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OCTOBER 959
U S ARMY AVIATION SCHOOL MUS
FORT RUCKER ALABAMA ~ '
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tfHJteJ tattu AIJ,M/fI
VI TION
EDITORI L ST FF
C PT JO SEPH H POOLE
F R E D M MON TG O M ER Y
D IANA G WILL IAMS
RTICLES
ARMY AVIATION PHILOSOPHY
Brig Gen Ernest F. E a terbrook USA
GO FO R BROKE
Dr . Thoma F. St a ton
PLAN CHARLIE
Capt arl H. Saw ls, J r ., Inf .
HURRY SEND A CHOPPER Cap t Curt is O. Gr eer , Jr. , MS
LOW AND SLOW IN THE BIRD DOG
Capt Ernest Bruce, Inf.
THE AVIATION ME CHANI
Griffin W illiam s
FROSTY MAN , FROSTY .
FR OM THE HORSE 'S MOUTH
DEP RTMENTS
PUZZLE R
MEMO FR OM FLIGHT SURGEON
CRASH SEN SE .
O CTOBER 959
V OLUM E 5
NUMBER 10
1
4
10
13
16
22
24
27
9
19
31
u . ARMY AVIATIO CHOOL
Brig Gen Ernest F . Easterbroo
Commandant
Col Delk M. OdenAssistan t Commandant
CHOOL STAFF
Col Robert H. Schulzi ctm of Instruction
Col Edward N. Dahlstrom
S ecre tary
Lt Col James L. Townsend
CO, USAAVNS Regim ent
Lt Col John W. OswaltCombat Deve lopment Offic
DEPARTMENTS
Lt Col Ritchie GarrisonTactics
Lt Col Raymond E. J ohnsonRota ry W ing
Lt Col Harry J. Kern
Ma in tenance
Lt Col J ames B. Gregorie, JrAdvanc ed F ixed W ing
Lt Col Thomas J . Sabiston
Publications andN on Resident Instruction
Lt Col G. W ilford Jaubert
Primary Fixed W ing
The U. S. ARMY AVIATIO DIGE TUl official publication of the Departmentthe Army published month ly unue r tisupervision of the Commanuant, U. S. Ar mAy iation chool.
The mission of the U. S. ARMY AVITION DIGES' ' is to provide info r mationan operational or fUl1ctiollal na ture COllceing safety and airc raft accident pr even tiotraining, maintenance, operations, researand development, aviation medicine aother related data.
Manuscripts, photographs, and other illutrations pe r taining to the above sub jectsinte rest to per onne l conce rn ed with Ar mAviation are invited. Di rect communicatio
is autho r ized to: Editor-in -Chief U.AltMY A VlATION DlGE 1 , U. . Ar mAviation choo . Fo r t Rucker. Alabama.
-nle s otherwi e in d icated , mate ri althe . . ARMY AV I AT IO DIGE ST mue re p r inted pr o vid ed cr edit is given to tU. . ARMY AVIA TI O N DlGE 1 andthe author .
The printing of th is publitation has beapproved by the Di r ector of the Bu r eauthe Budget, 22 De cember 1958.
Views expre sed in t h is magaz lIl e a r e Dnece sarily those of t he Department of tArmy or of t he U. S. Arm y Aviation SchoUnless specified othe r wise, all photog r apare U. . Army .
Dist r ibution:
To be distribu ted in acco r dance wirequirements stated in DA Form ] 2.
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OCTOBER 1959
prepared landing areas whichWILL be found in combat zones,both day and night, under vary
ing weather conditions. This
imposes critical training problems. As in any other activity
in the Army, aviators mustpractice in peacetime to accomplish expected missions in war
time. For aviation, this practice
is concerned primarily with tac
tical, short field operations.Aviators recognize that this
type of practice, under adverse
weather and terrain conditions,is considerably more conduciveto accidents than fiying to and
from long, hard-surfaced run
ways under the surveillance of
air traffic controllers.
GOAL ZERO
By no stretch of the imagina
tion should the type of operations of Army Aviation and
resulting accidents be taken to
imply complacency Nothing
can be further from the truth.
The goal of Army Aviation is
always to reduce accidents to
zero. Unfortunately, the onlyway to guarantee this is to
ground all Army aircraft. Obviously, we cannot afford to go
to this extreme. Almost as bad
would be restriction of fiyingto airline type operations. Whilethis would allow aircraft to operate, it would not train Army
Aviators to accomplish combat
missions. The way to reduceaccidents in the Army and retain ability to accomplish com
bat missions clearly calls forUNDERSTANDING, CLOSE
SUPERVISION, and STRONGLEADERSHIP.
During fiscal year 1958, accidents involving Army aircraft
used up more than 4 percent
of the dollar loss due to all accidents in the Army. The costof Army aircraft accidents wasin excess of 9,500,000, as op-
posed, for example, to a fire lossof approximately 5,000,000.These are startling figures andaviation personnel must worktogether to reduce them.
USABAAR
One agency involved exclusively in aviation accidentreseach is the United States
Army Board for Aviation Accident Research, short title:
USABAAR. Located at Fort
Rucker, USABAAR's mission,as defined in AR 15-76, is to
conduct research of aviation accident experience, particularly
Army experience, to determine
personnel or materiel deficiencies in Army A via ion whichresult in noncombat loss. Basedon analysis of this research, the
Director of USABAAR is required to recommend to the
Director of Army Aviation appropriate action to enhance the
durability, reliability, and efficiency of Army Aviation. The
activities of USABAAR do not
confiict with those of safety directors at any given echelon of
command. The Army SafetyProgram and USABAAR share
common objectives. They are
both aimed toward reducing
aviation accidents to zero, whileallowing the safe, yet aggres
sive, conduct of aviation fiyingtraining.
PROBLEM AREAS
To oversimplify, there are
two general problem areas in
aviation accident prevention:people problems and hardware
problems. Generally, peopleproblems can be divided intoabout three groups. The firstgroup includes operators (aviators and other crew members) ;the second group includes technical specialists (crew chief,mechanics, aircraft parts personnel, tower opera ors, crash
res cue personnel and many
others); the final group are
those who use and ride Army
aircraft, the passengers.
HUM N RROR
Human error is one of the
major cause factors involved inaircraft accidents. However, weare gilding the lily and accomplishing negative results when
we label accidents as caused by
pilot error. The term pilot error has no benefit as a sourcof material for preventing similar accidents in the future. Fre
quently, it places a detrimenta
stigma on Army Aviators
reduces the effectiveness oftviation program. In the peo
ple aspect of aircraft accidentswe must bend every effort to
attempt an understanding o
why the pilot had an accidentand what situation he had to
cope with at that particula
time, under those particular circumstances. When this analYSiSis made judiciously and withou
prejudice, we are well on th
way to accomplishing a definituseful purpose.
The finding of pilot error ian accident report without fur
ther information is prima facievidence that a full investigation has not been conductedFurther, accident report findings of unexplained pilot erro
are grossly misleading to commanders in the field by implieindications that punitive or disciplinary actions against pilotare called for. This trend, i
allowed to continue, will certainly destroy the initiative an
desire of the individual pilot tpractice fiying in tactical situa
tions.
TECHNICI NS
The second group of peoplproblems, the technical speciaists, presents another broa
area in which all aviation pe
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sO'nnel can wO'rk tO'gether fO'rthe cO'mmO'n gO'O'd. t dO'es nO'ttake an aircraft maintenance
expert to' IO O k at the mainte
nance activity O'f any airfieldand determine whether O'r nO't
certain cO'mmO'n basic preceptsO'f gO'O'd management, gO'O'd supervisiO'n, and jO'b understand
ing are being fO'llO'wed. AIthO'ugh the skills invO'lved are
a little mO're cO'mplicated than
thO'se fO'und in vehicle mainte
nance, the basic philO'SO'phy inmaintenance is the same. A mechanic whO' is alert, dressed
neatly, keeps a clean tO O I bO'x,
uses his references while per-
O'rming maintenance, and appears to' knO'w his jO'b is a prime
indicatO'r O'f gO'O'd aircraft main
tenance in a particular unit.The same general thinking
fO'IIO'WS in the aircraft parts
supply setup in any aircraft
maintenance O'rg-anizatiO'n. The
knowledge, ability, and attitude
O'f the aircraft maintenance O'f-
ficer and his assistants are alsO'indicative O'f gO'O'd maintenance.
A well O'rganized airfield cO'n-
trO'I tO'wer, withO'ut pandemO'nium, clean, and efficiently laidO'ut, indicates thO'se peO'ple whO'
cO'ntrO'I terminal and en rO'uteflying activities prO'bably knO'wtheir jO'bs.
These indicatO'rs, which incertain circumstances need fur
ther investigatiO'n, O'n the sur
face will give a very definiteindicatiO'n O'f the efficiency O f
status O'f training in variO'usareas. We needn t wait fO'r an
accident to' O'ccur to' IO O k arO'undand see if the O'peratiO'n appears
to' be a gO'O'd O'ne under bO'thrO'utine and exceptiO'nal circum
stances.
P SSENGERS
The final grO'up O'f peO'pleprO'blems includes the passen
gers. Here again, aviatiO'n per
sO'nnel can wO'rk to gether: in
such matters O'f checkingwhether O'r nO't the passengers
are wearing shO'ulder harnesses,
are familiar with cO'mmO'n sensesafety precautiO'ns fO'r walking
in the vicinity O'f aircraft, knO'w
hO'W to get intO' and O'ut O'f aircraft, and whether pilO'ts and
passengers jO'intly understand
individual activities in event O f
inflight emergencies. These are
just a few O'f the areas in whichall can wO'rk.
H RDW RE PROBLEMS
Hardware prO'blems are prO'b-ably a little mO're exacting fO'r
technicians and O'peratO'rs. This
is a critical area because, unlike
O'ther Army vehicles, aircraft
O'perate in three dimensiO'ns.When a materiel failure O'ccursin flight, we almO'st always have
sO'me damage to' aircraft, O CCU-
pants, O'r bO'th.There is an O'ld rule in the
aircraft business called Mur
phy s Law. Murphy says that
if an aircraft part can PO'ssiblybe installed incO'rrectly, sO'O'nerO'r later sO'mebO'dy will install
it that way. This has beentranslated intO' a philO'SO'phyin Army aircraft cO'nstructiO'nwhich is called the gO' right O r
nO gO''' criteria. This means that
aircraft hardware must be designed SO that it can be installed
in O'nly O'ne way-the cO'rrectway.
ST TISTICS
TO' the uninfO'rmed, aircraft
accident rates and statistics can
be, and O'ften are, very misleading. One O'f the better examplesO'f this can be fO'und in a cO'm-parisO'n O'f twO' accidents. Alarge cargO' type helicO'ptercrashes to' total destructiO'n,killing six peO'ple. The CO'st
O'f this accident, in hardware
alO'ne, can be well O'ver 1,000,-000. Statistically, this WO'uld
be O'ne accident. AlmO'st daily,
ARMY AVIATION PHILOSOPHY
there are repO'rts O f bent propellers and spread landing gear
caused by yO'ung pilO'ts trying
to' learn their trade in cO'nfO'rm-ance with the tactical flyingmissiO'n. These accidents may
cause a dO'llar CO'st O'f anywherefrO'm 50 to' 250. This demO'n-strates the tremendO'us spread
which is nO't shO'wn thrO'ugh accident rates and statistics: O'ne
accident fO'r a cost O'f O'ver amilliO'n dO'llars in hardware;
anO'ther, same statistic, 50.We, in the aviatiO'n field O'f
the Army, are nO't unaware O'f
the tremendO'us CO'st O'f aircraft
accidents, bO'th frO'm hardware
andpersO'nnel
casualtyIO'ss.
Our
training prO'grams, at the U S.Army AviatiO'n SchO'O'I and in
O'ur variO'us units, cO'nsider aviatiO'n accident preventiO'n to' be
a primary subject fO'r cO'ntinual cO'nsideratiO'n, discussiO'nand implementatiO'n. On the
O'ther hand, we are faced with
a requirement to' train yO'ungaviatO'rs, with limited experi
ence, in the O'peratiO'n O'f air
craft under tactical cO'nditions,
day and night, O'ut O'f shO'rt, unimprO'ved landing areas.
Basically, aviatiO'n accident
preventiO'n is a management
prO'blem. t is incumbent O'n allO'f us, wO'rking jO'intly, to' givecareful, sympathetic and under
standing cO'nsideratiO'n to' the
peculiar prO'blems O'f aviatiO'naccident preventiO'n, and to the
cO'mmO'n prO'blem O'f Army safe
ty. Weare all O'n the same team.
By wO'rking tO'gether, we canfurther the cO'mbat effectiveness O'f the Army which we allserve.
Brigadier General Ernest F.
