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www.csis.org |
The Iraq War: Progress inthe Fighting and Security
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
November 17, 2008
1800 K Street, NWSuite 400
Washington, DC 20006
Phone: 1.202.775.3270Fax: 1.202.775.3199
Web:www.csis.org/burke/reports
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Introduction
This report is a status report. It is not intended to support a given policy,and it is not intended to assess future risks like Arab-Kurdish tensions, the
government’s handling of the Sons of Iraq, or intra-Shi’ite tensions
between the government and Sadr and the JAM. There are, however,
several points that deserve special attention.
The manning and funding comparisons of the US military effort in the
Iraq and Afghan wars show just how critical providing adequate resourceshas been to progress in the war, a point often lost in discussing concepts
and strategy. (pp. 8 to 11)
Changes in strategy and tactics have, however, had a critical impact and
here it is clear that US strategy has evolved far beyond the initial strategy
often described as the “surge.” The “Anaconda Strategy” described by
General Petraeus took advantage of Al Qa’ida’s extremism and the
alienation of Iraqi Sunnis to create a far larger movement with civil and
economic dimensions, not just military ones. (pp. 12 to 15)
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Introduction - II
Ethnic and sectarian differences remain a critical problem, and
challenge to Ira’s future stability and security. The US retained enough
influence in 2007, however, to bridge over many of these divisions – inspite of slow progress and a lack of support by the Iraqi central
government in some areas.
• It is also important to note that Iraqis never supported division of the
country at a popular level, and that a steady decline took place in ethnic
and sectarian violence. As the graphs in this report show, this decline has
led to massive decline in such violence between late 2006 and September2007, and a further decline after the containment of the Sadrists and JAM
in Baghdad in the spring of 2008. (pp. 16 to 25)
The graphs showing the patterns in overall violence show a steady rise
from 2003 to late 2006, and that a major reduction in violence through
August 2007. Since that time, violence rose only during the clash between
the central government and Sadr/JAM forces in the spring of 2008, andhas continued to decline. (pp. 26 to 32)
•The extent to which the Anaconda strategy went beyond an increase in
US troop levels is clearly reflected in the data on violence and casualties
for 2006, 2007 and 2008. Advances in US intelligence,
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Introduction - III
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities during 2005-2007 laid the
groundwork for far more effective attacks on terrorist and insurgent
networks. The Sadr ceasefire enabled US and Iraqi forces to first deal withAl Qa’ida in 2007, and then deal with Sadr and the JAM in 2008 – aided
in part by carefully targeted US efforts against the most extreme elements
of the JAM in 2007. The US team in Iraq expanded the civil-military aid
and governance efforts into the field in spite of the ability to quickly
deploy more US civilian advisors, and expand aid and governance activity
at the local and provincial level. (pp. 33 to 41)
Declassified US intelligence maps show the impact on the scale of Al
Qa’ida and affiliated insurgent activity in Iraq and Baghdad from the end
of 2006 through the fall of 2008, as well as the impact of key land and air
operations, and targeting Al Qa’ida’s key cadres. Coupled to still classified
advances in IS&R, the US effectively redefined jointness incounterinsurgency warfare. (pp. 42 to 45)
Graphs showing the level of violence by type of attack also reflect these
patterns (pp. 41-44), but they also provide a warning. The overall level of
violence remains as high as at the beginning of the 2004. The war is not
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Introduction - IV
“won” or “over.” Suicide bombings and other bombing attacks on the Iraqi
population have not been sharply reduced in number or intensity. What
some US commanders call an “irreducible minimum” can only beaddressed by political accommodation and the growing capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces. (pp. 46-50)
Major progress has occurred in reducing the level of violence in
Baghdad, which has been a key center of violence throughout the
insurgency. This has only been possible, however, by US division of the
city into largely Sunni, Shi’ite, and mixed areas. Reaching politicalaccommodation and creating security in the capital remain key challenges.
