasmata, cognos-
citu r qu idd itas re i, et ex hoc ha be tur sinceritas vera . Et
per hoc solv i tur
primum argumentum H e n r i c i ;
et
secundum in tent ionem August in i non p lus conclud i t .
A d secundam
rationem
Henr ic i d ico quod
anima
mutabil is est ab uno actu disparato ad a l iu m , secundum
diversitatem
ob jec to rum, p rop ter
suam
i l l im i ta t ionem e t
im m ate ria l i tate m , qu ia est respectu cujusl ibet entis ;
s imi l i ter ab actu in non actum, quia non semper est in
ac tu ; sed respectu
primorum
p r i n c i p i o ru m, q u o ru m
Veritas nota est ex terminis, et conclusionum evidenter
deductarum ex terminis, non est mutabi l is a contrario
in contrarium, sci l icet a vero in
fa lsum.
Regulae
enim
i n lumine intel lectus agentis intel lectum recti f icant, et
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
13I
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning]
From all that has been
said,
it is clear how the citations
from August ine to the contrary are to be interpreted.
The texts of Augustine concerning this matter can also
be explained in terms of one of the aforementioned ways
of seeing.
[Article V I . To What Extent Henry's Arguments H o ld ].
As to the sixth article, we must see how the three reasons
adduc ed i n fav our of the f irst op inio n i n so far as they are
taken fro m A ugust ine do prove some tr u th , a l thou gh they
do not establish that false conclusion for which they were
advanced.32
Here we must recognise 33 th at we sho uld no t expect
pure truth f rom sensible th ings as from a primary and
essential cause, for sense kno w ledg e has to do w i th some
thing incidental, as we have pointed out,34 even though
some of the acts o f the senses are ce rta in an d true . B u t
the essences of things are known in virtue of the active
in te l lect , a part ic ipat ion of the Uncreated L ight , which
i l lumines the imaginat ion and in th is way true puri ty [of
tr u th ] results. I n this fashion, the f irst argum ent of
H en ry is solved. A n d according to the m in d of Aug ust ine,
i t proves nothing more.
To the second reason of Henry, I say that the soul can
change in the sense th at i t has no w one act, no w ano ther,
acco rdin gly as objects differ. Fo r the soul is no t m ater ia l
and is unl imited in the sense that i t can know and love
a ny th in g whatsoever.35 Likew ise, it can be active or
ina ctive , for i t is no t always in act. B ut w it h rega rd to
the fi rst pr incip les the tru th o f w hic h is kn ow n from their
terms,
or with regard to conclusions evidently deduced
fr o m the terms, the soul cannot change from one con trary
state to ano ther, i .e. fr o m tr u th to falsity. Fo r rules
36
known in the l ight of the agent inte l lect keep the mind
from erring, and even though the intel l igible species
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I32 DUNS SCOTUS
ipsa species intel l igibi l is terminorum, l icet in essendo
sit mutabi l is , in
repraesentando tamen
in
lumine in te l -
lectus agentis immutabiliter repraesentat, et per duas
species intell igibiles cognoscuntur t e rm in i primi p r inc ip i i ,
et ita ilia unio est vera et certa evidenter.
A d tertium d icendum quod conc lud i t con t ra
eum,
quia non poni t n is i
speciem
sensibilem
vel
phan tasma;
n o n autem concludit de specie intel l igibi l i repraesentante
q u id d i t a t e m.
Dicendum autem, quod si potent iae sensi t ivae non
sunt impeditae, species sensibil is veraciter repraesentat
re m ; sed in somno potentiae, sensuum exter iorum sunt
l igatae, ideo virtus imaginativa, conservans species
sensibiles, se cundum diversitatem f luxus humorum capit is,
apprehendit eas tamquam res quarum sunt simil i tudines,
qu ia v im
rerum habent ,
secundum Phi losophum, De
motibus
animal ium*
N o n plus con clud i t ter t ia rat io. ]
* cap. vi i
(7016,
20).
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CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
132
of the terms is mutable in its being, sti l l in representing
in the light of the agent intellect, the intell igible species
represents things in an immutable way, and the terms
of a f irst principle are known by two intel l igible species
an d consequently the u ni on [o f the terms in a p ropo sit ion]
is true and evidently certain.
As for [Henry 's ] th i rd argument , we must po in t out
that i t is tel l ing against his own posit ion, since he admits
of no species other than the sense image or sensible
species. B ut the arg um en t is n o t effective whe re an
in te lli g ib le species is h e ld to represent the essence. H o w
ever, i t must be admitted that i f the sensit ive powers
are not impeded, the sensible species truly represents the
thing s. I n sleep, howe ver, the powers o f the external
senses are bo un d. W herefore, the im ag ina tive po we r,
conserving the sensible species according to the different
movement of humours in the head, apprehends those
species as the things themselves of which they are but
likenesses, for they have the force of things, according to
the Philosopher in De motibus
animalium.*
The th i r d
reason proves no more than this.
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V I
T H E S P I R I T U A L I T Y
A N D I M M O R T A L I T Y O F
T H E H U M A N S O U L
Summary o f
the
A rgumen t
Q u e s t i o n
:
C a n
i t be
k n o w n
b y
n a t u ra l r e ason tha t t h e re w i l l
be a gen e ra l r e su r re c t ion o f m a n k i n d ?
P r o
e t
C o n t r a
B o d y o f t h e Q u e s t i o n
Pa r t I . A k i n d o f a p r io r i p roo f o f t h e re su r re c t ion
M e t h o d
o f
p ro ce du r e
First proposition : T h e i n t e l l e c t i ve sou l i s t he speci f ic
f o rm
o f
m a n
Proof based o n t e s t im ony o f ph i losophe rs
Proof f rom reason
:
( i )
A n
unsa t is f a c tor y form u la
t i on ; (2) Scotus 's form u la t ion— (a ) p r oof o f t h e
an t e ce de n t ; (b) p ro of o f t he conseq uen t
Second
proposition : The i n t e l l e c t i ve sou l is i m m o r ta l
A r g u m e n t s fo r i m m o rt a l i t y
A r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t i m m o r t a l i t y
Scotus 's opin ion
R e p l y t o t h e a r g u m e n t s fo r i m m o rt a l i t y
Th i rd p ropos it ion : Th e h u m a n sou l w i l l no t rem a in ou ts ide
the body fo rever
A r g u m e n t s for a r e su r re c t ion
Scotus 's opin ion
R e p l y t o t h e a r g ume n t s
E v a l u a t i o n
o f
t h e
a
p r io r i p roof
P a r t I I . T h e a posteriori p roofs o f t h e re su r re c t ion
E v a l u a t i o n o f the a posterior i a rg um e nts
Pa r t I I I . Solu t ion t o t h e Q ue s t ion
R e p l y t o t h e A rg u m e n t s a t t h e b e g i n n i n g
(2,322) 18
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
134
[ V I . THE
SPIRITUALITY
AND
IMMORTALITY
OF THE
HUMAN SOUL]
I a s k : C an i t be known by n a tur a l reason tha t there w i l l be
a ge ne ra l resu rrect ion
o f
m a n k in d
?
[Pro et Cont ra]
Proof tha t i t can be kn ow n
x
:
[A rg .
1]. A na tu ra l desire cannot be i n v a in . f M a n ,
howeve r, has a na tu ra l des ire to li ve forever , an d i t can
be known by natura l reason that such a des i re exis ts.
The refore, etc. Proof of the m inor : Whe re a n a tura l
aversion for something exists, i t is only because of a
n a tu ra l des ire or love for som eth ing e lse. B ut m a n has
a na tu ra l avers ion for d ea th. Th is is ev iden t both f rom
exper ience an d from w ha t the Apostle says to the
Cor in th ians
%
: "W e do not w ish to be u nc lo the d , bu t
ra the r c lothed ove r".
[Arg.
11].
A lso , i t is na tu ra l ly kn ow n tha t we seek
happ iness by our ve ry n ature . This is c lear from
Nicomachean Ethics, bk .
i , * *
w i t h rega rd to bea t itude i n
gen era l an d f rom
Nicomachean
Ethics , bk.
x , f f
for bea t itud e
in p a r t i cu la r . B u t from n a tu ra l reason i t is kn ow n tha t
bea titud e m ust be e tern a l . Hence, i t is kn ow n from
n a tu r a l reason tha t m an is orda ined to some e terna l
p e rfe c t ion. Proof of
the
m inor : Augu st ine
% %
proves i t
thus : "A n d i f l ife qu i ts h im by h is d y ing , how can a
blessed life r em a i n w i t h h im ? An d w hen i t qu its h im ,
w i th ou t doub t i t e ithe r qu i ts h im u n w i ll in g l y , or w i ll in g l y
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135 DUNS SGOTUS
S i n o l e n t e m , q u o m o d o e s t v i t a b e a t a , q u a e i t a e s t i n
v o l u n t a t e , q u o d n o n s it i n p o te s t a t e ? S i autem v o le n t e m ,
q u om od o be a t a v i t a e r i t
quam
f i n i r e v o l u i t q u i h a b e ba t ?
S i d ic as q u o d n e u t r u m , nee
v e l le ,
nee no l l e , s e d nee ilia
b ea t a e s t v i t a quae t a l i s e s t u t quem beatum f a c i t amore
e j u s i n d i g na s i t .
I t e m ,
n a t u r a l i t e r notum e s t q uo d t o t a s pe c i e s no n
c a r e t fin e s u o, q u i n i l i u m i n a l iq u o i n d i v i d u o c on s e q u a t u r .
Se d n a t u r a l i t e r n o t u m e st b e a t i tu d i n e m esse f in e m s p e c ie i
h u m a n a e ; e rg o e t h o m i n e m p osse c on s e q u i i l lam sa l t e rn
i n a l iq u o i n d i v i d u o ; s e d n o n p o te s t e a r n c o n s e q u i i n i s ta
v i t a p r o p t e r multas m i s e r i a s q u a e c o n c o m i t a n t u r vitam
istam u t p o t e v a r i e ta s fo r tu n a e , i n f i r m i t a s c o rp o r is ,
i m p e r fe c t io s c i e n t ia e e t v i r t u t i s , e t i n s t a b i l i ta s e t fa t ig a t io
i n exe r cendo a c t u s pe r f e c t i o n i s , i n tantum u t n u l l a
o p e r a t io , q u a n t u m c u m q u e i n p r i n c i p i o d e l e c t a b i l i s , p os -
s i t co n t i n ue e s se de l e c t ab i l i s ,
imo
p e r
ipsam
f a s t i d i e ndo
d e l e c t ab il e e r i t ce ssare ab ip sa ; e t n o t u m e s t pe r r a t i o -
nem n a t u r a l e m o p e r a t io n e m b e a t if i c a m n o n esse
f a s t i -
d i o s a m ,
nee p o tes t a so la anima s e p a r a ta h a b e r i , q u i a i n
h o c h o m o n o n c o n s e q u e r e t u r f i n e m suum ; e rg o h a b e -
b i t u r i n a l i a v i t a a t o t o c o n j u n c t o , e t p e r c o n s e q u e n s a d
m in u s v id e t u r p e r rationem n a t u r a l e m c o n c l u d i i n q u ibu s
h o m o a d f i n e m s u u m p e r t i n g e t .
I t e m ,
p e r r a t io n e m n a t u r a l e m n o t u m est q u o d omnis
s p e c i e s q u a e e s t d e i n t e g r i t a t e u n i v e r s i , e s t p e r p e t u a ,
q u i a totum i n t e g r u m e s t perpetuum ; sed h om o es t
s pec ie s pe r fe c t is s im a , s a lt e r n i n t e r is t a in f e r i o r a . Nos
enim
a l i q u o
modo sumus
f in is o m n i u m , s e cu n d o
Physi-
corum.*
E r g o , e t c .
II ,
ca p. i i
(1940,
35).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
135
or ne ither . I f u n w i ll in g ly , how is the life blessed w h ich
is so w i t h i n h is w i l l as no t to be w i t h i n h is power ? A n d
whereas no one is b lessed who wi l ls someth ing that he
does n ot have, how m uc h
less
is he blessed w ho is q u i tte d
against his
w i l l ,
not by honour, nor by possessions, nor
by a ny oth er th in g , but by the blessed l ife itsel f, since he
w i l l have no life a t
a l l.
. . . B u t ne i the r is th a t a blessed
li fe w h ich is such as to be u n w or thy of h is love w hom
it m akes bles se d".
[A rg . i n ] . Fu r the rm ore , i t is know n na tu ra l ly t ha t
an e nt i re species can not fa i l to a t ta in its en d. A t least
the end m ust be ach ieved in some ind iv idu a ls . B u t i t
i s na tu ra l l y known tha t bea t i tude i s the end of the
hu m an species. Therefore , i t is n a tu ra l ly kn ow n th a t
a t leas t some in d iv id u a l can a t ta in i t . B u t he cann ot
at ta in i t in th is l i fe because of the many concomi tant
miser ies such as the vic issi tudes of for tune, bodi ly in
f irm i t y , im per fec t know ledge a nd v i rt ue , in s tab i lit y and
fat igue in the exercise of even the most perfect acts,
ina sm uch as no opera t ion , be i t ever so d e ligh t fu l i n the
beg inn ing , can con tinu e to be d e l ig h t fu l . Fur the rm ore ,
when such an opera t ion causes wha t i s de l igh t fu l to
becom e d is tastefu l , i t w i l l no long er be pe r form ed . Now
i t is known by natura l reason that the beat i f ic v is ion is
not som eth ing d is tas tefu l . Nei ther is i t som eth ing tha t
the sou l can
possess
a lone in sep arat ion f rom the body , for
i n th is w ay man w ou ld no t a t ta in h is goa l. Consequent ly ,
th is end w i l l be a t ta ine d in another l ife by the w ho le
m a n ,
body a nd soul together. I t seems,
t hen ,
t ha t
n a tu ra l reason can reach th is conclus ion a t least in rega rd
to those ways by w h i ch m an w i l l a t ta i n h is end .
[A rg . i v ] .
Fur the rm ore , by na tu ra l reason i t is
kn ow n tha t every species re qu ired fo r the in teg r i ty o f the
un iverse, is e terna l . For the un iverse as an in teg ra l
w hole is ete rna l . Now m a n is the m ost pe r fect spec ies,
a t least am ong terre s tr ia l beings, for , Physics, bk. i i , * " w e
are in some w ay the end of a l l th ing s " . Therefore , e tc .
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I36 DUNS SCOTUS
Oppositum :
A u g u s t i n u s , xm De T r in i t a t e , ca p . i x , * loquens de v i t a
i m m o r t a l i
vel sempiterna
d i c i t : H a c
utrum
c a r e a t
humana
n a t u r a ,
nee p a r v a q u e s t io e st. H u m a n is q u i p p e
a r g u m e n t a t i o n i b u s hanc i n v e n i re c o n a n t e s , v i x p a u c i ,
magno
p r a e d i t i i n g e n i o , v a c a n t e s o t i o ,
doctrinisque
subtilissimis e r u d i t i , a d indagandam so l i us animae i m -
m o r t a l i t a t e m p e r v e n i r e p o t u e r u n t .
I t e m ,
A c t . xvi i , j d i c i t u r d e quibusdam Atheniensibus
a u d i e n t i b u s
P a u l u m ,
q u i d i c e ba n t q u o n i a m n o v o ru m
d a e m o n io ru m v i d e b a t u r a n n u n t ia t o r esse, q u i a Je s u m
e t r e s u r re c t io n e m a n n u n t i a b a t e is ; e t t a m e n i l l i A t h e -
n ienses
erant
p h i l o s o p h i ,
multum
v i g e n t e s r a t i o n e
n a t u -
rali ; p a t e t d e D io n y s i o c on v e r s o, q u i f u i t u n u s eorum ;
e r g o i s t u d q u o d v i d e b a t u r e i s i t a remotum a v e r i t a t e ,
non
v i d e t u r esse bene
notum
p e r r a t i o n e m
naturalem
;
u n d e o m n i a q u a e a d d u c i t i b i P a u l u s , n o n s u n t n i s i
q u a e d a m p e r s u a s i o n e s u t p a t e t i b i .
I t e m ,
A c t . xxvi,J c u m d i ce r e t Pau lus : S i pa ss ibilis
C h r i s t u s , s i p r i m u s e x r e s u r r e c t i on e , e t c . Fe s tu s m a g n a
voce d i x i t : In sa n i s ,
Pau l e .
[ C o r p u s Quaestionis]
[Pars Pr im a : Rat io
quodammodo
a
priori]
Hie manifestum e s t q u o d s i a l i q u a r a t i o o s t e n d a t
r e s u r r e c t i o n e m , o p o r t e t q u o d a c c i p i a t u r e x a l i q u o , q u o d
est p r o p r i u m h o m in i s , i t a q u o d n o n c on v e n i a t aliis c o r ru p -
t i b i l i b u s . Ho c
autem
n o n e st m a t e r i a
etiam
i n c o r r u p t i -
b i l i s , nee fo r m a a l iq u a d e s t r u c t ib i l is , q u i a e t s i t a l is s i t
i n
h o m i n e ,
e t e x ce l l e n t i o r
omni
f o r m a b r u t i , t a m e n e x
*
xm ,
cap. ix (Mign e, P.L., x m ,
1023).
t Acts, xvii. 18. I loc. c it. xxv i . 23-34.
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 136
To the con t ra ry :
[A rg . 1].
Aug us tine , speak ing of the l ife tha t is e te rna l
a nd immo r t a l i n De
Trinitate
bk . x i i i , c. ix ,* says :
"Wh e t he r hu m an n a tu re c an re ce iv e th is . . . is no
sm al l qu es t ion. . . . Assured ly , of those w ho endeavour
to d iscover i t f rom hu m an reasonings, scarce ly a few ,
and they endow ed w i t h g rea t ab ilit ies and aboun d ing
in l e i su re , and l ea rned w i t h t he mos t sub t l e l ea rn ing ,
have been able to a t ta in to the inve s t iga t ion of the im
m or ta l i ty o f the sou l a lon e " .
[A r g .
11].
Fur the rm ore , in Acts xv i i , f i t is re la ted tha t
ce r ta in Athe n ians lis ten ing to Pau l sa id : " 'He seems to
be a hera ld of s t range gods ' , because he proc la imed to
them Jesus an d the re su r rec t ion". Neverthe less, these
Athe nian s w ere phi losophers whose forte was the use
of n a tu ra l reason, as is c lear from the case of the conve rt
Dionys ius, w ho w as one of the m . B u t i t does not
seem tha t w h a t appeared to the m to be so fa r from the
t ru th is kn ow n adequa te ly by n a tu ra l reason . Hence ,
i t i s ev iden t here tha t wha t Pau l adduces in th i s
con
nex ion i s mean t to be no th ing more t han a k i nd o f
persuas ive form of a rg um en ta t ion .
[A rg . h i ]. Fur the rm ore , w he n Pau l sa id in Acts xxvi,%
" that Chr is t was to suf fer , tha t he f i rs t by h is resur rec
t ion [ from the dead was to p roc la im l ig h t to the peop le
an d to the Gent iles . . .] Festus sa id w i th a loud vo ice ,
'Pau l , t hou a r t m ad ' "
[B ody of the Q ue st ion]
[Part I. A Kin d of A Pr ior i Proof]
Th is m u ch is c lea r , i f any a rgum en t p roves the resur
rec t ion, i t m ust be one based on som eth ing tha t is p rope r
to man and does not belong to other per ishable th ings.
Bu t such a t h i ng wou ld no t be ma t te r , no t even i nco r
ru p t ib le m at ter .2 Nei the r is i t some form tha t can be
destroyed. For even i f such a fo rm exis t in m an a nd
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137 DUNS SCOTUS
ilia non potest sumi rat io suff ic iens ad probandum
resur rec t ione m tot ius ; e rgo opor te t qu od ac c ip ia tu r a
forma specifica hominis vel ab operat ione conven iente
homini
secundum
illam
form am .
Isto modo
p rocedente ex t r ibus proposi t ion ibus con-
c lud i t u r p ropos i t um, e t s i
omnes illae essent
ra t ione
n a tu ra l i no tae , haberem us p ropos it um . Sun t autem
istae :
Anima
i n te l lec t iva est fo rm a sp ec ifica h om in is" ;
secunda, "An im a i n te l le c t i va est i nc o r ru p t ib il i s " ; ex
qu ibus seq u itu r qu od fo rm a specifica homin is est incor
ru p t ib il is . Ad d i t u r t e r t i a , qu od " fo rm a hom in i s specifica
n on
remanebit
perpetuo ext ra
suum
t o t u m "
; sequi tur
e r go quod a l i q uando r ed ib i t t o t um i dem.
Ista
red i t io
i t e ra ta ,
voca tu r resu r rec t io secundum Dam ascenum l ib .
iv , ca p. xix * : Res urre ct io secunda est ejus, q u od disso-
lutum
est, su rrec t io. De ist is t r ibu s p roposi t ionibus ,
qu a l it e r notae s un t, v ideam us pe r ord inem .
[Propositi/) I . Anim a intellec tiva est form a specifica hom inis].
De p r ima d i c i t u r quod es t r a t i one na t u r a l i no t a , quod
osten d i tu r d u p l ic i te r : uno m odo per au c tor ita tes Ph ilo-
sophorum , q u i hoc assereban t, e t nonn is i tan qu am
ra t i one na t u r a l i
notum
; a l io m odo addu cen do ra t ione s
na tu ra les , ex qu ibus hoc con c lu d i tu r .
De primo : Aristotele s defmit animam n De anima,\
qu od est actus corpor is ph y s ic i , orga n ic i , e tc. Et in
p r i n c i p io
tertii,J
d i c i t de pa r te au tem
an imae ,
q ua
cognoscit et
sap i t ,
ub i v i de t u r pone re an imam i n t e l l e c -
tivam
pa r tem sa lte rn sub jec t ivam an im ae p r ius
definitae
i n c o m m u n i.
I t e m , omnes ph i losoph i t amquam d i f f e ren t i am e jus
p rop r i am commun i t e r posuerun t i n de f i n i t ione homin i s
*
Defide
orthodoxa, iv , cap. xxvi (Migne, P.G.,
xciv,
1220).
t
11,
cap.
i
(412",
28).
%
in ,
cap.
iv (429",
10).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 137
i n deed ,
one even more exce l len t than any bru te fo rm,
s t i l l t h i s wou ld no t p rov ide an adequa te a rgument fo r
the resur rec tion of m an
as
a
w ho le.
Hence , the a rgum en t
m ust be based upon tha t fo rm w h ich is spec ific to m an
or upon some operat ion which man enjoys by reason
of this form .
[Method of Procedure]. Th e m e thod used to establish
the thesis is to proceed from three proposit ions. I f a l l
t h ree of these can be known by na tu ra l reason , the
proposed conclusion w i l l fo l low . The three proposit ions
are these :
(1) The
intellective
soul
is
the
specific form of
man
;
(2) The intellective soul is incorrup tible. From these tw o
i t follow s tha t the spec ific form of m a n is inc orrup t ible.
To these a th ir d is ad de d : (3) The specific form of man
w i l l not remain forever outside the composite. Hence i t
fo llows tha t a t some t im e the same com posite w i l l be
restored.
This second re tu rn Dam ascene ca lls the resur
r ec t i on *
: "Th e res ur rect ion is the second r is ing of w h a t
has been diss olve d". Le t us consider these three proposi
tions in order a nd see to w h at exten t they are ev ide nt .
[Firs t Proposition. The intellec tive soul is the specific fo rm
of
man].
This f irs t p rop osit ion is sa id to be know n by
n a tu ra l reason an d is p roved in tw o w ays. The f ir s t
proof is based upon the test imony of phi losophers who
assert th is as som eth ing kn ow n by n a tura l reason a lone.
The othe r p roceeds f rom na tu ra l a rgum en ts w h i ch lead
to this conc lus ion.
[Proof based on the test imony of the phi losophers].
As to the fi rst , Ar is totle defines the soul in the De anim a,
bk .
n ,
f as " th e ac t o f the n a tu ra l organ ised body " , and
so on. An d in the beg inn ing of bk. h i ,
J
he speaks
of " the par t o f the sou l w i th wh ich the sou l knows and
th inks . . . " , where he seems to make the in te l lect ive
soul a t leas t a su bjec t ive part,3 of w h a t he has prev ious ly
de fine d as the sou l in ge ne ra l.
Fur thermore, a l l ph i losophers commonly ass ign
" r a t i o n a l " as the d i fferenc e tha t p rope r ly defines m a n ,
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I38 DUNS SCOTUS
r a t i on a l e , p e r r a t i on a l e i n t e l lig e n t e s
animam
i n t e l l e c -
tivam esse p a r t e m essentialem e jus .
Nee
b r e v i t e r i n v e n i t u r a l iq u i s p h i lo s op h u s n o t a b i li s ,
q u i h o c n e g e t , l i c e t ille maledictus Ave r r o e s i n f i c t i o ne
sua
in
De
a n i m a , *
q u a e
tamen
n o n e s t i n t e l l i g i b i l i s ,
nee
s ib i , nee
a l i i , p o n a t i n t e l l e c t i v a m
quamdam
s u b s t a n t i a m
s e p a r a t a m m e d i a n t i b u s phantasmatibus c o n ju n c t a m ;
quam conjunctionem nee
i pse
nee
a l i q u i s s e q u a x p o t u i t
e x p l i c a r e , nee p e r illam c o n j u n c t i o n e m s a l v a r e h o m i n e m
in t e l l ig e r e . N a m s e c u n d u m ipsum h om o formaliter n o n
esset n i s i q u o d d a m a n i m a l i r r a t i o n a l e e x c e lle n s , p e r
quandam t a m e n a n im a m irrationalem e t s e n s i t i v a m
excellentiorem aliis
a n i m a b u s .
De secundo : a d
propositum
n o n in v e n i t u r fa c i l it e r
r a t i o a p r i o r i n e q u e a p o s t e r i o r i , n i s i e x p r o p r i a o p e r a -
t i o n e h o m i n i s , s i q u i d e m f o r m a i n n o t e s c i t e x p r o p r i a
o p e r a t i o n e , s i c u t m a t e r i a e x t r a n s m u t a t i o n e .
[ 1 .
Rat io
I nadaequa td \ .