Easterbrook s Commanding Gen-
eral of the U S. rmy Aviation
Center and Commandant of the
U S. rmy viation School Fort
Rucker Ala.
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GO FOR
ROKEDr homas F Staton
Educational Adviser
Air University
THERE ARE THREE quirks
of human nature that make
the job of education for flyingsafety difficult. These quirks
cause a large portion of flyingaccidents. To be effective, any
program of flying safety musttake these quirks into consid-eration. t must direct its ef-forts toward counterbalancingtheir suicidal tendencies, ratherthan merely putting out ade-quate information on principlesand procedures.
The first of these suicidalquirks of human nature is :Men tend to be prouder of their
willingness to take a chance, to
go for broke, than of theircaution, conservatism and care-fulness.
During my early days as Ed-ucational Adviser with AirUniversity I got around. For
two or three years I did not
keep a room on a permanent
basis at all. A closet off my
office held my clothes. VOQ'sat different bases were my
home. My laundry was scat-
tered from Tyndall to Ran-dolph, from Maxwell to Wright-
Pat. I picked it up and left more
as I made my periodic visits todo any educational advising
that was wanted.
This was during the time im-mediately after WW II when
pilots were pouring back fromoverseas, hot from combat, and,often, impatiently waiting to
return to civilian life. Any
spare man with wings who hap-
pened to be around a base was
my pilot on a flight to my next
destination.I had some interesting ex-
periences on some of the severalhundred flights I made under
those circumstances. I remem-
ber these three.
The time we aborted three
times with the same A-26 for
mechanical failures. The last
abort was due to an electricalfire that broke out an instant
after we became airborne. Wetriumphantly made our flight
This article is repr inted from
F LYING S FETY magazine.
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on the fourth trial, all in the
same morning.
Another was the time all flyable planes were evacuated ona hurricane warning exceptone, in which a volunteer pilot
slipped me out the next morning, dodging the storm. Thisenabled me to give two lecturesat different bases the same day.
And then that Sunday morning the pilot showed up weakand shaky from what I judged
to have been a hard Saturday
night. (The flight was longenough for him to be in pretty
good shape by the time he
muld have to land that A-26, I,gured.)
I am bound to have had other
types of experiences, too; timeswhen I said, "Uh Uh. I'm not
going up in THAT weather "
Times I decided to stay overuntil the next day when Ilearned that i I flew today my
pilot would be making his firstflight in a C-45. But those experiences are vague, fuzzy. Ican't remember the ones where
I played it cautious nearly as
vividly as the ones where I
took the devil-may-care atti
tude, "If you think you can flyit, I know I can ride it with
you "
You can confirm the universality of this quirk by ex
amining your own pattern ofthinking and feeling. When abunch of pilots are shooting the
bull, how often do you regalethe group with stories of the
times you cancelled a flight because of weather. Then, about
the number of times you tellabout flying 'er in when evensparrows were walking?
There is a tendency to glorifythe cowboy more than the store
clerk, the fullback more than
the Phi Beta Kappa, and the
man on the flying trapeze morethan the man who wrote the
music for his act. These are allexamples of this same human
tendency to romanticize the
risk-taker more than the man
who figures ways to avoid the
risk.
In their hearts, men feelsome pride in being so sure of
their ability or so casual about
death that they will play Rus-
The long range result o carelessness is tragedy
O FOR BROKE
sian Roulette with a plane whenthey really want to get somewhere. Impelled by a sense of
duty, a love of life and a regard
for their families they will, onoccasion, let discretion have the
better part of valor. But they
do not remember those occasions with the affection they
reserve for the times they
brought 'er in, with a 100-footceiling, 1/ 16 mile visibility and
no GCA
The consequence: Cautionand carefulness have to compete against a subconscioustendency to regard them as aform of timidity unworthy of
a military man.
Suicidal quirk number two is:
Men tend to use their powersof logic and reasoning to findjustification for the things they
want to do rather than to determine what is best to do. Asa pilot struggles to resolve the
conflict between a knowledgeof what is the safest thing todo and what he is inclined to do,he may undertake to think the
problem through to a best solu
tion. But because of quirk number two, his thinking is not somuch to determine which is the
most sensible thing to do (healready knows that) but to figure out a way of making what
he wants to do, seem sensible.
Tomorrow is Jimmy's birth
day. My job keeps me away
from him too much anyway.I'm a pretty poor father if Iwon't fly when I'm a little tired
to get to his party.""We've got to trust our
NCOs if we expect them to assume responsibility. If I trustmy crew chief so little that Ihave to check the plane myself,I'd better get a new crew chief.
Both these instances displayr r a t ion a self-justifications,
but man in the aggregate can
be called a rational creature on-
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OCTOBER 1959
ly by the most generous inter
pretations of rational. Any
psychologist will confirm this
fact. Basically, man is a creature of emotions, feelings, impulses and unrecognized urges,all kept under precarious control by a flimsy bridle of intelligence, rationality and logic, and
the painful whip of authority
and social pressure.
Education which goes nodeeper than his intellect willassuredly guide him and influence his behavior in matters on
which he has no especial feelingone way or the other. But when
man's basic nature, his funda
mental urges and strong de
sires, pull him toward one
time when any form of theftinvolving more than a few pennies was a gallows offense inEngland, pickpockets industri
ously plied their trade among
the crowds which gathered to
watch theexecution
ofthieves.They would risk their lives for
a few pennies because they figured they were so clever they
would not be caught. Silly?How about the motorist who
cuts sharply in front of an oncoming car to save waiting ten
seconds to make a left turn?
How about the pilot who didn't
bother to pick up a bailout bottle because he didn't intend to
fly above 30,000 feet? In all
honesty, he is highly unlikely
egular flying c n minimize accidents
decision and his education inclines him toward another, alltoo frequently he will go withhis feelings. He will tend to gowith his natural inclinationsunless his education has gonedeeper than intellectual aware
ness of what is right and
wrong, and produced in him a
profound emotional loyalty tothe facts and principles he
learned. This is one of the jobs
of flying safety education.The third widow-producing
quirk in human nature is the
fact that: Men will risk lossesout of all proportion to possiblegains if they feel that through
their skill and luck they can
probably avoid the loss. At a
6
to need it, but if he is not afraid
of appearing old-womanish or
if he doesn't talk himself into
believing that precautions are
not really necessary, a few seconds' effort may save his life.
Then there is the pilot whoknows his landing approach isa little off, but figures he can
make it without going aroundagain. A few minutes of flyingtime is saved if he succeeds. fhe fails-scratch one pilot. Nogambler would buck odds likethat when he could so easilymake them more favorable tohim, but people do with their
lives.My observation and study
convinces me that the Air Force
Flying Safety Program leaveslittle to be desired in the accuracy and completeness of its
information and guidance. Its
methods of disseminating information and publicizing safety
procedures also impress meas being about all that could beasked for.
And yet accidents resultingfrom violations of principles of
flying safety o happen.
Why?
In light of the extensiveness,intensity and thoroughness of
the Air Force's educational pro
gram, I do not believe for oneminute that half of the violations of flying safety are due tl
ignorance. My study has ledme to the conclusion that the
majority of accidents due topilot error are caused by pilotsfailing to do what they knowthey ought to do, not by their
ignorance of what they ought
to do.
Is there a commander any
where who has not asked him
self despairingly, upon reading
the report of investigation on
one of his men killed throughviolation of flying safety measures, WHY did he do it? He
KNEW better. Why? Why?
WHY?
If they know better and stilldo it, why, indeed? The answer: Human nature·s three
suicidal quirks. He knew bet
ter, but he'd rather take achance than r i s k seemingchicken. He knew better, but
he talked himself into doing itthat way because he WANTED
to o it that way. He knew bet
ter but he thought he would be
able to get by and wouldn't
take the trouble to o it right.
Any program of flying safety
education that is to be effectivemust be designed in light of
those three quirks in the nature
of man. Just educating people
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as to what is the safe, the proper, thing to do is futile if the
education does not reach downinto the emotional structure of
the person. It must create asafety prejudice so strong
and so ingrained in his naturethat it outweighs the three
combined quirks which are nature's prime fool-killers.
Here is a psychologist s proposal for deepening flyingsafety education below the intellectual level. It's a proposalfor creating an emotionalizedattachment to the principlesand procedures of flying safety
. Lstead of mere mental aware-
ess of them.Commanders: Make it obvi
ous to your pilots that flyingsafety is one of your pet hobbies. There are officers whowill knock themselves out try
ing to read every nuance of the
Old Man s mind in preparing amemo for him. They will go to
any extreme to avoid givinghim reason to criticize or repri
mand them. Yet, they'll sometimes disregard flying safety
measures as if their lives wereof the lightest importance tothem.
If pilots know their com-nander is red hot on the
subject of flying safety they
become more safety-conscious.For instance, the Old Man posts
a pilot roster-flying time calendar on the bulletin board, and
has every pilot s distribution of
flying time each month regular
ly recorded thereon. He conspicuously stops every day tocheck the pattern of flying time
of his pilots. This will prac
tically eliminate the end-of-themonth, do-or-die-no-matter
what rush to get in minimums.If flying systematically and
regularly is important enoughto the Old Man for him to go to
that trouble to keep up with it,
it will seem important to his
pilots. If he makes it obviousby his own example and his
conversation that he observesevery feature of flying safety,
his pilots will be less self-con
scious and more conscientiousabout taking those precautions.
f he occasionally talks approvingly about someone get
ting reamed out for a violationof flying safety it will sometimes do more to deter a YOURg
hot-shot pilot from the carelessness of youth than the possibility of death would.
Commanders are respectedIf they demonstrate respect for
flying safety, the men who respect them will acquire a deeper and more powerful respect
for flying safety.
Commanders, Operations Officers, Inspectors - everyonehaving anything to do with the
subject: Make adherence to
principles and procedures of flying safety an end in itself.
There is a fine point of psychology involved here. Let's say
that flying safety is taught only as a means of avoiding accidents. A pilot violates a flyingsafety procedure and suffers noill effects from it. So, the wholeprogram of flying safety becomes a little less important inthe conscious or subconsciousmind of that pilot. When weflout a law and get away with
it, we respect that law a little
less in the future.
Therefore, I suggest as tightcontrol measures as are practicable to apprehend any violations of flying safety. A pilotclimbing into his plane without
making the prescribed external
check-a violation of specifiedprocedures in bringing a plane
down, where unusual pilot skillprevented trouble this time
- carelessness in making a
GO FOR BROKE
weather check, even though
nothing ill came of it . . . if
such things are done enoughtimes, accidents will result.Therefore, doing any of them
one time should be cause for
swift, positive, punitive action.This is not a new idea. Any
one knows that unshined shoesand being out of uniform donot necessarily inj ure the accuracy with which an air crew
puts bombs on the target. But,the long-range, cumulative effect of slack uniform disciplinebecomes inj urious. Therefore,
uniform discipline is empha ...sized as an end in itself, because
it isimportant,
eventhough
itsimportance is hard to pin to aspecific result.
The long-range result of violations of flying safety proVISIons are inevi able andterrible. But the results are
so long-range that they are, by
themselves, insufficient deter
rents. Give flying safety the
prestige accorded proper wearing of the uniform. Punish
violations because they are vio
lations, irrespective of whetheror not any ill results could bepinned to the specific violation.
Commanders: Educate wivesin how they can help their hus
bands live longer. A fine balance has to be maintained here.Wives need to be educated in
how they can contribute to their
husbands' safety in flying. But,
they should not be put into the
position of helping their hus
bands decide how to do theirjobs.
Much of their education necessarily has to do with how to
make their husbands' flyingeasier on them. So, care has to
be taken to insure that they donot get the idea that the wholeprogram of wife education is apropaganda campaign aimed at
making life easier and happier
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play it safe and how important
it is to do so. Cultivate in the
minds of those younger flyersthe idea that old hands willmeasure their flying sense and
ability as much by their conscientiousness in observing all
rules and procedures of flyingsafety as by anything else.
All flyers: Use your intelligence and knowledge of what
you ought to do to consciouslyoffset the effect of the three
suicidal quirks in human na
ture. When your feelings tellyou, Don't be a worry wart.
Are ya' an old woman or apilot ? Ask your mind, Dis-
egarding that name - calling,
{hat is the sensible thing todo?
When you have an inclination to do something that is not
exactly according to the rules,
consciously try to think of allthe reasons you shouldn't do it
instead of kidding yourself into thinking it is really sensible.Then honestly weigh each side
you ARE THE PILOT of an
L-20 on an administrative
flight into Atlanta MunicipalAirport from Fort Rucker. Upon landing, the right brake
fails and the aircraft ground
loops, causing damage to the
landing gear, propeller, and
right wingtip. No injuries are
sustained.
Indicate by a V which of the
following actions you would select to be most appropriate.