(pp. 51-57)
Iraqi civilian casualty patterns show the same decline as in the levels of
violence, whether calculated by Iraq, US, or NGO count. (pp. 58-61)
•The same is true of US military, allied military, and Iraqi security forces,
although the Iraqi security forces continue to take significant losses. (pp.
62-69)
•Iraqi perceptions of the “surge” present reporting problems because
polling data are dated and do not reflect the level of progress achieved
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Introduction - VI
security in that province. (pp. 88-91), when these charts are compared to
the other data in this report.
• Like public opinion polling on the impact of the “surge,” the polling datalag current developments. They do, however, clear reflect the tensions
between Iraqi belief that the invasion was not justified, a history of
popular support for attacks on US and allied forces and a broad desire for
the US and allied forces to leave -- and understanding that a rushed US
and allied departure could undo the gains made to date. (pp. 92-99)
• Major progress has occurred in increasing the size and capability of Iraqiforces, and in Iraq’s taking over the funding of such efforts. This progress
is still, however, highly dependent on continued US and allied advisory
efforts and support. (pp. 101-123)
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Afghanistan Iraq
Territory (Sq Km 647,500 437,072
Population 31,889,923 27,499,638
GNP ($USB) 35 100
Oil Export Revenues - 2007($USB)
0 41
Per Captia Income (US$) 1,000 3,600
Literacy Rate (%) 74.1 28.1 74.1
Median Age 17.6 20
% 0-14 years 44.6 39.4
0
5,000,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
35,000,000
Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007
Iraq vs. Afghanistan
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US Force Levels in Iraq vs.
Afghanistan
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Iraq BA 0 50 56.4 83.4 98.1 129.6 145.4 *53.4
Afghan BA 20 14 12.4 17.2 17.9 34.9 30.2 *12.5
FY01-
02FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08
FY09
Bridge
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Strategy Strategy
•No new Bush strategy since December 2006
• Anaconda strategy slide provided by by General Petraeus in
April 2008 testimony to Congress.
• Broad picture of potential long term US force cuts, and shift
of US role to strategic overwatch, presented in September
2007, but with little details.
• No clear long term timelines: Force cuts beyond one brigade
remain “conditions based.”
• Both the Iraqi MoD and head of MNSTC-I said in February
2008 that Iraqi forces would not be ready to assume full
counterinsurgency role before 2012.
• Announced development and aid strategy do not yet reflect
US cuts in aid and massive increases in Iraqi oil export
revenues.
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Full Spectrum Operations
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Counterinsurgency Guidance
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Changes in Doctrine
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Changes in Leadership Development
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Ch i L L d
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Changes in Lessons Learned
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Ch i K l d M
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Changes in Knowledge Management
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
A i B i d T “R d
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Active Brigade Team: “Road to
Deployment
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal
Challenges
30
Sectarian Challenges Afghanistan: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi’a. 1% Other
Iraq: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3%
Christian or Other
Ethnic Challenges Afghanistan: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara
9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch
2%, Other 4%
Iraq: Arab 75-80%, Kurdish 15-20%,
Turcoman, Assyrian & Other 3%
Tribal Challenges Afghanistan: Fragmented, rural, divided
Iraq: Confederations, broad area, heavily
urbanized.
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31
Iraqi Sectarian & Ethnic Divisions
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Three sources: CIA World Factbook, unsourced;
“Iraq: a Country Study,” Federal Research Division, Library of
Congress, 1988, unsourced (“knowledgeable observers”);
Average ABC News polls „07-„08, N=6,652 via 1,386 points.
CIA WFB LoC ABC
Shiites 60-65% 60-65% 49%
Sunni Arabs 12-22* 13 33
Kurds 15-20 NA 15
Non Muslims 3 NA 3
*Extrapolated
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Directorof Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
Real World Ethno-Sectarian Population
Parameters?
I i N S ht Di i i E D i
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33
Iraqis Never Sought Division Even During
Worst Part of Fighting
Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2007. Pg. 1
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Movement of Iraqi Refugees
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Copright Anthony H.