E x o p e r a t io n e e r g o i n t e l l i -
g e n d i a r g u i tu r p r o p o s i t u m s ic : i n t e l l ig e r e es t p r o p r i a
o p e r a t i o h o m i n i s ; e r g o e g r e d i tu r a p r o p r i a f or m a ; e rg o
i n t e l l e c t i v a e st p r o p r i a fo r m a h o m i n i s .
S e d i s t a r a t i o p a t i t u r i n s t a n t i a m q u i a i n t e l l e c t u s a d
i n t e l l ig e r e se h a b e t s e c u n d u m eos
tantum
p a s s iv e , e t n o n
ac t iv e ; e r go is t a p r o p o s i t i o, p r o p r i a o pe r a t i o es t a
p r o p r i a f o r m a , n o n p r o b a t i n t e l l e c t i v a m e s s e p r o p r i a m
formam h o m i n i s , s i q u i d e m a b ip s a n o n e st is t a o p e r a t io
s e c u n d u m e o s , s e d a b o b j e c t o i n t e l l i g i b i l i vel s e c u n d u m
a l iq u o s a p h a n t a s m a t e .
[2 .
Ra t io Sc ot i ]. Ideo ex ilia o p i n i o n e , formo
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 138
mean ing by " ra t iona l " t ha t t he i n te l l ec t i ve sou l i s an
essentia l p a r t of m a n .
In fa ct , to pu t i t br ie fly , no phi losophe r of an y note can
be found to deny th is except that accursed Averroes in
h is com m en ta ry on De anim a, bk .
i i i , *
where h is fantast ic
concept ion, in te l l ig ib le nei ther to h imsel f nor to others,
assumes the in te l lect ive par t of man to be a sor t of
sepa ra te subs tance un i t ed to man th rough the med ium
of sense im ages. B u t ne ither he nor h is fo llowe rs to the
presen t day have been ab le to exp la in th i s u n ion. Nor
can i t be m a i n ta i ned t ha t i n v ir tue o f such a u n ion m a n
h im se lf unde rs tands , fo r acco rd ing to h im , m an as such
is no th i ng m ore t han a k i nd o f i rr a t i ona l an im a l w h i ch
excels the othe r an im als by reason of
an
i r ra t iona l sensi
t iv e sou l th a t is m ore excellen t tha n othe r sou ls.
[Proof f rom rea son]. As to the sec ond, i t is n ot easy
to find e i the r an
a priori
or a n a poster iori a rgu m en t, unless
i t be based on a fu n c t ion p rope r to m a n, fo r the form is
kn ow n from its p roper fun c t ion , even as m a t te r is kn ow n
from the existence of chan ge.
[1. An Unsatisfactory Form u lation]. On e argument4
based on the funct ion of the in te l lect that is used to
establish the p roposed conc lus ion is th is . To u nd erstan d
is a fu n c t ion p rope r to m a n . The refore, i t has its source
in the fo rm p roper to m an . The i n te llec tive form then is
t ha t p rope r to m an .
Th is a rgu m en t, how ever , is open to c r i tic i sm inasm uch
as those who p ropound i t admi t tha t the in te l lec t has
only a pass ive an d n ot an ac tive re la t ion to in te l le c t ion.
Hence , th is p ropos i tion " A fun c t ion tha t is p roper p ro
ceeds f rom the p rope r for m " rea l ly does not prove tha t
the in te l lec t ive p a r t is the p rope r form of m a n , for this
operat ion does not proceed f rom the form but accord
i ng to t hem 5 i t is caused by the in te l l ig ib le objec t , or
ac cord ing to the v iew of
others
i t proceeds from the sense
image.6
[2.
Scotus's
Form ulat ion]. I p u t th is argu m en t,
then ,
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139 DUNS SCOTTJS
r a t i on e m a l i t e r s ic : H o m o i n t e l l i g i t fo r m a l i t e r e t
p r o p r i e ; e r g o
anima
i n t e l le c t i v a e st p r o p r i e f or m a
h o m i n i s .
A n t e c e d e n s videtur sat is manifestum se c u n d u m a u c -
t or i t a t e s A r i s t o te l is t e r t i o De a n im a * e t primo
E t h i -
co rum, \
q u o d i n t e l l i g e r e e s t p r o p r i a o p e r a t i o h o m i n i s .
O p e r a t i o
autem
u t d i s t i n g u i tu r c o n t ra a c t io n e m seu
fa c t i on e m f or m a l i te r in e s t o p e r a n t i , e t n o n est a b
i p s o i n a l t e r u m .
Gonsimiliter decimo Ethicorum J
i n
i n t e l l i g e r e p o n i t f e l i c i t a t e m h o m i n i s , e t m a n i f e s t u m e s t
q u o d ilia fe l ic i ta s in e s t fo r m a l i t e r h o m i n i ; e r go e t ilia
o pe r a t i o i n qua co ns i s t i t .
Se d t e n t a n d u m e st p r o ba r e a n t e c e d e n s p e r r a t io n e m
c o n t r a p r o t e r v u m s i n e g e t , e t h o c i n t e l l i g e n d o i n a n t e -
c e d e n t e i n t e l l i g e r e p r o p r i e d i c t u m p e r q u o d i n t e l l i g o
a c t u m c og n os c e n d i t r a n s c e n d e n te m
totum
genus sens i t i -
v ae co gn i t i o n i s .
P r o b a t u r e r g o i l lud a n t e c e d e n s u n o modo s ic . Hom o
co gno sc it a c t u co gno sc en d i , n o n o rg an i co ; e r go
i n t e l
l ig i t p r o p r i e . C o n s e q u e n t ia p a t e t e x r a t i o n e j a m p o s it a ,
q u i a intellectio p r o p r i e e st c o g n i t i o tra n s c e n d e n s t o t u m
genus sensa t i on i s
; omnis
a u t em sensa t i o e s t co gn i t i o
o rg an i c a ex se cundo De an im a . An te ce de ns h u ju s
enthymematis p r o b a t u r , n a m organum determinatur a d
certum
g e n u s s e n s i b i l i u m e x
n
De a n i m a * * e t h o c id e o
q u i a c o n s i s t i t i n m e d i a p r o p o r t i o n e e x t r e m o r u m i l l i u s
g e n e r is . Se d a l iq u a m c o g n i t i on e m e x p e r im u r i n n obis
q u a e n o n c o m p e t it n o bis s e c u n d u m t a le or g a n u m , q u i a
t u n c determinaretur p ra e c i s e a d s e n s ib il ia d e t e r m i n a t i
g e n e r i s , c u j u s o p p o s i t u m e x p e r i m u r , q u i a c o g n o s c i m u s
* m, cap. m, passim.
f Ethica Nicomachea, i , cap. v i i ( iog8a, 7).
+ x, cap. v i i i
(1178*, 21).
* * n, cap.
v -x ii ,
passim
(4166,
32SS ;
424", 25-26).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 139
i n a nother fo rm . Ma n form a lly
and
properly understands ;
therefore, the intellective soul is the proper form of man.
[a .
Proof of the an tece de nt ]. Th e antecedent seems to
be c lear enough accord ing to the test imony of Ar is to t le
in De
anima,
bk . h i , * a n d Nicomachean Ethics, bk .
i,f
since
to un de rs tan d is the p roper opera t ion of m a n . Now an
operat ion, in cont rad is t inct ion to an act of fashion ing
som eth ing or to an a c t ion , is fo rm a l ly in the one w ho
per form s the opera t ion and is n ot p roduced by the agen t
in s om ething else. Sim ila r ly Ar istot le in Nicomachean
Ethics, bk .
x,J
makes man 's happ iness consis t in under
s tand ing . Now i t is c lear th a t th is fe l ic i ty is form a l ly in
m a n . C onsequen tly the opera t ion in w h ich th is fe l ic i t y
consis ts m ust a lso be in m a n form a l ly .
Never the less, we should t ry to prove the antecedent
by reason lest some contentious in d iv id u a l deny i t . Now
in the an teceden t, I take " to k n ow " or " to un de rs tand "
in the proper sense of the term as an act of knowledge
w h ich transcends every t ype of
sense
knowledge .
[First
p roof ] .
One w ay of p rov in g th is an teceden t ,
t h en , is th i s . M a n knows by an ac t o f know ledge w h i ch
is n ot organ ic ; hence he know s or understands in the
p rope r sense of the te rm . The consequence is ev ide nt
for the reason a l ready g iven, s ince in te l lect ion proper ly
speaking is a knowledge which t ranscends a l l sense
know led ge . A l l sensation, howe ver , is organ ic knowledge
as Ar is to t le shows in De an im a, bk. i i . There the an te
cedent of th is enthymeme is p rove d f rom the fac t tha t
every orga n is de term ine d to a c e r ta in k in d of sensible,7
and th is because i t consis ts in a ba lance between two
extrem es.8 B u t we do experience in ourselves som e
know ledge wh i ch we do no t have i n v i r t ue o f some
organ , fo r i f i t were organ ic , th i s knowledge wou ld be
l im i te d prec ise ly to the sensibles of som e d eterm ine d
k i n d , wh i ch i s t he ve ry oppos i t e o f wha t we ac tua l l y
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I40 DUNS SGOTUS
p e r
talem
a c t u m d i f f e r e n t i a l )
cujuscumque
gene r i s
sensibilium a d
a l i u d ,
q u o d n o n e s t a l i q u i d i l l i u s g e n e r i s ;
e r go
cognoscimus utrumque e x t r e m u m .
Pa t e t is t a
c o n s e q u e n t i a s e c u n d u m Philosophum s i c a r g u e n t e m 11
De a nim a * d e s e ns u c o m m u n i .
Sed
hie
i n s t a t u r
p r i m o ,
q u i a c o g n i t i o o r g a n i c a e s t ,
q u a e in e s t s e c u n d u m d e t e r m i n a t a m p a r t e m c orp o ris ;
ilia autem d e q u a a r g u i tu r , q u o d p e r i l lam d i s t i n g u i m u s
se ns ib il ia a n o n se ns ib il ib u s , in e s t t o t i p r im o , e t id e o n o n
est p e r a l i q u o d or g a n u m p r o p r i e lo q u e n d o ; tamen n o n
t r a n s c e n d i t totum g e n u s cognitionis s e n s i t i v a e s e c u n d u m
p e r fe c t io n e m , q u i a in e s t p r i m o
t o t i ,
e t pe r consequens i t a
e st m a t e r i a l e , s i c u t i l lud q u o d in e s t t o t i p e r p a r t e m ; i t a
enim
pas s io tot i u s es t
m a t e r i a l is ,
s ic u t q u o d in e s t t o t i p e r
p a r t e m .
Se c un d o n e g a t u r a s s u m p t u m q u o d
ille
a c t us
n o n i n e s t s e c u n d u m a l i q u o d o r g a n u m , q u i a i n e s t s e c u n
d u m o r g a n u m p h a n t a s i a e
;
c u ju s p r o b a t i o e s t, q u i a
illo
laeso impeditur c o g n i t i o . Nee p r o b a t i o ilia d e d e t e r -
m in a t io n e o rg a n i a d certum g en u s c o n c lu d i t , q u ia
p h a n -
ta s i a e x t e n d i t se a d o m n i a s e n s ib il ia .
Se d p r i m a i n s t a n t ia e xc lu s a es t p e r q u o d d a m i b i
t a c t u m ,
q u i a p e r i l i u m a c t u m d i s c e r n i m u s t o t u m g e n u s
s e n s i b i l i u m a b a l i q u o e x t r a t o t u m g e n u s i l l u d ;
nee il ia
p r o ba t io , q u o d i m p e d i t u r is te a c tu s la e so or g a n o p h a n t a
s ia e c o n c l u d i t ; h o c e n i m e st p r o p t e r o r d i n e m
istarum
potentiarum i n o p e r a n d o , n o n a u t e m q u i a i n t e l le c t io
e x e r c e a t u r m e d i a n t e i s t o o r g a n o .
A l i te r p r ob a t u r a n te c ed e n s p r i n c i p a l e , q u i a a l i q u a
* De
anima, in ,
cap. i
(425°
30 S.).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
14O
exper ience. For by such an ac t we know prec ise ly how
one k in d of sens ible d i ffers f rom an othe r , a nd con-
q u e n t ly w e kn ow both extrem es. Th is consequence is
ev iden t f rom the Ph i losopher , who uses th is a rgument
in De anim a, bk. i i , * in reg ard to com m on sense.
B u t to this som e objec t , f irs t of
a l l,
t h a t organ ic know
ledge is th a t w h ich is p resen t in some de term ina te p a r t o f
the body , whereas the a foresa id knowledge by w h ich we
dis t ing u ish sensibles from th ings tha t c an not be pe rceived
by the senses, is present in the body as a w hole an d for
th is reason is n o t had i n v i r tue of some o rgan in the p rope r
sense of the w ord . For a n a t t r ibute of the w hole is as
mater ia l as someth ing wh ich ex is ts in one of i t s pa r ts .
Never the less, th is knowledge does not t ranscend in per
fect ion the whole class of sense knowledge since i t is
p r im a r i ly i n the body as a wh ole an d hence is ju s t as
ma te r i a l i n cha rac te r as t he know ledge i n on l y a pa r t
of the w h ole . Secondly, the y de ny the as su m pt ion tha t
th is act of knowledge is not present in v i r tue of some
orga n because i t is the re by reason of the orga n of the
im a g ina t ion . Proof fo r th i s is foun d in the fac t th a t w hen
th is o rgan i s damaged , such knowledge i s no longer
possible. Ne i th e r is the p roof from the l im i ta t ion of the
organ to a cer ta in k ind of sensible conclusive, because
the im a g ina t ion extends to a l l sensibles.
Th e fi rs t objec t ion, how ever ,
has
a l rea dy
been
exc luded
by w ha t was trea ted above, fo r th rough th is ac t o f know
ledge w e d isce rn the d i fferenc e betw een the w hole class
of sensibles a n d som ething th a t is outside the class as a
w ho le. Nei the r does the a rgu m ent tha t th i s ac t is
impeded by damage done to t he imag ina t ion p rove
any t h i n g .
For th is is due to the fu n c t ion a l re la t ion tha t
exists between these powers and not because the act of
unders tand ing i s exerc i sed t h rough the med ium o f an
organ.
[Second p roof"]. Another p roof fo r the p r inc ipa l an te
cedent
is based on
the fac t tha t
we possess some
im m a t e r ia l
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141
DUNS SCOTUS
c o g n i t i o i m m a t e r i a l is e st i n n o bis ; n u l l a s e n s i tiv a p o te s t
esse im m a t e r i a l is ; e r g o , e t c .
Istud
v o c a b u l u m i m m a t e r ia l e e st fre q u e n s i n u s u
Ph i lo -
s o p h i i n p r o p o s i t o , sed v i d e t u r a m b ig u u m . Pote s t enim
a d propositum t r i p l i c i t e r i n t e l l ig i ; vel im m a t e r i a l is , q u i a
i n c o r p o r e a , h o c
m o d o ,
q u i a n o n p e r p a r t e m c o r p o r e a m
e t
o r g a n u m ,
e t t u n c i s t u d e st i d e m c u m p r o p os i tio n e
j a m p o s ita d e n o n o rg a n i c a . V e l a l i o m o d o i m m a t e r ia l is ,
q u i a
nullo
m o d o e x t e n s a , e t t u n c p l u s d i c i t
quam
n o n
o rg a n i c a ; e t s i e n i m omnis o r g a n i c a s i t e x t e n s a , q u i a
r e c i p i t u r i n e x t e n s o , n o n
tamen
so l a , q u i a s i r e c i p e r e t u r
i n t o t o composito
p r i m o ,
c u m i l lud s i t e x t e n s u m , a d h u c
o pe r a t io esset e x te n sa . Te r t i o m o do po te s t i n t e l l i g i
i m m a t e r i a l i t a s e j u s i n c o m p a r a t i o n e a d o b j e c t u m , u t
s c i l ic e t re s p ic i a t ob je c t u m s u b r a t i on i bu s i m m a t e r i a l i bu s ,
u t p o t e i n q u a n t u m a b s t r a h i t u r a b hie e t n u n c e t h u j u s -
m o d i ,
q u a e d i c u n t u r c o n d i tio n e s m a t e r ia l e s . S i
autem
( p r ofe r e t u r v e l ) p r o ba r e t u r i m m a t e r i a l i t a s s e c u n d o m o d o ,
p lu s h a b e r e t u r p r o p o s i t u m q u a m e x p r o ba t io n e e ju s
p r i m o m o d o . Se d n o n v i d e t u r sic p os se p r o b a r i , n i s i e x
c o n d i t i o n i b u s o b j e c t i , q u o d r e s p i c i t ille a c t u s , n i s i f o r t e
ex r e f l e c t i o ne , q u i a
experimur
nos
reflecti
s u p e r a c t u m
is t iu s c o g n i t io n i s ; e t q u a n t u m n o n e st s u p e r se
r e f l e x iv u m ,
e t i de o ab ob jec to is t i u s ac t us fit fina lit e r p roba t i o an t ece -
den t i s .
Sic : H a b e m u s i n n o bis a l i q u a m c o g n i t i on e m o bje c t i
s u b
ilia
r a t io n e s u b q u a n o n p ot e s t esse e ju s a l iq u a c o g n i
t io s e n s i t i v a ; e r g o , e t c . An t e c e d e n s p r o b a t u r , q u i a
e x p e r i m u r i n n o bis q u i a c og n os c im u s a c t u u n i v e rs a l e ;
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
141
knowledge. No sense knowledge , how ever , can be im
m a ter ia l ; therefore, etc.
Th is w o rd " im m a te r i a l " is fr equen tly u sed by the
Phi losopher in this connexion, but i t appears to be
am biguous . There a re th ree re levan t ways i n w h i ch i t
can be
understood, (a)
E it he r th is know ledge is im
m a te r ia l because i t is in corporea l in the sense tha t i t is
not an ope rat ion th a t invo lves a corporea l p a r t or orga n.
In th is sense, the present proposi tion is the same as tha t
p rev ious ly pos ited w i th regard to non-organ ic knowledge.
(b ) Ano the r way i n wh i ch t h i s know ledge cou ld be
im m ate r ia l w ou ld be tha t i t is n ot extended i n any w ay .
In th is case m uc h m ore is asserted th a n the fac t tha t i t is
n ot
orga n ic .
For a l thou gh ev ery th ing organ ic
is
extend ed
inasmuch as i t i s rece ived in to someth ing extended
[v iz. the org a n ], th is is n ot the on ly
reason.
I t w ou ld s t il l
be extended i f i t w ere rece ived im m ed ia te ly by the com
posite as a w hole, because the com posite is i tse l f exten ded.
(c) Im m a te r i a l i ty can be unders tood i n a t h i r d sense,
na m ely w i th re ference to the objec t , inasm uch as th is
knowledge considers the objec t un de r im m a ter ia l aspects ,
as
for ins tance, abstrac t ing f rom the "he re an d
now '"
a n d
such l ike , w h ich a re sa id to be m a ter ia l cond i tions. I f we
w ou ld p rove th is know ledge to be im m a t e r ia l i n the second
sense an d n ot m ere ly i n the f irs t our proposed conclus ion
w ou ld follow a l l the
m ore .
B u t i t
seems
t ha t the on l y way
we cou ld do th i s wou ld be f rom the cond i t ions wh i ch
cha racter ise the objec t of
such
an act (un less perhaps we
cou ld do
so
on the basis of ref le ct ion , s ince we exper ience
ourselves ref le ct ing on th is a ct of know led ge , for w h a t has
q u a n t i ty is not capa ble of ref le ct ing up on itse lf.) A t a ny
ra te the p roof of the an tecedent u l tim a te ly rests up on the
objec t of this a ct.
Th e p roof is as follow s. We possess som e knowledg e
of an object under an aspect i t cou ld not have as an
object of
sense
know led ge ; there fore,
etc.—Proof
of the
antecedent : ( i) We exper ience i n ourselves th a t we
( 2 , 3 2 2 ) 20
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I42 DUNS SCOTUS
e t e x p e r im u r q u i a cognoscimus ens , vel q u a l i t a t e m
[ M S q u a n t i t a t e m ] s ub r a t io n e
aliqua
c o m m u n i o n
quam
s i t r a t i o primi ob j ec t i sens ib i l i s , etiam r e s p e c tu supremae
s e n s i t iv a e . E x p e r i m u r e t i a m q u o d c og n os c im u s
r e l a -
t ion e s c on s e q u e n t e s n a t u r a s
r e r u m ,
e t ia m n o n s e n s ib i l iu m .
E x p e r i m u r e t i a m q u o d d i s t i n g u i m u s totum genus sens i
b i l i u m a b a l iq u o q u o d n o n e st i l l iu s g e n e r is . E xp e r i m u r
e t i a m q u o d c o g n o s c i m u s r e l a t i o n e s r a t i o n i s , q u a e s u n t
s e c u n d a e i n t e n t i o n e s , s c i l i c e t
relationem
u n i v e r s a l i s ,
g en e r is e t s pe c ie i e t co m p o s i t io n i s , e t aliarum i n t e n t io n u m
l og i c a l i u m . E x p e r im u r e t i a m q u o d c og n os c im u s a c t u m
i l i u m q u o c o g n o s c i m u s i s t a , e t
i l l u d ,
s e c u n d u m q u o d
i ne s t no b i s i s t e a c t u s , q uo d e s t p e r a c t um reflexum supe r
a c t u m r e c t u m e t s u s c e p t iv u m e ju s . E xp e r im u r e t ia m
q u o d assentimus c o m p l e x io n ib u s q u i bu s d a m s in e p os si-
b i l i t a t e c o n t ra d ic e n d i v e l e r r a n d i , u t p o t e
primis
p r i n c i p i i s .
E xp e r i m u r e t ia m q u o d c og n os c im u s i g n o t u m e x n o to p e r
d i s c u r s u m , i t a q u o d n o n p o s s u m u s d i s s e n t i r e e v i d e n t i a e
d i s cu r su s , nee c on c lu s ion is i l l a t a e ; q u o d c u m q u e is t o r u m
cognosce re es t
impossibile cuicumque
p o t e n t ia e sen s it iv ae ,
e rgo , etc.—Si q u is autem p ro t e r v e n eg e t is tos a c t us inesse
h o m i n i , nee se e xp e r i r i is tos a c t u s i n s e , n o n e s t u l t e r i u s
c u m e o d i s p u t a n d u m , s e d d i c e n d u m e s t s i b i q u o d e s t
brutum ; s ic u t c u m d ic e n t e , n o n v i d e o colorem i b i , n o n
est d i s p u t a n d u m , sed d i c e n d u m
s i b i,
t u i n d i g e s s e ns u q u i a
caecus e s. I t a q u o d quodam s e nsu , i d e s t , p e r ce p t i one
i n t e r i o r i ,
e xpe r im u r is tos a c t u s i n n o bi s ; e t i d eo s i q u is
i s t o s n e g e t , d i c e n d u m e s t eum n o n esse h o m i n e m , q u ia
n o n h a b e t
istam
v i s ion e m q u a m a l i i
experiuntur.-—
A s s u m p t u m , s c i l i c e t q u o d n u l l u s i s t o r u m actuum po tes t
in esse s e c u n d u m a l iq u a m p o t e n t ia m s e n s i t iv a m , p r ob a t u r ,
q u i a a c t u u n i v e r s a l e c o g n o s c i t u r s u b t a n t a
indifferentia
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 142
know t he ac t ua l
un iversa l ,
( i i) We experience tha t we
know be ing or q ua l it y u nder a m ore genera l no t ion t ha n
tha t cha rac ter is t ic o f the p r im a ry objec t o f even the
highest sense
fa cu lt y ,
( i i i ) We exper ience th a t w e a lso
kn ow re la t ions tha t fo llow from the na tu re o f th ing s , even
w he n the la t te r a re no t capab le of
being
perce ived by the
senses, ( iv ) We exper ience tha t w e d is t ing u ish the w hole
class of sensible objects from w h a t is n ot such, (v ) We
experience tha t we k now concep tua l re la tions , w h ich a re
second in ten t ions , such as tha t of the un ive rsa l , the genus,
the species, the ju d g m e n t an d other log ica l in ten t ions.
(v i ) We a lso exper ience tha t we know the very ac t
whereby we know these th ings and we exper ience tha t
th is a ct exis ts w i th in us. This w e do by a n act of reflec
t ion upon the d i r ec t ac t and i t s rec ip ien t , (vii) We
experience th a t w e assent to proposi tions such as the fi rst
pr inc ip les w i th ou t a poss ib ilit y of e r ror or cont ra d ic t ion.
(v i i i) We a lso exper ience tha t
we
l ea r n the un known from
the kn ow n by m eans of d iscu rs ive reason ing , so tha t we
are unable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the
reasoning process or to the conclusion that is inferred.