As the pilot in charge your
responsibilities are:
Close flight plan and notify
Flight Service or FAA immediately and give them details.
of the issue. When it is a ques
tion of saving a little time or
effort balanced against the possibility of losing your life, ask
yourself if i t makes sense to gointo the situation without doing all you can to better the
odds in your favor.
In the last analysis, every
thing else in this article is onlya gimmick to get you, each individual flyer, to personally
accept the principles and pro
cedures of flying safety in your
life. You won't become a safer
flyer just because the Old Man
watches the flying roster; because you are punished for flying safety violations; because
your wife is safety-conscious orbecause other flyers idealizeflying safety.
You will become a safer flyer only by permitting your
attitudes and practices to be
changed by the things they do.If you consciously try to,change
yourself into a safer flyer youwill have a lot better chance of
Close flight plan. Notify
Fort Rucker base operations
by the most expeditious
means and give them details
for preliminary report.
D Call accident investigation
board at nearest military installation and ask them to
investigate the accident sothe aircraft may be moved.Arrange for repair of the
aircraft.
D Coordinate with airport officials regarding dispositionof the wreckage. f at allpossible, leave it as it
stopped until investigating
officials arrive.
D Get names of witnesses and
O FOR BROKE
being around to watch your
kids grow up.
There is no such thing as flying without risk. t is just amatter of how little danger with
which it can be done. (Ed. note:
For that matter, statistics showthat more people die in bed than
anyplace else.) When you take
off, your life is in your hands,
not the hands of flying safety
officers. It depends on you. And
the same is true of flying safe
ty education; you are in command of your own education.
You can't be educated as a re
sult of what someone else does,but only as a result of what
YOU do.
Safety makes sense. Risk
makes widows. I t is as simpleas that. f you take a chance
and get by, no one has gained
much. f you take the chance
and DON'T get by, your wife
loses, your children lose, the
country loses. Come to think of
it, you lose, too.
move the aircraft as soonas possible.
Arrange for guards,or other
wise safeguard the aircraft.
D Refuse to let photographs be
taken until proper authority
is obtained.
D Do not refuse to let photosbe made unless classified ma
terial is involved, but with
hold your consent and try todelay photographers un t l
permission is obtained from
PIO or other proper author
ity.
The recommended solution to
the PUZZLER may be found
on page 21.
9
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HE CAR DOOR made a loudnoise as it slammed shut.
Hogan and I thanked the dr iver, then walked toward my car
as he was driving away.
Fog was hanging heavy inthe night air; the sound of it
dripping from the hangar buildings indicated it was the next
thing to rain. It was a late hour
and the few lights that were onglowed faintly in the distance.
I started my car and drove
toward home. Automobile tires
Captain Sawls is light Com -
mander of th e S hawnee B ranch
in th e D epartment of Rotary
W in g Training . H e 1 S xed and
rotary wing qua li ed and has
approx im ately 3400 jfJght hours .
10
Captain Carl H. Sawls Jr. Inf
on a wet pavement make arhythmic tune; this was a beau
tiful sound, I thought , as wedrove along, stopping occasionally for the traffic lights that
were still on at this late hour.
Turning to look at Sgt Hogan, I said, "This is a beautiful
night "
i thout re tu rn ing my
glance, he looked outside at the
weather, grinned and said,"Yeah, it is "
Earlier in the day SFC Hogan and I had decided, over acup of coffee, to fly to Birming
ham. I needed night crosscountry time for my annual
minimums; besides, it was the
first football game of the year
in Vulcan Stadium. So, the
flight was agreed upon, with
I
coffee mugs raised in a salute
to the "two-fold mission. "
A thorough preflight wa spulled on our National Guard
L-17 A aircraft, and other necessary details were made ready
for the anticipated flight. With
the approved flight plan from
Maxwell Flight Service, wewere ready for takeoff.
A good start and a ground
runup that checked out perfectly, found us airborne a
1700 hours. Gear was uppedflaps milked into the up position, and we turned out of traf
fic picking up our heading to
Birmingham as we climbed to
altitude. Upon reaching ou
altitude, the a i rc r a f tw strimmed up and cruise rpm and
manifold pressure were set
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Everything was checking out
smoothly and in the "green";
this was to be a good flight.
The weather en route was
clear and mild, indicating agood return flight later that
night.Some 30 minutes later, from
15 miles out, Birmingham tower was contacted for landinginstructions.
After touchdown, we refueledand tied down. A quick checkwith the tower made sure our
flight plan had been closed. Wecalled a cab for the last leg of
the journey to the stadium. Everything was as planned, run
ning on schedule.It was 2230 hours when wereturned to the airport. A quickhamburger and a cup of coffeewould taste good - giving usplenty of time for checking the
aircraft, filing a flight plan, and
being airborne within the hour.An hour later this "3-3" had
become airborne with a VFR
flight plan in his hip pocket. Aleft crosswind leg put us east
of downtown Birmingham and
on our return course to Montgomery.
The night was black and the
dimly shining stars, blendingwith the scattered lights south
of the mountains, left no visible horizon for pilotage.
Fifteen minutes after take
off put us well south of Birmingham and the mountains,into fairly level terrain.
I t wasn't much later when I
became horror stricken; theghastly glow of wingtip lights
meant but one thing - FOGThe dimly shining stars aboveand faintly glowing lights onthe ground had disappearedcompletely.
My first thought (a f t e r
checking airspeed, a I t i t u de,heading, needle and ball) wasto do the famous 180 0
turn
back to Birmingham. I soongave up plan A when Birmingham went IFR, with commercial traffic "stacking up" atvarious holding points; also, the
mountains were to be given
some thought.Gears were turning in a semi
frantic effort to set up and put
into operation plan "B." The
thought ran through my mind,an old saying of the coach,"When in doubt - punt " Iwanted to laugh out loud, but
was afraid Hogan might think
I had flipped my lid; so I returned my thoughts to the
problem at hand.
Checking the map, plus the15 minutes flown, gave me agood idea where we were on our
out-bound course. Fairly levelterrain and the knowledge thatour flight path would crosshighway 31 south to Montgomery gave me courage (false). Iexplained to Hogan what wasto take place, plan "B."
His job, since we had onlyneedle and ball and a magnetic
compass, was to count down in
hundreds of feet as we started
letting down from 2,000 feet.My job was already cut out for
me: I was going to concentrate
on the compass heading and try
to keep the aircraft level with
needle and ball until we brokeout beneath, while descendingabout 200 fpm. Picking up high
way 31 south and flying to
Montgomery would be no sweat
-ye t
PLAN CHARLIE
As Hogan called out 700 feet,I leveled off and steadied the
aircraft. Looking out ahead and
down, I could see only fog. t
was then I envisaged an L-17 Aaircraft scattered 0 v e r the
countryside, along with the remains of two people whom Iliked very much. With this inmind, along wit h pas sin gthoughts of an accident investigation board, another "3-3"pilot hit the panic button whenencountering IF R conditionsand set up the next plan, C.
Climbing back for altitude
and leveling off at 2,000 feet, Ipicked up my heading for Mont
gomery. This seemed to be thefirst sensible thing I had doneup to now; plan c was being
put into effect. Tuning in the
low frequency radio to MXF, Irechecked VHF radio on Baker
Channel, glanced at the time,and rechecked the instrument
and engine panel.
Plan c was (act like an
Army A via tor) to fly my
planned flight course at 2,000feet for 30 minutes from take
off time (this altitude shouldkeep us below instrument traf
fi and well above the terrain).
The 0 30 time of a 0 45ETE would put us 0 15 out
of Dannelly Field, l\iontgomeryand in the NW quadrant of
MXF low frequency. I'd plannedto stay in the NW quadrant until I had made contact with
(MXF) GCA in the event someone was making a low fre-
lan harlie saw him through
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OCTOBER 1959
quency approach into MaxwellAir Force Base. At this point
and time, I would contact MXF
for a GCA. I was feeling much
better, more like a man.First call to Maxwell tower
brought nothing; I called againand asked for a long count for
tuning on Baker Channel. Rotating the coffee grinder" han
dle on the VHF radio brought
in a loud, clear count downfrom Maxwell tower. I informed
MXF tower that I was on aVFR plan, Birmingham to Dannelly, when I encountered IFR
conditions, and requested as
sistance with a GCA to MaxwellAir Force Base. Maxwell tower
asked how much fuel I had left.To this I replied, Two hours."
I was given several frequen
cies to contact GCA, but onlyhad Baker Channel and the
emergency frequency; towersaid he'd work me on "Baker."
I requested that they run n the
"first string team" as I had noinstrumentation in the aircraft
for making precision turns to agiven heading, and, too, I was
only a 3-3. Maxwell said he'dwork me on a "no gyro" system
- the key word being NOW.GCA gave me several identification turns and had me located12 miles NW of MXF at 2,000feet.
Everything was workinggreat at this point, and I was
unaware of Hogan sitting beside me.
Several more turns had me
on downwind for a north land
ing - base leg and then a
Editor's Note:
10-mile final approach, with
instructions to complete my
landing check. A call back gaveMaxwell GCA, "Landing checkcompleted, gear down and in
the 'green'.
My final instructions were,Do not acknowledge any fur
ther instructions, and if you donot hear the voice of GCA Operator at any 5-second period of
time, pull up and use missedapproach procedure until contact is made."
I thought to myself, "I want
this landing more than any
thing."
All corrections were made,
with light pressures on the rudder pedals to keep from overcontrolling on final approach.At each mile GCA informed me
of my position, as to distance
fro m touchdown, alignment
with runway 36, and glide path.
"This is Maxwell GCA. Youare 1 mile from touchdown,high on glide path, alignment
looks good. You are on glidepath; hold that rate of descent.You are 14 mile from touch
down, 600 feet altitude, glidepath good, aligned with runway
36.
As I broke out I saw twoparallel strings of run way
lights directly in front of the
aircraft and traffic pas sin galong beneath on highway 31into Montgomery. I stayed with
the gauges, wondering how lowGCA would continue to workme.
"This is Maxwell GCA. We
have you visually in sight. Continue to make your instrument
letdown. (These fellows weregood and I was not about to
argue with them; they had
brought me this far, and I was
going all the way with them.)You are over runway boundary;
alignment good, with fifty feet
altitude. Raise your nose tolanding attitude-hold i t cut
your power.
Just as throttle was retarded, the wheels gave out
with a soft screech. We wereon the ground
"This is Maxwell GCA. Take
over and taxi to intersection; afollow me" jeep will park you.
Thank you and goodnight, Sir.
Yes, it was a good night
Thirty minutes later the fieldwas closed, below IFR minimums.
Later in flight operations, Ithanked the fellows who had
worked me on GCA. They werejust young boys, but were doing a man-size job
The operations officer ar
ranged transportation to Dannelly Field where my car wasparked.
Thinking ' back over the 1-hour flight from Birmingham to
Maxwell, I turned what couldhave been a disastrous flightinto a successful GCA landingby realizing the foolish mistake
I had made in trying to stay
VFR in IFR weather. I had
made my plan c (Charlie) to
fit the situation and stuck to
it. I t was that simple.
We all applaud when an Army Aviator (or any
aviator for that matter) gets through an experiencein one piece. Especially do we applaud if that experience is passed on for others to use. With 20-20hindsight, we cannot resist a little preaching, to wit:
lack of preflight planning-a little procedure that canmake pros old.
Route Traffic Control Center and explained his pre
dicament. This would have made the Center aware of
any possible conflicting traffic and enabled them toremove possible danger through rerouting of other
traffic. There's must more to flying than pushing the
"go" button. From the tone of Capt Sawl's article webelieve a thoughtful aviator has gained a great deal.We hope you have, too.he pilot should have immediately contacted an Air
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HURRY
SEND
A
Captain Curtis O Greer, Jr.
MSC
·AIRPLANE CRASH These
electrifying words cam eover the loudspeaker in the
Eighth Army Aviation Detach-ment ready room. "They needall the helicopters that can flyto evacuate casualties."
Within minutes all the flyable choppers were manned and
on the way.
Army Aviation wrote a brief
history that dark night on the
Han River, one that lives on.And since then many pages
have been added to the dramat-
ic story of Army helicopterrescue and evacuation.
In France a young girl dependent suffered critical burns
over 40 percent of her body.After first aid, a Medical Service Corps demonstration team
was hastily called in. Minuteslater the girl was en route toan advance hospital while plasma was being administered.
Proved on Korea s b ttlefields
Near an airborne center atruckload of paratroopers returning from town were pinned
under the truck as it plungedthrough the guardrail and overturned in a creekbed. In minutes an H-34 hovered over the
wreckage, the fanning bladesonly inches from the bridge
abutment while a line was secured on the truck. A quick lift
and the Sioux pilots who accompanied the Choctaw extri-
cated the dying and dead;
moments later the race to the
hospital began.