Cordesman, all rights reserved 37
Movement of Iraqi Refugees
•Some 2.7million
displacedwithin Iraq
•1.2 millionbefore
February 2007
•1.5 millionsince
•300,000 in
first threemonths of
2008
Source: SIGIR, Quarterly
Report, April 30, 2008, p.
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Iraqi Civilian Deaths Per Day from Vehicle
Bombs, Gunfire & Executions: 2003-2007
Source: Iraqi Body Count, as of June 24, 2008
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Vehicle Bombs 1.4 5 9.6 16 21
Gunfire/Executions 15 18 26 58 39
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Rise in Terrorism in Iraq: 2005-
2007Attacks Targeting Non-Combatants
Adapted from US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism. April 30, 2008, and www.nctc.gov
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
Terror attacks Attacks causing at least one
death, inury, or kidnapping
People killed, injured, or
kidnapped
2005 3,469 2837 20731
2006 6628 6026 38863
2007 6212 5574 44008
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The Military Course and Impact of
the Surge
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The “Surge” - II
47
Synergy and Serendipity Al Qa’ida extremism alienates many Sunnis and tribes
Tribal uprising in Anbar is transformed into sons of Iraq
Sadr declares and keeps ceasefire.
Kurds wait on Article 140
What Went Wrong Central government did not reach out to Sunnis, “Sons of
Iraq”. Police generally fell short, did not perform.
Negligible progress in rule of law
Extremely slow progress in political accommodation.
US civilian role and aid impact fell far short of goal.
Iraqi government spending on development, services, and
security.
Did not reduce impact of British defeat in the south, growing
intra- Shi’ite tensions.
Growing Iranian role and influence
Did not affect Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions.
Little progress in strengthening ties to other neighbors.
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US Troop Levels: March 2003 to
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US Troop Levels: March 2003 to
May 2008
GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-08-837June 23, 2008, p. 19
Al Qa'ida in Iraq December, 2006
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50
Q q ,
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51
OEF Close Air Support Sorties
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Totals
2004 1 3 7 1 3 24 16 9 13 4 1 4 0
2005 1 1 1 23 7 10 16 20 9 19 23 46 0
2006 5 23 42 63 59 141 216 242 329 240 201 209 0
2007 178 163 310 202 179 288 368 670 181 98 289 0 0
0
100
200
300
400
500
600700
800
Source: CENTAF CAOC, 5 December 2007
OEF Close Air Support Sorties
With Munitions Dropped, 2004-2007(Excluding 20mm and 20mm rounds and unguided rockets)
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Copyright Anthony H.Cordesman, all rights reserved 53
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Copyright Anthony H.Cordesman, all rights reserved 54
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55
Al Qa'ida in Iraq March, 2008
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56
Source for slides18 and 19: MNF-I,
April 9, 2008
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Patterns in Violence As Result of
the Surge and Campaign Against
Sadr
Al Qa'ida in Iraq Winter 2006 vs. Fall
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58
2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Key Areas of Shi’ite Extremist Activity: Winter
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2007 vs. Fall 2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008
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Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Security Incidents: Jan 2004-Oct 2008
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Security Incidents: Jan 2004-Oct 2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Indirect Fire Attacks: 2004-2008
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Indirect Fire Attacks: 2004 2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
IED Explosions: 2004-2008
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p
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
IED INCIDENT TRENDS
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IED INCIDENT TRENDS
65Source: Bill McMichael, Pentagon Correspondent, Times News Service, Military Times News Group, http://www.militarytimes.com/
Caches Found and Cleared: 2004-2008
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Caches Found and Cleared: 2004 2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Weapons and Explosive Cache Finds: 25
M h 7 A t 2008
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March-7 August 2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
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Trends in Baghdad:
US and Iraqi Views
US Joint Security Stations and Outposts inBaghdad: July 2007
