COIN and Afghanistan

Post on 20-Jan-2016

33 views 0 download

Tags:

description

COIN and Afghanistan. Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 6, 2011. JCS options (13-15 Sept). (a) cruise missile attacks; (b) longer bombing campaign; (c) large-scale invasion CIA Plan: money, SOF + airpower. US demands. Hand over leaders of al-Qaeda Close all terrorist camps - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of COIN and Afghanistan

COIN and Afghanistan

Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 6, 2011

JCS options (13-15 Sept)

(a) cruise missile attacks;

(b) longer bombing campaign;

(c) large-scale invasion

CIA Plan: money, SOF + airpower

US demands

1. Hand over leaders of al-Qaeda

2. Close all terrorist camps

3. Give US full access to verify closure

4. Release all foreign nationals held captive

5. Protect foreigners (including aid workers)

President Bush statement to Joint Session of Congress, 20 September 2011

Balance of forces

Coalition Enemy

SOF 300-500 Al Qaeda 2-3,000

Western troops 3-5,000

Taliban 60,000

Northern Alliance 15,000

Operation Enduring Freedom

1.Coalition air offensive (7-19 Oct 2001).

2.US/UK special forces supported Northern Alliance offensive in northern Afghanistan (late Oct – Nov 2001).

3.US/UK-led land offensive in southern Afghanistan (Dec 2001 – July 2002).

Campaign milestones

Mazar-e-Sharif (10 Nov)

Kabul (13 Nov)

Konduz (26 Nov)

Kandahar (6 Dec)

Tora Bora (17 Dec)

Paktia (March, May)

Political development

UN Bonn Conference, Dec 2001

Transitional Authority up to mid 2002

Loya Jirga elects Hamid Karzai as President, June 2002

Presidential elections, 2004 and 2009

Parliamentary elections, 2005 and 2010

Campaign incoherence

Operational Progress

1. Protect the population

2. ANSF development

3. Growth of sub-national governance

4. Military momentum

CIVCAS (2009-Oct 2010)

Total ISAF/ANSF

Non-adjusted Stable Down 20%

Adjusted Reduced Down 50%

ANSF numbers

Target: Oct 2010

Actual: 24 Sept 2010

ANA 134,000 139,000

ANP 109,000 122,000

Not perfect but popular

The best counterinsurgents?

Goverment-in-a-box?

Sub-national governance

80+ KTD

District Delivery Prog: 14 of 80 by Sept 2010

NSP + ASOP producing results

Evidence of progress

Obama’s War

Main effort: the South

March 2009 Feb 2010

RC-N 5,080 7,500

RC-W 2,940 5,500

RC-C 5,740 5,000

RC-E 25,570 26,500

RC-S 22,330 54,500

Op MOSHTARAK

Strategic obstacles

1. Government corruption

2. NATO war-weariness

3. Insurgent safe havens in Pakistan

Fall in public support (%)

Country 2009 2010

United States

55 40

United Kingdom

42 37

Germany 37 30

France 32 30

The Transition Strategy

Most likely scenario

“Continued operational progress is most unlikely to produce desired strategic outcomes.”

Relearning the principles of COIN

1. Political-led campaign

2. Population = COG

3. Isolate the insurgent

4. Operate within the law

5. Minimum use of force