A motorist ran off the roadand overturned. An Army A viator passing in a helicopterquickly landed, rendered firstaid, and then delivered the injured man to the hospital.
"Hurry Send a Chopper "For years this request has sent
helicopter pilots scurrying offon mer c y medical missions.
Countless lives have been savedby both military and civilianpilots, utilizing many different
types of rotary wing aircraft.Medical evacuation is one of the
primary functions of Arm yA via ion today.
This life-saving method of
transport was proved on the
battlefields of Korea, under the
most difficult weather, terrain,
and flight conditions. Accomplished while helicopters were
still in their infancy, pilots of
all three of the Armed Forcesi r
evacuated thousands ofUnited Nations soldiers. Physi-
cians were amazed at aeromedical evacuation's contribution to
Captain Greer s Medical I n-
structor in the Departmen t of
Tactics H e is rot ry wing quali-
fied nd has pproxim tely 900
igh t hours
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OCTOBER 1959
he helicopter reduced the mortality rate in orea
the reduction of the mortality
rate among wounded. A mortality rate of only 2.4 percent
was attained during the Koreanconflict-the lowest of any major war yet
Without a doubt, the air am
bulance is here to stay - not
only in our Armed Forces, but
in civil use as well. Every major hospital will ultimately
have its own heliport; outlying highway ne tworks willhave designated patient pickuppoints for both day and night
operations. Seriously ill or injured patients will be air lifted
over congested city traffic, just
as soldiers were evacuated from
combat areas above heavilytraveled main supply routes.
Vital inflight emergency
medical treatment can be rendered before the killer, shock,gets a foothold. Precious moments will be saved, and the
patient treated while there's
still a good chance of survival.Many problems must be solvedbefore this can become-a reality, but these solutions are possible.
As far back as 1936 the Army
14
Medical Service experimented
with the autogyro in the air
ambulance role. Today, our Ar
my Medical Service has organ
ized its ambulance helicopterunits based on the experienceand knowledge gained in Koreaand elsewhere. Their principalmission is the evacuation of the
most critical cases; however,they are also used to transport
high priority medical suppliesand key medical personnel between field installations.
Only the physician has the
professional k now led g e and
training to properly diagnoseand sort casualties for this type
of evacuation. Only he can designate the particular medicalfacility where the patient must
go to receive definitive emer
gency treatment. For these reasons, this service must remain
under medical control.Our surgeons are becoming
increasingly aware of the great
potential of the helicopter as
an evacuation vehicle. They are
more efficient in their use of
this relatively new machine,and have been very cooperativeand understanding of the pilot s
many problems. These are someof the problem areas: margina
weather and night operationssafety precautions, load limitations, pilot capabilities, and
basic information required in
planning the mission.When the external litter carrier is utilized, no inflight treat
ment can be rendered, with the
exception of whole blood, o
blood substitutes, which freezein cold weather. During extremely cold weather operations, the heating system of the
external litter carrier is inadequate for the patient in criticacondition. When using this
method of evacuation, all
pients should be thoroughly
brief ed reg rd i ng strange
noises and vibrations to whichthey are unaccustomed. The
possibility of acrophobia o
claustrophobia occurring cannot be underestimated. The
unconscious patient must be observed during the flight. If the
internal litter is used, a medical attendant is assigned to ren
der treatment during flight
Oxygen therapy has been administered wi th excellenresults. Adequate heat is available when the larger transpor
type helicopter is used.The helicopter does not re
place the other methods of
evacuation; the hand-carried
litter, jeep ambulance, and fieldambulance are merely augmeni
ed by this new means. When
speed in evacuation is vitalwhen isolated areas require
support, the helicopter standsready at all levels of commandto do the job. Backup suppor
for the Medical Service air ambulance units is obtained by
the surgeon, through commandchannels, f rom the other
branches and arms of the serv
ice authorized Army AviationA recent evacuation mission
was flown by an aviator sta-
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tioned in Korea. A soldier had
fallen and suffered a painful hipinj ury on a mountain pinnacleat an elevation of 3,980 feet.Evacuation by hand-carried litter and field ambulance to the
nearest hospital, 30 miles away,would have required approximately 6 hours. The request
for evacuation was passed backto the air ambulance unit, and
a helicopter was dispatched immediately. Fifty-five minutes
later the soldier was undergoing excellent medical treatment
in a well-equipped hospital.
This procedure is simple inature but can get very inolved and confusing if certain
prerequisites are not met. The
contents of Chapter E i g h t ,Field Manual 8-35, "Transpor
tation of the Sick and W ounded, should be read and studied
by all concerned. A great dealof training and prior planning
goes into a mission of this type.
The requesting agency (normally the doctor) ensures that"this trip is necessary." He
must know and understand the
capabilities and limitations ofthe pilot and aircraft. The exact location of the pickup site,by grid coordinates and promi-
ent land features, is passedback with the request. Other
valuable information is the
number of patients to be evacuated, diagnosis of each, disposition of patients, and method
to be used to mark the pickupsite. The pilot is informed of
any propertyexchange
or special supplies and equipment he
is required to bring forward.
The ground party's job is alsoimportant for the safe accomplishment of the mission. Agreat deal depends upon them.
The site selected must be large
enough to accommodate the
type of aircraft utilized. t
should be free of all obstruc-
HURRY SEND A CHOPPER
he Iroquois made pickup on this 10 OOO-foot mountain
tions to flight. Level, dust-free
sites are desirable. Cloth panelsused to identify the site must
be secured. If smoke is used, itis placed on the downwind sideof the intended pickup site.
Only necessary personnelshould be used for loading andunloading operations. Person
nel approach the helicopterfrom the front so the pilot has
them in view. Other rules are
these: avoid the danger area
of the tail rotor, bend downwhen passing under the main
rotor blades, and keep the litters in a horizontal position. In
general, exercise good safety
practices. For night operationsa larger area is needed. Smudge
pots and vehicle lights have
been used successfully many
times for this type of operation. Vehicle lights are directedinto the wind because this isthe direction in which the pilot
will land the aircraft. Lights
should not be placed in such aposition as to blind the pilot.
The pilot must know and
never exceed the limitations of
himself or the aircraft. He isthe final authority in any mat
ter concerning the safe operation of the craft for which he
is responsible. Pitch-dark night
operations and marginal weath
er conditions often face our
helicopter pilots in the field.Sound judgment and compliance with current policies and
regulations are valuable aids inrendering a final decision as to
whether or not the mission willbe flown. A high degree of pilot
proficiency must be attained,
and retained, if missions are to
be conducted without danger tothe lives of the crew and passengers and damage, or destruction, of the aircraft.
Sound judgment and coordination are absolutely necessary
among the three personnel elements involved in an evacuation mission: the physician, the
ground party, and the pilot.
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S OW
Captain Ernest Bruce nfO THE ARMY AVIATOR assigned to the Little goofs that mean nothing at higher alti
aviation company of a tactical ground unit tudes are sometimes fatal at low altitudes. Havelow-level missions are a regular part of his duty. you ever run a gas tank dry? Lost 100 feet in:.These missions are somewhat hazardous at a turn? Inadvertently stalled? Gotten carbure- est but errors in judgment and technique can tor ice? If any of these has happened to you onincrease this danger enormously. a low-level run you are lucky to be alive.
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The large number of aircraft
involved in low-level missionaccidents has caused concernamong Army safety officials.They ask: Why did the deceased pilot attempt to make a
steep turn at 150 feet whenthere was nothing to prevent
his climbing to 400 or 500 feet
before turning? Why did the
pilot on a flour-bombing mission look down to watch the
floursacks hit-and fly into the
ground at 120 mph? Why?
The age and experience levelof most of the pilots pullingduty with tactical units may bea factor. The young pilots
straight out of flight school areusually assigned to the Combat
Division Aviation Companies.As they gain experience they
migrate to other aviation jobs
and are replaced by more pilotsstraight from flight school. Alltoo often when a low-level mission comes up, the more experienced pilots consider them
selves too old for that sort of
thing and leave the mission to
the young pilots who are leastqualified, experience - wise, to
handle it. The young fellows,whether they realize it or not,need the guiding hand of an
experienced Army Aviator inthese matters.
Were you ever practicing autorotations in a Sioux when
several dozen civilians gathered
at the airport fence to watch?
t brings out the ham in most
of us-that almost irresistibleurge to put on a little airshow
for the people. The same at
mosphere sometimes prevailswith low-level missions. There
may be several hundred troops
watching you make your run.
They are expecting something
spectacular, and you don't want
to disappoint them. Maybe they
will have something to write
LOW AND SLOW
he pullup c n e h z rdous
home about-at the expense ofyour life.
All too often pilots use the
term tactical as an excuse for
violating safe flying practice
and common sense. Often socalled tactical flying provesto be just immature buzzing.Most low-level missions in support of tactical ground units
actually require the aircraft to
be at treetop level for only ashort period of time. The pilotcan fly to the unit's area at asafe altitude, make his low-levelpasses, return to his home fieldat a safe altitude and be just as
tactical as the Hot Pilot whocontour flew from the time he
left the home field until the
time he returned.
Let's go through a typicallow-level mission, a freefall
supply drop. This mission istypified by low airspeed flightconducted as close to the ter
rain as safety permits so the
supplies can be dropped with
out undue damage. The pointsto be considered will apply inmost cases to other low-levelmissions, such as a message
drop or pickup, a low-level photo run, or low reconnaissance.
If the mission is laid on inadvance the pilot has an opportunity to make a reconnaissance of the mission area if he
is unfamiliar with it. In the
example of a freefall supplydrop, time spent on a thorough
high reconnaissance, if possible, is time well spent.
Usually, under field conditions, the unit will furnish an
observer who is familiar with
the ground situation and the
terrain. In such event, don't
neglect to brief your passenger,who will usually arrive prepared for the worst in full bat
tle gear. A steel pot and the
torque tube make a deadly combination. Nothing will jam the
aileron controls more effectively than a steel helmet betweenthe L-19 torque tube and sideof the cabin.
Your observer must be thoroughly briefed prior to takeoff.Explain to him what you willdo and what you expect him to
do. Caution him against inad-
Capt ain ruce is Flight Com-
mander of Flight in th e I nstru-
ment Dim sion of th e Department
of Fixed lVing Training H e has
a total of 2800 l ight hours
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OCTOBER 1959
vertently interfering with the
throttle quadrant or pushing
against the torque tube whilein the throwing position.
Always, without exception,remove the rear stick from its
socket and stow the rear rud-
der pedals in the down position. Your observer could, whilegroping for support, place his
foot against the stick or rudder
pedal and cause you to crash
instantly. If you have a fellowpilot for an observer be certain
that he doesn't put the rear
stick in the socket out of habit.
After taking off there are
several things to do before
starting the mission. Be certain that you switch to the
fullest fuel tank. Determine the
proper direction to make your
low-level run. You must take
into consideration wind direction and velocity, t e r ra in
forced landing areas, directionof the sun (if it is early in the
morning or late in the after-
noon), and the target pattern
on the ground.
TH LOW L V L RUN
The actual low level is the
most dangerous part of the mission. A properly executed run
should consist of a more or lessstraight descent from a safe
altitude to the low-level alti-
hlde, a straight low-level run,
and a straight pullup. Of coursesmall turns might be necessary
because of terrain, but steep
banks near the ground must beavoided. Every pilot knows howeasy it is to lose 100 feet in aturn, but what if your air-
craft is only 75 feet above the
ground?
8
During the low - level run
there is an almost irresistible
urge for the pilot to watch the
supplies fall. Naturally there
is a feeling of satisfaction whenwatching your bull s-eye but
this is a luxury that you cannotafford. Diversion of attention
at low altitudes is one of twobig killers in low-level missions. If you must know the
results of your run, have your
observer give you a strike report. On low-level runs the
pilot must devote his completeattention to flying the airplane.
The other big killer is excessive bank at low altitudes. A
perfectly normal bank at 1,000feet could be excessive at 30feet. Remember, the steeper
the bank the more difficult thataltitude control becomes; and,of course, the lower the altitude becomes the less you canafford to lose. Use nothing inexcess of a shallow bank during
the low-level run. If the target
cannot be covered without turn-
ing, then make more than onerun.
After completing the lowlevel run, it is only commonsense to pull up to a safe altitude. The pullup can be as haz-
ardous as the low run if not
executed properly. A sharp,
steep pullup will prove to befatal if the engine should fail.To appreciate the danger of asteep pullup try this the next
time you are flying a Bird Dog:Place the aircraft on a certain
altitude several thousand feetabove the ground; make a steep
pullup after gaining about 150feet of altitude, and cut the
throttle. Attempt to keep the
plane from stalling and attempt
to get i t into a gliding attitude
before passing through the altitude that you started from.You can't do it can you? Andyou couldn t do it if your engine should quit on a steep pull
up from ground level.Most other low-level missions
may require more than onepass. It is important for the
pilot to pull up to a safe altitude before attempting to placehimself in position for another
run. Recently a pilot pulled upto 150 feet after dropping amessage and began a steep
turn, apparently with the intention of flying back over the
drop area. He stalled in the
turn and was killed on impact.Making steep turns at low altitudes is like playing with
matches in a dynamite factory.