B u t the kn ow ledge of any of these cann ot be a t t ribu te d
to any sensit ive
fa c u l ty ;
therefore,
etc.—Should
a
con
t en t ious ind iv idua l deny tha t such ac ts a re p resen t in
m a n or th a t he experiences these acts in h im sel f, a person
ough t not to a rgue w i t h h im any fu r the r , bu t he ough t to
be to ld th a t he is a b ru te a n im a l . I t is the same w i t h one
w ho says : " I do n ot see co lour h e re ". We should not
a rgue w i t h such a one bu t s im p ly t e l l h im : "You need
senses because you are b l i n d ". An d so by a c er ta in
"sense" , namely in te rna l percep t ion , we exper ience
these acts w i th in ourselves. Hen ce , i f som eone w ere to
deny the i r exis tence w e w ou ld have to say tha t he is n o t
a m a n because he lacks th is in te r ior v i s ion w h ich others
experience.—The
assu m pt ion th a t a sense fa cu l ty is n ot
the source of
any
o f
these
acts [v iz. ( i ) to (v i i i ) ] is p roved
as follow s : Th e a ctu a l un ive rsa l has such an ind iffere nc e
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143
DUNS
SGOTUS
s u b q u a n t a
ipsum
s i c c o g n i t u m e s t
simul
d i c i b i l e
de
o m n i b u s s i n g u l a r ib u s i n q u i bu s s a l v a t u r ; s ic n o n c og n os -
c i t se nsus . Sed de se cundo es t e v i d e n t iu s , q u i a n u l l a
p o t e n t i a p o t e s t c o g n o s c e r e a l i q u i d s u b r a t i o n e u n i v e r s a -
l iori r a t i on e su i p r o p r i i o b je c t i ; s i c u t v is u s n o n cogno sc it
a l i q u i d s u b r a t io n e indifferenti a d c o lo re m e t a d sonum ;
e r g o c o g n i t i o
ilia
est
alicujus
s ub r a t io n e c o m m u n io n
q u o c u m q u e p o s i t o o b j e c t o , etiam supremi sensus non
p o te s t esse a l iq u a s e n s a t io. Q u a r t u m p r o ba t i d e m , q u ia
nu l l a s ensa t i o po t e s t e s se d i s t i n c t i v e
pr imi
ob jec t i sens i -
b i l i s , i .e . c o m m u n i s s i m i , a b eo q u o d n o n e st t a l e , q u i a nee
p o te s t esse u t r iu s q u e e x t r e m i . D e r e l a t i on i bu s c on s e-
q u e n t i b u s a l i a n o n s e n s i b i l i a i n t e r s e vel i n sens i b i l i a a d
se ns ib il ia , p a t e t p e r i d e m q u i a s ensus n o n po t e s t i n is tos
e t
multo magis
p a t e t d e r e l a t i on i bu s is t is , q u a e d i c u n t u r
r a t i on i s , q u i a s en su s n o n p ot e s t moveri a d c og n os c e n d u m
a l i q u i d q u o d n o n i n c l u d i t u r i n o b j e c t o s e n s i b i l i u t s e n s i -
b i l i ; h a b i t u d o r a t io n is n o n i n c l u d i t u r i n a l i q u o u t
ex is tens e s t ; sensus autem ex i s ten t i s es t u t ex i s tens es t ,
e t p e r ho c po sse t p r o b a r i
pr imum
e t i a m d e a c t u u n iv e r
s a l ^ q u i a u n i v e r s a l i i n a c t u r e p u g n a t esse e xis te n s u t
ex is tens es t . Al iud d e reflexione s u p e r a c t u m e t p o te n -
t i a m ,
p r o ba t u r p e r h oc q u o d q u a n t u m n o n es t
reflexivum
su p r a se . A l i a d u o de co m p o s i t io ne e t a s sensione co m
p o s i t i o n ^ e t d e d is c u r r e r e e t a s s e n t ire e v i d e n t i a e d is c u rs u s
p r o b a n t u r e x r e l a t i o n e r a t i o n i s , q u i a i s t a n o n s u n t s i n e
r e l a t i o n e r a t i o n i s .
C on s e q u e n t ia p r i m i e n t h y m e m a t is p r o b a t u r s ic . Si
t a l is a c t u s s it i n n o bis fo r m a l i t e r c u m n o n s it s u bs t a n t ia
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
143
abou t i t t ha t wha t i s known i n t h i s way can be p red i
ca ted s imul taneously of a l l the s ingu lars of which i t i s
ch ara cter is t ic ; no sense fa c u l ty , howe ver , know s th ings
in th is wa y. The same is even m ore ev ide n t as regards
the
second,
fo r no fac u l ty ca n know som eth ing und er an
aspect m ore un iversa l tha n tha t o f its proper objec t , even
as v is ion perceives noth ing under some aspect common
to co lour a n d to sound. C onse que nt ly , a knowledge of
someth ing i n even more genera l t e rms than tha t cha r
acter ist ic of the f i rst object of even the highest sense
can not be a sensation. Th e same holds t ru e of the
f ou r t h ,
for no sensat ion can d is t ingu ish between the
most un iversa l of a l l sens ib le objects and that which is
not sensible, because i t cannot perceive both extremes.
This is a lso t rue of the re la t ions which exis t between
th ings im p erc ep t ib le to the senses or betw een such th ings
an d those w h ich can be p erceived by the senses, for the
sense fac u l ty has no a bi l i t y to perce ive such re la t ionsh ips .
An d th is is a l l the m ore t r ue o f those re la tions w h ich a re
p u re ly conc ep tua l , since the senses can be m oved to per
ce ive on ly what is inc luded in a sens ib le object as such.
B u t conce p tua l re la t ions a re n o t inc lud ed in any ex is t ing
t h i n g
as
such , whereas the senses have to do w i th e xist ing
th ings as ex is t ing . The same argum ent c ou ld be app lied
to the ac tua l un iversa l , fo r i t i s absurd tha t the ac tua l
un ive rsa l sh ould exis t
as
such. The o the r , rega rd ing our
a b i li t y to re flec t up on the ac t an d the fa cu l ty , is p roved
f rom the fac t t ha t any th ing t ha t has quan t i t y canno t
reflec t up on itsel f. As for the other tw o (v iz. the a ct of
ju d g m e n t a nd the assent to the same or the act of reason
ing and the assent g iven to the ev idence for the same),
what was said of conceptual relat ions proves these acts
do n ot proceed f rom a sense fa c u l ty , for ne ither of these
tw o exis t w i thou t a conce p tua l re la t ion .
\b.
Proof of the c onsequ en t]. The consequence of the
f i rst
enthymeme 9
is p roved as follow s :
[First
p roof"].
I f
we
form a l ly possess such an a ct, since
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£44 DUNS SGOTUS
n o s t r a , q u ia q u a n d oq u e in e s t e t q u a n d o q u e non i nes t ,
e r go o po r t e t d a r e
i l l i
a l i q u o d
receptivum proprium
;
n on autem a l i q u o d
e x t e n s u m ,
s i ve s i t pa r s o r gan i ca s i ve
totum c om p o s i tu m , q u i a t u n c ilia op e ra t io esset ex tens a ;
nee
posse t e sse t a l i s qua l i s d i c t a e s t , c i r ca ob jec t a
talia
q u a l ia d i c t a s u n t ; e r g o o p o r t e t q u o d in s i t s e c u n d u m
a l iq u i d n o n e x te n s u m ; e t q u o d
i l lud
s it fo r m a l i t e r i n
nob is ,
i l l u d n o n p o te s t e sse n i s i anima i n t e l l e c t i v a , q u i a
quaecumque a l ia f o r m a e st e x te n sa .
Vel a l i t e r p o te s t p r o b a r i c o n s e q u e n t ia i s ta e u n d o a d
conditionem
o b j e c t i i s t i u s a c t u s , q u i a q u a e l i b e t f o r m a
i n fe r i o r i n t e l le c t i v a , s i habet o p e r a t ion e m , habet p raec i se
r e spe c t u o b j e c t i s ub r a t i o n i b us o ppo s i t i s i s t i s r a t i o n i b us
d i c t i s ; e rgo s i
habemus
op e r a t io n e m c i rc a
objectum
sub
i s t i s r a t i o n i b us , ilia n o n i n e r i t n o b i s s e c u n d u m aliquam
fo rmam aliam a b i n t e l le c t i v a ; e r g o in e s t n o bis s e c u n d u m
i n t e l le c t i v a m ; e r g o i n t e l l e c t i v a f o r m a l i te r in e s t n o bis ,
a l i t e r n o n essemus fo r m a l i t e r o p e r a n te s s e c u n d u m illam
o p e r a t i o n e m .
E x s e c u n d a o p e r a t i o n e
h u m a n a ,
s c i l i c e t v o l u n t a t e ,
p ote s t p r o b a r i i d e m , q u i a h o m o e st
dominus actuum
s u o r u m , i t a q u o d i n p o te s t a t e e ju s es t p e r v o l u n t a t e m
determinare
se a d h oc v e l e ju s o p p o s i t u m , s i c u t d i c t u m e st
d i s t i n c t i o n e x x i i , s e c u n d i v e l
x x i i i , *
q . i i i , e t ho c e st
notum
n on tantum ex f i de sed etiam p e r rationem n a t u r a l e m .
I s t a a u t e m
indeterminatio
n o n p o te s t esse i n a l iq u o
a p p e t i tu s e n s it iv o se u o rg a n i c o v e l e xte n s o q u i a q u i l i b e t
a p p e t i t u s or g a n ic u s v e l m a t e r i a l is d e t e r m i n a t u r a d
certum
g e nu s a p p e t i b i l i u m s i bi c on v e n ie n s , i ta q u o d i l l u d
apprehensum n o n p o t e s t n o n c o n v e n i r e nee a p p e t i t u s
nee
a p p e te r e ; e rg o v o lu n t a s , q u a s ic i n d e t e r m i n a t e
v o l u m u s e s t a p p e t i t u s n o n a l i c u j u s t a l i s f o r m a e , s c i l i c e t
* Opus oxoniense, n , dist. xxv, q . unica (Vives e d .).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 144
i t is not our substance as such—for i t i s not a lways
present in us—it fo llow s, the refore, tha t th is act needs a
prope r subject . Now the la t ter can not be som eth ing
extended , whether i t be a par t o f the organ ism or the
whole composi te , for then th is operat ion i tse l f would be
extende d an d w ou ld lack the p rescr ibed charac teris tics .
Nei the r w ou ld i t be concerned w i th such objec ts as have
been d escr ibed a bove. Hen ce , i t is necessary th a t th is
ac t be i n us i n v i r tu e o f som eth ing unextended and tha t
the la t te r be fo rm a l l y in us . Now th is can be noth ing
else than the in te l lect ive
soul,
for ev ery other form is
extended.
[Secondproof ~\.
Anothe r w ay to prove th is consequence
would be to consider the condi t ion of the object of th is
ac t, for i f an y form in fer ior to the in te llect ive form
fun ct ions, i t is a lw ays w i th reference to an object h a v ing
character ist ics the very opposite of those ci ted above.10
Therefore , i f we have an opera t ion wh ich regards an
object un de r the aforem en tione d aspects , th is w i l l n ot
be p resen t in us in v i r tue of any fo rm o ther than the
in te l lec t ive . Henc e, i t is by reason of th is form tha t i t is
present in us, a nd consequ ent ly the in te l le ct ive form i tse l f
is fo rm a l ly in us , fo r o therw ise w e w ou ld n o t fo rm a l ly
fu nc t ion i n t h i s w ay .
[Thi rdp roof"]. We can prove the same from the second
opera t ion c ha racter is t ic of m a n , nam e ly
v o l it ion ,
for m an
is m aster of his acts to such an exten t tha t i t is w i th in h is
powe r to de term ine h im se lf a t w i l l to th is or to its
opposite,
as has been said
i n
bk .
i i ,
d is t . xxii
or
xxm ,
q .
i i i . *
An d th is is som eth ing kn own by n a tu ra l r eason a nd no t
m ere ly by fa i th . Such a lack o f de term ina t ion , how ever ,
can not exis t in an y organ ic or e xtend ed ap pe t ite , because
every organ ic o r mater ia l appet i te i s de termined to a
certa in c lass of sui table objects so that what is appre
hended cannot be unsu i tab le nor can the appet i te fa i l
to seek i t . Th e
w i l l ,
the re fore , by w h i ch we can w i l l i n
such an i nde te rm ina te way , i s no t t he appe t i t e o f a
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145 DUNS SCOTUS
m a t e r i a l is , e t p e r consequens a l ic u ju s e xced en t is omnem
talem formem hujusmodi ponimus i n t e l le c t iv a m , e t tu n c
s i a p p e t i t u s
ille
s i t f or m a l i te r i n n o bis , q u i a e t a p p e t e re ,
s e q u i tu r q u o d fo rm a ilia s i t f or m a n o s t r a .
\Propositio I I . Anima in te l lect iva est im m or ta l is] . De
s e cu n d a p r o p os i tio n e p r i n c i p a l i , q u a e e s t, q u o d a n im a
i n t e l le c t iv a e st i m m o r ta l is , p r o c e d i tu r s ic u t d e p r i m a .
Primo a d d u c e n d o a u c t o r i t a t e s P h i l o s o p h o r u m q u i h o c
sense r un t .
A r is t o te l e s I I De an im a* d i c i t q u o d i n t e l le c t u s s epa r a -
t u r a c a e t e r is , s ic u t p e r p e t u u m a c o r r u p t i b i l i . S i d i c a t u r
q u o d s e p a ra tu r q u a n t u m a d o p e r a t ion e m ;
c o n t r a —
e x h o c s e q u i t u r p r o p o s i t u m , q u i a s i p o te s t s e p a r a r i
s e c u n d u m o p e r a t io n e m e t s e c u n d u m
esse
s e c u n d u m
ipsum
i
De
anima.]
I t e m ,
in De an ima \ p o n i t u r d i f f e r e n t i a i n t e r sensum
e t i n t e l le c t u m , q u o d e xc e lle n s s e n s ibile c o r r u m p i t
s e n s u m ,
e t p r o p t e r h oc p o s t s e n s a tion e m t a lis m in u s
s e n t it m in u s s e n s ibile ; n o n s ic d e i n t e l l e c t u . Imo
p o s t q u a m i n t e l l e x e r i t
summa
i n t e l l i g i b i l i a ,
magis
i n t e l l i -
g i t i n f e r i o r a ; e r g o i n t e l le c t u s n o n d e b i l i t a t u r i n op e -
r a n d o , e t t u n c u l t r a s e q u i t u r , q u o d s it i n c o r r u p t ib i l is i n
essendo.
I t e m ,
x i i Me tapkys i cae , cap . i , * * moven tes causae velut
p r i u s ex i s t e n t e s , q uae
autem
u t r a t i o , i d e s t, fo r m a s u b -
s ta n t a l is s u p p le c u m c a u s a t o u t to t o ; q u a n d o enim
sa na t u r h o m o , t u n c e t s an ita s e s t. S i a u t e m p os t e r iu s
a l i q u i d
m a n e t , perscrutandum
est ; in
quibusdam
e n i m
* n , cap . i i (413&, 25). t 11, cap. i i
(4136, 29-31).
J
m,
cap . iv
(429",
29-429&, 4). * *
xn ,
ca p. i i i
(1070°
21 ff.).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 145
m a ter ia l form , an d in consequence i t belongs to som e
th in g w h ich excels every such fo rm . B u t th i s is ju s t w ha t
we assume the in te l le ct ive form to be. An d therefore, i f
th i s ap pe tite is form a l ly in us ina sm uch as its ac t is in us ,
i t follow s th a t th is form is our form .
[Second Proposition : The intellective soul is im m orta l].
The m ethod of de a l ing w i th the second p ropos i tion , v iz.
tha t the in te l lec t ive sou l is im m or ta l , is the same as tha t
used w i th the f irs t . Th e test im ony of those phi losophe rs
w ho he ld th is is ad duced fi rs t .
[Arguments for im m ortality : u A r g .
i ] .
Ar i s to t le , in De
anim a, bk .
i i , *
says th a t the " in te l lec t d iffers f rom the rest
as w ha t is e te rna l d iffe rs from w ha t is pe r ish ab le". An d
i f som eone objects tha t i t is som eth ing d i ffere nt an d ap ar t
on ly in so far as its operations are concerned, the p ro
posed conclusion st i l l fo l lows, for according to Ar istot le
in De anim a, bk. i,f i f i t can be set ap ar t by reason of i ts
operat ions i t can also exist a p a rt .
[A rg . 11].
Fu r the rm ore , i n
De anim a, bk .
h i ,
%
he
says
t ha t
the senses d i ffe r f rom the inte l le ct , because som ething
th a t st im ulates the sense excessively tends to im p a ir i t
so tha t afterw ards even an objec t th a t does n ot s t im ulate
the sense so strongly is less capable of being perceived,
whereas such is no t the case w i th the in te l lec t . Q u ite
the cont rary , once the h ighest in te l l ig ib les have been
grasped what is less intel l ig ib le becomes even bet ter
k n o wn . The in te l le ct consequ ent ly is not w eakened in
fu n ct ion, an d from th is i t follow s fur th e r , the in te l lec t
is im pe r ish able in its being .
[A rg . i n ] . Also, i n Metaphysics, bk . x i i , c. i , * * he says :
"Th e causes tha t produ ce m ot ion , for instance , exis t
previously whereas those which are the essence, that is,
the su bstant ia l form , exis t s im ultane ously (Add 'w i th the
effec t cons idered as a w h o le ' ) . For w he n a m an is
he a l thy, the n he a l th a lso exis ts. . . . B u t w e m ust
inq u i re w hether an y th ing rem a ins a fte rwa rds. For in
some cases there is nothing to prevent th is, for instance
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I4 6 DUNS SCOTUS
n i h i l p r o h i b e t , u t s i anima e s t t a l i s , non o m n i s , sed
i n t e l l e c t u s , e t c .
Vul t
e r go d i c e r e quo d i n t e l l e c t u s e s t
f o r m a manens p os t c o m p o s i tu m , se d n o n a n te .
I t e m ,
xvin De an im a l ib u s * relinquitur s o lu m in t e l le c t u m
de fo ris a d ve n i r e . E r g o n o n a c c i p i t esse pe r gene r a -
t i o n e m ,
s e d a c ausa ex tr in s e c a ; e t p e r consequens n o n
p o te s t a c c i p e r e n o n esse p e r c o r r u p t i o n e m ,
nee
pe r
a l i q u a m causam i n f e r i or e m c o r r u p t i v a m , q u i a e ju s esse
n o n s u b e s t a l i c u i t a l i c a u s a e , c u m s i t a c a u s a s u p e r i o r i
i m m e d i a t e .
I t e m ,
ex d i c t i s
Philosophi
fo r m a n t u r a l iq u a e r a t ion e s ;
est unum principium a p u d
e u m ,
q u o d n a t u r a l e
d es i -
derium n o n e st f r u s t r a ; n u n c autem i n a n i m a e s t
d e s i d e r iu m n a t u r a l e a d s e m p e r esse.
I t e m , vii Metaphysicae,]
v u l t q u o d m a t e r i a e s t, q u a res
p otes t esse e t n on esse. Er g o
i l lud
q u o d n o n h a b e t
materiam s e c u n d u m e u m n o n h a b e t p o t e n t ia m n o n
e ss en di ; i n t e l le c t iv a n o n h a b e t m a t e r i a m s e c u n d u m
e u m ,
q u i a e st f or m a s i m p l e x .
I t e m ,
in Ethicorum % v u l t q u o d f or t is de b e t se expo ne r e
morti
p r o r e p u b l ic a e t i d e m v u l t rx E t h i c o ru m * * e t lo q u i t u r
s e c u n d u m j u d i c i u m r a t io n is n a t u r a l is ; e rg o s e c u n d u m
rationem naturalem p ote s t c o g n os c i i m m o r t a l i ta s
a n i m a e .
P r o b a t i o i s t i u s c o n s e q u e n t i a e , q u i a n u l l u s p r o p t e r
q u o d c u m q u e bonum v i r t u t i s vel i n s e , vel i n a l i o vel
communitatis d e b e t a p p e t e r e v e l p o t e s t omnino n o n
esse
s u u m ,
q u i a s ec u n d u m A u g u s t in u m in De l ibera
a r b it r io , \\ N o n esse n o n p o te s t a p p e t i . N u n c a u t e m s i
a n i m a n o n esset i m m o r t a l i s , m o rie n s a c c ip e r e t t o ta l i t e r
n on esse.
*
De generatione animalium, 11,
cap. i i i
(736*,
28).
f v i i , cap. xv (io39<>, 29).
j Ethica Nicomachea, in , cap. v i i (11174, 8).
* * ix, cap. v i i i (1169", 20).
ft
in ,
cap. v i i i
(Migne,
P.L.,
xxx i i ,
1282).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 146
the sou l may be of th is
sort—not
a l l the
soul,
bu t the
in te l lec t" . Hence , w h at Ar is to t le wishes to say is tha t
the in te l lec t is the form w h ich exis ts after the com posite
ceases to e xist , even thou g h this form does not exist p r ior
to the com posite.
[A rg . i v ] . Also, he says i n his w ork De generatione
an imal ium*
: " I t rem ains for the in te l lec t a lone to enter
from the outs ide ". Hence , the in te l lec t does not receive
exis tence by w ay of ge ne ration bu t ra the r f rom an ex
tr ins ic cause ; conse qu en t ly, i t ca nn ot cease to exist by
pe r ish ing . Nei the r can any in fe r ior cause corrup t the
soul s ince its existence does not com e un de r the powe r of
any such cause, for i t owes i ts existence di rect ly to a
high er cause.
[A rg .
v ] . Also, some argum ents can be constructed
from the d ic ta of the Philosopher . One of
his
p r inc ip les
is tha t a na tu ra l desire is not in vain.12 Now the soul
has a n a tu ra l desire to exist forev er.
[A rg .
v f j.
Also, in Metaphysics, bk . v i i , | he has this to
say : "Ma t te r is tha t i n v i r tue o f
which
a th ing can exis t
or n ot e xis t ". The refore, ac cord ing to h im , w hatever
has no m a t ter lacks the ca pa ci ty to be non-exis tent . Now
the in te l lec t ive soul, acc ord ing to h im , is de vo id o f m at te r
s ince i t is a s im ple form .
[A rg .
v i i ].
Also, in Nicomachean Ethics, bk . m.,% he says
tha t a brave m an m ust expose h im se l f to d ea th fo r the
state.
An d th is he appears to repea t in bk.
ix
of the
same w or k .** Now he speaks acc ord ing to the d ic ta tes
of n a tu ra l reason. C onseque n tly , the im m or ta l i t y o f the
soul can be kn ow n by n a tur a l reason. Proof of th is
consequence : No-one is oblige d or is even able to seek
his com plete non-existence for the sake of some vi r tu ous
good whether tha t good be someth ing in h imse l f o r in
another o r a good of the commun i ty , fo r accord ing to
August ine
a
p erson ca nn ot desire
non-existenc e, f f
I f
the
sou l were n ot im m or ta l , how ever, t he one who is d y ing
w ou ld be a cce pt ing com plete non-exis tence .
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147 DUNS SGOTUS
I t e m ,
a r g u i t u n u s D o c t o r q u a s i e x v e r b i s P h i l o s o p h i
sic : Quod corrumpitur a u t corrumpitur p e r c o n t r a r i u m ,
au t pe r d e fe c t u m a l ic u ju s ne ce ssa r io r e q u i s i t i a d esse e ju s .
Sed anima i n t e l l e c t i v a non h a b e t c o n t r a r i u m , nee esse
co r por is e st s im p l i c i t e r n e ce ssa r ium a d e ju s esse, q u i a
hab e t
proprium
esse pe r s e , e t i d e m i n co r p o r e e t e x t ra
co r pus ; nee e s t d i f f e r e n t i a n i s i q u o d i n c o r p o r e
c o m -
m u n i c a t
i l lud
c o r p o r i [ M S c o r r u m p i t u r ] ; e x t r a c orp u s
n o n c o m m u n i c a t .
I t e m ,
s im p l ex n o n po te s t s e p a r a r i a s e ip so ; a n im a e st
s im p l ex ; e r go n o n p o te s t s e pa r a r i a s e ip sa e t p e r conse -
q u e n s nee a s u o esse s e p a r a r i p o te s t q u i a n o n p e r aliam
f o r m a m a se h a b e t e sse . Secus e s t d e co m p o s i t e , q u o d
h a b e t esse p e r f o r m a m , q u a e f o r m a p o te s t s e p a r a r i a
m a t e r i a , e t i t a esse c o m p o s i t i d e s t r u i .
Sed oppositum v i d e t u r Ph i lo so phu s sens is se , q u i a i n
f ine ,
v i i Me taphys i cae*
e x i n t e n t i o n e
vult
q u o d
omnes
p a r t e s , q u a e p o s s u n t s e p a r a t a e manere a t o t o , s un t
e l e m e n t a , i d e s t, p a r te s m a t e r ia l e s , s ic u t ip s e i b i a c c i p i t
e l em en t a ; e t p r a e t e r ta l e s necesse es t po ne r e i n t ot o
aliquam fo rm a m , q u a e totum e st i l l u d q u o d e s t, q u a e n o n
p o s s i t m a n e r e s e p a r a t a a p a r t e m a t e r i a l i , t o to non
m a n en t e . E r go s i conce ss it
animam intellectivam
esse
fo r m a m h o m i n i s , u t p a t e t ex p r o ba t io n e p r op o s i t io n is
p r a e c e d e n t is , n o n p o n i t e a rn m a n e r e
separatam
a m a t e r ia ,
t o t o n o n m a n e n t e .
I t e m ,
p r i n c i p i u m v i d e t u r a p u d eum q u o d i l l u d
q u o d incipit esse , d e s i n i t esse. U n d e I De caelo et
m u n d o , \ c o n t r a P l a t o n e m v i d e t u r h a b e r e p r o i n c o m -
* v i i , cap. xv i i
(10416, 12
ff.).
t
1,
cap . x
(2796,
31-32) ; cap. xi i
(282'',
4).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 147
[A rg . v i n ] . Also, one teacher 13 argues as i t w ere from
the w ords of the Philosoph er as fo llow s : W h a t per ishes,
perishes by reason of
its
con tra ry or because i t lacks some
necessary prere qu is i te for its existence. Th e inte l le ct ive
soul, how ev er, has no c ontra ry. Ne i th e r is the existence
of the body a necessary prerequisi te for the soul 's exist
ence , since the soul possesses its ow n p rope r per se exist
ence.
The la t te r is the same wh ether the sou l is in the
body or out of i t . Th e on ly d ifference is tha t w he n
the soul is in the body, i t communicates i ts existence to
the bod y, w hereas w he n i t is outside i t does not d o so.
[A rg .
i x ] .
Also, w ha t is s im ple can not be separated
from i tse lf. The soul is s im ple ; the refore, i t c an not be
sepa rated from itsel f, n or ca n i t , in consequence, be
sepa rated from its existence, for i t does not h ave i ts
existence in v i r tu e of som e form othe r tha n itself. I t is
otherwise w i th som eth ing com posite w h ich has exis tence
in v i r tu e of the fo rm . Th is fo rm can be separa ted from
m a tter , thus de stroying the existence of the c om posite.
[Argum ents against im m ortality : A rg .
i
] .
Th e Phi los
opher, however, seems to take the opposi te v iew, for at
the end o f
Metaphysics,
bk .
v i i , *
he expresses the op in ion
tha t the on ly par ts w h ich cou ld be separa ted f rom the
w hole are the e lem ents, i.e. the m a ter ia l p ar ts , for in th is
sense he und erstand s elem ents here. I n a d d i t ion to these
elem ents i t is necessary to assume the existence of som e
fo rm in t he who le wh i ch i s t he to ta l i t y o f t ha t wh i ch
exis ts. This form could not exis t in sep aration from the
m a ter ia l pa r t once the w hole no long er exis ts. Hence , i f
he grants tha t the in te l lec t ive sou l is the form of m a n , as
is ev ident f rom the proof of the preced ing proposi t ion,
he does not ad m i t tha t i t exis ts in sep arat ion from m a t te r ,
once the w hole no long er e xists.