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Baghdad: July 2007
GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, GAO-08-837June 23, 2008, p. 20
Ethno-Sectarian Attacks: May 2006-Oct 2008
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Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence
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in 2007-2008(Trend in Total Incidents per Month by Type)
Source: Iraqi Official
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Katyusha 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 9 16 23 15 32 21 0
Suicide Bomb 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 3 2 Assasination 0 21 13 13 23 15 16 0 0 9 12 16 21 16 15 22 31 25
Bicycle Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Car Bomb 26 23 19 38 35 20 35 15 24 20 15 16 6 13 13 13 13 11
Mortar 87 74 43 83 90 190 138 89 76 54 48 46 82 62 228 216 98 63
IED 55 65 33 82 63 133 96 84 63 78 73 71 103 77 131 118 107 96
0
50
100150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence
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Baghdad: Major Incidents of Violence
in 2007-2008(Monthly Distribution of Incidents by Type)
Source: Iraqi Official
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total
IED 55 65 33 82 63 133 96 84 63 78 73 71 103 77 131 118 107 96 0
Mortar 87 74 43 83 90 190 138 89 76 54 48 46 82 62 228 216 98 63 0
Car Bomb 26 23 19 38 35 20 35 15 24 20 15 16 6 13 13 13 13 11 0
Bicycle Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assasination 0 21 13 13 23 15 16 0 0 9 12 16 21 16 15 22 31 25 0
Suicide Bomb 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 2 1 3 2 0
Katyusha 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 9 16 23 15 32 21 0 0
0
50
100
150
200
250
Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in
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2007-2008(Trend in Total Casualties per Month by Type)
Source: Iraqi Official
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunBody Found 395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103
ISF Dead 28 36 33 25 32 35 69 22 23 41 26 29 31 28 42 64 59 24
ISF Wounded 55 45 69 100 88 95 119 40 31 58 54 84 77 72 121 141 94 81
Dead Civilian 255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143 98 104 153 197 322 531 233 178
Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Baghdad: Major Iraqi Casualties in
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2007-2008(Monthly Distribution of Casualties by Type)
Source: Iraqi Official
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total
Wounded Civilian 206 512 403 110 999 530 893 507 437 461 287 329 311 453 941 152 938 468 0
Dead Civilian 255 256 198 495 344 190 300 235 219 143 98 104 153 197 322 531 233 178 0
ISF Wounded 55 45 69 100 88 95 119 40 31 58 54 84 77 72 121 141 94 81 0
ISF Dead 28 36 33 25 32 35 69 22 23 41 26 29 31 28 42 64 59 24 0
Body Found 395 365 324 411 726 548 596 421 324 174 165 126 123 116 135 117 123 103 0
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
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Violent Civilian Deaths: Jan 2006-Oct 2008
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Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Iraqi Body Count: Iraqi Civilians Killed During
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the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat
Source: Iraq Body Count: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/enforced-security June 24, 2007
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Deaths 1,42 1443 1,76 1,58 2,09 2,42 3,12 2,74 2,39 2,92 2,96 2,65 2,79 2,46 2,56 2,41 2,73 2,08 2,53 2,32 1,22 1,18 986 856 767 962 1534
-200
300
800
1,300
1,800
2,300
2,800
3,300
Icasualties: Iraqi ISF & Civilians Killed During
th “S ” d Aft d b M th f C b t
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the “Surge” and Afterwards by Month of Combat
Source: Icasualties, http://icasualties.org/oif/IraqiDeaths.aspx
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Ap
ISF 189 158 191 201 150 132 217 233 150 224 123 123 91 150 215 300 198 197 232 76 96 114 89 72 69 110 161 113
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
ISF
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US & Coalition Casualty Patterns
US Kill d d W d d i C b t
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US Killed and Wounded in Combat
in Various Wars
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical AnalysisDivision, as of April 8, 2008
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1000000
Revolutionary1812 Mexican CivilSpan.-Amer.WWI WWII Korea VietnamLebanon Gulf Somalia Afghan IraqWounded in Action 6188 4504 4152 281,88 1662 204002 671846 102284 303644 467 1937 30004
Killed in Action 4435 2260 1733 140414 2446 53402 291557 36574 58209 256 382 29 294 3310
Non-combat Deaths 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Civil War is Union only; Confederate dead were 74,524 battle and 59,297 other;
wounded unknon.