A pilot must guard against
surprises at low altitude. Sur-
prises such as control inter-
ference and fuel starvation
have already been mentioned,but what about terrain sur-
prises? A Bird Dog made asupply drop to a unit in a small
valley. After dropping the supplies the pilot found that he
was unable to clear the ridge
lines forming the valley. He
crashed about 50 feet from the
crest of the ridge. He wasn't
injured, but he was somewhat
surprised. A low recon and adry run prior to the low-levelpass are good insurance against
surprises.
Low - level missions require
skillful flying as well as properplanning and good judgment.
A professional attitude towards
low-level missions is an excellent way for the Army Aviator
to increase his life expectancy.
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UNDAMENTALLY, the Ar-
my flight surgeon's role isto provide the services of a physician to the pilots and support-
ing personnel of Army Aviation.His patients are a breed apart,
requiring that he augment his
professional training and medical background with a knowledge of flight and aeromedicaltechniques.
In the more or less routine
peacetime operations of the
present, our younger pilots have
little cognizance of times past
in which the flying doctorsperformed feats of derring-do.Instead, they are familiar with
Tjl who functions in a clean,ften air-conditioned office.
They associate his functionswith bright shining tools, polished desks, and crisp, efficientclerks or secretaries. t wasnot always thus.
The circumstances of a viation medicine today are different from those of the chaoticdays when we struggled to
wrest air supremacy from the
flying hordes of Goring & Co.Then, it was the flying doctor,
the flight surgeon, more thananyone individual, who taught
man to keep apace with his incredible machine. For eachengineering advance that fur-
ther stressed the human bodythe flight surgeons initiated
medical adjustments that modified the man and aided him in
some way to meet the machine's
challenge.
T E S RECORD
The flight surgeons lived andflew with their men, came to
know them intimately, to appreciate their problems. They
j umped into the field to administer first aid, and into
oceans to prove that fliers couldrelease themselves from the
regulation parachute while immersed in water. They made
parachute descents fro m as
high as 40,200 feet to test bailout oxygen equipment. They
allowed their bodies to be instantaneously projected from
10,000- to 35,000-foot altitudes
in low-pressure chambers to
prove that explosive decompression would not kill.
In the face of a destructivewar, the flying doctors were
motivated by a spirit of experiment to defy nature and thus
ensure man's safe place in the
skies. Without them, modern
military flying would have beenimpossible and the aviation
feats of World War II wouldhave gone unaccomplished.
There are no longer the opportunities or causes, inherent
in war, for today's flight sur-
geons to be applauded and decorated as were their earlier
confreres. However, when occasions arise which interrupt
the day-to-day routine of our
present flight surgeons, they
have responded in exemplary
manner. A recent emergencyin the Carribean illustrates thataviation medicine is not necessarily restricted to routine
functions, that the flight sur-
geon is not just an operatingindividual in standard procedure patterns. The story bears
telling in aviation circles.
RECEIVES EMERGENCY CALL
A tuna boat, some 500 milesat sea south of Panama, sent
out an emergency radio callstating that their captain washaving an attack of appendi-
citis. The call was picked up by
a military aircraft rescue unit
operating in an area of deserts,open seas, mountains, and j ungles, providing emergency medical service where it might
otherwise be unattainable.
In hurried response, a rescue
flight arrived on the scene atdawn. While circling over the
area, the flight surgeon aboard
radioed to the ship. The vessel's radio operator advised that
his captain was vomiting bloodand appeared to be very criti-
cal, perhaps dying.
In turn, the flight surgeon
impressed his pilot of the emergency. He instructed that, if
at all possible, an immediate
landing to evacuate the patientmust be made. The pilot flewseveral low passes over the sea
to determine surface conditions.
The eventual landing wasvery rough. The rescue air-
craft planed off a gigantic swelland skimmed into the air, its
props in full reverse. She fellback into the angry sea at aslightly nose-first angle. Uponcontact with the water it tore
twistingly to theleft. Much
of
the equipment aboard was torn
free upon impact, and minor
bruises and lacerations were
inflicted on some of the crew.Water entering the compart-
ment added to the confusion as
the flight surgeon administered
first aid, instructing those whocould tend their inj uries and
assisting those who could not.
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OCTOBER 1959
ROUGH P SS GE
The aircraft was able to taxi,
and the pilot headed her overthe rough water toward the
waiting trawler. The distancewas considerable and passage
was extremely rough. Beforethe aircraft had come alongsidethe tuna boat, several members
of the rescue crew were strick
en with seasickness and re-quired further attention from
the flight surgeon.
The boat crew sent a dingyover the water to pick up the
doctor. He was brought aboard
the fishing vessel safely, exam-ined the ship's captain and
found that he had an obviousperitonitis, high fever and was
severely dehydrated. He in-structed several of the fishingcrew to bundle the patient inblankets and a few of their wa-terproof sou'westers and set
about bringing his patient to
the rescue aircraft.
SE SICK IRCREW
The gunwales of the little
dingy were nearly awash as theflight surgeon, his patient, andone of the tuna crew oared their
way from the tuna boat to the
floating aircraft. There the pa-tient was made as comfortableas possible. Some of the crash
debris had been restored to or-der, but the entire crew wasnow violently seasick. Onceagain the FS had more than onepatient requiring medical as
sistance. The aircraft's seasickcomplement was pr ct ic l ly
useless to the FS. The prob-lem became even more complexas all efforts to assist the pa-tient resulted in causing him
greater nausea and consequentvomiting.
As the pilot made several un-successful attempts to taxi in-t a takeoff position, the FS
20
kept up his medication and wasfinally able to introduce somedemerol, terramycin, and fluidsintravenously. These drugs had
an immediate effect, and the
patient became more comforta
bleand
quiet.The FS then turned his at
tentions t the aircraft's crew.At that moment, it was as im-portant for the m t pullthrough as it was for the fish-erman. As their seasicknesscontinued, fewer of them wereable t get about their duties,and the aircraft was fast losingits struggle with the rough
seas. The flight surgeon made
the crewmen get t their feet
and walk past him as he doledout dramamine tablets. He ad
vised them to breathe regularly
and deeply, and urged them to
think of things other than their
predicament. He ordered sev-eral to assist in setting his kit
near the patient's hammock.Gradually, order was restored
in the compartment.
SITU TION GRIM
The patient continued to rest
comfortably and the FS went
forward to discuss the situa
tion with the pilot. They both
agreed that it appeared verygrim. The aircraft could not be
gotten into a takeoff positionand was further hampered by
a lack of jato equipment. Ev-en if the pilot were able to
maneuver the aircraft into po-sition, it was doubtful there
would be enough power to lift
both the damaged aircraft andthe additional weight of water
that had been shipped uponimpact. The pilot suggested
that a tow rope be thrown out
by the fishing boat and the
plane be towed until the seaswere calmer. The fishing crew
complied with the request, the
line was made fast and the pilot
cut his engines, relying on the
tiny boat ahead to see them
safely through the high seas.Meanwhile, the crew, some of
whom were not much improved,inspected the aircraft and re-ported some, perhaps disablingdamage, had been sustained
through either the crash or the
buffeting of the water. The
chief damages among the air
craft's vital parts were the
flaps, wheel fairing, and the
horizontal stabilizer.As darkness approached, the
flight surgeon decided that the
patient should be re-transferred
to the tuna boat. The towlinehad broken twice during the
long afternoon and he worrie
that it might break again during the night, leaving the planestranded at sea.
STORM WORSENS
The fishing vessel sent out its
dingy for the second time so
that the patient could be trans
ferred to his own ship. The
seas were higher than at the
time of the previous transfer.
Passage from the aircraft to
the boat was made with con-
siderable difficulty and causedgreat discomfort to the tuna
captain. Progress was slow as
the oarsman alternately rowedand bailed in a dual effort to
keep the skiff on course andafloat. The flight surgeon strug
gled in vain to keep his patient
dry and relatively calm.The patient was placed in his
bunk aboard ship. His condi-tion had hardly improved, al-
though he was respondingsomewhat favorably to treat
ment.
During the night the supplyof demerol and intravenous
fluids ran out. As the drugs'
affects wore off, the sick man
evidenced greater discomfort,fever, and pain. The ship's ra
dio operator called for assist
ance, stating the problem and
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the flight surgeon s urgent needof drug supplies. As the patient s condition be cam e increasingly critical, the secondday of storm tossed waters began. The flight surgeon waited
helplessly for supplies.
SUPPLIES ROPPE
Shortly after dawn a secondaircraft from the rescue unit
flew over. The pilot radioedthat he would not chance a landing, dropped the needed supplies, wished them luck and
flew off. Once again the patient
responded to the drugs, but by
mid-afternoon his condition had
again degenerated and as thehours passed, his breathing became extremely labored. If the
patient were to survive, it wasimperative that some measure
be taken to provide relief. However, the necessary equipment
was not at hand. The flight sur
geon took a length of intrave
nous feeding tubing and fash
ioned it to serve as a LevineTube. He inserted it with somedifficulty through the ship cap
tain s nasal passage and at tached a 10 cc. syringe to the
exterior end. The suction induced by the syringe affordedsome relief.
The man s breathing was stillvery labored, however, and by
evening this little relief had
ceased to be sufficient. Some
On the basis of the factual
information contained in the
PUZZLER on page 9, the recommended solutions are as follows:
Close flight plan. Notify Fort
Rucker base operations by the
most expeditious means and
give them details for preliminary report. They will make
instrument providing greater
suction had to be employed. But
what? The flight surgeon knewhe had no professional equipment with him that would servehis purpose.
IMPROVISE
He asked the tuna crew if
any such equipment or instru
ment were aboard. The ship s
engineer mentioned t im i d I Y
that a grease gun might do the
job. The flight surgeon thought
it could be used and instructed
several crew members to cleanthe gun thoroughly with gasoline. Under his direction, it
was then sterilized in the galley by the ship s cook. When
this was done the flight sur
geon modified the clumsy toolwith tape, plastic tubing and asyringe barrel. The captain s
men watched wonderingly as
the surgeon advanced upon his
patient with the homemade aspirator. Grouped around the
circle of light from the singlebulkhead lamp, they waited.
Minute by minute, the soundof breathing became less harsh,
more evenly paced. Although aviolation of professionalism,the grease gun had worked. Asthe flight surgeon attended to
its use, he watched the patient
fall into a fitful sleep. The suction provided by crude improvisation had saved a life. The
arrangements for investigation.Coordinate with airport offi
cials regarding disposition of
the aircraft. If at all possible,leave it as it stopped until investigating officials arrive. If
traffic is heavy and a delay ininvestigation is expected, the
aircraft may have to be moved.Arrange for guards or other-
MEMO FROM FLIGHT SURGEON
medical officer assigned a watch
for the night and instructed
each man in how to manipulate
the life-saving instrument. He
requested that he be awakenedimmediately if the patient s
condition became w r s e andsought his first sleep in over40 hours.
Throughout the night the
tuna vessel towed the rescue
aircraft; the weary flight sur
geon managed a few muchneeded naps; the patient continued his fitful sleep; and the
seas became calm. On the following morning a third aircraft
from the rescue unit appeared
on the scene, circled overheadand landed. The calmed waters
offered no problem as the patient was transferred aboard
the aircraft. A successful opensea jato takeoff was made and
the tuna captain was flown to
Gorgas Hospital in Canal Zone,Panama. Following an emer
gency appendectomy there, he
was hospitalized for a long period of time.
This inspiring account of aflight surgeon who managed tosucceed in his mission in the
face of overpowering oddsmight well be some hero of fiction. Might be--except for atuna boat s captain somewherein the Carribean who can vouchfor every word.
wise safeguard the aircraft. In
this case Fort McPherson couldbe called on to furnish guards.
Do not refuse to let photosbe taken unless classified ma
terial is involved, but withholdconsent and try to delay photographers until permission isobtained from PIO or other
proper authority.
2
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TH IIV IITION
HE INCREASING technological advances of today
demand that a competent aviation mechanic possess much
more talent than his predecessors. There was a time whenthe mechanic was a fellow whowasn t very good at booksbut whose hands could handlea wrench with all the skill of asculptor manipulating a chisel.
Today's aviation mechanic notonly handles his tools with
great facility, but he also must
have a vast amount of specialized knowledge. He is a skilledtechnician. Only a step away
from the engineer, he is a professional, too.