[A rg .
11].
L ike w ise, i t seems to be one of his p r inc ip les
th a t w h a t begins to exist ceases to exist. Hen ce , i n his
work De caelo et m undo,\ ag ainst Plato, he seems to con
s ider i t imposs ib le tha t any th ing cou ld have come in to
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I48 DUNS SCOTUS
poss ib i l i , q u o d a l i q u i d in c e p e r i t , e t tamen s i t p e r p e t u u m
e t i n c o r r u p t i b i l e ; e t
i l l
Phys icorum, cap. de
i n f i n i t o , *
cu j us es t
p r i n c i p i u m ,
e jus es t f i n i s .
[Opino
Scot i] .
Potes t d id q u o d l i c e t a d istam
s e c u n d a m p r o p o s i t i o n e m probandam sint r a t i o ne s p r o -
bab i l e s ,
non
t a m e n d e m on s t ra t iv a e ,
imo nee
necessar iae .
E t q u o d a d d u c e b a t u r p r o ea s e c u n d u m
primam viam
d e a u c t o r i t a t ib u s p h i lo s o p h o ru m , d u p l ic i t e r p o te s t
so lv i .
U n o modo q u o d dubium e s t q u i d P h i l o s o p h u s c i r c a h o c
sense r i t . Va r i e
enim
l o q u i t u r i n d i v e r s i s
l o c i s ,
e t h ab u i t
d i v e r s a p r i n c i p i a , e x q u o r u m a l iq u ib u s v i d e t u r s e q u i
unum
o p p o s i t u m ,
e x aliis
a l i u d .
Unde p robab i l e e s t ,
q u o d i n i s t a c o n c l u s i o n e s e m p e r f u e r i t d u b i u s , e t n u n c
magis v i d e b a t u r a c c ed e re a d unam p a r te m , n u n c a d
a l i a m ,
j u x t a q u o d t ra c t a b a t m a t e r i a m c on s on a m u n i
p a r t i m a g is quam a l t e r i .
E s t e t a l i a r e s p o n s i o r e a l i o r q u o d n o n o m n i a d i c t a a
philosophis a s s e r tiv e , e r a n t e is p r o b a t a p e r r a t i o n e m
necessariam n a t u r a l e m ; s ed fr e q u e n t e r n o n h a b e ba n t
n i s i q u a s d a m p r o b a b i l e s p e r s u a s i o n e s , vel v u l g a r e m
opinionem p h i lo s op h o ru m p r a e c e d e n t iu m . U n d e d i c i t
Ph i losophus
11 Caeli
et
mundi f
i n c a p . d e d u a b u s q u a e s t.
d i f f i c i l i b u s , t e n t a n d u m e s t d i c e r e q u o d v i d e t u r e s s e
d i g n u m ,
r e p u ta n te s p r o m p t i t u d i n e m m a g is i m p u t a r i
v e r e c u n d ia e , q u a m a u d a c ia e , s i q u is p r o p t e r
philosophiam
s t a r e , e t p a r va s sufficientias d i l i g i t , d e q u i b u s habemus
maximas d u b it a t io n e s . U n d e p a r v a e sufficientiae
f r e
q u e n t e r s u f f e c e r u n t p h i l o s o p h i s , u b i n o n p o t e r a n t a d
majorem p e r v e n i re , n e c o n t r a d i c e r e n t p r i n c i p i is p h i los o -
p h i a e .
E t i n
eodem
c a p . d e [ a l i is ] a s t r is d i c u n t A e g y p t i
*
in ,
c ap. iv
(203'->,
9).
f n, cap. xi i (291*, 25-29 ;
292",
6 ff.).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 148
exis tence an d s t i ll be e terna l an d im pe r isha ble. An d in
the Physics he
says
* : "Wh a teve r has a beg inn ing has an
end " .
[Scotus's Opinion]. I t ca n be stated th a t a lthou g h
there are probable reasons tor th is second proposi t ion,
these are n ot de m onst ra t ive , nor for tha t m at ter are they
even necessary reasons.14
[Reply to the arguments fo r im m orta lity]. Th e testim onies
of the
philosophers—the
f i rs t way used to prove the
proposition—can
be solved in tw o w ays. First of
a l l ,
i t
i s doubt fu l what the Phi losopher rea l ly he ld on th is
poin t , for he speaks d i f ferent ly in d i f ferent p laces and
has d i f fe ren t p r inc ip les , f rom some of wh ich one th ing
seems to fol low w hereas from others the ve ry opposite
can be in fe r re d . Wh erefore, i t is probable th a t he was
a lw ays d ou bt fu l about th is conclus ion a nd a t one t im e
seems to be d ra w n to one s ide a nd a t othe r tim es to the
other dep end ing on w hether the subjec t m at te r he was
t rea t ing a t the m om en t was m ore i n accord w i t h the one
or w i th the othe r .
Another answer , and one more in accord w i th fac ts ,
is that not a l l the s ta tements by the phi losophers were
establ ished by proofs both necessary and evident to
n a tu ra l reason. Freq ue n t ly , w ha t they gave was n oth ing
m ore tha n ra ther persuas ive p robab le a rgum ents or wh a t
was com m only h eld by ea r lier ph i losophers. For th is
reason,
the Phi losopher in De
caelo
et mundo, bk . n,f in
the cha pter on the tw o d i ff ic u l t qu estions, says : "W e
m ust now a t te m p t to s ta te the p robable so lu t ion, for we
reg ard the zea l of one whose thi rst a fter p hi losophy leads
h im to accep t even s ligh t ind ica tions w here i t is very
di f f icu l t to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty
tha n o f
over-confide nc e".
Hence, in those m atte rs w here
they cou ld f in d no th ing be tte r w i thou t c on trad i c t ing the
pr inc ip les o f ph i losophy, "s l i gh t ind ica t ions" f requen t l y
h ad to suffice for the ph ilosoph ers. As he says in the
same cha pter : "Acc oun ts of othe r stars are g ive n by the
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149 DUNS SCOTUS
e t Baby lon i i , a quibus multas c redu l i t a tes habemus de
unoquoque as t ro rum.
Unde
ph i losoph i quandoque
acqu iescunt propter persuas iones probabi les, quandoque
propter asser t iones pr inc ip iorum
suorum
p rae ter ra t io-
nem
nece ssar iam . Et ista responsio
sufficeret
ad
omnes
au ctorita tes, l ice t essent expressae [M S n u l lae ] , qu od non
conc ludun t p ropos i t um. Tamen responder i potest per
o rd inem.
Ad
p r i m u m ,
quod non i n t e l l i g i t
istam
separa t ionem,
n is i p raec ise in hoc quod in te l lec tus non u t i tu r corpore
in operando, e t p rop ter hoc es t incor rup t ib i l i s in ope-
ran do, loqu en do de
ilia
c o rrup t ione , qua v ir t us organ ica
corrumpitur p rop te r corruptionem org a n i ; et ista sola
co r rup t io
competit
po ten tiae organ icae. Secundum
Phi losophum
i
De
an im a *
si senex acciperet
oculum
juv en is , v idere t u t iq u e s icu t juv en is ; e rgo ipsa p o ten t ia
v i s i va non es t deb i l i t a t a s i ve co r rup ta quan tum ad
ope ra tione m ; sed [a d ] organum tantum ; nee t amen
ex is ta incor rup t ione in te l lec tus , qu ia
sci l.
non habet
o r ganum ,
pe r cu jus co r rup t ionem poss i t co r rump i i n
operando, sequ i tu r quod s i t simpliciter i ncor rup t ib i l i s
in operan do, q u ia tun c seq ueretur q u od in essendo esset
incor rup t ib i l i s , s i cu t tunc
argutum
est ; sed ta n tum
sequ i tu r quod non es t cor rup t ib i l i s in operando, illo
modo
quo po ten t ia o rgan ica ; tam en p one re tu r s im p l i
c i te r cor rup t ib i l i s , jux ta illud Phi losophi in De anima.\
In te l lec tus co r rum p i tu r i n nobis
quodam
i n te r io r i cor -
r up to .
E t hoc p ro t an to , qu ia ponere tu r p r i n c i p i um
operand i to t i composito ope ra tione m p rop r i am e jus ;
* i,
cap.
iv (408&, 18-30).
t
in , cap. v (430° 23) ; 1, cap. i (403°
7-10).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 149
E g y p t i a n s a n d B a b y l o n i a n s . . . f r o m w h o m m a n y o f
o u r be l ie fs a b o u t p a r t i c u l a r s ta rs a r e d e r i v e d " . T h e r e
f o r e , t h e p h i l os o p h e r s a g r e e d t o t h i n g s s o m e t i m e s be c a u s e
o f p r o b a b l e p e r s u a s i v e r e a s on s , a t o t h e r t i m e s b e c a u s e
t h e y h a d a ss e r te d as p r i n c i p l e s , p r o p o s i t io n s w h i c h w e r e
n o t n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s . A n d th i s r e p l y w o u l d s u f fi c e f or a l l
t h e t e s t i m o n i e s c i t e d a b ov e ; e v e n i f t h e y c l e a r l y a s s e r te d
t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c l u s i o n , t h e y s t i l l d o n o t e s t a b l i s h i t .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , th e s e a r g u m e n t s c a n be a n s w e r e d i n o r d e r
as fo l l ows .
[ T o
1 ] .
T o t h e f i r s t : A r i s t o t l e u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s
s e p a r a t i o n t o m e a n n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t
d oe s n o t u se t h e b o d y i n p e r f o r m i n g i t s o p e r a t i o n , a n d
f or t h i s r e a s o n i t is i n c o r r u p t i b l e as t o f u n c t i o n . T h i s is
t o b e u n d e r s t o od i n t h e s en se t h a t i t is u n l i k e a n o r g a n i c
p o w e r w h i c h p e r i s h e s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e o r g a n d e c a y s .
T h i s t y p e o f d e c a y p e r t a i n s e x c l u s i v e l y t o a n o r g a n i c
f a c u l t y . F o r a c c o r d i n g t o t h e P h i l o s o p h e r i n D e
a n i m a *
b k . 1 , i f a n o l d m a n w e r e g i v e n t h e ey e o f a y o u n g m a n ,
h e w o u l d i n d e e d see as w e l l as t h e y o u t h . H e n c e , t h e
f a c u l t y o f v i s i o n g r o w s w e a k or d e c a y s o n l y f r o m t h e
s t a n d p o i n t o f i t s o r g a n a n d n o t i n so fa r a s i ts o p e r a t i o n
d i r e c t l y is c o n c e r n e d . F r o m t h e fa c t t h a t t h e in t e l l e c t ,
h o w e v e r , is i n c a p a b l e o f d e c a y i n t h e se ns e t h a t i t h a s n o
o r g a n b y w h i c h i t c o u l d p e r i s h , i t d oe s n o t f o l l ow t h a t t h e
i n t e l l e c t is i m p e r i s h a b l e as t o f u n c t i o n i n a n u n q u a l i f i e d
s e ns e , f o r t h e n i t w o u l d i n d e e d fo l l o w t h a t i t is a l s o
i m p e r i s h a b l e i n be i n g as t h e a r g u m e n t m a i n t a i n s . W h a t
doe s f o l l o w is t h i s . So f a r as i ts a b i l i t y t o o pe r a t e a l o ne
is c o n c e r n e d , t h e i n t e l l e c t is i n c a p a b l e o f d i s s o l u t i o n i n
t h e s a m e s e n s e t h a t a n o r g a n i c p o w e r i s c o r r u p t i b l e .
A b s o l u t e l y s p e a k i n g , h o w e v e r , t h e i n t e l l e c t is a s s u m e d t o
be p e r i s h a b le a c c o r d i n g t o t h e P h i lo s op h e r ' s s t a t e m e n t i n
D e a n i m a , b k . m , f t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t p e r is h e s i n u s o n c e t h e
i n t e r i o r s en se p e r i s h e s . A n d t h i s is j u s t w h a t on e w o u l d
h a v e t o m a i n t a i n i f h e a s s u m e d t h e s o u l t o b e a p r i n
c i p l e w h i c h h a s a n o p e r a t i o n p r o p e r t o t h e c o m p o s i t e
(2,322) 21
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150
DUNS SCOTUS
sed
compositum
est
c o r r u p t i b i l e ,
e r go e t
principium
operativum
e ju s . Q u o d
autem
s it p r i n c i p i u m op e r a n d i
t o t i , e t q u o d o p e r a t io e ju s s i t o pe r a t io t o t iu s , v i d e t u r
A r i s to t e l e s d i ce r e 1 De a n im a *
A d
aliud
d i co , quod exce l l ens sens ib i l e
corrumpit
sensum
p e r a cc id e n s , q u i a c o r r u m p i t o r g a n u m , q u ia
so l v i t illam mediam p r o p o r t io n e m , in q u a c on s is t it bon a
d i spos i t io o r g a n i ; e t pe r
oppositum
in t e l le c t u s , q u i a n o n
h a b e t o rg a n u m , n o n corrumpitur ab exce l l en t i ob jec to ;
s ed e x h oc n o n s e q u i tu r q u o d s it in c o r r u p t i b i l i s n is i
p r o be t u r q u o d n o n d e p e n d e a t i n e ss en do a t o to q u o d e st
c o r r u p t i b i l e .
A d t e r t iu m d e
xn
Me taphys i cae d i c i t u r quod A r i s to t e l e s
po su i t illud s u b d u b i o , q u i a d i c i t fo rs a n . Se d n o n d i c i t
f o r s a n a d i s t u d q u o d i n t e l l e c t u s manet pos t e r i u s , i d e s t ,
pos t
totum
; s ed d i c i t n o n
omnis
a n i m a , s ed i n t e l l e c t u s ;
e t s e q u i t u r : Omne namque impo ss i b i l e f o r s an , ub i
dub i t ab a t a n po ss i b i l e s i t
omnem animam manere
post
c o m p o s i tu m . Se d d e i n t e l l e c t u n o n d u b i ta t n o n d e p e n
de a t i n e s sendo a t o t o q u o d es t c o r r u p t i b i l e . S i e rgo
exp resse hoc a sse r a t, po t es t d i c i qu od
tamen
n o n fu i t p e r
r a t i o n e m n e c e s s a r i a m s i b i d e m o n s t r a t u m , s e d p e r
r a t i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s pe r suasum .
A d a l i u d , valde dubium e s t , q u i d i p se sense r i t d e
inceptione animae
i n t e l le c t iv a e . S i
enim
n o n p o s u i t
Deum a l iq u i d im m e d ia t e d e n ov o a g e re , sed t a n t u m m o d o
motu sempiterno movere c o e l u m ,
e t ho c u t a gens
r e m o t u m ,
a q u o a g e n t e s e p a r a t o p o n e r e t i p s e i n t e l l e c t i -
vam d e n o v o p r o d u c i ? Si e n im d ic a s , q u o d a b a l iq u a
passim.
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
150
as a w hole. Th e com posite, how eve r, is pe r ish able.
Consequent ly, i ts operat ive pr incip le is a lso per ishable.
Th a t the sou l is the ope rative p r inc ip le of the w hole com
posite an d tha t i ts ope rat ion
is
also th a t of
the
w hole
is
ju s t
w hat Ar istot le seems to say in De
anim a,
bk. i .*
[To
11].
To the n ext , I say th a t an excessively st im u
lat ing object damages the senses only incidenta l ly inas
m u c h
as
i t dam ages the organ by d isrup t in g tha t ba lance
w h ich constitu tes the q u a l ity of being p rope r ly d isposed.
On the othe r h a n d , s ince the in te l lec t has no orga n, i t is
no t dam aged by a m ore h igh ly in te l li g ible objec t . B u t
from this i t does not follow tha t the inte l le ct is im
per ishable unless i t f i rst be proved that i t does not
depend for existence on a composi te being that can
per ish.
[To i n ] . To the t h i rd a rgum en t based on Metaphysics,
bk . x i i , some re p ly tha t Aris tot le assumes this as som eth ing
doubtfu l s ince he uses the word
perhaps .—However,
he does not say "pe rh a p s " w hen he speaks of the in te l le ct
pe rsist ing after the w hole , bu t says : "N ot a l l the soul,
but the in te l lec t ". On ly a fte rw ard does he add : "For
i t is perhaps im possible tha t a l l [ th e p arts of the sou l. . . ] ,
w here he doubts w he ther i t is possible for the e n t ire soul
to ou t l iv e the com posite. Nevertheless, he has no doubts
tha t the intel lec t does not de pend for i ts existence on the
w hole com posite w h ich is pe r isha ble.
If Aristot le expressly asserts this, then i t can be said
tha t he was conv inced of this because o f probable reasons
an d n ot because i t w as a ny th ing dem onstra ted to h im by
necessary reasons.
[To rv ] . As for the othe r , i t is very d oubt fu l w ha t
Ar is to t le held in regard to the or ig in of the in te l lect ive
soul.
For i f
he
assumed tha t God does not im m ed ia te ly
p roduce any th ing new, bu t mere ly moves the heaven
w i th an e te rna l movemen t and th i s on l y as a remote
agen t , t hen by wha t
separate15
agent d id Ar is to t le
assume the sou l was p roduced f rom wi thou t
?
I f you
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151 DUNS SCOTUS
I n t e l l i g e n t i a , d u p l e x est in c o n v e n i e n s . Unum q u i a i p s a
n o n po te s t c r e a r e substantiam ex p r i m a d i s t in c t io n e hujus
q u a r t i . * A l i u d ,
q u ia
ilia
n o n
magis
p ote s t a l iq u i d n o v u m
p r o d u c e r e i m m e d i a t e , quam D e u s s e c u n d u m p r i n c i p i a
Philosophi d e im m u t a b i l i t a t e a g e n t is , e t id e o s e m p i te r n i-
t a t e i n a g e n d o .
Nee
p o t e s t i p s e , u t v i d e t u r , s e c u n d u m
p r i n c i p i a s u a p o n e re intellectivam esse terminum agen t i s
n a t u r a l i s q u i a u t v i d e t u r e x
xn Metaphys icae , \
p o n i t
e a r n incorruptibilem e t n u l l a fo r m a q u a e e st t e rm in u s
a g e n t is n a t u r a l is , e st s i m p l ic i t e r i n c o r r u p t i b i l i s . Pote s t
d i c i q u o d p o n i t e a rn i m m e d i a t e a c c i p e re esse e t n o v u m
esse a De o q u i a q u o d a c c i pe r e t e sse sa tis s eq u i tu r e x
p r i n c i p i i s e ju s c u m n o n p o n a t e a r n p e r p e t u o p ra ec es siss e
s i ne co r po r e ,
nee
p r i u s fu is se i n a l io c o r po r e ;
nee
est
p r o b a b i l e s e c u n d u m rationem a quo po ss i t r e c i p e r e t a l e
esse, nullo
p r ae suppo s i t o , n i s i a Deo .
Sed co n t r a : e r go co nced e r e t c r e a t io ne m . Resp o nde o ,
n o n s e q u i t u r , q u i a n o n p os u i t aliam p r o d u c t io n e m
c o m -
p o s i t i , e t
animae
i n t e l l e c t i v a e , s i c u t
nee
i gn i s e t f o rmae
ign i s ; sed illam a n i m a t i on e m c o r p o ris o r g a n i c i p o n i t esse
p r o d u c t i o n e m p e r a c c id e n s ip s iu s a n im a e . N os
autem
p o n im u s d u a s p r o d u c t io n e s ;
unam
a n o n esse a n im a e a d
esse e ju s , e t is t a e s t c r e a t io ; a l i a m a n o n a n im a t io ne
c o r p o r i s a d a n i m a t i o n e m e j u s , e t
ilia
e s t p r o duc t i o co r
po r i s a n i m a t i , e t p e r m u t a t io n e m p r o p r i e d i c t a m . Q u i
*
Opus
oxoniense,
rv ,
dist. 1, q . i, n . 28.
t
x i i ,
ca p. i i i
(1070",
25-28).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I5I
say i t was by one of the In te l lige nc es , the n we encounter
a d ouble d i ff ic u l ty ; one, because an In te l lige nc e c ann ot
create a substance (as I prove in bk. iv , d ist . i ) * ; the
othe r , because such a be ing cann ot im m ed ia te ly p roduce
any th ing new any more t han God cou ld , fo r acco rd ing
to the Ph ilosophe r 's p r inc ip les rega rd ing the im m u ta
b i l i t y of the agent i t fo llow s tha t the a ct ion of such a
be ing is e te rna l . Ne ithe r d o we see any way i n w h i ch
Ar is to t le cou ld c la im tha t the in te l le ct ive sou l is the effect
of
some
n a t u r a l
agent16
w i th ou t v io la t in g h is p r inc i p les ,
because he
seems
to assume the sou l to be im pe r ish able in
Metaphysics,
bk .
xn.f
An d n o form tha t is the effect of a
n a tu ra l agen t is im per isha ble in an u nq ua li fi ed sense.
But i t can be sa id that he assumed the sou l received
exis tence im m ed ia te ly from God and tha t th is exis tence
was som eth ing new . For i t w ou ld fo llow read ily enough
from his p r inc ip les tha t i t w ould have received exis tence,
since A ristot le assum ed no e tern a l bodiless pre-existence ;
ne i ther d id he ho ld tha t the sou l ex is ted p rev ious ly in
some othe r body ; nor does i t seem possible a cc ording
to reason tha t a sou l w h ich presupposes no m a ter ia l
p r inc ip le cou ld have received its exis tence f rom anyone
othe r tha n God.
To the c ont rary : I f th is exp lana t ion w ere t rue , Ar is
to t l e wou ld have adm i t t ed
creation.—I
rep ly tha t th i s
does not follow , for he d id n ot assume a p rodu ct ion of the
in te l lec t ive sou l d is t in ct f rom the p rodu ct ion of the com
posite , ju s t as he d id not assume one p rodu ct ion for f ire
an d anothe r for the fi re form . Wh a t he posited was the
an imat ion of the organ ic body and th is inc iden ta l l y
invo lved the p rodu ct ion of its soul. Now we ad m it tw o
types of p rod u c t ion , one from the soul's non-existence
to exis tence and th is we ca l l c reat ion, the other is the
passage of the body from an ina n im ate to an an im ate
s ta te and th is i s the p roduc t ion of a l i v ing body by a
change in the p rope r
sense
of
the
w ord . I f anyone, there
fore,
w ere to assume m erely the second typ e of p rod uc t ion
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152
DUNS SCOTUS
igitur,
p o n e r e t
tantum
s e c u n d a r i a , n u l l a m
creationem
po n e r e t , e t i t a A r i s t o t e l e s .
Se d l ic e t v i te s s e c u n d u m
eum
c r e a t io n e m , q u om od o
tamen p ote s t s a lv a re a ge ns im m u t a b i l e a l iq u i d n o v u m
p r o d u c e r e
?
R e s p o n d e o ,
nullo modo
n i s i p r o p t e r
n o v i -
tatem
p a s si r e c e p t iv i ; q u o d
enim
e f f e c t us to t a l i t e r e t
p ra e c is e d e p e n d e n s a c a u s a a c t i v a , esset n o v u s , r e d u c e -
r e t u r s e c u n d u m A r i s t o t e l e m i n a l i q u a m v a r i a t i o n e m
ips i us causae e f fi c i en t is ; sed q u od e ffe c t us de pen den s ab
a g e n t e e t r e c e p t i v o s i t n o v u s , p o t e s t r e d u c i i n n o v i t a t e m
ip s iu s pa s s i , s in e n o v i t a t e ag en t is e t i t a d i c e r e t u r
hie
q u od
D e u s d e n e c e s s i t a t e n a t u r a l i , t r a n s m u t a t c o r p u s o r g a n i -
cum
a d a n im a t io n e m ,
quam
c i to c o r p u s e s t s u s c e p t iv u m
is t ius
animationis
e t a c a u sis n a t u r a l ib u s f i t a l i q u a n d o d e
n o v o i s t u d s u s c e p t i v u m , e t i d e o t u n c n o v a e s t m u t a t i o
a d a n i m a t i o n e m a b i p s o D e o .
S e d q u a r e r e d u c e n d a e s t i s t a n o v i t a s i n D e u m , s i cu t
i n c a u s a a g e n t e m
?
D i c o q u o d , q u i a s ic u t es t
primum
a g e n s e t i d e o s e c u n d u m A r i s t o t e l e m e s t s e m p e r a g e n s
a l i q u a a c t io n e i n passum s e m p e r eodem m o d o se h ab ens ,
i t a s i a l iq u o d p a s s u m p o te s t esse n o v u m e t s u s c e p t iv u m
a l i c u j u s f o r mae , quae no n po t e s t s ub esse causa l i t a t i
a l ic u ju s c a u sa e s e c u n d a e , D e u s e st i m m e d i a t a c a u s a i ll iu s
e t t a m e n d e n o v o , q u i a
omni
po t e n t i a e pas s i v ae i n e n t e
o po r t e t po ne r e aliam a c t i v a m c o r r e s p o n d e n t e m , e t i d e o
s i p a s s i v a e n o v a e n o n c o r r e s p o n d e t a l i a a c t i v a c r e a t a ,
c o r r e s p o n d e b i t s i b i i m m e d i a t e d i v i n a .
A d
aliud
d e d e s i d e r i o n a t u r a l i r e s p o n d e b i t u r , r e s p o n -
d e n d o a d r a t ion e s p r i n c i p a l e s , q u i a p r i m a r a t io p r i n c i
p a lis e t s e c u n d a e t t e r t i a p r o c e d u n t e x h o c .
A d a l i u d d e vn M e ta p h y s ic a e * d e m a t e r i a , v e r a e st ilia
v n ,
cap . xv
(1039'',
29).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 152
he w ou ld no t thereby postu la te a c rea t ion . An d th is
was the case w i th Ar is to tle.
B u t even i f you av o id asserting a c rea tion acc ord ing to
Ar is to t le , h ow
is
it possible to
save
the idea tha t som eth ing
new i s p roduced by an agen t t ha t i s immu tab le
?—I
r ep l y t ha t the on ly w ay is to exp la i n w ha t is new i n te rm s
of someth ing in the pa t ien t o r rec ip ien t o f the ac t ion .