T t l US Kill d d W d d i I
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Total US Killed and Wounded in Iraq:
2003-May 3, 2008
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical analysisDivision, as of May 5, 2008
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Total Deaths KIA Non-Hostile WIA Returned WIA Not Returned19 Mar-30 Apr 03 139 109 30 116 429
1 May 03-3 May 08 4,076 3,323 753 16,451 12,915
Dod Civilians 11 8 3 0 0
Totals 0 0 0 0 0
US Kill d d W d d i C b t i I b
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US Killed and Wounded in Combat in Iraq by
Cause: March 2003-April 5, 2008
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical AnalysisDivision, as of April 8, 2008
Drowning Burns/SmokeArtllery/Mortar/RocketExplosive DeviceGrenade Gunshot NBC AgentsOther Weaponery RPG Air/Veh. CrashFall, Cut, Other MedicalUnknown
Killed in Action 15 17 190 2076 655 40 110 7 155
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Killed in ActionTotal of 3,267hostile deaths,
738 Non-hostiledeaths, and
29, 676wounded =
33,681 Total
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83Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 23
Monthly US Casualties – Operation Iraqi
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y p q
Freedom: March 2003-April 2008
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
M a r
M a y
J u l
S e p
N o v
J a n
M a r
M a y
J u l
S e p
N o v
J a n
M a r
M a y
J u l
S e p
N o v
J a n
M a r
M a y
J u l
S e p
N o v
J a n
M a r
M a y
J u l
S e p
N o v
J a n
M a r
M a y
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Wounded
Killed in Action
Non-Combat Deaths
Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
Total US and Allied Killed During the
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Total US and Allied Killed During the
“Surge” and Afterwards
Source: Icasualties: Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, accessed,May 4, 2008
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May
Other 2 2 2 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 2
UK 2 6 1 3 3 1 12 3 7 8 4 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0
US 106 70 112 83 81 81 104 126 101 78 84 65 38 37 23 40 29 52 52 19
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140 Total from 3/2003-endto 3/2008=
4066 US, 176 UK, 135
Other,
and 4,377 Total
Monthly US Casualties – “Surge” and
Aft d J 2007 M 2008
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Afterwards: January 2007- May 2008
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar April May2007 2008
Wounded 647 519 618 653 658 753 616 565 361 297 203 212 234 215 328 330 195
Killed in Action 78 70 71 96 120 93 66 55 42 29 28 14 34 25 36 42 15
Non-CombatDeaths
5 11 10 8 6 8 12 29 23 9 8 9 6 4 3 10 4
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000Wounded
Killed in Action
Non-Combat Deaths
Note: Accidents includes “other deaths; Killed in Action includes “died of wounds”. Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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Perceptions of the Surge:
US and Iraqi
I t f T S
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88
70%68%
70%
65% 67%
53%49%
43% 44%42%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Security where
forces sent
Security in
other areas
Political
dialogue
Ability of
Iraqi gov't
Economic
development
August Now
Impact of Troop Surge ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK poll
% saying it's worse
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK P OLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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After the “Surge”
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g
91
Reducing the Uncertainties of a “Long War”
Sunni- Shi’a and Arab-Kurd political
accommodation. Sons of Iraq
Sadr vs. ISCI
Stable autonomy for Kurds.
Open list and air elections at national,
provincial, and local level.Creation of Effective governance and services at
at national, provincial, and local level.
Resolving petroleum and national budget
issues. Move from aid and government subsidies to
sustained development and employment.