All this has come abo u tthrough the spectacular growth
in aviation in these postwar
years. The research and devel
opment ball started rolling during World War II, and it has
gained momentum each year.
Our scientists and engineers are
placing marvels of scientific development in the hands of our
military leaders. These intri
cate products from the mindsand hands of our nation s foremost researchers are funnelinginto Army Aviation.
MECHIIN Criffin illiams
We have come a long way
from the light observationplanes of WW II. The L-4 and
L-5 gave way to the L-19,Otter, Beaver, the versatile
helicopter - each serving an
important place in operational
missions of the Army. Nowthese are making way for the
new developments in VTOL and
STOL aircraft.
With each new step ingrowthof equipment, the demands onthe human side of the man
machine combination have increased. Increased knowledge,responsibility, and integrity are
demanded of both the pilot and
the mechanic.
There is no room for secondclass ability on the Army Aviation maintenance team - onlyfirst class men working to be
come masters. Although themechanic is a recent graduate
of an excellent training school,he is still a fledgling in aviationmaintenance. His skills willprogress with him through allthe days of his career. Every
day will be an exciting new period of growth, because today s
mechanic must become a mas
ter. The safety of the pilot, his
crew, the aircraft, and the accomplishment of mission are inhis hands. They must be capable hands.
Learning must be a constant
process of the good aviation
mechanic-no matter how excellent his knowledge of funda
mentals and his proficiency in
applying them, every mechanicstill has much to learn. Oncethe fundamentals are mastered,
there are new and better ways
to be developed for doing the
job. And with more intricate
equipment being delivered to
Army Aviation all the time,there is a constant challenge to
master new techniques. Prog
ress has always been an uphillclimb. Tomorrow will be different from today; and the mechanic must be ready for new
developments and new responsibilities to come. This makes
the aviation mechanic's job always new and interesting, forever challenging. The goodmechanic can never grow stale.
The good mechanic knowshis aircraft completely. He isaware of all possible malfunctions; he knows what to lookfor and how to find it. His ear
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is as sensitive to the dissonant
sound that indicates trouble as
is the physician's listening to
a patient's heartbeat. His maintenance is never in a hurry,
never touched by the confusion,inaccuracy, and agitation connoted by the word hurry Instead, he does his job right
away, and the ri ht way, carefully seeking out and repair
ing the faulty parts, usingapproved maintenance procedures, proper tools, and completing his job by correctlyfilling in all forms and reports
applicable to the job.The mechanic can fail the
fine tradition of maintenance
by underestimating the importance of paperwork in his job.The record of maintenance performed is not distinct from the
maintenance; it is part of the
job-no job is complete without
it. The fundamental informa
tion on the completed reports
can save many months of research and work in troubleshooting causes of failure incomponents. Often maintenance
difficulties can be resolved by
finding the answer to such aquestion as, What faults didteardown reveal? on the reports filed by the mechanics.
A good mechanic realizes the
importance of using the proper
tool and following the proper
technical instructions in performing maintenance on today's intricate mechanisms. He
reaches for the proper toolsalmost automatically, for he
knows the importance of specialized tools for performing
specialized functions.As important as it is to use
the proper tool in the correct
manner, there will be a time incomba or an emergency si ua
tion when the proper tools willnot be available. I t is then thatother traits of the good mechanic come to the forefront:
resourcefulness, ingenuity, flexibility. These qualities are indispensable to the good mechanic. He must be able tochange his methods and paceof work under certain circumstances, but he never changes
his standards of accomplishment, his craftsmanship.
t has been said that there isno such thing as a little mistake in aviation maintenance.There is no little mistake for
the simple reason that the
slightest deviation from goodcraftsmanship, or ignoranceand carelessness can be the
factor in an aircraft accident.Even when vast and tragic
consequences o not follow,anything less than the best possible maintenance breeds trou
ble-either now or later.
The good mechanic has initiative. His fundamental knowledge of the aircraft will comefrom his school training. After
the course of instruction isover, there is no letdown; hisown initiative will propel himto study and keep abreast of
new concepts and techniques.He will constantly strive tomake each maintenance and repair job the best he has ever
performed. Not only his body,but his mind must be alwaysalert, always on the job, doingand seeking better ways of doing. Then when the pilot brings
the aircraft safely home, the
mechanic knows that his part
of the aviation teamwork waswell done.
The feeling of being. appreciated for doing a good job isessential to job satisfaction.
Yet it sometimes seems that
the mechanic must deal with
the s i t u t ion 0 f a c k 0 frecognition for his services.Sometimes this feeling is engendered by a lack of rapport
between the supervisor and his
men.
THE AVIATION MECHANIC
But the good mechan ic
knows that many things in lifeare taken for granted. So heshrugs his shoulders and continues being his skilled, dependable self. Fine craftsmanship
and willing acceptance of responsibility are the rule rather
than the exception in aviationmaintenance.
Without the superb work of
the dedicated mechanic, the
pilot s job could not have beenaccomplished. The safety of
our aviators, and in final analysis the safety of our nation, isdependent to a great extent onthe aviation mechanic. His jobis a vital part of a vital service.
Whenever he feels unappreciated, the elements of self-appreciation should hold fast -the pride of responsibility andthe dignity of integrity, skill,judgment, understanding.
Knowledge, proficiency, and
integrity - these overall traits
sum up the character of the
Army Aviation Mechanic, andthey comprise the unchanging
principle of aviation mainte
nance.Maintenance of Army air
craft is not a glamourous job.and probably never will be. Itis sweat on the line, and sometimes paperwork and study at
night. And not all maintenance
men are good; there's neverbeen a surplus of good mechanics. But there are the men whohave personal pride in their
work and enjoy a sense of selfaccomplishment in han d l in g
their tools proficiently - toolsof ever-increasing specialization. These are the men whoare to be saluted for developinga new profession in the maintenance field.
References: FSF Inc., Avia-
tion Mechanic s Bulletin, andAircraft Accident and MAIN-
TENANCE Review, USAF.
23
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SWEATING IN the 90° heat
of September in south Alabama, it is hard to imagine winter flying woes. But we knowthat a few thousand miles to
the north, Mr. Frost is in his
last days of summer hiberna
tion. Soon this frigid gentleman will emerge from frozenslumber and blast his icy breath
across our airfields. Lest we be
caught with our red flannelsdown it would be wise to givea three-fingered salute and follow the advice of our younger
brothers.
I ING
First in Mr. Frost s bag of
winter tricks is icing. He produces this hazard in many
ways. Turbulent air suspendssupercooled w te r dropletsabove the freezing level in
thunderstorms, over rough ter
rain, and over warm water sur
faces. These areas give the
heaviest icing during instrument flying conditions. Glazeice forms in the dry cold air
under a warm front when air
temperature is near or belowfreezing and raindrops spread
over aircraft and freeze because of the cold temperature
and additional cooling from par
tial evaporation. This icing isnormally avoided by climbing
24
to an altitude that is in the
warm air of the warm front.
Frost is formed on any object that is cooled to belowfreezing in moist air. Freezing
may occur on parked aircraft
at night by radiational coolingor it may occur when an air
craft is cooled at high altitude
and lets down quickly into moist
air.
Wet snow that accumulateson parked or taxiing aircraft
may result in serious icing by
freezing to the aircraft on take
off especially where a temperature-dewpoint spread inducesevapora tional cooling.
Here are some of the effectsof icing and recommended corrective actions:
Stalling speed increases as
lift is decreased by structural
ice changing the shape of the
airfoils and increasing drag and
gross weight. Maintain a safe
margin of airspeed especially
in critical maneuvers such astakeoff climb turns, letdownsand landings.
Dynamic efficiency of propellers and rotor blades i s loweredwhen ice changes blade profiles.Deicing of propellers is aidedby alternately increasing and
decreasing rpm so that air friction and propeller vibration can
act to break off ice. Rapid
changes in pitch will help to
shake the ice from rotor blades.
Air pre ssur
e instruments,such as altimeter, airspeed and
rate of climb fai l when iceclogs pitot tubes or static air
lines. When suspecting this
type of icing rely on flight indicator and power settings for
attitude indications.
It makes good sense for allaviators to know just what an
ti-icing devices are available ontheir aircraft and to be very
familiar with their capabilitiesfor handling ice.
No two winters are ever exactly alike but there are certain general adverse weather
patterns which may be anticipated each year with varying
frequency.
OG
There will be many days
when the threat of a general
fog formation will require careful flight planning to ensure afuel reserve for the possibilityof subminimum conditions developing quickly over a large
area. Fog development is most
likely where moist air movesnorthward over cold ground or
shallow warm front surfaces.
Since the diurnal factor of sun
heating is at a minimum from
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OCTOBER 1959
PRE FLIGHT
Frost, snow, frozen ice particles or just ice on top of wings, rotor blades and stabihzers
should be removed prior to flight Check your d e i equipment. Pay particular attention to air
intakes
ST RTING ENGINE
That never-fail summer starting procedure will have to be modified, particularly on the first
morning start. Watch minimum temperature requirements.
T XIING
Nose wheels and tail wheels are not effective on wet or icy ramps, EXCEPT AT SLOW
SPEEDS. Use wing walkers and allow yourself lots of space
PRE T KEOFF
Give yourself and the engine a break; wait for minimum temperatures. Check behind before
you start your runup so you won t blow snow and slush over other aircraft, runways and taxiways
Don t depend on your takeoff propeller blast to clear your wings of snow: Even dry, powdery
snow may have melted and refrozen the wings.
T KEOFF ND CLIMB
26
Remember the pitot heat and use It Maintain enough cabin heat for a clear windshield
DESCENT
Have deicing equipment on and everything warmed up before starting descent through clouds
When throttle openings are reduced, exposure to carburetor ice goes up fast Lower-powered
descents in clouds and rain should always be made with carburetor heat on
L NDING
If you have flown through icing conditions, remember the effect on airfoils and ca rry an air -
speed margin for unpredicted stall speeds Remember that blowing snow can erase visibility
Wet or icy runways must be longer than dry runways. Too much slush or water can bang up your
aircraft
This article was prepm ed by
the U S. rmy Board for Avia-tion Accident Research.
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This article was prepat ecl by
th e U S A rmy B oarel fo r A via-
tion cc iden t R esea rch
I YOU SUDDENLY fell andbroke your arm, would yon
go to your plumber? televisionrepairman ? lawyer?
When threatened with a lawsuit, would you seek your grocer? tailor? neighbor? wife
(lots of free advice here ) ?When your Army Aviation
unit has a rash of accidents, doyou consult a mathematician?
engineer? psychologist? for
tune teller (some promise in
this area, but no concrete results as yet) ?
Ridiculous? Try reading afew of the more prominent
safety publications and see howmuch material is prepared by
eggheads. We must not be disrespectful of these learned gen
tlemen, so we will omit the fact
that they have more time than
anyone else to write their
thoughts concerning the many
fields in which their highereducation makes them experts.
Granted, th e compari son sabove were stretched from left
field and scientists certainly
playa most important part in
aircraft accident prevention, it
still remains that av ia to rs
should have a loud voice in designing aviation accident pre
vention programs.
Recently, a surveywas
conducted among the youngest pilots of a large Army Avia ion
unit. The great majority of
these men are lieutenants, with
a faint spattering of captains.
These contributions are so apt,
refreshing, and encouraging
that we present some of them
here, with no comments. We
dare you to read them with
out gaining some very useful
knowledge
ROUTINE COMPLACENCY
"During the past year our
aviation company has under
gone one Army training test,
participated in two maj ormilitary exercises, and has per
formed numerous flying demonstrations. During all this,
only one serious flying accident
was sustained in this more haz
ardous type flying. However ,
in the last four months wehave had four most costly air
craft accidents, none of which
occurred during a major exer
cise or flying demonstration,
and the flying involved was of
a less hazardous nature. Using
these facts, plus information Ihave gained talking to other
pilots, I believe i t could be said
that during the more hazard-
ous type flying, pilots havebeen better prepared mentally
to cope with all situations -more so than routine type flying-as they realize they are
flying under more d i f f i cuI tconditions. Under routine conditions, pilots become complacent and less prepared for those
situations which may quicklydevelop.
"In the past, our flying safe
ty program has been geared
m a i n I y for maneuvers andflight demonstrations. it tIehas been said during the rou
tine periods between maneu
vers when pilots are least
aware of inherent flying dan
gers.
"For these reasons, I feelthat a flying safety program
should be stressed, especiallyduring the lax periods when
only proficiency and routine
flights are taking place."SCHOOL S OUT
"New pilots should be made
more aware of the responsibility they have to themselves
and the government to fly air
craft as they were taught at
the Army Aviation School. Toooften, new pilots feel compelledto 'prove themselves' because
27
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OCTOBER 1959
Administrative vs Tactical
they are no longer under thewatchful eyes of school IPs.