Accord ing to Ar is to t le , i f a new ef fect depended so le ly
upon the act ive cause, some var ia t ion in the ef f ic ien t
cause it se l f w ou ld be req u i red . B u t a new effec t tha t
depends upon both the rec ip ien t and the agen t can be
accounted for in terms of
something
new i n the rec ip ien t
a lone an d not in the agen t . An d thus we cou ld say tha t
in the present instance God by
a
n a tura l necess ity changed
an orga n ic body in to a l i v in g substance ju s t as soon as the
body was capable of rece iv ing l ife . An d n a tu ra l causes
w i l l de term ine ju s t w hen the la t te r becomes ready to
receive i t , and hence a t th is moment God produces th is
new change so th a t i t com es to li fe .
B u t w hy m us t th is new en t ity be a t t r ibu ted to
God as
to
i ts [ im m ed iate ] effic ien t cause
?—I
rep ly th a t the reason
is this. Just
as
God, the firs t age nt, is c ont inu a l ly operat
ing by some ac t ion on a pa t ien t wh ich rema ins con
stan t ly in the same con d i tion ac cord ing to Ar is to tle , so
l ikewise i f someth ing is capable of receiv ing some new
form which cannot be caused by any secondary cause,
God m ust be its im m ed ia te cause ; an d ye t for a l l tha t
som eth ing new com es in to existence . For i t is necessary
to postu late some act ive potency that corresponds to
every passive poten cy. Now i f there is no such created
cause c orres pond ing to the new passive poten cy, then i ts
im m ed ia te cor respond ing cause w i l l be d iv ine .
[To v ] . The othe r a rgum ent about the na tu ra l des ire
w i l l be answered in the rep ly to the in i t ia l arguments,17
for the fi rs t three proceed f rom th is n ot ion.
[To
v i ] .
As fo r the a rgum ent about m at te r in Meta
physics,
bk .
v i i , *
th is d es cr ip t ion of m at ter h olds n ot m ere ly
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153 DUNS SCOTUS
d e s c r i p t i o materiae non tantum i n t e l l i g e n d o q u o d
m a te r i a e s t , q u a re s cu j us ip s a es t pa r s po tes t esse e t non
esse ; sed r e s , s ive cu jus ip s a es t p a r s , s ive q ua e r e c i p i t u r
i n i p s a ; a l i o q u i n fo r m a ig n is n o n p os se t n o n esse, q u i a
m a t e r ia n o n es t p a r s
formae
i g n i s .
A d
aliud
d e f o r t i f i t m a g n a a l t e r c a t io , a n s e c u n d u m
rectam r a t i o ne m de b e t s ic se expo ne r e . Pote s t tamen d i c i
s i c u t
Philosophus
r e s p o n d e t i n
ix *
q u o d
bonum
m a x i
m u m t r i b u i t s ib i i n e xe rc e n d o i l i u m m a g n u m a c t u m
v i r t u t i s , e t h o c b on o p r i v a r e t s e, imo v i t io s e v i v e r e t , s i illo
a c t u
praetermisso
tu n c , s a lv a r e t
suum
esse p e r
q u a n t u m -
cumque ; m e l i u s e st autem s im p l ic i t e r m a x im u m bon u m
e t
momentaneum quam
re m is s u m b on u m v i r t i t i s
vel
v i ta
v i t i o s a p e r m a g n u m t e m p u s .
Unde
e x i l l o p r o b a t u r
e v i d e n t e r , q u o d b o n u m c o m m u n e s e c u n d u m r e c t a m
r a t i o n e m e s t
magis
d i l i g e n d u m q u a m b o n u m
p r o p r i u m ,
q u i a totum b o n u m p r o p r i u m d e b e t h o m o e xp on e re
d e s t r u c t i o n i s i m p l i c i t e r , etiamsi n e s c i a t animam
i m -
m o r t a l e m ,
p r o p t e r b o n i c o m m u n i s s a l v a t i o n e m , e t
illud
m a g i s d i l i g i t u r s i m p l ic i t e r , p r o p t e r c u ju s s a lu t e m esse
a l t e r i u s c o n t e m n i t u r .
A d illas r a tion e s D o c t o r u m . S i i n t e l l i g i t a n im a m
h a b e r e p e r se esse i d e m i n t o t o , e t e x t r a t o t u m , p r o u t p e r
se esse d i s t i n g u i t u r c o n t r a i n esse a c c i de n t i s ; ho c modo
f o rm a i gn i s , s i e sset s ine m a te r i a , ha be re t p e r se esse e t
t u n c p os se t c o n c e d i q u o d f or m a ig n is esset i n c o r r u p t i b il is .
S i a u t e m i n t e l l i g a t d e esse p e r
s e ,
q u o d c o n v e n i t c o m p o s ito
i n gene r e s ub s t an t i a e , s i c
falsum
e s t q u o d
anima
s i ne
co r p o re ha be t p e r se esse, q u i a t u n c esse e jus n on esset
a l t e r i c o m m u n i c a b i l e , q u i a i n d i v i n i s etiam p e r se esse
i s t o m o d o a c c e p t u m e s t
i n c o m m u n i c a b i l e .
U n d e
omni
* Ethica Nicomachea, ix , cap. v ii i
(n6ga, 15-17).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
153
i n the sense tha t a th ing w h ich has m at te r as one of its
par ts is able to exist and not exist , but a lso that a thing
composed of mat ter or received in to mat ter is ab le to
exis t an d not exis t . Othe rw ise the form of
fire
c ou ld no t
be n on-exis tent , for m a t te r is n ot a p a r t of the fi re form .
[To
v i i ].
To the othe r about the brave m a n , there is
a great d ispu te w he the r ac cord ing to r ig h t reason one
m ust expose h im se lf to de ath in th is w ay . Be tha t as i t
m ay , one cou ld solve th is objec t ion the w ay the Philos
opher does.* One could say tha t by pe r form in g such a
grea t ac t o f v i r tue , th i s ind iv idua l has obta ined the
highest
good,
whereas i f
he
had saved h is l ife by om i tt in g
th is ac t , he w ou ld have de pr ive d h im se l f o f this good a nd
w ha t is m ore , h is l ife w ou ld be m ora l ly ev i l . Absolutely
speaking i t is bet ter to have this greatest good even
m om en ta r ily tha n to be w i th ou t i t o r to have a long , bu t
a m o ra l ly
e v i l,
l ife . Whe refore, ev iden t proof is had f rom
this that accord ing to r ight reason the common good is
to be pre ferre d to one's in d iv id u a l good, because even i f
a m an is unaw are t ha t h is sou l is im m or ta l , he is s t i ll
bound to expose his ent i re personal good to destruct ion
in order to save the com m on good. An d tha t must be
loved a l l the m ore, a bsolu te ly speak ing, to
save
w h i c h the
existence of an othe r is reg arde d as of l i t t le acc ount.
[To
v m ] . As
for the argum ents of ce r ta in teachers, i f the
m ea ning is tha t the sou l has the same per se existence 18
in the composi te as i t has outside the composi te, where
per se existence is un de rstood as c ontrasted w i th the
existence character ist ic of
an
acc iden t, the n the fire form ,
i f i t w ere to exis t ap a r t from m at ter , w ould a lso
have
per
se
exis tence, an d the n w e c ou ld a dm it tha t the f ire form is
im pe r ish able. B ut i f by per se exis tence is m ean t tha t
ch ara cter istic of the com posite in the l in e of substance,
the n i t is false to say th a t the soul has per se existence
outside the body . For were such the case, i t cou ld n ot
communicate i ts being to another , for even in what is
d iv ine , per se being in th is sense is inc om m un ica ble.
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154 DUNS SCOTUS
modo
d e f i c i t q u o d
anima
ha be t p e r se esse s ine c o r -
p o r e , q u i a in s e c u n d o intellectu a n t e cedens e s t falsum
e t i n p r i m o c o n s e q u e n t ia n o n v a l e t , n i s i a d d a s i b i , q u o d
n a t u r a l i t e r s i n e miraculo h a b e t p e r se esse p r im o m o do ;
s ed h a e c p r o p o s i t i o c r e d i ta e s t, e t n o n p e r
rationem
naturalem n o t a .
A d
a l i u d ,
n on omnis c o r r u p t i o e st p e r separationem
a l te r i u s a b a l te r o ; a c c i p i e n d o
enim
e sse ange l i , s i
illud
p o n a t u r s e c u n d u m a l iq u o s a l i u d a b e s s e n tia , i l l u d n o n
es t separab i l e a se i pso , e t
tamen
e s t d e s t r u c t i b i l e pe r
su c ce ss i o nem o ppo s i t i a d ipsum esse.
[Proposi t io I I I . Anim a non rem anebit perpetuo extra suum
to tum].
D e t e r t i a p r o p o s i t i on e d i c i t u r e a rn p osse p r o b a r i
e x h o c , q u o d p a r s e x t r a totum es t i m p e r f e c t a ; fo rm a
autem t a r n n o b i l i s n o n r e m a n e b i t p e r p e t u o i m p e r f e c t a ;
e r go
nee
s e pa r a t a a t o t o .
I t e m ,
n u l l u m v i o l e n t u m est p e r p e t u u m s ec u nd u m
Aristotelem i De caelo et m und o* Sep a r a t io a u t em
animae a c o rp o re e st v i o le n t a , q u i a c o n t r a i n c l in a t io n e m
n a t u r a l e m a n im a e ; s e c u n d u m P h i lo s op h u m , q u ia
i n c l i -
n a t u r n a t u r a l i t e r a d p e r fe c i e n d u m c or p u s .
[Opin io Scott]. D e is t a p r o p o s it io n e v i d e t u r q u o d
Ph i l o sophus , s i posu i sse t animam i m m o r t a l e m , magis
po su i s se t e a r n pe r pe t uo
manere
s i n e co r po r e
quam
i n
c o r p o r e , q u i a omne c o m p o s i t u m e x c o n t r a r i i s e s t
c o r r u p t i b i l e .
Nee
r a t io n e s is ta e p r o b a n t . P r i m a
n o n ,
n a m
ilia
m a jo r ,
"P a r s e x tr a t o t u m e st i m p e r fe c t a , " n o n e st v e r a n is i d e
n , cap. i i i
(286", 18).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 154
Hence, there is n o w ay in w h ich the sou l has per se
exis tence w i thou t the body , for i f we take t he t e rm i n t he
second sense the antecedent of the argument is fa lse,
whereas i f
we
tak e i t in the f irs t sense, the consequence is
i n v a l i d , un less you ad d th a t i t has th is exis tence n a tura l ly
and w i th ou t a m irac le . B u t th is la t t e r is som eth ing we
bel ieve , bu t i t is n ot kn ow n by n a tura l reason.
[To i x ] . To the othe r , not a l l de st ruct ion is the resu lt
o f sepa ra ting one th in g from another . Take the be ing
of an angel , and le t i t be assumed as some do that i ts
existence is d is tin c t from its essence.19 Such a being is not
separable f rom i tse l f
and
nevertheless i t can be destroyed
if i ts existence is succeeded by the opposite of existence .
[Th ir d Proposition : The human soul w il l not remain
outside the body
forever.
A r g .
i ] .
They say t ha t the t h i r d
p ropos i t ion can be p roved f rom th is tha t a par t wh ich
exists outside the w hole is im pe rfect.20 Th is form [viz.
the sou l ], how ever , is so noble tha t i t w i l l not rem ain
forever im p erfec t ; the refore i t w i l l not exist a p a rt from
the com posite forev er.
[A rg . 11].
L ike w ise , ac cord ing to Ar is to tle in h is w ork
De
caelo et
mundo,* n o th ing un n a tu ra l is e te rna l. B u t the
sepa ration of the soul from the body is un n a tu ra l , because
i t i s con t ra ry to the na tu ra l i nc l ina t ion of the soul.
For ac cord ing to the Philosophe r the sou l has a n a tura l
inc l in a t ion to per fect the body .
[Scotus's
Opinion]. So fa r as this p roposit ion is
con
cerned,
i t seems th a t i f the Philosopher h a d assum ed the
sou l to be im m or ta l , he w ou ld have he ld t ha t i t
con
t in u e d to exis t outs ide the body ra the r th a n in the body ,
for everything composed can be destroyed by i ts con
t rar ies.
[Rep ly to the a rgu m en ts]. Nei the r do the reasons
g ive n above prove the proposi tion.
[To 1]. The fi rst does not because this m a jor : "Th e
p a r t w i th ou t the w ho le is im p e r fe c t " , is true on ly o f tha t
par t which receives some per fect ion when i t is in the
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155 DUNS SCOTUS
p a r te q u a e r e c i p i t a l i q u a m
perfectionem
i n t o to ;
anima
autem n o n r e c i p i t p e r fe c t io n e m sed communicat ; e t sic
po t e s t formari r a t i o a d
o p p o s i t u m ,
q u i a n o n r e p u g n a t
a l ic u i a e q u e p e r fe c t o i n se m a n e r e , l ic e t a l t e r i n o n
c o m -
municet suam p e r f e c t io n e m ; h o c a p p a r e t d e ca u sa
e f f i c i e n t e , c u i n o n r e p u g n a t q u a n t u m c u m q u e m a n e r e
s i ne suo e f fe c tu ; sed anima manet a eq ue p e r f e c t a i n esse
s u o p r o p r i o , s iv e c o n j u n c t a s iv e s e p a r a ta ; i n h o c
tamen
h a b e n s d i f f e r e n t i a m , q u o d s e p a r a t a n o n c o m m u n i c a t
esse
suum
a l t e r i .
Pe r ho c ad
a l iu d ,
q u i a i n c l i n a t i o n a t u r a l is e st d u p l e x :
u n a a d a c t u m primum e t e st i m p e r fe c t i a d p e r fe c t io n e m ,
e t c o n c o m i t a t u r p o te n t ia m
essentialem
a d a c t u m s ec un
d u m .
E t e st a l i a i n c l in a t i o a d a c t u m s e c u n d u m e t est
p e r f e c t i a d p e r f e c t i o n e m c o m m u n i c a n d u m e t c o n c o m i
t a t u r p o t e n t ia m a c c i d e n ta l e m . D e p r i m a
verum
est ,
q u o d o p p o s i t u m e ju s es t v i o l e n t u m , e t n o n
p e r p e t u u m ,
q u ia p o n i t imperf ectionem p e r p e tu a m , quam Ph i l o sophus
h a b u i t p r o i n c o n v e n i e n t i , q u i a p o s u i t i n u n iv e r s o ca usa s
a b l a t iv a s a l iq u a n d o c u ju s l ib e t i m p e r fe c t io n i s . Se d
s e c u n d a i n c l in a t i o , e ts i p e r p e t u o s u s p e n d a t u r , n u l l u m
v i o l e n t u m p r o p r i e d i c i t u r , q u i a nee im p e r fe c t io ; n u n c
a u t e m i n c l i n a t i o animae a d c o r p u s tantum e s t secundo
m o d o . Vel
p o t e s t d i c i s e c u n d u m A v i c e n n a m , q u o d
a p p e t i t u s a n i m a e s a t ia t u s e st p e r h o c q u o d semel p e r f e c i t
c o rp u s , q u i a ilia c o n j u n c t i o e st a d h o c , u t a n i m a mediante
co r po r e , a c q u i r a t s uas pe r fe c t io ne s pe r sensus , q ua s n o n
posse t acqu i r e r e s i ne sens ibus , e t pe r consequens nee s ine
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 155
com posite. Now the soul does n ot receive pe rfec t ion bu t
com m unicates pe r fec t ion. C onseq uen tly , one could tw is t
th is arg um en t in fav our of the opposite v iew . For the re
is no th ing absurd about a th ing ex is t ing apar t , even
thoug h i t does not com m un ica te i ts p er fec t ion to an othe r ,
so lon g as i t is eq ua lly per fect exis t ing in th is w ay . This
is c lear f rom the [s im i la r ] case of
an
e fficien t cause. For
i t is not rep ug na nt tha t such a cause should exis t w i thou t
caus ing an effec t . Now the
soul, so
fa r
as
i ts ow n being is
concerned, is eq ua lly pe r fect w he the r i t is separated f rom
or jo ine d to a bod y. The re is, of course, th is d i ffere nc e.
As se parated, the sou l does n ot com m un icate its being to
another.
[To 11]. This a lso answers the other argument , s ince
there a re tw o k inds of n a tu ra l inc lina t ions One regards
the p r im a ry ac t or a c tua lisa t ion , an d th is is the n a tu ra l
inc l ina t ion of the imper fect for i ts per fect ion and is
someth ing that accompanies an essent ia l potency in
re la t ion to its second a ct . B ut there is anothe r inc l in a t ion
tow ards a second act w here the la t ter is a pe r fec tion to be
commun ica ted and th i s i s t he na tu ra l i nc l i na t ion t ha t
accom panies a n acc ide nta l poten cy. O f the fi rs t , i t is
t ru e tha t the opposite of the n a tu ra l in c l in a t ion is som e
th i ng u nn a tu ra l an d no t e te rna l, because i t w ou ld im p l y
eterna l imper fect ion, which the Phi losopher regards as
som eth ing im proper inasm uch as he has postu la ted tha t
causes exis t in the un iverse w h ich w i l l i n t im e do aw ay
w i th any im pe r fec t ion . The second inc l in a t ion , how ever ,
even though i t would be forever suspended, impl ies
n oth ing u n n a tu ra l in the p rope r sense of the te rm s ince
no im pe r fec t ion is invo lved . Now the inc l in a t ion th a t the
soul has for the body is of the second type . Or i t can be
sa id w i th Av ice nn a tha t once the sou l has per fec ted the
body, th is desi re of the soul has been sated, s ince the
purpose of
this
u n ion is t ha t the sou l th rough the m ed ium
of the body m ay acq u i re those of its pe rfections w h ich i t
cou ld n o t acqu ire w i th ou t the senses or w i th ou t a body .
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I56
DUNS SCOTUS
co r po r e ; semel autem c o n j u n c t a , acquisivit q u a n t u m
ilia s i m p l i c i t e r a p p e t i t a c q u i re r e illo m o d o .
D i c o e rg o q u o d i s t a r u m trium propositionum e x qu i b us
formatur r a t i o a d r e s u r r e c t i o n e m quodammodo a p r i o r i
q u ia s u m p ta e s u n t a fo rm a
hominis
r e s u s c i t a n d i , p r i m a
e st n a t u r a l i t e r n o t a e t e r r o r e i op p os i tu s q u i p r o p r i u s
es t e t so l i u s Ave r ro i s , pess imus es t , non
tantum
c o n t r a
veritatem
t h eo l o g i ae , s ed
etiam
c o n t r a
veritatem p h i l o -
so ph iae ; d e s t r u i t enim scientiam q u i a omnes a c t us
i n t e l l i g e n d i , u t d i s t i n c t o s a b a c t i b u s s e n t i e n d i , e t o m n e s
ac t u s e l e c t i o n i s , u t d i s t i n c t o s ab a c t i b u s appe t i t u s s en -
s i t i v i ;
e t i t a om n e s v i r t u t e s q u a e n o n g e n e r a n t u r s in e
e l e c t i o n i b us f a c t i s s e cundum
rectam
r a t i o n e m e t p e r
c on s eq u en s t a l is e r ra n s esset a c o m m u n i ta t e h o m i n u m ,
r a t i o n e
utentium
e x te r m in a n d u s .
Sed
aliae
d u a e n o n s u n t
sufHcienter
n o t a e r a t i o n e
n a t u r a l i , l ic e t a d e as s i n t q u a e d a m p e rs u a s ion e s p r o ba -
b i les .
A d
secundam quidem
p l u r e s e t p r o b ab i l i o re s ;
u n d e e t illam v i d e t u r magis expresse sensisse Ph i losop h u s.
A d t e r t i a m a u t e m p a u c i or e s , e t p e r c on s e q u e n s c o n c lu s i o
sequens ex i s t i s non es t su f f i c i en t e r pe r
istam viam
n o t a
r a t i o n e n a t u r a l i .
[Pars Secunda : Rationes a
posteriori]
S e c u n d a v i a a d e a r n e s t a p o s t e r i o r i b u s ,
quarum
a l iq u a e p r ob a bi le s t a c ta e s u n t i n r a t io n i bu s p r i n c i p a l i -
bus , u t p o t e d e b e a t i tu d i n e h o m in i s . A d h oc e t ia m
a d d i tu r d e ju s t i t i a D e i r e t r i bu e n t i s ; n u n c a u t e m in
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
156
B ut i f a t any t im e the sou l was jo ine d to the body , the n
i t has acqu i red the per fec t ions tha t i t s imp ly des i red to
acqu i re i n th is w ay .
[Eva lua tion of
the
a p r ior i p roof]. O f the three proposi
tions used to const ruct a k in d of a p r ior i a rgum en t
in the sense tha t the p roof
is
based on the na ture of the
form of m an th a t is to be restored, I say tha t the fi rs t is
known by na tu ra l r eason and tha t t he con t ra r y e r ro r ,
which is proper to Averroes on ly , is of the very worst
k i n d . Not on ly is i t opposed to theological t r u th bu t
to ph i losoph ica l t ru th as w e l l. For i t destroys know led ge
i tse l f ina sm uch as i t denies a ny act of knowledg e d is t inc t
from sensat ion or an y act of choice d ist in ct f rom sense
ap pe tite an d hence does aw ay w i th a l l those v ir tue s
w h ich req u i re an ac t o f choice in accord w i th r igh t reason.
One who er rs in th is way, consequent ly , should be
ban i shed f rom the company o f men who use na tu ra l
reason.
The other two proposi t ions, however , are not known
ade qua te ly from n a tu ra l reason even thoug h there a re
a number of probable persuas ive arguments in the i r
favour.21 Th e reasons for the second, ind ee d are m ore
num erous as w e l l as m ore h igh ly probable. For th is
reason,
the Philosophe r appears to have h e ld th is doct r ine
m ore expressly.22 For the t h i r d , however, the reasons
are few er. Th e conclus ion, t hen , wh ich fo l lows f rom
these three propositions is n ot su ffic ie nt ly kn ow n a p r ior i
by n a tu ra l reason.
[Part
I I . The A Poste riori Proofs]
The second way to prove the resur rect ion is by a
posteriori arg um en ts. Som e p robable a rgum en ts of this
k i nd were men t ioned i n t he i n i t i a l a rgumen ts , fo r
instanc e, those conce rn ing the happ iness of m a n . To the
la t te r th i s a rgum en t based on the jus t ice o f a r ew a r d in g
God is add ed . In the present l ife the v i r tuou s suffer
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157 DUNS SCOTUS
v i t a i s ta v i r tu o s i
majores
p a t i u n t u r p oe n a s,
quam
v i t i o s i .
E t istud a r g u m e n t u m v i d e t u r A p os tolu s ta n g e re a d
I
Cor.
x v * : S i i n hac v i t a
tantum
spe r an t es
sumus
i n
G h r i s t o , miserabiliores s u m u s o m n i b u s h o m i n i b u s , e t c .
Se d is ta e ra t ion e s a p o s t e r io r i m in u s c o n c l u d u n t , q u a m
ilia a p r i o r i a c c e p ta a p r o p r i a f or m a hominis ; n on enim
a p p a r e t p e r r a t i o n e m
n a t u r a l e m ,
q uo d unus e s t r e c t o r
o m n i u m h o m i n u m s e c u n d u m leg es ju s t i t ia e r e t r ib u t i v a e
e t p u n i t i v a e . E t e sto q u o d s ic d i c e r e t u r q u o d u n i c u i q u e
i n b ono a c t u s uo s i t r e t r i b u t i o s u ffic i e n s , s ic u t d i c i t Aug us -
t i nu s f : Jus s i s t i , Domine e t i t a e s t , u t s i t s i b i poena
omnis p e c c a t o r , i t a q u o d ipsum p e c c a t u m e s t p r i m a
p oe n a p e c c a t i . U n d e p a t e t q u o d S a n c t i a rg u e n te s a
p o s t e r i or i a d p r o p o s i tu m , n o n i n t e n d u n t fa c e r e , n i s i
q uasdam pe r suas i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s , s i c u t G r ego r i u s l i b .
x i v ,
I
po s it is a d ho c qu i bu sd a m pe r su as i on i bus d i c i t :
Q u i p r o p t e r is ta s r a t io n e s n o l u e r i t c re d e r e , p r o p t e r
fid e m c r e d a t . C o n s i m i li te r d o c t r in a
Pauli
A c t . x v i i e t
xxv i * * e t I a d C o r . x v f f p e r e x e m p l u m d e g r a n o c a d e n t e ,
e t p e r resurrectionem Ch r i s t i : S i Ch r i s t u s r e su r r ex i t e t
mortui
r e s u r g e n t , e t p e r r e t r i b u t i o n e m
j u s t a m .
H u j u s -
modi no n sun t , n i s i p e r s uas i o ne s p r o b ab i l e s , vel t a n t u m
ex p r aem is s is c r e d i ti s . Pa t e t d i s cu r r e n d o pe r s i n g u l a .
[Pars Ter t ia :
Solutio Quaestionis]
B r e v i t e r e r g o p o t e s t t e n e r i q u o d nee a p r i o r i p u t a
nee p e r r a t io n e m p r i n c i p i i intrinseci i n h o m i n e , nee a
*
i
Cor. xv ,
19.
t Confessiones, 1, cap. xi i (Mign e, P.L.,
xxxu ,
670).
J Moralia in Job, xiv , cap. xl (Migne, P.L., l x xv ,
1077).
** Acts,
xvn .
31 ;
xxv i .
23. t t 1 C or. xv.
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I57
m ore pun ishm ents tha n those w ho a re w ick ed . I t is th is
l in e of a rgu m en t th a t the Apostle seems to have in m in d
in the fi rs t le t te r to the C orin th ian s * : " I f w i th th i s l ife
on ly i n v iew we have ha d hope i n C hr is t , we a re o f a l l
m en the m os t to be p i ti ed , e t c " .
[Evaluation of the a posteriori
arguments].