Neighbors: Iran, Syria, Turkey, Gulf
US and Iraqi domestic politics
Legislative Progress Towards Political
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Accommodation: 2007-2008
Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Potential Risks and “Storm Clouds”
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Source: General David H. Petraeus, “Iraq Update,” October 7, 2008
Patterns of Violence by ProvincePatterns of Violence by Province
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Patterns of Violence by Province Patterns of Violence by Province
and Transfer of Responsibilityand Transfer of Responsibility• Violence varies sharply by province.
•Violence by province diminished from mid-2007 to April 2008, butMaliki offensive in Basra and fighting with Sadr that began in March2008 has since radically increased the level of violence and areasimpacted.
• Polling data date back to February 2008.
• Reporting on transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces haveconsistently bordered on the absurd. Transfers have been cosmeticand Iraqi forces are not ready for the mission.
• Iraqi government cannot provide effective governance or presencein many areas supposedly under its control.
Average Number of Daily Attacks in Iraq forSelected Provinces, August 2005 through
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95
Early May 2008
Note: Each data point representsthe average number of dailyattacks for the specified period of
time, as reported in DOD’squarterly reports to Congress.
GAO analysis of DOD’s quarterly reports to
Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in
Iraq, January 2006 through February 2008; and
data provided by MNF-I for March 2008 throughMay 2008
Source: GAO. “SECURING,
STABILIZING, AND REBUILDINGIRAQ: Progress Report: Some
Gains Made, Updated StrategyNeeded” June, 2008. Pg. 13
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96
Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” March 2007, Pg. 15
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97
Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June 2007, Pg. 20
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98
QuickTime™ and a
decompressor are needed to see this picture.
Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 21
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99Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 27
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2007
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100Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September June 2007. Pg. 26
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2007
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101Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September 2007. Pg. 23
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: October 2007
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102Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” December 2007. Pg. 19
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: January 2008
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103Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” MJarch, 2008. Pg. 26
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: April 2008
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104Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 30
Iraqi Perceptions of Safety: August 2008
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105Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 29
Saw Local Violence During Past 6 Months:
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Car bombs/suicide attacks 27% Baghdad 61%
Snipers/crossfire 24% Mosul 58%
Sectarian fighting 22% Diyala 58%
Unnecessary violence
by U.S. forces 28% Anbar 54%
by militia 18% Basra 60%
Forced separation 14% Baghdad 28%
Basra 29%
Saw oca V o e ce u g ast 6 o t s:
August 2007-February 2008ABC News/BBC/ARD/NHK Poll
Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
Transferring Provincial Control - I
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107
Petraeus briefing Slides, April 2008
Source: Petraeus Briefing Slides, April 9, 2008
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108Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” June, 2008. Pg. 33
Transferring Provincial Control - II
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109
Source: Department of Defense. “Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg. 32
Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis
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110
Date FOBs # Transferred %Transferred
October 2006 110 52 47.3%
June 2007 122 61 50.0%
September 2007 125 61 48.8%
November 2007 125 61 48.8%
January 2008 125 63 50.4%
Source: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,November 2006, June 2007, September 2007,
December 2007, and March 2008.Note: DoD did not report on FOBs in March 2007.
Transfer of Forward Operating Bases to Iraqis
Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April 30, 2008, p. 105
I i i f US R l i II i i f US R l i I
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Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq Iraqi views of US Role in Iraq
• Trend has been more favorable, since victories in 2007 but…
• Iraqi public opinion data date back to February 2008. Events sincethat time may have increase Sunni tolerance and support of USforces and reduced it for Shi’ites.
• Data on Iraqi perceptions show clear conflict between nationalism,desire for US to leave,and understanding US presence stillnecessary.
• Sharp polarization of Iraqi opinion along sectarian and ethniclines.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Source: ABC/BBC/ARD/NHK POLL - IRAQ FIVE YEARS LATER: WHERE THINGS STAND, Monday, March 17, 2008, and Gary Langer, Director
of Polling ABC News, “War in Iraq: The Public Perspective,” presentation to the CSIS, April 30, 2008.
