1 San Diego, California 25 February 2014. 2 Securing Routing: RPKI Overview Mark Kosters Chief...

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Transcript of 1 San Diego, California 25 February 2014. 2 Securing Routing: RPKI Overview Mark Kosters Chief...

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San Diego, California25 February 2014

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Securing Routing: RPKI Overview

Mark KostersChief Technology Officer

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Why are DNSSEC and RPKI important?

• Two of the most critical resources– DNS– Routing

• Hard to tell when resource is compromised

• Focus of increased attention globally

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Why DNSSEC? What is it?

• Standard DNS (forward or reverse) responses are not secure– Easy to spoof– Notable malicious attacks

• DNSSEC attaches signatures– Validates responses– Can not spoof

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Reverse DNS at ARIN

• ARIN issues blocks without any working DNS–Registrant must establish

delegations after registration–Then employ DNSSEC if desired

• Authority to manage reverse zones follows SWIP–“Shared Authority” model

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Reverse DNS: Querying ARIN’s WhoisQuery for the zone directly:whois> 81.147.204.in-addr.arpa

Name: 81.147.204.in-addr.arpa.Updated: 2006-05-15NameServer: AUTHNS2.DNVR.QWEST.NETNameServer: AUTHNS3.STTL.QWEST.NETNameServer: AUTHNS1.MPLS.QWEST.NET

Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/rdns/81.147.204.in-addr.arpa.

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Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN

• Permit by-delegation management• Sign in-addr.arpa. and ip6.arpa.

delegations that ARIN manages• Create entry method for DS Records

– ARIN Online– RESTful interface– Not available via templates

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Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

First identify the network that you want to put Reverse DNS nameservers on…

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Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

…then enter the Reverse DNS nameservers…

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DNSSEC in ARIN Online…then apply DS record to apply to the delegation

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What is RPKI?• Resource Public Key Infrastructure

• Attaches digital certificates to network resources– AS Numbers

– IP Addresses

• Allows ISPs to associate the two– Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)– Can follow the address allocation chain

to the top

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What does RPKI accomplish?

• Allows routers or other processes to validate route origins

• Simplifies validation authority information– Trust Anchor Locator

• Distributes trusted information– Through repositories

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AFRINIC RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC

LIR1 ISP2

ISP ISP ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP

Issued Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy

Route Origination Authority“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

ICANN

Resource Cert Validation

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AFRINIC RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC

LIR1 ISP2

ISP ISP ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP

Resource Allocation Hierarchy

Route Origination Authority“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

1. Did the matching private key sign this text?

ICANN

Issued Certificates

Resource Cert Validation

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AFRINIC RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC

LIR1 ISP2

ISP ISP

Route Origination Authority“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

ISP ISP4

2. Is this certificate valid?

ISP ISP ISP

Issued Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy

ICANN

Resource Cert Validation

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AFRINIC RIPE NCC APNIC ARIN LACNIC

LIR1 ISP2

ISP ISP

Route Origination Authority“ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

ISP ISP4 ISP ISP ISP

Issued Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy

ICANN

3. Is there a valid certificate path from a Trust Anchor to this certificate?

Resource Cert Validation

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What does RPKI Create?

• It creates a repository– RFC 3779 (RPKI) Certificates– ROAs– CRLs– Manifest records

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Repository View./ba/03a5be-ddf6-4340-a1f9-1ad3f2c39ee6/1:total 40-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143 1543 Jun 26 2009 ICcaIRKhGHJ-TgUZv8GRKqkidR4.roa-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143 1403 Jun 26 2009 cKxLCU94umS-qD4DOOkAK0M2US0.cer-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143 485 Jun 26 2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.crl-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143 1882 Jun 26 2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.mnf-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143 1542 Jun 26 2009 nB0gDFtWffKk4VWgln-12pdFtE8.roa

A Repository Directory containing an RFC3779 Certificate, two ROAs, a CRL, and a manifest

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Repository Use

• Pull down these files using a manifest-validating mechanism

• Validate the ROAs contained in the repository

• Communicate with the router marking routes “valid”, “invalid”, “unknown”

• Up to ISP to use local policy on how to route

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Possible Flow

• RPKI Web interface -> Repository

• Repository aggregator -> Validator

• Validated entries -> Route Checking

• Route checking results -> local routing decisions (based on local policy)

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How you can use ARIN’s RPKI System?• Hosted• Hosted using ARIN’s RESTful service• Web Delegated• Delegated using Up/Down Protocol

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Hosted RPKI

• Pros– Easier to use– ARIN managed

• Cons– No current support for downstream

customers to manage their own space (yet)

– Tedious through the IU if you have a large network

– We hold your private key

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Hosted RPKI with RESTful Interace• Pros

– Easier to use– ARIN managed– Programatic interface for large networks

• Cons– No current support for downstream

customers to manage their own space (yet)

– We hold your private key

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Web Delegated RPKI

• Pros– Harder than Hosted, Easier than

Delegated (Up/Down)– Manage your own RPKI system– Control your own private keys

• Cons– Need to setup your own RPKI

environment– Fairly complex

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Delegated RPKI with Up/Down• Pros

– Same as web delegated– Follows the IETF up/down protocol

• Cons– Extremely hard to setup– Need to operate your own RPKI

environment

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN OnlineSAMPLE-ORG

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN OnlineSAMPLE-ORG

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Hosted RPKI in ARIN Online

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Your ROA request is automatically processed and the ROA is placed in ARIN’s repository, accompanied by its certificate and a manifest. Users of the repository can now validate the ROA using RPKI validators.

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Delegated with Up/Down

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Delegated with Up/Down

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Delegated with Up/Down

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Delegated with Up/Down

• You have to do all the ROA creation• Need to setup a CA• Have a highly available repository• Create a CPS

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Updates within RPKI outside of ARIN• The four other RIRs are in production

with Hosted CA services• ARIN and APNIC have delegated

working for the public• Major routing vendor support being

tested• Announcement of public domain

routing code support

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ARIN Status

• Hosted CA deployed 15 Sept 2012• Web Delegated CA deployed 16 Feb

2013• Delegated using “Up/Down” protocol

deployed 7 Sept 2013• RESTful interface deployed 1 Feb

2014

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Why is this important?

• Provides more credibility to identify resource holders

• Leads to better routing security

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Q&A