These a
poster ior i arguments, however, are even less conclusive
tha n the
a
p r ior i p roof
based
on the p roper fo rm o f m an ,
s ince i t is n ot c lear f rom n a tur a l reason th a t there is one
ru le r who governs a l l men accord ing to the laws of re
t r ibu t ive an d p u n i tive justice.23 I t cou ld a lso be sa id
that the good act is i tse l f suf f ic ien t reward for anyone,
as
Aug us tine
says
i n the
Confessions,
bk .
i f
: "For i t
is
even
as Thou has t appo in ted , tha t every inord ina te des i re
shou ld br ing its ow n p u n ish m en t ", so tha t s in it se l f is the
f i r s t pun ishment o f
sin.
I t is c lea r the n tha t w he n the sa in ts a rgued a posteriori
for the proposed conclus ion, the y d id n ot in ten d to g ive
a n y th in g m ore tha n p robable persuas ive proofs. Gregory,
fo r ins tance, ha v ing p u t dow n c er ta in such p roofs
says %
:
"Whoever does not wish to bel ieve because of these
reasons, let h im believe because of fa i t h " . The same is
t rue of Paul's teachings in the Ac ts ** an d in the f irs t
ep is tle to the C orin th ian s f f where he uses the exam ple of
the g ra in th a t fa lls in to the e ar th , or where he a rgues
from the resu r rec t ion of C hr is t tha t i f C hr is t be r isen , the
dead w i l l rise ag a in , or whe re he appea ls to the no t ion
of a ju s t rew a rd . Such a rgum ents a re no th ing else than
probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons der ived
from prem ises th a t are m atters of belief , as is eviden t
i f we exam ine them i nd i v id u a l ly .
[Part I I I . Solution to the Question]
To pu t i t b r ie f l y , t hen , we can m a i n ta i n t h a t n a t u ra l
reason cannot prove that the resurrect ion is necessary,
ne i the r by w ay o f
a
p r ior i reasons such as those based on
( 2 , 3 2 2 ) 22
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
158
t he no t ion o f t he i n t r i ns i c p r i nc i p l e i n man , no r by
a
poster ior i arguments, for instance, by reason of some
opera t ion or pe r fec t ion f i t t in g to m an . Hence we h o ld
the resu r rect ion to be ce r ta in on the basis of fa i th a lone .
Fur th e rm ore, as Aug us t ine says in De Tr in ita te, bk.
x m ,
c. ix , * the second p roposi t ion used in the fi rs t [or a p r ior i ]
p roof [v iz . o f the im m or ta l i ty o f the h um an sou l] is no t
held because reason dictates this, but solely because of
the
Gospel f
w here C hr is t te lls us : "D o n ot be a fra id of
those w ho k i l l the body bu t cannot k i l l the s ou l" .
[Rep ly to the Argu m en ts a t the B eg inn ing ]
To the firs t argument
24
: I f the argu m en t is based on
the n otion of
natural
des ire taken in an exac t an d p rope r
sense, an d a n a tu ra l des ire i n th is sense is n ot a n e lic ited
ac t bu t mere ly an inc l ina t ion of na tu re towards some
t h i n g , the n i t is c lear th a t the existence of such a n a t u r a l
des i re for anyth ing can be proved on ly i f we prove f i rs t
tha t the na tu re in ques tion is ab le to have such a th in g .
To a rgue the othe r w ay roun d , therefore , is begg ing the
qu est ion. Or i f n a tu ra l des ire is take n in a less proper
sense, v iz. as an ac t e l ic i ted i n con form ity w i t h the na tu ra l
inc l in a t ion , we a re s t i ll una ble to p rove tha t any e l ic i ted
desi re is natura l in th is sense wi thout f i rs t prov ing the
existence of a natura l desi re in the proper sense of the
t e rm.
B ut suppose tha t som eone we re to argue tha t w hatever
i s immed ia te ly des i red , once i t i s known, i s someth ing
that is desi red natura l ly , s ince such proneness seems to
arise on ly from some na tu ra l inc l in a t ion . One answer
to this object ion would be to deny the f i rst statement ,
s ince a p erson w i th bad ha bits is inc l in e d to des ire
im m ed ia te ly w ha tever is in accord w i th these hab its ju s t
as soon as such a th in g presents i tse lf. How ev er, i f
nothing else intervenes, nature of i tsel f is not v ic ious ;
ne i ther
is
i t
vicious
in everyone.
Consequent ly ,
i f everyone
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159 DUNS SCOTUS
illud
a p p r e h e n s u m ,
sequitur
q u o d
i l lud
d e s i d e r i u m n o n
es t v i t i o s u m ; e r go i s t a r e spons io no n est ge ne r a l is .
Ideo po t e s t d id q u o d o p o r t e r e t o s t e n d e r e illam a p p r e -
hensionem esse
s e c u n d u m
rectam
r a t io n e m n o n
e r ro n e a m ;
a l i o q u i n s i a d a p p r e h e n s i o n e m e r r o n e a m statim omnes
a p p e ta n t a c t u e l i c i t o, n o n s e q u i tu r i l l u d d e s i d e r iu m
esse c on s o n u m i n c l i n a t i o n i n a t u r a e ;
imo magis
o ppo s i -
t u m . No n e st autem m a n i fe s t u m p e r r a t io n e m n a t u r a -
l e m ,
q u o d r a t i o o s t e n d e n s
homini
s e m p e r e s s e t a n q u a m
a p p e t i b i l e , s i t r a t i o n o n e r r o n e a , q u i a p r i u s o p o r t e r e t
os te n d e r e q u o d i s t u d p os se t c o m p e t e r e h o m i n i .
B r e v i t e r e r g o omne m e d i u m e x d e s id e r io n a t u r a l i
v i d e t u r esse in e ffic a x , q u i a a d efficaciam e j us opo r t e r e t
os t ende r e vel p o t e n t ia m n a t u r a l e m i n n a t u r a a d is t u d ,
vel
q u o d a p p r e h e n s i o ,
quam
s t a t i m s e q u i tu r i s t u d
d e s i d e r i u m , s i s i t a c t u s e l i c i t u s , s i t a p p r e h e n s i o r e c t a e t
n o n e r r one a ; e t horum primum e st i d e m c u m c on c l u -
s ion e q u a e c o n c l u d i tu r e x d e s id e r io n a t u r a l i . S e c u n d u m
a u t e m difficilius v e l m i n u s notum i s t a con c l u s i one . E t
a d p r o ba t i on e m h u ju s q u o d d e s i d e r i u m hominis n a t u r a l e
est a d im m o r ta l i t a t e m , q u i a n a t u r a l i t e r fu g i t m o r t e m ,
p o s s e t d i c i q u o d i s t a p r o b a t i o c o n c l u d e r e t a e q u e d e
quocumque
b r u t o . E t s i a d d a t u r i l l u d P h i lo s o p h i
n
De
genera tione * : M e l i u s es t i n om n ibus se m pe r esse
q u a m n o n esse, is t u d est a d o p p o s i tu m , t u r n q u i a a e q u e
c o n c l u d e r e t i n b r u t o s i c u t i n
homine ;
t u r n q u i a s u b d i t :
H o c a u t e m i n o m n i b u s i m p o s s i b i l e e x i s t e r e c o n t i n u e
p r o p t e r
longe
a p r i n c i p i o d i s ta r e : id e o r e l iq u o
modo c om -
p l e v i t D e u s n a t u r a m c o n t i n u a m f a c e r e g e n e r a t i o n e m ,
*
De generatione et corruptione, n , c a p .
x
( 2 2 6 * ,
25
ff.).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 159
im m ed ia te ly desires such a th ing as soon as he know s of
i t ,
i t w ould fol low tha t the des ire in th is
case
is not viciou s.
Th e
first
answer to this object ion, then , is n ot adequ ate.
Therefore i t c ou ld be answered l ike th is. We m ust show
tha t such know ledg e is not erroneous bu t is in acc ord w i th
r ig h t reason. Otherw ise , i t does n ot fo llow tha t ju s t
because everyone, on the basis of an erroneous concep
t ion ,
were immedia te ly to e l ic i t on act of des i re , th is
desire is i n acco rd w i t h an in c l in a t ion o f na tu re . Ind ee d ,
i t is ra the r the opposite th a t follow s. Now i t is n ot c lear
by n a tu ra l reason tha t the a rgum ent es tab lish ing e terna l
existence as something desirable is not erroneous, since
m an m ust fi rs t be show n to be capab le of
such
a t h ing .
To pu t i t b r ie f l y ,
t hen ,
every a rgument based on
natura l desi re seems to be inconclusive, for to construct
an eff icacious argument, i t would be necessary to show
ei ther th a t n a ture possesses a n a tu ra l poten cy for ete rna l
l i fe , or tha t the know ledge w h ich im m ed ia te ly g ives rise
to th is des i re , where the la t ter is an e l ic i ted act , is not
erroneous bu t in a ccord w i th r ig h t reason. Now the
first of
these
a l tern at ive s is the same as the conclusion to
be established.25 Th e second is m ore difficult to prove
a nd is even less ev ide nt th a n the conclus ion.
As fo r the p roof tha t man has a na tu ra l des i re fo r
im m or ta l it y because he na tu ra l ly shuns de a th , i t can be
sa id tha t th is p roof app lies to the bru te an im a l as w e l l as
to m a n . An d sh ou ld some one br ing up the s ta tem ent of
the Phi losopher in
De generatione
et corruptione, bk .
i i
* th a t
i t is bet ter for everything to exist forever than not to
exist forever, th is is real ly an argument for the opposi te
view ; f i rst of
a l l,
because i t holds equal ly wel l for both
bru te an d m an , an d second ly , because Ar is to tle h im se l f
adds : "Since i t is im possible, how eve r, for a l l th ings to
exist foreve r because of th e i r g reat d istanc e from the ir
source, therefore God ad opted the re m a in ing a l tern at ive
and comple tes the per fec t ion of na tu re by mak ing
gen era tion con t inuou s" . I t is ju s t
as
i f Ar is to t le w ished to
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l6o DUNS SCOTUS
q u a s i d i c a t , c u m d e s i d e r iu m n a t u r a l e s it a d se m per
esse, i n q u i bu s e st ho c impossible i n se ipso , es t illud
s i cu t poss ib ile e s t , s c i li c e t i n c on t i n u a t i one spec i e i
i n d i v e r s is i n d i v i d u i s ; e t i t a c onc ed e r e t de homine
s ic u t d e a l io g e n e r a bi le q u o d h a b e t n a t u r a l e d e s i d e r iu m
a d se m p e r esse, n o n i n u n i c o i n d i v i d u o , se d i n t a l i
success ione.
Se d s e m p e r v i d e t u r s t a r e v is q u o d fu g i e n s
unum
o p p o s i t u m , n o n fu g i t i l l u d n is i p r o p t e r amorem a l t e r i u s .
C o n c e d i p o t e s t q u o d e x h o c s e q u i t u r q u o d c u m f u g i a t
m o r t e m p r o n u n c , amat vi tam p r o n u n c , e t s ic d e q u o l i b e t
n u n c s i g n a t o. Se d n o n s e q u i t u r , e r g o p r o infinite
A d i l l u d A p o s t o l i : re s p on d e o n o lu m u s n os i n s p i r a t i
s iv e c e r t i f i c a t i p e r fid e m , e t u t i q u e n o lu m u s n a t u r a l it e r
s ic , q u o d i s tu d n o l le e st s e c u n d u m i n c l i n a t io n e m n a t u r a -
l e m ,
s e d no n e st
notum
r a t i o n e n a t u r a l i q u o d i s t u d n o l l e
e s t s e c u n d u m i n c l i n a t i o n e m
n a t u r a l e m .
A d s e c u n d u m , c on c e d o q u o d verum e s t b e a t i t u d i n e m
n o n s o l u m i n u n i v e r s a l i , s e d etiam i n s p e c i a l i a p p e t i
n a t u r a l it e r a b h o m i n e , s ic u t in fe r iu s p a t e b i t d is t . x l i x . *
Se d n o n e st n o t u m n a t u r a l i r a t io n e q u o d ip s a i n p a r t i -
c u l a r i ,
q uae s c i l i c e t co ns i s t i t i n
illo
i n q uo no s
credimus
e a rn c on s is te re , a p p e t a t u r n a t u r a l i t e r a b h o m i n e
autem
;
enim op o r te r e t esse n o t u m p e r r a t i on e m n a t u r a l e m , q u o d
esset
ille
a c tu s n o bis c on v e n i e n s t a n q u a m fin is . C u m
e r go p r o b as pe r Philosophum q u o d b e a t i t u d o n o n
tantum i n g e n e r a l i e x i
Eth icorum,
f s ed e t i a m i n s p e c i a li
e x x
%
a p p e t i t u r n a t u r a l i t e r , re s p on d e o :
ilia
r a t i o
b e a t i t u d i n i s quam P h i l o s o p h u s r e p u t a t s p e c i a l e m , q u o d
s c i l i c e t c o n s i s t a t i n s p e c u l a t i o n e a l t i s s i m a r u m c a u s a r u m
pe r f ec t i s s ima , e s t
valde
u n i v e r s a l is ; i n s p e c i a l i a u t e m
* Opus oxoniense, iv , dist. x l ix , q . ix,
nn .
2-3
(Vives ,
v o l . xxi , 318).
f Ethica Nicomachea, 1, cap. v i i
(1097'', iff.).
% x , cap. v i i -v i i i
(117°
I2ff.).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
l6o
say that s ince there is a natura l desi re to exist forever,
in those beings incapable of such existence there is a
desire for such cont inued existence as is possible, viz.
t h roug h the c on t in u i t y of
the species
in
diverse
ind iv idu a ls .
And so one cou ld g ran t tha t jus t l i ke the o ther be ings
tha t can be gen era ted , m an too has a n a tu ra l des ire to
exist
forever—not
in deed i n a s ing le i nd i v i du a l , bu t i n a
con t in u a l success ion of ind iv idu a ls.
As for the p r inc ip le tha t one flees from one th ing on ly
because he loves i ts opposi te, however, i t appears that
this is a lways v a l id . We can a dm i t tha t i t follow s from
this pr inc ip le that i f one shuns death now, he loves l i fe
now, and the same can be sa id a t any g i ven momen t .
B u t from this i t does n ot follow th a t he loves to live
forever.
To tha t a rgumen t f rom the Apos t l e , I r ep l y t ha t we
who do not wish [ to be unc lothed or who are averse to
dy ing ] a re w e w ho a re m ade ce r ta i n or insp ired by fa i th .
We a re i ndeed na tu ra l l y ave rse to dy ing i nasmuch as
such an ave rs ion i s i n acco rd w i t h an i nc l i na t ion o f
na tu re. B u t i t is no t kn own to n a tu ra l reason tha t th is
avers ion is in accord w i th an inc l in a t ion of na tu re.
To the second argument : I concede tha t i t is tru e m a n
natura l ly seeks happ iness not on ly in genera l but a lso
i n pa r t i cu l a r , as w i l l be m ade c lea r in d is t inc t ion x l i x . *
B u t i t is not know n by n a tu ra l reason tha t m an na tu ra l ly
des i res that par t icu lar beat i tude which consis ts in what
we believe it to consist,26 for it would be necessary to
know by na tu ra l reason tha t such an ac t per ta ins to us
as an en d. C onseque n tly , w he n you p rove by the
Philosopher tha t n ot on ly is bea t itude in gen era l des ired
na tu ra l l y ( f rom
Nicomachean Ethics ,
bk .
i)
f bu t also bea t i
tud e i n p a r t icu la r ( from
bk . x ) , %
I rep ly tha t the bea t itud e
w h ich the Ph ilosopher cons idered p a r t icu la r , na m ely the
bea t itud e w h ich consis ted in the m ost per fect s pe cu la tion
about the h ighest causes, is in fac t a know ledg e throu g h
universals.27 B y descen ding to p a rt ic u lars ,
then ,
Ar is to t le
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l 6 l
DUNS
SGOTUS
d e s c e n d e n d o, ip s e n o n v i d e t u r p roc es sis se u l t r a s p e c u la t io-
tionem perfectissimam i n v i t a is t a . U n d e in q u is i t a is ta
b e a t i t u d i n e
hominis
s u b d i t : O p o r t e t e t co rpu s
sanum
esse,
e t
c i b u m ,
e t f a m u l a t u m esse, n o n tamen aes t i -
mandum multum magnis i n d i g e r e , f e l i c e m . E r go
fe l i c i t as
ilia
spec i a l i s
quam
nos
ponimus speculationem
h o m i n i possibilem longe p e r f e c t i o r e s t q u a c u m q u e p o s s i -
bil i i n v i t a i s t a , ilia n o n e st n a t u r a l i t e r n o t a esse fi n is
nos t e r
nee
n a t u r a l i t e r
notum
e st e a rn n a t u r a l i t e r a p p e t i
a nob i s tanquam f i n e m .
C u m p roba s p e r rationem Augustini b e a t i t u d i n e m n o n
posse esse n i s i s e m p i te r n a m , d a b i t u r i s t u d a b illo q u i
t e n e t b e a t i t u d i n e m humanam po sse hab e r i i n v i t a i s t a ,
q u o d v ole n s a m i t t i t e a r n , q u i a d e b e t s e c u n d u m rectam
r a t i o n e m
velle
c o n d i t i on e m n a t u r a e s ua e . R e c t a
autem
r a t i o o s t e n d i t i s t i n o n h a b e n t i f i d e m , u t v i d e t u r s ib i ,
q u o d c o n d i t i o n a t u r a e s u a e e s t
mortalitas
t a r n
animae
quam co r po r i s , e t i d eo deb e t v e l l e s i c u t e t vitam a m i t -
t e r e , i t a v i t a m be a t a m . E t c u m d i c i s , n o n e st v i t a be a t a
q u a e n o n e r a t
amata
a b h a b e n t e ,
verum
e s t , s i non
esse t ama t a p r o t u n c quando e s t po ss i b i l i s , e t c o n
ven i e n s i l l i a m a n t i , s e d s ic esse co n ve n i e n t em p r o sem pe r
no n e s t
notum
p e r r a t io n e m
n a t u r a l e m .
A d aliud c on c e d i tu r q u o d n o t u m est h o m i n i ipsum
posse consequ i f i nem
suum
i n a l iq u o in d i v i d u o , e t p e r
c o n s e q u e n s , b e a t i t u d i n e m i n i l l o g r a d u i n q u o n o t u m
est b e a t i tu d i n e m esse fin e m h o m i n i s . E t c u m d ic is h oc
im po ss i b ile esse i n v i t a i s t a , d i co q u o d is t a im po ss i bi li t a s
n o n es t n o t a p e r r a t i on e m n a t u r a l e m . G u m a d d u c is
i n fo r t u n a , i n f i r m i t a t e m , im p e r fe c t io n e m v i r t u t i s e t
s c i e n t i a e , r e s p o n d e t u r q u o d h a e c o m n i a r e p u g n a n t
pe r f e c t ae f e l i c i t a t i , qualem n o t u m e s t c o m p e t e r e I n t e l l i -
g e n t ia e , s ed n o n q u a l e m n o t u m e st p osse c om p e t e r e
h o m i n i .
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL l6l
d id not seem to go beyond the m ost pe r fect specu la
t ion poss ible in th is li fe . Hence , ha v ing in q u i red in to
the na ture of th is happ iness of m a n , Ar is to t le adds
28
:
"To be happy i t i s necessary for man that h is body be
he a l thy , tha t he have food , com pa nions hip , th a t he does
not c rave too m uc h or w an t too m u c h ". Since we assume
th a t m a n is capa ble of a sp ecu la t ion far m ore per fect th a n
anything possible in this l i fe, the specia l happiness
wh ich we pos tu la te i s no t known na tu ra l l y to be
our end , ne i ther i s i t known na tu ra l l y tha t we seek i t
as an end .
Wh en you a rgue from August ine 's p roof tha t happ iness
cannot be an y th ing bu t e te rna l, a person w ho ho lds tha t
hu m a n happ iness is poss ible in th is l ife w i l l re p ly tha t he
does w ish to lose i t . For a cc ording to r ig h t reason, he
m ust w ish w ha tever is the lot o f h is na tu re. B u t to a
person w ho has no
f a i t h ,
r ight reason seemingly reveals
the lo t of our n ature to be m or ta l both in body an d sou l.
The refore, he m ust w ish to lose l ife an d the refore to lose
the h ap py l i fe . An d w hen y ou say tha t such a l ife is not
h a p p y w h i c h h a d n ot been love d by the one w ho possessed
i t ,
th is is t rue on ly i f
such
a li fe ha d not been loved a t a
tim e w hen i t
was
both poss ible a nd f i t t in g to have i t . B ut
i t is n o t know n by n a tu ra l reason tha t to be ha pp y forever
is som eth ing in accord w i th our n a tu re.
As fo r the o the r [o r th ird a rgu m en t ], we g ran t tha t m an
knows he can a t t a i n h i s end i n some ind i v i dua l , and
conseque n tly , tha t he knows he can a t ta in happ iness in
the degree recognised to be m an 's end . Wh en y ou
say th a t such happ iness is n ot possible in this l ife , I rep ly
that th is impossib i l i t y is not known by natura l reason.
Whe n you adduce the m is for tune , bod i ly i n f i rm i t y ,
inp er fec t ion of v i r tue an d know ledg e, the answer is tha t
these are inc onsistent w i th the type of pe rfect happiness
known to be character is t ic of
an
In te lligen ce
29
bu t they
are n ot inconsis tent w i th the happ iness k now n to be
w i th i n the reach o f m an .
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162 DUNS SCOTUS
A d q u a r t u m , d i c e r e t u r q u o d is t a sp ec ie s p e r p e t u a b it u r
i n u n i v e r s o p e r
continuam successionem
i n d i v i d u o r u m
quam p o n e r e t P h i los o p h u s p e r genera tionem c o n t in u a m ,
n on autem c on t i n u a b i tu r p e r vitam a l i c u j u s , nee
a l i -
quorum
i n s p e c ie . E x h is a p p a r e t q u a n t a e s u n t g r a t ia e
r e f e r e ndae no s t r e C r ea t o r i q u i no s pe r f i d em ce r t i s s imo s
r e d d i d i t in h is , q u a e p e r t in e n t a d fin e m n o s t r u m , e t a d
p e r p e t u i t a t e m s e m p i te r n a m a d q u a e ingeniosissimi e t
e r u d i t i s s i m i p e r r a t i o n e m n a t u r a l e m q u a s i n i h i l p o t e r a n t
a t t i n g e r e , ju x t a
i l lud
q u o d
adductum
e s t d e A u g u s t i n o
xi i i De T rin i ta t e ca p . i x * : Q u od v i x p a u c i , e t c . S i fide s
ad s i t q u ae e st i n e is q u i bu s d e d i t f il ios De i
f ier i ,
n u l l a
quaes t i o es t qu i a i p se suos c r eden t es i n hoc ce r t i s s imos
r e d d i t .
*
x i i i ,
ca p. ix (Mign e,
P.L.,
x m , 1023).
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THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 162
To the fourth , i t m igh t be sa id tha t in the un iverse i t is
the species tha t w i l l go on forever throu g h the continuous
succession of ind iv id u a ls. I t is th is w h ich the Philosopher
postu la ted by h is doct r ine of continu ous ge ne rat ion. B ut
i t is no t the l ife o f any s ing le ind iv id u a l or ind iv idu a ls
w i th in the species th a t w i l l cont inu e to exis t.
F rom a l l th is i t is appa ren t how m uch thanks m us t be
g iven to our C rea tor , w ho th roug h fa i th has made us
most cer ta in o f those th ings wh ich per ta in to our end
and to e te rna l
life—things
about w h ich the m ost lea rned
and ingen ious m en can know a lm os t no th ing acco rd ing
to August ine's statement in De Tr in i tate, bk.
x i i i ,
c . ix * :
"Sca rcely a few , etc".30 "B u t i f fa i th be there—that
fa i th w h ich is to be foun d in those to w hom [Jesus] has
given the pow er to becom e the sons of God—there is no
quest ion about i t , "
31
for of th is He has m ade those w ho
believe in H im m ost ce r ta in .
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NOTES
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N O T E S
Section I
1 The mss read either phicos or phycos. The text is faulty here
as it is in so many other instances. Scotus's meaning, however,
seems clear enough.
2 In quid and in quale are two basic modes of
predication.
They
refer prim ar ily to the five predicables of Porphyry, namely, the
genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident,
though Scotus extends the idea of in quid and in quale pre
dication to the transcendental order. Briefly , the difference
between the two is this. To predicate in quid means to predicate
either the entire essence (i.e. the species) or at least the deter
minable part of the essence (e.g. the genus). The term is
derived from quiddity or essence and such predication represents
an answer to the question : What is i t? (Quid est?). To
predicate in quale means to predicate a further determination
or qualifica tion of the essence. This qu alification (quale) may
be either essential (e.g. a specific difference) or non-essential
(e.g. a property or accident). Since the specific difference is
really a part of the essence or quiddity, Scotus sometimes
speaks of i t
as
being predicated in
quale quid
or in
quale
substantiale
in order to distinguish it from properties or accidents which
are said to be predicated either in quale
accidentale
or simply
in quale. To predicate something in quid, says Scotus, it is not
enough that the predicate be an essential note but that it be
predicated per modum subsistentis, which from the viewpoint of
grammar means that it must be predicated as a noun, not as
an adjective or pa rticip le or adverb. Predication in quale,
whether it be an essential qualification or not, is always pre
dicated per modum denominantis, which from the viewpoint of
grammar means it is predicated as a modifier. "Substance",
"whiteness", "rat ionali ty", "rat ional animal", " l i fe", "truth",
"goodness", if used as predicates, would be predicated in quid,
whereas "substantial", "white", "rat ional", " l iving", "true",
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166 DUNS SCOTUS
"good" , if
used as predicates, would be predicated in quale.
"Be ing"
(ens) can be used either as a noun or as a particip le.
In the first case it is predicated in quid and is equivalent to
"a b eing " or "a th in g " w ith a singular and plu ra l. I n the second
case,
if used as a pred icate, i t is predicated in quale or denomina
tive. Used as a particip le, "b e in g " always requires a subject
which it modifies.
1
Ultimate differences are denominative terms that are irreducibly
simple. I n regard to concepts that designate rea l things or some
real aspects of real things (first intentions), Scotus distinguishes
those which are irreducibly simple and those which are not.
Irreducibly simple concepts (conceptus simpliciter simplices) are such
as cannot be reduced or broken down into two more simple
concepts that are first intentions, one of which is determinable
and the other determining. The concept of
" m a n " ,
for
instance,
can be
reduced to "a nim al" and "ra t ion al" . "A ni m al "
in tu rn can be broken down into "sentient " and "o rga nism ".