They take chances they never
would in school and subject
themselves to accidents.
two times a month and expectto have a good round every
time he plays. In order fo r apilot to stay pro.ficient he must
fly more than 2-4 hours every
week. If he fails to fly every
two or three days, he loses coordination and his depth perceptio.n is likely to be erratic
during the first several landings. It always takes a whilefor him to get the feel of the
aircraft again.
Two of the more important
factors fo.r safe flying are toknow the limitations of equipment and yourself. Know what
the aircraft will do and won't
do. Learn all you can about the
aircraft and its equipment.
In summary, a pilot mustspend all the time possible flying. He must strive always for
self - improvement. Above all,he must know the capabilitiesand limitations of himself and
his aircraft.
STANDARDIZATION
The key to an effective accident prevention program is efficient flight standardizatior
Those responsible must be experienced, capable, and thor
oughly standardized and have
full backing of the divisionstaff.
I recommend a thoro.ughcheck-out standardizatio.n of allpilots reporting to this station.
I recommend that a gro.up of
the most experienced IPs be
formed into a standardization
board.
Standardization is an imPo.rtant factor for there are
Pilots should be a 0 wed
more time and opportunities toimprove proficiency flying. Ev
ery pilot gets rusty after he
is out of school for a while.The many aspects o f flyingwhich are neglected are lowlevel flying and strip operatio.ns. Experience is invaluablein flying, and the more time apilot has to devote to developing his proficiency instead of
performing cross-country 'taxi
service', the better pilot he willbecome.
Sunday golfer is no pro
Most accidents occurring inour company involve more experienced pilots. I believe that
this shows a drop in perform
ance due to pauses in flying
time, interrupted by periods ofheavy flying. If training couldcontinue in a mo.re scheduledmanner to maintain pro.ficiency,these accidents might be pre
vented.
SUNDAY GOL
In order fo.r a golfer to play
a good round of golf, he can't
go out on a Sunday afternoon
28
[.. _ _ ___._ __ ........_ ...
.
•••
••
••••
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usually many possible ways of
doing things, but there is always one way that is better
than others. In Army A via ion,even though the aviator's initial training is fairly standard-
ized, the aviators in the fielddevelop their own set of rulesand techniques. A continuousstandardization program willnot permit pilots to forget basicrules and techniques."
PILOT RROR
I believe an active safety
program should be initiated
consisting of conferences concerning accidents and the i r
auses. We should not be sat-
isfied with the term 'pilot error', but should attempt todetermine what caused these
situations to develop, what corrective action was taken by
pilots, and the correct technique to be used in a like situa-
tion."
PROFICIENCY
I recommend that pilots be
allowed enough flying t im e
each month, in addition to ad-ministrative flights, to maintain a high level of proficiencyfor the type of flying required
in tactical situations. We shouldhave followup checks to ensure
that pilots are maintaining proficiency."
"All pilots who have under
600 total hours should ride
with an instructor pilot at least
once every six months. This
could be scheduledwithin
platoons with no inconvenience to
anyone. After pilots have beenchecked out in new aircraft
and satisfied instructor pilotsin all phases required by stand-
ardization, they should be assigned flights in the aircraft to
develop proficiency."
The initial check-out for allpilots should be more inclusive.
At the present time, it is lookedon as a formality.
Aircraft accident rates are
directly proportional to flyingproficiency, and pilot proficiency is proportional to flying ex
perience.Fly
i n g proficiencymust be considered two-fold:namely, past experience and
current ability. Emphasis must
be placed on current ability and
this must be maintained by
continuous, and not sporadic,flying.
This post had, at one time,a flying safety record which wasmuch envied. The monthly average flying time of each andevery pilot was considerably
higher than it is at present.
VI TION S FETY OFFICER
"Reviewing the volume of
publications of various typesfrom all sources concerning flying safety, and the concernexpressed at all levels of command, it would seem that there
is enough said about the sub ect and little actually doneabout it.
I feel, therefore, that theonly logical recommendation I
FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH
can make at this time is that afull time, working safety officer be appointed for this unit,or preferably, for this installation. This officer should bemature, well experienced in
aviation, and be placed on fulltime duty as flying safety officer. If bot a graduate of the
safety course at USC, he shouldattend this course at the earliest practical date.
USTERITY PROGR M
During the current austeri-
ty program, each pilot will belimited to a relatively smallamount of flying time comparedto the average when accidents
were almost nonexistent. Thisbrings up a point to be considered: Which is the better solution to budgetary problems?
(1) Saving money by ra-
tioning aviation fuel, thus reducing pilot proficiency, or (2)saving money by reducing air-
craft accidents by increasing
pilots' current flying ability and
saving investments made inpilots and passengers? The on
ly possible solution is the secondanswer. Aircraft accidents here
Fuel austerity vs proficiency
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OCTOBER 1959
have cost the Army approximately $500,000 in the last sixmonths. f a small portion of
this amount could have beenspent on an active flying proficiency program, the net sav
ings would undoubtedly havehelped the budget.
If a maximum must be set
on monthly flying time, service missions should not be
counted toward that maximum.
As much time as possibleshould be devoted to a proficiency program.
The following poi n t s are
suggested for a flying proficiency program:
1 Standardization of instruc-tor pilots.
2. Standardization classes, to
ipclude: re-emphasis of Aviation School procedures, principles of flight; effects of windgust, degree of ban k, and
weight on stalling speed; discussion of wind drafts overvarious terrain and vegetation;
and a safety forum discussingaviation accidents and pilots'experiences.
3. Standardization flights.
4 Establish the SOP thatnew pilots will not be assignedservice missions until they have
a complete checkout and have
flown a minimum of 30 hours inthe local area.
5 Establish an organizedprogram where pilots can work
strips in supervised groups.This should be several times
each week, ensuring that eachpilot spends at least one hour
per week working in field strips
and confined areas.
Perhaps most important tothis unit, is a larger, better
standardized force of instructor
pilots. Those few presently as-
signed are in administrative
positions demanding so muchof their time, that they cannot
30
properly check out incomingaviators.
Another need is a better
program of planning proficiency flying, involving training insuch areas as cross-wind strip
work, forced landing practice,contour flying, terrain evaluation, etc.
PRO EDURES
I notice that attempts tostandardize flight for a particu-
lar aircraft failed. I wonder if
IP's could, in all cases, adhere
to either the flight handbookor procedure sheet established
by this command and stop dis
missing the absence of procedures as technique. I don't feelthat an IP who hasn't followedprocedures and dismisses it,just because he hasn't yet had
an accident, can do a good job
of instilling the importance of
procedures in others.
TR INING
I recommend more frequent
and more realis tic t r a in i n gflights, and annual or semiannual proficiency checks for all
pilots, with emphasis on correcting unsafe habits w hi c hmay have developed.
I recommend developmentof a flight safety program with
less emphasis on statistics and
more on recognition of possibleunsafe conditions and procedures to follow to avoid these
condi tions.
I propose that a training
section be formed under the
supervision of a senior, dualrated pilot. The fixed wingclass, of one week duration,
would be attended by six pilots.The most promising students
would be retained as assistan
instructors for the followingweek. The rotary wing class
would follow a like procedure,with perhaps a smaller number
of students.
The course of instruction
would consist of informal classes, flight instruction, and at
least one evaluation ride givenby the senior instructor. Par-
ticular emphasis w 0 u d beplaced upon emergency procedures, short field technique and
the basic maneuvers.
ealistic training pays o
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Requests for U Crash Sense to
describe an aircraft accident in
vestigabon f1 O J I beginning to end
have come f1 (n ll rna ny so urces .
Thi s i ~ s u e will be devoted e n t ~ r e l ytv cover£ng two acc1:de nt invest1:
gations . 111 one of these, th e accident 1:nves tigation board did an
outsta,nding .job 1 n determining
t(f1 S9 factors and lJr epm-ing a
('o mplete and thm oug h r'eport. In
th e oth er, the investigation wascompletely SNAFU
ccident Number ne
HISTORY O LIGHT
Two aviators of a Shawneetransportation company wereassigned the mission of provid-ing air support for filming atelevision show. They proceed-
ed to the set where a pontoonbridge was to be lifted. Aviator
One flying the aircraft on the
trip out to the bridge site made. reconnaissance and completed
a landing. Aviator Two left the
aircraft and A via or One kept
the engine running to burn offexcessive fuel.
In a short while the firstpractice pickup was attempted.
The pickup was completed and
Aviator One increased rpm to
2700 to lift the load. During
this attempt the pontoonbridge buckled and was re-leased by activating the manualrelease.
The aircraft was landed inthe vicinity of the pontoonbridge while the bridge sectionwas reinforced for an 0 the rpickup attempt. Aviator Two
returned to the aircraft and flying from the left side cameto a hover over the load. After
pickup he had trouble center-
ing over the load and again re-leased it.
Aviator Two moved off then
returned and centered over the
With external loads attached to Shawnee
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Lateral stability s decreased considerably
load. The ground guide man
gave the signal to pick up.While power was being applied,the load became airborne. The
aircraft moved sideward to theright and continued until the
forward rotor blades struck theground. Soon after the aft rotor blades alsO hit; the bladesof both rotors disintegrated.
The aircraft continued to rolland came to rest on its side.The IO ad was released just after
the forward rotor blades struckthe ground, and it came to rest
upside down. Aviator One shut
the engine down by turning the
magneto switch off, and the
crew members left the aircraft.
INVESTIG TION
Competent investigations always begin far in advance of
aircraft accidents. In this case,
32
the command was ready with
a preaccident plan In accordance with paragraphs 5-8, DAPamphlet 95-5, this plan provided for:
a. A crash alarm system.
b. A crash rescue plan.c. ApPO intment of an air-
craft accident investigation
board prior to the accident consisting of the mO st capable investigation personnel availableto the appointing authority.
d. Assignment of responsibilities for technical assistance,including engineers signal,PIO, aviation medical officer,Provost Marshal, and safety officer.
e. An aircraft investigation
kit containing equipment needed immediately upon arrival atthe accident scene.
f. Authority to call for tech-
nical assistance from any agency available to the command.
In addition to furnishing the
fastest possible means for res
cue of personnel, a preacciden
plan gets trained investigator:at the scene of the accidenwith a minimum loss of time.
Shortly after the Shawneecrew evacuated, the wreckagearea was roped off and guards
were stationed to prevent re
moval of, or tampering with
any of the physical evidenceOne investigator quickly located and interviewed witnesses. Another investigator directed a search for all pieces o
the aircraft and began a diagram of the debris. A third
investigator directed the tak
ing of photographs.
To build a house, you mus
first obtain all the materials
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that go into it. To complete an
investigation you must firstcollect all a vailable evidence.Otherwise neither house nor
investigation will prove useful.Too often aircraft accident in-
vestigation boards begin layingthe foundations for their housesbefore investigations are com-plete. Jumping to unsupported
conclusions before all the evi-dence can be collected is likelaying the roof before the raft-
ers are up.
RE ONSTRU TION
After all members of the ac-·dent investigation board were
Impletely satisfied that allpossible evidence had bee ngathered they began to recon-struct the accident. Using over-all and detail diagrams photo-graphs i r c r f t flight andmaintenance records weather
reports statements of creweyewitnesses and technical ad-visors they were able to estab-
ish the sequence of events prior
to during and immediately fol-lowing the accident. They now
knew WHAT had happened andtheir next job was to analyzethe evidence and determine
WHY it happened. Again too.ften when circumstances in-
dicate human failure accidentinvestigation boards list piloterror in slot 7 of the 285 andconsider their job finished. Ac-tually at this point only the
foundation for the house iscomplete.
From the evidence the boardwas able to accurately recon-struct the sequence of events
and gain a clear picture of what
took place.
During the last pickup asslack in the cables and powerwas being applied the pontoonbridge left the ground un-known to the pilot. The bridgetouched the ground while thfi
aircraft was moving to the
right. With the weight of the
load on the ground the left
load cables became taut apply-ing tension on the two right
cables of the helicopter sling
causing the aircraft to tilt tothe right.
At this point the pilot Avia-tor Two called to Aviator Oneto release the load. He appliedleft cyclic control. Aviator Onepulled on the manual releaseand found that it would not re-lease the load. The right cablesof the aircraft were firmly an-chored to the left cables of the
load. With left cyclic ineffec-tive the aircraft continued its
motion to the right lifting the
left side of the load and pullingdown harder on the right sideof the aircraft. It continuedto increase the angle of right
tilt.Aviator Two reduced power
CRASH SENSE
attempting to center the air-
craft over the load. This actionwith the left side of the loadin the air and pulling on the
right side of the aircraft re-sulted in a greater twisting
action on the aircraft. The air-craft continued its motion tothe right and started to drag
the load. The left side of the
load continued to rise and the
right side dragged on the
ground for 7 feet.As the aircraft continued tilt-
ing and moving to the right
Aviator Two applied right ped-al attempting to right the air-
c r f t longitudinally into the
direction in which it was mov-ing. The right cables continuedte pull on the right side of the
aircraft increasing its angle of
tilt forcing the aircraft into an
extreme attitude and bringing
the rotor blades close to the
ground. As the front rotor .
argo hook will not release manually t times
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OCTOBER 1959
blades made contact, the air-
craft had tilted to such an extent that the load was nowcentered under the aircraft and
there was almost equal tension
on the four sling cables, now
within the travel limits of therelease cable.