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Iraqi Force DevelopmentIraqi Force Development -- IIII
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Iraqi Force Development Iraqi Force Development II II
• Data on police progress disguise reality that most police are nowcontrolled at local and governorate level, many “trained and equipped” men
are no longer in service, and embeds have not been provided or effective.
• Corruption and incompetence in MoD and MoI remain major problems.
Prime minister’s office continues to provide ineffective guidance andmanagement.
• The future role of the tribal militias and “Sons of Iraq” remains uncertain in
spite of slow Iraqi government efforts to deal with issue.
•No clear plans for transferring funding responsibilities from US aid to Iraqigovernment budget, but progress is taking place.
2000
Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations
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300
400
500
600
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1 J u n 0 7
2 9 J u n 0 7
2 7 J u l 0 7
2 4 A u g 0 7
2 1 S e p 0 7
1 9 O c t 0 7
1 6 N o v 0 7
1 4 D e c 0 7
1 1 J a n 0 8
8 F e b 0 8
7 M a r 0 8
4 A p r 0 8
2 M a y 0 8
3 0 M a y 0 8
2 7 J u n 0 8
2 5 J u l 0 8
Attack Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations
IEDs and Mines (includes Explosions and Found and Cleared)
Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks
Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks
1 5 A u g 0 8
~592K
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Comparative Cost of Aid to
Afghan and Iraqi Forces
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Source: CBO, 2008
g q($US Current Billions)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Afghan 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 1Iraq 0 0 0 0 5 6 3 6 2
Total 0 0 0 0 5 7 5 13 3
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Afghan
Iraq
Total
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125Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008
How US Iraqi Security ForcesAid Funds Have Been Spent
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126
Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Report, April
30, 2008, p. 51.
Iraqi Security Budget by Year
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Iraqi Security Budget by Year
Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008
Iraqi Security Expenditures vs Budget
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Iraqi Security Expenditures vs. Budget
Source: MNF-I, April 9, 2008
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Number of Iraqi Security Forces:March 2005, January 2007, and April 2008
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130
Notes: a: The term “operational” refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term “trained and equipped” refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from theState Department’s March 9, 2005 and January 31, 2007 Iraq Weekly Status Report and Multinational Security Transition Command Iraqi Security ForcesUpdate, January 26, 2007. b: The term “trained” refers to Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and Counterterrorism Bureau forces. Numbers are from April30, 2008 Iraq Weekly Status Report. c: Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. d: Army numbers include support forces. e:Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. f: The number in the Iraqi police service in 2005 includes highway patrolforces. g: Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. h: Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities ProtectionService personnel working in 27 ministries. i: Numbers reflect total Iraqi security forces trained to date, some of which are no longer assigned due tocasualties, absence without leave, and normal separation.
Source: GAO. “SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed” June, 2008.Pg. 24
Total Size of Iraqi Security Forces
(Number of Personnel) Aug 07-Jul 08
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0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL
Border Enforcement
National Police
Iraqi Police Services
Special Operations
Navy
Air Force
Support Forces
Army
Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008
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Growth of Iraqi Security Forces
(Assigned Personnel) August 2007-July 31, 2008
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0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
Aug-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08
Border Enforcement
National Police
Iraqi Police Service s
Special Operations
Navy
Air Force
Support Forces
Army
Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008
Projected Growth of Iraqi Forces
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135Source: MNSTC-I, September 2008
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Iraqi Ground
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137
a. Data is derived from the MoD HumanResource Information ManagementSystem (HRIMS), whichtracks MoD manpower and payroll data.
b. The table represents TOTALFIELDED GROUND FORCES (154,598 – ALMOST ALL ASSIGNED TOIGFC) and what is PLANNED or ingeneration, etc., with regard to ground
forces (9,430).
Source: Department of Defense.“Measuring Security and Stability
in Iraq.” September, 2008. Pg.
47
Iraqi GroundForces
PersonnelBy Division:
July2008
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142Source: MNF-I April 9, 2008
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