This process, according to Scotus, cannot go on indefinitely.
Otherwise nothing wo uld be known . U ltimate ly we arrive
at intelligible elements or notions that are incapable of further
analysis and hence are irred uc ibly simple. Restricting our
selves to real concepts, that is "first intentions", we can say,
according to Scotus, that there is but one irreducible simple
concept that is determinable or quidditative, and that this is
" t h i n g "
or "b e in g " used as a noun. But there w il l be as
many irreducibly simple differential, determining, or qualifying
concepts as there are different concepts, where different is
taken in the technical Aristote lian
sense.
(Things differ, accord
ing to the Stagirite, only if they have something in common ;
otherwise they are simply diverse. Cf. Metaphysica, x , cap. i i i ,
10546, 23~3°)-
Since Scotus gives as examples of concepts
that are not irreducibly simple that of the individual, the
species and the genus, and since even such concepts must
contain an u ltima te difference, it seems that we can d istinguish
three types of ultimate differences, according to him : (1) the
haecceitas or indiv iduatin g difference ; (2) certain kinds of
specific differences ; (3) transcendental differences, such as
those which limit or contract "being" to the ultimate genera
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NOTES
167
or categories, or such notions as " in fi n i te " ,
"necessary11,
"a cc iden ta l" , etc. Accord ing to Scotus, not every specific
difference should be considered to be irreduc ib ly simple.
Since we are speaking of first intentions we must take into
consideration the nature of the rea lity designated by the
concept. Consider the notion "l iv in g bo dy ". Acco rding to
Scotus, " l i v i n g " is derived from and connotes the life pr inc iple
which is a form or substance really distinct from the body
which has its own forma corporeitatis. Since the life princ ip le
can be designated by a determinable or non -di fferent ial
notion (e.g. "substance", " th in g " , "a being") Scotus does
not consider the term " l i v in g " , as applied to an organism or
man , as an irreduc ibly simple concept. Such a specific difference
is not ult imate , though further analysis wi ll eventually yield
a specific difference tha t is irreduc ib ly simple (Cf. Opus
oxoniense, n, d. in , q. vi, n. iq ; 1 d. in , q. i i i , n. 15 ; 1 1 d. xxv,
q. i,
n.
16).
4
Attributes or properties (propria or
passiones)
are those qualifica
tions which are necessarily connected with their respective
subject yet do no t enter in to its essential de fini tio n. " B e in g "
has two types or attributes, those which are simply coextensive,
such as " o n e " , " t r u e " , " g o o d " , and those whic h are coextensive
in disjunction such as "infinite-f inite", "simple-composed",
"necessary-contingent", etc.
B
The primacy of commonness, or better, of common predication,
which Scotus ascribes to being, simply means that "being"
conceived
quiddi ta t ive ly
or as a noun is predicable of anything
that can be grasped by a concept that is not irreducibly simple.
Th e virtual primacy tha t Scotus attributes to " b e i n g " i n reference
to its attributes and ultimate differences does not mean that
the formal concept or ratio "being" contains these notions in
such a way that the latter can be abstracted from the former
by an act of intellectual abstraction or analysis as some have
claimed.
I t simply means th at these other notions or rationes
are predicable by a necessary or per se predication of some
subject that can be designated as "a being" or "a thing".
According to scholastic usage, if the predicate of a necessary
or per se nota propos ition is par t of the essential def in it io n o f
(2,322) 23
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NOTES
169
something wit ho ut affirm ing or denying anyth ing of it ;
(2) the act of "composition and division", or immediate judg
ment, whereby the mind affirms or denies some predicate of
some subject ; (3) the act of reasoning or mediate judg men t,
by which the mind infers one proposition from another or other
propositions.
9 D emonstration, according to Aristotle {Analytica
posteriora,
1
cap.
xii i) is of two k inds : dem onstration of the fact (demon-
stratio quia) and demonstration of the reasoned fact
(demonstratio
propter quid). The first mere ly establishes that the conclusion
of the syllogism is true, but the second additionally indicates
the reason why the predicate of the conclusion inheres in the
subject. Fo r the midd le te rm o f a demonstration of reasoned
fact gives the cause or some ontologically prior principle
(e.g.
the essential definition) that can be considered as the
reason or rational explanation why the predicate must be
affirmed of the subject. A demonstration of reasoned fact w il l
always be an a priori fo rm o f demonstration ; an a posteriori
demonstration, on the contrary, will always be a demonstration
of the simple fact.
10
Scotus has previously discussed why G od is the subject o f
theology but not of metaphysics, and to what extent theology
verifies the Aristotelian notion of a science.
11 "Its principle", that is, some self-evident or analytical proposi
tion of which it is the subject.
Sect ion I I
1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments , see pp. 30 ff.
2 The statement of Pseudo-Dionysius that we do not know what
G od is ; we know only wha t he is not (Cf. D e caelesti hierarchia,
11.
Mig ne, P.G., in ,
141
; see also St J ohn D amascene,
Defide
orthodoxa, 1 iv. Migne P.G.,
xcrv ,
800), was often quoted by
the scholastics. Th is
docta ignorantia
was exaggerated by many.
Scotus Eriugena, for instance, suggests that perhaps it might
be more correct to say tha t G od is not good, true , jus t, etc.,
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170 DUNS SCOTUS
since any term or concept we might derive from the universe
of creatures is so radically inadequate to express what God
is that it could more truly be denied of God than affirmed of
H im (Cf. De divisione naturae, 1, xiv ff. M igne, P.L.,
cxxn,
462fF.).
Duns Scotus reminds us that this way of speaking cannot be
taken too seriously. I f our knowledge is purely negative, it is
no knowledge of God at all.
3 Henry of G hent makes use of this dis tinction in his Summa,
art. xxi i , q. i ad ii i ; q. iv.
4
He nry of G hent, loc. c i t , q . iv ; St Thomas, Summa theologica,
1, q. i i i , art. iv ad ii i .
5 Henry of Ghent, loc. cit.
R Ibid.
7 Henry maintains that God is already known in a most general
manner in every concept the human intellect forms of
a
created
object as "th is b ein g" . Consequently, he is forced to hold
that we cannot know a creature without at the same time
having some knowledge of G od. This knowledge of God in
creatures, however, must be distinguished from a knowledge
of God as He is in Himself. See Summa, art.
xx i i ,
q. v i.
a
Hen ry, Summa, ar t. xx iv , q . v i. For Scotus's answer to Henry's
arguments, see p. 32.
9 Henry contrasts two rad ically different notions. By pr ivatively
undetermined being, he understands the notion of being that
applies to creatures. As creatures actua lly exist, they are
qualified or determinate forms of
being.
For instance, man is
a rational, sentient, organic, material, substantial being.
Nevertheless, the mind prescinds from all these determinations
to form a simple concept of being, undetermined but determinable.
The concept of being that applies to G od, however, negates
or denies all determination and therefore is called negatively
undetermined being. G od, in a word, is not only being in
an unqualified and undetermined sense, but His being is
incapable of any restriction, limitation or determination.
Therefore, being in this sense is undetermined and indeterminable.
Now determinable and indeterminable beings have nothing positive
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NOTES 171
in common ; they agree only in what is denied, namely,
determination. Therefore, our so-called "conce pt" of being as
common to God and creatures is in reality not one concept
but two . But because of their sim ilarity, the m ind fails to
distinguish between the two, even as the eye fails to resolve
two distant objects. This dual "concept" is what H enry
calls the "analogous concept of being".
10 I n scholastic terminology, "ind ete rm ina tion " as applied to G od
is a first intention. I t expresses a perfection o f a rea lly existent
entity, in this case the positive mode of existence, infinity.
Indetermination in the second instance, is characteristic not of
a real ent ity, bu t of our concept of being. I t is a second intention,
since it refers not to some condition of reality but to a character
istic of a concept or ens rationis.
11 Only what is true can be an object of "knowledge" or scientia
in the strict Aristotelian or scholastic sense of
the
term. Hence,
"false knowledge'- is a contradiction in terms. Sim ilarly
certitude, in the technical sense of the term, presupposes that
the proposition to which the mind gives its firm assent is a
true and not a false statement.
12 The intellect, according to the general view of the scholastics,
is a dual faculty comprising the active or agent intellect and
the passive or possible intellect. Th is divis ion is based upon
an obscure passage in Aristotle's De
anima
(in, cap. v ;
430s 18)
and underwent a variety of interpretations. W ith Alexander
of Aphrodisias, as well as with some scholastic interpretations
of Augustinian illumination, the active intellect is identified
w ith G od. W ith Alfara bi and Avicenna, it is a subordinate
intelligence or "angel" somehow connected with the moon.
St Thomas considers the active intellect to be a faculty of the
soul rea lly distinct from the possible inte llect. Scotus also
considers it to be a property of the soul but regards it as only
formally distinct from, but really identical
wi th,
the possible
intellect and the soul's substance. The general function of the
active intellect is to render the potentially intelligible in the
sense image actually inte lligible . The additional specific
refinements Scotus has given to this general function do not
concern us here.
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iy2 DUNS SCOTUS
13 Notions perta ining to the essence of the object (generic,
differential or specific notions) are contained "essentially".
Colour, for instance, is contained essentially in redness. A
notion is regarded as virtually contained in a given object, if
the object has the power or virtus of producing the notion in
the mind. I n a broad sense, "v i r tua l" is not opposed to
"essential", since the object has the power to produce a concept
of what i t contains essentially. In addition, however, the
object can be said to contain virtually its necessary properties
(propria) or any effects i t is capable of producing. An object
such as a golf-ball could produce a simple notion proper of
itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of a circle,
according to Scotus, for the notion of circularity is virtually
contained in the notion of sphericity. Such an object, however,
could not give rise to a simple proper notion of a triangle or
pentagon.
14 A pure or simple perfection (perfectio
simpliciter)
is one that does
not contain in its formal notion any imperfection or limitation.
As such i t is opposed to mixed perfections (perfectio secundum
quid) wh ich involve both perfection and imperfection. K now
ledge,
volition, existence, wisdom and the like are regarded by
Scotus as pure perfections. Matter, corporeity, sense knowledge
or even knowledge obtained by a reasoning process as con
trasted with intuitive knowledge, all involve limitation and
imperfection in their very notion.
15 For this discussion see above, pp. 4-8.
16 Scotus distinguishes between two types of objects that move
the intellect of a creature to knowledge, one natural, the other
voluntary or supernatural. The natural motivat ing object of
an intellect causes knowledge automatically or necessarily, as
it were, by the very fact that it is what it is and is co-present
to that intellect. Now the d ivine essence is a natural or
adequate motivating object of immediate and intuitive know
ledge only in regard to the divine intellect itself. For any
created intellect, God's essence is a purely voluntary object.
The reason, says Scotus, lies in this fact that God's essence
can
not be related necessarily or automatically, as it were, to any
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NOTES 173
creature or part thereof—a corollary of the absolute inde
pendence of the First Being. A l l relationships between G od
and creatures are contingent and dependent upon the divine
wil l ,
the ultim ate source of a ll contingency. Consequently, in
the beatific vision of God in heaven, says Scotus, it is not
the divine essence as
such
that moves the intellect bu t rather the
divine wi l l . In this sense, G od is a vo luntary object. But the
peculiarity of the beatific vision lies in the fact that the divine
will motivates but does not terminate this act of intuition.
And this is something unique in the order of objects and
follows from the fact that God's will is really identical with
God's essence (Cf. Quodlibet, q. xiv).
17
For the distinction between a demonstration of the fact and a
demonstration of the reasoned fact see note 9 above. I n this
particular instance, the demonstration of the fact referred to
is an
a posteriori
argument which proceeds from effect (creatures)
to cause (G od). In such a process, that which is most unlike
creatures, and consequently most distinctive of
G od,
is the last
to be demonstrated.
18 See Scotus's proof for the existence of
G od,
pp. 52 ff.
19 The less universal and more specific the concept, the greater
its comprehension or intension. The concept of man, for
instance, contains the more universal notions of "animal",
"organism", "substance", "being", in its intension.
20
The scholastics list a number of loci from which a dialectitian
may draw his arguments. The locus a minori assumes that
what is within the power of the less perfect, is also within that
of the more perfect. Now the intellect, a purely sp iritual
faculty, is more perfect than the imagination, an organic
faculty.
21 Seep. 14.
22
See p.
14.
23
For a description of this fallacy see Aristotle's De sophisticis
elenchis, cap. v (1676,
1-20).
24 In tu itive knowledge of G od is supernatural. See note
16.
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174 DUNS SCOTUS
26
See p.
14.
26
See pp. 68 ff.
27 See p. 14.
28 See p.
17.
Sect ion I I I
x For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see p. 76.
2 This is the solution given by Henry of Ghent, Summa, art.
xxi , q. i.
3
See Aristotle , De
caelo,
1, cap. iii
(270", 12-13)
; cap. x ii
(281*,
18 ff.) ;
11,
cap. iv
(287°,
23-24) ; cap. v i
(289"*,
8-9) ;
Metaphysica, ix , cap. v ii i
(10506,
22-24).
4 See p. 173, note 17.
5 Cf. Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxvi, q. unica, n. 5.
6 Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. ii, art. iii corpus, quarta
via.
7
"Natural" is understood in the technical sense of a cause
that acts by a necessity of nature and not deliberately or freely.
Effic ient causes, according to Scotus, fall in to two classes :
(1) those which possess antecedent rational knowledge and
act deliberately ; (2) those which lack such knowledge and
act autom atically or by a necessity of nature. See Quaest.
in Metaphysicam, ix, q. xv, n. 4
(Vives,
vol. .
vn , 6086
ff.) where
he divides all active powers into either nature or will. Here
he proves paradoxically that according to Aristotle's division
of rational and irrational powers the intellect is "irrational"
in the sense tha t it acts automatica lly in the presence of evident
truth whereas the will is "rational" in the sense that it can
freely choose to love or not to love an object known through
reason or intellect.
" I n an ascending order one progresses by going fro m the posterior
to the prio r ; in a descending order, from the pr ior to the
posterior. For instance, in regard to a series of temporally
ordered causes where one precedes the other in time, many
philosophers (e.g. St Bonaventure) deny the possibility of an
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NOTES
I75
infinite regress into the past (an ascending order) and use
this argument to establish a creation in time, yet they admit
the possibility of effects of created causes continuing indef
inite ly into the future (infin ite regress in a descending temporal
order). Scotus, as his answer to the objection that follows
indicates, denies categorically the possibility of an infinite
regress in an ascending order only in regard to essentially
ordered causes. Inasmuch as such causes must exist simul
taneously to produce a given effect, a chain of such causes
will be non-temporal in character.
9
Accord ing to Aristotle's theory of colour borrowed from
Plato (Timaeus, 67E), fine particles penetrate and dilate the
medium whereas large particles compress it producing white
or black colour respectively. Cf. Metaphysial, x , cap. v i i (1057*,
8 ).
Hence "d ila ting " is regarded as a property of anything
white, and "white" may be regarded as a per se cause of the
same.
10 See Aristotle, Physica, 11, cap. hi
(195s,
27 ff.) ; cap. v (196&,
24-29) ;
Metaphyska,
v, cap. ii
(1013&, 2gss).
11 See Aristotle , Metaphyska, v , cap. x i
(1018',
9-11).
12
See p. 39.
13 See
p . 42.
14 Scotus contrasts "nature" as a necessarily acting cause with a
free agent acting w ith purpose or deliberation . See above,
note 7.
15 See p p. 46-7 .
16 Cf. Scotus s third conclusion, p. 46.
17 See p p. 47 -8.
18
A univocal cause is one whose effect is of the same nature as
itself. A father, for instance, is the univocal cause of his son.
An equivocal cause, on the contrary, is of a different nature
from its effect. For instance the artist is an equivocal cause
of his pain ting. Since the less perfect cannot be the total
cause of the more perfect, the total or principal cause, if
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176
DUNS SCOTUS
equivocal,
must be more perfect than its effect. Th is argument
seems to presuppose that
efficient
causality involves no imper
fection and therefore w il l be found in the most excellent nature.
Cf. pp. 42 and 45.
19
Scotus is not attem pting to prove num erical or ind ividu al
un ity at this point bu t rather a un ity of nature. To put it in
other words, the triple primacy is characteristic of but one
kind of being. Whether there is more than one ind ividua l of
this kind is not discussed here but in the following question
on the un icity of G od (cf. pp. 82 ff. ). Scotus's intention is
expressed more clearly in the De Primo Principio, chapter iii
of which parallels the present question of the Oxoniense. He
proposes "to demonstrate, if Thou wilt grant it, that some one
nature is simply first. However, I say one nature for this
reason, because in this third chapter the aforesaid three
primacies will be shown, not about a unique singular or one
in number, but about a unique qu idd ity or nature. There
wil l ,
however, be mention of numerical unity later."
[De
Primo Principio, cap. ii i ; Roche translation , p. 39 ).
20 "Possible" is taken as the contradictory disjunc tion of
"necessary". I t designates a being which exists in v irtu e of
another and hence, of itself, is merely possible. Scotus seems
to have been influenced by Avicenna's possibile esse and necesse
e s s e .
n
See note
14.
22
Scotus refers to his theory of "natural appetite" in virtue of
which appetite every nature seeks its own perfection. Th is
"seeking", however, is not to be understood in the sense of a
conscious striving for some known goal but is merely the
ontological relation that exists between a thing and whatever
can perfect. I n this sense, for instance, matter seeks or loves
form and vice versa. In the present case the subject perfected
and that which perfects it (viz. the end) are simply iden tical.
Hence, Scotus argues that if we say the First Agent has a
"natural love" of itself, this is equivalent to saying that it is its
own perfection or it is itself.
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NOTES 177
23 See Aristotle, Physica,
v i i i ,
cap. v i (259 *, 32 ff.) ; De caelo,
11
cap. i i i
(286s,
34 ff.) ; De
generatione
et corruptione,
11
cap. x
(336",
23 ff.) ; Metaphyska, xn , cap. v i - v i i (1072s, 9 ff).
24
A subject is said to be in contradictory potency to something
if it can either have it or not have it . Th e argument here is
this. I f thought can either be present or absent so far as the
nature itself is concerned, then to think requires some effort
on the part of the nature and this would eventually produce
weariness.
25 The first act or actualisation of a being is that it exists with
its various faculties or powers. Th us , for instance, so far as
man's body is endowed or informed by the human soul, man
is in first act. When a man actualises his hu man faculties or
powers by acts of seeing, thinking, willing, etc., he is in second
act. For Scotus, a ra tion al nature achieves its highest perfect ion
by loving the highest good.
26 Activum implies an immanent operation, that is one which is
not only initiated by the subject but remains in and perfects
tha t subject. V i ta l activities such as though t, vo lit ion and the
like are imma nent operations. Factivum, on the other ha nd ,
implies that the operation is transient, that is, has a term
outside the agent. Man 's artifacts are produced by a transient
activity.
27 Cf. St Thomas, Sent., 1 dist. xxxv, q. i, art. i ad iii ; Summa
theologica,
1
q. xiv, art. i i.
28 Scotus uses the term ratio
intelligent
(literally "the reason for
kn ow in g" ). The allusion here is probably to the notion of an
"intelligible species", which in human knowledge is supposed
to substitute for the object in such a way as to make universal
concepts possible. Even i f one were to postulate something
analogous to the species in regard to God's knowledge, it
would still be identical with His essence and intellect.
29 Since whatever receives something is perfected by the form
received, it would follow that the more perfect knowledge
would be perfected by the less perfect.
30
See Quaest. in Metaphysicam,
v i i ,
q. xv, n. 9.
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178
DUNS SCOTUS
81 "Infinity" is regarded here as a degree of intensity which the
perfection in question possesses. Scotus distinguishes between
intensive and extensive infin ity . A th ing is said to be exten
sively in finite i f there is no pure perfection (cf. p.
172,
note 14)
which it does not possess. Noth ing, however, is said in regard
to the intensity or degree to which such perfections are pos
sessed.
Each pure perfection, however, is said to be inten
sively infinite if it exists in the highest degree possible for that
respective perfection. Thus G od wou ld not be extensively
infinite i f He lacked knowledge and love. But H is knowledge
is intensively infinite if it is a comprehensive knowledge of all
that can be known, including His infinitely intelligible nature.
32
Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysial, 11, v
(994", 1-2).
33 Scotus distinguishes between the omnipotence of God as an
article of his Catholic creed (omnipotence in the proper sense
of the term) and the infinite power of God (omnipotence in a
qualified sense) as demonstrated philosophically by reason
unaided by fa ith (Cf. Quodlibet, q . v i i ; Opus oxoniense, 1, dist.
xl i i , q . un ica). I n this distinction we see the influence o f the
philosophy of A lfara bi and Avicenna. The latter, influenced
by Plotinus's theory of emanation, maintained that God can
create only one being immediately, viz . the highest Intelligence.
This creature in tu rn produces subordinate Intelligences. The
creation of the earth as well as the heavenly bodies and their
souls is the work of these created Intelligences. Even in this
theory, however, God is the ultimate cause of all things that
emanate directly or indirectly from H im , and therefore the
First Cause in some qualified sense at least is omnipotent.
As a theologian, however, Scotus could not subscribe to this
view, for according to his theology, he believed that whatever
God can do through the medium of the secondary cause He
has created He can do directly or immediately if H e so w illed.
But Scotus makes this much of a concession to Arabic
philosophy, namely, that in our present state we can only
demonstrate that God can create all things either mediately
or immediately and in this sense God's power must be in
finite intensively. We can give only probable arguments for
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l8o
DUNS SCOTUS
theoremata de esse et
essentia (Louvain,
1930),
p p.
17
ff., regarding
the particular interpretation to which
Scotus
is referring.
43 In his analysis of a given entity, Scotus often arranges the
various perfections or rationes the mind distinguishes therein
according to an ontological priority, accordingly as one ratio
presupposes the other for its existence but not vice versa.
To conceive the entity under some prior ratio in order to
discover what additional attributes are implied
in
virtue
thereof is to conceive it according to a prior instance of nature.
44 St Thomas, Sent., 11, dist. x l i i i , q. i, art. i ; Summa theologica, 1,
q.
v i i , art. 1.
46 See
p. 35.
46 See
pp. 27-8.
47 See
p. 35.
48 See
p p. 53-4.
49 See
p. 35.
60
Tha t is to say, a kind of one-to-one correspondence exists
between the two by reason of certain essential likenesses or
similarities.
61 See
p. 35.
62
Cf. Aristotle, Physica,
vm ,
cap. i
(251", 8-25211,
4).
63
See p. 36.
64
Magnitude is considered as being finite by nature . Cf. the first
argument in the contra, p. 36.
Sect ion IV
1
For
Scotus s
reply to these argum ents, see pp. o,2ff.
2
Cf. Aristotle,
Topica,
11, cap. x
(1146,
33).
8
Cf. Pseudo-D ionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. v (M igne,
P.G.,
in ,
819) ; St Bonaventure, De mysterio Trinitatis, q. i, art. i
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NOTES I01
(Quaracchi, vol. v, 47°) ; Aristotle, Metaphysial,
11
cap. i
(993*. 24-3i)-
* Cf. Aristotle, Topica,
m,
cap. 1
(117",
16); St Augustine,
De
libero arbitrio,
in,
cap. ix, xi (Migne, P.L., xxxn,
1283, 1288).
0 This argument and its accompanying refutat ion have been
added later by Scotus as some manuscripts indicate.
6 William of
Ware,
Sent. 1 dist. ii. q. ii (Muscat ed. in Antonianum,
11 (1927), 344-350). For Scotus's reply, see pp. o,if.
7 Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii, n.
12.
8 The "natural
w i l l "
and "natural love" according to Scotus are
not elicited acts or operations at al l. They are merely the
ontological relation of perfectibility that exists between what
ever can be perfected and that which perfects it (cf. section i n
note
22).
In this
sense,
everything may be said to love itself, i.e. its
own perfection. Only i f the th ing is a part can it be said to love
the whole more than itself since the whole is the perfection of
the part. Similar ly, God as the ult imate perfection of rat ional
creatures is loved naturally more than the creature itself.
8
To use as a means something that should be loved as an end
is a perversion of love.
10 Beatitude in the technical sense implies that the object exhausts
the potentialities of the rational being so that the latter is
perfectly satisfied and is at rest in the possession of this object.
Such an object is necessary to the happiness of this being and
therefore it could not be destroyed without destroying the
happiness.
11
Cf. the preceding question, pp. 38 ff.
12 St Bonaventure, Sent. 1 dist. ii , art. i, q. i ad iv ; Wi ll iam
of Ware, Sent. 1 dist. ii, q. i.
13
See p. 84.
14 See pp. 25-6, the third statement.
16 See p. 83.
16
See p. 83.
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182
DUNS SCOTUS
17 See p. 83.
18
Aristotle, De
caelo,
1, cap. i i
(269", 19-20).
19 See p. 83.
20 St Bonaventure, Sent.
1,
dist. ii, a. i, q. 1 ad i i .
Section V
1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 131, 122 ff.
2
Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. i, q. ii.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysica,
in ,
cap. iv (999a). See Henry's inter
pretation of this passage, Summa, ar t. i, q . i i .
4
Scotus summarises the teaching of Henry in Summa, art. i , q . i i i .
G
Note added by Scotus, according to the scribe of the Assisi
manuscript.
6
Scotus, follow ing St Augustine, uses the term Academician
and sceptic as synonyms. The Academicians or Academics
were the adherents of Plato, so called because Plato used to
deliver his discourse in the Academy at Athens. The Academy
continued after Plato's death and was characterised at different
periods of its existence by different philosophical trends.
Scepticism, it seems, was introduced by Arcesilas, the founder
of the M idd le Academy, and later modified by Carneades, who
dom inated the T h ird Academy. Cf. St Augustine, Contra
Academicos.
' See p. 100.
8 A marginal note in the Assisi manuscript indicates that the
subsequent passage is not found in Scotus's own copy.
9 Cf. note 25 o f sect. in . Here the objector argues : By life or being
alive Augustine means nothing more than that the body has
a life principle, viz. the
soul,
which is its primary or first
actualisation. He does not mean that the soul is conscious,
that is, that we are in second act.
