Post on 21-Dec-2015
Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture
Institutional Responses to the Kyoto Protocol in Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States
Collaboration
Linda M. Young – Montana StateAlfons Weersink – University of GuelphMurray Fulton – U of SaskatchewanB. James Deaton – University of Guelph
Institutional response
Why economic institutions emerged the way they did…
One question: the EU has a carbon market but does not support carbon sequestration in agriculture, while US lacks a viable carbon market but has limited support for carbon sequestration in agriculture
Event Australia Canada EU US
LULUFC
KP
Policies
Possible Explanations Include:
1. Carbon sequestration opportunities
- perfect information?
2. Interest Group Pressure: Industry, Agricultural, Environmental
3. Institutional Inertia
Inclusion of Sinks- LULUCF
Hotly debated: whether or not to include sinks in the KP Rate of sequestration one problem Another with potential release
Fear: granting credits not achieving real reductions
EU: emissions reductions – not sequestration Baselines: in calculation of baselines?
Not in all countries inventories Credits but not in baselines also problematic
EU: advocate for “real” reductions
Environmental groups strongClimate Action Network “continues to have
fundamental concerns about the use of sinks under the KP…” and want a variety of guarantees, about biodiversity, no monoculture, social assessments and etc.
Agricultural interests not advocatesEventual compromise – internal
disagreement
US, Canada and Australia all favored sinks
US: undaunted by concerns about measuring and monitoring; unbalanced to ignore activities that remove carbon; comprehensive accounting to protect existing reservoirsCould account for ½ US reduction
commitments!
Australia’s position contradictory
Favored the inclusion of sinksBut actually, a net emitter in the land
change categoryRate of land clearing 40%> revegetationForestry provided an emission offset of 5%
national emissionsComparative advantage not the only
factor here
KP - put off the issue
In 2001 Marrakesh Accords – guidelines for LULUFC
Parties can receive credit for carbon sequestered through revegetation and cropland management in excess of 1990 levels.
If land use included in their inventory, must account for both emission and sink activity during the commitment period
Negotiation of KP
Conducted with a belief that they might be boundAustralian government never supportive
Use of sinks: reductions at least cost Information may not have been perfect
Industry groups – support as least costAgriculture – support as service provider
Ratification of the KP
EU and Canada have ratified itClinton administration negotiated
Bush won’t ratify Voluntary limits
Australia: never supportive; not ratified
EU Carbon Market
Began operation in 2005Limits emissions from 12,000 plants in
six industriesCan trade with other EU firms Linked to CDM and Joint Implementation
Restrict use of imported creditsWill not trade LULUFC activities
Canada
GOC consultations domestic trading scheme – operational 2006
LFEs have emission targetsCan purchase offsetsAlso (unlike EU) from carbon sinks ag and
forestryGOC limited the price of carbon credits –
CA$15/t
United States
Some companies have purchased credits
Idaho exampleChicago Climate Exchange
Industry/municipal members↓emissionsLimited trades Iowa Farm Bureau
Australia
No domestic trading programReviewing new federal program to
replace uncoordinated state programsNSW Electricity Benchmark SchemeSydney Futures Exchange
Registries/Inventories
Discussed in the paperImportant to establish baselines, for
reductions to count against however,A morass of details –
Effectiveness determined by how well they meeting international standards US case – credit towards future limits
Why Governments Might Support Carbon Sequestration
Achieve commitments at least costFavored by industry and agricultural
interest groupsEnvironmental groups – US , EUSupport producer income
Achieve other environmental goals
Perhaps not least cost for EU & CA
KP: rules, protocols still being devisedEU: busy with new institutions
NAPS, connection of JI and CDMAg seq. – lots of additional infrastructure
Canada: same, but more thought into role of agricultural sequestration
Have to meet unfinished int. standards
US Carbon Sequestration Programs
While KP rejected, agricultural sequestration not completely
Embraced on a low levelEQUIP and CRPMultitude of bills in CongressNot developing/meeting international
standards
EU
No market demandCAP also limited demandTreaty of Amsterdam
CAP 2000Still little in way of sequestration activities
Comparative Advantage and Stance
New studies revise estimates
First hypotheses – EU lacked comparative advantage
Canada
Environmental objectives not income support policy
GHG Mitigation program – cut emissionsIdentify and encourage sequestrationDevelopment of computer simulation
models
Australia
Only sequestration through treesLittle potential for sequestration through
crops – and salinity more pressing
Event Australia Canada EU US
LULUFC INFORMATION;
MAYBE INDUSTRY PRESSURE
CS OPPORTUNITY;
INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE
INFORMATION;
INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE;
LEADERSHIP
CS OPPORTUNITY;
INTEREST GROUP PRESSURE
KP INDUSTRY PRESSURE
INTERST GROUP AND SOCIETAL VALUES
INTERST GROUP AND SOCIETAL VALUES
LEADERSHIP
INDUSTRY PRESSURE
Policies INSTITUTIONS; ENV PROBLEMS;
INST HISTORY;
INTEREST GROUPS
INSTITUTIONS;
INTEREST GROUPS