Aviator One was still working the manual release, and the
load released and came to rest
upside down. Rotor blades disintegrated and the fuselage slidalong on its right side. There
was no sudden stoppage of the
engine; the rotor heads continued to rotate with the bladestubs digging large holes in the
ground.
WE THER
Weather at the time and location of the accident was broken clouds at approximately 900feet with 5 miles visibility in
light rain. There was no appreciable wind. Although rain-
ing lightly, th i s was notconsidered as a contributing
cause factor because the pilot,by his own statement, could
clearly see signals given by theground crew.
H RDW RE
Investigation of the aircraft
and its components revealed nomechanical malfunction. A factory technical representative
assisted in the inspection, and
his report was included in the
evidence.Due to the extreme attitude
in which the i rc r f t wasplaced, the cargo sling releasemechanism would not function.An unsatisfactory equipment
report was submitted on this
item. The cargo sling mechanism from the wrecked aircraft
was thoroughly checked and
found to be operating normally.The abnormal situation wascaused by the aircraft s right
4
movement over the external
load. This condition permits
enough slack in the sling release cable that it will not beactuated far enough to allowthe cargo sling hook to release.
It was determined that theexternal load weighed approximately 2,100 pounds, well with-
in the limitations of a Shawneefor the existing density altitude. The board noted that the
copilot s window assembly didnot release when the emergencyrelease handle was actuated af-
ter the accident. Investigation
revealed the window was heldin position by the seal placed onthe metal frame of the nose en
closure. This condition wascaused by deterioration of the
seal under extreme heat conditions.
CREW
From statements of witnesses and the pilot, it was determined that Aviator Two didnot realize that the external
load had left the ground during
the pickup in which the accident occurred. As a result, he
attempted to center over a loadthat was clear of the ground.The control forces used causeda condition which is inherently
dangerous to a helicopter of
tan d e m rotor configuration.(With external loads attached
to Shawnee aircraft, lateral sta-
bility is decreased substantial-
ly. This fact is demonstrated
to pilots undergoing training in
the H-21C.)The commanding officer of
the Shawnee company wascalled by the board as an expert
witness. He stated that he had
experienced similar flight conditions in which external loadsleft the ground without his
knowledge, and that another
aviator had reported difficultyin releasing his load while the
aircraft was off-center to th
right.
Crew flight records showethat A viator Two had a tota
of 317 flying hours in Shawneaircraft, with a total of 45
hours overall flying. He habeen properly instructed in th
technique of hauling externa
loads. Aviator One had a tota
of 163 hours in Shawnee air
craft and total flying time o
352 hours. He had not yet accumulated enough flying tim
to be qualified to haul externa
or internal loads without an
other qualified aviator in th
cockpit.
MEDIC L
The helmets worn by th
pilot and copilot f fo rde
protection from mechanical injuries during the crash. However, one of the helmets fell ofduring the crash and the othe
during evacuation. The twpilots were flying with chh
straps loose.The crew chief, who was oc
cupying a passenger seat jus
aft of the hoist hatch door, received a hard blow to the headt was noted that he used goo
judgment in not trying to evacuate the aircraft from the reawhere fuel fumes were heavy
The crash caused rotor bladfragments to be thrown wit
considerable for c e o v e r distances up to 100 yards. Spectators in the area had beeordered out prior to the crash
However, it was noted tha
similar operations had beecond ucted near troops and spectators in the past. (Note: Onsoldier was killed by flying debris when a Mojave crashe
near his position.)
CONCLUSIONS
Aviator Two was not awar
that his external loa d ha
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cleared the ground, and his corrections allowed the aircraft to
get in a condition where lateral
con t ro I became ineffective.While the pilot attempted to
use other controls, the forward
rotor blades made contact withthe ground.
There was no established signal that could be used by
ground personnel to show the
pilot when his external loadwas completely clear of the
surface. Upward motions by
guidemen will not allow pilotsto know the conditions of their
loads in those cases where the
and weight of the
compares to the load involved in this accident.
The pilot's decision to useless power in an effort to center over his load proved poorjudgment. At the point this reduction in power was made,flight controls were actuated ina manner that tended to bring
the aircraft closer to theground. First contact of the
rotor blades with the ground
followed immediately.
It was found that in the circumstances which prevailed in
this accident, the manual cargosling release will not operate.rhis factor made recovery from
an unusual attitude extremely
difficult and affected the pilot'sreactions because he was depending on the manual releaseto drop the load.
Crash helmets will not provide maximum protection for
which they were designed if
worn with chin straps loose.Rescuers who approach a
Shawnee resting on its right
side will find the words PUSH
IN FOR RESCUE upside down.This might not be understoodbecause of excitement and
could possibly delay rescue.The forward roof escape
hatch, used by the crew to evac-
uate after this accident, might
not provide clearance for personnel burdened with packs and
other equipment.
The copilot's window couldnot be used to afford escape be
cause it was sealed by heatdamage to the material used for
weather stripping.
Ground personnel in the vicinity of helicopter accidentsare extremely vulnerable to flying debris.
Both Aviator One and A viator Two experienced difficultyin locat ing controls andswitches by feel due to the
unusual attitude in which the
aircraft came to rest.
RECOMMEND TIONS
t is recommended that this
accident be brought to the at
tention of all Shawnee aviators,
with a full explanation of howthe accident occurred.
All Shawnee units have acontinuing training program
for ground crew personnel whohandle external loads and guide
aircraft in making hookupsover loads.
Aviators not rely on the
manual cargo sling reI e a s emechanism, but em p loy l l
methods of actuating the cargo sling release when circumstances warrant.
Development of a cargo slingrelease mechanism which willoperate from any attitude.
All Shawnee aviators be instructed to
open all windows in
CRASH SENSE
the nose enclosure as a part ofthe pilots' preflight inspection.
Weather stripping for emergency release exits be madefrom a material with heat resistant qualities.
Crash helmet chin straps besecured for all takeoff, landing,and hovering maneuvers.
Unnecessary personnel andspectators be kept at least 150yards away and sheltered dur
ing sling load operations.Ground crewmen be equipped
with steel helmets , goggles, and
light-colored gloves (of orange
or white to improve recognitionof hand signals during periodsof reduced visibility).
All personnel, both air and
ground, be instructed in the
most efficient means of break
ing plexiglass (i.e. striking near
the frame, with the heaviest,hardest object available).
Rescue instructions be paint
ed in both directions on the
surfaces of aircraft to enableeasy reading regardless of howthe aircraft comes to rest.
Pi lot s be instructed that
switches are most quicklyfound by vis u a I orientation
when the aircraft is in an unusual position.
Consideration for the wearing of light leather gloves by
aircraft crews. A Navy air
safety magazine has carried
several stories of helicopter pilots who avoided severe hand
burns by wearing gloves. Glovesalso reduce danger of cuts dur
ingescape.
ccident Number wo
An Army Aviator was assigned a Seminole test flight.The aircraft took off with pilotand crew chief aboard, flew for
two hours and returned for
landing. The aircraft was either
landed with the landing gear
retracted, or the gear failedduring landing roll. Damages
totaled more than 8,000.From the accident report, it
was clearly evident that no pre-
5
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OCTOBER 1959
accident plan existed for the
unit:
Item The aircraft accident investigation board was
not appointed until four days
after the accident.
Item 2 - No statements of
witnesses were taken, although
the accident occurred at a heavily populated airfield.
I tern 3 - Photographs were
not taken until after the air
craft had been moved.Item 4 - Although qualified
aircraft technicians were immediately available, they werenot used.
TESTIMONY
INDEX O F SUBST ANTIATING E X H I I T ~A Statements of Crew
M ' nt Off .B Statement OT 01 •
C Statement of Weather ou
o Witness Statements
E Statement of CO T h Rep.F Statement of Factory ec .
G Fl ight Plans
H UERJ PhotographS
1 Overal I Scene2 Under Side of Aircraft
3' L h Side of Aircraft. C
ek 't Rotor Hub Damages
4 oc pI ,
5, Strut Assembly
6. Cargo Sling Hook
7, Cargo Sling Hook d
8 Copilot Window Close dc 1 t Window Release9, ap a
1 Accident Diagrams d. t' g Boor
2 Orders Appoln In3 Aircraft Records
4 Aircraft Damage
5 Crew Flight Records
6 AF Farm 14A
7 AF Form 14B8 Statement of Ops. OH .
9 UER CI Loads10 OF, Hauling aT,.) Ing
OF, Cockpit WIndows n
12 OF from Flight Surgeo
fOi OH\ \ll USi O l
This accident rep 0 r t contained 55 long pages of verbatim testimony which was taken
in an evident gestapo-like at
mosphere. During this inquisition, witnesses were actually
threatened wi th punishment.
Sample: By not recalling what
happened when obviously youmust know, you are subjecting
yourself to very severe punish
ment.
Thorough investigation and reporting h ve no substitute
The control tower operators
testified that the aircraft landed with the wheels down, and
the gear retracted during the
landing roll. This was also supported by the crew chief and
pilot. In the face of this, the
accident investigation boar dreached the conclusion that the
pilot had landed with the gear
retracted. They listed the causefactor as PILOT ERROR and
recommended that the pilot beplaced before a flight evaluation board.
With an inadequate investigation, sketchy and conflictingevidence, any attempt to ana-
Landing ge r retracted - how?
lyze this particular accidenwould be pure conj ecture. However, a statement by the medi
cal officer indicated that thepilot had, for some time, shownsigns of emotional instability
manifested by heavy and continual drinking. No mention of
medical or possible supervisory
cause factors was made by the
investigation board in its report.
And there you have them:
two accidents, two investigations, two reports-different as
night and day. Accident No.1
lights the way to improved Army Aviation. Accident No. 2sheds no light. Its diagnosis of
PILOT ERROR is a trite andoft-repeated phrase which willnot prevent future accidentsIn the final analysis, the worth
of any accident investigation ismeasured by its ability to provide corrections and improvements in all possible fields.
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SE RCH DRESCUE
Above: 15 -year -old J h nMan on Owen, III, and his
father in Grand Canyon hospital after dramatic r s cue
from the depths of Grand Can
yon by a Shawnee (H-21) flownby CWO Clifford T. Bradley
and CWO Louis E. Goselin, as-i ted by crew chief Forrest
Robbins and a park ranger.
Right: they look over a map of
the area just before the earch
mission. (Photo courtesy Ari
zona Republic)
The heartening ight of a hawnee in the
ky above the mighty Grand anyon providedglad news to a victim of near tragedy lastsummer.
Army Aviation again played a dramatic
role of air re cue in the area of the world's
mightiest cha m-Arizona s Grand Canyon.
Pilot, CWO Clifford T. Bradley, and hi
copilot, CWO Loui E. o elin, as i ted by
crew chief Forrest Robbins and a park ranger,
flew a hawnee from the U. . Army Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Ari
zona, to natch young John Man on Owenfrom certain death.
Hovering at 1,100 feet above th canyon
floor, the Army Aviator aw rock piled
forming the letter H. Going down into thEnarrow, twi ting canyon for a cIo er look,they saw the boy waving a white flag.
Bradley maneuvered into the canyon, heldone wheel onto a andbar and hovered in the
intense heat. The crew chief and park ranger
jumped out and assisted the boy into the
waiting helicopter amid a den e cloud of
and and dust.
Ten minute later they were etting downat the Grand anyon hospital. The ver atil
ity and skill of Army Aviator had saved
another life.
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RMYHELICOPTER T WORK
- : ;l .:..... ; to :: • : : ~ ~ •
.: · ~ · ~ ; · ~ ; < ~
ervice to the fighting element i the keynote for Army Aviation. f there i a philo ophyof Army Aviation, thi i it. Serving the commander to the be t of hi profe sional ability,improving the Army s capability to provide abulwark for freedom , and striving for better
way of doing old ta k i forever foremo t inthe mind of the Army Aviator. The diver etask being performed here are well within that
cope- ervice. Not only to the fighting element but to communities periled by fire, floodand famine , not only to uffering individual bu
to si ter ervices in need of Army know-how anLequipment, ervice by Arm y Aviators i un-tinted, devoted and con tant. Thi i part of
their creed.