10 Note added by Scotus.
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NOTES 183
11 Additional note by Scotus.
12 Cf. Aristotle's de fin iti on of the perfect syllogism, whi ch is a
syllogism of the first fi gur e. Analytica priora, 1 cap. ii (24s, 22 ff.),
cap. iv (266, 29 ff.).
13 Cf. note 9 of sect. 1 .
14 Opus
oxoniense,
p ro l . q. i i i , n.
13
; 1 dist.
v i i i ,
q. v, n. 24.
16 Note added by Scotus.
16 An additional note of Scotus.
17 See pp. 100 f.
18 Note added by Scotus.
19
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, iv, qq. vii,
v i i i ,
xxi i i ; v, q. iv.
20 See
pp .
101
f.
21 Th e acts of " int el l ige nc e" as distinguished fro m "re as on ing "
are o f tw o kinds :
(a)
simple apprehension or intelligence
whereby the mind grasps the meaning of something without
affirming or denying anything of i t, and (b) the act of "com
posit ion and di vi si on ", that is, the act of jud gm en t, i n w hi ch
the mind affirms or denies some predicate of the subject of the
proposit ion.
22 The active intellect, according to Scotus, is not really distinct
fr om the soul. He nce, it is a mo re perfect effect of G od th an
would be the impression or accidental effect produced in the
soul by God, the Uncreated Light.
23
Th is or some sim ila r q ua li fi ca ti on m ust be add ed, because
according to Scotus, the will or faculty of love is more noble
than either the active or possible intellect.
24 The marginal note in the Assisi manuscript, non in libra Scoti,
indicates that the passage in the Latin text within parentheses is
not found in Scotus's own copy.
25
Cf. p. 97 . The elaborate att em pt to "save face " for St
Augustine in this fifth article not only indicates the esteem in
(2,S22) 24
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184
DUNS SCOTUS
which Scotus held the saint but it also illustrates the cardinal
princ iple he uses in inte rpre tating other thinkers. " I wish to
give the most reasonable interpretation to their words that I
possibly can" (Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. v i i i , q. v, n. 8 ). The
intricate and subtle explanation that follows is typical of the
reasoning that earned Scotus the ti tle Doctor subtilis.
26 According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, the subsequent
section in parentheses in the Latin text is missing in
Scotus s
own copy.
27 Scotus tells us (Opus oxoniense, I, dist. x l i i i , q. unica) that
prior to their actual existence, God knows all possible creatures
whether they shall ever be given existence or not. Absolutely
speaking,
these creatures may consequently be said to "have
an intelligibility 1 or esse intelligibile ; this, however, is dependent
upon the divine intellect so that one can say that God does
not know these things because they are intelligible, but rather
they are inte lligible because G od knows them . For in knowing
the possible, God gives it a kind of "existence", viz. that
characteristic o f the content or object of thought. Even
though the human intellect i n the present life has no immediate
intu itive knowledge o f
G od,
of the divine intellect or its thought
content, it still remains true that the ultimate reason why the
notions derived from created objects are intelligible is because
G od first gave them inte lligib ility i n knowing them. This
intelligibility or meaning can be called the "eternal light" in
a qua lified sense. And al l propositions that are evident fro m
the meaning of the terms can be said to be seen in the eternal
light.
28 Only something that exists in the proper sense of the word
can be an efficient cause. Consequently, we cannot ascribe
any such causality to something that exists on ly in an improper
sense as the content or object of thought. Nevertheless, i t is the
intelligibility of the object that is said to "move" the intellect
to know the thing in question. Scotus argues that we should
rather ascribe that causality which meaning has in regard to
our intellect to the divine mind or intellect which gave to all
created things their meaning or intelligibility.
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NOTES 185
29 The priority referred to here is one of nature, not of time.
Cf. note 43 of sect. in.
30
Such knowledge implies a direct vision of God and is not
possessed by man in this life.
31 The triangle is considered the first figure in plane geometry.
Thus it is symbolic of the Triune God who is first in ihe
hierarchy of beings.
32
See pp.
9 9-100.
33
According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, Scotus's
personal copy is left incomplete at this poin t. What follows is
supplied from the Vives edition, v o l . ix, 207.
34 Seep.
128.
35
Literally, "It is in respect to every being whatsoever".
86 That is, principles evident from their terms.
Section V I
1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 158 ff.
2 The matter of the heavenly spheres was considered to be incor
rup tible in con tradistinction to the corruptible terrestrial matter
of the four elements.
3
Subjective parts are contrasted w ith essential parts. The
latter refer to the order of comprehension or intension ; sub
jective parts refer to the order of extension or class inclusion.
Here the meaning is that the intellective or rational soul is a
member or part of what Aristotle designates by the general
term of the soul or life principle of man.
1 Cf., for example, St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxv, art. i i .
5
St Thomas maintains that the intellect wh ich is perfected by
the act of knowledge pertains to the category of passive
potencies. This is the so-called intellectus possibilis. Cf. Summa
theologica, 1, q. lxxxv, art. i i . i i i ; in , q . ix, a rt. ii i ; Contra
gentiles,
11,
cap. lxxxv,
xcvi,
xcviii . G odfrey of Fontaines goes
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186 DUNS SCOTUS
even further in denying all activity to the possible intellect.
Cf. Quodlibet,
v i ,
q. vi i ;
vm ,
q. ii ; ix , q. xix ; x i i i , q.v.
Cf. also Giles of Rome, Quodlibet, m, q . x i i , xi i i .
6 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, v, q. xiv.
7 Aristotle, De anima, n, cap. ii (424", 30 ff.) ; see also 111, cap. i
(425", 19).
8
Accord ing to A risto tle, the sensory power consists i n "th e
equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ".
(Cf.
De anima,
11,
cap. xii ,
424s,
30 s.)
8 See pp. 138 f., number 2.
10 See pp. 141 ff.
11 Cf. Richard of Middleton, Sent., 11, dist. xix. art. i, q. 1.
12 Cf. for example, Ethica Nicomachea, I, cap. ii (1094", 20-21; ;
also Averroes, Metaphysica, 11, com. 1.
13 Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxv, art. vi.
14 According to Aristotle and the scholastics, a demonstrative
proof in the technical sense of the term must have premises
that are both necessary and evident propositions. Premises
known by faith in revelation are not evident and hence are
not technically capable of producing a demonstration. Such
premises, though never evident, may be either necessary or
contingent propositions. For instance, "G od is ju s t" would
be considered a necessary proposition inasmuch as it is based
on the immutable nature of
God
and could never be otherwise.
On the contrary, "Jesus Christ is the redeemer of mankind"
would be considered a contingent proposition because the
whole order of redemption like creation depends on the free
decrees of G od. Now Scotus calls proofs based on necessary
though not evident propositions "necessary reasons". The
arguments for immortality, however, are based on contingent
propositions and hence fail to meet the technical requirements
for an Aristotelian demonstration on two counts.
16 "Separate agent", that is, a pure spirit or Intelligence. Such
celestial beings (the angels of the scholastics) were called
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NOTES 187
"separate substances" inasmuch as they subsisted apart from
matter and were not destined by nature to inform or dwell in
a corporeal body like the spiritual soul of man.
16 "N atu ra l agent" is understood here as one which causes
generation and co rrup tion.
17 See pp. 158 ff.
18 Li tera lly, "existence through itse lf". Technically, however,
per se existence or subsistence is used by the scholastics to
designate that mode of being characteristic of substance or
substantial union in contradistinction to per accidens existence
characteristic of accidents or incidental aggregates. Scotus's
reply to the argument plays upon the ambiguity of the term
per se existence as applied to a composite substance such as
man.
Since the component elements of man (body and soul)
are not accidents but substances, albeit incomplete as to
function at least, each could be said to possess per se existence.
But the same is true of any materia l or perishable form . On
the other hand, since man as a whole is not an accidental
aggregate but a composite substance, the union of soul and
body represent a per se mode of existence, but one which the
soul possesses only as long as it is united to the body.
19
Cf. St Bonaventure, Sent.
11,
dist. ii, pars prima, art. i, q. iii ;
St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q . 1, art. ii ad ii i.
20 Confer Henry of G hent, Quodlibet, 11, q. i ii ; St Thomas,
Contra gentiles, TV, cap. lx xix .
81 For Scotus, as for Aristotle and the scholastics generally, a
probable or dialectical proof does not have the same connota
tion as it has for the neo-scholastic. A val id and convincing
proo f may st ill lack the technical requirements of an Aristotelian
"demonstration" as defined by the Stagirite in the Analytica
posterioia, 1, cap. ii
(716, 18-25) or by
Scotus in Opus oxoniense,
prol. qq. i i i-iv lat., n. 26 (Vives, vol. vni , 1836) ; in . dist.
xxiv, q. unica, n.
13,
(xv,
44 )
; Reportata parisiensia,
prol.
q. i, n. 4
(xxi i ,
yb) ; m, dist. xxiv, q. unica, n. 16 (xxm, 454).
If such a probable proof is persuasive, it may even give
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22
18b
DUNS SCOTUS
subjective or m ora l certitude in the
sense
that a ll prudent fear of
error is excluded, and yet it will not produce strictly demon
strative knowledge or scientia.
See pp. 145 ff.
23 Though Scotus claims that na tural reason can demonstrate the
existence, un icity and in fin ite perfection of
G od,
he regards the
Christian concept of a just and m erciful G od as a matter of
faith.
Cf. De Prima Principio, cap. iv (ed. Roche p.
146).
24 See p. 134.
25 According to Scotus's theory of natural desire, to admit that
human nature is capable of immortality is to admit that man
has a na tural desire for i t ; for a na tura l desire is not a conscious
act or elicited volition but is rather the ontological relation
that arises between the perfectible and its perfection. Only
in a metaphorical sense can this relation be called "desire"
Cf.
Reportata
parisiensia,
iv ,
dist. xlix, q. ix, nn. 3-5
;
see also
note 22 of sect. h i .
26 N amely, in the beatific face-to-face vision of G od.
27 Cf. the question on man's natu ra l knowledge o f
G od,
especially
the fifth statement, p. 28.
28 Ethica Nicomachea, x, cap. v ii i (1178*, 35 ff.) .
29 Tha t is, a pure spirit or angel.
30 Cf. p. 136 for the complete text.
31 St Augustine, De Trinitate, xm , cap. ix (Migne, P.L.,
n n ,
1023).
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I N D E X E S
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I N D E X O F P R O P E R N A M E S
Adam Wodam xix
Albert of Metz x i
Albertus Magnus v
Alexander of Aphrodisias
171
Alexander I I I , K ing of Scotland
xiii
Alfarabi
171,
178
Alnwick, see William of Alnwick
Anselm
of Canterbury 24, 73,
76 .
Antonius Andreas xxi
Apostle (St Paul) 91, 92,
132,
136,
155. 158
Arcesilas 182
Aristotle (The Philosopher) 5, 6,
9, 11,
12, 14, 15,
30, 31, 36,
47, 48, 52, 55-7. 62-6, 78, 80,
gg,
100, 104, 107,
i n ,
112,
113, 116,
n g ,
122, 132, 137,
145-56, 159, 160, 166, i6g,
171. iTS-5,
177-9=
182,
183,
185-8
Augustine 32,
3g,
71, 88, 91, 97,
98, 100-06, 112,
113, 116,
122,
123, 126-9, 130, 131, 134, 136,
146, '57. 158, 171,
182,
183,
188
Averroes (The Commentator)
10, 30, 80,
134, 138, 156, 179,
186
Avicenna v,
9-11,
40, 56, 66,
155, '71, «76, 178, 179
Balic, C. xvii, xviii, xx
Benedict X, Pope xv
Berthold of St Denis xv
Bettoni,
E. xxii
Boehner, Ph. vi
Boethius 104
Bonaventure
174,
181,
182,
187
Boniface V I I I , Pope x, xv
Brockie, Marianus ix
Callebaut,
A. xii, xiii, xvi
Campbell,
B.
J .
xxii
Carneades 182
Copleston,
F. C. vi, xx iiCratylus 116
Dalderby,
rce
John Dalderby
Damascene
(St John) 17,
35, 99,
i37> 169
Day, S.
J .
xxii
D ionysius, the Pseudo - Areo -
pagite 136, 169
Duns, Elias
ix, xii, xiii
Duns, Ninian ix, xi
Duns of Berwickshire x i, xii
Duns of Duns xi
Duns of Grueldykes xii
Duns of Maxton-on-the-Tweed
Fernandez Garcia, M. xxii
Festus 136
Giles of Ligny x, x i, xv, xvi, xix
Giles of
Rome 179, 186
Gilson,
E. xxii
G lorieux, P. xvi
Godfrey of Fontaines 185
Gonsalvus of Spain x, xiii, xiv,
xxi
Grajewski,
M .
J. xxii,
xxiii
Gregory I, Pope
14,
32,
157
Harris, C. R. S. xx, xxii
Henry of Ghent 13, 17-19, 26,
32. 96, 99-I03. 106, 115, 118,
120,
122,
131, 170, 171, 174,
179,
182,
183, 186,
187
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192
Heraclitus 103, 116
Hugh of Hartlepool ix
Jerome of Ascoli (Pope
Nicholas IV) xiii
Jesus Christ 60,
136,
157,
162,
186
John Damascene,
see
Damascene
John Dalderby ix
John of Cornwall xxi
Klibansky, R. vi
Little,
A. G . xix
Longpr6, E. x i, xv i, xv ii
Maimonides, see Moses Mai-
monides
Marsilius of Inghen xxi
Meier,
L. ix, xiii
Micklem, N. xx iii
Mohan, G . vi
Moses Maimonides (Rabbi
Moses) 84, 91
Mueller, M . xx
Nicholas of Lyra xx i
Oliver Sutton, Bishop of Lincoln
ix, xii
Paul,
Apostle,
see
Apostle
Pelster, F. xiv, xvi,
xvii,
xix
Pelzer, A. xvii
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES
Peter Godin xix
Peter Lombard v, xiv
Philip IV , K ing of France x, xv
Philip of Bridlington xiv, xix
Plato
a
1, ioo, 147, 175,
182
Plotinus 178
Porphyry
165
Richard of Middleton
186
Richard of
St
Victor 90
Roche, E. xx, xx i,
176, 188
Saint-Maurice, B. xxi ii
Schaefer, O. xxii
Sharp, D . E. vi, xx iii
Shircel, C. L. xx iii
Siger of Brabant v
Sutton,
see Oliver Sutton
Sutton, see
Thomas Sutton
Thomas Aquinas v, 170, 171,
174. 177.
79, 185,
186,
187
Thomas of Erfurt xxi
Thomas Sutton x iv
Tweedy, W. ix
Vier,
P. C. xxiii
Vitalis du Four xxi
Wadding,
L.
xviii,
xix, xx, xxi
William, G uardian x
William of Alnwick xxi
William of Ware 181
Wolter, A. B. xx iii
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I N D E X O F S UB JE CT S
Abstract knowledge, defined 179
Abstraction 30
Academicians 103 ff, 182
Academy of Plato
182
Act, f irs t and second 57,
177
Action,
immanent
and
transient
177
Active intellect 22, 30,
121
f,
— defined 171
Activum,
defined 177
Additiones
magnae
xviii
After-images
112
Agent intellect, see Active intel
lect
Analogy, see Being
Angel 56,
171,
186 f
— destructible 154
— finite 74 f
Appetite, natural
176
Athenians 136
Attribute, defined 167
— of being 167 f
Authority, interpretation of 184
Awake, certitude of being
111
ngf
Babylonians
149
Beatific vision
173,
188
Being, analogous concept of 17 f,
21 f, 171
— as common to God and
creatures
170
f
—
as knowledge
of
God 18, 170
—
as
noun and participle
166
—
as
possible
176
— coextensive attributes of 3,
167
Being, concept of 170
— correlative attributes of 9
Being,
deduction of attributes of
8f
— disjunctive attributes 3, 167
— first object of intellect 4
— not univocal to all predi
cates
4
— primacy of common predi
cation of 4, 167 f
— primary transcendental 2 ff
— properties of 167
— ultimate differences of 4,
166
f
— univocity of
4
f, 20 ff
— virtual primacy of 4, 167 f
Body, relation to soul 149 ff,
•53
«"
Categories, supreme genera 3,
166
f
Cause (s) 10
— accidentally ordered 40 f
— ascending and descending
order
174
f
— chance
as
48 f,
109
— circularity in 39
— contingent and necessary 54
— efficient 37 f, 49
— equivocal 175
— essentially ordered 40 ff
— exemplar 37 f
— final 47 f, 49
— incidental 40
— infinite regress in 39,
41
ff
— nature and w ill as 174
— univocal 175 f
Certitude 97 ff
— contingent propositions and
in
Certitude, disposed faculty
needed for
118,
120
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i94
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Certitude, doubt and 20
— experimental knowledge
and 109 ff
— firs t principles and 104 f,
106 ff
— logical relations and 108
— moral 188
— mutability of object and
n6f
—• of being awake 111, 119 f
— of personal actions 105,
i n
ff
— possibility of 96 ff
— presupposes truth
171
— sense knowledge and
105,
i i4f f
Change, implies contingent crea
tion 152
— requires something perma
nent 43
Colour, theory of 175
Common good 153
Concepts, certainty and doubt
implies distinct 20
— different versus diverse
166
— irreducibly simple
166
— real 166
Conjunction, of
planets
64
Contingent propositions, certi
tude of 111
— not inferred from necessary
ones 9, 104
Contingency, defined 55
— implies creation 152
— implies free wil l 54,
173
— mutability and
152
— not implied by necessity g,
104
— primary truth of fact 9
Contemplation of God 14, 32
Contradiction inconceivable 73
Creation,
defined 179
— demonstrable 67, 179
— of soul 150 ff
— temporal 175
De
anima,
Quaestiones xx
De Prima Principio, Tractatus xx f
Death,
obligation to accept 153
Demonstration, a priori and a
posteriori 169
— of fact and reasoned fact 169
— quia and propter quid 169
— requires necessary premises
39
— scholastic notion of
186
Dialectical proof 187
Differentiae ultimae 166 f
Disputatio in aula xv f
Divine intellect, not intuited
172
f,
184
— source of all intelligibility
125 f, 184
Dreams 118 ff
Emanation theory 178
End, see Finis
Ens rationis 171
Esse
intelligibile
184
Essence, limited by existence
74
f
Essential inclusion
172
Eternal, an existential attribute
123
— divine ideas in a qualified
sense are
123
Eternal rules, truth seen in
122
ff
Eucharist 6,
168
Evaluation, instinctive power of
19,
29
Evidence,
see
Certitude
Evil, compatible with God 77
Exemplar, created and uncreated
100
— knowledge requires un
created
102
— truth as conformity to 120
Existence, limitation of essence
— not known without essence
16
— per accidens
and jfwr se
187
Experience, and first principles
111
Factivum 177
Fallacy of asserting consequent
3i» 173
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS
95
False, unknowable 20,
171
Finality, primacy of 47 f
Finis,
agent acts for sake of 53
— God as ultimate 47 f
First intention 171
First principles, certainty of
106 ff, 112
Forma corporeitatis
167
Formalitatibus, Quaestio
de
xx
Fortune, an incidental cause
48
Free wi l l , a condition for change
80 f
— opposed to nature 174
God,
absolute perfections of 52 ff
— analogical knowledge of
17
ff
— analysis of concept of
14
ff
—
Anselmian
argument for 73
— as being 170
— as efficient cause 39 ff
— as final cause 47 f
— as most perfect 24 ff, 48 f,
93
f
— as uncreated light , see
Illumination
— being universally predicated
of
5,
19 ff
— demonstration of existence
of 36
ff
— goal of metaphysics 12
— indemonstrable attributes of
89 ff,
178,
188
— infinite power of 66ff,
178
— infinity of
62
ff
— intellect of 52
— knowledge identical with
essence of 58 f
— knows creatures perfectly
60
f
— knows possibles
184
— man's knowledge of 15 ff
— most perfect concept of 26 f,
77
— negative knowledge of 15,
169 f
God, not intuited 25 f,
3 1
172 f,
184
God, not self-evident 11
— not subject of metaphysics
10
ff
— omnipotence of
178
— omniscient 60 f
— pre-eminence of 48 f
— proper concepts of 25 ff
•— possibles distinctly known
by 60 f
— quidditative concept of
19
— relative perfections of 37 ff
— simplicity of 19
— subject of transcendental
predicates 2 f
— triple primacy of 38 ff
— unicity of 81 ff
— univocal knowledge of 5,
19 ff
— virtually all things 94
— voluntary object of know
ledge 26, 172 f
— will of 25, 52 ff
— wisdom of 25
Haecceitas
166
Happiness, end of man 135,
160 ff
— natural desire for 160
Illumination, divine 97 ff, 100 ff,
120
ff,
129
f,
171
— of agent intellect
171
Illusion
112,
119
Immateriality, defined 141
Imperfection, implies perfection
93 ,. .
In quid and in quale predication
165 f
Inclusion,
essential 172
Individual difference 166
Induction, principle of 109
f,
114
Infinity, defined 72
— intensive and extensive
178
— intrinsic mode of being 27,
75 •
— most proper notion 01 Ijoa
27 f, 171
— numerical
3 1
64, 68 f
— of causes 39 ff
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Infinity, potential 31
— unknowable 14
Intellect, abstractive power of 30
— agent, see Active intellect"
— as passive potency 185
— formally distinct from soul
171
— motivating factor of 22
— of man desires infin ite being
70 f
— possible or passive 171
— voluntary and natural
objects of
172
f
Intellectual knowledge, tran
scends all senses
139
ff
Intellectus agens, see Active
intel
lect
Intellectus possibilis 185
Intelligence, kinds of 183
Intelligences,
see
Angel, Separate
Substances
— emanation from first cause
178
— soul created by 150 f
Intelligible species 28,
118,
177
Intelligibles, primary 4
Intention, first and second 166,
J7 ' .
Interpretation of authority, prin
ciple of
184
Intuit ion,
denned 179
— of G od 25 f,
3 1
172 f, 184
— only o f what is or can he 74
Judgment, defined 112
Knowledge, certitude of, see
Certitude
— contingency of existential
111
— essential and existential 16
— incompatible with falsity 20,
'71
— possibility of 96 ff
— scientific 109 ff, 171
— strict (scieniia) 171
Law of disjunction 8
Ledum completa xvi, xviii
Ledum oxoniensis xviii
Light, uncreated, see Illumina
tion
Locus a minori 173
Logica Scoti xix
Logical writings of Scotus xx f
Love,
natural
176,
181
Man, end of lower creation
135
— highest happiness of 160 ff
Matter, incorruptible 185
Melaphysicam, Quaestiones in xx
Metaphysics, 1 ff
— as theology 15
— G od, the goal of 9 ff
— science of causes 12
— science of transcendentals 2
— subject of 9 ff
Moon,
intelligence of 171
Movement, infinite 36
Natural agent 187
Natural desire
152,
158
ff
— not in vain 30,
146
— theory of
188
Natural philosophy, subject of
1
o
— relation to metaphysics
10
Nature, absolute and in present
state 16
— opposed to will 174
Necessary reasons 186
Negation, knowledge of 15 f
New Year, Gallican custom x
Number, infinite 3 1 64, 68 f
— species like 51
Omnipotence 65 ff, 178 f
One,attribute of being 3
Opus oxoniense xvii
Opus parisiense
xv ii
Order, ascending and descending
174
f
Ordinatio xvii ff, xx
Parts, subjective and essential
185
Passiones 167
Per accidens and per se causes 40
Per se predication 167 f
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INDEX OF SUBJECTS
197
Perfection, pure and mixed 24,
93
f» 172
Permanent, condition for change
43.
Physics, see Natural philosophy
Possibles, have esse intelligibile
184
Posterior,
prior not virtually in
cluded in 23
Potency, contradictory 177
Potential, known
through
act
31
Pre-eminence, primacy of
48
f
Predication in quid and in quale
165 f
Predication per
se 167
f
Prima lectura xviii
Primacy, of common predication
167
— of efficient causality 39 f f
— of virtuality 167 f
Principles, certitude of 106 f f
Properties {propria), defined
167
Proprium (passio)
167
Pure spirit, see Separate sub
stances
Quando, as category 3
Quantity, infinite 77 f
Quiddity
165
Quodlibet xvi, xxii
Ratio
Anselmi
73
— intelligendi 69,
177
Rationes aeternae ('eternal reasons
or rules) 97 ff, 122 ff
Relation, unknown unless both
terms known
121
Reportatio xvii f
—
examinata
xiv, xix
— magna xix
—•
parisiensis xvii, xix
Resurrection 132 ff, 137
Sceptic, see Academician
Scepticism
103
ff
Science (scientia), defined
171
— presupposes existence of sub
ject
10
Scotistic Commission xxi
Self-evident (per se notum), see
Principles
Senses, error of
1 0 1
105, 109,
114
f
Sensibles, not in continual flux
i i 5 f
Sentences, Commentary on xiv,
xvi ff
Separate substances
186
f
— intelligible 30 f
Simple intellect 7,
168
f
— intelligence
1 2 1 168
f
Simpliciter simplex 166
Singularity 32 f, 91
Soul 133 ff
— Averroistic theory of 138,
156
— defined
137
— has per se existence 153 f
— immortality of
145
f f
— origin of 150 f
— specific form of man 137 ff
— spirituality of
133
f f
Specific difference
167
Spirits, see Separate substances
Subject, prior to attributes 168
Subjective parts 185
Substance, not known directly 5 f
Syllogism, the perfect
183
Theology, subject of
169
Theoremata xxi
Transcendentals 2 ff
— coextensive attributes 3
— defined 3
— disjunctive attributes 3
Triangle, symbol of Trini ty
185
Trinity 23, 185
Tru e, attribute of being 3
Truth, as conformity to exemplar
99
ff
— certain and unadulterated
120
— knowledge of 96 ff
— senses an
occasion,
not cause
of 108 f
Ultimate differences (differentiae
ultimae) 166 f
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Unicity of God 82 ff
Univocal concept, defined
20
Univocity
of
being, see
Being
Vesperies xiv, xvi
Virtual inclusion 172
Virtual primacy, of being 167 f
Vis
aestimativa 19,29
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Volition
144
f
Will ,
as nature
181
— basis of contingency 54 f
— infinite good as object of
71
— more noble than intellect
183
Wisdom, principle of order 53
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